REVIEWS • RESENSIES

J.P. Louw: *Semantics of New Testament Greek*. Fortress Press (Philadelphia, Penns.) and Scholars Press (Chico, Calif.), 1982, pp. ix + 166, $12.95.

(The present review has its origin in a genuine concern for the methodological question of whether, and then to what extent, hermeneutical techniques derived from modern linguistic theory should be applied by classicists to a linguistic analysis of Greek and Latin prose. The review was partly conceived on the occasion of a visit to the 'Istituto di Filologia Classica' of the University of Palermo/Italy during a period of study leave in March 1984: I would like to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Giusto Monaco for the invitation and the opportunity to present to staff and students an informal seminar on the 'Louw-Nida Method'.)

1. Genesis and Contents

This is a 'completely revised version' of a book (*Semantiek van Nuwe Testamentiese Grieks*, Univ. of Pretoria, 1976) 'first drafted in 1973 as a hand-out to students in order to provide a practical handbook to the various modern linguistic theories – trying to make these insights useful as a semantic explication of the grammar and style of New Testament Greek' (p.viii).

The book comprises ten chapters, rather disproportionate in length, dealing, essentially, with descriptive semantics from a linguistic, strictly synchronic point of view, and culminating in a theory and practice of 'discourse analysis'.

Chapters 1–3 (p.1–21) contain preliminaries
– briefly discussing what the A. sees as the main concerns of semantics;
– justifying this publication ('As yet there is no book on NT Greek that considers semantics', p.1);
– advertising it with an impressive doxographical display of citations from recent, largely American, linguists.

Chapters 4–7 (p.23–45) have in common the focus on synchronic word semantics and comprise an uncompromising rejection of 'the fallacies' of traditional, 'word-bound' approaches to exegesis:
– the 'etymological method' is 'exposed' as totally inadequate;
– there is no 'general' meaning (*Grundbedeutung*) of a word;
– the old mistaken belief in 'one word, one meaning' should give way to the new insight that 'words only partially overlap between languages'.

Chapters 8–10 (p.47–158) represent the positive counterpart to the previous section and constitute the very essence of the book. They deal with semantics of word, phrase and discourse respectively:

– ch. 8 ('What is meaning?', p.47–66) considers the difficulty of formulating a positive definition of 'meaning' and the importance of distinguishing various aspects of meaning, esp. the 'literal' from the 'figurative', and introduces (Nida's) semantic word classes 'object', 'event', abstract', 'relation';

– ch. 9 ('Semantics is more than the meaning of words', p.67–89) is of central importance to an understanding of the matrix of the A's methodology and introduces the analysis of 'immediate constituents' and the distinction of 'surface' *vs*. 'deep' structures;

– ch. 10 ('Semantics is more than the meaning of sentences', p.91–158) is a rounded off unit on 'theory and practice of "discourse analysis" ' (so explicitly on p.89) and comprises two distinct sections: (i) the theory (p.91–117) and (ii) eight practical examples: Philem. 4–7, Col. 3:1–4, 1 Cor.12:4–11, 1 Cor. 12:12–26, 1 Cor. 12:27–31, Rom. 1:1–7, Rom. 1:8–17, Rom. 2:1–16 (p.117–158). It should be noted that, although this is nowhere acknowledged, the section on theory of 'discourse analysis' is a slightly modified version of the 'Theoretical Considerations' forming a preface to the A's *A semantic discourse analysis of Romans* (Univ. of Pretoria, 1979, vol.2, p.3–31) and that the last three practical examples are reproduced almost verbatim from that publication.

2. Positive Aspects

A. Regarding the theory, Prof. Louw's method, or rather the Louw-Nida method (see below 3B(1)), is a necessary corrective to centuries-old misunderstandings and misuses of word semantics as 'etymology' for exegetical purposes.

B. Regarding the practical application, the Louw-Nida method may, if used with discretion, be integrated fruitfully into the traditional 'word (and dictionary!)-bound' exegesis as a propaedeutic exercise:

(i) in *paraphrasing* a text, in order to improve on the traditional, usually too literal translations of the NT: after all, the best translation of involved constructions can only be a condensed paraphrase.

– In this regard, the method seems to be most suitable to elucidating obscure nominal constructions with an ambiguous genitive or prepositional phrase. Such constructions are common especially in St. Paul's letters: e.g. βάπτισμα μετανοίας (Mark 1:4); ἐπὶ τῇ κοινωνίᾳ ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας. . . (Philip. 1:5). They are excellently explained and cleared of ambiguity by means of Nida's semantic classes (in spite of the inevitable elements of subjectivity involved in such classifications);[1]

(ii) in *tabulating* syntactically involved 'paragraphs', in order to visualise 'all stylistic features which may be regarded as being on a rhetorical level', such as parallelisms, chiastic or antithetic arrangements, repetitions of thematic words,

anaphoras, ellipses, etc.

– This 'mapping' exercise seems to be of some use in determining the *focal points* in any NT pericope and, therefore, in re-arranging the original word order or syntactic frame with a view to a more 'dynamic' translation and with the least possible degree of arbitrariness. A good example for the practical utility of the method is the 'dynamic' translation of Eph.1:5–7 (excellent, if contrasted with the *King James Version*: p.87–88).

– In this regard, however, Louw's present model of 'discourse analysis' is still far from perfect (see below, 3B2).

Some improvement, especially on its 'mechanical' and 'static' aspects, may derive from Panhuis' recent model of 'communicative perspective', itself, however, far from perfect,[2] or from Friberg's dissertation.[3]

3. Major Points of Disagreement

A. On word semantics

1. The 'negative' chapters, especially the fourth on etymology, often throw the baby out with the bath-water by indulging in one-sided generalisations (sometimes disguised in impressive linguistic jargon). For example:

'At present one of the basic principles of semantics is that the relation between the form of a word and its meaning is an arbitrary one' (p.25).

This sounds respectably de-Saussurian: in fact, it is only partially true. There is a relevant exception to the suggested *general* arbitrariness: meaning *is* related to form in hundreds of 'motivated' words, as are all instances of *onomatopoeia* and many *compounds* and *derivatives*. Of course, there are various degrees of motivation, from total transparency to full idiomatisation (idiomaticity). This important restriction is never mentioned; it should have been considered in dealing with certain NT compounds (διαχειρίζομαι, διχοτομέω, ὑπερβαίνω), for which idiomaticity is too readily assumed simply to counter traditional explanations based on (equally assumed) motivation: thus, according to the A., 'διαχειρίζω' (sic) in Acts 5:30 'only means "to kill" '; διχοτομέω in Matt. 24:51 has nothing to do with 'cutting asunder' but 'simply means "punish severely" '; ὑπερβαίνω does not mean 'I transgress', but 'has its focus only on the breaking of a commandment as a feature of sin' (p.29–30). The real difficulty with such NT (or classical) Greek compounds lies in assessing how far they might have been 'motivated' when used by a NT writer: a difficulty which to a great extent may be overcome by means of an accurate historical documentation based on adequate parallels.

2. This leads to a discussion of another, even more questionable, generalisation: that *single words* are nonentities in comparison with the all-important contextual meaning.

That single words have no meaning at all is neither true nor can it be proved by Nida's statement that meaning is not

'an inherent property belonging to words . . . but . . . a set of relations for
which a verbal symbol is a sign'

(quoted on p.23). Understandable as it is as a reaction to a centuries-old abuse of
etymology, this view is nevertheless one-sided and may lead to unwarranted
manipulations in cases where the single word *does* count. For, in addition to the
fact that there are many well-defined scientific and technical terms and 'object-
words',

'there is no getting away from the fact that single words *have* more or less
permanent meanings, that they actually do refer to certain referents, and not
to others, and that this characteristic is the indispensable basis of all
communication. It is on this basis that the speaker selects his words, and the
hearer understands them. . . . The study of single words and their meanings
is the indispensable basis of scientific semasiology'.[4]

3. While the A's indignation at pseudo-etymology as applied to exegesis may be
warranted, the systematic exclusion of any *diachronic perspective* is, to say the
least, a moot point:

– A single paragraph is devoted to the problems of *historical change*, which the
A. considers as 'one of the most basic aspects of meaning . . . not accounted for by
the etymological method'. A remarkable after-thought concludes the paragraph:

'The fact, however, remains that it is decisive for any semantic study to know
whether the older meaning still exists at the later stage' (p.31).

This 'decisive' importance of the historical perspective, i.e. *historical semantics*, is
nowhere brought to the fore in the book. On the necessity of approaching
polysemy from a point of view combining both descriptive and historical
semantics, I would like to quote S. Ullmann:

'Polysemy is the pivot of semantic analysis. Couched in synchronistic terms,
it means that *one word can have more than one sense*. Translated into
diachronistic terminology, it implies that a word may retain its previous
sense or senses and at the same time acquire one or several new ones. (. . .)
Furthermore, the same principle entails a far closer connection and inter-
dependence between descriptive and historical semantics than can be the
case in other departments where old and new are not found synchronously
side by side'.[5]

4. Selected examples to illustrate 1–3:

(a) διακονεῖν τραπέζαις (Acts 6:2) is explained, *contra* Goppelt in *TDNT*,[6] as an
idiom 'signifying commercial activities related to the conduct and transaction of
money matters, i.e. "to handle finances" ' (p.36).

– The modern banking jargon is misleading and does not reflect the humble
reality described in the passage. The assumption of full idiomaticity is totally
unwarranted. What gives the A. his dogmatic certainty about the *correct* meaning
of the expression can hardly be the (scanty) evidence from intra-textual parallels.
If it is – as I suspect – the wisdom of Jackson-Lake,[7] why not give as much weight

to other views from recent, accurate commentators?[8]

(b) 'ἡμέρα means "day" in most cases in the NT, but in 1 Cor. 4:3 it means "law court". This is a rare meaning, yet it is unnecessary to recover the idea of "day" in the meaning "law court" . . . The possibility that this meaning developed from "day" is of no importance' (p.37).

– A clear case of bias against etymology *tout court*. Dogmatism of this kind is unnecessarily obstructive in teaching students. So often, the 'rare' meaning is easily – and usefully – explained by means of parallels. In the case of 1 Cor. 4:3, by means of ἡμέρα κρίσεως (*dies iudicii*, Matt. 10:15) and its *LXX* equivalent ἡμέρα Κυρίου (1 Chron. 4:41), in opposition to ὑπὸ ἀνθρωπίνης ἡμέρας ('a *human* tribunal': 1 Cor. 4:3). This can be readily observed from old *LSJ* and the disparaged *TDNT*.

(c) The 'illegitimate totality transfer' (Barr) should certainly be rejected. However, the acrimonious tirade against the traditional fixation of σάρξ with 'flesh' (p.39ff.) does not account for a tradition of centuries:

– the vocabulary of the NT writers is imbued with a pre-existent and considerable OT tradition;

– key-words such as 'flesh' or 'spirit' have entered the linguistic heritage of Western literature through centuries of *literal* translations of the Bible. As in the Greek original, so in the Latin *Vulgate* and in modern European languages, these terms have kept their *polysemy*. Neither a perfect semantic analysis nor the best of 'dynamic' translation theories can in each case presume to eliminate that polysemy without destroying important connotations. One need only consider the opposition σάρξ:πνεῦμα, of Hellenistic-Gnostic origin and fundamental importance in the NT, especially in the theology of Paul and John. According to the A. (p.39–40), σάρξ should be rendered with different expressions (read: paraphrases!) each time to suit different specific contexts, e.g.: John 1:14 'The Word became *a human being*'; Rom. 9:8 'Children of *natural birth*'; Rom. 8:12 'To live according to *human nature*'.

– Ought we, then, to ban from usage (and from modern dictionaries) the term 'incarnation' (It. 'incarnazione', Germ. 'Fleischwerdung', etc.) simply because 'flesh' is partially associated with the butcher?

(d) Ἄφες τοὺς νεκροὺς θάψαι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νεκρούς (Luke 9:60) is explained as yet another 'idiom' which 'should be understood as "you understand me wrongly; this is not what is at stake" ' (p.49).

– In fact, the Lord's saying is not an idiom, but a pun on the double meaning of νεκρός, 'dead' in a *physical* and in a *spiritual* sense.[9]

– It may be interesting to note that this misunderstanding is repeated from an earlier article of the A.,[10] where the Lord's saying is explained as a proverb 'paralleled' by a Greek 'idiom' (νεκροὺς ὁρῶν νέκρωσιν) attested in the *Corpus Paroimiographorum Graecorum*[11] and 'referring to an irrelevant concern'. Unfortunately, the A. seems to have misunderstood the 'parallel' quotation, a iambic verse which reads 'νεκροὺς ὁρῶν νέκρωσιν ἕξεις πραγμάτων' and is interpreted by the editors of the *CPG* (Leutsch-Schneidewin) as follows: 'Est

versus Astrampsychi, cuius sensum recte sic exponit H. Stephanus in Thes. L.G. v. νέκρωσις: *mortuos videns emorietur et languescet ardor peragendi quod institueras'*. The expression is totally unrelated to Luke 9:60.

(e) 'Αλώπηξ, in εἴπατε τῇ ἀλώπηκι ταύτῃ, referred to Herod (Luke 13:32), is said to have not the traditional meaning of 'fox' (associated with 'cunningness' in all the other occurrences in the NT), but, by 'metaphorical extension of the cognitive meaning', the meaning of 'rascal' (associated with 'wickedness'): 'the fox was a symbol of a base and wicked person – a rascal' (p.55).

– In fact, the only 'parallel' adduced and available from (late) antiquity, a Patristic glossa from the *Catenae*[12] (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ζῶον ἀεὶ πανοῦργον καὶ δύσπορον), is by no means adequate evidence for such an 'extended' meaning. On the contrary, the author of the *Catena ad Luc.*, may himself have extrapolated such a meaning from this very text of Luke: after all 'cunningness' is still a connotation of both πανοῦργον and δύσπορον.

The above examples prove, *i.a.*, that a 'semantic analysis' of the NT, unless duly integrated and constantly sustained by historical philological exegesis, is of little use for a better understanding of really ambiguous or difficult passages of the original.

B. On 'discourse analysis'

1. The term 'discourse analysis', though very popular in South African biblical exegesis, has become quite ambiguous. Since it was first introduced by the American structuralist Z.S. Harris in 1952, it has been used in a variety of meanings by different scholars: (1) as 'text analysis' in the peculiar sense given to it by Harris; (2) as 'text grammar' or 'text linguistics'; (3) as 'conversation analysis'; (4) as 'analysis of linguistic and non-linguistic interaction' (in Cicourel's model of 1980).[13]

Prof. Louw's 'discourse analysis' cannot be aligned with any of those streams, but lies somewhere between (1) and (2). Based on syntactic 'colon' analysis, it claims to be 'nothing more than a technique for mapping the form of a text in such a way that the syntactic relationships of the constituent parts can be most readily recognised' (p. 95).

This 'technique' combines the conceptual framework of 'transformational grammar' according to Chomsky's 'standard theory' (1965) and 'extended standard theory' (1972)[14] with E.A. Nida's semantic analysis and theory of translation.[15] Nida's linguistic thought, widely known for its fundamental rôle in recent 'dynamic' versions of the Bible, is in fact the essential component, present in some form in all chapters; so it would not be wrong to call Louw's approach to semantics and discourse analysis the 'Louw-Nida Method'.

2. It would be unfair to criticise this method, basically a practical technique, on account of an all-embracing 'text theory', which it emphatically does not claim to be.[16] Compared e.g. to the new *Lateinische Textgrammatik*,[17] the scope of Louw's discourse analysis is considerably restricted: there is no systematic treatment of

'text cohesion' (pro-forms, anaphoric words, deixis, etc.) or 'text pragmatic'; even *stylistics* has only been partially included, insofar as the A's attention is focused on those 'stylistic features which may be regarded as being on a rhetorical level' (p. 104) or which sometimes formally mark the paragraph as a unit, such as 'transitional particles, repeated words, parallel or chiastic structures, or intro- ductory and/or terminal statements' (p. 116). Therefore, F.E. Deist's 'Open questions to discourse analysis',[18] directed mainly at the *theoretical* shortcomings of 'discourse analysis' (as it is generally understood by South African scholars), cannot be applied entirely to the A's essentially *practical* method.

On the other hand, it is equally important for the reader to know (much more explicitly than the A. would have him realise) that, at this early stage, the Louw- Nida method is by no means an *alternative* to thorough exegesis, since it usually (and tacitly) *presupposes* a sound historico-philological explanation of words and sentences. This presupposition is utterly obscured by a consistently dogmatic dismissal of all 'word-bound' or 'traditional' approaches. In fact, though sometimes a necessary corrective to certain one-sided (*pseudo-etymological*!) word-exegesis, the Louw-Nida method is itself one-sided and fallacious *whenever it presumes* (as it frequently does) *to dispense with historico-philological exegesis*.

3. Deist has pointed out that to investigate and uncover 'deep structures' is a questionable and exegetically sterile manipulation of the text in order to make explicit through more or less skilful paraphrases what an intelligent reader has in any case already understood. In other words: when it comes to polysemy (not immediately evident) or ambiguous syntactic structures, the 'static' method of 'discourse analysis' is of no use since the 'mechanically' uncovered 'deep structures' are not the same as what is presumed to have been the ancient author's intention, but rather subjective paraphrases of what the modern reader presumes to understand.
– I do not wish to pursue further the theoretical aspect of a complex controversy involving the validity of the assumption that 'transformations do not affect meaning'.[19]
– The following statement indicates that the A. may, after all, be unaware of the slippery ground on which he treads: 'the chosen surface structure is essentially the one that renders the deep structure in the best way' (p. 76). This may be true in most cases of 'well-formedness'; that it is not *generally* true, can be proved by dozens of passages in the NT that might have been formulated in a better way.
– Two points in Louw's theoretical infra-structure are worth considering:
(1) the unconvincing definition he gives of the basic units of discourse analysis, the *colon* and the *paragraph*. Both terms are used in a very special, technical sense, quite different from the current one (this seems to represent the A's personal contribution to the linguistic theory underlying his 'discourse analysis'). Whereas a 'paragraph' roughly coincides with a 'pericope', a 'colon' is laboriously defined in a sequence of variations (on p. 95, 97, 98, 106, 109 and finally 113), the last of which reads:

'A colon, then, may be regarded as syntactically an expression having a matrix consisting of a nominal element and a verbal element along with such additions as are linked directly to either of the two elements of the matrix or additions which are in turn linked to other additions'.

A clue to the meaning of this is given by the previous definition: 'so-called simple sentences and complex sentences are regarded as colons, while so-called co-ordinate sentences . . . are regarded as consisting of two or more colons', p. 102). Moreover, 'determining the length of a paragraph is a decision based on the total structure of a larger stretch of discourse. Therefore, it cannot be properly done until the basic colon analysis is completed' (p. 145).

(2) The systematic substitution of *free paraphrases* for literal translations may lead to the loss of meaningful iconicity, as in the case of 1 John 1:7 (τὸ αἷμα Ἰησοῦ καθαρίζει ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας), or to a banalisation of the original tone, as in the case of Philem. 4–7. (p.77 and 123 respectively).

– In 1 John 1:7, indeed 'τὸ αἷμα refers to the death of Christ' and 'does not mean that the blood as a liquid reconciles our sins'. But to say 'this specific surface structure [αἷμα in the 'meaning' of 'death'] was probably chosen *because others, such as ἀπέθανε, do not render as well the total intention of the author*', is a rather enigmatic way of saying *because of the metaphor of 'washing clean'* (through blood as a liquid!).

– Philem. 4–7 is rendered with a 'dynamic translation' (based on deep structures etc.) as follows:

'Philemon, every time I pray I thank my God for you for I heard of your faith in the Lord Jesus and your love for your fellow believers. And I pray that the faith we share *will make us to know the good things that are for us* in view of Christ. Your faith [,] my brother, brought me great joy and encouragement because you *cheered up* your fellow believers with the help you gave them'.

If the aim is to provide a clearer version of Philem. 4–7, it should be pointed out that:

– 'will make us to know' is entirely ungrammatical, so that the modern English reader would be unable to make sense of it;

– 'the good things that are for us' is entirely obscure: 'for us' merely gives a vague suggestion of advantage;

– 'cheered up' has the wrong register in this context.

4. *A case study:* ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται (Rom. 1:17)

The A. considers Rom. 1:17 a typical case of syntactical ambiguity which his 'disc. analysis' based on colon and deep structure can easily resolve.

Of the two possible deep structures (a) ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται[20] and (b) ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται[21] the former is more likely to reflect Paul's intention, he says, 'on the basis of the wider context of the Ep. to the Romans' (p.105), where, i.a. 'δίκαιος involves not some abstract characteristic of a person, but a state of being resulting from an activity'.

The argument is unconvincing: 'the wider context' seems only to mean that

there are other passages in *Rom.* which point to *justification by faith*. On the other hand, there are no parallels to the (un-Greek!) phrase δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως 'just(ified) by faith' (the correct Greek is ὁ ἐκ πίστεως δίκαιος or rather δεδικαιωμένος). Nor can the traditional exegesis, based on the reference to Hab. 2:4 in the LXX (of which *Rom.* 1:17 is a quotation), be simply disregarded 'because a reference to Hab. 2:4 . . . or even to the Hebrew OT does not provide a satisfactory basis . . . since it is a rather free quotation'.

A recent study on Gal. 3:11 (= Rom. 1:17 and Hab. 2:4) has made it plausible that Rom. 1:17 is not a case of *syntactical ambiguity* after all. Richard B. Hays[22] explains the controversial passage as follows: The real ambiguity is not the syntactic relation of ἐκ πίστεως, which clearly modifies ζήσεται, but its *agential* referent: by *whose* faith shall the righteous one live: his own faith or God's faithfulness? And who is the 'righteous one', the Messiah or the believer?

In his opinion, there are three possible interpretations ('deep structures'?) of Gal. 3:11 (= Hab. 2:4 and Rom. 1:17):

'(a) The Messiah will live by (his own) faith(fulness);
(b) The righteous person will live as a result of the Messiah's faith(fulness);
(c) The righteous person will live by (his own) faith (in the Messiah).
Paul's thought is rendered wholly intelligible only if all three of these interpretations are held together and affirmed as correct. The ambiguity of Paul's formulation allows him to draw multiple implications out of the Habakkuk text'.[23]

I do not wish to suggest that Hays' exegesis is the only correct one, but merely to show the inherent shortcomings of Louw's 'discourse analysis' as an *alternative* to exegesis.

4. Marginalia et Errata (a selection)

(a) Important omissions

– p.ix: the list of abbreviations should include the *TDNT* (quoted on p.36).

– p.44: The note on the peculiar usage of Scottish 'this' (for 'this' and 'those') is taken from J.C. Catford's *A linguistic theory of translation* (1951), as duly acknowledged in the Afrikaans original (p.53).

– p.65: Nida's paternity of the 'semantic (word) categories' is not acknowledged as it was in the Afr. original, p.69.

– p.76–79: No explanation is given of three important technical terms: 'utterance' (tacitly used as a synonym of 'sentence', but see Lyons, *Sem.*, vol.I, p.26f.), 'focus' and 'kernel sentence' (this was explained in a section, p.87–89, of the original Afrikaans, but has unfortunately been excised).

– p.159–164 (Bibliography): The user will miss the page references in several articles from periodicals or readers, such as Conklin, Jakobson, Katz (1964), Moravcsik *et al.*

– p.165–166: The 'Index of Authors' (p.v: 'Index') is not exactly what is required; this would be an 'Index of subjects' and an 'Index of NT passages discussed in the book'.

(b) Errata in translating and/or editing

- p.viii: 'unless the information *is* (not *are*) integrated'.
- p.25: '*fenestra*, as *quae nos ferens extra*': delete *quae* or change *ferens* to *fert*.
- p.64: 'ἀσύνθετος ("to not keep a promise")': for *not to keep*; but ἀσύνθετος is not a verb.
- p.65: The notion of 'semantic categories' should be introduced in a new paragraph, beginning at 'Finally . . .'.
- p.67: 'Jack *sees* (not *and*) Jill'.
- p.69: '. . . psychological judgments must never be preferred *to* (not *over*) linguistic ones'.
- p.83: 'an abstract *or* (not *of*) conjunction'.
- p.94: 'To understand any text it is necessary to know how the text *is* (not *was*) structured'.
- p.131: '. . . which *is* (not *was*) motivated'.

(c) Incorrect spelling of Greek words

(In view of their frequency, incorrect *accents* cannot be listed here; I have counted more than 70, eight of these on p.61 alone: θηριόν, (for θηρίον, 6 times), κτήνων (for κτηνῶν, twice)).

- p.29: διαχειρίζομαι (not διαχειρίζω).
- p.66: εἰς τὸ διηνεκές (not διηνεκής).
- p.71f.: πέμψαντά με (not πέμψαμτά or μέμψαντά).
- p.80: εὐαγγέλιον (not εὐαγγελία).
- p.127: εἰ ἀπέθανε σὺν (not τῷ) Χριστῷ.
- p.133: χαρίσματα (not χάρισμα) ἰαμάτων (twice).
- p.139: ὁδὸν ὑμῖν (not ἡμῖν) δείκνυμι.
- p.150: σὺ (not οὐ) σεαυτὸν κατακρίνεις.
- p.151: verse 9 τοῦ κατεργαζομένου (not -μένον); v.16 ὅτε κρινεῖ (not κρίνει).

(d) Alia

- p.30: 'This derivation [from ἁ-μαρτος] is given by J.B. Hofmann (1950) *as the origin* of ἁμαρτάνω'. It should read *as the probable origin* (Hofmann: '*viell*(*eicht*) von einem Adj. *ἁ-μαρτος "unteilhaftig" . . .* '). However, Frisk's (or Chantraine's etymological dictionary, not Hofmann's, must be consulted in controversial cases. Here the opinion of both is: 'etymology obscure'.
- p.42: To illustrate the 'erroneous consequence of a "totality transfer" in modern languages', the A. (or his translator?) invents the expression 'the hall was *taxed to capacity*' and comments: 'the term "taxed" means only "filled" or "occupied" '. The expression is hardly English and can, at best, be adduced to illustrate the carelessness of contemporary English usage (here: a case of lax neologism from substitution by analogy).

– p.55: 'Cramer 1833–44 (repr. 1967)' not 'Cremer 1967' (the same mistake in the bibliography);

– id.: Zink's quotation reads 'diesem (not *dem*) Fuchs . . . *diesem* (not *dem*) Verderber'.

p.64: 'δεξιὰς δίδωμι' is impossible; substitute δεξιάν δίδωμι or δεξιὰς διδόναι.

– id.: 'γενεὰ ἀρχαῖα ("ancient generation*s*" . . .)' must become 'γ. ἀρχαία ("ancient generatio*n*" . . .)'.

– p.81: '. . . the experiencer of the event as·in βάπτισμα 'Ιωάννου': John is not the experiencer but the agent.

– p.84: 'Rom. 1:5 ἐλάβομεν χάριν. . . *We* (not *I*) received grace. . .'.

– p.84 and 87: 'εὐχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ μου etc.' is taken from *Philippians* 1:3–5, not Philemon (3 times!).

– p.93: 'Saramacc*an*' (not Saramacc*a*).

– id.: 'Padučeva (1972) . . . *She* stated' (not Padućeva (*1974*) . . . *he* stated).

– p.95: (*et passim*): the more correct plural of *colon* is *cola*, not 'colons'.

– p.112: '. . . for certainly ἀεί may be related to ἐποίησε': this implies the possibility of the Aorist expressing an habitual or repeated action in the past, a prerogative of the Imperfect.

– p.119: 'The γάρ, therefore, equals γ'ἄρα'. A somewhat strange way of saying that γάρ is here used as a coordinating conjunction.

– p.120: It is not entirely true that 'the chiasmus is a popular form of style that is found in the NT'. According to Blass-Debrunner, par. 477 'Chiasmus ist im NT selten, z.B. Phm.5 τὴν ἀγάπην καὶ τὴν πίστιν', and Ergänzungsheft 1970[2], p.49 'Paulus nimmt indessen eine Sonderstellung ein . . .' (incidentally: the example of chiasmus given on p.120 as something uncovered by 'discourse analysis' is already in Blass-Debrunner, and perhaps in earlier sources).

– *Bibliography*: Abraham, S. and *F* (not A.); Bloomfield . . . New York 1933 or London 1935 (not London 1933); Conklin 1962 (not 1967): adde p.119–41 (repr. in Tyler 1969,·p.41–59); Coseriu-Geckeler: adde p.103–171; Goppelt 1971 (not 1972); Jakobson, in R.A. Brower (not Brown): adde p.232–239; Katz 1964 'Analyticity and contradiction in natural language' (not 'Semi-Sentences'): adde p.519–543; (Katz) 1966 (not 1965); Moravcsik: adde p.3–35; Ullmann (not Ullman): Weinrich 1963 (not 1968).

To conclude:

Referring to the relatively long period of time which elapsed between the original and the present 'completely revised version', the A. writes in his 1981 'Preface' (p. viii):

'A book comes off the press inevitably at a stage when one would want to treat various points somewhat differently, enlarge on numerous implications, etc.'

The above review of this version would seem to endorse his statement. A second 'complete revision' may be advisable and will certainly be welcome.

NOTES

1. On the arbitrariness of semantic categories, see J. Lyons, *Semantics* C.U.P. 1977 (repr. 1981), vol. 2, p. 706–710.
2. See Dirk G.J. Panhuis, *The communicative perspective in the sentence. A study of Latin word order*, Amsterdam 1982 (= SLCS, vol. 11); but see the review by J.G.F. Powell in *CR* 34(1) (1984) 75–77.
3. T. Friberg, *New Testament Greek word order in light of discourse considerations*, Univ. of Minnesota (microf.) 1982.
4. G. Stern, *Meaning and change of meaning*, Göteborg 1931, p. 85, quoted from S. Ullmann, *The principles of semantics*, Oxford 1963³, p. 64, N.2.
5. S. Ullmann, *The principles of semantics*, p. 117.
6. Incidentally, the only time the *TDNT* (= Theological Dictionary of the New Testament) is quoted and rather unfairly ridiculed.
7. *The beginnings of Christianity* (repr. 1965) p. 64: 'To serve tables: . . . it is not impossible that it was intended in the first sense to cover the general financial administration of the community'.
8. E. Haenchen, e.g., comments (*Die Apostelgeschichte*, Göttingen 1977⁷, p. 256, n. 1): 'Trotzdem wird mit τραπέζαις διακ. nicht die "general financial administration of the community" bezeichnet, sondern die *Armenfürsorge*'. Similarly H. Conzelman (*Die Apostelgeschichte*, Tübingen 1972², p. 50): 'für die Mahlzeiten sorgen'.
9. *Cf.* the annotation in the Jerusalem Bible *ad loc.*, and *TDNT*, vol. 4, p. 893.
10. 'Discourse Analysis and the Greek New Testament', *The Bible Translator* 24 (1973) 108f.
11. Apostolii, *Centuria* 12, 4b vol. 2, p. 542.
12. *Catenae Graecorum Patrum in Novum Testamentum*, ed. J.A. Cramer 1838–44 (repr. Olms 1967), vol. 2, p. 110.
13. See H. Bussmann, *Lexikon der Sprachwissenschaft*, Kröner Verlag, Stuttgart 1983, *s. v.* 'Diskursanalyse', p. 104.
14. 'Still a syntactically based theory; but it allows for the possibility that the semantic interpretation of a sentence should be determined jointly by its deep structure and its surface structure': J. Lyons, *Semantics*, 1977, vol. 2, p. 416.
15. *Cf.* 'Communication and Translation', *The Bible Translator* 23 (1972) 309–316, and *Signs, Sense, Translation*, Univ. of Pretoria, 1981.
16. 'It is extremely important that the reader [should] not view this book as presenting a text theory or a theory of discourse analysis': p. viii.
17. *Interpretatio: Neue Lateinische Textgrammatik*, by H.J. Glücklich, R. Nickel, P. Petersen, Ploetz-Verlag, Freiburg-Würzburg 1980.
18. 'Ope vrae aan die diskoersanalise' in *Ned. Geref. Teologiese Tydskrif*, 19 (1978) 260–271.
19. *Cf.* J. Lyons, *Semantics*, 1977, vol. 2, p. 412f.
20. So the Revised Standard Version: 'He who through faith is righteous shall live'.
21. So the traditional *King James Version*: 'The just shall live by faith', The *Jerusalem Bible*: 'The upright man finds life through faith', *et al.*
22. *The faith of Jesus Christ. An investigation of the narrative substructure of Galatians* 3:1–4:11, Scholars Press, Chico/Calif. 1983, p. 150–157.
23. So R.B. Hays, *op. cit.* p. 156: my underlining.

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