
This book on the Pentecontaetia is arguably one of the most important works on this period to have been published since the early seventies. The half century of Greek history known as the Pentecontaetia is an era for which sources are few and most of the interpretation is controversial. The book comprises six essays: (1) The Peace of Callias, (2) Toward a Chronology of the Pentecontaetia, (3) Plataea between Athens and Sparta: In Search of Lost History, (4) Thucydides and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War: A Historian’s Brief, (5) Athens, the Locrians, and Naupactus, (6) Thucydides and the Arché of Philip.

This is a truly noteworthy publication. The views expressed have been developed and enriched over a period by intercontinental dialogue and consultation — by large and helpful audiences and numerous individuals, from Princeton to Perth, and from Marburg to Melbourne (Badian 199 n. 71) — generously acknowledged. It is a repository of papers read to the Oxford Philological Society and to the Institute of Classical Studies in London, followed by vigorous discussion, and eventually drafted in St. John’s College at Oxford.

An outline of Professor Badian’s book, presented chapter by chapter, must needs fall short of adequately reflecting its comprehensiveness, the argumentation in the text and the exhaustive documentation in the notes. Personal views on principal problems, ‘both methodological and detailed problems concerning particular incidents’ (Badian 96) are accommodated by page references all along to the text and notes.

**Chapter 1: The Peace of Callias**

The subject is proclaimed as an important historical problem: the question of how — in what circumstances and in what way — the war begun by Darius and Xerxes came to be settled, and the relationship between the two great powers in the Aegean area that developed out of the settlement — the role it played in Athenian politics in the middle of the fifth century, the
incompatible nature of the political systems of the two contracting powers, and the history of Athenian and Persian diplomacy.

The key event in this chapter is the battle of the Eurymedon, followed by the peace negotiated by Xerxes straight after the Eurymedon encounter which took place in the late summer of 466 (Badian 6 and 10) and shortly before his death in August 465 (Badian 4, and p. 188 n. 7 with reference to Parker and Dubberstein, Babylonian Chronology). The Athenian embassy led by Callias to the court of Artaxerxes 'on other business' early in his reign was relevant to the peace named after Callias (Badian 3 and 11).

This was the first Argive embassy (cf p.68 'Argive envoys') to Artaxerxes early in his reign to assure itself of the continuation of the peace made by Xerxes, that is, whether he regarded Argos as a friend, as his father Xerxes had done (Hdt. 7.151).

Meister does not dispute the reality and significance of the Eurymedon event and the terms of the peace settlement by Xerxes, but he disclaims its relevance for the Peace of Callias, the historicity of which he does not accept: '... dass der Eurymedonansatz wenigstens einen sinnvollen historischen Hintergrund für den als so ruhmvolle bezeichneten Frieden abgab ... einen Höhepunkt im Kampf gegen die Perser ... Aus diesem Grunde lag es nahe, den aus propagandistischen Gründen erfundenen Frieden ... in die Zeit nach der Eurymedonschlacht zu verlegen' (Meister, Palingenesia 18, p 43). Badian's reply to Meister, in defence of the authenticity of the Peace of Callias, was communicated to him, to the effect that the peace was concluded after the Battle of the Eurymedon, and was renewed in the Periclean period in 449/48 (Palingenesia xviii p. 5). He subsequently motivated this opinion by demonstrating 'the inadequacy of a view that neatly contrasts peace and war' (Badian 33, and p. 187 n. 5, quoting Hans Schäfer on the Peace that 'today, quite rightly, no one ... doubts its authenticity').

In the dearth of documents and texts the study of Xerxes' settlement after Eurymedon is relevant and imperative. Guided by Thucydides Book 8 Badian discussed details (p. 5ff.), matters such as territorial terms, boundaries, a non-aggression clause, the so-called Frhtgrenze, tribute, the competence of satraps, and finally the Achaemenid Kingship — the rights of the King, and the nature of the King's participation in Greek affairs: the King's edict setting out what he thought just, is irrevocable '... the biblical "law of the Medes and Persians" as referred to in the books of Esther and Daniel' (Badian 55). This determined the nature of the dealings of the Achaemenid court with the Greeks throughout the period of the Pentecontaetia — in the last resort the 'only relevant evidence we have' for an understanding of the Peace of Callias (Badian 55, and p. 199 n. 68; his discussion in Georgica: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 58).
A document, the relevance of which could be considered for the study of the Peace of Callias and its authenticity, is the letter of Artaxerxes to the high priest Ezra of Jerusalem (Ezra 7.11–26). It belongs conceivably among the tralatician Achaemenid texts referred to by Badian (p. 42: '... no doubt mere accident that we have not recovered a copy set up by Artaxerxes I'). Its context is the concern and the policy of the Achaemenid court to redress the wrongs suffered by the Jews under the captivity in Babylon inflicted by Nebuchadnezzar. Ezra, Nehemiah and Esther are the post-captivity books in the Old Testament historical record (Scofield's text of the Bible, the authorized version with commentary, may be helpful). Artaxerxes was the third in the series of rulers — Cyrus, Darius, Artaxerxes — concerned in a traditional Achaemenid policy on behalf of the Jews (Ezra 6.14). The omission of Xerxes from this series invites speculation, possibly a change of policy, or Xerxes' involvement in the peace-settlement after Eurymedon (Bengtson, The Greeks and Persians p. 359ff., chapter by Maurice Meuleu). On this issue Badian's comment is apposite: the new treaty was politically embarrassing, detrimental to the image of a power supposedly 'the liberator of the Hellenes' (Badian 43, with discussion).

The letter, doubtless an edict, reflects Artaxerxes' ethics and outlook — and, in passing, an aspect of the contemporary Achaemenid court structure: '... the realm of the King and his sons' (Ezra 7.23; Badian 46, a reference to 'the King and his sons'). The relevance of the letter for the study of the Peace of Callias is the synchronism effected with the reign of Artaxerxes (Ezra 7.7, the seventh year of his reign), and the importance it attaches to the Eurymedon settlement as a key event in the Pentekontaetia. This aspect accounts for the pertinacity with which the concept of 'renewal' was pursued in various situations, for instance the Thirty Years' Peace (Badian 11), throughout the reign of Artaxerxes until as late as the Archidamian war, of which the Peace of Epilycus, concluded after Artaxerxes' demise, by Darius II, was a continuation and sequel.

The theme of Chapter 1 has largely to do with the quest for evidence to substantiate the historicity and identity of the Peace of Callias (cf. Badian 39: 'What was the Peace of Callias?', and Badian 41: 'the most difficult question of all: whatever the text said ... and what actions ... led to its setting up?'). The most relevant evidence in the last resort derives from the precedence and models provided by the dealings of the King with the Greeks over an extended period (Badian 46: the formula 'worked out long ago', p. 49, the renewal of a peace 'negotiated at an earlier time') — being sources classifiable under 'the only relevant evidence we have' (Badian 55).

Chapter 2: Toward a Chronology of the Pentekontaetia down to the Renewal of the Peace of Callias

A fully detailed chronology of the Pentekontaetia cannot be established
Thucydides wrote his Pentecontaetia as a sketch, an insertion within his first book near the end of his life (Badian 203 n. 2, Eduard Meyer 'über jeden Zweifel') and precise dates were no longer easily obtainable; no precise statements on lapse of time occur until Thuc. 101.3 (Badian 74). Unusually glorious events are remembered, noticeably after the middle fifties. It is not precision of dates but sequence that concerned Thucydides most (Badian 75). His purposes and methods are not those of a modern historian, and they are probably more remote from ours than those of Herodotus.

Thucydides' criticism of Hellanicus' inaccuracy had to do with the sequence of events (Thuc. 1.97.2, Badian 76) — an understandable shortcoming since Hellanicus' *Atthis* was only a small part of his work, and the Pentecontaetia only a small part of his *Atthis* (Badian 76). There were also problems of overlapping: sieges extended over a period, whereas a battle such as the Eurymedon was a single event in the course of an extended period (Badian 77). The fifth century history is garbled by oral tradition (Badian 78, Meyer *Forschungen* II 132 '... wie ganzlich unfähig ... auch nur die Hauptpunkte einer historischen Entwicklung festzuhalten*'). Thucydides never considered documents as a source for historical information. Consider also problems of composition and of artistic presentation (Badian 78, and p. 204 n. 12). Thucydides is a difficult author, and very little of the basic grammatical and stylistic work has yet been done on him (Badian 80, and p. 205 n. 15, comparing the 'erzählenden Zeitformen' undertaken by Hultsch on Polybius).

Chronological issues include the Drabescus episode (Badian 82, and p. 205 n. 19); the activities of the Spartan Pausanias (Badian 86ff. and 206 n. 24); the Spartan earthquake and the helot revolt, a case where Thucydides' 'idosyncratic way of telling his story' has been misunderstood' (Badian 89f.); the Ithome incident, extensively discussed (Badian 93ff.: the dismissal of the Athenian troops allegedly as revolutionaries is 'pure fiction', Badian 95 and p. 227 n. 24, Beloch '... sehr zweifelhaft, ob überhaupt an der ganzen Sache etwas Wahres ist').

Chapter 3: Plataea between Athens and Sparta: In Search of Lost History

This chapter concerns the debate between Archidamus and the Plataeans on the fate of Plataea in the Peloponnesian War. The Plataeans appeal to Archidamus, the Spartan invader of Plataean territory, to respect Pausanias' restoration of their territory (*Thuc. 2.71–2*). They remind Archidamnus of the oaths taken along with the other allies who fought at the battle of Plataea. Archidamus replied that the oaths obligated all the allies to co-operate in the joint liberation struggle from Athens (Badian 111),
but he now made an *ex gratia* offer to the Plataeans to let them proclaim themselves an open and neutral city, a concession known to Archidamus to be futile since the women and children of Plataea had been evacuated to Athens and were now hostages in Athenian hands — ‘self-delusion tinged with hypocrisy’, a feat of generosity unquestioningly accepted by modern scholars (Badian 113, 217 n. 9).

The underlying issue is the status of Plataea at the time when Pausanias guaranteed its autonomy along with that of the other allies. It had implications for the Plataeans very different from what it had for the other allies. Herodotus dates the guarantee of Plataea’s autonomy to 509/508 BC (Hdt. 6.108; cf. Grote IV 94 who advocated 509 BC). Thucydides supplies an earlier date in 519 BC (Thuc. 3.68.5), ‘the ninety-third year’ of Plataea’s alliance with Athens. Uncertainty still lingers. In Herodotus’ view the status of Plataea was technically one of ‘slavery’; Thucydides describes it as an ‘alliance’, *ζυμμυρχία* (Badian 116–117). Herodotus’ view is confirmed by the fact that the Plataean dead were buried together with the Athenian slaves after the battle of Marathon in the same mound still seen by Pausanias (1.32.3). This implied ‘a public statement regarding the status of Plataea’, a status which the Plataeans seemingly accepted without demur (Badian 118). Pausanias stresses that Plataea opted for Athenian citizenship *ὑπὲρ τῆς Ὀθησίων* (‘because of hatred for Thebes’) (Paus. 1.32.8). The Plataeans recognized that Athens was their only guarantee against their hated neighbour (Badian 120). The clash of interest between the two great powers, Athens and Sparta, was clear. Thucydides does not seem to have been aware of this outright (Badian 121 and 123, keeping in mind that Thucydides did not work from full records of the past, but in the light of the subsequent trend of Thucydides’ narrative to dwell on Spartan intrigues and plots against Athens). Badian’s exposition constitutes an essential preamble to the crucial study of Thucydides in the following Chapter 4 (but cf. Badian 223 n. 34, with reference to Vol. IV on the new edition of the *CAH*: it is fair to say that the subject of this essay is still largely “lost history”).

Chapter 4: Thucydides and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War: A Historian’s Brief

Badian states his case in agreement with scholars such as Eduard Meyer and Eduard Schwartz that the first book of Thucydides was written after the end of the Peloponnesian War. The tradition of Thucydides as an objective and scientific historian was taken over from German scholarship. ‘Modernist’ interpretations of Thucydides still cling to this perspective (Badian 224 n. 8, Gomme’s introduction to the first volume of the *HCT*). Since Thucydides wrote his book over a long period of time, allowance must be made for changes of mind (Badian 128, incidentally the
'staple of Thucydidean strata research', Badian 224 n. 9, with reference to Andrewes and Dover, *HCT V*, the 1981 edition. This accounts for the apologetic character of the thesis of Thuc. Book I recognized by Schwartz seventy-five years ago. It is the purpose of Badian's investigation to follow up Schwartz' insight, neglected in 'modernist' interpretation, to point out that Thucydides' main aim was to show that Sparta started the war in a spirit of ruthless *Realpolitik* to undermine Athenian power. Two motifs introduce Badian's discussion of Thucydides' disinformation on the causes of the Peloponnesian War: (1) Sparta's ineffective *prostasia* over her allies, and (2) the Spartan eagerness for war (Thuc. 1.28.1 and 1.33.3, Badian 129). Thucydides' disinformation is patent in his suppression of Sparta's constitutional position in her leadership of the Peloponnesian League — of the decisive role of Corinth within the structure of the league (Hdt. 5.74–75, and 92.1, the address of Sosicles the Corinthian).

The foundation myth of the Athenian Empire, again, is the voluntary acquiescence of Sparta in the *prostasia* of Athens over the Ionians (Badian 130).

Aspects pertaining to Thucydides' wilful disinformation on the causes of the Peloponnesian War include the following:

1. The Thirty Years' Peace was basic to the *aitiai* presented by Thucydides, yet he refrained from an exposition of its relevant terms, disclosing only the territorial clause (Thuc. 1.115.1). An autonomy clause existed which allowed cities not listed in the treaty to join either alliance (Thuc. 1.35.1), and this in turn enabled the two major powers, the Peloponnesian League and Athens respectively, to guarantee each other's hegemony. This was the main purpose of the peace (Badian 137).

2. The arbitration clause is first heard of when Athenian envoys were present at Lacedaemon 'on other business' (Thuc. 1.71.1), committing Athens to the acceptance of arbitration. It depicts Sparta as unaware of this clause (Badian 142). Thucydides' art is here at its most purposeful, calculated to defame Archidamus, a man of prudent moderation, as a pure *Realpolitiker* at his first appearance (Badian 143).

3. Pericles was responsible for Megara's boycott legislation as is revealed in the evidence of Aristophanes' *Acharnians*. Thucydides lets Pericles deny this in Pericles' overpowering final speech, which practically forced the reader to accept Pericles' version (Badian 145).

4. In the votes for war and in the negotiations preceding its outbreak Thucydides' main concern was to demonstrate Spartan duplicity and Athenian innocence. The formulation of the motion put to the Spartan Assembly by Archidamus was a statement of record to the effect that the Assembly considered the treaty to have been broken by the Athenians and that the Athenians were guilty. It was not a declaration of war, and it left the possibility of negotiations open. The short belligerent speech of Sthenelaidas
is fictitious and Thucydides' own invention (Badian 146–7, notably p. 148, and p. 231 n. 46 on the view of Kagan).

5. No Athenian ambassadors were present at the congress of the Spartan allies and the allied congress followed the same lines as the Spartan assembly. Spartan policy was consistently aimed at preserving peace (Badian 149–150).

6. Thucydides informs us that the person of Pericles stood in the way of avoiding war (Thuc. 1.127.3); Thucydides stresses this — an admission which contradicts the thesis of Thucydides' aitiai that it was Sparta which had long been plotting against Athens. The issue is that Pericles' prevention of concessions to Sparta was in fact widely known. To explain this contradiction Thucydides introduces the motif of Spartan bradytēs which prevented Sparta from making a decisive effort earlier on. This motif supports Thucydides' presentation of his case, as Badian not inappropriately comments, 'with the skill of an advocate claiming a passion for objectivity' (Badian 161–2).

Chapter 5: Athens, the Locrians, and Naupactus

When Athens settled the Messenians at Naupactus, the Athenians (thus Thucydides is said to tell us) (Thuc. 1.103.3) had νεώστη, i.e. 'only just' captured the city from the Locrians. This has caused difficulties for upholders of the view that Thucydides records events in strict chronological sequence (Badian 163). Curtius (Hermes 1876) suggested that the Ozolian Locrians had seized Naupactus, suggesting occupation in war, εχόντων implying 'occupation'. Eduard Meyer pointed to the hostages taken from the Opuntian Locrians after Oenophyta (Thuc. 1.108.3, Badian 164 and p. 236 n. 4). Oldfather (RE 13 1 1926), following Meyer, provides a full discussion of the Locrian occupation of Naupactus, concluding that the Athenian action was 'eine schroffe Verletzung des Völkerrechts' (Badian 164–165). Gomme (Comm. 1.304), upholding the principle of strict chronological order for the Pentecontaetia, has difficulty in fitting in the date of the Athenian seizure of Naupactus but follows Curtius' implications of recent possession, νεώστη. Badian (165) supports Curtius (1876): the verb εχόντων is not in-frequently combined with βη, maintaining that Thucydides implies that the Locrian occupation was recent (Badian 165). The issue is: can Thucydides be proved to be saying that the Athenians had taken Naupactus from the Ozolian Locrians 'who had recently seized Naupactus' (Thuc. 1.103.3)? Badian's answer is 'yes', on the basis of the position of the adverb νεώστη following after the verb (Badian 167). Consider the larger context of Thucydides' narrative on the Athenian settlement of Messenians at Naupactus, along with Oldfather's reference to the 'Verletzung des Völkerrechts' which the settlement entails. The situation can be construed as follows: hostages had been taken from the Opuntian Locrians (Thuc. 1.108.3), a measure
which was intended to operate ‘for a short period only’, to guarantee compliance with the Naupactus settlement of Messenians by Athens. The wider political context was Tolmides’ *periplous* of the Peloponnesus, and the need to capture Naupactus as a strategic site. The adverb *νωρίς* is one more instance of ‘Thucydides’ persistent “apologia” for Athens that characterizes his first book (Badian 168, and p. 238 n. 13).

Badian’s article concludes with a post-script so to speak, on the subject of the *Periplus* (to p. 214 n. 53): ‘I would now add that the *Periplus* as such acquires a more serious purpose if planned not merely to show Athenian power — but to capture a strategic site that could not be reached in any other way’ (Badian 238 n. 13, adding a reference to Lewis and Hornblower in the new *CAH* V).

Chapter 6: Thucydides and the *arché* of Philip

The chapter concerns Athens’ betrayal of two friendship alliances, (a) with Perdiccas, and (b) with Sitalces, which in the end cost Athens the loss of Sitalces, a very valuable ally, the King of the powerful Odrysian empire in Thrace. Athenian relations with Perdiccas, the King of Macedonia, play a role in the events that led to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Badian attributes the course of events to Athenian *Realpolitik*, the fear of a growing Macedonian power which led to the military participation of Athens in Macedonian affairs, in an alliance with Philip, a dissident under Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia — despite that fact that Athens had been in alliance with Perdiccas (Thuc. 1.57.2). Thucydides construed the dissidence of Philip as ‘military’ (which it was not), justifying military intervention (Badian 172, and 239 n. 2). Philip had an *arché*, it appears, within the domains of Perdiccas, which he lost, and to restore it led to an invasion of Perdiccas’ territory which Athens supported (Thuc. 2.100.3, Badian 173), jeopardising her friendship with Perdiccas; this was subsequently restored precariously by an ‘enforced alliance’ (Badian 174).

The Sitalces narrative in Thucydides begins with a promise, clearly stated, of Sitalces to Athens to help her finish ‘the war in Chalcidice’, a promise which the Athenians failed to take seriously, ostensibly ‘because they did not think Sitalces was serious’ (Thuc. 2.101.1: they did not think Sitalces would come, ἀποστούντες αὐτὸν μὴ ἐξέγειν). This is hard to believe (Badian 182): Thucydides compressed and distorted Sitalces’ contribution in Chalcidice, a version of events which must be rejected, presenting Sitalces’ expedition as a total failure and picturing Sitalces as weak and unreliable. In the end the Athenians deserted Sitalces, as they had deserted Perdiccas earlier (Badian 185): Thucydides consistently disguised Athenian *Realpolitik* ‘by selective omission and disinformation’. The fact is that Athens deprived itself of a major Thracian ally to aid them in the most exposed part of the empire. In this case Athenian *Realpolitik* was
misguided and shortsighted (cf. Thuc. 2.97 for the extent of the Thracian empire). Badian's contribution is original and a timely perspective (contrast Gomme HCT II p. 241 on Thuc. 2.95–101, on Sitalkes and his Thracian Kingdom, describing Sitalces' invasion of Chalcidice as 'of very little importance').

This chapter is essentially a sequel to Chapter 4 on Thucydides and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

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