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MASINISSA, SYPHAX, AND SOPHONIBA

It is the purpose of this short paper to examine the accounts given by Appian, Dio Cassius, and Diodorus Siculus of the guerrilla warfare carried on by Masinissa against Syphax in the years 205-204 B.C. and the short, fatal marriage of Masinissa and Sophoniba after the defeat and capture of Syphax in the following year; and then to compare these accounts with the version given in Livy xxix 29-33 and xxx 12-15.

According to Appian, (*Hispanica* vii 37; *Punica* ii 10) Sophoniba had been betrothed to Masinissa, but the Carthaginians had then given her to Syphax to secure his loyalty against the Romans. As a result, Masinissa joined Scipio when he was in Spain in 206 B.C. A very similar account is given by Dio Cassius (xvii 57, 51-53; Zonaras ix 11). This version runs counter to that of Livy, who, in his account of the meeting between Scipio and Masinissa and the conclusion of their alliance, does not mention any such motive (xxviii 35). Moreover, in xxix 23, Livy describes the celebration of the marriage between Syphax and Sophoniba as taking place while Scipio was in Sicily, in 204 B.C.; though the words 'mentio quoque incohata adfinitatis' (xxix 23,3) imply that the betrothal may well have taken place some time earlier. However, if Appian and Dio were right in making the betrothal of Sophoniba to Syphax the reason for Masinissa's desertion of the Carthaginians, it would be necessary to reject the repeated statements in Livy that Syphax was still regarded as a friend of Rome until just before Scipio sailed from Sicily; to do this would be to regard Livy's account of Scipio's preparations in Sicily as fundamentally unreliable.

However this may be, it does not affect the question of whether or not Sophoniba had been betrothed to Masinissa once before.

Here Appian and Dio are supported by Diodorus Siculus (xxvii 7), though Diodorus suggests that she had actually been married to Masinissa before her marriage to Syphax. Livy, on the other hand, implies that Masinissa had never set eyes on Sophoniba before he met her in the palace at Cirta after the capture of Syphax (xxx 12). However, Livy's account of the whole episode is highly dramatized, and little weight can be attached to the details of his story at this point.

The guerrilla warfare between Masinissa and Syphax is described by Appian (*Punica* ii 11-12) in far more sober and less dramatic terms than those employed by Livy, and Appian sets out reasons why Masinissa was able to maintain himself against superior numbers; the whole passage has a Polybian ring about it. However, Appian goes on to say (*Punica* iii 13-14) that, on hearing of Scipio's departure from Sicily, the Carthaginians and Syphax came to terms with Masinissa; but Masinissa had no intention of keeping his side of the bargain, and immediately made contact with Scipio; then he drew Hanno and the Carthaginian cavalry, who had not realised his change of sides, into an ambush which he had planned with Scipio. This story also occurs in Dio Cassius (xvii 65-66; Zonaras ix 12).

Finally, Appian's account of the marriage of Sophoniba to Masinissa and her subsequent death (*Punica*, v 27-28) is far less dramatic than that of Livy. According to Appian, after the capture of Syphax, Sophoniba sent emissaries to Masinissa to explain that her marriage to Syphax had been forced upon her; Masinissa accepted her explanation and married her; when Scipio, acting on the advice of Syphax, insisted that she be surrendered to the Romans as part of the booty, Masinissa

sent her poison, telling her she now had the alternative of killing herself or becoming a captive of Rome. The account in Dio (Zonaras ix 13) is similar to that of Livy, though once again the previous betrothal to Masinissa is implied. The remark of Syphax quoted by Livy, that it was the one consolation in his defeat that the woman who had ruined him was now likely to ruin his rival too, occurs in a very similar form; but the actual administering of the poison is done by Masinissa himself, and not, as in Livy and Appian, by a messenger. Diodorus (xxvii 7) gives a brief summary of the whole incident, mentions a previous union between Masinissa and Sophoniba, and says that Masinissa gave her the poison with his own hands and forced her to drink it.

Certain conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of the various versions set out above. First, the account in Livy of the guerrilla warfare between Masinissa and Syphax and the marriage and death of Sophoniba is confirmed, in outline, by other accounts that, in part, are contained in an extant author, Diodorus, of earlier date than Livy. Secondly, ignoring minor points of detail, such as whether Sophoniba killed herself at Cirta or at Scipio's camp, and whether Masinissa gave her the poison with his own hands or sent it by a messenger, there are three main points in which the version in Appian, Dio, and Diodorus diverges from that of Livy: first, the story of a previous union, whether betrothal or marriage, between Masinissa and Sophoniba; second, the story that the betrothal of Sophoniba to Syphax while Masinissa was in Spain was what induced the latter to join Scipio; and third, the story of a pretended reconciliation between Masinissa and the Carthaginians just before Scipio landed in Africa in 204 B.C. and the treacherous deception of Hanno by Masinissa. This

indicates that Appian, Dio, and Diodorus were all following a common source, and one that was different from Livy's.

It is probable that the original source from which these stories about Masinissa were derived was none other than Polybius. It is certain that Polybius had met Masinissa and had had the opportunity of talking with him about the Punic War (Pol. ix 25). It is equally certain that Polybius was very interested in the personality and career of Masinissa (Pol. xxxvii 10). It is probable, therefore, that the basic material for most of these stories was provided to Polybius by Masinissa himself. Such material, of course, would be highly subjective. If, then, the account of the reconciliation between Masinissa and Carthage is to be assigned to Polybius, he must have obtained it from a Carthaginian source.

Finally, apart from the dramatic overtones of Livy's narrative, it differs from that of Appian, Dio, and Diodorus in giving considerable details about the struggle for the succession in the royal house of the Maesulii (xxix 29). These details may have been given by Polybius, but omitted for some reason by the source followed by Appian, Dio Cassius, and Diodorus; on the other hand it is possible that Livy obtained these details from a completely different source, one that had some special interest in Numidian history. Considerations of chronology make it unlikely, though not impossible, that the source Livy used was one of the historical works of King Juba, but it may well have been the '*libri Punici*' of King Hiempsal of Numidia, the contemporary of Sulla, which Sallust had translated (*Jugurtha* xvii 7).

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TWO NOTES ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF SPARTA

1. A note on the Spartan *Rhetra* in Plutarch, *Lyc.* 6

This note is concerned with the powers assigned to the people in the corrupt final clause of the Spartan *rhetra* and the limitations placed upon these powers by the rider of kings Polydorus and Theopompus.⁽¹⁾

The corrupt final clause of the *rhetra* reads † γαμωδανγοριανημην και κράτος. Any restoration of this passage must take Plutarch's explanation (*Lyc.* 6, 3) of this part of the *rhetra* into consideration: τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἀθροισθέντος εἶπεῖν μὲν οὐδενὶ γνώμην τῶν ἄλλων ἐφεῖτο, τὴν δ' ὑπὸ τῶν γερόντων καὶ τῶν βασιλέων προτεθεῖσαν ἐπικρίναι κύριος ἦν ὁ δῆμος.

Numerous emendations have been offered.

M. Treu gives a list of the earlier emendations,⁽²⁾ and below I list those offered since Treu:

- a. M. Treu:⁽³⁾ δάμω δ' ἀνταγορίαν ἔμεν και κράτος, "dem Damos aber soll zustehen Gegenrede und Entschied (Herrschaftsgewalt)".
- b. A. von Blumenthal:⁽⁴⁾ δαμῶδων γοριαν ἔμεν και κράτος which he translates "civium arbitrium esse et potestatem."
- c. H. T. Wade-Gery:⁽⁵⁾ independently from Treu also proposed δάμω (or δάμω) ἀνταγορίαν ἔμεν και κράτος – "the demos shall have the right to criticize (sc. to make counter-proposals?) and the final voice".
- W. den Boer accepts this emendation but with some modification in the interpretation; he translates, "the people must have the right to contradict and have power".⁽⁶⁾
- d. K. M. T. Chrimes:⁽⁷⁾ δαμωδᾶν κυριαν ἔμεν – "confirming to belong to the citizens".
- e. N. G. L. Hammond:⁽⁸⁾ δαμοτᾶν ἀγορᾶν ἔμεν και κράτος.

Von Blumenthal's conjecture has been

convincingly refuted by Hammond,⁽⁹⁾ that of Miss Chrimes by Woodward and den Boer.⁽¹⁰⁾ We are left with the emendation of Hammond, and that of Treu and Wade-Gery. Several objections may be raised against Hammond's emendation: (i) his explanation of how the error arose is palaeographically too involved. (ii) The only reason why the transposition of Δ and T in ΔΑΜΟΤΑΝ could have taken place is similarity in pronunciation, but is this likely in a familiar word such as δαμότης? (iii) The corruption of the completely intelligible ἀγορᾶν into an unintelligible γοριαν cannot be accounted for. Hammond's objections to the emendation of Treu and Wade-Gery are as follows: "ἀνταγορία does not occur in Greek and its meaning, if it be 'to speak against the proposals of the Gerousia', is not reflected in Plutarch or Tyrtæus. The form δάμω is inconsistent with Plutarch's text, e.g. Συλλανίου. The emendation also adds two letters to the text, introduces the connection δέ whereas the other clauses of the *rhetra* are an asyndeton, and affords no explanation for the corruption of Δ into Γ". However, palaeographically ἀνταγορία is probable on the assumption that the copyist's eye slipped from T to Γ.⁽¹¹⁾ The objection that the word does not occur in Greek is not decisive, as both Treu and Wade-Gery have pointed out.⁽¹²⁾ The corruption γαμω is more difficult but, as Wade-Gery has emphasized, some form of δᾶμος must be restored since Plutarch certainly understood the *damos* to be spoken of in this clause.⁽¹³⁾ Hammond rightly objects to the gen. δάμω and, with Treu, who also considers the gen. an impossible reading,⁽¹⁴⁾ I prefer the reading δάμω (dat.). The explanation for the connecting δέ is more difficult, but it may be explained on

the ground that the last clause stands in a strong adversative relationship to the immediately preceding phrase οὕτως εισφέρειν τε καὶ ἀφίστασθαι. The implied subject of this phrase is the kings and elders, and, after it has been stated that the kings and elders shall introduce proposals, the last clause says: 'but the final decision shall rest with the people.' This special emphasis of the powers of the people in the last clause might perhaps be due to the fact that the Spartan assembly, which probably developed out of the gathering of fighting men under the early kings, was now for the first time elevated to a statutory body with defined powers.

Palaeographically, then, the emendation of Treu and Wade-Gery appears to be the most acceptable. On historical grounds, however, the word ἀνταγορία seems untenable, for the later meaning of the verb ἀνταγορεύειν is 'to speak against, reply', and both Plutarch and Aristotle make it clear that the members of the Spartan assembly did not possess the right of discussion. Plutarch's commentary (*Lyc.* 6, 3) on this part of the *rhetra* falls into two parts:

- a. a negative part: εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδενὶ γνώμην τῶν ἄλλων ἐφεῖτο.
 - b. a positive part: ἐπικρίναι κύριος ἦν ὁ δῆμος.
- The positive part of his commentary explains the words καὶ κράτος in the final clause of the *rhetra*, i.e. the people had independent power in so far as they could accept or reject the proposals of the *Gerousia*. The negative part explains the corrupt words in the *rhetra*, i.e. the people did not possess the right of proposal, and Plutarch does not imply that they possessed the right of discussion. Aristotle distinctly states that discussion was not permitted in the Spartan assembly: in *Politics* 1273 a 6 he discusses the Carthaginian constitution saying that τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις ἀντειπεῖν ἔξεστι, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις πολιτείαις οὐκ ἔστιν. These other consti-

tutions are those of Crete and Sparta which he had discussed before that of Carthage. With den Boer, I believe that this evidence is conclusive.⁽¹⁵⁾ Wade-Gery defends his interpretation of the meaning of ἀνταγορία as the 'right to criticize' by the drastic procedure of not only doubting Aristotle's dependability, but also of regrouping his text.⁽¹⁶⁾ Hammond has advanced a new interpretation, viz. that the procedure in the assembly was different when the *Gerousia* was unanimous and when it was not.⁽¹⁷⁾

Prof. den Boer has shown an acceptable way out of this difficulty whilst retaining the reading ἀνταγορία.⁽¹⁸⁾ He points out that "it should be remembered that at an earlier stage of political life the various terms did not possess the definite technical meaning which they acquired in later periods". Thus ἀνταγορία at first meant "contradiction", i.e. simply 'to be in opposition'. Later on ἀνταγορεύειν, like ἀντιλέγειν, acquired the technical significance of 'submitting counter-proposals'. Thus far I am in full agreement with den Boer. In terms of the *rhetra*, therefore, the final decision on the proposals of the *Gerousia* rested with the people who could accept or reject these proposals, but they could not discuss or amend them nor submit a proposal of their own.

αἱ δὲ σχολιὰν ὁ δᾶμος ἔροιτο, τοὺς πρεσβυγενέας καὶ ἀρχέτας ἀποστατήρας ἤμεν.⁽¹⁹⁾ This was the rider which, according to Plutarch *Lyc.* 6, 4, was introduced by Polydorus and Theopompus when ὕστερον μέντοι τῶν πολλῶν ἀφαιρέσει καὶ προσθήσει τὰς γνώμας διαστρεφόντων καὶ παραβιαζομένων etc. Plutarch explains the meaning of the rider as τοῦτ' ἔστι μὴ κυροῦν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀφίστασθαι καὶ διαλύειν τὸν δῆμον, ὡς ἐκτρέποντα καὶ μεταποιῶντα τὴν γνώμην παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον. The question now arises in what way the powers of the people were limited by the rider. The answer to this question lies in the in-

terpretation of the verbs διαστρέφειν and παραβιάζεσθαι, in Plutarch's reason for the introduction of the additional clause, and the verbs ἐκτρέποντα καὶ μεταποιῶντα in his explanation of the meaning of the clause. If we assume, with Wade-Grey and others, that the people had the right of discussion and amendment, the meaning would of course be that the people changed the motions put before them contrary to the best interests of the state. But Plutarch and Aristotle make it clear that the people did not possess these rights, and the solution, I think, is that all these verbs are conative, i.e. at a later stage the people attempted to assume the rights of discussion and amendment while not in fact possessing it. This tendency was curbed by the kings and elders who added a clause to the effect that, if the people should attempt to change the motions, they would withdraw and dissolve the meeting.⁽²⁰⁾

The interpretation of the phrase σκολιῶν ἔροιτο is now also clear. The adjective means 'crooked' i.e. 'unjust' (LSJ s.v. II). The verb διαστρέφειν in Plutarch's commentary means 'to twist about' and metaphorically 'to distort' (LSJ s.v. I). There is, therefore, a certain parallelism between the verb in Plutarch's commentary and the adjective in the rider. Plutarch says the people tried διαστρέφειν the proposals before them, i.e. to twist, distort them. In other words, the people, having no right of proposal or of amendment in terms of the *rhētra*, try to distort the proposals of the *Gerousia*, thus in effect submitting their own proposal, which is a 'twisted' or a 'crooked' one. It appears, then, that, with Wade-Gery, we should take the phrase σκολιῶν ἔροιτο as meaning "if the people submit a crooked proposal". My explanation of the significance of the rider, however, differs widely from that of Wade-Gery. In his view the rider was merely a safeguard against "crooked formulation" on

the part of the people, i.e. a safeguard against abuse of their rights of discussion and amendment. I believe that the rider was a restriction of the powers of the people within the original limits as laid down by the *rhētra*: if the *damos* should attempt to exceed its rights and σκολιῶν ἔροιτο the kings and elders would withdraw.

The interpretations of neither den Boer nor Hammond can be sustained. Hammond's interpretation that σκολιῶν is used adverbially, and that the meaning of the rider is "if the people declare wrongly", must be rejected because of his assumption that the people had the right of discussion. Den Boer's interpretation that the rider means "if the people are of the opinion that the proposal is not right"⁽²¹⁾ is untenable because, as den Boer himself says, it would amount to removing all effective power from the assembly. It appears hardly likely that the people would have accepted a limitation to their sovereignty amounting to political suicide, and we have evidence that in later times the Spartan assembly possessed real power, e.g. Thuc. I, 87; Xen. *Hell.* II, 2, 19; *Ages.* 6.

2. A note on Tyrtaeus fr. 1

The whole fragment is relevant, particularly the following verses:⁽²²⁾

12. χωρὶς Πάμφυλοί τε καὶ Ἰλλεῖς ἠδ[ε] Δυμᾶνες]
ἀνδροφόνους μελλίας χερσὶν ἀν[ασχόμενοι],
[ἡμεῖς] δ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖς ἐπὶ
πάν[τα] τρέποντες]
15. [ἔκνου] ἄτερ μονίηι πεισόμεθ' ἠγεμ[όνων].
ἀλλ' εὐθύς σύμπαντες ἀλοιησεῦ[μεν] ἀμαρτήηι
[ἀ]νδράσιν αἰχμηταῖς ἐγγύθεν ἰσ[τάμενοι].

A supposed change in the number of tribes at Sparta is sometimes used as an argument in support of the view that the so-called

Lycurgeoan reform at Sparta took place about 600 B.C.⁽²³⁾ According to this theory there were three 'Dorian' tribes in the time of Tyrtaeus, the Hylleis, Pamphyloi and Dymanes, but after 600 the citizens of Sparta were divided into five tribes, the change from the three-tribe to a five-tribe organization being ascribed to the Lycurgeoan reform.⁽²⁴⁾

One of the arguments adduced in support of this alleged change in the number of tribes is that before 600 the Spartan military organization was based upon the three Dorian tribes, while after that date we find an army consisting of five obal regiments.⁽²⁵⁾ Thus Wade-Gery maintains that the Spartan army which fought at Plataea in 479 B.C. was an obal army consisting of five obal regiments. He believes that the existence of the army based on the three Dorian tribes before 600 is proved by Tyrtaeus fr. 1, first published in 1918 by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.⁽²⁶⁾ Wade-Gery, following Wilamowitz and Gercke,⁽²⁷⁾ concludes that the papyrus describes a prospective battle "in which the Spartans are to go into action χωρίς Πάμφυλοί τε καὶ Ἰλλεῖς ἠδ[ε] Δυμᾶνες]. In the Messenian revolt, then, the units of the Spartan army were those three 'Dorian tribes', the same as we find in many Dorian cities, racial or 'kinship' groups which purported to be descended from Herakles' three sons, Hyllos, Pamphilos, and Dyman. The evidence is conclusive, but there is little trace of it in our tradition: Aristotle in his *Constitution* appears to know only the two later stages, the Obal army and the Morai".⁽²⁸⁾

Now it must be pointed out, as N. G. L. Hammond has done,⁽²⁹⁾ that the evidence is not as 'conclusive' as Wade-Gery maintains. The author of the fragment is not known and the suggestion that Tyrtaeus wrote it is probable but by no means certain. The mention of the Messenians in v. 66 suggests that the fragment is concerned with either the First Messenian War (as Tyrtaeus fr. 4 is) in the

second half of the eighth century, or with the Second Messenian War, the time at which Tyrtaeus was writing.⁽³⁰⁾

In 1950 Hammond advanced a new interpretation of this fragment.⁽³¹⁾ The main conclusions of his careful study are: in vv. 14-16 the emphasis lies with the opening words, and in v. 16 the emphasis is fully driven home with the words ἀλλ' εὐθὺς σύμπαντες. These words, Hammond continues, obviously contrast with the only word in the preceding lines which carries such emphasis, viz. χωρίς in v. 12. He suggests that the sense may be that "the Pamphyloi Hylleis and Dymanes fought separately: 'but we (perhaps the Spartans of Tyrtaeus' day) shall obey our steadfast leaders without flinching, but we shall one and all combine forthwith to beat down (the foe? . . .) as we stand at close quarters to the spearmen'. In that case a contrast is drawn between the tactics which the Dorian tribes had employed in the past and those which the Spartans are to employ in a future battle".⁽³²⁾ Hammond concludes that "in this poem, then, reference may well be made to the invasion of the Peloponnese by the three Dorian tribes who are mentioned elsewhere in this connection. The contrast is also a natural one in Tyrtaeus. The change from Homeric tactics took place at Sparta not later than c. 700 B.C." W. den Boer's only objection to this theory is that the contrast may not be between old conditions at Sparta and the new tactics, but between the condition of the enemy who is to be engaged and the conditions at Sparta.⁽³³⁾

Hammond's interpretation has much to commend it, but, whereas he takes the contrast expressed in the fragment as between the coming battle and the remote past, I suggest that the reference is to the immediate past, to the First Messenian War which according to Tyrtaeus took place in the time of πατέρων ἡμετέρων πατέρες (fr. 4, v. 14),

and that the main contrast contained in the poem is a contrast in tactics.

Hammond⁽³⁴⁾ has adequately proved that the tactics described in vv. 16-24 are those of hoplite warfare, and, except for one minor detail, he is in agreement with Miss H. L. Lorimer who has stated that "everything that can be extracted from fragment 1 is in complete accord with the tactics of the phalanx".⁽³⁵⁾ Miss Lorimer further states, "that from c. 700 onwards hoplite equipment was general at Sparta is clear, and, in view of the interpretation sometimes put on certain passages in Tyrtaeus or the poetry which goes under his name, the fact is of importance. On the other hand, the evidence does not suggest that here any more than elsewhere the new equipment goes back into the eighth century".⁽³⁶⁾ If the change to hoplite armour and tactics took place c. 700, the change was effected not long before the time of Tyrtaeus. It was such a fundamental change in methods of warfare that it is only reasonable to expect that it would be reflected in the literature of the time. Tyrtaeus' poem, composed at a time of national crisis (if in fact it does refer to the Second Messenian War in the second half of the seventh century), must have had a considerable emotional appeal, an appeal which was strengthened not by a reference to a remote, almost forgotten past, but by a reference to the immediate past, to the previous occasion when the security of the state had been threatened by the Messenians, and to the momentous changes in armour and tactics which had since taken place. The threat of the Second Messenian War would naturally recall memories of the first struggle, and an encouragement to the Spartans that they should face and defeat the foe with their new arms and tactics, just as their forefathers had done with a different military machine, was eminently suitable in the circumstances.

The change to hoplite armour and tactics

was certainly accompanied by some change in the army organization. We have no information as to the nature of the change, but it appears quite probable that the change from tribal to obal army should be associated with the change from Homeric to hoplite tactics, rather than with an hypothetical constitutional change in 600 B.C.

The foregoing argument is based upon the assumptions that the Spartan *rhetra* in Plutarch *Lycurgus* 6, in terms of which the *obae* (whatever their nature)⁽³⁷⁾ were apparently created, must be dated early, and that the *obae* had been in existence for some time before they were incorporated as part of the army organization. It must perhaps be emphasized that it is completely unnecessary to associate any change in the army organization with those obscure words in the *rhetra*, φυλάς φυλάξαντα καὶ ὠβάς ὠβάξαντα.⁽³⁸⁾ These words need not suggest that the Dorian tribes were abolished by the *rhetra* (whether the participle φυλάξαντα is derived from φυλάζειν or from φυλάττειν)⁽³⁹⁾ and certainly do not suggest that the *obae* were instituted as part of the army organization from the start. Constitutional changes certainly do influence army organization, but not every change in army organization is necessarily due to a constitutional change — changes in armour and tactics are as liable to affect army organization.

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(1) I cannot accept the view of some scholars that the *rhetra* and rider are contemporaneous, e.g. H. T. Wade-Gery, *CQ* 38, 1944, 115; K.M.T. Chrimes, *Ancient Sparta*, 1949, 477 f.; H. Rudolf, 'Die Lykurgischen Rhetra und die Begründung des spartanischen Staates', *Festschrift Bruno Snell*, 1956, 63-64. If the rider is regarded as an integral part of the *rhetra*, the authority of both Plutarch and Aristotle must be disregarded (the mention of Aristotle in *Lyc.* 6, 2 shows that Plutarch is drawing on Aristotle for his information in this passage,

cf. W. den Boer, *Laconian Studies*, 1954, 169) and no scholar has yet advanced a convincing reason for doing so.

(2) 'Der Schlusssatz der Grossen Rhetra', *Hermes* 76, 1941, 22-42.

(3) *Ibid.*

(4) 'Zur Lykurgischen Rhetra', *Hermes* 77, 1942, 212-215.

(5) 'The Spartan Rhetra in Plutarch Lycurgus VI', *CQ* 37, 1943, 62-67; 38, 1944, pp. 1-9, 115-126 (reprinted in *Essays in Greek History*, 1958, 37-85).

(6) *Op. cit.* p. 176-179.

(7) *Op. cit.* p. 478 f.

(8) 'The Lycurgean Reform at Sparta', *JHS* 70, 1950, 42-64.

(9) *L.c.* p. 44.

(10) Woodward, *Hist.* 1, 1950, 633; den Boer, *op. cit.* p. 178-179.

(11) Wade-Gery, *CQ* 37, 1943, 64 n. 2.

(12) Treu, *l.c.* p. 33; Wade-Gery, *CQ* 37, 1943, 64 n. 3.

(13) *CQ* 37, 1943, 64 n. 2.

(14) *L.c.* p. 34 n. 2.

(15) *Op. cit.* p. 176-177.

(16) *CQ* 37, 1943, 70 f.

(17) *L.c.* p. 45-47. I cannot here consider this theory, with which I do not agree, in detail. I can only point out that the passage from Diodorus (XI, 50), in which it is described how Hetoimaridas opposed the general Spartan wish to go to war with Athens, and which Hammond cites in support of his argument, does not in fact support it. Diodorus merely states *παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἔπεισε τὴν γερουσίαν καὶ τὸν δῆμον*, and there is no suggestion that there was deviation from the procedure which one would consider normal; Hetoimaridas first prevailed upon the *Gerousia* not to go to war with Athens, and, when the rather surprising decision of the elders was brought before the people, he was naturally chosen to persuade the people to support the decision of the *Gerousia*.

(18) *Op. cit.* p. 177.

(19) The emendations *ἔλοιτο* or *αἰροῖτο* have been proved unnecessary by Wade-Gery, *CQ* 37, 1943, 65, 70. The meaning of *ἀποστατήρας* I take to be that the kings and elders will be "withdrawers", i.e. go away and dissolve the meeting, cf. Hammond, *l.c.* p. 45 n. 21.

(20) Von Blumenthal, *l.c.* p. 213 was, as far as I know, the first to suggest that *ἐκτρέποντα καὶ μεταποιούντα* are *imperfecta de conatu*. The difference between his interpretation and mine should however be emphasized: He maintains that in terms of the *rhetra* the people possessed *arbitrium et potestatem*, and that in terms of the rider "soll die Gerusia die Versammlung auflösen, sobald sie eine Neigung zu misslichen Beschlüsse wahrnimmt". These "missliche Beschlüsse" can (I suppose) only

originate from the ranks of the people. This interpretation assigns such arbitrary and vaguely defined powers to the *Gerousia* that it renders the proper functioning of the assembly almost impossible — any opposition to the wishes of the *Gerousia* could be interpreted as "eine Neigung zu misslichen Beschlüsse".

(21) *Op. cit.* p. 180.

(22) Diehl, *Anth. Lyr. Graec.* vol. I, 2nd. ed. 6 f.

(23) The greatest exponent of this theory is no doubt H. T. Wade-Gery, *CAH* III, 562, and *CQ* 38, 1944, 115 f. In his review of K. M. T. Chrimes' *Ancient Sparta*, 1949, A. M. Woodward states that "in selecting Wade-Gery's arguments (in *CAH* III 1925) as representative of modern views and ignoring more recent discussions of the problem, whether published by himself or by other historians, especially in German periodicals, the author appears to some extent to be tilting at abandoned windmills" (*Hist* 1, 1950, 625). Woodward is at fault, for Wade-Gery's articles in *CQ* 37, 1943, 62 f. and 38, 1944, 1 f., 115 f. certainly support his account in *CAH* III. In 1950 H. W. Stubbs wrote that the constitutional settlement at Sparta "is now generally admitted to have taken place about 600 B.C." (*CQ* 44, 1950, 32). In 1956, in an article entitled 'Die Lykurgische Rhetra und die Begründung des spartanischen Staates', *Festschrift Bruno Snell*, 1956, 61-76, Hans Rudolph dated the reform in the time of Tyrtaeus, "also in das späte 7. Jahrhundert".

(24) Cf. for example Wade-Gery in *CAH* III, 560.

(25) *CQ* 38, 1944, 117 f.

(26) *Sitzungsberichte Kön. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1918, 728-736.

(27) *Hermes* 55, 1921, 347-8.

(28) *CQ* 38, 1944, 120.

(29) *JHS* 70, 1950, 50.

(30) I accept the second half of the seventh century as the time when Tyrtaeus lived, cf. *RE* Zweite Reihe, VII, 1945-46. For the dating of the First Messenian War in the second half of the eighth century, cf. G. Dickens, *JHS* 32, 1912, 15 and K. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* 1², 262 f. It is here assumed that the Second Messenian War took place in about the third quarter of the seventh century, cf. A. Andrews, *CQ* 32, 1938, p. 96 n. 2; W. den Boer, *Laconian Studies*, 1954, 133-34; G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* 1, 590 n. 1.

(31) *L.c.* 50 f.

(32) *Ibid.* p. 51.

(33) *Op. cit.* p. 173 n. 1.

(34) *L.c.* p. 50-51.

(35) 'The Hoplite Phalanx', *BSA* 42, 1947, 76-138; the evidence of Tyrtaeus is discussed on p. 121-128.

(36) *Ibid.* p. 93.

(37) Discussions of the nature of the *obae* include: V. Ehrenberg, *RE* XVII, 1693-1696; A. J. Beattie, *CQ* NS 1,

1951, 46-48; H. T. Wade-Gery, *CQ* 38, 1944, 120 f.; K.M.T. Chrimes, *op. cit.* 424 f.; W. den Boer, *op. cit.* 172 f.; Hammond, *l.c.* 59 f.; Rudolph, *l.c.* 70 f.

(38) Two examples of scholars (apart from Wade-Gery) who make such an association are Hammond, *l.c.* p. 59 and Rudolph, *l.c.* p. 70.

(39) For example: Wade-Gery, *CQ* 38, 1944, 117 f. derives the participle from *φυλάζειν* and maintains that

no new division of tribes was envisaged by the *rhētra*; Hammond, *l.c.* p. 59, also derives the participle from *φυλάζειν*, but believes that the Dorian tribes were abolished by the *rhētra* and a new division into tribes based upon five *obae* was created; den Boer, *op. cit.* p. 171 (also cf. his important n. 1 on this page) derives the participle from *φυλάττειν* and does not believe that a new division of tribes was envisaged.

THE LETTERS IN PLUTARCH'S ALEXANDER ⁽¹⁾

In the course of the *Life* Plutarch cites no fewer than thirty-one letters written by or to Alexander. These he evidently regards as authentic and uses in preference to his other sources, as e.g. in his account of the operations against Porus in chapter 60. He treats this correspondence, in fact, exactly as he does the Platonic epistles in his life of Dion. As in many cases the letters contain statements about Alexander not to be found in Arrian, and in others conflict with his account, it is obviously of prime importance to determine whether we are dealing with genuine letters of Alexander and his correspondents, or with forgeries. Naturally, then, they have been examined many times. In their doctoral dissertations at the end of the last century Pridik and Zumetikos came to the conclusion that almost all were genuine, but Kaerst and, more recently, Pearson have maintained exactly the opposite.⁽²⁾ The truth, I think, lies somewhere between.

Kaerst (605) pointed with justification to the widespread tendency in the period between Alexander and Plutarch to pass off forged letters as the productions of famous statesmen or philosophers, and cited the correspondence, almost certainly not genuine, attributed to Aristotle, Ptolemy and Philip. Few scholars too, I imagine, would argue that all the letters attributed to Plato, Isocrates or Demosthenes were written by them. There

must have been many reasons for forgery, and Pearson (445) has rightly emphasised that we are not dealing with a forger in the modern sense of the word. Rather, he suggests, such a writer may wish to provide sensational new material "to refute the judgement of historians or vindicate the judgement of philosophers". To these reasons, as Tarn has pointed out,⁽³⁾ we may add the need for ammunition in the propaganda war which followed Alexander's death. Clearly the general position adopted by Kaerst and Pearson is strong and I accept the view of Kaerst that the onus of proof lies on the person who would assert the authenticity of any of the letters. But *proof*, in my opinion, does exist in the case of at least one of the letters, and there is more to be said in favour of others than has been said.

Clearly Pridik and Zumetikos claimed too much, and many of their arguments are rendered valueless by Pearson's acute observation (444) that "the mere fact that a letter includes remarks which are attributed to Alexander by reputable historians is no proof that the letter is genuine". On the other hand it is impossible to be satisfied with the position taken up by Pearson (445). "Much trouble", he writes, "has been taken in attempting to sort out the few quotations which could be genuine from those which probably or certainly are not; but the results of such investigation, even if valid, are of

little importance when the quotations which *could* be genuine are either insignificant or are already reported by the historians". But surely it is not of "little importance" to determine whether Callisthenes was implicated in the Conspiracy of the Pages, or to learn what Alexander thought about his divine son-ship. Pearson makes no detailed examination of the correspondence, but merely advances suggestions about the motives of the forger or forgers. His position is basically this: if the letters contain material found in the historians then they are forgeries based on this material; if they contradict the historians then they are designed "to edify or startle readers with new discoveries", or to present a picture of Alexander as a tyrant. His views are essentially those of Kaerst, to whom he refers, and it is with the detailed examination of Kaerst that I must take issue. The results of such an examination *are*, in my view, important, but before I proceed to this I would make a number of general points.

Kaerst (617) has argued that it is extremely striking that the letters cited by Plutarch were not known to Ptolemy and Aristobulus, or at any rate were not known to have been used by them, although we know that the letters written by Alexander, Parmenio etc. were available to the earliest writers on Alexander. The latter part of the sentence, however, is merely a deduction from Plutarch *Phocion* 17E. There we are told that "Duris writes that Alexander, after his victory over Darius, dropped the greeting *χαίρειν* from his letters except when writing to Phocion and Antipater: Chares too has related this". But Duris is almost certainly using Chares here, and it is unnecessary to suppose that Chares had access to a published collection of Alexander's correspondence. In his position as *εἰσαγγελεύς*, Court Chamberlain, he may well have known that Alexander used this form of address only in the two instances mentioned.

It is, therefore, unsafe to conclude from this that a collection of the correspondence was published when Ptolemy and Aristobulus wrote shortly before 280 B.C. Kaerst himself once made the suggestion (in his *Forschungen*, but not apparently retracted) that the letters illustrative of Alexander's character in chapters 22 and 39-42 of Plutarch's *Life* may have been taken from Chares' history. This *may* be right, although it is not susceptible of proof, but it is important to realise (as Pearson does) that Plutarch must have used more than one collection of letters. Even if Chares did have access to a collection of letters, they may not have been the sort of letters likely to interest Ptolemy, whose history was clearly very different from that of Chares. Ptolemy, it would seem, avoided controversial questions and was not concerned to relate intimate details about Alexander.⁽⁴⁾ To say that because a letter contains information not found in Arrian it is probably not genuine is then an argument of limited validity.

The existence of a collection or collections of Alexander's letters was assumed long ago on the strength of the method of introduction — *Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς* used by Plutarch, as also by Athenaeus and Hesychius. Pearson (448), following Kaerst, carelessly refers to "the frequency of his (i.e. Plutarch's) quotations with his casual reference to 'Alexander in his letters'", but in fact Plutarch uses this form of address only three times. Powell,⁽⁵⁾ who also holds that Plutarch made use of a collection of (forged) letters, likewise calls attention to "the quiet naiveté with which again and again he takes credit for making use of the letters for the first time". This, as he says, is the best proof that Plutarch used a collection of letters, but of the letters he cites two are addressed to Antipater, and the third (in chapter 60) may have been written to him. Altogether we have 7 letters written by or addressed to Antipater (and

three others without an addressee may be to him), so that it is probable that Plutarch had before him a separate collection of Antipater's correspondence. It is possible, I suggest, that this correspondence was published subsequent to 280 B.C. and was therefore not available to Ptolemy and Aristobulus. The reign of Antigonos Gonatas provides a possible date, and the fact that Gonatas had literary interests of his own and that he was the son-in-law of Antipater may be held to provide a reason for their publication. It is most unlikely that this correspondence is that to which Cicero refers (*De Off.* II 14,48) and which is almost certainly forged. More probably Cicero had access to the two books of letters which, according to Suidas (*s.v.* 'Αντίπατρος), Antipater left behind, and which presumably contained only letters written by Antipater. Two books after all would not contain many letters.

It is suggested too, or at any rate implied,⁽⁶⁾ that the existence of collections of forged letters during the Hellenistic period makes highly probable the falsity of any collection of letters. Recently the discovery of two papyri has been thought to strengthen this assumption. The former (*P.S.I.* XII, 1285) includes two letters from Darius to Alexander and the replies of Alexander, the latter (*Pap. Hamb.* 129) contains as well as other correspondence letters from Darius and Porus to Alexander, and from Darius to his satraps. These letters, it is clear, formed one of the sources of the Alexander-Romance.⁽⁷⁾ But what is important in the present connection is that these letters, together with the vast majority of these mentioned by Kaerst, are *obvious forgeries*. Pearson indeed, makes the significant remark that "if Plutarch was familiar with a text of this kind, it must have been a completely different collection". We may add, a completely different kind of collection.

Finally I would stress that we are not

justified in assuming that the evidence of the "good tradition", i.e. primarily Ptolemy, is invariably correct. Even Thucydides has recently, and in my opinion rightly, come under fire for his account of the Athenian Empire and for his portrait of Cleon,⁽⁸⁾ and we have no reason to suppose that Ptolemy was a more objective or more truthful historian than Thucydides. We cannot accept his view e.g. of the Conspiracy of the Pages or of the operations against Porus without asking whether he may not have had a motive for concealing the truth or may not have made an honest mistake.

With these preliminary remarks in mind we may now turn to the letters themselves. About many of them, especially those to which Plutarch refers only briefly, no conclusion is possible. This is true particularly of the eight letters in chapters 39-42 which Plutarch uses to illustrate various aspects of Alexander's character, notably his generosity towards his friends and his solicitude for them. These are not attested elsewhere and we cannot say whether they are genuine or not. The same is true of the three letters in chapter 39: that of Olympias rebuking Alexander's excessive generosity to his companions; the letter to Antipater warning him to beware of plots against him; and that from Antipater complaining of Olympias' interference in Macedonian affairs. In the case of the first of these we do at least have a quotation from the letter and Tarn has justification for his statement that "it is exactly what any mother of strong character, let alone an Olympias, must have written to a son in Alexander's position".⁽⁹⁾ But this, of course, can hardly be said to *prove* its authenticity. Elsewhere when Plutarch refers to letters of Alexander he evidently does not have the correspondence before him, but derives his information from a historical source. This is almost certainly the case in chapters 19, 29 and 34. The remaining

letters demand more extensive examination.

1. *Chapter 7,7.* Plutarch sets out the text of a letter from Alexander to Aristotle in which the King complains that the philosopher has published τὸς ἀκροατικοὺς τῶν λόγων, and that they will henceforth be available to all. Gellius (*N.A.* xx 5,11 f.) also gives the text of this letter, and adds the text of Aristotle's reply which Plutarch merely summarises. Kaerst (614) points to the widespread tendency to exalt Alexander the student of philosophy above Alexander the king and supports his argument by reference to Gellius *N.A.* ix 3,6 and other letters. Almost all scholars are agreed that these letters are not genuine and I see no reason to disagree with their verdict.

2. *Chapter 17,8.* Plutarch tells us that Alexander's passage along the coast of Pamphylia afforded many historians material for bombastic description, for they wrote that it was by some great and heaven-sent good fortune that the sea retired to make way for Alexander. He then goes on to refer to a letter of Alexander to an unnamed correspondent in which the king makes no reference to any such divine intervention. Pearson (447) cites this letter (together with that in ch. 46) as an example of a forgery designed to "debunk" remarks made by the historians, but does not discuss it further. Kaerst,⁽¹⁰⁾ however, gives three reasons for thinking it not genuine: it is much too brief to be genuine; its contents conflict with Arrian I 26,2; and it is not in keeping with Alexander's character to "play down" the marvellous element. But surely everyone except Kaerst has realised that Plutarch does not quote letters verbatim (unless he says so) or *in extenso*, but selects, perhaps from quite lengthy letters, those passages which lend support to the point which he wishes to make. Secondly, the conflict with Arrian is hardly proved. Plutarch merely remarks that in his

letter Alexander has said nothing so outrageous as the line he has just quoted from Menander – he might have added Callisthenes' statement (frag. 31. Jacoby) that the sea seemed to do *proskynesis* to Alexander. Menander and Callisthenes go far beyond the οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ θεοῦ of Arrian, i.e. Ptolemy, and we can understand how Alexander might make such a remark and still write a letter such as that which Plutarch uses. We must also consider, as Kaerst does not, to whom Alexander sent his letter. There is much force in the suggestion that whatever view he himself took of the matter he would not have been likely to enlarge upon the marvellous nature of the occurrence if he were writing to Antipater or other Macedonian leaders. It has also to be remembered that Callisthenes' account was probably written later, perhaps after the visit to Ammon, and that there is no evidence that *at this time* Alexander wished Callisthenes to write as he did.

But there remains one objection to accepting this letter as authentic. In it Alexander made a road,⁽¹¹⁾ the so-called Climax, or Ladder, and passed through (? this road) starting from Phaselis. In Arrian, on the other hand, Alexander sends part of his army by a road through the mountains (i.e. the Climax), while he himself with his entourage goes by the shore route. Thus if we take διελθεῖν in the letter to refer to the Climax the letter must be forged, for Arrian's account based on Ptolemy must be accepted. I am inclined to think that Plutarch is summarising too much and that διελθεῖν in the original letter meant through the coast passage. We might expect a forger to make certain that he had the facts straight about Alexander's route.

3. *Chapter 19,5.* Plutarch recounts that at the time of Alexander's illness in Cilicia Parmenio sent him a letter bidding him beware of his physician Philip, since he had been bribed by Darius to kill him. Darius,

according to the letter, had offered him a large sum of money and the hand of his daughter. Arrian (II 4,8), Justin (XI 8,6) and Curtius (III 6,4) all relate that Alexander received such a letter from Parmenio, although Arrian mentions only a bribe, Justin only a bribe of money and Curtius says that Philip was offered 1,000 talents and marriage with the king's *sister*. Plutarch has taken the whole incident, including Parmenio's letter, from the historical source which he is following at this point.

4. *Chapter 20,9*. Plutarch cites a letter from Alexander to Antipater to dispose of the assertion by Chares that in the battle at Issus the king had been wounded by Darius himself. In the letter Alexander does not mention his assailant and says that he had suffered no ill-effects. The wound received by Alexander is well attested, being mentioned by all the major sources,⁽¹²⁾ and Kaerst's reason (611) for rejecting the letter is that it contains no "individuelles Moment", "nichts Besonderes und Eigenartiges"! Again his method is at fault. Even if the letter dealt exclusively with the battle, which it need not have done, Plutarch is using it to contradict Chares only in one particular, the wound sustained by Alexander. He does not attempt a detailed account of the battle, in which he was not interested, just as he disposes of the actual fighting at the river Hydaspes in a few lines. Pearson's view (447) is that it was useful to be able to quote a letter in which Alexander made light of the wound to show the folly of Chares' exaggeration. Such a possibility may be admitted but I cannot think it deserves to be taken seriously.

5-7. *Chapter 22, 2-3-4*. In this chapter Plutarch assembles a number of anecdotes designed to illustrate Alexander's moral and physical continence, and in connection with the former cites three letters written by the king. The first is addressed to Philoxenus, the

officer in charge of his sea-communications, and rebukes him for asking if he should send him two beautiful boys. The second castigates Hagnon for a similar offer, while the third instructs Parmenio to put to death two Macedonian soldiers if found guilty of rape. Neither of the latter two incidents is mentioned elsewhere and the first only by Plutarch in two passages in the *Moralia* (333A and 1099C) and by Athenaeus (I 22d), who cites the same letter. Clearly then we cannot say whether the letters are genuine or not. Kaerst (616) holds that they are all forgeries designed to prove Alexander's chastity and this is certainly possible, but his assertion that the fact that Athenaeus as well as Plutarch mentions the letter to Philoxenus tells against its authenticity must be rejected out of hand. If Pridik and Zumetikos are right in holding that Plutarch found it (? this extract) in Chares, Athenaeus probably also took it from him, since he quotes from Chares no fewer than six times.

8. *Chapter 25,8*. It is impossible to say whether the letter sent by Alexander to his tutor Leonidas is genuine or not.

9. *Chapter 27,8*. After his visit to the oasis of Siwah Alexander is said to have written to his mother Olympias that he had received certain secret responses which he would tell to her alone when he returned. Kaerst (612) regards this letter as not genuine, as "an Alexandrian fabrication", but gives no reason beyond the prevalence of letters, e.g. Gellius *N.A.* XIII 4, dealing with the relationship of Ammon and Olympias.⁽¹³⁾ But the contents of this letter agree essentially with Arrian's remark that Alexander heard what he desired.⁽¹⁴⁾ It seems most improbable that a letter giving no information would have been forged and Tarn⁽¹⁵⁾ very rightly asks what motive a forger could have had for writing it. There is no good reason to doubt its authenticity.

10. *Chapter 28,2.* In this chapter Plutarch deals with Alexander's attitude to his divinity and concludes that he had no belief in it. As an honest man, however, Plutarch quotes from a letter in which the king refers to Philip as his so-called father, implying that his real father was Ammon. I have dealt with this letter at length elsewhere⁽¹⁶⁾ and see no reason to alter my conclusion that it is a genuine letter written by Alexander towards the end of his life.

11-12. *Chapter 29,7.* A letter of Darius and reply of Alexander. This is the second of the two embassies sent by Darius to Alexander and is given by Arrian (II 25,1-3) in almost identical terms, although he places it during the siege of Tyre. Here Plutarch is probably following Aristobulus.

13. *Chapter 34,2.* The instructions to the Greeks and to the Plataeans are attested by no other author and the former nowhere else. The instruction to the Plataeans is mentioned again by Plutarch at *Aristeides* 11,8 where we are told that Alexander had a proclamation made at the Olympic games. The instruction was presumably issued in the form of a *diagramma*, but it seems unlikely that Plutarch saw this. More probably he is following a historical source.

14. *Chapter 37,3.* Following a lacuna in the text, which must have contained a narrative of the capture of Persepolis, Plutarch relates that Alexander himself wrote that he gave instructions for the execution of the captives. The words *γράφει γὰρ αὐτός* suggest that Plutarch has before him a letter, although this is perhaps not certain. The historians say nothing of the incident and the authenticity of the letter must be considered doubtful, although we must not argue that such an action does not fit Alexander's character.

15. *Chapter 39,4.* To Phocion – cf. *Phocion* 18,6.

16. *Chapter 39,7.* From Olympias.

17. *Chapter 39,11.* To Antipater.

18. *Chapter 39,13.* From Antipater.

19. *Chapter 41,4.* To Peucestas.

20. *Chapter 41,5.* To Hephaestion.

21. *Chapter 41,6.* To the physician Alexipus.

22. *Chapter 41,7.* To the physician Pausanias.

23. *Chapter 42,1.* To an unnamed correspondent.

24. *Chapter 42,1.* To Peucestas.

25. *Chapter 42,1.* To Megabyzus.

As I have written above (p. 23), no decision about these letters is possible. I list them for the sake of completeness.

26. *Chapter 46,3.* In this chapter Plutarch gives a list of those authors who said that the Amazon queen visited Alexander beyond the Jaxartes, and then follows this by another list of those writers who said that it was a mere invention. He then remarks that Alexander seems to agree with the latter as he wrote that the Scythian king offered him his daughter's hand in marriage but did not mention the Amazon. Kaerst (608-9) admits that this letter in itself gives no cause for doubt and rejects it merely because he has already rejected the letter mentioned in the following chapter, of which this is clearly a part. The offer by the Scythian king is attested by Arrian (IV 15,3) and Curtius (VIII 1,9), but there is no indication that this was a famous episode such as a forger might be expected to know. Plutarch finds (in a collection) this letter to Antipater dealing *in detail* with the events of the period but containing no reference to the queen of the Amazons. He therefore concludes that Alexander supports those writers who say the whole thing was invented, but does not venture to assert that the omission *proves* this.⁽¹⁷⁾ Hence his use of *ἔοικεν*. It seems excessively sceptical to see in this letter the work of a forger.

Chapter 47,3. Fearing that the Macedonians will refuse to continue the expedition, Alexander addresses the picked force he has with him in Hyrcania and warns them of the danger of abandoning the conquest of the Persian Empire half-way. His speech was contained in a letter to Antipater from which Plutarch quotes. Kaerst holds this letter to be a conflation of the accounts given by Curtius IX 2,33 f. (cf. Arrian v 28,2) and VI 4,1, and maintains that the substance of the letter fits the situation at the river Hydaspes, not that in Hyrcania. According to Curtius (VI 2,15 f.) there is a *tumultus* at Hecatompylos among the Macedonians when they see that the Greek mercenaries are being discharged, and a rumour spreads that the king is returning home. Alexander then summons the *praefectos copiarum* before delivering a speech to the men, which is received with enthusiasm. Diodorus (xvii 75,1) places the mutiny 3 days before the army reaches Hecatompylos and after the death of Darius. Alexander persuades the Macedonians to continue and then discharges the Greek allies, although he re-enlists volunteers. Arrian (III 19,5) mentions the discharge of the allies at Ecbatana, before the death of Darius, but says nothing of any mutiny. But there seems no reason, despite Arrian's silence, to doubt the *tumultus*. The *πληθος* doubtless consists of the troops commanded by Craterus and Erigyus and by *τοὺς ἀριστοὺς* is meant what Arrian calls (III 23,2) *τὸ πλεῖστον καὶ ἅμα τὸ κουφότατον τῆς δυνάμεως*, led by Alexander. The *tumultus* presumably took place in Hyrcania, as Plutarch says, and Diodorus and Curtius are wrong to place the discharge of the Greek allies there, although their discharge was the *cause* of the *tumultus*. With regard to the contents of the letter, *ἂν μόνον ταραξάντες τὴν Ἀσίαν* and *κτώμενος* (a conative present participle) *τὴν οἰκουμένην* fit Hyrcania perfectly well, and the former expression cannot

apply to the situation on the river Hydaspes. It seems clear from Plutarch's *ὅτι ταῦτ' εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ πάντες ἐξέκραγον ὅπου βούλεται τῆς οἰκουμένης ἔγειν* and Curtius' "*summa militum alacritate iubentium quocumque vellet ducere, oratio excepta est*" that Curtius or his source had access to the letter.

27. Chapter 55,6. Early in 327, after capturing the rock of Choriene, Alexander marched to Bactria but sent Craterus, Polyperchon, Attalus and Alcetas to Pareitacene to deal with a rebellion.⁽¹⁸⁾ The Conspiracy of the Pages took place in Bactria during their absence, and Plutarch relates that in a letter to Craterus, Attalus and Alcetas Alexander wrote that the pages confessed under torture that they alone were responsible, and that no one else was privy to the plot. Kaerst⁽¹⁹⁾ stresses that the contents of this letter run counter to the evidence of Ptolemy and Aristobulus as given by Arrian (IV 14,1) – *Ἀριστόβουλος μὲν λέγει ὅτι καὶ Καλλισθένην ἐπᾶραι σφᾶς ἔφασαν ἐς τὸ τόλμημα. καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὡσαύτως λέγει*. It is, however, possible, as Mr Griffith suggests to me, that by *οὐδείς ἄλλος* Alexander means no Macedonian, no one that matters, and that there is no real conflict between this letter and the following one, although Plutarch evidently thought there was. It might also be argued that, alternatively, *ἐπᾶραι* and *συνειδείη* do not conflict, that *ἐπᾶραι* merely means that Callisthenes provided the spark that set off the plot. But even if we do hold that the evidence of the letter and of Arrian cannot be reconciled, the evidence of Ptolemy and Aristobulus is not above suspicion. Arrian himself appears to have serious doubts: at IV 12,7, after commenting on Callisthenes' unseasonable freedom of speech and his foolish arrogance, he remarks that this is why people easily credited those who said that he had a part in the conspiracy and those who even said that he incited the pages to the plot.

But the matter can be settled without reference to the contents of the letter.⁽²⁰⁾ We need allow no weight to Kaerst's remark that Alexander would not have written to Craterus while he was absent on a short expedition. The king may well have wished to scotch any rumours regarding the *extent* of the conspiracy; the letter does not refer directly to Callisthenes, but merely says that only the Pages were involved.⁽²¹⁾ Kaerst lays no great stress on the absence of Polyperchon from the list of addressees – "his name could easily be left out by Plutarch" – but in fact the omission is of vital importance. Thirlwall⁽²²⁾ had already remarked that the genuineness of the letter "seems to be placed beyond doubt by its direction, which could hardly have occurred to a forger". Certainly we cannot credit a forger with the necessary knowledge to send a letter to only those three commanders who were in fact operating together. For Curtius (VIII, 5, 2), whose authority was undoubtedly Ptolemy, after mentioning the dispatch of Craterus against the rebels, continues "Polyperchon quoque regionem, quae Bubacene appellatur, in ditionem redegit". He was therefore operating independently when the letter was sent.

28. *Chapter 55,7.* After the previous letter Plutarch goes on to say that afterwards Alexander wrote to Antipater inculpating Callisthenes and threatening to punish τὸν σοφιστήν and those who sent him out. Kaerst (608) naturally takes this letter also to be a forgery. It is connected, he writes, with the rumours regarding the complicity of Aristotle and Antipater in Alexander's murder by poison. We hear, he argues, of no danger to Aristotle beyond these threats, while the evidence of Chares, who does not mention the danger to Aristotle, is at variance with the letter. These arguments are very weak. Alexander's anger with Aristotle was short-lived; he had more important tasks on his

mind. Certainly (chapter 74) we hear of derogatory remarks about Aristotle's teaching. Chares writes that Callisthenes was kept in bonds for seven months in order that he might be tried ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ in the presence of Aristotle. Ptolemy admittedly says that he was tortured and then hanged, but Aristobulus relates that he was taken along with the army bound in fetters and to this extent supports Chares. If Chares is right in saying that Alexander intended to have him tried in Aristotle's presence, his evidence would seem to support the authenticity of the letter. We may suppose that Alexander intended to punish him by seeing his nephew tried (and presumably condemned), or we may even consider that Alexander had something worse in store for him. Zusetikos (p. 52) goes so far as to derive the letters from Chares' history on the grounds that they are closely interwoven with the narrative. This seems very questionable; εὐθύς and ὕστερον may well be Plutarch's own deduction from the contents of the letters.

29. *Chapter 57,8.* By the river Oxus Alexander discovered a spring of oil and writes to Antipater that he regarded this as one of the greatest of omens, since the seers prophesied from it a glorious expedition. Athenaeus (II 42 f.) mentions that Alexander wrote about the discovery of oil in Asia, and presumably had before him this letter to Antipater. This discovery itself is well attested,⁽²³⁾ and it is difficult to see why anyone should want to forge a letter on this subject, since it can hardly be called a "sensational new document". Why the fact that the letter is mentioned by both Athenaeus and Plutarch should argue against its authenticity, as Kaerst maintains, I do not understand.

30. *Chapter 60, 1-11.* Plutarch bases his account of the operations against Porus almost entirely upon a letter of Alexander, and stresses the fact that it is the account of

Alexander himself – αὐτὸς ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς. Besides the discussions in *Forschungen* 111 f. and *Philologus* 51, 608-611, Kaerst has devoted a separate article (*Phil.* 56, 406-412) to the examination of this letter and has concluded that it is a forgery based on Ptolemy and Aristobulus. That Arrian's account of the operations is much more detailed and much clearer than Plutarch's and that the letter "kein neues Motiv ergibt" (*Phil.* 51, 609) will surprise no one. Kaerst himself realises that Plutarch has no taste for this kind of thing. But, in fact, the letter contains material not found elsewhere; e.g. Alexander advances 20 stades, and the battle lasts until the eighth hour. Kaerst finds only two important differences between the two accounts. In the first place, after crossing the river Hydaspes Alexander advances with his cavalry and mounted archers, leaving the infantry to follow. Then, according to the letter, he expected he would easily defeat the enemy *cavalry* if they should attack, or, in case the enemy *phalanx* advanced, that his infantry would come up in time. The version of Arrian (v 14,2) is significantly different. In his account, Alexander, being superior in cavalry, rode on ahead with cavalry and mounted archers, intending *with these troops* to overcome *the whole Indian force*, or at least to contain it until the infantry arrived. Zume-tikos (p. 60) calls this with justice a "consilium temerarium atque praecipit". It is hard to believe that Alexander did not envisage the possibility of an attack by a detachment of cavalry, even if, as Kaerst says, the main strength of the Indian force did not lie in this arm. Moreover did he expect the Indian king to attack with a force containing elephants? But there is a weightier objection to accepting Arrian's account. Although the decisive attack in the main battle was made by cavalry, Alexander needed the support of his infantry and it is incredible that he could

contemplate an easy defeat of the Indians (κρατήσσειν οὐ χαλεπῶς) with cavalry alone. He never defeated a large army with cavalry unsupported. An excellent example of the weakness of cavalry is provided by Alexander's operations against the Malli (*Arrian* vi 8,6), when he pursues them across the river Hydraotes but on their seeing that he had only cavalry with him they turned and made a vigorous resistance. Alexander, seeing their solid formation, since his own infantry was not present, kept circling round and making charges without coming to close quarters. Cavalry unsupported by infantry could not win battles. If Arrian's account did not rest on the authority of Ptolemy, it would have been rejected out of hand. It is, of course, open to anyone to argue that Arrian is here summarising Ptolemy's account and that it is he who is responsible for the omission of the reference to an attack by the Indian cavalry. In that case one objection to the authenticity of the letter vanishes.

A second reason for rejecting the letter is found in the divergence between Ptolemy (*Arrian* v 14,6) and Plutarch concerning the strength of the detachment under Porus' son: 2,000 cavalry and 120 chariots according to Ptolemy, 1,000 cavalry and 60 chariots according to the letter. Arrian also tells us that Aristobulus gave only 60 chariots. Kaerst concludes, somewhat rashly, that the letter is a conflation of Ptolemy and Aristobulus and talks of "Konkordanz" and "Uebereinstimmung" between Plutarch and Aristobulus. But they agree only in the number of chariots, and we have no right to suppose that Aristobulus may have mentioned cavalry. Arrian's⁽²⁴⁾ digression clearly implies that his account gave only 60 chariots and did not include other troops. οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰκός, he writes, Πῶρον... ξὺν ἐξηκόντα ἄρμασιν μόνοις ἐκπέμψαι τὸν αὐτοῦ παῖδα and continues (after the digression) ἀλλὰ δισχιλίους γὰρ λέγει

ἰππεῖς ἄγοντα ἀφικέσθαι τὸν Πύρου παῖδα, ἄρματα δὲ ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι. The emphasis in the last sentence is on the presence of cavalry, not on the number of chariots. But the difference between the figures of Ptolemy and those of the letter remains. It is hard to find a convincing reason for it, whether one assumes that the letter is genuine or not. Certainly it is not altogether satisfactory to argue that Ptolemy has exaggerated the numbers "ad maiorem regis gloriam" in this minor matter, although he does exaggerate Persian losses as e.g. at Gaugamela.⁽²⁵⁾ But why should the writer of the letter, if it is a forgery, minimise the numbers? Was he trying to depreciate Alexander's success, or merely to be different? This seems even less likely than the view that Ptolemy has exaggerated. May we not have here an honest difference of opinion? Alexander will then have given *his* estimate of the numbers involved and Ptolemy *his*.⁽²⁶⁾

Apart from these differences, there is nothing to give one pause. The letter contains nothing at variance with Arrian's account of the tactics in the main battle. In both it is the presence of elephants which determines Alexander's dispositions, and in both Coenus is sent against the Indian right wing.⁽²⁷⁾ It is foolish to expect in a *very* summary account of the battle, made by a writer who had no interest in its detail, the accuracy of an Arrian.

There is, finally, one piece of evidence which may be relevant and which, if its relevance is admitted, greatly strengthens the case for acceptance of the letter. I refer to the passage at the beginning of chapter 62 where the Macedonians who had with difficulty defeated Porus' army of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry⁽²⁸⁾ refuse to cross the Ganges to engage the vast Indian forces on the other side. The very moderate totals of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry under Porus

contrast strikingly with those of the Indian forces facing them – 80,000 cavalry, 200,000 infantry, 8,000 chariots and 6,000 elephants! I suggest that the figures for Porus' troops are taken from the letter used in chapter 60. If so, it is surely most unlikely that a forger would have underestimated the totals of the Indian forces which Alexander defeated at the Hydaspes.

31. *Chapter 71,8.* After the mutiny at Opis Alexander sends home those Macedonians who are unfit for further service and according to Plutarch writes to Antipater instructing him to see that they should have the front seats at games and in the theatre and should wear garlands. Arrian (VII 12,4) says that Craterus was sent to conduct them home and that Alexander ordered Antipater to bring out reinforcements. Pearson (446 n. 73) holds that this contradicts the substance of the letter, but this is not necessarily so. Certainly Arrian does *not* say, as he asserts, that Craterus was to look after the resettlement of these men, and it is possible that Antipater might do this before he brought out the fresh troops. But admittedly there is no *proof* that the letter is genuine. Our verdict should be *non liquet*.

To sum up, we may say that with regard to the letters in chapter 22 and chapters 39-42, most of which deal with Alexander's character, our verdict can only be *non liquet*. This applies also to the letter to Leonidas (no. 8). Nos. 3, 11, 12 and probably 13 come not from collections, but from the historians, and we have no reason to doubt their authenticity. But it is the remaining letters which are important and about which the historian must make up his mind. The letter to Aristotle (no. 1) is almost certainly not genuine, and nos. 14 and 31 must be considered doubtful. Of the remainder the letter to Craterus, Alcetas and Attalus (no. 27) is *certainly* authentic and the others, mostly to Antipater, have good claims, I believe, to be considered

genuine. Each letter must be considered on its merits and it must be remembered that alongside the many forgeries which circulated in the Hellenistic period there must have been many genuine letters in existence. Collections might be entirely trustworthy, or entirely forged, like the Romance letters, or anywhere in between.

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(¹) I am indebted to Mr. G. T. Griffith and to Dr. E. Badian for reading an earlier version of this article and for making valuable criticisms. They are not, of course, responsible for the views expressed here.

(²) E. Pridik, *De Alexandri epistularum commercio*, Berlin, 1893; A. Zumetikos, *De Alexandri Olympiadisque epistularum fontibus et reliquiis*, Berlin, 1894; both of the foregoing contain references to earlier work. J. Kaerst, *Forschungen zur Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*, Stuttgart, 1887, 107 f.; expanded in 'Der Briefwechsel Alexanders des Grossen', *Philologus* 51, 1892, 602-622 - references in the text are to this article unless otherwise stated; L. Pearson, 'The Diary and Letters of Alexander the Great', *Hist.* 3, 1954-55, 429-455, to which he refers in his recent book, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great*, 1960. References in the text are to Pearson's article.

(³) *Alexander the Great*, II, Sources and Studies, 1948, Appendix 16 "Plutarch's Life of Alexander", 296-309 esp. 301 f.

(⁴) See Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great*, 188-211 esp. 211.

(⁵) J. E. Powell, 'The Sources of Plutarch's *Alexander*', *JHS* 59, 1939, 229-240 at p. 230.

(⁶) By Pearson p. 448.

(⁷) See R. Merkelbach, *Die Quellen des griechischen Alexanderromans*, 1954, 1-2 for a description of the contents of the papyri, and p. 195 f. for the text of the letters. See also Pearson, p. 448.

(⁸) G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, 'The Character of the Athenian Empire', *Hist.* 3, 1954-55, 1-41; A. G. Woodhead, 'Thucydides' Portrait of Cleon', *Mnem.* (ser. 4) 13, 1960, 289-317.

(⁹) *Op. cit.* (n. 3), 302.

(¹⁰) *Forschungen* 107 f.; *Philologus* 51, 1892, 611. All references to Arrian are to his *Anabasis*.

(¹¹) F. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse*, 1949, 506 n. 101 must be right about this. Strabo XIV 666 calls the

mountain Climax, and the name has evidently come to be transferred from the road to the mountains.

(¹²) Arrian II 12, 1; Diodorus XVII 34, 5; Curtius III 11, 10; Justin XI 9, 9.

(¹³) Kaerst sees in this letter the origin of these later letters, but they are more probably due to the writings of Cleitarchus and the well-known addiction of Olympias to mystic cults and to snake-handling - cf. Plut. *Alexander* 2.

(¹⁴) III 4, 5 - ἀκούσας ὅσα αὐτῷ πρὸς θυμοῦ ἦν.

(¹⁵) *Op. cit.* (n. 3), 348 n. 2.

(¹⁶) *CQ* (NS) 3, 1953, 151-157.

(¹⁷) Pearson (447), however, thinks it was useful to be able to quote a letter in which Alexander did not mention the Amazon but said that the Scythian king offered him his daughter's hand in marriage. But such a letter would *prove* nothing.

(¹⁸) See Arrian IV 22, 1.

(¹⁹) *Forschungen* 110.

(²⁰) On what follows see my article 'Alexander's letter to Craterus, Attalus and Alcetas' in *CQ* (NS) 5, 1955, 219-221.

(²¹) The τινὰς ἄλλους of Arrian IV 13, 7 refers to Pages only - cf. Zumetikos, *op. cit.* (n. 2), 49 n. 1.

(²²) *History of Greece*, VI, 325, n. 1.

(²³) Arrian IV 15, 7-8; Curtius VII 10, 13-14; Strabo 518 c.

(²⁴) Pearson (*Lost Histories of Alexander the Great*, 172-3) regards the digression as Ptolemy's. "The argument from probability", he writes, "is Ptolemy's, not Arrian's; Arrian clearly intends us to understand that Ptolemy is criticising Aristobulus, and believes that Aristobulus is the earlier writer of the two." But Kaerst (*Philologus* 56, 410) well remarks that "das Wort γὰρ (οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰκόσ) gibt die Begründung zu den vorhergehenden Worten Arrians - δῖον καὶ ἐγὼ ξυμφέρομαι."

There is, in fact, no evidence that Aristobulus wrote before Ptolemy. It is nonsense to suppose that when Aristobulus gives the name of a tribe attacked by Alexander as Glaukanikai and Ptolemy calls them Glausai (Arrian V 20, 2) this proves that Ptolemy is criticising Aristobulus. Why should not Aristobulus be criticising Ptolemy? More probably the two writers are writing independently. I quote Tarn (*op. cit.* (n. 3), 38) on this point: "It is obvious, if only from variations in place and personal names, that he (i.e. Aristobulus) and Ptolemy moved in different spheres and got their information in different ways." Pearson (*op. cit.*, 166-167) also holds that the differences in the account of the capture of Bessus in the two historians (Arrian III 30, 1-5) suggests that Aristobulus wrote before Ptolemy. "It is unlikely", he writes, "that the civilian would disagree with the military authority on such matters". But

even if we grant this supposition, and it is by no means certain, the difference is equally well accounted for if we suppose that Ptolemy's book had been published but that Aristobulus did not know it. It is quite unnecessary to suppose that where two writers differ one is criticising the other.

(25) See e.g. Tarn *op. cit.* (n. 3), 137.

(26) It might be argued that Ptolemy derives his information from the *Journal* and that the numbers were increased in the official account of the battle, but

Pearson, in his *Historia* article, seems to me to have proved conclusively that the extant quotations from the *Journal* are not genuine and that Ptolemy did not use the *Journal*.

(27) See my article in *JHS* 76, 1956, 26-31.

(28) These are presumably the totals for the Indian forces in the battle – μόλις γὰρ ἔκεινον (sc. Πῶρον) ὠσάμενοι, δισμυρίους πεζοῖς καὶ δισχιλίοις ἱππεῦσι παραταξάμενον (Plut. *Alex.* 62,2).

THEOGNIS, 257-66

257 Ἴππος ἐγὼ καλὴ καὶ ἀεθλίη, ἀλλὰ κάκιστον
 ἄνδρα φέρω καὶ μοι τοῦτ' ἀνηρότατον·
 πολλαίκι δ' ἤμέλλησα διαρρήξασα χαλινὸν
 260 φεύγεν, ἀπωσαμένη τὸν κακὸν ἠνίοχον.

Ὅ μοι πίνεται οἶνος ἐπεὶ παρὰ παιδὶ τερεῖνη
 ἄλλος ἀνὴρ κατέχει πολλὸν ἐμοῦ κακίων·
 ψυχρὸν μοι παρὰ τῆδε φίλοι πίνουσι τοκῆς,
 ὡς θαμὰ θ' ὕδρευει καὶ με γοῶσα φέρει.
 265 ἔνθα μέσσην περὶ παιῖδα βαλὼν ἀγκῶν' ἐφίλησα
 δείρην, ἣ δὲ τέρεν φθέγγετ' ἀπὸ στόματος.

This passage was discussed at some length in *CQ* (NS) 9, 1959, 1-5 by Professor J. A. Davison. He began by saying: "In 1902 E. Harrison, discussing 261-266, observed, 'The poem has never yet been satisfactorily explained' (*Studies in Theognis*, p. 167): and today, after fifty-six years' discussion, that observation remains as true as when it was written." He then gave a *résumé* of various scholastic views and interpretations of it. There is no agreement, it appears, as to whether 257-260 and 261-266 should be taken together or not. There is fairly general agreement that 261-266 constitute a γρῖφος or riddle of some sort. The answer to it, according to Carrière followed by Van der Valk, is that the speaker of 261-6 is a *cruche*, a pitcher or water-container of some sort: that the arm it claims to have thrown round the girl's waist is the

strap by which it was carried "sans doute en bandoulière"; and its kiss the touch of its spout against the girl's neck. This is surely no less improbable than it is physiologically and artistically unstimulating. Davison's interpretation of 261-6, with which I agree, is that the owner of the arm and the kissing apparatus is a young man, accompanying a young woman who has been sent to fetch water from the well. I agree with D. also that there is likely to be some connection between φέρει in 264 and φέρω in 258; that κατέχει in 262 is to be taken intransitively or elliptically; that ψυχρὸν in 263 = ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ; and that μοι both in 261 and 263 is a 'dative of the person interested'. But I feel sure that the antithesis in those two lines is intentional, whereas he doubts it. I see no difficulty, as he does, in connexion with παρὰ τῆδε in 263 – which to my mind quite simply and naturally repeats παρὰ παιδὶ τερεῖνη in 261. In 264 I would read ὡσθ' ἄμα θ' and accept the slight misplacement of the τε. . . I see no difficulty in taking the φίλοι τοκῆς of 263 to be the girl's parents, against D.'s objection that, if they were, their house should not be called the girl's house (παρὰ παιδὶ τερεῖνη) in 261. I think we have all said to our contemporaries in the days of our youth "at your house" or "your place" when we really meant their

parents' place. D. takes the point of 261 and 263 to be "something like this": 'It isn't the *wine*. . . that is drunk that is any advantage to me; on the contrary it is the fact that they want their drink *cold* that gives me my chance' i.e. to make love to the girl, who has to go and fetch water with which to cool it. This seems to me to be throwing a lot of work on the *μοι*'s in 261 and 3. I do not think there is any case for D.'s admittedly tentative suggestion that lines 257-260 should be transposed to follow 261-266 as the substance of the "soft word" or words (*τέρειν*) spoken by the girl on being kissed. The words in 257-60 seem to me much too vigorous and bitter to be so described. A single word, or a word or two of endearment is rather to be expected from the willing recipient of a kiss. I have in short, with respect and due acknowledgement for the stimulus to Professor Davison, a somewhat different explanation to offer for 257-266, as they stand and all of a piece.

1. The key to it is 257-260. The theme or metaphor of these lines is familiar enough, e.g. in the ditty "My husband's a jockey, a jockey, a jockey. . .", and it is not to be taken any more primly in the present context.

2. The *dramatis personae* are a young man, the speaker of 261-264 and the reporter of the tale; and a young woman whose 'dear parents' wish another man to enjoy, or rather to continue to enjoy, her favours. If she were a tender maiden she would hardly be so outspoken in 257-260, and if she were a married woman she would not be living at home.

3. This other man (older and better off, we may assume) they receive with honour and regale with *wine* – when he comes. It need not be assumed that he is there at the moment

of the dialogue. The younger man (the teller of the tale) is treated familiarly – he goes with the girl to the well – but without formality or respect, being given nothing but *water* to drink, or so he complains.

4. The girl's rather indelicate and horsy metaphor of 257-60 is 'played down' by the young man in his response of 261-4; but its overtones continue, from *κάκιστον* in 257, and *κακὸν* in 260, to *κακίων* in 262; whilst *καλὴ ἵππος* in 257 has suggested *τερεινῆ* in 261 – 'smooth', 'sleek', 'well-groomed' (and in the context difficult to translate appropriately); and this again has suggested *τέρειν* in 266; the verb *κατέχειν* in 262 re-echoes *ἡνίοχον* in 260, in the sense of 'bridle', 'control', 'hold the reins' (cf. Aesch. *Persae* 190 *et al.*); while *φέρει με* in 264 is similarly reminiscent of *ἄνδρα φέρω* in 258.

To render the passage then, with some licence of expression: 257-60 "I'm a good filly and a winner. But I've a rider who's no good at all, and I hate it. I've often thought of taking the bit between my teeth, and doing a bolt, and giving that rotten jockey the push." 261-66 "No wine gets drunk for me at that fine (filly's) house: for another fellow's in charge there although he is certainly not the man that I am. Her 'dear parents' drink nothing but cold water for me – so that she has to go draw it and, in spite of her grumbling, put up with (a jockey like) me while she's doing it." So saying, I put my arm around her waist and kissed her neck, and she said a soft word from her lips.'

I take *γοῶσα* as referring, more or less playfully, to the note of dissatisfaction that the girl has voiced, a moment before, in 257-60.

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A NOTE ON TWO DETAILS IN PINDAR'S MYTH OF PELOPS

In the course of preparing a paper, intended for a non-specialist audience, on the myth and the imagery in Pindar's First Olympian Ode⁽¹⁾ a few minor details of interpretation occurred to me which it might be worth while bringing to the attention of classicists. That minor details can have great weight in Pindar's narratives has been well demonstrated by Leonard Illig: Pindar seldom recounts events or describes circumstances merely for the joy of telling a story; the objective and picturesque in his myths are seldom there for purely aesthetic reasons; in all its details his narrative is determined by some moral or ethical approach to his subject matter.⁽²⁾

In his version of the Pelops myth Pindar rejects, as invidious gossip made up by jealous neighbours, the current account about Pelops being cut up by his father Tantalus and served to the divine guests attending his banquet at Sipylus. The real cause of Pelops' disappearance, Pindar tells us, was that Poseidon, who had fallen in love with him, during the banquet abducted him on his golden chariot "to the highest home of Zeus" (37-42). Having recounted this, Pindar adds (43-45):

ἐνθα δευτέρῳ χρόνῳ
ἦλθε καὶ Γανυμήδης
Ζηνὶ τῶύτ' ἐπὶ χρέος

"where at a second occasion also Ganymede came for the same service to Zeus".

By this reference to the parallel case of Ganymede Pindar, so to speak, quotes the source or authority upon which he has based the innovation he introduced into the Pelops myth.⁽³⁾ For it is well known that as Poseidon is said by Pindar to have abducted Pelops, so Zeus himself abducted the Trojan prince Ganymede because of his beauty. On the model of the Ganymede myth Pindar introduces into the Pelops myth a new

element,⁽⁴⁾ which not only purifies the latter so as to render it in itself a suitable symbol or *exemplum* of *areta*, on the mythical plane,⁽⁵⁾ but also increases the relevance of the myth by introducing an additional manifestation of inborn *areta*, namely that of physical beauty.⁽⁶⁾ But the reference to Ganymede also serves to bring out the full significance of Pelops' translation into heaven (already suggested by *ποτὶ δῶμα Διὸς μεταβάσαι*, 42), for at the end of the contemporaneous⁽⁷⁾ tenth Olympian Ode the poet stresses the youthful beauty of the victor & *ποτε | ἀναιδέα Γανυμήδει μόνον ἔλαλκε σὺν Κυπρογενεῖ*, i.e. Ganymede was to Pindar a mythical symbol of *immortality*⁽⁸⁾ achieved in heaven through physical beauty.

Now, in Pindar's reference to Ganymede, one is struck by the insistence on two details: first, Ganymede came to the abode of Zeus "at a second occasion"; second, he came there "for the same service to Zeus". According to Homer (*Iliad* xx 231/2, v 265/6) and the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite (v. 207/8), which Krakidis⁽⁹⁾ has shown to have influenced Pindar's version in respect of Pelops, Ganymede was the son of Tros, i.e. belonged to the generation *before* Pelops, who should be reckoned as a contemporary of Laomedon (grandson of Tros and grandfather of Hector, who was the contemporary of Pelops' grandson Agamemnon). In the *Little Iliad* (fr. 6 K), however, a different tradition was preserved making Ganymede the son of Laomedon and so belonging to the generation *after* Pelops. Apparently Pindar's explicit reference to *δευτέρῳ χρόνῳ* is a declaration in favour of this latter tradition.⁽¹⁰⁾ But why did he so expressly prefer this particular version?⁽¹¹⁾ Naturally in order to ensure for the hero of his present myth priority and preeminence in being translated to heaven.

Pelops thus has the honour of being the first to be abducted to Olympus. Had Ganymede's ascension and immortalisation preceded, Pelops' subsequent, and temporary, sojourn would have shown up rather unfavourably. Pelops, on the other hand, was in any case soon again to lose his elevation so that there would then be ample "room" for a successor.⁽¹²⁾ So, the parallel case of Ganymede was introduced to "authorise" the innovation; but once the two heroes are juxtaposed, the present myth requires measures to ensure the precedence of *its* hero.

In the second detail upon which Pindar insists – "for the same service to Zeus" – he again declares in favour of a younger variant tradition. Clearly, according to Pindar, Poseidon abducted Pelops with an erotic motive,⁽¹³⁾ and τῶντ' ἐπὶ χρέος can only mean that this was Zeus' motive with Ganymede too (cf. also σύν Κυπρωγενεῖ in *Ol.* x 110). So Pindar here expresses his preference for a younger tradition above the older epic version according to which Ganymede was abducted merely to serve as a cupbearer in Olympus,⁽¹⁴⁾ e.g. *Iliad* xx 234/5 Διὶ οἰνοχοεῦειν, | κάλλεος εἶνεκα οἴο; *Hymn. Aphr.* 203/6 ἤρπασεν δὲ διὰ κάλλος ἴν' ἀθανάτοισι μετεῖη | καὶ τε Διὸς κατὰ δῶμα θεοῖς ἐπιεινοχοεῦοι. In literature the erotic motive in the Ganymede myth was perhaps already found towards the end of the sixth century in Ibycus (fr. 30 Bgk.), for this poet is reported by the scholiast on *Apoll. Rhod.* iii 158 to have described the abduction of Ganymede (as well as that of Tithonus) in his *Ode to Gorgias*, which was apparently inspired by homosexual love, a new theme which this poet introduced into choral lyric – παιδικοὶ ὕμνοι.⁽¹⁵⁾ In *Theognis* 1345 f. the erotic motive for Zeus' abduction of Ganymede is clearly stated, though these verses are of disputed authorship and date.⁽¹⁶⁾ An early Ionic-Italic amphora, two late black-figure vases and a series of red-figure ones

dating from the earliest period portray Zeus caressing or in the company of a youthful, sometimes naked, Ganymede playing with a cock or a hoop, and sometimes with a winged Eros present; occasionally Zeus is pursuing the youth, showing that the motif belongs "in den Kreis der Liebesverfolgungen".⁽¹⁷⁾ It is this tradition which Pindar prefers.

It seems over-ingenuous to suppose with Kakridis that Pelops was abducted both for Poseidon's own erotic purposes and, though this is admitted to be of secondary importance, to serve as cupbearer in Zeus' palace.⁽¹⁸⁾ This supposition is made from the express reference in ποτι δῶμα Διὸς (42) and its parallelism with the Hymn to Aphrodite (Διὸς κατὰ δῶμα θεοῖς ἐπιεινοχοεῦοι), and also from the assumption that Pelops must have been serving as cupbearer at his father's banquet when he was abducted.⁽¹⁹⁾ But though Poseidon may very well have used his handsome ἐρώμενος for this and other services, that does not enter into Pindar's representation at all.⁽²⁰⁾ Could τῶντο in 45, merely from the foregoing mention of a banquet at *Sipylos* and the words ποτι δῶμα Διὸς, receive the implied additional connotation of service as cupbearer? Also the express addition of Ζηνί in 45 clearly shows that service to Zeus was *not* intended in the mention of Poseidon taking Pelops "to Zeus' home". The reference to Zeus' home in connection with abduction by *Poseidon* need not upset us: it is merely a variation for Ὀλυμπος (54), used at the same time as an associative link – typical of Pindar's manner⁽²¹⁾ – preparing for the mention of Ganymede who was abducted to "Zeus' house" in the narrower sense, and so anticipating the theme of immortality which is subsequently suggested more directly by the introduction of Ganymede.

* * *

The passage 67-87 presents Pelops' successful contest with Oenomaus for the hand of his daughter, Hippodamia. In his presentation of this episode Pindar concentrates attention rather on the spirit and mental attitude of the hero than on the actual contest. After the detailed report of Pelops' prayer to his divine lover Poseidon (71-85), the poet succinctly states the outcome (86-88): the words of Pelops did not remain ineffective; the god glorified him with a gift of a golden chariot and unwearied winged steeds; he beat Oenomaus and gained his bride. Then one more detail is added (89):

ἄ τέκε λαγέτας ἔξ ἀρεταῖσι μεμαότας υἱός.
This point falls strictly outside the limits of the Oenomaus story,⁽²²⁾ and seems to hang somewhat loosely between, on the one hand, the subsequent reference to Pelops' cult at Olympia, serving as a bridge between the legendary past and present reality (90-95, cf. 23-24b), and, on the other hand, the culmination of the mythical episode about the contest with Oenomaus in 88. The reference to the sons of Pelops could have been introduced as a natural sequel to his marriage, and, as such, an additional honour to the hero⁽²³⁾ – additional, that is, to the honour of receiving the love of Poseidon and a temporary sojourn in Olympus, and to the honour of his god-given success against the formidable Oenomaus, and to the honours of the cult which are mentioned next. However, if this is all that there is to it, verse 89 still seems to me a rather weak addition.

But the verse gains in power and relevance if in the emphasis laid upon the *virtues* of these sons of Pelops (ἀρεταῖσι μεμαότας) we notice an implicit refutation or suppression of the well-known tradition about the dispute between the brothers Atreus and Thyestes, and about Atreus' serving up to his brother the flesh of the latter's own children. This element of the myth was connected with that

tradition which assigned a decisive role to the treachery of Myrtilus in the contest against Oenomaus,⁽²⁴⁾ the connection consisting in the curse which Myrtilus was said to have called down upon Pelops and his descendants when the latter killed him, or simply in the blood-guilt caused by the killing.⁽²⁵⁾ It was Myrtilus' father, the god Hermes,⁽²⁶⁾ who subsequently sent the lamb with the golden fleece from which resulted the disaffection between the two brothers. Now, for obvious reasons, Pindar in his account of events completely disregards the role of Myrtilus in favour of the (perhaps older) version based on the divine aid of Poseidon.⁽²⁷⁾ And in addition to thus tacitly "purifying" the narrative of the Myrtilus tradition, Pindar adds, in the end, in verse 89 an implicit rejection also of the horrors in the subsequent history of Pelops' sons.⁽²⁸⁾ Pindar is by his own preceding narrative doubly justified in doing so, for not only has the absence of Myrtilus eliminated a major cause or motive for the Thyestes-Atreus atrocities, but also Pindar's correction about the crime of Tantalus has removed that version of which the later crime of the Pelopids was largely a parallel. Pindar deals with this point in such a vague and indirect way so as to avoid in his poem an excess of sombre detail.⁽²⁹⁾

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(1) 'Pindaros se Eerste Olimpiëse Ode – Beeld en Simbool', accepted for publication in *Standpunte* 35, 1961 (Cape Town).

(2) L. Illig, *Zur Form der pindarischen Erzählung*, diss. Kiel 1931 (Berlin 1932), 6-9 and 68 f. (ch. iv): our poet's approach results "aus einer Pindar eigentümlichen Art, ein mythisches Geschehen nicht nur anschaulich, sondern zugleich auch in seiner sinnbildlichen Bedeutung zu sehen und aus der Verpflichtung, über das bloss Anschauliche hinaus das dem geistigen Auge erfassbare Sinnbild wirksam zu gestalten".

(3) J. T. Kakridis, 'Die Pelopssage bei Pindar', *Philologus* 85, 1930, 463-477, cf. 467 n. 19.

(4) σὲ δ' ἀντία προτέρων φθέγγομαι (36).

(5) On this function of the myth see e.g. J. H. Finley, *Pindar and Aeschylus*, 1955, 19 and 40; W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikion*, Schr. Königsberger Gel. Ges., 1928, 338 f.; L. Illig, loc. cit.

(6) This is how he interprets and links up with the traditional datum of ἐλέφαντι φαίδιμον ὄμον κεκαδμένον (27).

(7) Both celebrate victories gained at the 76th Olympiad, 476 B.C.; on the dating of *Ol. x* in the second half of 474 see my thesis *Pindaros se Tiende en Elfde Olimpiese Odes*, Leiden 1955, 11-14.

(8) J. Duchemin, *Pindare: poète et prophète*, 1955, 160-162; she attaches to the event also the significance of an initiation.

(9) Loc. cit. 463-465.

(10) I cannot share Kakridis' objection (p. 467-9) that considerations of genealogical chronology ("diese spitzfindige Entdeckung") would have no influence upon a poet's mind in deciding such matters.

(11) This question is also implied by Gildersleeve's remark ad loc.: "and so the chronology is saved, if it is worth saving".

(12) Still, the honour and priority of the present hero, and not the impossibility of having two cup-bearers simultaneously in Olympus (Kakridis, 468-9), is the decisive factor. At any rate there was already Hebe serving in this capacity (*Iliad* iv 2)!

(13) τοῦ... ἐράσσατο 25, δαμέντα φρένας ἰμέρω 41, φίλια δῶρα Κυπρίας 75.

(14) Its difference in this from the later version was noted by Aristarchus by marking a διπλῆ against *Iliad* xx 234 (see Schol. ad loc.).

(15) See W. Schmid, *Gesch. Griech. Lit.* I, 1929, 494, who also points out (p. 493, n. 3) that to the rare innovations introduced into myth by Ibycus belong "die neuen erotischen Züge", as e.g. the love of Hypnus for Endymion (Diehl ad fr. 1), and of Talos for Rhadamanthys (fr. 32 Bgk).

(16) Diehl ad loc.; Schmid, op. cit. 377.

(17) P. Friedländer, *RE* vii 742.31 f., 56 f., also 749.1 (s.v. Ganymedes, 1912).

(18) Loc. cit. 465-6, cf. n. 16. See previously A. Boeckh in his commentary (1821) p. 108, and W. Christ in his (1896) ad loc.

(19) *Ibid.* 469-470; cf. also K. Scherling, *RE* Suppl. vii 851, 15 f. Kakridis also refers to Lucian, *De dial. deor.* iv 4, v 2, where using Ganymede as cup-bearer is advanced as a pretext for Zeus' real purpose.

(20) Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*, 1922, 236.

(21) Schadewaldt, op. cit. 301-2, 305-8.

(22) With ἔλεν... παρθένον τε σύνευνον (88) the compositional ring introduced in 69 by ἐτοιμόν ἀνεφρόντισεν γάμον is closed and the episode concluded. For a recent summary, with the relevant bibliography, of this stylistic feature, cf. B. A. van Groningen, *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque*, Verh. Kon. Ned. Akad., N.R. LXV, 2, 1958, 51 f.

(23) Cf. E. Thummer's *Die Religiosität Pindars*, Commentationes Aenipontianae, 1957, 84, where he stresses the parallelism between the series of honours received by the hero and those of the victor, Hieron.

(24) There is unanimity among scholars about the relative chronology of the two versions. See e.g. C. Robert, *Griech. Heldensage* I, 1920, 209; J. T. Kakridis, *Hermes* 63, 1928, 415 f.; K. Scherling, *RE* xvi 1152-3 (s.v. Myrtilos, 1933), *RE* Suppl. vii 851-2 (s.v. Pelops, 1940). The earliest evidence for the rôle of Myrtilus is the fifth century Athenian logographer Pherecydes (*Fr. Gr. Hist.* I, 3, fr. 37). According to Pausanias v 17, 7, the chest of Cypselus portrayed Oenomaus pursuing Pelops who had Hippodamia with him on his chariot (the contest being in origin apparently a violent abduction), which was drawn by winged horses; Pelops is also portrayed with winged horses on two black-figure lecythi (Sauer, *Arch. Jahrb.* 6, 1891, 34; P. Jacobsthal, *Göttinger Vasen* Taf. 6, 21 - quoted by Kakridis p. 417, n. 4, and Scherling, *RE* Suppl. vii 861-2). The winged horses seem to indicate the early currency (at least sixth century) of a version in which the treachery of Myrtilus had no place. (Yet the winged steeds are retained together with Myrtilus by Pherecydes fr. 37b and Eur. *Orest.* 988 f. πτανόν μὲν δίαγμα πάλων... Μυρτίλου φόνον - a contamination necessitated by (or originating) the version making Pelops journey across the sea after his victory). But I cannot accept Scherling's conclusion that Pindar "could not have known the treachery of Myrtilus" (see also note 28 below) and that Pherecydes is probably the author of the Myrtilus version (*RE* xvi 1152, 66, 1154, 40; more cautiously at Suppl. vii 852; cf. W. Schmid, *Gesch. Griech. Lit.* I, 711: "Pherecydes will offenbar nur das Überlieferte geben"). There seems to be no valid reason why we may not assume that Pindar knew both versions, selected that which best fitted the paradigmatic tendency of his narrative, and linked it up with (perhaps it was a motivating source for) the erotic theme he had already introduced in the first part of his narrative. If my interpretation of line 89 is valid, it becomes an argument in favour of Pindar's having known the Myrtilus version with its consequences.

(25) Soph. *El.* 508-515 and Eur. *Orest.* 990 f., 1548-9 consider the killing of Myrtilus as the cause of the woes of the Pelopids; the curse is mentioned by Apollodorus,

Epit. II 8 and Schol. Eur. *Orest.* 990, l.25 (Schwartz).
 (26) Eur. *Orest.* 997 indirectly suggests the role of Hermes, and this is made explicit by several scholia ad loc. (990,26, 995,24-5, 998,11, ed. Schwartz). The schol. 995,26 f. states that according to the 'cyclographer' Dionysius of Samos (*Fr. Gr. Hist.* I 15, fr. 7) Euripides in his account about the lamb follows an early epic, the *Alkmaionid*, but that in Pherecydes' version the lamb was sent not by Hermes but by Artemis (*Fr. Gr. Hist.* I 3, fr. 133). From this Scherling concludes (*RE* XVI 1154,26 f.) that in Pherecydes – and *a priori* also in Pindar – the killing of Myrtilus had not yet come to be connected with the woes of the Pelopids – but this need not follow, for Pherecydes may be contaminating here as in his account (fr. 37b) combining Myrtilus with winged steeds of Pelops (cf. also W. Schmid, *op. cit.* 712; Jacoby, *Fr. Gr. Hist.* I 403) or simply disregarding the different version (Jacoby, *op. cit.* 424).
 (27) In the myth of the tenth Olympian Ode, too, describing Heracles' founding of the Olympic games as a thanks-offering to Zeus after the victory over Augeas,

we may interpret some not too obviously relevant details as an implicit refutation of a different tradition, connecting the founding of the games with Pelops (support for which might in some quarters have been wrongly inferred from *Ol.* I) – e.g. the introductory statement (v. 25b) that Pelops' tomb was already ἀρχαῖον when the games were founded; the statement (v. 52-3) that the Cronus hill was nameless and snow-drenched (contrasting with its sun-bathed aspect in the time of Heracles, *Ol.* III 25b) "formerly, while Oenomaus ruled", i.e. in the time of Pelops. See my thesis (note 7), 150-156, 191-193.

(28) In their commentaries Mezger (1880) and Galiano² (1956) assume that Pindar, like Homer, did not yet *know* these horrors. Dissen-Schneidewin (1847) more cautiously say "vides tacere Pindarum... nefaria discidia".

(29) Gildersleeve (1890) remarks ad loc. "one cannibalistic incident was enough for one poem, to say nothing of the rule τὰ καλὰ τρέψαι ἕξω".

LIVY AND AUGUSTUS

The thesis that Livy's *Histories* represents a work of propaganda to stabilise and to glorify the régime of Augustus is by no means new.⁽¹⁾ Since 1939 it has received massive support, partly under the stimulus of, or in reaction from, German National Socialism and its cultural propaganda-machine.⁽²⁾ In Germany the theory reached an extreme form in the work of G. Stübler.⁽³⁾ In 1939-40 (the dates are significant) two influential books were published in English in which Livy's alleged services to the Augustan principate were sharply criticised. C. N. Cochrane⁽⁴⁾ states unequivocally:

"With Livy we are far removed from the Thucydidean sense of history as a diligent and meticulous search for truth, conducted with due regard for the most exacting standards of evidence. What Livy offers us is rather an unabashed tract for the times; the Augustan version, in fact, of Plato's noble lie. And if this involves an element of artistic distortion,

such distortion is to be justified in view of the purpose to be served. . . That purpose may be described, in the vernacular, as an attempt to 'sell' the Augustan system." Cochrane further quotes Livy's comment in the Preface, "nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus"; he adds: "To say this, however, is to admit that the resources of government, in the ordinary sense, have been exhausted. It is to suggest that a situation has arisen which calls for nothing less than the intervention of a second founder. And, finally, it is to point to Augustus Caesar as the man."

Sir Ronald Syme's memorable *The Roman Revolution* makes the point more allusively: "The Emperor and *his*" (italics mine) "historian understood each other. . ." ⁽⁵⁾: "Poetry and history" (Livy is the only historian implicated) "were designed to work upon the upper and middle classes of a regenerated society". ⁽⁶⁾ Syme further suggests that Livy, like Vergil and Horace, "had everything to gain from the

new order", and may have had "private and material reasons for gratitude to Augustus". The implication is clear, though he concedes that it is inference, resting on no solid evidence. But in a recent article, which has performed a maieutic function for this paper, Syme appears at first sight to have modified his standpoint. He makes it clear that Livy is "not a flatterer and a timeserver", and even questions the relevance of the label 'Augustan historian': "All in all, Livy, the pride and glory of Augustan letters, should perhaps be claimed as the last of the Republican writers".⁽⁷⁾ Yet throughout this article Syme makes various allegations of detail to suggest that Livy lent his writings to purposes of propaganda, and finally comes the blunt statement: "Livy's annals of Augustus were written in joyful acceptance of the new order, in praise of the government and its achievements".⁽⁸⁾

The student of Livy's *Histories* must find many grounds for criticism of them. Not least there is the Chauvinism which excludes sympathetic assessments of non-Italian nations,⁽⁹⁾ and which portrays in idealised colours the political and military virtues of the Old Republic.⁽¹⁰⁾ Yet Livy was more honest than his annalistic predecessors, and a strong case can be made out for his having composed his history in resolute independence of contemporary political pressures, and in accordance with his own uncompromising political views. It may well be true that the *Ab Urbe Condita*, "patriotic, moral and hortatory", could be exploited by Augustus "to honour the memory of ancient valour, revive the pride of the nation and educate coming generations to civic virtue".⁽¹¹⁾ But it is important to emphasise that such was the traditional function of Roman historiography since the time of Sempronius Asellio.⁽¹²⁾ Cochrane's thesis that Livy consciously sought to stabilise Augustan autocracy is to be refuted

by making a careful distinction between the traditional Roman Chauvinism, of which Livy is undoubtedly guilty, and the particular propaganda element which might laud the person and political achievement of Augustus in order to ease his path to the successful manipulation of power. Allegations of purposeful service to the régime fundamentally misinterpret Livy's political attitudes.

I POLITICAL PRESSURES ON LIVY

How far was Livy free to write what he wished? The clearest picture of literary freedom under Augustus can be gleaned from Ovid's letters from exile. The literary world was circumscribed, and Augustus was sufficiently acquainted with the greater number of the *littérateurs* to be able to exert strong moral pressure on them. Yet there are those who pursue a sturdy independence of action, like Carus and Celsus.⁽¹³⁾ Of repressive legal action there is little evidence, except in the two sectors of writings affecting sexual morality, and defamation. The case of Ovid illustrates the first, the banishment of Cassius Severus for pamphleteering against "vires feminasque inlustres"⁽¹⁴⁾ the second. These punishments were exacted in the final years of Augustus' principate.

Historical studies were little affected. Augustus sat in the audience when the outspoken Cremutius Cordus, at a *recitatio*, labelled Brutus and Cassius – outlawed by the princeps at a less creditable stage of his career – "ultimos Romanorum".⁽¹⁵⁾ It was Cremutius, too, who severely criticised the triumvirs for the proscriptions, again without any reaction from the government.⁽¹⁶⁾ The case of the historian T. Labienus, whose books were burned by Senatorial decree, must however be noted. The elder Seneca's evidence suggests that Labienus, nicknamed *Rabienus* for his violent *παρρησία*, was not the

victim of the government but of private enmity: "effectum est enim per inimicos ut omnes eius libri comburerentur".⁽¹⁷⁾ Such evidence as there is tempts one to the view that there may be an element of exaggeration in Syme's portrayal of the censorship in Augustus' final years: "One symptom was the suppression of offensive literature. Bonfires were decreed by vote of the Senate. The histories of the Pompeian Labienus were amongst the condemned books".⁽¹⁸⁾ Dio states that the bonfires were for scurrilous libels only.⁽¹⁹⁾ One need not be an apologist for the Augustan principate to believe that "the Roman government was loath to interfere with literary freedom".⁽²⁰⁾

One cannot, of course, dismiss the possibility that Augustus' revival of the long dormant law of defamation afforded the *princeps* a pretext for a wider censorship. But Livy's work was virtually completed by the time Cassius Severus and Labienus were prosecuted. Seneca emphasises the unprecedented nature of Labienus' punishment: "*in hoc primum excogitata est nova poena. . . res nova et invisitata supplicium de studiis sumi*". Livy was free to frame his own historical interpretation. But there is a subtler form of censorship, as Syme shows,⁽²¹⁾ the pressure of friendship and benign patronage. As with Vergil and Horace, as with members of Ovid's circle, so with Livy the *princeps* forged amicable relations. When did the friendship commence? Our first indication shows it flourishing in the later years of the reign, probably after 5 B.C., for Livy had reached in his history the career of Pompey.⁽²²⁾ Further testimony is provided by the historian's encouragement of the initial studies of Claudius, who was thus congenially detained from the formal appearances of state so embarrassing to his great-uncle Augustus. The date was about A. D. 8.⁽²³⁾ But probably Augustus sought out Livy much

earlier, when he became aware of the high literary promise of the *Ab Urbe Condita*. No evidence however exists to suggest that Augustus promoted the birth of the work; Livy's case, *vis-à-vis* Augustus, is utterly different from Vergil's.

The imperial friendship left its mark on the poetry of Vergil and Horace. Augustus duly appears in the *Aeneid* – "aurea condet saecula"⁽²⁴⁾ – and the sympathetic understanding of the reader is considerably taxed in the Horatian poems which celebrate the *princeps*.⁽²⁵⁾ Can a similar allegation be directed against Livy's *Histories*? The evidence from the extant books must first be considered.

II THE PREFACE AND THE FIRST PENTAD

If the extreme, blatantly untenable view be discounted that Livy seeks to shed oblique glory on Augustus by his characterisation of such heroes as Scipio Africanus,⁽²⁶⁾ the vital areas for consideration are the Preface and the first pentad. Livy states in his Preface that his history has a didactic function in the moral and political spheres,⁽²⁷⁾ and the Preface has closest reference to the early books.⁽²⁸⁾ The political lesson which he repeatedly propounds is that Senatorial government, embracing the Ciceronian *concordia ordinum* and exhibiting enlightened sympathy to the plebs, is the ideal. The speeches are the chief media for this lesson. Kingship at Rome is anathema: "regium nomen, alibi magnum, Romae intolerabile esse".⁽²⁹⁾ *Libertas* is fundamental: "ea esse vota omnium, ut qui libertati erit in illa urbe finis, idem urbi sit".⁽³⁰⁾ The rule of law must transcend any individual's political power: "imperisque legum potentiora quam hominum peragam".⁽³¹⁾ *Libertas* is above all dependent on the regular transfer of the supreme power: "vicissitudinem imperitandi, quod unum exaequandae sit libertatis".⁽³²⁾ When the Senate

governs wisely, its popularity exceeds that of any ambitious individual: "itaque haec indulgentia patrum. . . adeo concordem civitatem tenuit, ut regium nomen non summi magis quam infimi horrerent, nec quisquam unus malis artibus postea tam popularis esset quam tum bene imperando universus senatus fuit".⁽³³⁾ (There may be a first-century connotation in the employment of 'popularis' here, and Julius Caesar is probably in Livy's mind.) Livy believes that such aristocratic paternalism can achieve the *concordia* which is vital for the maintenance of *libertas* and the advancement of Rome's stature: "aeternas opes esse Romanas nisi inter semet ipsi seditionibus saeviant."⁽³⁴⁾ Livy addresses this message – the necessity of *concordia* – directly to his Augustan audience: "mille acies graviore quam Macedonum atque Alexandri avertit (sc. miles Romanus) avertetque, modo sit perpetuus huius qua vivimus pacis amor et civilis cura concordiae".⁽³⁵⁾ For the universal Augustan longing was for peace, and the horrors of the Civil War dominate Livy's description of the clash between Rome and Alba: "civilis simillimum bello, prope inter patres natosque".⁽³⁶⁾

Such passages attest Livy's uncompromising senatorial outlook; he is a true son of Patavium. He can have lent support to Augustus only for so long as he believed that Augustus was striving to reinstate Senatorial government. There is no systematic exploitation of the historical themes of later decades in Augustus' interests; alleged examples of such exploitation in the early books merit all the closer an analysis. Some must be dismissed as fanciful. To the rest the prevailing historical circumstances at the time of composition are closely relevant.

The dating of the first Pentad is thus of more than academic importance. Book I was published between 27 and 25,⁽³⁷⁾ but many believe that the text has been revised, and that

an earlier date of composition is likely. Bayet⁽³⁸⁾ suggests that an earlier edition of I-V had been published in 31-29, which presupposes a date of composition before Actium. Syme demonstrates the tenuous basis of this thesis, but though he proposes a later date he considers that much of the pentad had been written by 29. This assumption also rests on insecure arguments,⁽³⁹⁾ and the tone of the later books (IV especially) suggests that Augustus had at the time of composition embarked on his programme of domestic consolidation. The date of publication is in short the likeliest criterion; young historians seeking to establish a reputation do not sit on their manuscripts for years.

If the first pentad was begun after Augustus' return to Rome in 29, and the later part of it composed after the 'restoration of the Republic' in 27, Livy's anxiety to write didactic history has particular point. He was politically naive, but he was preaching the desirability of a return to Senatorial government, and Augustus' moderation provided deceptive hopes. The Preface succinctly states that a reversion to the old Republican institutions can effect Rome's salvation: "inde tibi tuaeque reipublicae quod imitere capias".⁽⁴⁰⁾ But first-century Rome lacks the necessary moral stamina: "nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus".⁽⁴¹⁾ What are the *remedia*? Syme believes that Livy refers to "the acceptance of centralised government as the only guarantee of Rome's salvation".⁽⁴²⁾ But Livy has no such political vision, as his analysis of first-century history shows.⁽⁴³⁾ Livy's *remedia* are to be sought only in the moral sphere – no less than the idealised *bonae artes* of the old Republic. He looks backward, not forward.

Only two explicit references are made to Augustus in the first five books. The first is an appendix to his account of Numa's

closure of the temple of Janus. The two subsequent closures are cited – the first after the completion of the first Punic War, the second “quod nostrae aetati di dederunt ut videremus, post bellum Actiacum ab imperatore Caesare Augusto pace terra marique parta”.⁽⁴⁴⁾ It needs a scholar’s fervid fancy to regard this prosaic comment as a ‘palinode’ to Augustus for the allegedly rough handling of the *gens Iulia* in Book 1.⁽⁴⁵⁾

The second passage is at IV 20,7: “hoc ego cum Augustum Caesarem, templorum omnium conditorem aut restitutorem, ingressum aedem Feretri Iovis quam vetustate dilapsam refecit, se ipsum in thorace linteo scriptum legisse audissem, prope sacrilegium ratus sum Cossu spoliolum suorum Caesarem, ipsius templi auctorem, subtrahere testem”. The reference to Augustus’ rebuilding of the temples registers Livy’s strong approval; *pietas* towards the gods is conspicuous amongst the *bonae artes* on the revival of which Rome’s regeneration depends. But *sacrilegium*, translated carefully, has no reference to the person of Augustus.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Dessau⁽⁴⁷⁾ drew attention to the connection of this passage with the request of the proconsul Licinius Crassus to be allowed to dedicate the *spolia opima*.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Syme⁽⁴⁹⁾ brilliantly extends the argument to show the unlikelihood of the survival of the linen corselet from the fifth century; and the suspicious coincidence of so convenient a discovery makes it probable that Augustus found no such evidence. Livy’s reaction, as expressed in the text, is not without interest. He stresses emphatically that the *annales maximi* – “tam veteres annales” – and the *libri lintei* agree that Cossus was a military tribune at the time. He points out that so important a battle could not have taken place during the year traditionally assigned to Cossus’ consulship. This reads suspiciously like a sceptical rejoinder to Augustus’ claim; but finally Livy concedes

that since Cossus described himself as consul before Jove and Romulus he could hardly have been lying.⁽⁵⁰⁾ It comes as a shock to find that Livy is apparently troubled by Cossus’ possible dishonesty, not Augustus’; but the reader is left with the clear realisation that the literary sources are united against Augustus’ ‘evidence’, and perhaps Livy is satisfied at achieving this in the politest possible way. There may thus be more than absent-mindedness (and more than inadequate revision) in the subsequent statement that when Cossus won the distinction he was a military tribune.⁽⁵¹⁾ Syme is surely right when he comments that from Livy’s viewpoint the whole business was “a vexatious disturbance in a smooth and satisfactory narrative, which had been guaranteed by the consensus of the written sources”.⁽⁵²⁾

These direct references apart, a whole field of speculation, subjective in interpretation, lies open to the researcher. Some have examined Livy’s treatment of the *Iulia gens*, vainly hoping to discover some flattering manipulation of the tradition.⁽⁵³⁾ Others analyse the use of the adjective *augustus* in association with Rome’s early history – an unrewarding *Wortstudie* in view of its increasing currency from the time of Cicero onwards.⁽⁵⁴⁾

The most alluring temptation is the tendency to draw covert references to Augustus from the portrayal of the early heroes Romulus, Numa and Camillus. Such investigation is not wholly unrewarding provided that its limitations are recognised. The impact of Roman patriotic feeling after the victory at Actium, when talk of a ‘second founding’ of Rome was widespread, may have communicated itself to Livy’s early books. But such influence is unformulated and largely unintentioned. To argue that the description of Romulus, “deum deo natum regem parentemque urbis Romanae”,⁽⁵⁵⁾ has application to Augustus is to

ignore Livy's vehement objection to the titles *deus* and *rex* when applied to a living Roman.⁽⁵⁶⁾ The phrases which describe Camillus – "Romulus ac parens patriae, conditorque alter urbis", "diligentissimus religionum cultor"⁽⁵⁷⁾ – have clearly a closer relevance to Augustus. But the ultimate objection to the 'hero-symbolism' theory resides in its selective approach. Livy sets against his version of the dramatic apotheosis of Romulus the "perobscura fama" that the king was torn limb from limb by attendant senators;⁽⁵⁸⁾ there are likewise less creditable features in the portrayal of Camillus.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Presumably Augustus himself would have hesitated to draw parallels too closely!

Far too much has been made of such subjective investigation. Livy welcomed the *pax Augusta* and the 'restoration of the Republic'. But he explicitly states that his studies are an anodyne, a refuge from the contemporary scene.⁽⁶⁰⁾ It is only occasionally that the patriotism expels the pessimism, as in the speech of the tribune Canuleius,⁽⁶¹⁾ probably written shortly after the settlement of 27. Canuleius seeks political concessions, especially the consulship, for the plebs, and parries the conservative arguments. "quid postea? nullane res nova institui debet? et quod nondum est factum – multa enim nondum sunt facta in novo populo – ea ne si utilia quidem sunt fieri oportet?"⁽⁶²⁾ After citing previous innovations, he patriotically prophesies: "quis dubitat quin in aeternum urbe condita, in immensum crescente, nova imperia, sacerdotia, iura gentium hominumque instituantur?"⁽⁶³⁾ On this Syme comments: "Livy argues that, since the City is destined to endure for ever, and will grow all the time, new forms of authority, *nova imperia*, can be expected to emerge. That formulation suits the avowed monarchy of Caesar's heir – it does not have to be assigned to the primacy of Caesar Augustus in the restored Repub-

lic".⁽⁶⁴⁾ Against this view the argument must be pressed that support of an avowed monarchy is completely alien to Livy's political convictions. 'Nova imperia' may refer primarily to the administrative developments between the fifth and first centuries – the transfer of the control of justice to the praetors, and the prorogation of provincial and military commands. The phrase *in aeternum urbe condita* reflects Livy's essential Chauvinism; he believed that the city was providentially founded and also supernaturally aided in its growth.⁽⁶⁵⁾ But if any reference is intended here to the Augustan scene, the settlement of 27, which seemed to be based on traditional lines, may have been in Livy's mind.

In sum, the evidence for Livy's having aligned his early books to achieve the purpose of Augustan propaganda is too thin to merit serious consideration.

III LIVY AND THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC

A second main problem remains. How did Livy record the delicate issues of first-century history? By the time he reached the era of the Gracchi, disillusionment about Augustus' political intentions must certainly have dawned.⁽⁶⁶⁾ The absence of Livy's own account, and the tenuous evidence of the *Periochae* and later epitomizers, makes a precise assessment of his attitudes impossible. The *Periochae* are too jejune, and the same can be said of the most faithful of the compendious historians, the fourth-century Eutropius. Florus' *Epitomae de Tito Livio Bellorum Omnium* is partially a misnomer; though Livy is often drawn upon, other sources are attested,⁽⁶⁷⁾ and there are divergences from Livy in content and arrangement.⁽⁶⁸⁾ Florus' background of the Hadrianic principate, for which Augustus was the model,⁽⁶⁹⁾ may account for an apologetic tone on behalf of Augustus which is thus by no means necessarily

attributable to Livy. Orosius also is over-indulgent to the princeps. His Christocentric history propounds that Augustus was divinely chosen to establish tranquillity and universal peace in preparation for the Incarnation of Our Lord.⁽⁷⁰⁾ Cassius Dio employs Livy extensively for the period before Augustus' principate, but again the possible use of other sources, and Dio's own political motivation – reflecting both third-century insight into the principate and a maturer political sense than Livy's – have transformed the Livian version.⁽⁷¹⁾ On the other hand, Lucan's poem, for which Livy is virtually the sole source,⁽⁷²⁾ may express the Pompeian viewpoint with more rhetorical force than did Livy.

These qualifications cannot, however, obscure the central fact that Livy narrated the crises of the late Republic with transparent sympathy for the Optimate cause. He is very critical of the Gracchi, both Tiberius and Gaius.⁽⁷³⁾ The blame for the Social War is not laid on the Senate, but on the methods and motives of the tribune M. Livius Drusus.⁽⁷⁴⁾ Such moral condemnation of individuals, and the absence of consideration of political programmes and group attitudes, is typically Livian, revealing one of the historian's marked limitations. The account of the Marius-Sulla struggle justifies the Sullan party, with Marius held wholly responsible for the Civil War.⁽⁷⁵⁾ So far as Marius is concerned, "haud facile sit dictu utrum bello melior an pace perniciosior fuerit".⁽⁷⁶⁾ Sulla's victory is correspondingly acclaimed, but Livy never hesitates to condemn encroachments on civil liberties or acts which militate against *concordia*, and the proscriptions of Sulla are attacked as "unprecedented cruelty".⁽⁷⁷⁾

In his account of 60-44 B.C., Livy was highly critical of Julius. The first Triumvirate ("conspiratio") was a consequence of Caesar's design to usurp power.⁽⁷⁸⁾ The agrarian proposals in the *Leges Iuliae* may be a factor

contributing to Livy's jaundiced view of the agrarian agitations of plebeian leaders in the first decade.⁽⁷⁹⁾ But the chief criticisms were directed at his position in the state after Munda. Eutropius' version, "agere insolentius coepit et contra consuetudinem Romanae libertatis",⁽⁸⁰⁾ is echoed by Dio and to a lesser degree by Orosius.⁽⁸¹⁾

For Livy was, as Augustus commented, a Pompeian: "tantis laudibus tulit ut Pompeianum eum Augustus appellaret".⁽⁸²⁾ Were such *laudes* extended to Pompey's early days, so that Livy "idealised the early career of Pompeius, controverting Sallustius"?⁽⁸³⁾ It is unlikely. True, the unprecedented triumph, celebrated whilst Pompey was still an equestrian, is remarked upon,⁽⁸⁴⁾ but so is the ineffectiveness of his operations against Sertorius.⁽⁸⁵⁾ Whether Livy criticised Pompey's extraordinary powers is problematic. The Manilian law was passed "magna indignatione nobilitatis".⁽⁸⁶⁾ Dio's account of the debate on Gabinius' proposal centres upon a speech by the moderate senatorial Catulus, who criticises the extent of the powers to be conferred,⁽⁸⁷⁾ but Eutropius and Orosius pass no such judgment. Livy may have implicitly criticised Pompey's dissimulation as an immediate cause of the Civil War.⁽⁸⁸⁾ He certainly depicted as undignified and ignominious Pompey's evacuation of Italy in 49.⁽⁸⁹⁾ Livy's attitude to Pompey may have reflected that of Cicero, who supported Pompey as the leader of the Optimates, the opponent of revolution, the man who would restore the Republic.⁽⁹⁰⁾ The label Pompeian may in fact denote not so much a personal adherence, but more generally support for the senatorial government of the Republic.⁽⁹¹⁾

It has often been demonstrated that Pompey rather than Julius was Augustus' model in the manipulation of political power. Syme states that Augustus even "forsook the memory of Caesar", and after proscribing

Republicans he "stole their heroes and vocabulary".⁽⁹²⁾ Vergil, Horace and Livy are cited as presenting a consistent front on these matters on Augustus' behalf. The argument is overstrained. The sole passage from the *Aeneid* is a denunciation of the Civil War, in which Pompey – "gener adversis instructus Eois"⁽⁹³⁾ shares the obloquy with Caesar. Nor was the alleged 'party-line' sufficiently explicit to reach the keen ear of Ovid, or the notice of Varius.⁽⁹⁴⁾ But the crowning consideration in all this is the fact that Republican sentiment was inherent in, and came spontaneously to, the three literary giants of Augustan Rome, whose genius had been refined in the death-throes of the Republic. When Livy wrote that it was uncertain whether the state had benefited from the birth of Julius⁽⁹⁵⁾ – he was presumably balancing military exploits against the *eversio reipublicae* – Augustus may have privately welcomed this interpretation, but it is unjust to hint that he thrust it on Livy.

IV THE TRIUMVIRATE AND THE PRINCIPATE

The historian's serious embarrassments began with his depiction of the second Triumvirate – in particular with its early years, in which the triumvirs τὰ δὲ δὴ πράγματα πρὸς τε τὸ βούλημα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθύμημα τὸ ἑαυτῶν διῆγον, ὥστε χρυσὸν τὴν τοῦ Καίσαρος μοναρχίαν φανῆναι.⁽⁹⁶⁾

The *Periocha* of CXXI begins: "qui editus post excessum Augusti dicitur". The orthodox interpretation has suggested that Livy published CXXI-CXLII in the three years A.D. 14-17. But Syme's important analysis of the biographical evidence suggests that Livy's conventional dates as recorded by Jerome may have been postdated by five years.⁽⁹⁷⁾ If Livy died in A.D. 12, and the final twenty-two books were not published until after

Augustus' death, it is possible that Livy had completed his history some years before his death, and that he refrained from publication for fear of offending Augustus.⁽⁹⁸⁾

The pentad CXVI-CXX, published in Augustus' lifetime, is thus of particular interest, covering the years 45-43. The portrait of the young Octavian is markedly sympathetic. He arrives in Rome from Brundisium to the accompaniment of favourable prodigies.⁽⁹⁹⁾ In face of the intemperance and malice of Antony, he is active in defence of the state.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ The Senate is criticised for showing insufficient gratitude after the relief of Mutina, and this is the cause of Octavian's making alliance with Antony and Lepidus.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ His appointment as consul is marked by an augury recalling Rome's first foundation.⁽¹⁰²⁾

No attempt, however, was made by Livy to veil the barbarity of the proscriptions. "C. Caesar pacem cum Antonio et Lepido fecit ita. . . ut suos quisque inimicos proscriberent. In qua proscriptione plurimi equites Romani, CXXX senatorum nomina fuerunt".⁽¹⁰³⁾ Dio does not seek to diminish Caesar's responsibility in this, but reasonably suggests that the others, especially Antony, took the initiative.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ Eutropius writes: "senatum proscripsit, cum Antonio ac Lepido rem publicam armis tenere coepit. Per hos etiam Cicero orator occisus est multique alii nobiles".⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ It is doubtful if Florus' special pleading, or the unconscious irony of Orosius, can be attributed to Livy.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

In a long surviving fragment of CXX we can read Livy's account of the death of Cicero and a brief judgment of the man, appended according to his usual method. It has been alleged that Augustus remained hostile to the memory of Cicero, and that Livy dutifully echoed the *princeps*' view. There is certainly some outspoken criticism: "omnium adversorum nihil ut viro dignum erat tulit praeter mortem: quae vere aestimanti minus indigna

videri potuit quod a victore inimico nil crudelius passus erat quam quod eiusdem fortunae compos ipse fecisset". These two criticisms – Cicero's tendency to luxuriate in his grief, and the immoderateness of his onslaughts on Antony (which certainly suggest that Antony would have followed Catiline had Cicero been sole arbiter) – are not wholly surprising as a judgment of a historian of independent mind.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ If, however, Livy had said no more, the criticism of Carcopino⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ and Syme⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ – that Livy was retailing the officially approved judgment on Cicero – might seem justified. But Livy adds: "si quis tamen virtutibus vitia pensarit, vir magnus acer memorabilis fuit, et in cuius laudes persequendas Cicerone laudatore opus fuerit". This is generous praise; analysis of the whole passage shows how misleading selective quotation can be. And again, Livy's pro-Ciceronian sympathies are explicit in his account of the revenge exacted on the corpse of Cicero. "ita relatum caput ad Antonium iussuque eius inter duas manus in Rostris positum, ubi ille consul, ubi saepe consularis, ubi eo ipso anno adversus Antonium, quanta nunquam humana vox cum admiratione eloquentiae auditus fuerat. Vix attollentes prae lacrimis oculos homines intueri trucidata membra eius poterant."

In the same book (cxx) Livy narrated the legislation by which Brutus and Cassius were condemned on Octavian's proposal in their absence, and also the operations of Brutus in Greece. Undoubtedly Brutus and Cassius remained 'under a cloud' in the eyes of Augustus,⁽¹¹⁰⁾ but Livy did not accommodate his interpretation to suit the official attitude. There is independent testimony in Tacitus of his characterisation of these Republicans: "... hunc ipsum Cassium, hunc Brutum nusquam latrones et parricidas, quae nunc vocabula imponuntur, saepe ut insignis viros nominat".⁽¹¹¹⁾

The possibility is worth pondering, therefore, that Livy's delineation of the events of 44-3 proved privately unpalatable to Augustus, and that this influenced the historian's decision to postpone publication of cxxi-cxlii until after Augustus' death. This procedure enabled him to recount without embarrassment Caesar's humiliating defeats in the struggle with Sextus Pompeius.⁽¹¹²⁾ But undoubtedly – and predictably – in the account of the long struggle with Antony Livy is firmly in support of Octavian. Due emphasis is laid on the moral delinquencies of Antony at Cleopatra's court; his failure in the Parthian campaign of 36 is attributed to his own folly,⁽¹¹³⁾ and the responsibility for the fresh bout of civil war is laid squarely on his shoulders.⁽¹¹⁴⁾

Ten books were devoted to the years between Actium and the death of Drusus in 9 B.C. Why was this stopping-point chosen? If the suspicion is correct that these final books lay completed for years,⁽¹¹⁵⁾ Syme may well be right in his suggestion that 9 B.C. was chosen because Livy felt unequal to recounting the melancholy domestic scene after 6 B.C., especially as it affected Tiberius, Augustus' designated successor.⁽¹¹⁶⁾

The most striking feature of the *Periochae* of cxxxiii-cxlii is the absence of reference to political history at Rome. It is not enough to suggest that Livy was thus enabled to omit topics of possible embarrassment to Augustus; had Livy been an enthusiastic supporter of Augustan autocracy, indications of his approval would have been manifest. The historian's deliberate silence reflects a lack of enthusiasm. The sole citation of detail which Syme makes in support of his thesis concerns Licinius Crassus. He claims that Crassus' Thracian campaigns were discussed by Livy under the events of 27 not 29, in order that Crassus' claim to lay the *spolia opima* should appear after the settlement of January 27. This is to visit on Livy the sins of the epitomator.

cxxxiv contained the events of 29-27, and the epitomator is no stickler for chronological order.⁽¹¹⁷⁾

On the other hand, Livy may have given ungrudging praise to Augustus in his foreign campaigns, as he did to Julius. He drew on the *princeps'* memoirs for the Spanish campaign of 26, and his uncritical attitude towards his sources was reflected in the prominence given to Augustus and in the virtual exclusion of the concomitant operations.⁽¹¹⁸⁾ It may well be, however, that the decision of the *princeps* to embark on the German campaign was criticised. Florus writes: "Germaniam quaque utinam vincere tanti non putasset! magis turpiter amissa est quam gloriose adquisita".⁽¹¹⁹⁾ Livy appended to his account of the death of Drusus in 9 B.C. a mention of the disaster of Varus in A.D. 9. He may have been suggesting that the grandiose plan of conquest had been ill-advised. But in general, the achievements of Roman arms abroad will have been ungrudgingly and patriotically praised.

Syme's thesis, that "Livy's annals of Augustus were written in joyful acceptance of the new order, in praise of the government and its achievements" requires severe qualification. In so far as Livy lauded the victories of Rome and the extension of the empire, he was motivated by the larger patriotism. But the complete exclusion of the political history of the reign reflects dissatisfaction as well as prudence.

Many critics of Livy have proceeded from the *a priori* assumption that Livy's friendship with Augustus spelt collusion and manipulation of the historical tradition. This is a wrong basis, reflecting an exaggerated view of the *princeps'* interference with literature in his organization of opinion. It results in a manipulation of subjective factors and a selective treatment of objective evidence. A sounder procedure is to base an approach on

the evidence of Livy's political views in the extant books. These reflect a patently Republican bias (which contains large historical dangers of its own), but there is no evidence of Livy's espousal of Augustan autocracy, or of propaganda in its interest. Tacitus could be perfectly sincere in praising not only his eloquence but also his honesty – "eloquentiae ac fidei praeclarus in primis".⁽¹²⁰⁾

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(1) See, e.g., H. Dessau in *Festschrift O. Hirschfeld* 1903, 461 f. For a recent balanced discussion, see T. F. Carney, 'Formal Elements in Livy', *PACA* 2, 1959, 2 f.

(2) Especially the views of A. Rosenberg.

(3) G. Stübler, *Die Religiosität des Livius*, 1941.

(4) *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 1940, 98 f., 108.

(5) P. 317.

(6) P. 468.

(7) 'Livy and Augustus', *HSCP* 64, 1959, 71, 53.

(8) *Ibid.*, 75.

(9) G. De Sanctis, *Problemi di storia antica*, 1932, 230.

(10) P. G. Walsh, *Livy*, 1961, 151 f.

(11) *R.R.* 463 f.

(12) *Ap. Gell.* v, 18, 9.

(13) They openly preserved friendship with Ovid when others feared Augustus' displeasure: Ovid, *Pont.* iv 13; *Trist.* iii 6.

(14) *Tac. Ann.* i 72,

(15) *Suet. Tib.* 61,3

(16) *Sen. Ad Marciam* 26,1

(17) *Sen. Contr.* x *Praef.* 5.

(18) *HSCP* 64, 1959, 72.

(19) *Dio* lvi 27,1

(20) S. G. Owen, *Ovid, Tristia* II, 1924, 45.

(21) *R.R.* ch. xxx.

(22) *Tac. Ann.* iv 34: Titus Livius... Cn. Pompeium tantis laudibus tulit ut Pompeianum eum Augustus appellaret; neque id amicitiae eorum offecit. Pompey's death was recorded in cxii: assuming the publication of a pentad a year from 27-25, one can hazard a date of 5-3 B.C. for cxii.

(23) *Suet. Claud.* 41,1: historiam in adulescentia hortante T. Livio, Sulpicio vero Flavio etiam adiuvante, scribere aggressus est. Claudius was born in 10 B.C.

(24) *Aen.* vi 791 f.

(25) E. Fraenkel, *Horace*, 1957, 240.

(26) Stübler, o.c., 1.

- (27) *Praef.* 9-10.
- (28) Dessau, o.c.
- (29) xxvii 19, 5; cf. ii 9, 7; vi 20, 5 f.
- (30) ii 15, 2-4.
- (31) ii 1, 1.
- (32) iii 39, 8.
- (33) ii 9, 7-8.
- (34) ii 44, 8.
- (35) ix 19, 17.
- (36) i 23, 1.
- (37) i 19, 3 has reference to Caesar *Augustus*, and hence was written after January 27: the first but not the second closing of Janus is mentioned, which suggests a date in or before 25.
- (38) Budé, *Livy* I, xvii f.
- (39) Syme assumes (a) that the pessimistic tone of the Preface indicates early composition; (b) that iv 20, 7 f. (*Augustus*' famed information that Cornélius Cossus was consul when he laid the *spolia opima*) is a later insertion because it is inconsistent with the main account; (c) that this information was fabricated at the end of 28 to foil the ambitions of the proconsul Licinius Crassus. The first argument is dependent on the assumption that in Livy's eyes *Augustus* represents a panacea for moral ills: but see iv 6, 12; x 9, 6; xxvi 22, 15 (and I. Kajanto, 'Notes on Livy's Conception of History', *Arctos*, 1958, 62 f.) for a refutation of this dangerous presumption. The second argument raises the question of Livy's method of composition. His pages are crowded with inconsistencies through non-reconciliation of divergent sources; footnotes are sometimes inserted without amendment of the main account (Walsh, *Livy*, 143 f.). In short, inconsistencies need not be attributed to later insertions. The third argument provides good evidence for dating iv, but a timelag after the Licinius Crassus incident is obviously possible. A date of composition well into 27 would also be more in keeping with the description of *Augustus* 'templorum omnium conditorem aut restitutorem' (iv 20, 7).
- (40) *Praef.* 10.
- (41) *Praef.* 9.
- (42) HSCP 64, 1959, 42.
- (43) Below, section III.
- (44) i 19, 3.
- (45) Bayet, o.c., xix. Syme calls the reference 'fulsome' (p. 48).
- (46) Livy means that to remove Caesar as witness would be the equivalent of robbing the shrine of the corselet - which would be *sacrilegium*, a sacred theft. Syme (p. 43) seems to take the word in a looser connotation.
- (47) 'Livy und Augustus', *Hermes* 41, 1906, 142 f.
- (48) Dio, ii 24, 4.
- (49) O.c., 43 f.
- (50) iv 20, 11.
- (51) iv 32, 4.
- (52) HSCP 64, 1959, 47.
- (53) See Syme's good comments, 48-9.
- (54) H. Erckell, *Augustus, Felicitas, Fortuna*, 1952, 19 f.
- (55) i 16, 3. Syme believes that this has reference to the fact that in 29 *Augustus*' name was added to the hymn of the *Salii* (R.G. 10).
- (56) Camillus and Scipio Africanus are both criticised for arrogating to themselves a stature more than human: v 23, 4: triumphusque omnem consuetum honorandi diei illius modum aliquantum excessit. maxime conspectus ipse est, curru equis albis iuncto urbem invecus, parumque id non civile modo sed humanum etiam visum. So xxvi 19, 9: multa alia. . . admirationis humanae in eo iuvene exceserant modum. On kingship, n. 29 above.
- (57) v 49, 7; 50, 1.
- (58) i 16, 3.
- (59) Cf. n. 56 above.
- (60) *Praef.* 5.
- (61) iv 3 f. The version of Dionysius (xi 57) suggests that Livy has composed, not merely reproduced, this speech.
- (62) iv 4, 1.
- (63) iv 4, 4.
- (64) HSCP 64, 1959, 47.
- (65) i 4, 1; ii 40, 13; iii 7, 1.
- (66) Tiberius Gracchus is discussed in Book LVIII, written about 16 B.C.
- (67) O. Rossbach, *RE* 6, 2, 2761 f.
- (68) C. H. Heyn, *De Floro Historico*, 1866, 49 f.
- (69) R. Syme, *Tacitus*, 1958, 496.
- (70) See e.g., vi 20, 4: . . . ut per omnia venturi Christi gratia praeparatum Caesaris imperium comprobetur.
- (71) See, e.g. XLVI 34. E. Schwartz, *RE* 3, 1705, after comparing correspondences between Dio and the Livian tradition, adds: "durch diese Concordanzen ist allerdings die Annahme noch nicht ausgeschlossen, dass Dio die livianische Erzählung aus anderen Gewährsmännern ergänzt und verändert hat". Or, he continues, the discrepancies may be attributable to "eine spontane, von anderen Gewährsmännern unabhängige Kritik Dios".
- (72) R. Pichon, *Les sources de Lucain*, 1912.
- (73) According to Orosius (v 8, 3-4), Tiberius' motives for legislation were revenge on the nobility and a desire for popularity. The laws of Gaius were 'perniciosas' (*Per.* LX; cf. Flor. ii 3) and Gaius was 'magna reipublicae pernicies' (*Oros.* v 12, 3).
- (74) *Per.* LXX: 'perniciosa spe largitionum plebem concitavit'. Flor. ii 6, 3: 'cupidine dominationis'. *Per.* LXXI: 'invisus etiam senatui velut socialis belli auctor'.
- (75) *Per.* LXIX; Flor. ii 9, 6: 'initium et causa belli inexplibilis honorum Marii fames. . .'

- (76) *Per.* LXXX.
- (77) *Per.* LXXXVIII: crudelitate, quanta in nullo hominum fuit.
- (78) *Per.* CIII: eoque consulatus candidato et captante rempublicam invadere, conspiratio inter tres civitatis principes facta est.
- (79) II 41, 3; 52, 2, etc.
- (80) VI 25.
- (81) Dio XLIII 41, 3; Oros. VI 17, 1.
- (82) L.c. n. 22 above.
- (83) R.R., 464.
- (84) *Per.* LXXXIX.
- (85) *Per.* XCII: parum prospere pugnavit; cf. XCIII, XCVI.
- (86) *Per.* c.
- (87) Dio, XXXVI 31 f.
- (88) Flor. II 13, 16: ut daretur consulatus absentem, quem decem tribuni favente Pompeio nuper decreverant, dissimulante eodem negabatur.
- (89) Flor. II 13, 20; Dio, XLI 13, 4.
- (90) *Att.* IX 4, 2; *Fam.* XVI 11, 3; *Att.* VII 9, 3; *Att.* VIII 3, 2.
- (91) R.R. 464 n. 2.
- (92) *Ibid.* 317.
- (93) *Aen.* VI 831.
- (94) Ovid's eulogy of Julius, *Met.* XV 745 f.; Varius' epic on Caesar's death, Macrobius, VI 1, 39 f.
- (95) Sen. *N.Q.* V 18, 4.
- (96) Dio XLVII 15, 4.
- (97) *HSCP* 64, 1959, 40 f.
- (98) Mr. R. M. Ogilvie first drew my attention to this possibility.
- (99) Jul. Obs. 68.
- (100) *Per.* CXVII: et sibi et reipublicae...; Antony's conduct, Jul. Obs. 68: 'monstrous malignity': Flor. II 15, 2.
- (101) *Per.* CXIX; Dio, XLVI 40, 1.
- (102) Jul. Obs. 69; Dio, XLVI 46, 2 f.
- (103) *Per.* CXX.
- (104) XLVII 3 f.
- (105) VII 2, 2.
- (106) Flor. II 16, 6: haec scelera in Antonii Lepidique tabulis; Caesar percussoribus patris contentus fuit: Oros. VI 18, 10: itaque ne latius atque effrenatus incircumscripita caedes ageretur (!), CXXXII senatorum nomina, etc.
- (107) Syme believes that Livy was 'prone to benevolent appraisals' (*HSCP* 64, 1959, 70), but the evidence quoted from Quint. II 5, 19 and X 1, 101 relates solely to stylistic clarity. Perhaps Sen. *Suas.* 6, 21 was meant. But Livy is not afraid to make criticisms when necessary, e.g. that of Marcellus at XXVII 27, 11.
- (108) J. Carcopino, *Cicero and the Secrets of his Correspondence*, 1951, 18.
- (109) *HSCP* 64, 1959, 61.
- (110) R.R. 506; *HSCP* 64, 1959, 60.
- (111) *Ann.* IV 34.
- (112) *Per.* CXXIX: ex duabus classibus... altera quam Caesar duxerat deleta. Cf. Flor. II 18, 2.
- (113) *Per.* CXXX '... quia hiemare in Armenia nolebat, dum ad Cleopatram festinat'.
- (114) Eutrop. VII 7, 1.
- (115) L.c. n. 98 above.
- (116) *HSCP* 64, 1959, 70.
- (117) Compare a similar chronological disorder at the end of *Per.* CXXXIII.
- (118) *HSCP* 64, 1959, 65.
- (119) Flor. II 30, 1; cf. Oros. VI 21, 25-7.
- (120) *Ann.* IV 34, 3.

TWO NOTES ON NUMIDIA

I

The use of the name Numidia in the later imperial period to describe a part of the proconsular province of Africa to be distinguished from the area under the *legatus Augusti pro praetore leg. III Augustae* has been noted on several occasions.⁽¹⁾ For convenience this part of the proconsular province will be called *Numidia proconsularis* in this article, though there is no ancient authority for the

name. Its western boundary naturally coincided with the boundary between the sphere of activity of the proconsul and that of the *legatus Aug.* as established after the division of responsibility by Gaius; it ran west of Hippo Regius, Calama, Thubursicu Numidarum and Madauros, but to the east of Thibilis. This boundary was probably not fixed till the second century, because there are indications that the proconsul continued to act for some time in what was later the

sphere of the *legatus Aug.*, as in law no doubt he was entitled to do. Q. Marcius Barea is found as proconsul at Cirta in 42/3 and C. Paccius Silvanus in the same place in 77/8.⁽²⁾ The location of these two instances is significant; the Confederation of Cirta with its substantial number of Italian immigrants was the only part of North Africa west of the Bagradas valley in any sense urbanized and was more suitable for the jurisdiction of the proconsul than that of the *legatus Aug.* with his almost exclusively military preoccupations at this date. It is natural to relate the *intestina dissensio* which was one of the reasons for Claudius' choice of Galba to be proconsul *extra sortem* in 44/6 to disputes between *legati* and *proconsules*.⁽³⁾ The position was anomalous and must have remained so till the elevation of the area of the *legatus Aug.* to a province in the full sense by Severus. The Confederation of Cirta was certainly included in the sphere of the *legatus Aug.* by the middle of the second century; a *legatus Aug.* was patron of the Confederation in 140/1 and another carried out public works in 160/2,⁽⁴⁾ and there are no later records of proconsuls acting there. On the other hand *legati Aug.* are found on occasion acting well away from the military zone, being particularly concerned with the delimitation of tribal lands;⁽⁵⁾ an analogous case is the participation of a *legatus Aug.* in the commission sent by Vespasian to resurvey the old *fossa regia*.⁽⁶⁾ Even after the creation of the province of Numidia, the governors were still generally referred to as *legati Aug. pr. pr.*, and continued to exercise their authority in the desert zone to the south of the proconsular province and in the hinterland of the Tripolitanian cities.⁽⁷⁾

Evidence for the existence of an area of the proconsular province also called Numidia dates almost exclusively from the third century, in other words after the formation of a province of Numidia. The inscriptions

which provide the evidence refer to the spheres of activity of *legati proconsulis*, about whose number and responsibility there is dispute.⁽⁸⁾ In spite of the number of *legati proconsulis* known it is still not proved that the proconsul really had three as Dio says,⁽⁹⁾ though there is nothing either to disprove it. In the early principate the duties of the *legati proconsulis* were largely of a formal nature and it seems clear that at this stage they had no fixed areas of responsibility. Later this changed. Apart from one apparently isolated reference to a *legatus prov. Africae dioeceseos Carthaginiens. proconsulis patris*⁽¹⁰⁾ of the time of Hadrian, cases of *legati proconsulis* in charge of specific areas generally called *dioecesis* occur from the early third century. The use of the word *dioecesis* to describe such an area in Africa is surprising; one would expect *tractus* or *regio* on the analogy of procuratorial divisions in Africa (though there seems to be no connection between these procuratorial districts and those under the *legati proconsulis*).⁽¹¹⁾ In fact the term *regio* does occur as a synonym of *dioecesis*. The problem is confused by variable terminology, but two 'dioceses' are recorded in the following forms: (1) *leg. Karthaginis*,⁽¹²⁾ *leg. provinciae Africae dioecesis Carthaginiensium*,⁽¹³⁾ (2) *legatus provinc. Africae dioeceseos Hipponiensis*,⁽¹⁴⁾ *legatus provinc. (Afr)icae per Numidiam (Hippon)ensium*,⁽¹⁵⁾ *(legatus prov. Africae regionis Hipponiensis)*.⁽¹⁶⁾ The diocese of Carthage needs no explanation; the reference to Numidia Hipponensium shows that Hippo (Regius, not Diarrhytos) was the centre of the *dioecesis* of Numidia, which was also sometimes called the *dioecesis Hipponiensis*. All these examples are pre-Diocletianic and apart from Carthage and Hippo they show that Avioccala and Thibursicu Bure were in the diocese of Carthage.⁽¹⁷⁾ From the reign of Diocletian come a number of inscriptions referring to an obviously extensive programme of public

works carried out by the *proconsul Africae* Aurelius Aristobulus and his *legatus* Macrinus Sossianus between 290 and 294. The latter is referred to as *leg. N.*, clearly an abbreviation for *leg. Numidiae*, at Madauros,⁽¹⁸⁾ and as *legatus* (without a geographical designation) at Calama,⁽¹⁹⁾ Mididi,⁽²⁰⁾ Thugga Terebenthina,⁽²¹⁾ and an unidentified town at Sidi Achmed el Hacheni.⁽²²⁾ The last three places are in the territory shortly afterwards detached from the proconsular province to make the new province of Byzacium, but it is by no means impossible that this relatively unurbanized district was earlier in the diocese of Numidia.

After the division of Africa Proconsularis by Diocletian, the part which continued to bear this name was still divided into dioceses; there can be no doubt that, whatever uncertainty exists as to whether there were three or two at an earlier date, there were now only two. The terminology became more standard in the fourth century, the two officials now being generally referred to as *legatus almae Karthaginis* and *legatus Numidiae*. The examples⁽²³⁾ of the former are all in the eastern part of the province, in fact east of the old *fossa regia*; the only example of a *legatus* of the Carthaginian diocese active west of this line is from Thibursicu Bure.⁽²⁴⁾ It is just possible that there was some reason for this in the early history of the province. Though west of the *fossa*, Thibursicu Bure was in an area of Marian colonization which included such places as Thugga, Thignica, Uchi Maius and Vaga and which always had close connections with Carthage.⁽²⁵⁾ Such an area may well have preserved some characteristics which distinguished it from the area to the west which remained part of the Numidian kingdom till the death of Juba and was not settled till much later.⁽²⁶⁾ In fact we find that the *legati Numidiae* of the fourth century were active not only in the obviously Numidian

towns Thubursicu Numidarum, Calama, and Madauros,⁽²⁷⁾ but in others further east, though still part of Numidia till Caesar's conquest, namely Bulla Regia, Lares and Mustis.⁽²⁸⁾

The appearance of the name Numidia in the third century to describe a portion of the proconsular province is an example of the strength of popular memory and usage in North Africa, like that of the revival of the more obscure Byzacium for one of Diocletian's new provinces. The fact is that in this area there were substantial pockets of un-Romanized elements surviving till late times, not to mention fragments of the tribe of the Numidae itself. In the literary sources the un-Romanized elements are mentioned by Apuleius for the region of Madauros in the third century⁽²⁹⁾ and by Augustine for Hippo Regius in the fifth.⁽³⁰⁾ Besides, in geographical usage, the Numidians came to mean those peoples living north of the desert between the river Ampsaga in the west and Tusca in the east, thus including the Numidian province of Severus as well as Numidia proconsularis.⁽³¹⁾

Another curious point is that the boundaries of the ecclesiastical provinces of Numidia and Africa did not coincide with the secular ones. Quite apart from the fact that as a general rule such boundaries did coincide, we find that in Africa itself elsewhere the Diocletianic division of provinces was reproduced in ecclesiastical provinces. The Christian churches of Calama, Hippo Regius, Thagaste, Thubursicu Numidarum, all in the secular 'diocese' of Numidia in *Africa proconsularis*, were in the ecclesiastical province of Numidia, formed between 256 and 305.⁽³²⁾ One need not assent to all that has been written of Numidian particularism to agree that this looks like a case in which the churches in this area were in tune with popular usage and felt more closely tied to those to the west and south west in Numidia proper than to those nearer Carthage.

II

The history of the divisions of the African provinces at the end of the third and beginning of the fourth centuries is still obscure. Since the criticism by A. H. M. Jones⁽³³⁾ of the views of W. Seston,⁽³⁴⁾ which seemed in general to complicate the matter unnecessarily, no fresh evidence has appeared. Attempted reconstructions of Diocletian's scheme, especially where the division of Numidia into *Numidia Cirtensis* and *Numidia Militiana* is concerned, remain insecurely based and will not be attempted here. Three points in connection with the general picture may be made, however.

- (a) The earliest indication of Byzacium as a province is during the first Tetrarchy.⁽³⁵⁾ A faint indication that its formation may be shortly after 294 is to be found in the extensive activity of the *procos. Africae* Aurelius Aristobulus in the northern part of the province including a number of cities subsequently included in Byzacium.⁽³⁶⁾ Aristobulus' four year term of office (290-294) is unusual at this date and may be regarded as a special charge in preparation for the division of the province.
- (b) It is difficult to see how the creation of Byzacium could have failed, for purely practical reasons, to lead to the simultaneous creation of a province of Tripolitania. The arguments of Jones against Seston's proposition that Tripolitania was at one stage associated with *Numidia Militiana* give weight to the view that the province existed under the Tetrarchy. In further support it may be argued that in view of the relative importance of the two provinces, Aurelius Quintianus, *praeses Numidiae* in November 303,⁽³⁷⁾ will have held the governorship of Tripolitania⁽³⁸⁾ at an earlier stage in his career. Again,
- the building of a *centenarium* which he took over from his predecessor in Tripolitania⁽³⁹⁾ seems to be part of a general plan of strengthening the African *limes* which is well attested under Diocletian.⁽⁴⁰⁾
- (c) Whatever may be said about the divisions of Numidia, it is generally agreed that it was reunited again shortly before 320. Iallius Antiochus was *vir perfectissimus praeses* of an undivided province in 315 or later,⁽⁴¹⁾ and the first *consularis*, Domitius Zenophilus, was governor in 320.⁽⁴²⁾ Zenophilus also had the additional style of *sexfaxcalis*,⁽⁴³⁾ which often appears subsequently on inscriptions as an additional title of the *consularis Numidiae*.⁽⁴⁴⁾ No doubt the elevation in status was connected with the removal of the provincial administration of the undivided province from Lambaesis, where it still was at the time of Diocletian,⁽⁴⁵⁾ to Cirta. This city, which had been sacked by the troops of Maxentius when they captured it from the African usurper Domitius Alexander, was rebuilt by Constantius and renamed Constantina.⁽⁴⁶⁾ A consequence of the removal from Lambaesis will have been the separation of civil and military power in Numidia; the latter had still been retained by the *praeses Numidiae* as late as 303,⁽⁴⁷⁾ as it continued to be, exceptionally, in Tripolitania and Mauretania Caesariensis.⁽⁴⁸⁾ In view of the difficulties caused by the brief appearance of *Numidia Cirtensis* and its epigraphical abbreviation *N.C.*, it may be observed that during the fourth century the whole province was frequently called *Numidia Constantina*,⁽⁴⁹⁾ with the same abbreviation, there being no question of the name applying only to a restricted area like the earlier *Numidia Cirtensis*. The title was still in use as late as 383/392, but on the

TWO NOTES ON NUMIDIAS

whole, in view of the number of occasions on which it was omitted from formal inscriptions, was probably a local usage rather than the official designation, and recalled the favour shown to the city and the province by Constantine.

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(1) See especially S. Gsell, *Inscriptions latines de l'Algérie*, I, 1922, p. x-xii, A. Albertini, *Bulletin de l'Académie d'Hippone*, 1930-1935, 27 f., B. E. Thomasson, *Die Statthalter der römischen Provinzen Nordafrikas von Augustus bis Diocletianus*, I, 1960, 60 f.

(2) *ILAlg.* I, 550, 551.

(3) Suetonius, *Galba*, 7; P. Romanelli, *Storia delle Province romane dell' Africa*, 1958, 265-6.

(4) *CIL* VIII, 7036, *ILAlg.* II, 631.

(5) *ILAlg.* I, 2829.

(6) *CIL* VIII, 23084, 25967, *AE* 1912, 148-51.

(7) J. M. Reynolds and J. B. Ward Perkins, *Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania*, 1952, 8.

(8) See Thomasson, op. cit. I, p. 58-82.

(9) Dio Cassius, LIII, 14, 7.

(10) *CIL* XIV, 3599.

(11) *Contra*, Thomasson, op. cit., 78.

(12) *CIL* VIII, 23831; R. Cagnat, *Inscriptions latines d'Afrique*, 1923, 508.

(13) *CIL* II, 1262.

(14) *CIL* IX, 1592.

(15) *AE* 1933, 155.

(16) *CIL* X, 5178.

(17) See location of inscriptions in note 12.

(18) *ILAlg.* I, 2048.

(19) *ILAlg.* I, 179.

(20) *CIL* VIII, 608.

(21) *CIL* VIII, 11768.

(22) *CIL* VIII, 27816.

(23) *CIL* VIII, 1277, 11205, 23849.

(24) *ILA.* 508.

(25) T. R. S. Broughton, *Romanization of Africa Proconsularis*, 1929, 32 f., 58 f.

(26) Broughton, op. cit. 79 f.

(27) *ILAlg.* I, 1286, 179, 2102.

(28) *CIL* VIII, 25521, 1782, *ILT* 1557.

(29) *Apol.* 24.

(30) *Epp.* CVIII, 5, 14; CCIX.

(31) See *RE*, XIV, 2, 2166 f.

(32) A. Audollent, in *Dict. Hist. Géog. Eccl.* I, 1912, cols 848 f.

(33) *JRS* 44, 1954, 20, 21, 27.

(34) *Dioclétien et la Tétrarchie*, I, 1946, 326 f.

(35) *AE* 1908, 197.

(36) *Supra*, notes 18-22; see also *CIL* VIII, 624, 4645, 11774, 23413, 23657, 23658, *AE* 1933, 60; 1946, 119.

(37) *ILS* 644.

(38) *ILS* 9352.

(39) *ILS* 9352 with *AE* 1929, 4.

(40) Other centenaries *CIL* VIII 20215, *AE* 1942/3, 84; cp. Zosim. II, 34.

(41) *CIL* VIII, 7005.

(42) Optatus, Append. I, in *CSEL* vol. XXVI, 185 f.

(43) *AE* 1915, 30.

(44) E.g. *CIL* VIII, 17896, 18328, 7034.

(45) *CIL* VIII, 2729.

(46) Aurel. Vict. *Caes.* 40, 28.

(47) *AE* 1942/3, 84; see also *CIL* VIII, 2572.

(48) *Notit. Dig. Occ.* XXIX, XXXX.

(49) E.g. *ILAlg.* II 596, 619; *CIL* VIII, 8324, 18701, 7975, 7979, 20158; *AE* 1933, 159.

REVIEWS

J. Wilson and C. Parsons, A BASIC LATIN VOCABULARY, Macmillan, 1960. Pp. iv + 59; 3s.

It is surely a sign of the times that vocabularies, usually based on a word-count of the foremost Latin authors and specifically directed at G.C.E., are appearing in ever increasing numbers. Gone, apparently, are the days when a Classical education was assimilated like the air; but then, gone too is the breathing space of those more spacious and leisurely days.

Following hard on the heels of the same Company's *Latin Word List* of K. C. Masterman – a most valuable publication – comes "A Basic Latin Vocabulary". Like all such books, it is a somewhat flimsy publication and one wonders if such an economy might be a false one. The book claims to contain a collection of a thousand of the common Latin words. Most of the words indeed seem essential but it is surprising to note the presence of such words as *arguo*, *blandior*, *daps*, *manes*, *rota* and *ruber* while such words as *condicio*, *finitimus*, *inimicus*, *iniuria*, *regio* and *tribunus* are absent. Misprints (such as e.g. 'pugnae, -ae f.' of p. 38) are few. English derivations are given where possible.

A useful feature of the book is the grouping of Latin words which have a common root and connected meanings. Helpful too is the table of constructions at the end of the book. This table contains the common constructions with their uses, examples and notes. The table is followed by the Sequence of Tenses and a short list of verbs which take a Prolocative Infinitive.

All in all, this is a useful publication and could be of particular value for revision prior to the G.C.E. examination or to examinations of similar standing.

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J. R. Hawthorn and C. MacDonald: ROMAN POLITICS 80-44 B.C., Macmillan, 1960. Pp. X + 259; 9/6d.

In this book the classical masters of Bradford College and Sherbourne School selected a period of Republican history and divided it into a series of crucial topics. Each topic has a brief introduction followed by extracts from authors – Cicero, Sallust, Caesar, Asconius, Suetonius, Gellius, and the *Commentariolum Petitionis* – as a basis for study (approx. 92 pages), along with a commentary (approx. 100 pages). The book also contains two maps and three plans, a stemma, indexes of proper names, laws, political and legal institutions, social and political terms, and topography. In assessing this publication its primary object must be kept in view, i.e. the reading in secondary schools of good prose authors combined with the first-hand study of history as based on some relevant primary material. Additional clarification must be sought – or provided by the master – from the basic literature referred to, e.g. Syme's *Roman Revolution*, Scullard's *Roman Politics*, Badian's *Foreign Clientelae*, Sherwin-White (*JRS* 46, 1956 and *Greece and Rome* 4, 1957), Balsdon (*JRS* 29, 1939 and 47, 1957), and the relevant chapters by Cary and Last in *CAH IX*. The bibliography is not exhaustive but confined to works "which are likely to be accessible". The central theme is the working of the Roman government in the years following the dictatorship of Sulla, studied 'in action' and for the greater part through the mouths of eye witnesses. This is an effective approach and one which will produce insight and a feeling for historical reality such as handbooks alone cannot achieve.

In the first three chapters, 'The Tribunate', 'The Equestrians and the Lawcourts', 'Pompey and the Tribunate', Pompey's role as a *popularis* at this stage of his career is clearly brought out.

The restoration of the juries and of the *tribunicia potestas* go together (p. 15 f., Cicero, *in Verrem*). The next chapter, 'Optimates and Populares', fulfils the essential function of presenting the major factions in their true perspective – the inner ring of *consulares viri* and the opposition which sought to break down their exclusiveness. It sheds valuable light on Cicero's thought, as a supporter of the 'true' *populares* in the sixties (p. 35 f., *de Leg. Agr.*; contrast *populares isti*, p. 65, in 59 B.C.), and a follower of the ideal *optimates* in the fifties. In view of the central theme of the book the selection from the *Commentariolum Petitionis* is happily included in this chapter for what it reveals of *amicitiae* and the raw materials of political power and influence. In the next chapter (ch. V) the legal aspects of the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators are clearly dealt with, and the extracts selected illustrate Cicero's point of view and justification for the extreme measures taken (p. 58 f., *in Cat.* IV). The conspiracy is appropriately presented in its context, i.e. in the aftermath of the Sullan régime (cf. the *tertium genus*, p. 52 f., *in Cat.* II). A long chapter, 'Force and Fraud in Politics', is devoted to the years 58-52 B.C. The theme is the struggle for the preservation of the Caesarian legislation of 59 B.C. (cf. p. 106 and 211), which gives background and unity to this period; it accounts for the sustained opposition to Caesar throughout the decade and the intransigence which produced the civil war in the end (cf. p. 115, letter to Atticus, Dec. 50 B.C.), and which Caesar felt so bitterly (p. 118). Our attention is duly drawn to the 'new generation of optimates' and 'extremists' (p. 71 and 188). Caesar fares badly; he is virtually responsible for the new era in bribery and physical violence (p. 70 and 179). A fine note on Messius' proposal explains the constitutional implications of Pompey's commands (p. 188 f.). This period comes alive with the aid of information supplied on public assemblies (p. 197), their meeting places (p. 200), procedure and places of voting (p. 182 and 201), methods of

obstruction (p. 195), and constant reference to the maps of Rome and the *forum*. The value of Asconius' commentary is revealed e.g. on the issue underlying the trial of Milo and on Cicero's excellence as an advocate on the technical side (p. 93). This is the outstanding chapter in the book. The prominent feature of the chapter on the civil war (ch. IX) is the ambivalence of Pompey and Cicero's disillusionment: *nihil actum est a Pompeio nostro sapienter, nihil fortiter* (p. 121 f.; cf. p. 125. Contrast *Pompeius, nostri amores*, p. 65 – letter to Atticus in 59 B.C.). The crisis, and attempts to reach a compromise, are clearly set forth (p. 109 f.; correlate 114 f.). It is good to study Cicero's letter of Dec. 50 B.C. (p. 115) to appreciate the righteous indignation at Caesar's demands and the irony of his Gallic command – a truer reflection of how men felt than the speech *de Prov. Cons.* (p. 103 f.).

It is not clearly stated which were the powers of the tribunes Pompey is likely to have restored, or the effect of this, since the *intercessio* was never removed (Caesar makes much of this, p. 120) and the disqualification from holding further office had already been abolished by the *lex Aurelia*. Admittedly we can only surmise (cf. *CAH IX*, p. 292 f.). Similarly the brief note on patrician sanction for laws (p. 139) does not satisfy. The inclusion of chapters 136-7 of the *pro Sestio* (ch. IV) – the plea for admission to the highest order *ab universo populo* on the basis of industry and merit – or a reference to them in the commentary would have underlined the unity of Cicero's outlook as a *novus homo* and basically a *popularis*, linking up with his ideal of *cum dignitate otium* as based on a *concordia ordinum* (p. 156, in conjunction with p. 167). Attention should perhaps be drawn more specifically to Cicero's antipathy to Sulla, and the reasons for it – to the *illorum temporum dolor* (p. 53) – but particularly to the constitutional aspects of the new kind of dictatorship as Cicero would have seen it (cf. p. 127). The generalisation on speeches (p. 166) is apt to mislead. It reflects unfavour-

ably on Thucydides, about whom the last word in this respect has not yet been spoken; and the historicity of Tacitus' version of Claudius' speech in the light of the *Tabula Lugdunensis* must be borne in mind: "Il correspond... à sa tenue essentiellement historique" (P. Fabia, *La table claudienne de Lyon*, 1929, 203). In the chapter on the First Triumvirate (ch. VI) not enough is said of the 'constitutional' background to Pompey's dispute with the senate over his *acta* (p. 171); in the light of its prerogatives the senate had a strong case for its attitude. Similarly the request of the tax-farmers was outrageous – and Cicero thought so too (Att. II, 1, 8). We need more on the progressive deterioration of public order because of the fact that Rome did not have a police force (cf. p. 24, Ascon., *in Corn.*); the reader may gain the impression that it began with Caesar (p. 70). There seems to be an omission in the text in regard to the circumstances which gave Caesar his Gallic command (the note on p. 205 is not clear as it stands); and perhaps the constitutional procedure in the allocation of consular provinces can be given more fully (p. 208, 30). Lastly, an introductory note in the commentary on Asconius would not have been out of place.

Criticisms and suggestions are made primarily in view of the teaching function of the book, and in the light of the many other technical matters which are dealt with in detail and with superb clarity. Among the commendable features of the work I would include notes such as those on lawyers (p. 143), *cum dignitate otium* (p. 156), the s.c. *ultimum* (p. 164), topography (p. 172), *salva republica* (p. 175 and 233), *edicta* (p. 176), *CCCC* (p. 182), the *imperium maius* (p. 189 f.), and the *lex annalis* (p. 212).

This book may with profit be prescribed in university undergraduate courses as well as for secondary schools. It should not however take the place of the study of individual authors.

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H. Lloyd Jones, MENANDRI DYSCOLUS, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960. Pp. 84 including INDEX NOMINUM and INDEX VERBORUM; 15s.

The new Regius Professor deserves our gratitude for producing an inexpensive text of the *Dyskolos* quickly. The more general aspects of the *Dyskolos* have been discussed recently in this journal (PACA 2, 1959, 27) so that this review is confined to the text. After the manner of the *Oxford Classical Texts* introduction and critical notes are in Latin. The author adds *dramatis personae*, scenic notes, references to book fragments, etc., index of names, index of words. On the whole the work is excellently done and this is the best text yet available. The only general criticism to be made is that in a text which will be set for school and university examinations obelised words and gaps might have been further avoided where a reasonable emendation or supplement could have been suggested, e.g. 43, 44, 48, 89-96, 114, 142-3, 201, 247, 406, 496, 550, 596-9, 647, 817, 836-41.

I add some notes on detail in the hope that some points may be reconsidered in a second edition. The Latin *Dramatis Personae* defeats me: how can CHAEREA, SICO, PARTHENIS, *turba iuvenum ebriorum* belong to the *familia Callipidis*? 1. 5: *ad sinistram Cnemonis (ut vidit Quincey) domum videmus*. I should take this to mean 'on the audience's left' (which was Martin's correct interpretation of Pan's ἐπι δεξιά) but Quincey says 'the audience's right' because he believes that Getas calls 'Right wheel!' in 909 (the solution to 909 may be that Getas is looking towards the house). Does Lloyd Jones mean 'we see Knemon's house on Pan's left'? 35: I hope the better second thought in the footnote will prevail over the emendation. 126: Quincey's ὑποδυνώμενος might have been quoted. 134: *Exit Chaerea*. This must be right, and the paragraphos shows that the speaker changes at the end of the line. 144: *An scaenam linquit Byrrhia?*

I think he does 'not remain on the stage as far as possible from Knemon' but retires into the *Nymphaion* (cf. *Rylands Bulletin*, 42 1960, 507). 149: 'He shouts Ares' is out of key for Sostratos. The traces of letters are compatible with Martin's ἀλλὰ γὰρ (resuming after a digression). 173: λεωφόρον (Fraenkel, Post, Dale independently) is at least Greek. Here an obelus in the text would be justified. 201: Dale's ἀνύσας γ' accounts for Sostratos' 'she may be a rustic but she shows some spirit'. 282: χρόνω: does this mean 'attaining confidence in Chronos'? I find 'in time attaining confidence' easier. 301: Pyrrhias is given this line. But a) there is no authority for this, b) nowhere else in Menander do four speakers appear at once, c) Sostratos is alone for his agricultural experiment, d) 301 is perfect as Daos' comment on Gorgias 'Good, master, as I hope for blessings' (μοι at the end of the line as Harsh and Sydney), e) ὁ λαλῶν is Daos because he reported Sostratos' actions to Gorgias. 378: If the whole line belongs to Daos, surely ἀπέσωσα σ' is necessary at the beginning. 430: Ritchie's seductive attribution of 430, 432, 437, 440 to Sostratos' mother is accepted here. The two fatal obstacles are a) that the papyrus gives 430 to Getas, b) that the mother does not appear in the list of speaking characters. That Getas should tell Plangon to hurry is only objectionable if she is Sostratos' sister, not if she is a poor girl working in the house like her namesake in the *Heros* (36 f.). Martin's assumption that Sikon comes out with Getas is easier. But 434 νῆ Δί', ἀπεσώθητέ γε should be given to Knemon, and 438 the single word comment τάλαν could be given to the flutegirl. 485: ὁ should be δ, 'coming to my door', constructed after διευτύχηκεν. 488: It is possible to read καταφανῶς in the papyrus. 596: I prefer τίνος; 612: πάντ' ἔχομεν is surely Gorgias: 'No, thank you'. 622: Add *Prodit e sacello Sico*. 666: Ἀσκληπιόν. 691: The reference to Ar. *Ach.* 407 and *Thesm.* 95 is irrelevant because Aristophanes used the *ekkyklema* (cf. A. M. Dale, *JHS* 77, 1957, 207, 209);

Knemon may have been brought out on a wheeled couch, but εἰσχυκλεῖτ' is not the only possibility in 758 as Quincey has seen. 727: Szemerényi's ἔπερ ἄν ἄλλος κἀδικαίωσ' is the best solution, if a verb is felt desirable. 736-7: I prefer to punctuate: 'You have wits by the gift of heaven. You care for your sister as is natural.' 746: I am not convinced that οὐκ fits the traces better than ἀλλά; with ἀλλά, ταῦτα and οὕτω both refer to 'modern' life, which I prefer. 775 sounds like Sostratos' answer and there may have been a colon at the end of 774. 798 f.: I am not clear that Stobaeus' text is preferable here. 821: Should not the scenic note tell us that Gorgias has been in the doorway since at least l. 791? 878: I prefer εὐπαθεῖν: 'than now to make merry'. 879: Scenic note: why should the flute player come from the shrine? Is he not present all the time to accompany the choruses and perhaps the trochaic tetrameters? 913 should go to Knemon.

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C. E. Graves, THUCYDIDES, THE CAPTURE OF SPHACTERIA, Macmillan, 1961. Pp. XVI + 146, with a map, notes, vocabulary, illustrations and an index; 5/6.

This extract makes a very appropriate reader for boys studying Greek at SC level: short, but clearly a composite whole, in (mostly) straightforward and always attractive Greek, it concerns an interesting and significant historical incident. It is to be regretted, however, that, in this 14th reissue, the opportunity has not been taken of bringing the book up to date. A precedent for the introductions of changes into the book was set, after 6 reprints, in the reissue which followed the turn of the century. The present reprint, the 7th since 1902, has occurred after the longest gap in reissuing (24 years) the edition has experienced. Some comparable

alteration of substance might fittingly have marked this interval, the turn of the half-century and the edition's 82nd year.

As is shown by the Preface, redolent with its charming and scholarly nineteenth-century atmosphere, the edition as it now stands was intended for palmier days when Greek Prose Composition occupied a far more prominent place in the curriculum than it can do today, when so much more emphasis is placed upon a fuller appreciation of the classical texts as literature. This change of emphasis should have been reflected in modifications of the Notes; there is an obvious need for e.g. fuller information on helotry (p. 49), Cleon as a political figure (p. 80) and the trireme (p. 90). The latter point brings up the matter of the illustrations. That of a trireme (facing p. 4) gives no overall impression of its appearance and could advantageously be replaced by a photograph of the vessel reconstructed by modern scholarship. The relevance of the coin-drawings (facing p. 9) is not immediately obvious; a different selection interspersed at appropriate points in the Notes would heighten their significance and encourage use of the commentary.

Most schools teaching Greek to SC standard will possess classical sections in their libraries. It would in consequence have been of great service if the reference works upon which this edition is based (p. XIV) had been brought up to date: works now available will surely be Gomme's edition, Smyth's grammar (and Denniston, to whom reference is sorely needed at e.g. p. 84 and 115) and Hammond's history. As they stand, citations of older works are largely useless because these books are out-dated (and may well not be available). Revision of the Notes was anyway called for in view of Graves' own Preface to his 1884 edition of book IV, which revised the notes of *this* edition throughout, correcting several errors (and A. W. Spratt's edition, of 1911 vintage, might profitably have been consulted). Points at which advantage

might have been taken of a reissue to improve the Notes occur at pages 51 ἐπιστάσασθαι (cf. Gomme, vol. III, p. 445), 52 (comment on the historiographical function of the speech is necessary), 71 ἀπιδόντες – explanation of force of prefix), 75 (construction of ὑπάρχειν), 85 (comment on usage of the dual), 89 (κεκακωμένην translated as an aorist; comment on the force of perfect and pluperfect tenses is in general poor; cf. p. 67-68 and 60), 97 and 99 (commentary on Demosthenes & Cleon needs integration), 113 (further comment on καλοὶ ἀγαθοὶ – cf. Gomme at CQ 3, 1953, 65-68).

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K. J. Dover, GREEK WORD ORDER, Cambridge U.P., 1960. Pp. xiii + 72; 15s.

This is a work that has come to stay. Inspired by a stubborn but wise student who refused to alter his own word order in a piece of Greek prose composition, Prof. Dover for years has wrestled with the delicate problem of Greek word order and has now given not only the student but also Classics as a whole the most thorough answer that has ever come from the English world – perhaps even the most thorough answer given at any time – an answer which aims at determining the *most important determinants* of order in early Greek prose. In fact, the few words 'the most important determinants' denotes the real merit of this work. Before Dover, the multi-headed problem of Greek word order has usually been discussed – often very thoroughly (e.g. by Frisk) – in syntactical terms, i.e. the problem has usually been discussed in terms of only *one* determinant. Extensive statistics were utilised in the attempt to formulate valid "rules" for Greek word order – rules whose validity was to be questioned by the very next scholar (think esp. of the relation Object – Verb). With a very open mind D. states (i) that the word order in

Greek is much freer and (ii) less predictable than that of the majority of European languages and (iii) that all patterns of order which are describable in syntactical terms are secondary phenomena. In a very thorough and basically sound chapter on the nature of the problem, D. declares that this problem should never be approached from the angle of only one determinant, but that various determinants should be considered. D. then discusses the most important determinants governing word order in Greek and finds three:

i) the tendency of certain specified words to take a constant position (cf. esp. c. II (lexical and semantic determinants)),

ii) certain types of logical relation between the sentence and its context (= c. IV, cf. also p. 4 for a definition of logical determinant), and

iii) the tendency to adhere to familiar patterns.

In a separate chapter the syntactical determinants (= c. III) are discussed and via i.a. statistical data D. concludes: "It is clear that these statistics are very far from establishing for 'Classical Greek' *simpliciter* anything worth calling a syntactical rule of word order" (p. 31); and later: "all patterns of order which are describable in syntactical terms are secondary phenomena"; "In Greek the primary logical principles 'weighted the scales' in favour of an increasing dominance by syntactical patterns of order"; and "We find in fact that in the language of the New Testament rules of order are much more easily defined in syntactical terms than they are in Classical Greek" (p. 68).

The greatest merit of D.'s work, as has already been stated, is that he considers various determinants, and he has produced a work which though brief – perhaps too brief – is always clearly written, always well arranged, always fundamentally – whether you agree with his principles or not – well-thought-out. D. knows his bibliographical material and is in full control of everything important done by his predecessors. Moreover, the book is almost free of misprints and inaccuracies (the last two symbols on p. 46

should be altered to read $pNNpqNCppNpC$). In short an excellent book and the best guide on Greek word order to put into the hands of students and teachers (?).

I found the second chapter especially convincing, where D., as no one before him, as far as I know, has succeeded in showing the tendency of certain words to behave according to definite patterns. (Think of the *postpositives* (symbol q, i.e. i.a. ἄρα, γάρ, ἄν, με, μου, μοι) and the *prepositives* (symbol p, i.a. ἀλλά, ἦ, καί, μή (lest), relatives and ὁ (the)) in their relation to M (= mobile words, apt to be found anywhere in a Greek clause). A few patterns discovered by D., but which are already implicit in the work of Wackernagel, are of more than passing importance: historically seen, the tendency of $Mqq\dots$ $M > MqMq\dots$, with the second last sentence of p. 14 ("in particular, q which 'belong' in participial and infinitive clauses are commonly associated with the words to which those clauses are subordinate"), is of the utmost importance. Equally important is the tendency of p and M to coalesce (with the q apt to follow, thus giving pMq). This complex (pM) tends to be disrupted by an intruding q ($pMq > pqM$) – the q of the connecting particles being especially fond of disrupting this complex (cf. esp. p. 16. on the various likes and dislikes of different authors). This tendency ($pMq > pqM$) is however often halted because "q are not necessarily placed after the leading p or M of what would traditionally be defined as a 'clause', but may occupy a similar position within one of the word-groups which constitute the clause" (cf. p. 17 with good examples). Equally convincing and important is – I choose quite at random – D's remark that "chiasmus is not necessarily a literary embellishment" (p. 54); his very thorough and sound judgement on the reliability and dangers of mere statistical data (p. 60); and the contentious – but to my mind correct – first 12 lines on p. 67.

The task of the critic is not only to flatter but also to evaluate and to criticise. Without

detracting in any way from my very high esteem for D.'s work, I would, though hesitatingly, suggest the following:

i.

I believe that D. in his search for patterns has overemphasized the rôle played by the other two determinants (esp. the lexical and the logical) to the detriment of the rôle played by syntactical factors right from the era of the I.-E. age. D. has succeeded in proving the existence of patterns – also patterns which viewed historically could be termed as the product of a certain 'chance' (p. 59) – but he has failed to explain convincingly why all patterns of order describable in syntactical terms are necessarily secondary phenomena. The relationship Subject followed by Verb (and not V-S) approximates to the character of a 'rule' – dangerous as this dictum may be – to a greater extent than D. is inclined to admit – and this is confirmed by D's own and also by other statistics. Although i.a. on p. 65 reasons are given for the preponderance of the S-V pattern (cf. also p. 26 f. on the behaviour of preferential words (symbol M^a) vs ordinary words (= M^b), one feels that more attention should have been paid to the possibility that, after all, pure syntactical reasons were in this case of greater import than any other possible determinant.

ii

D's motivation for his choice of material (esp. from Herodotus and documentary inscriptions) is hardly satisfactory. What he says esp. of Herodotus, on the authority of Pohlenz (see p. 11), is a questionable truth. Do we indeed get a more 'natural' Greek from the older Greek prose? Or is this also a fact that can never be proved without the risk of circularity? D. prefers prose to poetry. But the important conclusions on p. 64-65 re the conflict pattern-principle is to a large extent based on Homer. And even though it be from the Catalogue of

Ships, metre and poetical style, apart from the formulaic character, certainly were also important determinant factors. D. in his evaluation has to my mind, not taken this sufficiently into consideration. And is this not also true of Aristophanes' *Ra.* 1434 (p. 19)?

iii

In his chapter on logical determinants D. by creating new terms (Nucleus and Concomitants (= N and C, cf. his definition p. 40)) gained much; amongst other things he hereby eliminated to a large extent the subjective factor. The latter of course is always present when applying 'emphasis' as a criterion. He indeed gained much. I am also convinced that a certain parallelism does exist between the behaviour of q and C – D's analyses on pp. 41-6 being particularly convincing. I am, however, inclined to think that D. in his enthusiasm has gone much too far – sections ii and iii as a whole being not so convincing. To mention but one example: is Herod. I,1,1 (symbols $N (=M^b)C (=M^b)C (=M^a)C (=M^a)pC (=M^b)$) really "clearly" (see p. 47) modelled upon $M \dot{;} MqqM$? And is the break after the leading M (symbol $M \dot{;}$ or $N \dot{;}$), a break necessary for D's pattern, really free of all subjectivity (cf. e.g. in this connection the last two breaks in Herod. II,26,2 (see p. 44))?

The preferential treatment of concomitants (see p. 49 f.) is according to D. mainly determined by antithesis (explicit or implicit). But can antithesis really always be discovered on mere formal or logical lines without involving emphasis as a major criterion, and thus bringing in subjectivity through the back door? (In this I see a real danger – and I say this in spite of the fact that I personally on the whole agree with his analyses – those on p. 52, as well as the argument there, being less convincing). And the sentence on p. 51 ("the preferential treatment of words which have some *emotional force*") confirms my fear of at least a certain amount of subjectivity.

iv.

Perhaps the fact that the work originated from lectures might be responsible for traces such as the following which underline defects on a more formal level: on p. 13 among reasons given why $\sigma\epsilon$, $\sigma\omicron\upsilon$, $\sigma\omicron\iota$ could not unconditionally be classed as q, D. mentions, quite correctly, i.a. "the danger of circularity inherent in the concept 'emphasis'". But this argument can only be fully grasped by the reader when he has also read D's exposition of 'emphasis', which comes on p. 32 f. Here should perhaps also be classed i.a. 'n words' (p. 3), $M_1q + M_2 > M_3q$ (p. 15), the symbols $\ddot{}$, $|$, $||$ – which are not explained explicitly (as is done in the case of pq_1Mq_2 (cf. p. 16)) though their meaning can be gathered from the context. Would this work, which is already rich in symbols, not have gained by using separate symbols for 'complex N' and 'complex C', by which the global pattern would undoubtedly have gained in clarity (cf. esp. p. 42 and 47)? Personally I should also have preferred to have the comparable statistics on p. 28, 29 SV vs VS etc. placed directly beside each other thus saving the reader the trouble of waiting for the conclusions at the bottom of the page.

v.

I know no better survey to put in the hand of students, but from the student's point of view I miss two things: first, a section or short chapter in which the long history of the problem is briefly stated and the different points of view are mentioned, thus giving the student more scope to appreciate and evaluate D's own merits. Secondly, a concluding chapter offering and analysing a few Greek passages, thus discussing the various problems and the arbitrariness of the word order with reference to the rôle of all three (or more) of the determinants (instead of only one of them at a time). This would have enabled the student to see what a real expert, as D. is, can make of it.

In conclusion: in many respects this is a unique work. The defects are mainly on the more formal level, and do not basically affect the lasting value of the book. It is to be warmly recommended.

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N. E. Collinge, THE STRUCTURE OF HORACE'S ODES, London 1961, Oxford University Press (University of Durham Publications). Pp. ix + 158; 25s.

This book aims at tracing the design of Horace's *Odes*, and at finding sense and beauty in that design. Since Horace believed in the equal importance of *ars* and *ingenium*, and since he was unremitting in his zeal for lyric perfection, there is some point in submitting his words, his ideas and his whole poems to detailed analysis. In recent years Fraenkel, Wilkinson, Campbell and others have thrown light on many of the *Odes*, and Mr Collinge both acknowledges his debt to them and criticises some of their interpretations. One would only wish that, in outlining his aims in his Preface, he did not overstate his case (p. viii): 'The *Odes*... are very largely exercises in form, to the exclusion of content, or at least to the exclusion of fresh invention.' In reality, apart from rare instances like iv 7, a palpable re-casting of i 4, each poem contains its own thoughts, its own *inventio* as orators would have said, appropriate to the addressee or the topic. The mere fact that many of the ideas of a particular ode may be found elsewhere does not mean that the ode is lacking in content.

There are four chapters, an analytical appendix to Chapter III, and indexes of names and Horatian passages. Chapter I is entitled 'Words and images: the mechanistic approach.' On iv 5, 17-24, a 'long series of strictly parallel asyndetic sentences, each of them filling a line' (Fraenkel), Collinge remarks that Horace has alternated

plain statement in the odd verses (*tutus bos*, etc.) with a goddess and divine personifications in the even, so that not only *Faustitas* but *Mos*, *Lex*, *Nefas*, *Culpam* and *Poena* should be given capitals. With Wilkinson (*C.Q.* (N.S.) 9, 1959, 181-192) the author takes the *iunctura* of the *Ars Poetica* as 'collocation', J. R. Firth's term for the company a word keeps. By comparing the vocabulary of iii 1, *domos fastidit, aequora, altum, molibus, caementa, fastidiosus, moliar*, with other passages in the *Odes*, one can see how Horace builds up such *iuncturae* and gives them a personal significance.

Chapter II is headed 'Contrast-technique I: the order of the odes.' It is held that, although Horace mostly avoids setting side by side odes in the same metre, we have no positive metrical guide other than the variety of the 'Parade' odes (i 1-9) and the alternation of sapphics and alcaics in ii 1-11. One may only wonder whether it is a coincidence that a sapphic ode appears second in each book except III, where it appears second after the Roman Odes; that (among others) i 10 and 12, 20 and 22, 30 and 32; iii 8, 11, 14 and 18, 20, 22 are sapphic. More interesting is the question of linkage of motif between adjacent odes. The first three Roman Odes are closely linked; Fontaine and Fraenkel have recognised a structural nucleus in iv 7, 8 and 9, while ii 4 and 5, 6 and 7, 13 and 14, iii 22 and 23, iv 2 and 3, 10 and 11 have obvious affinities. In considering the relationship between these and certain other adjacent odes, the writer stresses the necessity to apply the criterion of atmosphere, depending on the reader's mental associations and frame of mind, and concludes that there is a little more complexity in the arrangement of the odes than is generally allowed.

The third chapter, 'Contrast-technique II: thought-structure within the odes', is the longest and most important. Many of the poems have blocks of thought within them, a feature which Horace inherited from Greek choral lyric, whereas his method and mental atmosphere come from

the melic poets. Sometimes these blocks of thought are 'responsive', e.g., the second may answer the first, and the third tie first and second together. In Greek choral verse such responion is tied up with strophe, antistrophe and epode; in Horace it is *not* necessarily tied up with metrical divisions. Moreover the same ode may have responsive and non-responsive deployment of thought; for example, in i 9 (*vides ut alta*) the first three stanzas show a closely linked triad of ideas, whereas the last three have only an informal, progressive train of thought, the two halves being 'welded by the associative, indeed ambiguous phrase *donec virenti canities abest*.' Four main types of the responsive mode of writing are distinguished: strophic, e.g., i 19 (*mater saeva Cupidinum*); patterned, e.g., iii 1 (*odi profanum vulgus*), whose pattern is roughly *x/ |a/ bb/ cd/ dd/ |cc/ cd*; symmetrical, e.g., iv 1 (*intermissa, Venus, diu*), with 8 + 12 + 12 + 8 lines; interwoven, e.g., i 14 (*o navis*), which intertwines 'the perils to which the allegorical ship is exposed' with 'the resources the ship has for withstanding them or inspiring confidence' (Tracy). Odes consisting of two non-responsive sections are subdivided by Collinge into four categories, according to whether the thought of each part is static or progressive. For example, the first half of ii 4, 'that wicked little piece of banter *ne sit ancillae tibi amor pudori*', is static, whereas in the second Xanthias is subjected to a neat process of deflation (Postgate). Eight odes are said to have responsive and non-responsive sections; six of them have these in that order, two in the reverse. Where two responsive sections are combined, one would expect a treatment to be possible analogous to that where two non-responsive sections are combined. But since only three such examples emerge, each with its own complications, it is perhaps true that no further subdivision is profitable; the three are the astrological ode ii 17, iii 3 (*iustum et tenacem*) and iii 6 (*delicta maiorum*).

Chapter IV is an analysis, somewhat in Fraenkel's

style but at greater length, of ii 7 (*o saepe mecum*), in which Horace welcomes back his old comrade Pompeius who fought with him at Philippi. The preceding poem, to Septimius, also has *mecum* in the first line and a form of *amicus* at the very end; it too is addressed to a comrade in stress and danger; both have a theme of war-weariness. But there is a difference; Septimius is young and active, Pompeius is Horace's age and under a strain. Again, whereas i 36 (*et ture et fidibus*) has many similarities with this, Numida there takes the initiative; on the other hand Pompeius here is shown up as a diffident man. Next, the ode is contrasted with ii 3, in which the turncoat Q. Dellius is put in his proper place. In contrast, Pompeius had clearly been under a cloud for many years since Philippi and was hesitant about returning. Structurally the ode is compared with i 4 (*solvitur acris hiems*): it is combined of a responsive and a non-responsive mode, the latter being strongly progressive. In geometrical terms we have in each a circle followed by a straight line; but is it not an exaggeration to call them 'perhaps the most ambitious erections of Horace among all [his] architectural experiments'?

A few small criticisms: (1) the interpretation of *dare classibus Austros* as 'mutua casuum permutatio' (pp. 29-30) shows too naive an attitude to syntax; see C. J. Fordyce in *CR* 54, 1940, 96; while as to the suspected 'double hypallage' of iii 30, 13 f. (p. 32 n.), *carmen* was indeed a Latin song in origin, but no one will suppose that it refers to any other than a Greek song in several passages. (2) On p. 56 we are told that within one ode there is no variety in the elevation of the language; what about iv 12, whether it is addressed to Virgil, as Collinge believes, or not? (3) On p. 61, the statement 'the sapphic stanza... is basically not a unit of sense' should be qualified: the thought-breaks given by the writer for sapphic odes always fall at metrical divisions, e.g., 3 + 3 + 1 + 3 + 3 stanzas for i 2. (4) To interpret iii 30, 1-14 as a 'run-down' is to degrade it to the level of ii 4; as Kiessling-Heinze

put it, '*dum... scandet* soll das emphatisch vorangestellte *usque* nicht einschränken, sondern veranschaulichen: wie Rom ewig ist, so des Dichters Ruhm.' (5) The analysis of i 12 on pp. 104-5 starts by approving Christ's rather artificial division into 5 × 3 stanzas, but this is not the writer's last thought on the matter, for he later ('to be honest') changes to 3, 3, 2; 3, 1, 3. The printing is very good; one might wish, however, that where a sentence begins with a reference to a new ode (e.g., 'i. 36 shows...' on p. 84) there were a space or a dash after the preceding full-stop, or else some system of black type, to warn the reader that a new ode is being analysed.

In conclusion, this book offers much stimulating reading, and goes a fair way towards justifying the claim that categorizing, however provisional, has its rewards. The fact that it is provisional will be made abundantly clear by contrasting Collinge's rather bald treatment of ii 1 on p. 119 with Campbell's fuller treatment and somewhat different analysis in *Horace*, pp. 230 f. An examination of Book IV shows that Horace did not, with time, materially change his structural methods, which certainly represent an important contribution to the lyric ode.

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E. C. Kennedy, CAESAR: DE BELLO GAL-LICO I, C.U.P., 1960. Pp. 200 with notes and vocabulary; 6/-.

One must agree with Mr. Kennedy that "changing conditions in schools and especially in Latin... seem to indicate that there may be a place for another edition for boys and girls..."

The summaries at the head of each chapter should prove most helpful; the notes are adequate and, with a few exceptions, clear and to the point. The introduction, however, follows the pattern of Peskett and Shuckburgh (1879 and

1901 respectively – or should one say respectfully?): Early Life of Caesar, The Gauls, The Roman Army, Pay and Equipment and The Roman Camp.

The introduction is good as far as it goes (some phrases such as "... at the age of 40, he found that he had a genius for war" are vaguely irritating), but an extra chapter on the content of *this* particular book would have been very welcome. The incidental information scattered throughout the Notes is excellent, but should rather have been collected under one heading with the purpose of leading pupils to *find out* whether "on the whole... he (Caesar) wrote an unbiased and accurate account of his campaigns" (Intro. p. 16). More use should be made of the *Commentaries* as a primary source for the study of the historical background and of Caesar himself as a politician, general and *man of letters*. Discussions based on quotations such as i 10, 5; 12, 5-7; 31, 12 and 35,4 will throw some light on whether Caesar was trying to justify an act of aggression and whether he was guilty of treason according to Sulla's *Lex de Maiestate*. If the text is handled properly Caesar *can* be presented as a person who did have ambitions, who was an opportunist and who did have to justify his actions in an age of propaganda. An edition for boys and girls should stress these points.

The period is a fascinating one. Kennedy quite rightly discusses aspects of the Roman army, but the emphasis should be on the importance of the army during the time of Caesar. It is significant that soldiers took the oath of personal loyalty to the general himself, with as result the politicisation of the army's high command and army involvement in metropolitan politics over the question of demobilisation, (cf. R. E. Smith, *Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army*, 1958, 38-43).

Pupils should find the Notes extremely useful. There is a (welcome) tendency to *describe* rather than to *prescribe*, but occasionally the rule-of-thumb-method of explaining the use of subjunctive tenses is unsatisfactory, e.g. i 3,2 (p. 89): the

Historic Present: "... can be followed (?) by either primary or historic subjunctives" cf. Draeger, *Hist. Synt. der lat. Sprache*, 1878-81, 352: when the subordinate clause *precedes* the main clause Cicero and Caesar regularly use an Historic Subjunctive in the subordinate clause. When the main clause precedes the subordinate clause there is no fixed rule; cf. vii 45, 1 and 3.

The note on i 8, 2 (p. 96) is, for the same reason, vague to the point of being misleading. There must be some other reason for the mixture of primary and historic subjunctives.

I wish here to refer to i 31 and i 44. In the O.O. the tenses originally used by a speaker are often retained. This is known as *repraesentatio*. Instead of using Imperfect and Pluperfect Subjunctives only after historic main verbs, the Present and Perfect Subjunctives are often used if a Present or Perfect Indicative has been used in the O.R. for the sake of "vividness". In i 31 there are eleven regular Imperfect and Pluperfect Subjunctives after the historic main verb. Then follows a Perfect Subjunctive followed in turn by yet another eleven Imperfect/Pluperfect Subjunctives. From "Ariovistus autem..." we find four Perfect and ten Present Subjunctives.

In i 8, 2 *conarentur* is Prospective and at the same time indicates an action prior to that of *possit* (i.e. it is not subjunctive because it is in the O.O.). And it is quite possible that *conentur* (i 8, 3) could have been subjunctive in the O.R. as well.

i 13, 3; 44, 13 et al.: statements such as: "The Pluperfect Subjunctives represent the Future Perfect of direct speech" could be very confusing to pupils if no further explanation is given, and especially when they come across:

(a) i 27, 3 (p. 121): "... so that *perfugerunt* becomes *perfugissent*". It should be sufficient to point out that this is the verb of a dependent relative clause and that the Pluperfect Subjunctive *here* indicates a prior action.

(b) i 31, 15: "The Perfect Subjunctive represents the Future Perfect of direct speech."

The names given to the various tense-forms often do not conform to their functions. These names are very often meaningless when seen in connection with their functions, especially in *si*-clauses. i 34, 2 is a case in point: *si quid opus esset... venturum fuisse*. The O.R. is: 'si quid opus esset... venissem' (the Pluperfect Subjunctive of an unfulfilled past conditional in direct speech). *Venissem* means much more than 'I should/would have come': there is no indication from the context that Ariovistus had been unable to come. It implies that he *would* have come (but no longer intends to). Nor does the Pluperfect here refer to an impossible condition in the past, but refers to some future action as seen from a point of time in the past. The rules for sequence of tenses, although useful as a general guide, cannot be considered as binding in every construction.

The Subjunctive was very often used instead of an Indicative (i 23, 3, p. 116) when something different was to be expressed from what would have been conveyed by an Indicative. *Quod... existimarent* need not be "illogical" ('the Helvetii probably thought...'). This could also be an example of attraction into the subjunctive, something which occurs in the earliest Latin (cf. Handford, *The Latin Subjunctive*, 1946, 148-51, on the weakened force of the Subjunctive).

A construction which is of some interest is the use of *habeo* plus the P.P.P.: *exercitum quem coactum habebat* (i 15, 1). The reference to the Pluperfect (p. 104) is not clear and can be rather confusing. Other editors who comment on this construction merely state that continuous action is indicated (and that it is much more than a periphrastic form of the Perfect Indicative). This usage is, in fact, the result of the ambiguity of the Perfect tense. The Latin Perfect is in origin a confusion of two prehistoric tenses, corresponding respectively to the Greek Perfect and Aorist. The popular (Vulgar) Latin (which had already been established by this time and from which the Romance languages descend) achieved

a gain in clearness by restricting the inflected tense to its function as a mere praeterite and by using a combination of *habeo* with the P.P.P. to express the meaning of the Greek Perfect. *Coegi* came to mean *I brought together*, and *coactum habeo*, *I have brought together*. There are twenty-three examples of this construction in the two Commentaries. One wonders whether such sentences are not lapses into the use of the spoken language of that time.

The note on i 42, 5 (p. 147), 'si quid opus *facto* esset', is interesting. A reliable grammar describes *opus est* with the Ablative of the P.P.P. as an alternative for *opus est* plus Present Infinitive (cf. Cic. *Fin.* 5,16: *nihil opus est hoc facere longius*), which brings us to the realm of Obligation.

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W. J. Bullick and J. A. Harrison,
GREEK VOCABULARY AND IDIOM FOR
HIGHER FORMS, Macmillan, 1960. Pp.
viii + 105; 5s.

The book is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with the vocabulary of Greek drama, vocabulary for prose composition, and idiomatic usages. It is intended as a means to the rapid acquirement by the student of an adequate basic vocabulary for reading Greek drama (especially Euripides and Sophocles) and a more than basic vocabulary for composition. The compilers suggest that the student make himself familiar with the two vocabularies by working through them constantly, and the student who does so will certainly find himself with an impressive vocabulary at his disposal.

The compilers have deliberately arranged the vocabularies in such a way that they will not serve as a substitute for a dictionary: the first section (drama - Greek-English), although it is alphabetical in arrangement, groups words of

similar meaning under the initial letter of the first word of the group, without cross-reference to the other words of the group under their initial letters; e.g. s.v. ἀείδω are included the verbs μέλπω and ὑμνέω and the nouns ῥοδή and μέλος, but there is no entry of these words in the μ-, υ-, or ω- sections of the vocabulary. In the second section (prose - English-Greek), though there is some cross-referencing between words of similar meaning, it is by no means complete; e.g. "maiden" is in the list, but not "girl"; "inasmuch as" is there, but not "because" (indeed there appears to be no mention of ὡς as contrasted with ἄτε).

The same principle operates in the third section: the idiomatic usages are classified according to the form the Greek is to take, not the form in which the English phrase presents itself, so that the English phrases have a rather miscellaneous appearance.

In the hands of a diligent and intelligent student the book should prove extremely useful. It is compact, clearly set out in large type, and includes a number of blank pages for the student's additions. If a criticism must be made, it is that the decision to specify the genders of only some nouns (mostly neuters ending in -ος and -μα) is a curious one: the neuters mentioned are most of them obvious, while a number of masculine and feminine third declension nouns are not so.

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E. R. Dodds, PLATO, GORGIAS, A REVISED TEXT WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959. Pp. vi + 406; 45s.

This work displays all the qualities which we have learned to expect from the author of *The Greeks and the Irrational* and the editor of the *Bacchae*. In this edition Dodds displays a scholar-

ship both wide and exact, a great clarity in exposition and the shrewdest of common-sense. The work is designed to meet the needs both of professional scholars and of undergraduates. It aims to fulfill a long-felt need by replacing the Victorian editions of Thompson and Lodge, both now out of print and out of date. It admirably fulfills its purpose!

Dodds discovered that the standard Greek text of the *Gorgias* provided no adequate basis for a modern edition and furthermore that the Oxford text of Burnet was in many respects quite false due to some misunderstanding between its author and Král, the collator of F. Accordingly, he undertook a new examination of the evidence, collating fully for the first time two important MSS, F, the sole representative of the second major family, and W of the first. He also takes into account the indirect tradition, which is occasionally our only authority for a good reading, and is the first editor to employ all four *Gorgias* papyri. As a result of these researches the Platonic scholar has now at his disposal a text of the *Gorgias* which is far superior to any previous one. It must be noted, however, that very few of the textual problems discussed by Dodds seriously affect our understanding of Plato's thought. This review of the textual evidence occupies fully half of the Introduction. Dodds himself acknowledges that more space has been consumed on such matters than was originally intended.

In the rest of the Introduction Dodds considers the subject and structure of the dialogue, its personages and period and its date of composition. He also adds a section on "Plato and Athens". The commentary on the text is excellent. The evidence is presented in an extremely full and lucid form and there are valuable references upon a wide variety of topics. The work is concluded with an interesting appendix upon Socrates, Callicles and Nietzsche.

Dodds is understandably cautious in assigning a date of composition to the dialogue and is

sceptical of the attempts made by scholars to fix its date by relating it to the works of contemporary writers. He does, however, tentatively place it after Plato's first visit to Sicily. A consideration of the similarities between the *Gorgias* and the *Euthydemus* led Dodds to the inference that the latter was the earlier work. It is now generally agreed that the *Meno* and the *Gorgias* are close together in date. The former is linked with the latter by its references to the great Athenian statesmen of the fifth century, to Gorgias himself and to the Pythagorean σοφοί. Dodds argues against the view that the *Meno* is the earlier work, maintaining that the arguments for the priority of the *Gorgias* are stronger, viz. the allusion at *Meno* 71c to a meeting between Socrates and Gorgias looks like a reference back to the other dialogue; the statement at 95c about Gorgias' attitude to the teaching of ἀρετή seems intended to correct the false impression which a reader might well get from the *Gorgias*; the πίστις of *Gorgias* 454d f. is replaced in the *Meno* by δόξα (97b f.), which is henceforth the regular Platonic term; and the doctrine of rebirth, which is not mentioned in the *Gorgias*, is expounded for the first time in the *Meno*.

The *Menexenus* is of crucial importance for Dodds' attempt to date the *Gorgias*. Both of these dialogues deal with rhetoric and with the use of rhetoric by Athenian politicians. Both of them convey the same criticisms of Athenian democracy and Athenian foreign policy. It is Dodds' view that the *Menexenus* forms a kind of appendix to the *Gorgias* in the manner of a satyr-play to a tragic trilogy. The *Menexenus* is unique among the dialogues in that it contains direct and uncontroversial evidence of its date. Since it contains an anachronism referring to the King's Peace, it cannot have been composed before 386 and since "Aspasia's" oration stops there, it is unlikely that the dialogue was composed very much later. So Dodds suggests the sequence *Euthydemus*, Sicilian Visit, *Gorgias*, *Menexenus* and *Meno*. He refers as supporting evidence to

the "Sicilian cookery-book" of Mithaecus (518b6), which he believes may represent a reminiscence of the *Siculae dapes* which Plato experienced with displeasure (*Ep.* vii 326b), and argues that the Pythagoreanism of the *Gorgias* is most naturally explained by the new influence of Archytas, whom Plato met for the first time on his western visit. These arguments, as Dodds himself is the first to admit, hardly add up to proof.

In his note on the dramatic date of the dialogue it is persuasively argued that Plato had no particular year in mind. Taylor's attempts to reconcile the various conflicting chronological data (*Plato, the Man and his Work*, 1955, 104) in his desire to fix an early dramatic date, represent misplaced zeal. No amount of ingenuity can reconcile these discrepancies.

Dodds maintains in his discussion of the characters of the dialogue that Gorgias was not a sophist in the narrow sense and not seriously interested in philosophy. He was δεινὸς λέγειν (*Symp.* 198c), a rhetorician, a man who could alter the appearance of things διὰ ῥώμην λόγου (*Phaedr.* 267a) and make others δεινοὺς λέγειν (*Meno* 95c). He regards the latter's famous 'proof' that nothing exists; that even if anything did exist, it would be unknowable; and that, even if we could gain knowledge of it, we could not communicate this knowledge to anyone else as merely an ingenious παίγνιον or *jeu d'esprit* – a parody, perhaps, of Eleatic logic – since neither Plato nor Aristotle anywhere allude to it and because Isocrates, Gorgias' own pupil, mentions it merely as an example of a ὑπόθεσις ἄτοπος καὶ παράδοξος (*Helena* 1-4). There has been and still is considerable controversy as to Gorgias' purpose in writing this 'proof' (cf. G. B. Kerferd *Phronesis* 1, 1955/6 3f.). We may note that, according to Diogenes Laërtius, at any rate, Aristotle took Gorgias' views seriously and actually wrote a monograph against them (v 25).

Dodds' arguments that Gorgias was not a

sophist are unconvincing. *Contra* Dodds, Callicles does not say, in Gorgias' presence, that sophists are "worthless people" (520a1), but only that those who reach ἀρετή are – and these Gorgias himself ridiculed. Nor does *Meno* 95c support Dodds' claim. The context here surely implies that Meno *did* regard Gorgias as a sophist, albeit with the peculiar characteristic that he did not claim to teach ἀρετή (τῶν ἄλλων at 95c3 is inclusive and means "the rest of the sophists"). If Gorgias is not a sophist, he is so like them as to be indistinguishable from them!

In his discussion of the relationship between Gorgias and Empedocles Dodds might also have examined Diogenes Laertius' statement (viii 57) that Aristotle in his lost work, the *Sophist*, described Empedocles as the inventor of rhetoric. This role is traditionally ascribed to the Sicilians, Tisias and Corax, but the value of the information as evidence should not be disregarded on this account. It seems quite possible that Aristotle's claim may well have been a good deal less specific than Diogenes' comment implies (cf. *Sext. Emp. Adv. math.* vii 6 and *Quint. Inst. or.* iii 1, 8 DK31A19). (In the same passage Aristotle is held to have described Zeno as the "inventor of dialectic". This comment, too, contains a certain amount of truth and may also have been less specific than Diogenes implies. For Zeno's method has one important element in common with dialectic as conceived by Plato and Aristotle, namely, the practice of refuting an opposing thesis by deducing intolerable consequences from it.)

The section on Callicles is the most exciting of all. The only information we have about him is what Plato tells us in the *Gorgias* itself. Dodds argues persuasively both against the view that he is a "mask" for some historical figure and that he is a fictitious character. He points out that there are no clear instances of fictitious characters with personal names introduced as speakers in conversation with Socrates or of real persons introduced under fictitious names. In any case the

details Plato supplies in the case of Callicles would have little point if he were a fictitious character. Dodds suggests that the reason why the latter left no mark on the history of his time may well have been because his vigorous ambition and his frank avowal of it brought him to an untimely end in the desperate years at the close of the Peloponnesian War. When Socrates is made to say to Callicles at 519a7 σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῆ, Plato, Dodds points out, may well be putting into his mouth a prophesy *post eventum*. Dodds sees in the sympathetic portrait of Callicles something which Plato had it in himself to become (and perhaps would actually have become had it not been for Socrates). The Calliclean way of life Dodds well describes as the poisonous fruit which grew from the seed of Gorgias' teaching. It is for this reason that the dialogue is more aptly called *Gorgias* than *Callicles*.

The Commentary is extremely full (it occupies nearly 200 pages) and is a positive mine of information. In his note on 508a3 Dodds, discussing the usage of the term κόσμος, is surely right in his argument against the views of Kranz and Kirk. The former holds that this term was used in the sense of "world" by the Milesians in the sixth century, ignoring the doxographical tradition (*Philol.* 93, 1938/9, 430 f. and in his monograph *Kosmos*, 1955); whereas Kirk believes that it was first used for "world-order" late in the fifth-century and in the sense of "world" later still (*Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments*, 1954, 311 f.). Dodds himself believes that the truth lies somewhere between these extremes. Kirk, we may note, in a later consideration admits that the term has the sense of "world" in Empedocles' Fragment 134 1,5 (Kirk & Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 1957, 159). Parmenides' Fragment 4 1,3 surely confirms Dodds' standpoint. κόσμος must have the meaning of "world" here. The text could hardly mean "scattered in order". (More recently Kahn, strangely ignoring the evidence of Aëtius (ii I, 1 DK14A21) altogether,

has argued, like Kranz, for a Milesian origin of the term (*Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, 1960, Appendix I p. 219.)

The work has been most carefully brought to press. The slips we detect are but few. On p. 13, n. 3 read Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, 186; p. 101, I.1 ἀὐτῶ & I.4 ἐστίν; p. 243, last line 'personal'; p. 303, I.33 '485e3' and in the note on 456b6 'Phil' instead of 'Ant'.

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A. H. M. Jones: STUDIES IN ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND LAW, Macmillan, 1960. Pp. 243; 30s.

Professor Jones' new book consists of seven published articles, a radical revision of *JRS* 26, 1936, 223-35 (on the *dediticii*) and two fresh contributions – 'The Censorial Powers of Augustus' and 'Procurators and Prefects in the Early Empire' (pp. 19-26 and 115-25). We must surely be grateful for having this impressive body of work gathered conveniently between two covers. Here are Jones' mature, considered views on the most vital issues of early imperial history. A common theme runs through the work – the organic development of institutions from Republic to Empire – and thus it may not safely be ignored by those whose interests are bounded by the age of Cicero.

In the second of his new studies Jones concludes that *praefectus* was the regular title for all equestrian governors until Claudius suddenly and tactlessly introduced *procurator*, a term of private law under the Republic. Only Egypt's viceroy retained the old style, but then his whole position, with its proconsular affinities, was quite exceptional. A study of apparent *minutiae* leads typically straight to one of the *arcana imperii*, though Jones is content here with lifting only a corner of the veil. The work indeed, whether old

or new, is marked by its author's habitual clarity and practical commonsense. He wants to know how the machinery actually worked. Ancient and modern blueprints are ruthlessly scrutinised and rejected if they appear unworkable. The mastery of evidence is enviable.

Inevitably Augustus is central to many of the studies. Jones argues for a full *consulare imperium* for Rome and Italy and three tenures of *ensoria potestas*, despite the apparent denial in *Res Gestae*, 6. Dio may be right and he certainly deserves so able a champion. Many, however, will remain unconvinced. Augustus was surely supremely opportunistic and limited himself to the practical minimum. From 19 B.C. he enjoyed some of the consuls' prerogatives, but how much of their power beyond sharing responsibility for public order, as his twelve *fascēs* proclaimed? In 8 B.C. and A.D. 14 he needed special grants of *imperium consulare* like Claudius later (Dio, ix, 23, 4) – not simply for the census, but in order to raise levies in Rome (note Tac. *Ann.*, i 31). E.T. Salmon ably expounded this view in *Hist.* 6, 1956, 471 f. Jones might well have answered him in a special note and similarly replied to other critics of his articles. He did recognise the need to allow for *new* evidence and make minor changes, but this is hardly enough. Since he still clearly stands by what he wrote, we want to know how he disposes of later objections. He connects Dio's *ensoria potestas* very closely with the three senatorial *lectiones* (which he dates 29, 19 and 11 B.C.) and indeed finds no other evidence for its use. But can we be sure that Augustus' *senatum ter legi* applies to the strange affair of 19 B.C. (*ipsorum arbitratu*: Suet. *Aug.* 35)? Dio moreover, links his *lectio* of 11 B.C. with a census. Perhaps he has misplaced *both* from 8 B.C., where he unaccountably omits the census known from *Res Gestae*, 8 (*consulare cum imperio!*).

Jones shows conclusively that consular and praetorian elections were genuinely fought under Augustus until in A.D. 5 he created a senatorial/equestrian electoral body, which voted

as a reinforced *praerogativa*. The new system gave the equestrian élite effective control of these elections through their superior numbers in the college and they could be trusted to favour the kind of *novi homines* that the Emperor needed; but it became a mere formality in A.D. 14 when Tiberius transferred the real decision to the Senate. This is a bold attempt to reconcile the *tabula Hebana* with Tac. *Ann.* i 15. Perhaps, however, we should recognise Tacitus' troublesome *comitia* as the elections for the lower offices, which henceforth (save briefly under Gaius) were the sole concern of the Senate. We could then treat the *tabula Hebana* as seriously as Jones treats the *lex Valeria*. The Emperor continued to get his way with a show of real *libertas*. For how long did Augustus' creation survive? It is not an academic question on this view, as it is for Jones (p. 46).

Augustus' civil and criminal jurisdiction is derived by Jones from his *tribunicia potestas* and the *lex Julia de vi publica*, which extended *exercitio iudicii publici* at least to proconsuls. Since this law is surely due to Caesar (Cic. *Phil.* i 9, 21-3) not Augustus, I would prefer to recognise the *lex Julia de iudiciis publicis* as the regulating statute (11 B.C.?) and assume that the consuls were definitely included, not brought in by loose interpretation (see Jones p. 97 f.). Otherwise Jones' view is cogent and accounts well both for the emergence of the Senate as a High Court and for the fact that proconsuls sometimes executed capital sentences on *cives* without allowing appeal. Imperial governors may have subsequently acquired the same power (*pace* Jones; p. 56 f. and 91 f.); Tac. *Ann.* xii 60 points this way, while the offence of Florus and Galba (Jos. *Bell. Iud.* ii 308; Suet. *Galba* 9) was surely the imposition of *forms* of punishment from which *cives* were exempt, rather than refusal of appeal. This right suffered a melancholy decline in the third century. It remained a reality perhaps only for *honestiores* after A.D. 212, since governors exercised

virtually unquestioned *coercitio* against lesser folk. But were such *cives* legally degraded to quasi-peregrine status, as Jones argues (p. 61 f.)? It is possible that appeal survived in some form, but was rendered inoperative normally by fraud or such devices as Verres discovered long before (see Jones, p. 54).

Dominium in provincial land, Mommsen held, was vested in the Roman people. Jones surely dealt the *coup de grâce* to this theory in his 1941 article (*JRS*, 31), here reprinted. Provincials were not then in strict law all *dediticii*. Having cleared the ground Jones proceeds to a substantially new attack on the *Constitutio Antoniniana*. The crucial clause did not exclude existing *dediticii* from the citizenship itself, though the status was maintained after A.D. 212 for certain slaves and barbarian settlers. If the *Aegyptii* were still *dediticii*, I think that we must accept this anomalous view, since Caracalla gave them *civitas*. May not Severus' municipalisation of Egypt, however, have changed their status to that of *attributi*? Jones would deny this (p. 136 f.), but how decisive is his evidence? Whether we are to construe *χωρὶς τῶν δεδευμένων* with *δίδωμι* or *μένοντος* (as Jones prefers), Caracalla probably excluded all *dediticii* from his grant and this sense can surely somehow be obtained by restoration.

According to Jones there was no one central imperial treasury called the *fiscus* in the early Empire. The word designated either any one of the many provincial chests or, more specifically, the *fiscus patrimonii* (as in Sen. *De Ben.*, vii 6,3). In the Flavian period the word acquired its modern meaning, but even later such money as the Emperor held in Rome was stored in a number of *fisci* (*Iudaicus*, *Alexandrinus*, *Asiaticus* etc.); the *Fiscus* was the central organisation. Severus organised the *patrimonium* and the new, sinister *res privata* in a single central office and blurred the distinction between the Emperor's personal funds and the State monies which he handled. All this seems as cogent as Jones' insistence that the Julio-Claudians drew regularly

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on the *Aerarium* for funds, which explains their interest in its management. Less certainly he claims that Vespasian diverted the main revenues of the *Aerarium* into the *fiscus Alexandrinus* and the *fiscus Asiaticus*. These may have held only Vespasian's new taxes, exactly as the *fiscus Iudaicus*, not the whole provincial revenue. Hence Jones' picture of a depleted, insignificant *Aerarium* is open to serious criticism. He is also perhaps too positive in calling Augustus' *rationes imperii* "a general balance-sheet of the Empire" (p. 105). The *breviarium totius imperii* (Suet. *Aug.* 101) was perhaps confined to the public monies handled by the *Princeps*: "quantum pecuniae in aerario (sc. the *aerarium militare*) et fisci et vectigalium residuis". This *ratio* is perhaps contrasted with the *patrimonium* in *De Ben.* vii 6, 3.

Jones' last study is his penetrating and some-

times entertaining account of the lower Roman bureaucracy from the late Republic to Justinian. It calls for less comment, but repays careful attention because of Jones' strong sense of how things really get done. The Republican governors were not so short of staff as the text-books suggest, while one cause of the Byzantine Empire's resilience lay in the character of its bureaucracy, superior to that of the West. Throughout the book we have this blend of close argument and firm generalisation. We are forced to think and rethink and if we disagree it is with an uneasy feeling that the last word may yet lie with its author. Here we can judge the full worth of his contribution to early imperial history and salute an achievement that will not be outdated for a very long time.

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