Cependant, je ne peux pas accepter ce point de vue, vu les deux points suivants:

- (a) On ne peut pas réunir les mots πλόον et ναυσί de cette façon car ils ne se rapportent pas l'un à l'autre dans cet ordre d'idées: dans ce passage πλόον doit être interprété d'un point de vue géographique. Il se réfère à la limite extrême que les Grecs de l'antiquité avaient pu atteindre et que Pindare relie ici à l'idée de «limite extrême du nord». ναυσί, en revanche, est en rapport étroit avec πεζὸς ἰών (κεν) εύροις ... θαυμαστὰν ὁδόν (29-30) et est employé comme un terme de communication. Avec les mots ναυσί et πεζὸς Pindare indique les moyens de transport dont on se servait autrefois sur mer et sur terre. Ni par mer ni par terre, dit Pindare, on ne peut trouver le θαυμαστὰν ὁδόν au pays des habitants du nord. Voici précisément ce que le poète veut faire ressortir parce qu'il est sur le point de raconter le voyage de Persée chez ces habitants du nord, un voyage qui, au su de Pindare ainsi que de son public, ne s'est fait ni ναυσί ni πεζὸς ἰών, mais par la voie des airs, avec l'aide d'Hermès et d'Athéné.⁵ Il faut donc mettre πλόον dans un rapport qui diffère de la combinaison πλόον ... ναυσί pour qu'il serve de liaison aux Υπερβορέων άγῶνα.
- (b) En deuxième lieu, la combinaison de $\pi\lambda$ óov et de v α v σ í ne rappelle qu' un voyage par mer. Mais l'idée d'un simple voyage par mer ne rappelait pas, et ne pouvait pas rappeler, à Pindare le nom des habitants du nord. Seul un voyage particulier, déterminé d'une façon précise, aurait pu lui rappeler ce peuple extraordinaire d'Apollon: l'idée d'un voyage qui envisage une limite extrême.


University of the Orange Free State

J. H. BARKHUIZEN

^{5.} H. Hunger, Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie, Wien 1959, p. 277; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Pindaros, Berlin 1966, pp. 126-7.

^{6.} H. Hunger, op. cit., p. 157. Dans Ol. iii 43-44 et Isth. iv. 11-12 Pindare applique la phrase du dernier voyage aux Colonnes d'Hercule formant les bornes extrêmes de l'ouest. Pour déterminer l'emplacement des habitants du nord, voyez Ol. iii 31; pour la raison pourquoi ἔσχατον πλόον est relié dans ce passage aux habitants du nord, voyez aussi R.W.B. Burton, Pindar's Pythian Odes, Essays in Interpretation, Oxford 1962, pp. 7-8.

FORTIFICATIONS IN SOUTH ATTICA AND THE DATE OF THORIKOS*



^{*} At the request of the Editorial Board Professor H.F. Mussche has kindly consented to write an article (with illustrations) on the most important finds and results of the Thorikos excavations for *Acta Classica* XIII (1970). In this article he will return to the problem of the date of the fortification of Thorikos considered by Professor van Rooy in the present Note (Ed.).

The renewal and re-examination of the excavations at Thorikos – in 1960 and annually since 1963¹ – has led to the suggestion of a new date for the construction of the fortifications at Thorikos on the east coast of Attica in the latter part of the Peloponnesian War. J.R. McCredie concludes his section on Thorikos in *Fortified Military Camps in Attica*² as follows:

'Wrede, relying on Xenophon's statement in the *Hellenica* [1,2,1], suggested that this maritime fort was built in 410/9 B.C. Mussche, however, considering that the same conditions which necessitated the fortification of Sounion and of Rhamnous probably caused the construction of the fort at Thorikos, prefers to assign it to 412 B.C. For this study such a margin of error is not critical, but it seems to the writer that, in the absence of epigraphical or literary support, it is dangerous to reject the explicit and well dated statement of Xenophon.'3

The chief purpose of the present note is to use the literary evidence of Thucydides and the *Hellenica* respectively as firm starting-points for the fortification of Sounion and of Thorikos, and to consider reasons why the latter fortification should have taken place some years later than that of Sounion.

During the war the Laurion area in South Attica was of supreme economic importance owing to the exploitation of the rich silver mines. Its importance was enhanced after the catastrophic end of the Sicilian expedition in September 413, and the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia in the previous spring as a permanent post in Attic territory.⁴ One of the results of this occupation was that the overland route between Oropos and Athens by way of Dekeleia,

^{1.} The new annual excavations are a combined project of the 'Comité des fouilles belges en Grèce' (directed by Prof. Herman Mussche of Ghent and others) in association with the Greek Archaeological Service (under the supervision of V. Kallipolites). The preliminary reports of the Belgian Committee have been published at Blandijnberg 2, Ghent in Thorikos I (1963) (a revised and expanded edition in 1968 of 'Thorikos 1963' which had been published in L'Antiquité Classique 34 (1965), fasc. 1); Thorikos II (1964); Thorikos III (1965); and Thorikos IV (1966) (to be continued). For the purpose of the present note, see also H.F. Mussche, 'Note sur les fortifications de Sounion', in BCH 88, 1964,423–432; and, in particular, id., 'De versterkingen in Zuid-Attika gedurende de Peloponnesische Oorlog', in Gentse Bijdragen tot de Kunstgeschiedenis en de Oudheidkunde, Deel XIX, 1961–1966, 5–22, with a German summary (this article will be cited as Gentse Bijdragen); also, id., 'La fotteresse maritime de Thorikos', BCH 85,1961,176–205.

^{2.} *Hesperia*, Suppl. XI, 1966,34. The reference to Wrede is his article in *RE*, s.v. Thorikos, cols. 339–340; while that to Mussche is his last mentioned article in note 1 *supra* (alternatively his article in *Gentse Bijdragen*, kindly made available to me by the author).

^{3.} From Mussche's conclusion it is a short step to the statement in the B.S.A. *Archaeol. Reports* 1961–1962,6 that: 'The defence walls were probably built in 412 B.C. as Xenophon suggests (Hell. i 2, i)' For further reports on the Thorikos excavations see *ibid.*, 1964–1965,6 and 1966–1967,5f.

^{4.} Cf. Thuc. 7,19,1.

along which corn was imported from Euboia, was cut off; so that the sea route round Cape Sounion had to be used.⁵

The Athenians made a supreme effort to recover their sea power. Apart from undertaking the building of a new fleet,⁶ they made an almost immediate start with the fortification of at least two places: Sounion and Thorikos. The chief general aim of such a chain of fortified posts, linking up with Rhamnous⁷ on the north-east coast, would be to secure the import of corn from overseas.

From a study of the military architecture and the various styles of masonry, Pouilloux concludes (ch. 5) that the citadel and inner fortification wall at Rhamnous were built in the second half of the fifth century and the outer fortification wall in the late fourth or early third century. In testing these results against the literary evidence, he rightly argues (p. 58 ff.) that the capture of Dekeleia by the Spartans in 413, and the agitation in Eretria, demanded a fortress at Rhamnous as much as at Sounion in order to protect the grain route. He further regards Thucydides 8,95,1 as proof of the existence of this fortress in 411 B.C. In that year the Spartan Hegesandridas sailed with his fleet from Megara to Oropos, breaking his journey between Thorikos and Prasiai. Pouilloux infers that the Spartan did so because he feared the fortified post of Rhamnous. The citadel therefore could not be dated later than 412 B.C.

Against this explanation C. W. J. Eliot in A. J. Arch. 60,1956,199 f. argues that it takes into account neither the length of the journey nor the approach of night which would have made hazardous the rounding of Cape Phanari. Eliot suggests another line of argument with reference to Thucydides 8,4,1, who tells us that Sounion was fortified with walls in 413/2 B.C. Since Thucydides does not mention Rhamnous, the argument ex silentio would be that Rhamnous had been fortified earlier. Such an occasion might well have been furnished by the revolt of Euboia in 446 B.C. and by the Athenians realising that the Euripos was and would continue to be a weak link in their supply route.

While Eliot admits that there is no proof for this, I accept his tentative suggestion that a fortress was built at Rhamnous not long after 446 and very probably before 412 B.C. In the absence of direct proof, Eliot refers to 'the indirect testimony that the temples at Rhamnous and Eleusis did not transfer their treasuries to the Acropolis at Athens in accordance with the decrees of Kallias in 434/33 B.C., while Sounion did. The logical deduction is that Rhamnous and Eleusis were considered capable of defending themselves while Sounion and other places were deemed unsafe. A fortress built ca. 440 B.C. would explain both why the Kallias decrees did not apply to Rhamnous and why Thucydides does not mention its walling along with Sounion in 412 B.C.'

^{5.} Cf. Thuc. 7,28,1 and see H.D. Westlake, 'Athenian Food Supplies from Euboea,' in CR 62,1948,2-5 on the interpretation of this passage. See also Thuc. 8,60,1 on the capture of Oropos (where the Athenians had a garrison) by the Boiotians in the latter part of the winter of 412/11, i.e. about March 411.

^{6.} Thuc. 8,1,3-4; and cf. Westlake, CR 62,1948,3 n. 5.

^{7.} The date(s) of Rhamnous. After the partial excavation by Staïs in 1890–94, and the re-examination of Orlandos in 1922–23, the site was surveyed by the French archaeologist J. J. Pouilloux who published his findings in *La Forteresse de Rhamnonte (Étude de topographie et d'histoire*), Paris 1954. He concludes (ch. 2) that Rhamnous, unlike other (large) forts set to guard the main routes into Attica, had a dual purpose throughout. Situated on the sea overlooking the Euripos channel between the mainland and Euboia, it had the task of protecting sea trade, especially that of grain, as well as providing a harbour for the easy overland route to Athens. It also guarded the surrounding area, the lands extending to Marathon, furnishing a refuge when required by the people who worked the fields and lived nearby.

Thucydides' reference solely to Sounion in 412 suggests that, of the fortified posts under consideration, Sounion was in fact the only one to be fortified in that year; and that Thorikos was fortified after the winter of 411, the date at which the historian's narrative stops in mid course in Book 8.

SOUNION. After repeated and careful examination⁸ Herman Mussche concludes that, apart from a certain amount of later work done in the Hellenistic period, the whole of the fortification wall with its ten towers was built in 412.9 On this point he finds the archaeological evidence in complete agreement with the literary evidence of Thucydides 8, 4, 1, that the Athenians in the winter of 413/12 fortified Sounion to safeguard their corn ships as they sailed round the promontory.

The short additional Hellenistic wall with towers terminated in the ancient small harbour on the promontory which had two slipways to accommodate light vessels, and which originally had a gabled roof. Mussche¹⁰ accepts the arguments of Kenny for dating these docks in the third century;¹¹ but Westlake has rightly suggested that they may have superseded an earlier and less elaborate construction, since it is difficult to see how the fortification of Sounion could have afforded protection to the corn ships (Thuc.) unless warships were stationed there.¹²

THORIKOS. Thorikos not only occupied a key position in the defence of Laurion and the mining area, but it was also an exceptionally good maritime basis on the east coast of Attica. It was situated about halfway between Piraeus and Rhamnous, at a distance of approximately 32 sea miles from both, and it had two harbours divided by a peninsula which juts out into the sea. The main port – modern Frankolimani – is on the north side of the peninsula, and with a depth of 5 to 20 metres it provided a wide anchorage protected against the winds; while the beach with low inclines made it possible to draw the ships on to the dry sand.

Mussche's very brief treatment of Rhamnous suggests that he believes some fortification to have existed there before 412, and that this was strengthened probably in 412; cf. his reference to 'J. Pouilloux, die aantoonde dat het reeds versterkt was in 411, de *bijkomende* (my italics) werken werden wellicht in 412 uitgevoerd' (*Gentse Bijdragen*, 6; cf. *BCH* 85, 1961,203).

See finally R.L. Scranton, *Greek Walls*, Cambr. Mass. 1941,83 on the possibility of a late fifth century date for the *inner fortification wall* of the acropolis.

^{8.} Gentse Bijdragen, 15-21 and Plan 2 (BCH 88,1964,423-432 and Plan)

^{9.} On this point there appears to be general agreement in recent scholarship: cf. e.g. W. Wrede, *Attische Mauern*, Athens 1933,10f.; and E. A. J. Kenny, cited in n. 11 *infra*, 197f. 10. *BCH* 88,1964,430.

^{11.} E.A.J. Kenny, 'The Ancient Docks on the Promontory of Sunion,' ABSA 42,1947, 197.

^{12.} CR 62,1948,3 n. 4.

In 1960 Mussche conducted an excavation on the peninsula with its Church of Hagios Nikolaus.¹³ The fortification on the peninsula consists of two shanked walls, situated on the west and east hills respectively. The excavations and a systematic underwater survey showed that the two walls were originally connected by a wall which ran through the harbour on the south side of the peninsula, the modern Porto Mandri; so that the whole fortified area formed more or less a square. The total length of the walls was about 800 metres, of which 600 metres has been examined and mapped. This includes 6 towers, 3 small inner flanking towers, 2 gates and 5 sortie outlets.

Regarding the date Mussche concludes that the maritime fortifications of Thorikos are those mentioned by Xenophon, and that the date given by him, the 93rd Olympiad, can be determined more precisely, viz. in 412 B.C. Firstly, for historical and military reasons the fortifications comply perfectly with the demands of the situation in 412: protection of the sea route and of the Laurion area. When in 411 the Peloponnesian fleet sailed to Eretria, it significantly cast anchor between Thorikos and Prasiai (Thuc. 8, 95, 1), a coastal area which has no favourable anchorage. At that moment therefore Thorikos was already fortified. Secondly, the date 412 B.C. is supported by the hasty construction of the fortifications, executed with limited means, a phenomenon which is also encountered at Sounion.¹⁴

Now the date of Thorikos presents us with a problem. Apart from the fact that other reasons may be found for the Lacedaemonian choice of anchorage, and that Thorikos in 412 would probably have had at least a temporary garrison, our Xenophon text informs us as follows: 'In the following year – which saw the celebration of the ninety-third Olympiad ... when Euarchos was ephor at Sparta and Euktemon archon at Athens – the Athenians fortified Thorikos' ('Αθηναῖοι μὲν Θορικὸν ἐτείχισαν, Hell. 1,2,1).

Now we know that Xenophon in his *Hellenica* down to 2,3,10 (end of the Peloponnesian War) based his narrative on military seasons; and that an ancient interpolator, probably working backwards, made the chronological entries in Book 1 to 2,3,10 by Olympiads, ephors and archons. However, he made the mistake of leaving at least one year, and perhaps two years, archonless, and accordingly of setting the activities of the years 410/9 and 409/8 each a year or even two years late. We should, therefore, date the fortification of Thorikos not in the archonship of Euktemon (408/7), but either in that of Diokles, i.e. 409/8, or in that of Glaukippos, 410/9. The should in the property of the property of

^{13.} Gentse Bijdragen, 8-14 and Plan 1 (BCH 85,1961,176-205, with illustrations, passim).

^{14.} Gentse Bijdragen, 13-14.

^{15.} See W.S. Ferguson, *CAH* V, 483–5, and id., *The Treasurers of Athena*, Cambr. Mass. 1932, 44f. The latter work will be cited below as Ferguson.

^{16.} For the dates, see G.F. Hill, Sources for Greek History, new ed. by R. Meiggs and A. Andrewes, Oxford 1951, Table of Athenian Archons, p. 400,

Since we have no definite reason to reject the later *Hellenica* dating (i.e. later than Thucydides' date for Sounion), either the year 410 or 409 should be used as a firm starting-point in an attempt to explain why the fortification of Thorikos took place a few years after that of Sounion.

The first question which arises is whether it was built in 410 or 409 to safe-guard at that specific period the final stage of the corn route from the Pontus to Piraeus. Certainly, the alarm caused at Athens by the revolt of Euboia in 411 (Thuc. 8, 96) must have been intensified by a realisation that the revolt of Abydos (8,62,1) and, more recently, of Byzantium (8,80, 2–4) was endangering the corn route from the Pontus. 17 On the other hand, the outcome of the battle of Cyzicus in spring 410, which saw the destruction of the Spartan fleet, safeguarded the Pontic route, temporarily at any rate.

A second question is whether the purpose of the fortification of Thorikos in 410 or 409 could have been the protection of the Laurion mining area. Thucydides 7,27,5 tells us that one of the consequences of the occupation of Dekeleia by the Spartans under Agis was the desertion of 20,000 slaves, a large number of whom were χειροτέχναι, i.e. specialised craftsmen. But there are no real grounds for supposing either that the majority of the deserters were mineworkers from Laurion, ¹⁸ or that the exploitation of the mines came to a complete standstill before 406 or 405 B.C. ¹⁹

Now if in terms of a long term policy, or of immediate needs, or both, the fortification of Thorikos was a necessity in 410 or 409, surely this necessity would apply even more strongly to the year 413/12 when Sounion was fortified. At this stage Athens had lost her fleet and her command of the sea, so that her overseas corn route was no longer safe. Moreover, the Athenians would have known that when Alkibiades exhorted the Spartans to occupy Dekeleia, he had stressed the importance of depriving Athens of the revenues of the silver mines. While King Agis does not seem to have made the mines of Laurion a special *military* objective, this could not have been foreseen in 413/12.

Why then did the Athenians not fortify Sounion and Thorikos simultaneously in 412 B.C., in accordance with a co-ordinated strategic plan? An examination of the financial evidence, as correlated in broad lines with the historical events mainly by Ferguson and the authors of ATL^{20} will, I suggest, provide a likely answer to this question.

^{17.} Busolt, Gr. Gesch. III, 2, 1507, cited by Westlake, CR 62,1948,5, who points out that the supply route from Egypt was also threatened (n.l.).

^{18.} Cf. K.J. Dover, *Thucydides Book VII*, Oxford 1965,21 on 7,27,5.

^{19.} Cf. H.F. Mussche, Thorikos II, 1964,62.

^{20.} Ferguson 38f., cf. (in this order) 21,25,33, 34ff., 163f.; B.J. Meritt, H.T. Wade-Gery and M.F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, vol. III, Princeton 1950, 363-6 (to be cited as *ATL III*),

From Thuc. 7,27,1-2 we learn that not later than the beginning of July 413²¹ the Athenians decided to send back to Thrace a force of 1300 mercenaries who had arrived too late to join the Sicilian expedition, as it would have been too expensive to retain them for the Dekeleian campaign at a drachma per soldier per day. This is a clear first indication of the financial strain that was being felt by the city not long after the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia.

In the summer of 412 the rebellion of the allies began, starting with the revolt of Chios, and after 412/11 the Athenians were living financially from hand to mouth. From Thuc. 8,76,6 it follows that the revolution of the 400 in the year 411 synchronized with the exhaustion of both war-funds: the ordinary reserves must have been exhausted when in this year authorisation took place for the disposal of the special reserve of 1000 talents of coined silver that had been set aside by Perikles in 431 (Thuc. 8,15,1). Thucydides makes it quite clear (8,76,6) that at the time of the revolution the Athenians had no money except what the fleet at Samos could itself collect.

The gravity of the financial situation during the year 411/10 may also be inferred from the abolition of pay for all non-military services (Thuc. 8,65,3 and 67, 3). And so it seems quite certain that the Tamiae of 410/9 inherited an empty treasury.

However, a special and quite successful effort was made in 410 to recreate a temple reserve, by a decree passed in the third prytany of 410/9 (IG I², 109);²² and the Tamiae of 410/9 handed over to their successors of 409/8 a balance of several hundred talents. How did the finances of Athens and of Athena come to be partly rehabilitated in 410/9? Early in 410, after Alkibiades' naval victory over the Spartans at Cyzicus, the Athenians had once again – after three years of uphill struggle – become undisputed masters of the sea. The complete restoration of democracy at Athens in the same year was accompanied by a financial (apart from political) reorganisation (cf. ATL III, 363f.). Tribute was once more assessed, instead of the five per cent tax which had been substituted in 414; and to this was added, also in 410, the ten per cent tax imposed on all cargoes passing through the Bosporus from the Black Sea. It is also probable that after Cyzicus the subject allies squared their accounts by paying tax arrears as well as their current obligation.

Of course, the year 410/9 also saw the resumption of fairly heavy expenses, and the accounts of state borrowings from Athena for that year ($IG\ I^2$, 304A; cf. $ATL\ III$, 363ff.) show that all the loans for the year were made from current income, none from reserve. Furthermore, not all the Athenian expenses in 410/9 are listed in the inscription, partly because 'generals in the field more and more collected money and lived off the land, perhaps only casually

^{21.} See Dover's comment (p. 20).

^{22.} Cf. Ferguson 34ff., 53, 163f.

or irregularly informing the treasurers of Athena that such items ought to be carried on their books as loans' (ATL III, 366).

However, a reserve was accumulated in 410/9, and the solvency of the goddess Athena herself at the beginning of 409/8 is affirmed by the resumption of work on the Erechtheion (probably started in 421 after the Peace of Nikias, and abandoned during the Sicilian expedition).

We may now return to the question, why was Thorikos strengthened only in 410 or 409? In the absence of other evidence, the financial history of Athens supplies a plausible answer. It is highly possible that the *decision* to fortify both Sounion and Thorikos was taken in 413/12, and this would have been both a logical decision and action at that particular period. But the logic of the action was confuted by the strained financial situation at Athens.

The fortification of Thorikos could not be carried out before a financial rehabilitation had at least started. This did start fairly early in 410/9, and was in part effected by the end of that year: 'the expenditures attributed to the Tamiae of 409/8 are reconcilable with the hypothesis that under the plan launched in October 410 B.C. for repaying borrowings from the Goddess, a reserve of something like 350 talents remained in the Opisthodomos at the end of the year' (Ferguson, 37), i.e. at the end of 410/9.

How does this relate to the chronology of the *Hellenica*, and to the question which of the two schemes we should adopt (one, or two, 'archonless' years)? 'Neither scheme is without flaws',²³ thus Ferguson, who argues the case for the interpolator leaving only one year without a date, and accordingly puts *Hell*. 1,2,1 (the fortification of Thorikos and the start of Thrasyllus' expedition to Ionia) early in 409. More recently scholars have preferred to date (only) *Hell*. 1,1 from autumn 411 to spring 410, and to start 1,2,1 – which concerns our problem – in the summer of 410.²⁴

While it is difficult to decide between the years 410 and 409 as Xenophon's date for the fortification of Thorikos, the earlier date is probably to be preferred. As for the financial situation, it leaves both possibilities open, but the Athenians would have wanted to carry out the fortification of this strategically most important site as soon as possible (notwithstanding their recent naval success at Cyzicus); and the fact that the fortification was done with limited financial means also tends to tilt the scales in favour of 410, when we may expect a fairly rigid economic policy (in the sense of economising) to have prevailed, with a view to paying back to Athena some of the money borrowed from her, and to creating a reserve. However that may be,

^{23.} CAH V, 484.

^{24.} Cf. H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte*, 3rd ed., München 1965,238; E. Delebecque, *Xenophon*, *Helléniques*, Livre I, Paris 1964,2-6, cf. 47, note on I,2,l: 'l'été 410, probablement'.

either 410/9 or 409/8 may be accepted as Xenophon's date for the fortification of Thorikos.

Ferguson (p. 41) has shown that 'the great enterprises of 409/8 strained the financial resources of Athens to the breaking point' once again. This is confirmed by the fact that the Tamiae of that year for the first time saw fit to convert the ἀργυρώματα 'from the Parthenon' (IG I², 301, line 13) into coins. There were payments from the reserve even in 406/5 (IG I², 305, line 13), but a second and much more complete conversion took place in 406, which also saw the minting of the first gold coinage of Athens, after the people had decreed that the golden statues of Nike should be melted down.²⁵ The only silver that Athens had left in 406/5 was used for the plating of bronze coins; and in 405/4 the Attic money disbursed by the Tamiae was wholly in gold.²⁶

ANAPHLYSTOS. Finally the question arises whether, as Mussche has suggested,²⁷ Anaphlystos was fortified at the same time as Sounion. On the question whether visible remains of the fortifications at Anaphlystos on the west coast of Attica can still be discerned, opinions differ.²⁸ The site is now crossed by the new coastal road from Athens to Sounion. Xenophon in his last work²⁹ written about the middle of the fourth century (355/4 B.C.) speaks of Anaphlystos as a fortified post; and it would be tidy to believe, on geographical and strategic grounds, that the decision to fortify this post was also taken in 413/12 B.C. Regarding the actual date of the construction we have neither literary nor archaeological evidence; and until such information turns up, we may provisionally infer, from Thucydides' sole reference to Sounion in 412 and from Xenophon's sole reference to Thorikos in 410 or 409, that the fortification of Anaphlystos took place at a later date. While in his last work Xenophon does link up the fort at Anaphlystos with the protection of the silver mines in the general event of war, he makes no mention of its construction during his narrative of the Peloponnesian War from 411/10 to 404/3; and since this earlier part of the Hellenica, down to 2,3,9, does not suffer from such serious omissions as the later part, the fortification

^{25.} Schol. on Aristoph., Ranae 720.

^{26.} IG2 II, 1686; Ferguson 74.

^{27.} Gentse Bijdragen, 21; BCH 85,1961,203.

^{28.} Mussche, Gentse Bijdragen, 21 states that no visible remains have been found at Anaphlystos, but points out that on the maps of Curtius and Kaupert, dating from the latter part of the previous century, some signs of ancient harbour fortifications are indicated. On the other hand we have the rather vague statement of E. Kirsten and W. Kraiker in their revised edition of Griechenlandkunde, 1. Halbband, Heidelberg 1967,161: 'An der Westseite von Anawyso sind beim neuen Badeort Nea Phokaia die Mauern der Küstenfestung Anaphlystos kaum erhalten.'

^{29.} Poroi 4,43.

of Anaphlystos may in fact not have taken place during the latter part of the War. We may hope that new evidence will turn up to enable us to settle this question satisfactorily.

University of South Africa, Pretoria

C. A. VAN ROOY

ACTA CLASSICA



Acta Classica is
published annually
by the Classical
Association of
South Africa.
The journal has been
in production since
1958. It is listed on
both the ISI and the
SAPSE list of
approved publications.

For further information go to: http://www.casa-kvsa.org.za/acta_classica.htm