Scholia Reviews ns 16 (2007) 20.
Peter Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus: A Philosophical Study of the
Theology of Aristotle.
Han Baltussen,
Classics,
In this lucidly argued
monograph Adamson presents an interesting case study of the complex
transmission of Greek philosophical thought via Arabic writers. It illustrates
one way in which Greek philosophy became a lasting influence on Arabic thought.
Adamson aims to clarify the philosophical and historical context of a work
which was known in Arabic sources as The Theology of Aristotle. The work is in
fact a re-worked and reinterpreted version of views of Plotinus (d. AD 275) and
one of several Arabic writings constituting a larger work Adamson dubs the
Arabic Plotinus (AP). Theology was of course in Antiquity a term used for
metaphysical as well as religious matters. Confusion over authorship was not
uncommon either, and in this case the confusion may not only have been caused
by an individual mistake, but also by the fact that Plotinus made elaborate use
of Aristotelian ideas in his philosophical work.
The complexity of the case
depends for the philological aspect on the diverse range of sources and their
interrelations and a number of puzzles regarding the identity of the author for
the Urtext, the prologue and the headings following the prologue. For
the philosophical content the main issue is that of adaptation of Greek ideas
into the Arabic context. Adamson describes this process as philosophical
transformation resulting from an attempt to make Neoplatonism compatible with
the religions of Christianity and Islam (cover), and determining for centuries
how philosophers would approach Greek thought. Adamson is not only setting out
the complexities of the sources and their transmission at several stages
(Chapters 1-2), but more specifically trying to show that the version that can
be reconstructed from these surviving versions is philosophically significant
(Chapters 3-5). The study ends with the conclusion and a long appendix (pp.
179-205) in which the relationship between al-Kindi (c. AD 801-873) and the
Arabic Plotinus (AP) is clarified.
In Chapter 1, The Arabic
Plotinus Texts and their Origin (pp. 5-26), Adamson does some fascinating
groundwork (building on important work of others, in particular the Oxford
Arabist Zimmerman) to establish the nature of the relevant texts which form the
basis for recovering the Arabic Plotinus. It survives in different versions in
three main pieces of writing, each illustrating a partial version of what must
have been the common source and a substantial work preserving Plotinian thought
in Arabic. They are: The Theology of Aristotle, The Letter on Divine
Science, and The Sayings ascribed to the Greek Sage.
What is important here is
the claim that the author of this work (the Adaptor) did not come up with a
mere translation but rather with a creative adaptation. The work of AP shows a
high degree of truthfulness to Plotinus, in so far as he discusses topics from
the Enneads, but he also consistently interprets more freely,
re-arranges the order of topics and exhibits certain preferences while
suppressing other materials. A further problem, (which Adamson tackles in
Chapters 4-5) is the traditional view that the AP is in fact the work of
Porphyry. This will be refuted in the next chapter.
In Chapter 2 (pp. 27-48)
Adamson analyses the prologue in detail and the so-called headings (ru’ us).
The prologue actually mentions several names, among whom we find al-Kindi as
the corrector of the text. This has in the past attracted most attention, but
Adamson wants to include the headings in his analysis to make two points: the
headings go back to the Greek text of Plotinus Enneads 4.4; the author
of the prologue uses Aristotelian ideas from Arabic sources. By unravelling the
links with Aristotles Metaphysics Adamson is able to make plausible the
thesis that the author of the AP read Plotinus through Aristotelian eyes (p.
35). Stylistic analysis follows to show that al-Kindi is a plausible candidate
for authorship (pace Zimmerman who made a comment on the crude style not
typical for al- Kindi). Wisely, Adamson does not commit himself to an issue
which seems impossible to prove beyond doubt. A small section brings in the
first points of philosophical nature, when the conception of philosophy is
briefly highlighted in the Prologue: this conception runs along Aristotelian
lines (p. 41) with sciences building upon each other. An important point on
what philosophy tries to achieve concerns defining or delimiting (Prol. 8, see
p. 41): knowledge grasps an end, not what is infinite. (Adamson here refers to
the medieval notion of delimiting as defining; surely another obvious example
is the Greek horizein / horos as already discussed in Plato and
Aristotle).
His analysis of the
headings is of interest, as they have been rather neglected. But Adamson first
deals with the philological problems: the headings were viewed as evidence for
the Porphyrian authorship. But the evidence is ambiguous here (p. 43) and what
is more, it has not been observed that the full title is headings of the
questions (ru su al-masail). Adamson therefore argues against the
Porphyrian hypothesis by pointing out that the second part of the title Aporiai
Problems on the Soul comes from the title given to the work by Porphyry, yet
that the kephalaia might have been the work of the translators. Add to
this certain discrepancies between the headings (which abbreviate a lot) and
the paraphrase, and it becomes much more plausible to assume that the headings
and paraphrase were made separately but both times with the Greek underlying
them (p. 44). Regarding the purpose of the headings Adamson argues persuasively
that they were intended to summarize the topics laid out in the parallel Greek
text (p. 46). Adamson concludes that the headings do not present any
significant philosophical ideas, but that they do allow us to see that they
contain themes that are developed at greater length in the paraphrase (p. 47).
They include the idea of a type of ignorance higher than knowledge, of the
souls memory being in potency, and a philosophical link between these notions.
Other divergences from the Greek also occur (esp. on the brute soul), so that
it becomes clear that the same author wrote both headings and paraphrase (p.
47), yet that it is unlikely that al-Kindi was the author of these.
In Chapter 3, entitled
Psychology and Ethics (pp. 49-83), we enter the philosophical analysis proper.
It has two parts. First the Aristotelian influence on the Adaptors notion of
the soul is discussed (3.1) and next ethical views, which the Adaptor
emphasizes in his discussion of the relation between body and soul (3.2). On
the issue of entelecheia, the soul as the perfection of the body,
the Adaptor follows Plotinus in criticizing this view: he argues instead that
the soul is the cause of the bodys form and emphasizes that soul cannot be the
form of matter in the sense of an impression (p. 51). Thus there is a shift in
the reading of Aristotles theory of soul by using Plotinus interpretation. The
Adaptor distinguishes between two possible interpretations of Aristotles
theory (p. 54, italics mine): a materialist one (which he criticizes) and a
Plotinian one (which he adopts). This means that the Adaptor creates a shift
from the Plotinian criticism of Aristotle to the correction of a
misinterpretation.
As to the souls relation to
the body, the Adaptor exhibits Aristotelian influence in his interpretation of
Plotinus. Adamson traces in detail the different registers of the Adaptors
account, uncovering slight differences and shifts in the treatment of soul and
body (p. 57). AP sees the soul as form of body, but develops (pp. 59-63) a
distinction between rational and brute soul (p. 62). He is also able to show
that there is not only influence from the De anima but also from AP on
an Arabic paraphrase of De an. from the circle of al-Kindi (pp. 63-67).
Language and epistemology
form the subject of Chapter 4 (pp. 85-109) and this will lead up to the
transformation of Plotinus theory of the One in Chapter 5. AP is shown to
inject ethical language into passages where such concerns are not present (p.
69). This illustrates his greater concern with ethics than Plotinus, marking a
real departure from the Plotinian approach, often using much stronger language
and even changing the perspective on such issues as justice (for example, the
virtue of justice coming to be in the soul instead, as Plotinus claimed, being
the object of the souls inquiry).
The treatment of language
and epistemology raise the special difficulty in Plotinus that he had made
intellect and the One ineffable, that is, it is beyond the reach of language;
yet he continued to comment on these throughout his work. The AP is seen to
develop original ways to apply language to these higher metaphysical principles
(p. 85). The notion of learned ignorance, here glossed as ignorance that
transcends knowledge (p. 88) is another important element in the AP,
representing the first known doctrine on this topic in the Arabic tradition. In
this case it is elaborated almost completely independently from the Greek text
(mimar II). AP offers a doctrine, which seems to ignore the subtle
distinction Plotinus makes between knowing something and being aware that one
knows something (p. 90).
The fifth and last chapter
(pp. 111-70) brings in issues belonging to theology and metaphysics. Here we
find the most radical and significant changes made by the Adaptor: those having
to do with God (p. 111). Plotinus One has now been turned into a Creator God,
which is only possible if the One in Plotinus undergoes a thorough re-thinking
(ibid.). By way of a discussion of negative theology Adamson progresses by
concentrating on the application of predication by causality and eminence to
the One. It is noteworthy that in this part of the account the additional
influence of Arabic thought becomes palpable, as the discussion is related to
debates between practitioners of rational theology (ilm al-kalam), which
establishes a link with the time of al-Kindi. In the treatment of the negative
theology (indirect description of the One) and positive theology (using names
to signify) the Adaptor is seen to get rid of subtleties in Plotinus. Instead
of allowing for naming out of necessity, AP allows for attributes outside the
First principle, despite the fact that he agrees that the One does not have
attributes (a sign of multiplicity). It would seem that the Adaptor holds the
view that God relates to the attributes as Plotinus thinks nous does to
the forms (its objects): they are identical in the sense that they can only be
distinguished analytically: the attributes are in Him in the manner of cause
(from Theology of Aristotle IX.71 quoted on p. 124).
Several other important
issues of the Adaptors theology are discussed in this chapter, but it would
take us too far into intricate metaphysical arguments on God as first being,
pure actuality, creation and time, so I deal with the concluding chapter in
brief. Adamson draws a number of important conclusions from his analysis,
starting with some speculation on who would be responsible for the differences
between Plotinus and the Arabic Plotinus (p. 171). Porphyry is discarded, since
the already strong case against it by Zimmerman has been strengthened with
further arguments (4.1.3), and Adamson prefers to think it was someone from
al-Kindis circle, opting in the end for al- Himsi (p. 177). General
considerations are brought in to support this, in particular the insight that
al-Kindis works show that the early reception of Greek philosophy in Arabic
circles is characterized by the attempt to mediate between Aristotle and
Neoplatonism (which in many instances simply meant emphasizing the pre-existing
Aristotelianism of the Enneads, p. 173). Adamson even contemplates
al-Kindi himself as the better candidate for authorship (given the latters
brilliance as a philosopher and access to all the necessary sources -- further
developed in the substantial appendix), but there are objections that go
against this. Because the evidence does not exclude al- Himsi, on balance he
seems the most likely option. Thus this fascinating study of a complicated text
ends with a solution that is based on a thorough scrutiny of its most important
philological and philosophical aspects. This is no mean feat, as it also
represents a useful case study in the reception of Greek thought in Arabic
culture, offering another piece of the puzzle that is the story of intellectual
transformations.