fills overnight with wine three empty λέβητες that had been carefully closed and sealed. Here the only palaeographic difference is O>E, with the wrong division of words. Whether this is the work of Wilamowitz' Peripatetic of the first or second generation, may remain a moot point, but I don't think that the language of the hymn as restored warrants a late date.

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ARISTOTLE'S COMMENTS ON THE PARMENIDEAN ONE

While criticising the aberrations of the Eleatics Aristotle writes (Phys. 186a 16–18): ἐπείτα διὰ τί άκινητον, εἰ ἐν; ὄσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ μέρος ἐν δὲ—τὸ δὲ ὑδάη—κινεῖται ἐν ἀκανθῇ, διὰ τί οὗ καὶ πᾶν; Cornford correctly notes that Aristotle must here be attacking the limited One of Parmenides rather than the unlimited One of Melissus. Parmenides had denied motion to his sphere because of its internal homogeneity, but as Aristotle observes, this does not mean that the sphere as a whole is incapable of motion, even if, as Parmenides maintained, there is nothing outside it. Like an imaginary homogeneous globe of water (say in a goldfish bowl) the sphere of the all is perfectly capable of rotating within its own bounds. The clear implication of this criticism is that Aristotle regarded the Parmenidean sphere of the One as something physical and extended, for only such an entity is capable of rotation.

In the Metaphysics Aristotle also mentions the Eleatics who believed that τὸ πᾶν was ἐν. Here (Metaph. 986b 18–21) he writes Παρμενίδης μὲν γὰρ ἐστιν τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐν δὲ ἀπεσταίη, Μέλισσος δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑλὴν (διὸ καὶ ὁ μὲν πεπερασμένον, ὁ δὲ ἀπειρὸν φησίν εἶναι αὐτὸ). The obvious interpretation appears to be the following. Aristotle is here regarding Parmenides as using ἐν in the third of three senses he lays down in the Physics. The three senses are as follows: one as continuous; one as indivisible; one as having the same definition. Parmenides, then, is supposed to have argued that since objects x, y, z can each be defined as ὡς, they are therefore one in definition (κατὰ τὸν λόγον). In fact Aristotle and Eudemus do categorically credit Parmenides with such reasoning. However, as we have just seen, Aristotle in another context makes it clear that he accepted

2. Phys. 185b 7ff. Aristotle (line 19) here uses τὸ λόγον instead of κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
the clear implication of Parmenides’ own words that τὸ ἐν was a physical entity. In this case why should Aristotle here seem so pointedly to contrast the nature of Parmenides’ One with the material One he ascribes to Melissus? Knowing that Parmenides’ One was material also, Aristotle ought to have pointed out that Parmenides committed the added blunder of supposing that because each of the things in the world have a common definition they are also materially alike and collectively make up a homogeneous physical continuum (Anaximander’s spherical universe with its multiplicity blotted out). The difficulty of the passage becomes even more acute when we recall that in fact Melissus denied the corporeality of his One⁵ (in deference to Zeno’s critique of the μόρια of the so-called ones of the pluralists), and accordingly the description of his entity as οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὑλήν seems hardly appropriate.

Concentrating on the second part of the tangle first, it is to be noted that although Melissus denied σῶμα and πάχος to his One, he obviously believed that it was spatially extended.⁶ However, it could not be τὸ κενόν which for him was τὸ μὴ ὅν,⁷ and therefore what was it? Aristotle might understandably be puzzled and have concluded that like Anaxagoras in Aristotle’s view,⁸ Melissus must have misunderstood his own words. Obviously the Melissean One had some kind of physical existence and therefore it was, for Aristotle, ὑλή. But why should Aristotle fail fully to expound Parmenides’ fallacious reasoning and distinctly imply that Parmenides’ One was not comparable, whereas by the evidence of the Physics passage it was?

Perhaps Aristotle was merely seduced into employing a misleading antithesis, but possibly there was a real consideration which made him hesitate to put Melissus’ and Parmenides’ physically extended One on the same level.

On more than one occasion, but most clearly in Fragment 3, Parmenides appears to equate εἶναι and ψεῖν. Fragment 3 reads τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ψεῖν ἐστὶν τὲ καὶ εἶναι, and as Phillips⁹ observes, if for ψεῖν and εἶναι we were to substitute some less controversial pair of infinitives, we should not hesitate to understand the expression in the most obvious and simplest way. Clement of Alexandria¹⁰ did, and so did Plotinus,¹¹ and their view is a strong counter-

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6. This is made evident by Fragment 3. Melissus’ One κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος ἄπαρον ἄει χρῆ εἶναι.

7. Melissus Fragment 7. 7.


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weight to the contorted alternative renderings produced by modern scholars. Is it so impossible to credit Parmenides with the notion that the object’s activity of existing, its ‘isness’, is identical with the act of cognising in which it is recognised? On the most natural interpretation, line 34 of Fragment 8 certainly seems to state this. If so, for Parmenides there are not two worlds, one objective, one subjective, but one universe alone. Mortals err in distinguishing what they take to be their subjective awareness from the existence of that of which they are aware. Due to the unrecognised ambiguity of τὸ θανάτος Parmenides, as said above, regarded this one world not as a diversity, but as a homogeneous continuum.

Even if Aristotle could not fully fathom or comprehend the relationship between χωρίς and καθαρός he was certainly capable of realising that Parmenides’ thought exhibited far more profundity than that of Melissus whose Eleaticism was a crude materialistic progeny of Ionian monism tempered with Eleatic logic. Although Aristotle saw that the end product of Parmenides’ elimination of diversity in the face of the common ‘isness’ of all that his predecessors had termed τὸ ὑπήργειον, was a One that was extended and physical, just like that of Melissus, he may simply not have felt it just to place the two systems on exactly the same level.

Alternatively, it may be that, although when writing the Physics passage he was more or less confident about the physical existence of Parmenides’ One, Aristotle, while working on the Metaphysics, felt more dubious. In view of the apparent equation of χωρίς and καθαρός and despite Fragment 8, lines 42–9, he may have begun to have doubts as to whether Parmenides’ One was a material entity. Possibly the parenthesis διὸ κατ’ ὅ μὲν πεπερασμένον, δ’ ἄπειρον φησίν εἶναι αὐτό is added by way of tentative justification of such an interpretation.

Aristotle, probably rightly, gives (at de gen. et corr. 325a 15–16) the following reason for Melissus’ abandoning of the πέρατα which had circumscribed the Parmenidean One: τὸ γὰρ πέρας περατῶν ἀν πρὸς τὸ κενόν. Melissus, feeling that beyond a limited physical One there would have to be the dreaded non-existent void, dispensed with πέρατα. In the Metaphysics context, then, Aristotle may intend the following insinuation. Neither Parmenides nor Melissus were historically in a position to appreciate objections to an extra-cosmic void based by an Aristotle on his own presuppositions. Both at their time ought to have felt similar difficulties about postulating a limited, material One. Melissus did feel the difficulty and reacted accordingly. Parmenides seems to have felt no difficulty about

12. τὰς ὀνείρες. I would render, “The same is cognising and that on account of which there is cognising (i.e. the existence of the object of cognition)”.
14. See Anaximander Fragment 1.
15. See, for example, de Caelo 279a 11 ff.
the circumscription of his One. Since Parmenides was a far superior thinker to Melissus, the Parmenidean One could hardly have been material.

In actual fact it probably did not occur to Parmenides that his limited material One implied an extra-cosmic μὴ δό, since he appears to concentrate on his One's περὶ πάς rather as a mark of its perfection than as its physical boundary. One feels that Aristotle ought to have appreciated this but he is not above choosing his interpretations according to context.

University of Tasmania. P. J. BICKNELL

ANIMADVERSIONES AD EPIGRAMMATA BOBIENSIA

W. Speyer postquam iam ante de collectione epigrammatum e codice Bobiensi descripta copiose egit, anno 1963 in Bibl. Teubneriana editionem curavit omnes fere commentationes post annum 1955 publicatas iuste respicientem.

Editoris coniecturam 42, 2 sors pro fors necessariam habere nunc quidem dubito; pulchrevero 62, 4 pro cervos corvos (κόρακας) conieicit; recte 18, 2 viridum lectionem traditam retinet; iure 63, 1 Theombrotus A. Campana et W. Speyer tuentur, errorem cum praebant eundem Cic. Tusc. 1, 84; Scaur. 4; Aug. civ. 1, 22.

De iis vero, quae viri docti disseruerunt, non semper idem mihi videtur, quod editori. Meo judicio recte defenderunt codicis lectionem 7, 2 candidulus N. Terzaghi, 8b, 9 Quirina F. Munari et Sc. Mariotti, 16, 5 brutus H. Dahlmann, 31 inscr. In puerum Stellam F. Munari (masc. gen. sunt et οὐχαυτόν et extinctus), 63, 4 sed F. Munari (AP 7, 471, 3 ἀλλάκα).

Coniecturas eas probo, quas proposuerunt F. Munari 11, 1 munc (AP 9, 724, 1 ἦ in sententia, quam non interrogativam esse iudico), W. S. Barrett 12, 1 quidve remugis ? (coniecturae palmari viros doctos non ad unum omnes adsentiri satis miror: vertit poeta verba τίπετε δε μακ;), H. Avantius 14, 2 visne, ut (ad AP 16, 174, 2 munc redigi non potest), Sc. Mariotti 22, 1 ductas (amicae cum non gratieis, si audis Plaut. Poen. 868, ducari solegant, ironice poeta verbum adhibet: Zoilo uxor magno constabit), Sc. Mariotti 26, 25 nec numquam est (AP 9, 360, 9/10 οὐκ ... / μηδέποτε), Sc. Mariotti 29, 3 vael! (respondent rhythmı 29, 1 ah dolor : in me, 29, 3 vael metus est par; respondent exclamaciones 29, 1 ah, 29, 3 vael!), F. Munari 32 inscr. Item

16. See Parmenides Fragment 8, lines 30-33.

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