Perhaps the thorniest problem of the *de bello Hispaniensi* is its author (Suet. *Jul.* 56). Beyond the fact that he was an eyewitness¹ (a soldier?)² little can be said about his identity. Probably he was a cavalry officer. This is indicated in that the writer of the worst piece of Latin literature was painstakingly aware of cavalry movements and engagements to the point of absurdity. Of course previous authors of The Caesarian tradition, in the true Roman military spirit, tended to ignore the cavalry. The most striking difference between the *de bello Hispaniensi* and the Gallic and Civil Wars and the *de bello Alexandrino* is its author's keen attention to the cavalry.³

He was certainly an eye-witness to the operations in Spain. Topography is described in detail (7—the area around the River Salsum; 29—the plain of Munda). An insignificant cavalry action is reported to have taken place ‘in view of both camps’ (14). Numbers of casualties are exact even when trivial (15, 24). On two occasions the author gives information about the weather, a subject of interest only to an observer (27—the appearance of the moon; 29—it was a calm, sunny, day).

Moreover, the writer of the *Bellum Hispaniense* had an unusual interest in the cavalry. The most obvious examples relate to his continued reporting of cavalry skirmishes even when of ridiculously minor importance. Along with incidental details occurring in the region near Ucubi (e.g. the execution of a slave who murdered his master or the capture of enemy scouts who provided no information) he relates a fringe encounter of horsemen and light-armed (20). The author talks of the cavalry being attacked while gathering wood (27), capturing fifty of the enemy who were bringing supplies to Pompey's camp (11), and capturing two (!) enemy soldiers who were of no significance, gave no information, and were immediately executed (12). On more than one occasion the writer relates encounters of the cavalry being used on outpost duty—encounters which did not affect the course of operations: an attack by superior numbers which drove Caesar's cavalry off (13) or crushed them (14); a fort occupied by the cavalry was attacked by forces of infantry and cavalry who defeated Caesar's men (6). Another unimportant conflict involved Caesar's cavalry winning the day by dismounting and fighting light-armed enemy on foot

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1. O. Klotz, *Kommentar zum Bellum Hispaniense* (Leipzig, 1927), p. 2 and 'Julius,' *RE* x¹, 274.
3. The *de bello Africano* does not fit this pattern because, since the Pompeians had a tremendous advantage in cavalry, very much of the account deals with enemy horsemen and African method of cavalry fighting.
(15). In one incident enemy cavalry attacked a Caesarian watering-party with eight of the enemy being captured (21).

The author reflects an interest in cavalry by further remarks uncharacteristic of a Roman infantryman. When reporting losses at Munda he fixes the number at about a thousand men and follows with the novel phrase 'partly cavalry, partly infantry'—it may be significant that the cavalry is mentioned first (31). He tells of the arrival of a group of cavalry from Italy under a certain Arguetius and in the same breath corrects an irrelevant omission by which he had forgotten to mention the previous arrival of cavalry under a subordinate, Asprenas (10). He deems the desertion of indistinguished cavalry and light-armed to Caesar's camp important enough to record (21). When a standard bearer of the First Legion came over to the Caesarians he related the loss of thirty-five men 'on the day when the cavalry action was fought' (18). There is no indication of which action, the knowledge being assumed by the author, despite constant reference to minor cavalry engagements. In describing the battle scene at Munda the writer indicates that the terrain was a 'tempting situation for cavalry' (29), not the foremost tactical item for the traditional Roman campaigner.

The author of the Spanish War is particularly poor when describing the action at Munda, relating only two aspects: the successful fighting of the crack Tenth Legion and the supporting action of the cavalry (31). Other remarks indicate the author's concern with horsemen. In an unnecessary explanation he makes the obvious point that generally a cavalryman is no match for an infantryman if he dismounts, a fact known to anyone familiar with the military, but mentioned here because of their subsequent successful action (15). When reporting the desertion of a certain A. Valgius, his phrasing is that he 'mounted his horse and deserted' (13). The writer talks of Roman knights deserting to Caesar 'with their horses practically covered in silver,' an expression meaning that they brought their valuables with them (26). Finally, on three occasions, he relates cavalry losses and captures of incredibly small numbers: killed were three (13) and five (15); when an attack was made on a Caesarian watering party by forty enemy cavalry, eight were taken prisoner (21).

This unusual attention to the cavalry in the de bello Hispaniensi stands in marked contrast to the Gallic and Civil wars and the Alexandrian War in which there is no incidental information about the cavalry and in which even important material is sometimes omitted.

Caesar, although generally providing a full report, in more than one instance neglects the cavalry. In the initial encounter with the Helvetians nothing is said of where the cavalry was or what it was doing (BG I, 12). During the ensuing major battle the Roman cavalry seem to disappear after their initial role in slowing the enemy onslaught (BG I, 24 ff.). When preparing for the campaign against

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4. Compare the following casualty reports in which the cavalry is ignored: BG VII, 51 and BC III, 70, 99.
Ariovistus, Caesar explained the German method of cavalry fighting, mixed infantry and cavalry, but when he brought the Suebi to battle he found it unnecessary to provide information about the cavalry on either side (BG I, 52). Caesar marched toward the Belgic frontier with two legions. The cavalry is not referred to although he must have recruited horsemen in Gaul along the way as was his practice (BG II, 2).

Occasionally when relating various manoeuvres, Caesar tells how many infantry were with him, but not cavalry. Against the Helvetians he left camp with three legions (BG I, 12) and although cavalry were with him (I, 15) they are omitted from the record. He made a surprise descent on the Nervii with four legions and an unknown number of cavalry (BG VI, 3). In the campaign against Ambiorix he marched toward the land of the Menapii with five legions (BG VI, 5) and later sent three legions with Labienus, three were with Gaius Trebonius, and took three himself to march directly against Ambiorix (VI, 33). In these instances the cavalry is not mentioned. While still warring against Ambiorix Caesar had difficulty with the Nervii, campaigning with two legions and, again, an unknown number of cavalry (V, 48) although he had Gallic horsemen with him since one of them was to deliver a note to Cicero since there were 'minor' cavalry skirmishes (V, 50), and since Caesar used his cavalry to advantage (V, 51).

In two instances when Caesar discusses the disposition of his troops he omits mention of the cavalry: upon returning from Britain in 54 he divided his troops because of a grain shortage, giving specific information about the infantry (BG V, 24) but not the cavalry although they were there and fighting (V, 26); in the civil war when Caesar decided not to follow Pompey to Greece he dispatched troops to Sicily and Sardinia. Detail on the infantry is provided but not the cavalry (BC I, 30).

On other occasions Caesar gives definite numbers of infantry but not cavalry. When requisitioning troops from the Aedui he demanded 10,000 infantry and 'all the cavalry' (BG VII, 34). He collected his troops at Brindisi to follow Pompey—he had twelve legions and ‘all the cavalry’ (BC III, 2).

Finally, in Caesar's accounts of the campaigns of Dyrrachium and Pharsalus he is neglectful of the cavalry. In his report of Pompey's breakthrough at Dyrrachium Caesar does not tell about either his own or Pompey's cavalry dispositions at the critical moment although he later indicates that not only were they present but played a prominent role in the fighting (BC III, 62 ff.). Caesar discusses his lines at Pharsalus but does not mention the cavalry (BC III, 89) although they had previously been praised for their effectiveness (III, 84) and, of course, were on his right wing.

This same typically Roman neglect of the cavalry is seen in the de bello Alexandrinio. When the operations were finished at Alexandria Caesar set out

5. Parvulis equestribus proelis—in the Bellum Hispansiense insignificant cavalry action is never referred to as 'minor'.

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for Syria with the sixth legion—his cavalry is not referred to (33). In describing the battle of Domitius against Pharnaces, the author neglects to mention the disposition of the Roman cavalry (38–9). There is no report of the cavalry action in the battle of Zela (75 ff.). The cavalry is neglected in the important evaluation of the troops by Caesar in Pontus (69).

The pattern, sometimes subtle, is unmistakable. Caesar and the subsequent authors of the civil wars, displaying traditional Roman neglect of the cavalry, at times overlook this arm in their reports of military actions. The cavalry was regarded as an unfortunate necessity generally posing more problems than the more disciplined, polished, and effectively trained legionary soldiers. The author of the de bello Hispaniensi reverses this pattern and provides detailed information about the cavalry and, more than this, is proud of its effectiveness in Spain. For this reason it seems logical to suggest that the author of the Spanish War was connected with the cavalry in a leadership capacity such as praefectus equitum?

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7. B. Hisp. 7, 15.
8. It is well-known (Holmes, Rom. Rep., p. 298) that the author of the Spanish War had an abysmal lack of knowledge about important aspects of the campaign (e.g. the purpose of certain operations). As praefectus equitum he would not have been an important member of Caesar's staff.

THE FUROR AND VIOLENTIA OF AENEAS

In this article I will discuss three episodes in lines 517 to 560 of book 10 of the Aeneid in order to support the view that the Aeneid is not an unqualified glorification of Aeneas and Rome, but is rather a painfully ambiguous epic in which, to quote R. A. Brooks, 'Aeneas never fully possessed either the light or the kingdom that is ordained for him.'

Furor and violentia are often said to be characteristic of Aeneas' opponents, especially Dido and Turnus, but no character in the Aeneid displays as much furor and violentia as Aeneas himself when he avenges Pallas' death in Aeneid 10, 513–604. His three most brutal acts are modelled on

3. Indeed, when Vergil sums up this passage in X. 604, he states that Aeneas was 'furens':
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