ISSN 1018-9017

SCHOLIA

Studies in Classical Antiquity

NS Vol. 10 / 2001

New Zealand / South Africa

ISSN 1018-9017

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Editor: W. J. Dominik

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Scholia features critical and pedagogical articles and reviews on a diverse range of subjects dealing with classical antiquity, including late antique, medieval, Renaissance and early modern studies related to the classical tradition; in addition, there is news about museums and articles on classical artefacts in museums in New Zealand and the J. A. Barsby Essay.

Manuscripts: Potential contributors should read the 'Notes for Contributors' located at the back of this volume and follow the suggested guidelines for the submission of manuscripts. Articles on the classical tradition and the teaching of Classics are particularly welcome. Submissions are usually reviewed by two referees. Time before publication decision: 2-3 months.

Subscriptions (2002): Individuals: North America, Europe and Asia USD25/NZD55; Australasia and South America NZD38; Africa NZD20. Libraries and institutions: North America, Europe and Asia USD38/NZD85; Australasia and South America NZD57; Africa NZD30. *Institutional and personal cheques should be made out to 'Scholia/University of Otago'. Credit card payments are preferred; please use the credit card authorisation at the back of this volume.* Foreign subscriptions cover air mail postage and bank charges on institutional and personal cheques. Payments from Africa, however, must be made with an international bank draft or by credit card in New Zealand currency because of foreign exchange regulations in many countries. After initial payment, a subscription to the journal will be entered. All back numbers are available at a reduced price and may be ordered from the Business Manager.

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New Series: *Scholia* is indexed and abstracted in *L'Année Philologique*, indexed in *Gnomon*, and listed in *Ulrich's International Periodicals Directory*. The contents of *Scholia* and information about the journal are available on the world wide web at http://www.otago.ac.nz/classics. Photocopies of articles and other sections of *Scholia* are available from the British Library Document Supply Centre (BLDSC no. 8092.54348). *Scholia Reviews*, an electronic journal that features the pre-publication versions of reviews that appear in *Scholia*, is available on the world wide web at http://www.classics.und.ac.za.

Cover Illustration: Drawing by E. A. Mackay (University of Auckland) based on an Attic black-figure fragment (inv. L.1989.K) in the Museum of Classical Archaeology, University of Natal, Durban (on permanent loan from A. Gosling).

Typesetting: W. J. Dominik, O. J. Banks, S. L. Haskins

Printing: Otago University Print

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REVIEW ARTICLES

EDITORIAL NOTE

Scholia 10 (2001) is the first volume of the journal to be published in New Zealand. This publication marks the tenth year of the new series of a journal that was conceived as a scholarly journal in 1991 and was first published a year later in South Africa. In its first ten years *Scholia* and its companion electronic journal, *Scholia Reviews*, have published articles and reviews by scholars in twenty-four countries.[1] *Scholia* has been distributed to individuals, libraries and institutions in forty-one countries.[2] This success has been achieved mainly through the support of its institutional and personal subscribers. Naturally we encourage our readers and contributors to subscribe to *Scholia*; a form is included at the back of this volume for this purpose.

Scholia is now a joint publication of the University of Otago and the University of Natal. The journal will continue to feature critical and pedagogical articles and reviews on a broad range of subjects dealing with classical antiquity, including late antique, medieval, Renaissance and early modern studies related to the classical tradition. *Scholia* continues to invite submissions from scholars in these areas of classical studies and endeavours to provide authors with a decision regarding publication within three months of submission. Every article is refereed by at least two referees. The acceptance rate of articles submitted for publication in volumes 1-10 (1992-2001) is fifty per cent. Articles have been accepted for publication in English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Afrikaans. Formal letters of acceptance indicating the intended volume of publication are sent to all authors of successful submissions. No geographical restrictions are placed upon contributors, but the editors especially welcome Australasian and African submissions of a suitable standard. Contributors of articles receive twenty offprints; additional offprints may be purchased from the Business Manager.

Although *Scholia* has moved its main editorial and management office to the University of Otago, *Scholia Reviews*, the electronic reviews journal, will continue to be managed at the University of Natal under the editorship of John Hilton. A selection of these electronic reviews will continue to be published in the annual volumes of the print journal. *Scholia Reviews* is one of only two electronic review journals in the world in the discipline of Classics. Subscription is free and without restriction. This

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[1] Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Democratic Republic of Congo, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom, United States and Zimbabwe.

[2] In addition to the countries listed above, n. 1, these are Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland, Ukraine and Vatican City.

electronic journal and the contents of *Scholia* can be accessed at <http://www.classics.und.ac.za>. It is an editorial priority to provide critical reviews as soon as they appear. Reviews are normally solicited although unsolicited review articles and reviews are invited. Contributors should send their reviews by electronic mail. Writers of review articles and reviews receive ten and six covered offprints respectively. Authors whose books are reviewed are invited to respond in writing to criticism made by reviewers. Considered responses will be published in the same or following year's volume; one reply by the reviewer will be permitted and will appear immediately following the author's response.

As in past volumes, *Scholia* 10 (2001) features articles and reviews on a diverse range of topics, including Greek literature,[3] classical archaeology,[4] Latin literature[5] and Afrocentrism.[6] The contributors of these articles and reviews are mainly from universities in a dozen countries: New Zealand, Canada, United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Netherlands, South Africa, Ghana, Senegal, Malawi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

This volume of *Scholia* contains the last In the Universities section dealing with the study of Classics in African universities; the final In the Museum section based on classical artefacts and museums in Africa; and the last B. X. de Wet Essay to be published in *Scholia*. It is hoped that these sections will be published in the future in *Akroterion*, one of the journals of the Classical Association of South Africa.

The In the Universities section in this volume features two articles on the teaching of Classics in Africa. The first is 'A Short History of the Department of Classics, Chancellor College, University of Malawi' by Edward Jenner,[7] who served as a lecturer at Chancellor College from 1998 until the end of 2001, and the second is 'Classics in the Democratic Republic of Congo' by Dudu Musway, Professor of Latin at the University of Kikwit.[8]

For the past ten years *Scholia* has also published under the editorship of E. A. Mackay the In the Museum section, which has featured news about museums and

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[3] S. Stern-Gillett, 'Exile, Displacement and Barbarity in Euripides, *Iphigenia Among the Taurians*' (pp. 4-21); R. N. Osei, 'The Argument for Recollection in Plato's *Phaedo*: A Defence of the Standard Interpretation' (pp. 22-37); M. S. Cummings, 'The Early Greek Paraclausithyron and Gnessipus' (pp. 38-53).

[4] E. F. Bloedow, '"Bones of Contention": The Conflict Between Heinrich Schliemann and Rudolf Vichow in 1880 Over the Skeletal Material from Hanai Tepe' (pp. 54-68).

[5] C. U. Merriam, 'Clinical Cures for Love in Propertius' *Elegies*' (pp. 69-76); R. Bond, '*Urbs Satirica*: The City in Roman Satire with Special Reference to Horace and Juvenal' (pp. 77-91); M. V. Ronnick, '"Honey-Sweet Cups" in Lucretius, Jerome and Alan of Lille, *Anticlaudianus* 7.442f.' (pp. 92f.); E. Amato, 'Favorino nell'*Anthologia Palatina* (e un epigramma contestato a Meleagro)' (pp. 94-103).

[6] B. D. Buuba, 'Afrocentrisme d'hier et d'aujoud'hui' (pp. 104-11).

[7] See pp. 161-69.

[8] See pp. 169-71.

articles on classical artefacts in museums in Africa. *Scholia* expresses its gratitude to E. A. Mackay not only for providing an In the Museum contribution every year to the journal but also for drawing the sphinx that is featured on the cover and serves as the logo of the journal.[9] From volume 11 (2002) *Scholia* will feature news about museums and articles on classical artefacts in museums in New Zealand under the editorship of Patricia Hannah.

The B. X. de Wet Essay, the winning submission in the African student essay competition, has been published in *Scholia* since the inception of the student essay competition in 1991. *Scholia* expresses its gratitude not only to the Classical Association of South Africa for sponsoring this competition and for subsidising the cost of publishing the essay but also to the adjudicators and contributors. In 2001 the essays were judged by Richard Evans (University of South Africa), Betine van Zyl Smit (University of Western Cape) and Peter Tennant (University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg). The winning B. X. de Wet Essay in this volume has been composed by Anton Krige (University of Stellenbosch) and is entitled 'Seneca the Stoic and Epicureanism'.[10] The runner-up essay, 'Horace's Roman Odes', was written by Daniel Malamis (Rhodes University). Beginning with volume 11 (2002), *Scholia* will publish the J. A. Barsby Essay, the winning essay in the New Zealand student essay competition. This competition will be sponsored by the Classical Association of Otago.

A new web site, which will contain the contents of *Scholia* and information about the journal, is currently being set up at the University of Otago at <http://www.otago.ac.nz/classics>. The complete printed text of every volume of *Scholia* will be available online except the text of articles in the most recently printed volume. Further information about this web site will be forthcoming upon its completion.

William J. Dominik
Editor, *Scholia*

[9] For further information see 'Cover Illustration' on inside front cover.

[10] See pp. 175-83.

EXILE, DISPLACEMENT AND BARBARITY IN EURIPIDES' *IPHIGENEIA AMONG THE TAURIANS*

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Abstract. Barbarity is a recurrent yet elusive and therefore much debated theme in Euripidean drama. This article criticises some arguments that have recently been presented for a barbarophobic reading of Euripides' plays. It then argues that *Iphigeneia Among the Taurians* is structurally more complex than is generally recognised. Finally, it offers an analysis of Euripides' handling in this play of the themes of selfhood, exile and displacement.

The long and tortuous history[1] of Euripidean scholarship teaches us to take nothing for granted in the interpretation of the extant plays. If plausible arguments could at various times be mounted to claim that Euripides was a misogynist and that he was a feminist, a religious sceptic and a mystic, a rationalist and an irrationalist, it is not only because commentators tend to read their own preoccupations back into the past but also, more probably, because Euripides' extant *oeuvre*, taken as a whole, contains evidence of all of these positions. Does it display a similar measure of ideological uncertainty in its construction of barbarity? There, too, scholarly vacillations are much in evidence, and the present paper rests on the conviction that a study of some aspects of the characterisation and dialogues of *Iphigeneia Among The Taurians* uncovers a more complex message on the related themes of exile, displacement and barbarity than is generally recognised.[2] My argument will not extend beyond the scope of these issues. No attempt will be made to identify,

[1] As chronicled in A. N. Michelini, *Euripides and the Tragic Tradition* (Madison 1987) 3-51.

[2] See, e.g., G. M. A. Grube, *The Drama of Euripides* (London 1941) 315: '. . . neither the central figure nor the subsidiary characters are elaborated with any great subtlety'; P. W. Harsh, *A Handbook of Classical Drama* (Stanford 1944) 220f.: 'Plays such as the Iphigeneia seem to be designed almost wholly for entertainment, and it would be a mistake to insist upon finding any great moral or political significance in them'. Likewise R. Lattimore (tr.), *Euripides, Iphigeneia in Tauris* (London 1974) 6f. claims in the introduction to his translation of the play that 'in truth this drama is not one of the deep ones, nor is it personal, or intense'. A. N. Michelini [1] 240, for her part, writes: 'in *Helene* and *Iphigenia Among The Taurians* the oppressors are violent and unjust; but according to their barbarian lights, they behave in kingly fashion. The focus, in any case, is not on them, but on the Hellenic protagonists, whose rather unprincipled tricks win our sympathy against such unappealing adversaries.'

let alone define, the literary genre to which the play belongs. No conjecture will be hazarded as to the nature of Euripides' own views on the issues raised within the play, and no hypothesis advanced concerning any possible evolution in his style, dramatic technique or 'philosophy'.

While some critics (e.g., Pohlenz,[3] Vellacott,[4] de Romilly[5]) tend to attribute cosmopolitan views to Euripides, others (e.g., Goossens,[6] Conacher,[7] Kristeva[8]) do not hesitate to ascribe to him some, at least, of the xenophobic comments uttered by the characters in his plays. Yet others (e.g., Hall[9]), resisting all attempts to reconstruct the views of Euripides the man, nevertheless contend that, in the main, Euripidean drama could only confirm the negative stereotypical images of foreigners held by most Athenians at the time. Since it will here be contended, on the contrary, that *Iphigeneia Among the Taurians*, at one level at least, exposes Athenian barbarophobia, it is apposite first to cast a critical glance at some of the arguments wielded by the second group of scholars, most particularly Kristeva and Hall.

In *Strangers to Ourselves*, a book devoted to otherness as both a socio-political condition and a state of mind, the psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva writes:

> Among the three writers of tragedies, Sophocles, Aeschylus, and Euripides, who systematically use the term *barbaros*, Euripides differs from his predecessors by a more frequent use of the word in a more pejorative sense. *This would indicate that foreignness was personally more intolerable to him, and, generally speaking, more disturbing as time goes by.*[10]

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[3] M. Pohlenz, *Die Griechische Tragödie* (Göttingen 1954) 394.

[4] P. Vellacott, introduction and notes to his translation of *Iphigenia in Tauris* in *Euripides. Three Plays: Alcestis, Hippolytus, Iphigenia in Tauris* (Harmondsworth 1964) 35-37.

[5] J. de Romilly, *La Modernité d'Euripide* (Paris 1986) 183-219 *passim*.

[6] R. Goossens, *Euripide et Athènes* (Brussels 1962) 581, is especially explicit: 'Dans les deux pièces [*Iphigénie en Tauride* et *Hélène*], les personnages non helléniques nous apparaissent comme *moralement barbares*, ont un rôle odieux, et se laissent berner par les personnages grecs. Dans ces deux pièces encore, Grecs et Barbares échangent des coups de poing ou d'épée. Et ces pugilats, ces batailles mettent naturellement en lumière la supériorité sportive et militaire des Grecs qui est maintes fois soulignée' (my emphasis).

[7] As is evident in his presentation of the myth of Iphigeneia in Tauris in his *Euripidean Drama: Myth, Theme and Structure* (Toronto 1967) 310-13.

[8] J. Kristeva (tr. L. Roudiez), *Strangers to Ourselves* (London 1990) 51f.

[9] E. Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition Through Tragedy* (Oxford 1989).

[10] Kristeva [8] 51 (my emphasis).

'With Euripides', she continues:

> . . . '*barbarian*' points toward an area of inferiority that includes moral inferiority; the word *no longer refers to a foreign nationality but exclusively to evil, cruelty, and savageness.*[11]

Although Kristeva concedes that, in *The Trojan Women*, Euripides inverts the dichotomy between Greeks and Barbarians by showing that 'the term was applicable to the Greeks as well as to the Trojans', she adds that

> such internalisation of barbarity indicates the durability of hostile feelings towards them [foreigners], as well as the importance of that feeling in assessing others within the supposedly homogeneous group.[12]

Such forceful claims need to be critically examined if only because of the authority currently enjoyed by Kristeva in literary circles on both sides of the Atlantic. Let it, first, be noted, *en passant*, that this post-modern thinker appears to have no theoretical qualms in inferring an author's opinions from his characters' various dramatic utterances. Which particular plays, one will wonder next, has Kristeva in mind? Her general parsimony with textual references to primary texts[13] does not allow for a ready answer to this question although it can be concluded from the third of the above quoted excerpts that it cannot be any of the 'Trojan' plays. Could Kristeva have taken Jason's jingoistic comments in the *Medea*, or Hermione's in the *Andromache*, at face

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[11] Kristeva [8] 51 (my emphasis).

[12] Kristeva [8] 52.

[13] Kristeva [8] 197 states her indebtedness for this section of her book to M.-F. Baslez, *L'Étranger dans la Grèce Antique* (Paris 1984). Unfortunately, this well-informed and comprehensive study does not substantiate Kristeva's sweeping claims. Indeed, not only does Baslez fail to share Kristeva's views on Euripides' xenophobia but she is also careful to strike a balanced view on the matter of Greek barbarophobia in general, as the following extract from her conclusion to her section on the classical period demonstrates (pp. 200f.) : 'Point de préjugé racial donc dans les cités classiques, mais un préjugé de culture qui est relatif, réductible et n'exclut pas toute possibilité d'intégration. Le "bon Barbare" est arbitrairement doté des vertus qui manquent à la société grecque, depuis que Xénophon a incarné en Cyrus le Grand son idéal d'homme d'état réfléchi, manieur d'hommes, capable de conquérir à partir de rien un immense empire. Le "mauvais Barbare" perpétue une ethnographie traditionnelle caractérisée par le désordre de l'apparence physique (chevelure et moustache hirsutes), par la parole embarrassée, par Le luxe et l'excentricité (circoncision, eunuchisme), par l'irrationalisme. Tout cela exprime l'inculte. Le Barbare cruel est une notion moderne, postérieure en tout cas aux vagues germaniques dont la *Furor Barbaricus* entraîna la chute de l'Empire romain.'

value? Prudence (or the principle of charity[14]) should make us wary of accusing so eminent a thinker of so gross a mistake. Kristeva's third claim, namely, that Euripides' racism was more virulent than either Aeschylus' or Sophocles' cannot, for reasons of space, be tackled here.

If Kristeva's censure of Euripides may, at first sight at least, appear hasty, it should nevertheless be noted that Greek scholars, too, have recently expressed reservations about the extent of his cosmopolitanism. The fact that their doubts are generally more cautiously phrased and generously referenced makes them harder to allay. In her influential *Inventing The Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition Through Tragedy*, Edith Hall writes that: 'the tragedies of Euripides in particular frequently express the chauvinist imperative that Greeks must rule barbarians, not *vice versa*'.[15] To be sure, Hall, like Kristeva, recognises that in his 'Trojan' plays, Euripides deconstructs the polarity between Greeks and barbarians: 'In *Andromache and Troades* . . . the poet seems to have gone out of his way to make his audience confront the unsatisfactory basis of the assumption that the barbarian character was generally inferior'.[16] Like Kristeva, however, she regards this as a 'paradigm of the *rule-proving exception*' which 'shows not that he or his contemporaries had disowned the usual belief in Hellenic superiority over other peoples . . . but that it was so fundamental a dogma as to produce striking rhetorical effects on being inverted'.[17]

Hall's *caveat* about ascribing to the playwright the views of some of his characters is well taken. Although the dramatic unity of some plays elicits from the audience specific reactions to what happens on stage (could, for example, Jason's xenophobic comments be interpreted otherwise than as manifestations of odious bad faith?), the ideological dissonances between various extant plays cannot but foil any systematic attempt to construe Euripides' own views at various stages of his career. As for Hall's second contention, namely, that contemporary chauvinism (i.e., the rule) is presupposed in the very barbarophile message (i.e., the exception) that emerges from certain of Euripides' extant plays, it calls for a number of critical comments.

First, Hall's argument draws some of its plausibility from the ambiguity of the concept of rule. In ordinary usage, this term designates either an

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[14] I here slightly expand the scope of the principle of charity which, in the words of D. Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford 1984) xvii, 'counsels us quite generally to prefer theories of interpretation that minimize disagreement'.

[15] Hall [9] 197.

[16] Hall [9] 215.

[17] Hall [9] 222 (my emphasis).

evaluative standard to which compliance is required or a non-prescriptive midpoint or average specifying what holds in general and for the most part. To say, in the former sense of rule, that the exception proves the rule amounts to noting that, in certain cases, the authority of a rule is not only presupposed, but also strengthened, by the violations to which it is subject. This happens when, for example, a celebrated writer, occasionally and deliberately, flouts accepted usage as described in a grammatical rule. The very fact that this is properly called an infringement shows not only that a well-established standard (or rule) is here presupposed but also that its general validity is in no way challenged. Indeed, the effectiveness of the exception depends upon and, to that extent, reinforces, the very authority of the rule that it breaks.

Departures from the non-prescriptive 'rules' embodied in standard practice, on the other hand, are not normally called infringements. Neither can they be said to strengthen the rule which they 'break'. Indeed, in so far as norms of this second kind remain mostly uncodified and need not even be consciously acknowledged, deviations from them can be unwitting and remain unnoticed at the time. Overly subversive statements run the risk of remaining unheard. In that case, it is only when a rule collapses through, for example, a change in mentality, that it becomes recognised that it once described the normal state of things. As for deliberate deviations from standard practice or opinion, they tend less to strengthen (let alone 'prove') the rule than undermine it by both drawing attention to its arbitrariness and offering alternatives. If, in the process, they mention the rule, it is never to assert it, even indirectly. Indeed, such deviations are, in effect, challenges to the established order; subversion is their aim and their methods include disclosure, sarcasm, satire and parody.

As interpreted by most commentators, Kristeva and Hall included, the barbarophile message which emerges from Euripides' so-called 'Trojan' plays (*Hecuba*, *Trojan Women* and *Andromache*) breaks a rule in the latter sense of the word only. It represents not so much an *infringement* of prescriptive rules as a mere *departure*, albeit striking and deliberate, from his contemporaries' practice of habitually denigrating foreigners or treating them, in one way or another, as their inferiors. To that extent, *pace* Hall, the exception constituted by these plays could not possibly reinforce, let alone prove, the rule from which they depart. They were real, rather than apparent, deviations. By lending moral authority to the voice of the dispossessed and the marginalised,[18] Euripides, through his Trojan plays, could only weaken, rather than strengthen, the 'rule'

[18] Just as it can be argued that, through the character of Medea, Euripides included the voice of the deviant in his drama.

of his compatriots' xenophobia. By throwing it into vivid relief, as an element in the drama, he could only speed along the realisation of its unreasonableness.[19]

It will further be contended here that a comparable, although more subtle, because covert, strategy is at work in *Iphigeneia Among the Taurians*. While Athenian spectators of the Trojan plays had the moral claims of despised and vanquished barbarians thrust upon their attention, they could enjoy this play without attending to the uncomfortable issues that it raises. Ingeniously double-layered, the latter play in effect conceals its subversive intent under an intricate but dramatically simple plot and, at times, heartrending dialogues. Iphigeneia and her attendants, long exiled in a barbaric land amongst barbarians, voice poignantly and at length their nostalgia for the lost Greek homeland. They secure their return to it by cunningly outmanoeuvring their gullible hosts. For these reasons the play is often dismissed as an undemandingly jingoistic happy-ender. Yet, such an interpretation leaves out of account significant sections of the dialogue and crucial aspects of characterisation. In fact, below its surface chauvinism, *Iphigeneia Among the Taurians* derides and challenges, on a number of counts, Athenian complacency. At its deeper level, as will be argued, the drama teases the more reflective amongst Athenian spectators into querying not only the sincerity of the Greek moral voice but also the superior authoritativeness of its values. This satirical edge of the play, it will lastly be claimed, is all the more effective for being camouflaged under the cover of vulgar chauvinism. If accepted, the reading of this play here presented would therefore suggest that Euripidean drama could be more pervasively cosmopolitan and, correspondingly, more contemptuous of Athenian self-satisfaction, than is generally recognised. Whether Euripides generally meant to educate, edify, deride, or merely puzzle his audience is not a question that need concern us here.

Ritual and revenge killings, which, in this case, involve the shedding of kindred blood, constitute the subject matter of *Iphigeneia Among the Taurians*. Iphigeneia, whom Artemis has saved from Agamemnon's sacrificial knife by transporting her to Tauris, has become a priestess to the cult of her benefactress. Her duties include the sacrifice to the goddess of all Greek males who set foot on Tauris. The fact that Iphigeneia herself is an Argive and that,

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[19] From the evidence of Plato, *Politicus* 262D, we may speculate that Euripides' drama had this effect. Indeed, in that dialogue, as will be recalled, the Eleatic Stranger shows the young Socrates how inadequate, because artificial, is the taxonomy of the οἱ πολλοί, which divides the human race into two groups, i.e., a small homogenous 'class' (if it can be dignified by that name) of Hellenes and a large heterogeneous class which includes all other ethnicities.

unbeknown to her, the next victims turn out to be her brother and his friend, add to the enormity of the act that is demanded of her. Orestes' reason for risking disembarkation in Tauris is that he, too, is an outcast, hounded by the Furies for matricide. To be cleansed of bloodguilt, the Pythia has advised him, he will have to fulfil Apollo's bidding of removing Artemis' statue from her Taurian temple, and transport it to Athens. After lengthy dramatic exchanges on the sorrow of exile, the nature of friendship and the mystery of divine ways, brother and sister finally recognise each other. The crucial element in the recognition scene, which Aristotle considered to be a model of its kind (*Poet.* 1455a16-20), turns out to be the production of a letter to Orestes which Iphigeneia had long ago dictated to a Greek victim, by chance literate, of Artemis' Taurian cult. Iphigeneia then plots their escape from Tauris by taking advantage of the gullibility and decency of its king. Athena's divine intervention, at the close of the play, ensures the success of their plans and the relocation of Taurian Artemis in Attica.

Around this central story line the playwright weaves a complex study of exile and dispossession. Although the present paper focuses on the dispossession of the protagonist, it should not be forgotten that Orestes, too, suffers from banishment, not only from home and country but also from the moral order which then defined decency for the Greeks, and that the chorus is entirely formed of captive Greek women. As for the Taurians, who are constantly pushed off-centre of the action, they could be said, metaphorically, to be exiled on stage. Indeed, on the surface, their role appears to be that of doltish foils and paradigmatic others to their sophisticated, loquacious and reluctant 'guests' from Argos. It is, however, what the Greek exiles reveal of themselves and their values in their unguarded exchanges and free-spoken speeches which constitutes the main source of irony in the drama.

From the opening lines of the play, the effects of exile[20] on Iphigeneia are shown to be profound. From Achilles' bride-to-be to virgin priestess, from princess of the House of Argos to powerless exile, her social density has suffered considerable impairment. The dislocation between her past and her present has blurred the focus of her sense of self and robbed her personality of the simple cohesiveness that it would otherwise have had. Indeed, as will presently be seen, there is little consistency in, and between, her various moods, musings and pronouncements. When she describes herself, it is in negative

[20] All the exiled protagonists in Euripides' complete extant plays, i.e., *Medea*, *Andromache*, *Iphigeneia* and *Helen*, are female. Although no firm conclusion on the issue of gender and exile can be inferred from the contingencies of text preservation, this fact may nevertheless be significant.

terms, as her reliance on privative adjectives attests: ἄγαμος ἄτεκνος, ἄπολις ἄφιλος ('without husband, child, city or friend', 220). Taurian paths, as she perceives them, can lead her nowhere; they are ἀνόδοι ('unpaths', 889). The country itself is ἄμικτον ('uncivilised', 402). Rather than εὐξείνος ('hospitable to foreigners'), she puns, the sea that borders Tauris should more appropriately be named ἄξεινος ('inhospitable to foreigners', 218, 341, 395; see also 253).[21] Iphigeneia's sense of agency, too, appears to be exiled, and her only precarious hold on it is through the destructive actions of killing and deceiving which necessity binds her to perform.[22] To the extent that she is occasionally called upon to offer her own kind in sacrifice her priestly duties have a suicidal edge. Finally, she makes much of the fact that she is effectively dead to those who knew her past self:

> Τηλόσε γὰρ δὴ σᾶς ἀπενάσθην
> πατρίδος καὶ ἐμᾶς, ἔνθα δοκήμασι
> κεῖμαι σφαχθεῖσ' ἃ τλάμων.
>
> (175-77)
>
> I have been exiled far from the land
> which is yours and mine, and where I am thought
> to have been killed, to lie buried.[23]

Her bitter exclamation ἐκεῖθέν εἰμι· παῖς ἔτ' οὖσ' ἀπωλόμην ('there I come from; there I died as a child', 541) shows the extent of her dependence on kinship and related alliances for self-perception. Long deprived of possible

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[21] According to an alternative explanation suggested by L. Parmentier and H. Grégoire (edd. and trr.), *Euripide* 4 (Paris 1948) 122, whose edition is followed here, ἄξενος is an earlier name of the Black Sea, derived from an Iranian term meaning 'black' (axshaêna). Later, Parmentier and Grégoire [above, this note] 122 add, when the term was Hellenised, its tropeic value became apparent, and the privative alpha was replaced by the prefix εὖ. Whatever the merits of this explanation, it fails to take into account the unfailingly pejorative connotation of all the occurrences of ἄξενος in *IT*. The testimony of Ovid, who, in *Tristia*, constructs Tomis and the region bordering the Black Sea as sites of otherness, is here decisive. In its three occurrences in that work, the phrase *Pontus Euxini* ('Euxine Sea') is twice pronounced inapt, viz., *Euxinus falso nomine dictus* ('the Pontus, falsely called Euxine', 3.13.27f.) and *mendax cognomen* ('false name', 5.10.13).

[22] As she herself dimly surmises: εἰς ἀνάγκην κείμεθ' ('I am ruled by necessity', 620).

[23] Translated by Lattimore [2]. Although the translation of Vellacott [4] is mostly used throughout this paper, I occasionally rely on Lattimore's renderings as closer to the original. At times, I have provided my own, inevitably more pedestrian, translations. For clarity's sake, all translations are attributed. For the original, I follow the edition of Parmentier and Grégoire [21].

interaction with members of her family and fellow Greeks,[24] her sense of her own selfhood has become somewhat atrophied and unsteady. Exile has estranged her from the socially constructed self that she had unselfconsciously accepted in her Argive youth.

This is first indicated in her reaction to the dream that she narrates early on in the play. Back at home in Argos and asleep at night, this dream had her woken up by an earthquake and rushing out of doors to find the whole palace tumbling down and crashing to the ground. Soon only one column, from whose top brown hair flowed, remained erect in the midst of the ruins, and she found herself throwing lustral water at it. Iphigeneia's own interpretation of the dream's symbolism is interesting as much for what it neglects, or misreads, as for what it focalises. Indeed, she does not explicitly recognise that no more in her dream than in real life could she remain alive without leaving her place in the home. Furthermore, although she correctly surmises, within the narrative framework of the play, that the lone column symbolises her brother, and that the lustral water signifies that her role is to prepare him for death, she does not envisage the possibility that the dream might be premonitory.[25] Instead, she concludes that Orestes has already died (149f.). Lastly, although Iphigeneia links the throwing of lustral water to her current priestly duties, she fails to consider that the column in her dream might stand for all her fellow Greeks whom she is to prepare for sacrifice. On the contrary, her conviction that Orestes has died appears to have pushed her Greek self deeper underground and to have all but extinguished, at least for a time, the sympathy that she used to feel for Artemis' sacrificial victims. In other words, the loss of her brother further alienates Iphigeneia from her Argive self to the point that she ceases to identify with Artemis' Greek 'offerings'. She begins to view them with Taurian detachment. Having later recognised Orestes and discarded her dream as deceptive she prepares to return home at all costs since the only alternative would be the continued μηδὲν εἶναι ('inexistence', 1058) of exile. Only by returning to Argos, she senses, will she recover the unfissured sense of selfhood which the arrival of her brother has again brought within her reach.

As already intimated in the dream, however, estrangement may be the price of survival, and Euripides pointedly reminds his audience that it was so in

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[24] The fact that the constant companions of her exile are the captive Argive women who form the chorus does not mitigate Iphigeneia's plight since, like her, these women are displaced and hence deprived.

[25] This is especially curious in view of the fact that the function of dreams in most extant Greek tragedy is to predict the future; see S. R. F. Price, 'The Future of Dreams: From Freud to Artemidoros', in D. M. Halperin, J. J. Winkler and F. I. Zeitlin (edd.), *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World* (Princeton 1990) 367.

Iphigeneia's case (8, 783-87). Although exile alienated her from all that had made her the person that she was, it has also been, literally, a lifesaver to her who otherwise would have been ritually killed by her own father. As for the goddess whose cruel Taurian cult Iphigeneia now serves, she is the very same Artemis who, in Greece, had earlier both led the young princess to, and saved her from, Agamemnon's sword. In other words, if Iphigeneia has now become an agent of inhumanity to her fellow Greeks it is only because she was once a victim of their cruelty. From the very beginning of this play, therefore, Euripides' Athenian audience was encouraged to recognise that the inhabitants of Tauris are not the only ones to be guilty of infringing sacred moral laws. Their attention was drawn to the various ways in which human sacrifices were exacted in their own mythical past and hence to the fact that barbarity, as a state of moral anarchy, is not confined to non-Greeks.

Iphigeneia's uprooted condition and uncertain sense of self-identity account for the characteristic waywardness, not to say incoherence, of many of her utterances. Indeed, the memory of her father elicits now her vindictiveness, now her pity. At times she blames him for her current exile, at other times it is Helen whom she castigates. At one point, she switches, in the space of a few lines, from religious scepticism to conventional piety (380-88). But nowhere is her inconsistency more clearly displayed than in her attitude to the rites that she is made to perform. A crucial difference between Iphigeneia and her Taurian associates, it is sometimes alleged,[26] lies in the fact that, unlike them, she objects to human sacrifices *on moral grounds*. This, as we shall now see, is not invariably so.

True, on several occasions, Iphigeneia does express repugnance for the Taurian rites:

> Αἱμόρραντον δυσφόρμιγγα
> Ξείνων αἱμάσσουσ' ἄταν [βωμούς],
> οἰκτράν τ' αἰαζόντων αὐδὰν,
> οἰκτρόν τ' ἐκβαλλόντων δάκρυον.
>
> (225-28)
>
> The rites I celebrate are unfit for song;
> I drench an altar with blood of travellers;
> I pity them as they lament their fate,
> As their tears fall my heart is wrung.[27]

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[26] See, e.g. Pohlenz [3] 392.

[27] Translated by Vellacott [4]; Iphigeneia expresses similar feelings of moral fastidiousness in 30-41.

But she can also be dispassionate and matter-of-fact about them. Indeed, in the first *kommos* she reacts to the chorus' outraged dismissal of the Taurian rite as unholy to the Greek mind by pointing out that:

> τὰ τῆς θεοῦ μὲν πρῶτον ὡς καλῶς ἔχῃ
> φροντιστέον μοι. Μέθετε τῶν ξένων χέρας,
> ὡς ὄντες ἱεροὶ μηκέτ' ὦσι δέσμιοι.
> Ναοῦ δ' ἔσω στείχοντες εὐτρεπίζετε
> ἃ χρὴ 'πι τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ νομίζεται.
>
> (467-71)
>
> My first care is that the rites of Artemis
> Be duly ordered. So untie the strangers' arms;
> They must now stand unfettered, being consecrate.
> Next, go into the temple and prepare whatever
> Custom and the observance of this rite demand.[28]

At other times, she even contemplates the impending sacrifices with a curiously gleeful eagerness:

> Χρόνιοι γὰρ ἥκουσ'· οὐδέπω βωμὸς θεᾶς
> Ἑλληνικαῖσιν ἐξεφοινίχθη ῥοαῖς.
>
> (258f.)
>
> These men
> Were long in coming; and the altar of Artemis
> is not yet dyed too deep with streams of Hellene blood.[29]

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[28] Translated by Vellacott [4]. Earlier she had presented the Taurian custom as ἄρρητος ('unspeakable', 41) and had castigated it as φαῦλος ('vile', 390) on moral grounds: 'Ill attuned to the lyre' (δυσγόρμιγγα, 225), the victims' cries of distress, she had said, make her weep.

[29] In deliberately emphasising the prefix in ἐξεφοινίχθη, from ἐκφοινίσσειν ('to empurple throroughly', 259), Vellacott [4], whose translation of 336-39 is here quoted, takes position on the vexed question as to whether, before the arrival of her brother and Pylades, Iphigeneia had actually presided at the sacrifice of Greek men to Artemis. Like him, J. C. G. Strachan, in his 'Iphigenia and Human Sacrifice in Euripides' *Iphigenia Taurica*', *CPh* 71 (1976) 133, thinks that Orestes would not have been Iphigeneia's first Greek victim. For a different view, see, e.g., Grube [2] 133; D. Sansone, 'A Problem in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*', *RhM* 121 (1978) 35-47; and Lattimore [2] 73f. Although the claims made above concerning Iphigeneia's exiled self and impaired sense of agency accord with the former view, no attempt is made here to contribute to a controversy which is not directly germane to the object of this paper. It might, however, be useful to note that Ovid, who knew Euripides' play so well that he, purposefully and transparently, integrated line segments of it in his *Ex Ponto*, did consider that, prior to Orestes' arrival, Iphigeneia had presided at such sacrifices more than once. As he writes, *praefuerat templo multos ea rite per annos / invita invita peragens tristia sacra manu* ('Duly had she presided over the temple for many years, carrying

The remark with which the herdsman had earlier concluded his report of the arrival on their shore of two Greek strangers shows that Iphigeneia's current vindictive mood cannot solely be due, as she herself would like, self-deceptively, to believe, to her post-oniric conviction that her brother is dead. It is, in fact, of long standing:

> Εὔχου δὲ τοιάδ', ὦ νεᾶνί, σοι ξένων
> σφάγια παρεῖναι· κἂν ἀναλίσκῃς ξένους
> τοιούσδε, τὸν σὸν Ἕλλας ἀποτείσει φόνον
> δίκας τίνουσα τῆς ἐν Ἀυλίδι σφαγῆς.
>
> (336-39)
>
> You used to pray, young woman, for the opportunity to kill foreigners;
> if you kill foreigners of such quality, Hellas will atone for your murder
> and pay due penalty for the slaughter at Aulis.[30]

When Iphigeneia is in this particular mood, her behaviour echoes that of her father at Aulis. Indeed, in Aeschylus's interpretation of the myth, as will be recalled, Agamemnon's laments over his impending sacrifice of his daughter are followed, in the chorus' report, by expressions of unseemly and manic eagerness to perform the deed (*Ag.* 205-27). Likewise, the Iphigeneia at whom we glimpse through the herdsman's narrative can, at times, be a frantic and zealous servant of the very cult which, on other occasions, she castigates on moral grounds.[31]

The depiction of Iphigeneia's waywardness in this respect, however, is not merely a literary allusion on the part of the playwright. It also serves to highlight the fact that her moral indignation at barbaric *mores* is essentially a mood and, like all moods, soon passes. As will be seen later, it can quickly transmute itself into murderous vindictiveness and be aimed at those fellow Greeks to whom she ascribes responsibility for her present predicament. In that case, far from deploring the barbarity of Taurian sacrifices, this Greek princess dreams of inflicting them on her own kind. Further, the unreflectiveness of Iphigeneia's moods provides the playwright with opportunities for ironic parallels between barbarian and Greek modes of behaviour. For instance, Iphigeneia's lengthy self-introduction as a victim of Agamemnon's readiness to sacrifice his child to Greek honour, is immediately followed by the lines:

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out the gloomy rites with unwilling hand', 3.2.65f. [tr. A. L. Wheeler, *Ovid, with an English Translation: Tristia, Ex Ponto* (Cambridge, Mass. 1988)]).

[30] My translation.

[31] For interesting interpretations of Iphigeneia's conflicting attitudes toward human sacrifices see Sansone [29] and K. V. Hartigan, *Ambiguity and Self-Deception* (Frankfurt 1991).

πέμψασά μ' ἐς τήνδ' ᾤκισεν Ταύρων χθόνα,
οὗ γῆς ἀνάσσει βαρβάροισι βάρβαρος . . .
θύω γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ νόμου καὶ πρὶν πόλει
ὃς ἂν κατέλθῃ τήνδε γῆν Ἕλλην ἀνήρ.
κατάρχομαι μέν, σφάγια δ' ἄλλοισιν μέλει
ἄρρητ' ἔσωθεν τῶνδ' ἀνακτόρων θεᾶς.
(30f., 38-41)

Here in this Taurian country, where a barbaric king
Rules a barbaric people . . .
by a custom that held here before I came,
I offer all Hellenes who set foot on this shore—
At this feast of the goddess I begin the rites;
The sacrifice itself is an unspoken act
Performed by others in the interior of the shrine.[32]

The juxtaposition in itself is ironic. Explicit in her resentment of her father's cruelty, Iphigeneia nevertheless reserves her *moral* disapproval for the Taurian practice of sacrificing humans. In this she is made to appear oblivious to the fact that if human sacrifices are morally wrong in Tauris, so are they in Aulis,[33] and if the Taurians are to be branded barbarians for ritually killing human beings so should the Argives. While Iphigeneia's moral short-sightedness is partly to be explained by the particular circumstances of her exile, Euripides' Athenian audience had no such excuse. Iphigeneia's illogicality was blatant enough for them to spot it even if they could not all be expected to transfer the keener insight thus offered on to their own complacent belief in Greek moral superiority.

In the first *kommos*, again, having recalled her father's villainy (211), Iphigeneia is made, some twelve lines later, to voice fastidious reluctance at her barbarian hosts' ritual practices. This time, however, her mood is overtly vindictive and she fantasises about implementing these very rites on Helen and Menelaus (355-58). Her jagged reasoning in this passage repays close attention. In a moment of uncharacteristic lucidity, Iphigeneia first deplores the lessening of her compassion for Artemis' victims and ascribes it to the fact that:

οἱ δυστυχεῖς γὰρ τοῖσι δυστυχεστέροις
αὐτοὶ κακῶς πράξαντες οὐ φρονοῦσιν εὖ.
(352f.)

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[32] Translated by Vellacott [4].

[33] This is not to intimate that universalisation was a regular feature of Greek moral thought at the time. On this issue, cf., e.g., K. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1974) 278f.

When people are unfortunate, their suffering
makes them no kinder to those even less fortunate.[34]

Moral regret does not, however, prevent her from entertaining thoughts of ultimate revenge. Although she, again, recalls at length the scene of sacrifice at Aulis, it is Helen and Menelaus whom she would like to prepare for death:

Ἀλλ' οὔτε πνεῦμα Διόθεν ἦλθε πώποτε,
οὐ πορθμίς, ἥτις διὰ πέτρας Συμπληγάδας
Ἑλένην ἀπήγαγ' ἐνθάδ', ἥ μ' ἀπώλεσεν,
Μενέλεών θ', ἵν' αὐτοὺς ἀντετιμωρησάμην,
τὴν ἐνθάδ' Αὖλιν ἀντιθεῖσα τῆς ἐκεῖ . . .
(354-58)
Zeus never yet sent wind or ship to convey through
The Twin Rocks to this country Helen, who destroyed
My life, or Menelaus, for my just revenge,
To make a second Aulis for atonement here.[35]

At this point she appears to become aware of a dissonance between her various mental states but promptly blames it on Artemis and her contradictory commands. In the process, she voices feelings of religious doubt which are characteristic of Euripides' characters:

Τὰ τῆς θεοῦ δὲ μέμφομαι σοφίσματα,
ἥτις βροτῶν μὲν ἤν τις ἅψηται φόνου,
ἢ καὶ λοχείας ἢ νεκροῦ θίγῃ χεροῖν,
Βωμῶν ἀπείργει, μυσαρὸν ὡς ἡγουμένη,
αὐτὴ δὲ θυσίαις ἥδεται βροτοκτόνοις.
(380-84)
As for Artemis,
I find her guilty of hypocrisy. She calls
Unclean one who has touched blood, or a woman in labour,
Or a corpse, and bars him from her altars; yet herself
Takes pleasure in these offerings of human lives![36]

Such impious thoughts cannot, however, long be entertained by Artemis' priestess who soon reverts to her practice of blaming the Taurians:

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[34] Translated by Lattimore [2], who places these lines earlier in the text, viz., 344f.

[35] Translated by Vellacott [4]. Later on (440-66), the chorus shows itself guilty of the same inconsistency.

[36] Translated by Vellacott [4].

τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ', αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἀνθρωποκτόνους,
ἐς τὴν θεὸν τὸ φαῦλον ἀναφέρειν δοκῶ·
(389f.)
The truth is—men of this country, being murderers,
Impute their sordid practice to divine command.[37]

The thought expressed in these two lines is both daring and myopic. While the rejection of religious anthropomorphism is worthy of Xenophanes of Colophon, the failure to extend it to Greek religious practices is oddly obtuse in one who has just accused Artemis of inconsistency. A comical anti-climax to this muddled sophistication is provided by the expression of simple-minded faith with which Iphigeneia lamely concludes her speech: οὐδένα γὰρ οἶμαι δαιμόνων εἶναι κακόν ('I do not believe any of the gods to be evil', 391).

Simple faith, be it in the gods or in one's own culture, can be both touching and empowering. When, however, it is voiced in the same breath as religious scepticism—or contempt for alien cultures which are otherwise shown to share important features with one's own—, simple faith defeats itself and deserves to become an object of derision. Iphigeneia's blind confidence in the moral superiority of her culture belongs to this latter variety. Throughout the play, as was shown, her contemptuous dismissal of Taurian values and customs is repeatedly made to deconstruct itself by the unguarded admissions that she and her attendants let slip about themselves, their own culture, and their religious practices. In so far as Euripides' in-depth depiction of Iphigeneia's unsteady persona effectively underscored similarities between Greeks and barbarians, we may speculate that *Iphigeneia Among the Taurians* had a didactic edge.[38] What, at any rate, seems certain is that Euripides' chronicle of his heroine's self-deception is all the more caustic for being addressed to an audience who, for the most part, as he knew, shared her biases and prejudices. From the evidence of this play, it can therefore be concluded that Kristeva's interpretation of Euripides' *oeuvre* as xenophobic overall is both simplistic and groundless.

The two dramatic layers in *Iphigeneia Among the Taurians* can now, by way of a conclusion, be briefly pulled apart. The first-order level consists of a melodramatic tale of exile and return, narrated movingly and directly by the protagonist and the chorus. Although, as was argued so far, this layer can generate second-order questioning, it is nevertheless strong enough, on its own,

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[37] Translated by Vellacott [4].

[38] As appears to be intimated by Hartigan [31] 95: 'Euripides thus uses Iphigenia's presence among the Taurians to emphasize the discrepancies between the words men speak and the deeds they do'.

to sustain not only the interest of spectators but even, as we saw, the interpretation of critics. Athenian audiences out for an uncomplicated good time could find plenty to move and entertain them in this play: distressed Greek gentlewomen, cowardly, cruel and gullible barbarians, mistaken identity, touching recognition scenes, suspense, dreams, jingoistic wisecracks etc. At the second-order level Euripides' audience is obliquely invited to review, or qualify, their immediate emotional response to this tale. The quality of Iphigeneia's moral sense and the genuineness of her compassion are deftly questioned, her good faith made to appear suspect, her double standards exposed, and her xenophobic utterances skilfully voided of declarative content. While the play's first layer draws the audience into the drama, encourages their identification with the characters and engages their empathetic emotions, the second-order layer distances them from the action and invites them to be reflective, clinical and introspective. It cannot be too strongly emphasised at this point, however, that the play's success in making its audience think depends on the accuracy and vividness of the *mimesis* of current xenophobia provided at the first level. For this reason, the second dramatic layer of *Iphigeneia Among the Taurians* cannot be self-sufficient but depends for its satirical focus on the certainties expressed at the first level. On the stage as in real life, norms are most effectively attacked from the inside. *Pace* Hall, it can therefore be maintained that this play provides evidence that Euripidean drama could, at one and the same time, present a norm and ridicule it. Or as Vidal-Naquet aptly puts it: 'In Greek tragedy, the norm is presented only to be transgressed or because it has already been transgressed'.[39]

The dynamics between the two levels, and the ironies which they generate, amply compensate for the slightness of the plot of a play in which Euripides derides and displaces with one hand the self-congratulatory and uncomplicated certainties that he dishes out with the other. Only at rare moments do the two levels directly interact. One such is provided by the Taurian king's reference to his own country as βαρβάρων ἀκτή ('the shore of the barbarians', 1170). The fact that Thoas can take over Iphigeneia's own, unfailingly pejorative, use of this phrase highlights not so much his simple-mindedness as the ambiguity of the term *barbaros*. In her mouth it is a term of abuse while in his it denotes all members of the class of non-Greeks. A similar but sharper dissonance occurs four lines later when the king reacts to the information that Orestes is a matricide with the remark: οὐδ' ἐν βαρβάροις ἔτλη τις ἄν ('no barbarian would have dared', 1174). This is a moment of

[39] P. Vidal-Naquet, 'Aeschylus, the Past and the Present', in J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet (tr. J. Lloyd), *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece* (New York 1988) 264.

ultimate and corrosive irony. Having internalised the Greek contempt for his race, the self-abasingly naive Thoas inadvertently throws it back at his haughty guest who, characteristically, fails to take notice.

Iphigeneia is too busy deceiving him at this point with a tall story devised to ease her escape: mere contact with Orestes, she claims, caused Artemis' statue to shrink backward on its pedestal, to close its eyes, and, therefore, to require offshore purification. Thoas' final assent to this mendacious account is rich in ambiguities: σοφήν σ' ἔθρεψεν Ἑλλάς, ὡς ἤσθου καλῶς ('Greece made you clever, so you understood this well', 1180).[40] This remark could be interpreted as a quip: after all, his immediate response to Iphigeneia's tale had been to suggest the possibility of a rationalistic explanation for the statue's behaviour: Αὐτόματον, ἤ νιν σεισμὸς ἔστρεψε χθονός; ('[Did it turn] all by herself, or did an earthquake turn it about?', 1166).[41] The fact, however, that he later allows Iphigeneia, accompanied by the bound prisoners, to purify the statue in the sea makes it more likely that Thoas' words should be taken as meant literally. To that extent they corroborate the Athenian stereotyping of barbarians as foolish and easily deceived. But, by the same token, Thoas' remark also ridicules Greek self-satisfaction since it draws the audience's attention to the incongruity of his compliment to one who, throughout the play, proves to be a very poor reader of signs, misinterpreting her own dream, contradicting herself, and requiring circumstantial evidence before she recognises her own brother. And if her final admission of illiteracy surprises less that it should,[42] it is probably because it is summative of her overall imperceptiveness. Thoas' deference to his guest's superior Greek lucidity is therefore both self-verifying in its naivety and deadly in its implications; while it is likely to have made the many in the audience guffaw, it may have caused the few to smile shamefacedly or, at least, wryly.

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[40] Translated by Lattimore [2].

[41] In the translation of Lattimore [2], which is used here, this line is numbered 1143.

[42] As evidenced in her request to Pylades (582-85) to carry to Argos a letter written on her behalf by a former victim of Taurian Artemis' cult. In the notes that accompany his translation of the play, Vellacott [4] 187 comments on the oddity of this request: '. . . if Phaedra could write, why not Iphigenia?' However, this point should not be over-emphasised. Indeed, Iphigeneia's illiteracy is a prerequisite of the recognition scene which the plot requires. Moreover, as shown by R. Thomas in her *Literacy and Morality in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge 1992) 150-57, illiteracy long remained the norm in Greece among members of the upper classes. Yet, it is nevertheless significant that Orestes, the addressee of the letter, can read, and that is further assumed that so could all those in whose hands the letter might fall. Hence, *within the context of this particular play*, Iphigeneia's illiteracy is underscored.

The fact that, at the close of *Iphigeneia Among the Taurians*, Euripides should have given Thoas lines that dramatically subvert the very stereotype to which he otherwise makes him conform shows again his detachment, in that play, from the traditional Greek antipathy towards barbarians. Indeed, in this play, as we have seen, his barbarians' credulity is double-edged and mostly presents occasions for exposing the fatuity of their Hellenic guests' claim to superior intelligence, guile and moral refinement. There are no outright winners in this drama which is 'closed' by Athena briskly settling squabbles and apportioning rival, and equally petty, claims while reminding audience and cast that τὸ γὰρ χρεὼν σοῦ τε καὶ θεῶν κρατεῖ ('the gods themselves bow to Necessity, not only you', 1486).[43]

[43] I should like here to record my appreciation to David Bain, Janet Lewison and the two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Christopher Strachan for disagreeing with me in so constructive a manner.

THE ARGUMENT FOR RECOLLECTION IN THE *PHAEDO*: A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION

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Abstract. Two main issues stand out in recent debate on Plato's theory of recollection (*anamnesis*): the validity of the argument underpinning the theory and the role Plato assigns to sense-experience. This article supports the view that there is a role for sense-experience in the recollection of Forms but that perception on its own could not lead to a full recovery of our prenatal knowledge of Forms.

Plato's theory of recollection (*anamnesis*) has generated considerable interest amongst scholars during the past three decades. Two main issues, however, stand out as the focus of recent debate among the opponents of and apologists for the theory: namely, the validity of the argument itself (as presented in the *Phaedo*) and the role Plato assigns to sense-experience in *anamnesis*. J. L. Ackrill, for example, made an illuminating analysis of the logical structure of the argument for *anamnesis* in the *Phaedo* and exposed some of the gaps and incoherencies in the argument in his 1973 essay. These criticisms have attracted a significant following as is evidenced in the discussions by David Gallop (1975) and David Bostock (1986).[1] Again, Michael Morgan (1984) and Dominic Scott (1987),[2] taking cognisance of some of these difficulties in the structure of the argument, have read *anamnesis* in one case to support the thesis that sense-experience leads to an immediate apprehension of the Form and in the other case to show that sense-experience has no role whatsoever to play in the recollection of Forms. The standard interpretation of *anamnesis*, which may be said to stand midway between the two extreme positions, generally recognises a role for sense-experience but

[1] Cf. J. L. Ackrill, '*Anamnesis* in the Phaedo: Remarks on 73c-75c', in E. N. Lee, A. D. P. Mourelatos and R. M. Rorty (edd.), *Exegesis and Argument* (Assen 1973) 177-95; D. Gallop (ed.), *Plato: Phaedo* (Oxford 1975) 113-37; D. Bostock, *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford 1986) 66f.

[2] Cf. M. Morgan, 'Sense-perception and Recollection in the *Phaedo*', *Phronesis* 29 (1984) 237-51; D. Scott, 'Platonic Anamnesis Revisited', *CQ* 37 (1987) 345-66. Scott holds on to his 1987 interpretation in his more recent publications: *Recollection and Experience: Plato's Theory of Learning and Its Successors* (Cambridge 1995); 'Platonic Recollection', in G. Fine (ed.), *Plato* 1: *Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Oxford 1999) 93-124.

denies that perception could on its own lead to a full recovery of our prenatal knowledge of Forms.[3] This essay will attempt to show (a) that, in spite of some purely logical defects of the argument (when considered out of context), the recollection thesis as standardly interpreted makes perfect sense if it is read in the wider context of Plato's metaphysics; and (b) that the standard interpretation remains the best option open to us as against the two rival readings which create more problems in the comprehension of Plato's philosophy.

1

First then an outline of the criticisms which seem to threaten the standard interpretation.

(1) It has been pointed out that there is a difficulty in rendering into English the Greek noun ἀνάμνησις ('calling to mind', 'recollection') and its corresponding verb ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ('to recall to mind'). According to the critics Plato did not show himself aware of the logical distinction between remembering or recollecting something and being reminded of something. In this connection Ackrill observes 'recalling something does not entail being reminded of it . . . one may recall something without any particular object or experience having reminded one of it'. He thus rejects as being overtranslations those renderings of the Greek expressions of the form 'seeing *x* he thought of *y*'. Ackrill's apparent concern here is that such a rendering might imperil the whole strategy of the theory, namely 'the concept *being reminded of* and the question of how we come to think of things' (my emphasis).[4]

(2) The main *anamnesis* thesis as stated in *Phaedo* 73c4-d1 has also attracted unfavourable comments from critics. The thesis states: 'If a person sees *x* and not only recognises *x* but also thinks of *y* (which is the object not of the same knowledge but of another), then it is rightly said that he is 'reminded' of the object he gets the thought of'. Ackrill, for example, has three objections against it. First, to appeal to the notion of reminding is to imply the existence of an account in terms of associative laws connecting thought-contents. So to claim that 'seeing *x* reminded me of *y*' must involve my noticing those features of *x* by means of which I may make the transition from *x* to *y*.

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[3] Those who hold this position include the following: R. S. Bluck (ed.), *Plato's Meno* (Cambridge 1961) 8-17, 47-61; R. S. Bluck (ed.), *Plato's Phaedo* (Cambridge 1955) 146-50; F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London 1957) 2-6, 108f.; and J. T. Bedu-Addo, 'Sense-experience and the Argument for Recollection in Plato's *Phaedo*', *Phronesis* 36 (1991) 27-60.

[4] Ackrill [1] 180f.

Thus a recognition requirement is necessary if Plato is to give an adequate account of *anamnesis* and to bring out the ways in which it goes beyond 'he saw *x* and then thought of *y*'.[5] Herein lies the danger for the standard interpretation; for, if reminding is to explain concept-formation, a precondition for reminding cannot be recognition or something akin to it. Secondly, if the *anamnesis* account given above is right, then Ackrill believes the example of reminding at *Phaedo* 73e9—seeing a picture of Simmias and being reminded of Simmias himself—is in 'blatant breach of this condition'. As he argues, 'seeing that this is Simmias' portrait I am already thinking of Simmias'.[6] Thirdly, it is urged, the *anamnesis* thesis begs the question against alternative explanations for a person seeing *x* and thinking of *y*: as, for example, he could invent, make up, the idea of *y*. Thus the formulation of the thesis does not entail a case of reminding, and so the thesis is false.[7]

(3) The other element in the recollection account in the *Phaedo* which has attracted much attention concerns the identity of 'we' (or 'you') at 74a-75c and 76b-c.[8] Here Dominic Scott has strong words against the standard interpretation which (on Scott's reading) claims that *anamnesis* is to show how we all (that is, all human beings) recollect the Equal by referring instances of sensible equals to the Form which is never unequal. Scott thinks, 'to make this claim for all human beings is patent nonsense: it is not merely false, but trivially false at that'.[9] Moreover, it is argued, since 'we' at 75d1 and 76d8 clearly apply to Socrates' circle, to allow 'we' at 74a-b to apply to all men would seem inconsistent.

The foregoing seem to me the central objections that have been raised against the standard interpretation. And the question we need to consider is whether these criticisms do substantial damage to our preferred interpretation such that we ought to abandon this position for alternative readings proposed respectively by Morgan and Scott. I intend to show that these objections do no material damage to the *anamnesis* argument, provided the argument is read within the wider context of Plato's philosophy, and that the alternative readings being suggested, in fact, create more difficulties for our comprehension of Plato.

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[5] Ackrill [1] 182f. See also Scott [2 (1987)] 354f.

[6] Ackrill [1] 183, 185f.

[7] Also Gallop [1] 126; Bostock [1] 63f.

[8] Cf. Ackrill [1] 191f.; Scott [2 (1987)] 356f.; Bostock [1] 66f; Gallop [1] 120.

[9] Scott [2 (1987)] 356.

2

To go back then to Ackrill's first criticism concerning the semantics of *anamnesis*. There is nothing much in it that need detain us insofar as he himself admits that Plato intended *anamnesis* and its corresponding verb to stand for recollection through reminding.[10] True, the Greek expression if read independently could be ambiguous, but there is hardly any confusion about its meaning and application in the *Phaedo* passage. There *anamnesis* for Plato is a case of being reminded of *y* on seeing *x*. Thus the statement, 'seeing *x* and thinking of *y*' can justifiably be translated as 'seeing *x* reminded me (or: made me think; put me in mind) of *y*'. The crucial question is the respect in which such formulation of the *anamnesis* thesis could imperil its strategy if it is to account for how we come to think (conceive) of things. The real bother for Ackrill (as will soon become clear) is that he thinks the thesis that on 'seeing *x* I thought of *y*' is not necessarily a case of being reminded as one could conjure up (invent) *y*. Thus his criticism of the commentators who translate the expression to imply a case of reminding should really be reserved for Plato himself.

Now in what respects does the *anamnesis* thesis at *Phaedo* 73c4-d1 fail to deliver an explanation of concept-formation? One criticism raised against it (as noted above) is that for the theory to account for how we acquired our concept of, say, equality, the recognition of the reminding item should not presuppose (that is, contain implicit recognition of) the item we are to be reminded of. Thus, as perception, and so recognition, of equal sticks is implicit application of the concept equality, it is urged, whoever recognises equal sticks is already aware of the concept equal and so it is absurd for the same person to be reminded of equality after perceiving equal sticks. But does this criticism have any force?

Before answering the question I should like us to notice that part of the function of *anamnesis*, I think, is to explain concept-formation: that is, if we take concept-formation as a prerequisite for learning. This view is borne out by the manner in which the theory made its first appearance in the *Meno* (80d-81d). There Socrates' answer to Meno's sophistic query is that movement from ignorance to knowledge is possible because of our prenatal familiarity with Forms/Truths. And though at birth we would have forgotten this knowledge, (re)cognition is possible because the loss of that knowledge is not nearly so complete. Learning thus becomes a rediscovery of our previous possessions.

[10] Ackrill [1] 180.

Plato's message here is that it is due to this prenatal latent knowledge that discovery is possible.

Now, to perceive that two sticks are equal presupposes the notion/concept of equality. For the point about the sophistic paradox is that if Simmias did not in some manner possess the concept of equality it would not be possible for him to discern that the sticks are equal. Of relevance to the above criticism, however, is whether Simmias, in perceiving that the sticks are equal, need notice that he is employing the concept equality. Evidence from our everyday experience suggests the contrary.

To be able to intuit that two sticks are equal, for example, I must possess (a) the concept of equality, which itself presupposes (b) the notions of similarity and difference, which, in turn, imply (c) the concept of relation. In other words, the concepts: equality, similarity and difference, and relation are all implicit in the apparently simple intuition that the sticks are equal. But in making that intuition need I notice that I am actually deploying so many semantic/logical items in that act? Far from it. It is natural for me to claim I see that the sticks are equal and at the same time deny (without adequate reflection) that in so doing I was comparing and trying to detect a relation between the two sticks *before* arriving at the conclusion which is the content of my intuition. A child may be able to identify two sticks as equal and yet be puzzled when asked to say what equality is. The answer to our critics on this score is that evidence from daily practice shows that humans are accustomed to using a great number of concepts in making apparently very simple judgements *without them being conscious* that they are endowed with so rich a repertoire.[11] The lesson then from the *anamnesis* thesis is that sense-experience presupposes an endowment of a conceptual frame in whose absence cognition would not be possible. But for one to be so endowed is not to entail that one is fully conscious of one's possessions.[12]

To recap then. The criticism has been that Plato's theory fails to show a movement from x (that is, seeing x) to y (that is, recollecting y) for the reason that recognition of x presupposes familiarity with y. In other words, if *anamnesis* is to hold water, then the recognition of x must not involve implicit recognition of y; otherwise (to paraphrase Scott),[13] the absurdity results that in recognising x we are already thinking of y and so recollection of y is

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[11] In this regard I think R. E. Allen has best captured the spirit of the *anamnesis* thesis. See R. E. Allen, '*Anamnesis* in Plato's *Phaedo*', *Review of Metaphysics* 13 (1959) 172.

[12] On the proposed interpretation this is Plato's response to the sophistic paradox at *Meno* 80d-e.

[13] Scott [2] 354.

impossible. The response, in short, is that to claim that recognition of *x* involves implicit acquaintance of *y* is not to say that all those who are capable of recognising *x* are necessarily conscious of *y*, let alone capable of noticing the logical relation between *x* and *y*. As stated above, the matter of fact is that most of the time our intuitions are not the products of conscious analysis of all the elements that fuse to constitute our experience.

This fact seems to be lost sight of by Scott when he writes, 'but if we insist that Plato is using recollection to explain concept formation, if, that is, we need to have recollected the form equal in order to recognise this stick's equality, then we invite just that absurdity . . .'.[14] On the proposed interpretation the recognition of the stick's equality, though it involves implicit familiarity with the notion equal, need not presuppose conscious awareness of the notion equal. For, if it were so, before one could intuit that the sticks were equal a great deal of prior concepts would have to be deployed: namely to judge the stick's equality would involve not only notions of sameness and difference, but also notions of dimension and space (that is, length, breadth and possibly thickness). The fact of the matter is that most of the time all these notions are unconsciously taken for granted and applied in making the judgement that the sticks are equal. But to claim this much is a far cry from the claim that all those who intuit that two sticks are equal have automatically been conscious of all these concepts. There is therefore no need to recollect the form equal as a precondition for recognising equal sticks. The notion of equality already lies latent in your mind; and it is thanks to this endowment that one is capable of intuiting the stick's equality.

It is in this context then that the illustration of recollection with Simmias at *Phaedo* 73e9 ought to be understood. Ackrill's argument is that if the object perceived is recognised as a picture of Simmias the 'other knowledge' condition, namely the recollection of Simmias himself, cannot take place. He writes, 'saying to myself "this is a picture of Simmias" may lead me to think about Simmias for the next three hours; but it cannot bring Simmias to my mind, since in saying this to myself I already have him in mind'.[15] Admittedly the formulation of the example as it stands is technically problematic. For the idea underlying the sentence appears to be obscured by an ellipsis, as there is clearly a movement from seeing a picture to identifying it for what it is a picture of. Plato's concern, I think, is to draw out the point that the picture is really the picture of Simmias so that there might be no controversy about its identity. Cebes would have to proceed, however, from first perceiving the

[14] Scott [2 (1987)] 354.

[15] Ackrill [1] 186.

visible object, next recognising it as a picture, and then identifying it by recollection as a picture of his friend Simmias.[16] On this interpretation the perceiver would first see the visible object for what it is (as in the case of the lyre at *Phaedo* 73d6 and the picture at *Phaedo* 73e9) before conceiving the other object which has intimate relation with the object seen. Clearly, then, there is a movement from seeing Simmias' picture and recollecting Simmias.

There is, however, one major obstacle affecting recollection. On Plato's theory, if I see *x* and think of *y* (granted that I knew *y* previously but had forgotten *y*) then it is a case of recollection. The query is whether it is possible for me to see *x* and think of *y*, that is, to acquire a new idea (with which I have had no previous acquaintance). This criticism is important because it raises a fundamental question, namely, whether ideas or objects of knowledge can be invented/created or whether the population of knowledge is fixed and no new ideas could be created. Those who believe that humans are capable of creating or inventing new ideas rightly could accuse Plato of the charge that the Forms are nothing more than the products of his fertile imagination, and consequently they have no reality independent of his mind.

The interesting aspect about Ackrill's objection, I think, is not so much because Plato has by *anamnesis* underestimated the creative power of the mind[17] as that his query rocks the very foundation of Plato's metaphysics. For Plato under the force of Parmenidean logic (which espouses a strict dichotomy between being and not-being) has had to abandon the world of appearance and change in order to ground truth and reality in the eternal world of Forms. The purpose of the project, I think, is to establish a firmer ontological basis for truth that would fit Parmenides' criteria of reality and to rescue the unstable and sensible world from total annihilation by linking it to the world of Forms as a counterfeit to an original. Suppose we let the charge stand that the Forms are the products of Plato's imagination. The question then arises: where do we locate Parmenidean being? For Plato clearly is taking considerable pains to locate all this important being because he believes that for anything to pass as true being it must, *inter alia*, exist *independently* of thought (*Phd.* 76d6-e7). It is, of course, logically possible that seeing *x* might spur one to conceive and create *y*. The bother for Plato would then be how he would account for *y*'s status. First, if *y* came into being then it is subject to change, and possibly,

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[16] Cf. Morgan [2] 245.

[17] Plato, to be sure, has underestimated the creative power of the mind as he posits Forms for even artefacts. The notable example is his postulation in the *Republic* (596a-b, 597a-d) of the Form Bed on which the carpenter focuses in making the ordinary bed we use. The more reason why Ackrill's criticism shakes the core of Plato's metaphysics. (We must note, though, that Plato later, in *Parmenides*, rejected the idea that there could be forms of artefacts.)

decay. Secondly, such an intensional (that is, mind-dependent) object would lack external reality. On both counts *y* would not be a candidate for true being. It is against the background of Parmenidean logic, I surmise, that Plato does not consider this possibility; for entertaining such a possibility would ruin the very fabric of his metaphysics.

That Plato was firmly committed to the Forms when he wrote the *Phaedo* can hardly be disputed. The point I wish to make is that other considerations independent of *anamnesis* drove Plato to posit the Forms. In an earlier passage, for example, which bears no direct relation to recollection, Plato makes a distinction between stable and abiding realities and constantly changing sensible objects (*Phd.* 65f.). This contrast is brought up again in the third proof of the immortality of the soul (*Phd.* 78b-80b). The Forms once more play a crucial role in the final proof of the soul's immortality (*Phd.* 102a-107b). Further evidence from *Republic* 5 confirms Plato's commitment to two orders of reality: the world of being in contradistinction to the world of becoming. Corresponding to those two worlds are two levels of cognition: that is, unerring 'knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη) and unstable 'opinion' (δόξα). By definition the population of the world of being cannot come into being since they have always existed. Thus if the *anamnesis* thesis is interpreted against Plato's unshaking commitment to the eternal status of the Forms the possibility of the emergence of new knowledge becomes absurd. In this context we are left with the only choice that whatever is brought to mind on seeing *x* must be a discovery and not an invention as no new truths could be created. On this showing the *anamnesis* argument is not intended to establish the existence of the Forms: rather, it assumes the Forms, and it is on this assumption that *anamnesis* stands.

3

The other issue which has generated interesting debate concerns the identity of 'we' in the recollection passage in the *Phaedo*. There is good reason to take 'we' in the context as usually referring to Socrates' circle. After all, earlier on, at *Phaedo* 64f. we are made to understand that (a) the audience consists of Socrates' circle; (b) basic Socratic canons (that is, the notion of death as separation of body and soul; sense-experience as obstacle to knowledge; truth as the object of reasoning; the integrity of justice, goodness, beauty, etc.) are taken for granted without much debate. Thus unless it becomes patently obvious from the context (as at *Phaedo* 76a5), insofar as the recollection passage is not meant to prove the existence of the Forms, it would not be unreasonable to let 'we' in the passage refer, generally, to Socrates' circle. Of significance to our discussion, however, is whether Plato so intended to restrict

anamnesis only to those who acknowledge the existence of Forms as independent entities; to the extent that he wished to exclude the general run of human beings from learning, that is, recollecting. As against Dominic Scott, there is reasonable ground for the claim that Plato did not intend *anamnesis* to be performed only by members of his circle.

First, in restricting *anamnesis* to Socrates' circle, Scott has a problem in explicating knowledge in Plato's philosophy. His position is that those who judge the inferiority of sensible equals against equality itself are *ipso facto* in possession of knowledge of the Form. He thus takes 'know' at 74b2 to mean a sufficient familiarity with the Form to be able to participate in the question-and-answer sessions referred to at 75d3, whilst he interprets its use at 76c1f. as 'proper philosophic knowledge of the definition'.[18] Following Richard Hackforth,[19] Scott urges that 'when Simmias admits that he knows the equal, he means that he, like other Platonists, can give an account of a mathematical form, but does not concede any more than that'.[20] This explanation presumes that Plato is making a distinction between mathematical and moral Forms on the basis that mathematical concepts are simpler and easier to grasp than moral concepts. So 'when the argument is broadened to include all the forms . . . it is not thereby implied that Simmias has knowledge of all these'.[21]

The difficulties with Scott's interpretation can scarcely escape notice. The main basis of his reading is the distinction between mathematical and moral Forms. But if Plato intended to delineate two levels of knowledge by such a distinction, he would surely have dropped hints to alert us. As it is, far from making that intention clear, he states categorically at 75c-d that the 'present argument applies *no more* (οὐ μᾶλλον) to equality itself than it does to the beautiful itself, the good itself . . .' (my emphasis). This clearly is an open invitation to the reader to substitute say 'good itself' for 'equal itself', and on Plato's assertion the validity of the argument would not thereby be impaired. And it is precisely these entities that Socrates says we come to *know* or recollect by pertinent use of our sense experience (*Phd.* 75e2-7). It appears then that Plato at least within the context of the argument for recollection did not intend to restrict the number of known Forms in the manner suggested by Scott.

Besides, the distinction within knowledge that Scott is supporting is at variance with Plato's detailed discussion of the subject in the *Republic*. His claim is that Simmias knows the mathematical Forms and is able to give an

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[18] Scott [2 (1987)] 357

[19] R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford 1955) 75f.

[20] Scott [2 (1987)] 357f.

[21] Scott [2 (1987)] 357f.; see also Scott [2 (1999)] 112f.

account of them, but Simmias does not know the ethical Forms as he cannot give an account of them. In the middle dialogues, however, the explicit distinction Plato makes within knowledge is a distinction between *noetic* and *dianoetic* levels of apprehension. This distinction is found at *Republic* 510f. In a review of the discussion at 533b-c, Plato says of the geometers and their like that 'though they have some hold on reality, we can see they are *only dreaming* about it; they can *never* wake and look at it as it is so long as they leave the assumptions they use undisturbed and *cannot* account for them' (my emphasis). David Gallop in reference to this passage explains that 'it is natural to take dreams as lacking any foundation in external reality'. He thus rightly likens mathematicians to the 'sightlovers' (φιλοθεάμωνες) of book 5 in that both 'confuse images with originals, for they too are content with mere "images", that is, with terms and definitions (*logoi*), whose real *designata* they feel no need to question'.[22] Admittedly, at 510c-d it is mentioned that the mathematicians hypothesise the odd and the even, and so on, but Plato says they merely assume that they know what they are without giving an account. The lesson is that the mathematicians like the sightlovers have no adequate grasp of mathematical Forms even though they have some notions about them. Such inadequate apprehension of the Form is stipulated at 534c as the 'product of opinion'. The foregoing shows there is no suggestion that mathematicians are able to give an account of any Form, be it mathematical or ethical.

Now, as the argument for recollection is really meant to prove the pre-existence of the soul, all that is required of it is a demonstration that our notion of a perfect standard could not be derived from its sensible counterparts. So, if Plato can get Simmias to agree that there is a standard of perfection by which we judge the imperfections of the sensible objects we find here on earth, then Simmias must accept that we do not acquire the notion of perfection here on earth. The upshot is that we must have acquired it before birth, and must have been with our soul when it was not apprehending things with the senses. And, if Simmias can admit so much, then he must admit that the soul existed before its union with the body.

It is clear from the foregoing that, in order to prove the argument for recollection, Simmias need not be able to give an account of the Form Equal. All that he need concede is that he has a notion of perfect equality, just as the mathematicians show themselves aware of the odd and the even (*Resp.* 510c-d) without giving an account. Hence the validity of the argument does not rest with Simmias' adequate comprehension of the Form; any shadowy notion of

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[22] D. Gallop, 'Dreaming and Waking in Plato', in J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas (edd.), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy* (New York 1971) 192.

perfect equality by which Simmias is enabled to judge the inferiority of sensible equals is, in Plato's estimation, sufficient to establish the pre-existence of the soul.

Part of the evidence often appealed to for the claim that there is no transition from sense-experience to knowledge of Forms is the view that in Plato there is an unbridgeable gulf between the worlds of Forms and the senses. The proponents of this view often cite Plato's criticism of the sensible world in the *Phaedo*. To be sure, Plato is committed to a two-world view: the world of the sensibles and the world of Forms. There is ample evidence especially from the *Phaedo* to the later period (for example, *Republic* and *Parmenides*) that Plato conceives the Forms as a different kind of entity from the sensible particulars and so believes that they belong to *different* realms. This is expressly stated at *Republic* 534a, where δόξα ('notion') is correlated with the world of becoming and νόησις ('thought') with the world of reality.

The question which arises, however, is whether Plato so divorced the world of becoming (that is, the world of sensible particulars) from the world of being (that is, the world of Forms) as to rule out any significant relationship between the two worlds. Proponents of the 'two-world' order have tended to emphasise the 'gulf' (χωρισμός) between the world of sense and the world of Form at the expense of the logical relation which obtains between the two worlds.[23] Thus F. M. Cornford and R. E. Allen, for example, see in the *Phaedo*, at least, no significant relationship linking the two worlds.[24] Scott strongly supports this view as he observes himself that the 'most striking thing' about his interpretation of *anamnesis* is the 'rigid separation it makes between the empirical and the rational'.[25] He vividly depicts the incidental nature of the link between the two worlds with the Demaratus analogy. According to the story, Demaratus, a Greek spy in the service of the Persians, sent to the Greeks a wax tablet bearing two different messages, the first being fake and intended to deceive the Persians and the second beneath it containing the true message for the Greeks. Accordingly, the world of sense corresponding to the first message on the tablet must be wholly deceptive and cannot be used as a pointer to the second message corresponding to the world of Form. This analogy, in Scott's words, 'emphasises the element of deception in true Platonic spirit, and goes

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[23] See *Phd.* 64c-67b, 74a-76a, 80b; *Phdr.* 247c-e, 249d-250b; *Resp.* 585c-d, 509d; *Phlb.* 58e-59c; *Ti.* 28a-29c. In fact, *anamnesis* could not stand if Plato were not committed to a two-world order.

[24] Cornford [3] 6; Allen [11] 172-74.

[25] Scott [2 (1987)] 349.

hand in hand with the sort of pessimism which says that most of us do not attain knowledge at all'.[26]

Now, what is being contested here is whether Plato conceived the world of sense as so constructed as to bear no relevant relation to the world of Form except for a mere coincidence as depicted in the Demaratus episode. Evidence from the texts hardly lends support to this interpretation. True, Plato emphasises the difference between the two worlds and speaks of the sensible world as deceptive, but nowhere does he imply by these descriptions that the character of the world of sense is wholly unrelated to that of the world of Form. Admittedly, at *Phaedo* 65-67 there is a severe disparagement of the senses, and it is there that Plato comes closest to denying them any value whatsoever. But, as explained by Bluck,[27] Plato in that context is trying to depict the world-view of the accomplished philosopher. In this regard it is to be expected that the philosopher will not set much value on the sensible world when he is looking for truth. But the novice cannot share the same privileged access to the truth with the philosopher; and he will have to start from the use of his senses. So Plato's interest at *Phaedo* 65-67 is really different from the context where he is specifically addressing himself to the relation between the two worlds.

This topic, indeed, is treated in the *Phaedo* itself, and in a manner that leaves us in no doubt that Plato conceives the relation between the two as involving more than a mere accidental connection. In the recollection passage Socrates often describes the sensible particular as a likeness or resemblance or copy (albeit inferior) of the Form (*Phd.* 74d-e). In fact, the particulars are said to be 'wanting' to be like the Equal, or they are 'striving' to possess its nature (*Phd.* 74d10, 75a2, 75b7). These illustrations show that the Forms have not been conceived as an order of being totally divorced from the sensible order of things.[28]

Furthermore, at *Phaedo* 100c-101e there is an unequivocal statement of the relation between the two orders. Socrates affirms the causal relation between the two orders when he says 'all beautiful things are beautiful because of the beautiful itself' (*Phd.* 100d7f., 100e2f.). This causal relation is explained in terms of the 'participation' (μετάσχεσις) or 'sharing' (κοινωνία) of sensible things in the Form or the 'presence' (παρουσία) of the Form in the sensible

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[26] Scott [2 (1987)] 349. See Herodotus 7.239.4.

[27] Bluck [3 (1955)] 149.

[28] As a way of dealing with this criticism Scott concedes that there is indeed an ontological link between sensible objects and the Forms but still denies that there is a cognitive link between the contents of sense experience and those of (Platonic) knowledge. See Scott [2 (1999)] 114.

things. Though Plato here does not feel the need to explain precisely how the Form is the 'cause' of the particular, in view of what has been said about the subject in the recollection passage, it is plausible to interpret the cause in terms of an original object being the cause of its reflection or likeness.[29]

There is hardly any question that the fundamental feature of the phenomenon of reflection is that the reflection must depend on the original object for its existence and character. Where the original object is presumed to be a pure quality, such as beauty or equality, it is the community of character between the Form and its reflection, namely the sensible particular, which constitutes the essence of their identity. So, even if Beauty itself is poorly reflected in its sensible copies, yet no matter how poorly it is reflected one cannot say that it is by force of accident that the reflection (image) shares the character of beauty with the Form Beauty. It is only logical that the sensible particular is said to be an 'image' (εἰκών) precisely because it necessarily shares some obvious characteristic of the original object of which it is the image. Thus the Form is a necessary condition for the existence, or presence, of the beautiful character in beautiful things. It follows that just as it is not possible to have a reflection, or image, without an object to be reflected, so too, is it not possible to have a beautiful thing (a reflection) without the Form (the original).

It is plain from the foregoing that Plato holds the view that the world of Forms is logically related to the world of sensible particulars as an original to a reflection. Accordingly, the sensible world reflects some determinate characteristics of the intelligible world in the manner that a reflection is related to an original. To admit this much is a far cry, however, from saying that the sensible world is utterly deceptive and so cannot constitute the starting point for the search for the truth.

That all human knowledge is inaugurated by sense-experience is a truism which did not elude Plato. There are many occasions when in recounting how a person is to make intellectual progress Plato specifically instructs us to start from the perception of a sensible particular. A case in point is Diotima's instruction at *Symposium* 211b-c. It is there intimated that the right way to make an ascent to the Form Beauty is to 'begin with examples of beauty in this world'. Surely, if the beautiful things of this world bear no relevant relation whatsoever to the Form Beauty, there will be no point in instructing people to approach the latter via the former. That Plato believes sensible images are

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[29] The original-copy analogy is regularly applied especially in *Republic* 5-7 to show the relationship between the Forms and their sensible counterparts, for example, *Resp.* 476c-d, 510a, 517b-c.

useful in the search for reality is confirmed by a passage in *Epistle* 7.[30] At 342a-e Plato says that three things prerequisite for the attainment of knowledge are the name, the definition and the image; and it is after these that knowledge comes. Referring to the image he describe it as 'what we draw or rub out' (*Ep.* 7.342c1f.). We are made to understand that without the grasp of these three things (including the image) no one will ever attain knowledge of real being (*Ep.* 7.42e1f.). Again, at *Republic* 529d, for example, Plato instructs philosophers 'to treat the visible splendours of the sky as illustrations (παραδείγματα) to the study of the true realities'.

There is therefore good evidence to hold that Plato not only conceives the world of sense as bearing a logical relation to the world of Form but also recognises that a similar relationship obtains between sense-experience, whose product is 'opinion' (δόχα), and 'knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη). Thus opinion is related to knowledge as the sensible world is related to the intelligible world in the manner of an image to an original.[31] This being the case it must be conceded that opinion is not entirely divorced from knowledge and the possibility of converting the former to the latter must at least be left open.

Now, it has been noted earlier that Plato's concern in the recollection passage in the *Phaedo* is not to give an account of how humans make intellectual progress. Plato's purpose in the passage is to prove the pre-existence of the soul. Thus the issue of converting opinion to knowledge could not be expected to be given prominent attention there; worse, still, is the expectation that if Plato had been interested in how humans derived their concepts, the matter would have been discussed in the passage.

In contrast to the recollection passage in the *Phaedo*, the discussion of *anamnesis* in the *Meno* is intimately related to how humans make intellectual progress; and so it is there that we should look for conclusive evidence to show whether Plato believes sense-experience has any role to play in recollection of knowledge. Here the sceptic might say that the use of diagrams to assist the slave to progress from ignorance to a state of true opinion about the subject under investigation is no proof that Plato conceives a role for the senses in his theory. But the question that will have to be answered is whether at the end of the experiment the slave has attained 'knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη) of the

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[30] Admittedly there is controversy surrounding the authorship of the *Epistles*; it is, nevertheless, being cited here to show that the relevant passage is consistent with the view that Plato holds elsewhere.

[31] This is made explicit at *Republic* 510a and 534a. It is generally held that Plato draws a parallelism between opinion and sensible objects on the one hand and the Forms on the other hand. See J. T. Bedu-Addo, 'Dianoia and the Images of Forms in Plato's *Republic* VI-VII', *Platon* (1979) 31.

geometrical problem. In Plato's own words, the boy has not attained knowledge but true opinion (*Meno* 85c). But has the boy made progress towards knowledge of the subject? The impression that the passage leaves on the reader is that the boy has made progress, otherwise there would be no point about the experiment in the first place. To be sure, the purpose of the experiment is to show how any human being learns (recollect) and not to show how a person progresses from true opinion to knowledge. That is why the selection of a slave who is said to be completely ignorant of geometry is significant.

Contrary to Scott's view,[32] if the aporetic stage were not conceived by Plato to be part of the process of recollection, then there would be no point in selecting an ignorant slave for the experiment. Moreover, there is textual evidence to support the view that Plato himself considers that stage as an important part of the learning process. Even if we go along with Scott in taking Socrates' remark at *Meno* 82b5f. as not applicable to the aporetic stage (a claim that is rather arbitrary), Socrates' instruction to Meno further on makes it quite clear that Plato intended this stage to be part of the recollecting process. At the end of the aporetic stage Socrates turns to Meno and says: 'Observe, Meno, the stage he has reached on the path of recollection' (84a3f.). It is obvious from the context that the 'stage' being referred thereto is the aporetic stage, which is said to be 'on the path of recollection'. This remark should erase any doubt about the way the comment at 82b5f. ought to be read; surely, Socrates is asking Meno to pay attention as the demonstration of *anamnesis* is about to get started. Finally, the conversion of the slave's true opinion to knowledge, contrary to Scott's view, does not form part of the slave-boy experiment. Plato merely dropped hints as to how that feat could be achieved; but nowhere in the experiment do we witness the slave's attainment of ἐπιστήμη. The inevitable conclusion is that Plato consistently holds that recollection, or learning, necessarily proceeds from sense-experience to knowledge; and that movement from ignorance to attainment of true opinion constitutes a part of the recollecting effort.

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I have not attempted to defend the basic assumptions underpinning the recollection doctrine. These Platonic canons—that is, ἐπιστήμη as knowledge of the Forms; sense-experience as inadequate apprehension of truth; the absolute reality of the Form in contrast with the half-reality of sensible objects—have not been brought up for critical analysis. The *anamnesis* thesis

[32] Cf. Scott [2 (1987)] 351-53.

simply assumes these canons, as it is a theory of learning. *Anamnesis* is put forward in the *Meno* to show how a person makes intellectual progress. In the *Phaedo anamnesis* is invoked to argue for the pre-existence of the soul. In both works Plato shows himself aware of a role for sense-experience in learning; hence any attempt to strike out the status of perception in *anamnesis* would constitute a violation both of textual evidence and Plato's epistemology.

THE EARLY GREEK PARACLAUSITHYRON AND GNESIPPUS

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Abstract. Eupolis fr. 148 (Kassel-Austin, *PCG*) suggests that the fifth-century poet Gnesippus was a major influence on the development of the literary paraclausithyron. Eupolis says that Gnesippus invented nocturnal songs for adulterers to call out women with. Examination of possible earlier paraclausithyric fragments does not contradict this statement. Several other strange details in fr. 148 provide further evidence for the reliability of this assertion.

Among all that has been written about the paraclausithyron, relatively little attention has been given to Greek lyric and elegy, and it appears that no one has yet noticed the important role that Gnesippus, a little-known fifth century poet, might have played in its development.[1] Examination of relevant

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[1] F. O. Copley in his *Exclusus Amator: A Study in Latin Love Poetry* (Madison 1956), as the title indicates, focusses on Latin paraclausithyra. O. Garte, *Paraclausithyri Historia, e Litteris Graecis et Romanis Illustratur* (diss. Leipzig 1924) pays more attention to early Greek models, but quickly moves on to Aristophanes because he is only interested in more or less complete paraclausithyra, not relevant testimonia or background material. E. Burck, 'Das Paraklausithyron', in *Vom Menschenbild in der Römischen Literatur* (Heidelberg 1966) 244-56, excellent though it is, is also very brief.

Despite the eloquent advocacy of F. Cairns, *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry* (Edinburgh 1972) 6 for the superiority of 'komos' over 'paraclausithyron', this article will use the latter as being preferable for its strong association with the specific song or speech of the lover before the beloved's dwelling. It is an effective shorthand term for 'amatory komos song': see J. C. Yardley, 'The Elegiac Paraclausithyron', *Eranos* 76 (1978) 19 n. 1. Depictions of, or references to, the lover either at the door of the beloved or seeking admission to the beloved can be called paraclausithyric situations. The amatory komos procession, typically called simply the komos, is not under consideration here. There has been a tendency in recent work on the paraclausithyron to confuse the two terms; see, for example, K. M. W. Shipton, 'A Successful Kômos in Catullus', *Latomus* 44 (1985) 503-20; J. J. Hughes, 'A "Paraklausithyron" in Cicero's Second Philippic', in C. Deroux (ed.), *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* 6 (Brussels 1992) 215-27.

All fragments of Greek lyric and Greek comedy, unless indicated otherwise, are taken, respectively, from D. A. Campbell (ed.), *Greek Lyric* 1-5 (Cambridge, Mass. 1982-93), whose numeration mostly follows D. L. Page (ed.), *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford 1962), and R. Kassel and C. Austin (edd.), *Poetae Comici Graeci* 1-7 (Berlin 1983-89). Epigrams are cited both by their position in the *Anthologia Palatina*, where applicable, and by their numbers in

passages from Greek lyric and elegy, combined with careful examination of the mention of Gnesippus in Eupolis fr. 148 (Ath. 14.638e), suggest that Gnesippus was a major influence on the development of the paraclausithyron as a literary genre of content.[2]

It is easiest to start with Gnesippus. He appears to have been a poet and τραγωιδίας . . . διδάσκαλος ('producer of tragedy', Cratinus fr. 276.2) contemporary with Sophocles and Cratinus (Cratinus fr. 17).[3] He was of sufficient prominence to be worth mentioning by Chionides (fr. 4), Telecleides (fr. 36), and Eupolis (fr. 148; Ath. 14.638e). The latter attributes a very particular type of song to Gnesippus:

> τὰ Στησιχόρου τε καὶ Ἀλκμᾶνος Σιμωνίδου τε
> ἀρχαῖον ἀείδειν, ὁ δὲ Γνήσιππος ἔστ' ἀκούειν.
> κεινος νυκτερίν' ἠῦρε μοιχοῖς ἀείσματ' ἐκκαλεῖσθαι
> γυναῖκας ἔχοντας ἰαμβύκην τε καὶ τρίγωνον.
>
> (Eupolis fr. 148)
>
> It is old-fashioned to sing the songs of Stesichorus and Alcman and Simonides, but Gnesippus is there to hear, who invented nocturnal songs for adulterers to call out women with in accompaniment to the iambyke or trigonon.

This seems fairly straightforward.[4] Headlam-Knox and Yardley rightly conclude that these songs were some form of paraclausithyron.[5] However,

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A. S. F. Gow and D. L. Page (edd.), *The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams* 1-2 (Cambridge 1965) (hereafter 'Gow-Page, *HE*') and *The Greek Anthology: The Garland of Philip and Some Contemporary Epigrams* 1-2 (Cambridge 1968) (hereafter 'Gow-Page, *GP*'). Some other fragments are cited from J. U. Powell (ed.), *Collectanea Alexandrina* (Oxford 1925) (hereafter 'Powell, *Coll. Alex.*').

The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments made by by John Yardley, James McKeown, and Robert Schmiel on earlier drafts of this paper, and the remarks of *Scholia*'s two anonymous referees.

[2] For the komos or paraclausithyron as a genre of content, see Cairns [1] 5-7, 76, 88f. *et passim*; F. Cairns, *Further Adventures of a Locked-out Lover: Propertius 2.17* (Liverpool 1975); F. Cairns, 'Two Unidentified *Komoi* of Propertius: 1.3 and 2.29', *Emerita* 45 (1977) 325-53; F. Cairns, *Tibullus, a Hellenistic Poet at Rome* (Cambridge 1979) 168-85; F. Cairns, 'Propertius 4.9: "*Hercules Exclusus*" and the Dimensions of Genre', in K. Galinsky (ed.), *The Interpretation of Roman Poetry: Empiricism or Hermeneutics?* (Frankfurt 1992) 65-95.

[3] See also P. Maas, 'Gnesippos', *RE* 7.1479-81.

[4] C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry: From Alcman to Simonides*[2] (Oxford 1967) 86 reads it differently: 'It is old-fashioned to sing the songs of Stesichorus and Alcman and Simonides. But Cnesippus is there to be heard. He discovered nocturnal songs for adulterers to call for when they have women and an iambyce and a triangular harp.'

Eupolis implies that Gnesippus invented these songs. For while the phrase ηὗρε ἀείσματα seems to be unique in classical authors, the combination of εὑρίσκειν with other words for song is far more likely to mean 'invent' than merely 'compose'.[6]

While it is impossible to prove a negative, it is possible to examine all extant Greek lyric, elegy, and iambus dating from before Gnesippus for traces of probable paraclausithyra. This is absolutely necessary if some idea of Gnesippus' position is to be achieved. In fact, there are only three passages that seem to have some right to be legitimately called paraclausithyric: Alcaeus fr. 374, Anacreon fr. 373, and Theognis 1045f. There is understandable widespread agreement that Alcaeus fr. 374—δέξαι με κωμάσδοντα, δέξαι, λίσσομαί σε, λίσσομαι ('receive me, who has made revel, receive me, I beg you, I beg')—is the earliest surviving fragment from a paraclausithyron.[7] However, this attribution is not conclusive. Κωμάσδοντα almost certainly does not mean 'serenade' here, and the speaker could easily be a reveler arriving at a symposium or party to which he wants admission.[8] While the conjunction of

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[5] W. Headlam and A. D. Knox (edd.), *Herodas: The Mimes and Fragments* (Cambridge 1922) 83; Yardley [1] 19 n. 1.

[6] Consider Philo, *De Somniis* 2.27; Anon. *Anth. Pal.* 9.504.1, 4, 6f., 10; Ath. *Epit.* 14.619a; Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 1.10.27; *Schol.* 39c *ad* Pind. *Pyth.* 12 (A. B. Drachmann [ed.], *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina* 2 [Amsterdam 1967]); and Phot. *Bibl.* 320a (R. Henry [ed.], *Photius, Bibliothéque* 5 [Paris 1967] 160; also readily accessible as Arion *Test.* 5 [Campbell (1)] 3.22). Close, but not exactly parallel, is Plut. *Mor.* 1141b. Similar constructions using εὑρετής support this interpretation: Eust. *Il.* 18.570 (1164 = M. van der Valk [ed.], *Eustathii Archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem Pertinentes* 4 [Leiden 1987] 259.3f.); with which compare the *Schol. ad* Hom. *Il.* 18.570d1 (H. Erbse [ed.], *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem (Scholia Veterem)* 4 [Berlin 1975] 557); Antip. Sidon. *Anth. Plan.* 16.220.5. Εὑρίσκειν in this context rarely means simply 'compose': Justin Martyr, *Quest. et Resp.* (J. C. T. Otto [ed.], *Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum Saeculi Secundi* 5 [Wiesbaden 1969]) and Athanasius *Ep. Marcell.* 10 (Migne, *PG* 27.21.21-23).

[7] See Garte [1] 6; Copley [1] 14; Bowra [4] 377; C. M. Bowra, 'A Love Duet', *AJPh* 79 (1958) 376-91; Burck [1] 246; Gow-Page, *HE* 2.65; Headlam-Knox [5] 83; R. G. M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard (ed.), *A Commentary on Horace: Odes, Book 1* (Oxford 1970) 289; Yardley [1] 19f.; J. C. McKeown (ed.), *Ovid, Amores: Text, Prolegomena and Commentary* 2 (Liverpool 1989) 121; Cairns [2 (1992)] 71. Hermesian. (fr. 7.48-50 [Powell, *Coll. Alex.*]) clearly interpreted this as being paraclausithyric: see H. W. Smyth (ed.), *Greek Melic Poets* (New York 1963) 226.

[8] For understanding κωμάσδοντα to mean 'serenade', see LSJ *s.v.*; Smyth [7] 226; J. M. Edmonds (ed.), *Lyra Graeca* 3 (Cambridge, Mass. 1945) 656; Bowra [7 (1958)] 163. However, the primacy of the processional sense is recognized widely: *TLG s.v.*; H. Lamer, 'Komos', *RE* 11.1286-304; F. Passow (ed.; rev. V. C. F. Rost and F. Palm), *Handwörterbuch*

κῶμος / κωμάζειν and δέχεσθαι occurs in paraclausithyric contexts, it is much more common in religious or ritual komastic situations (e.g., Pind. *Ol.* 4.8, 6.98f., 8.1f., 13.29, *Pyth.* 5.22, 6.18-20; Eur. *Bacch.* 1172).[9] Λίσσεσθαι occurs with δέχεσθαι in Pindar, *Paeanes Odes* 6.3-5 and is itself elevated, particularly in classical Greek, where it is almost always used in contexts of prayer or supplication.[10] The anaphora, which creates a feeling of urgency that suits well an amatory context, could also easily fit a religious context.[11] The metre

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der greichischen Sprache 1 (Darmstadt 1970) *s.v.*; H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* 2 (Heibelberg 1973) 62; G. A. M. Minyard, *An Inquiry into the Lexical Meaning and Cultural Significance of the Word* ΚΩΜΟΣ/ΚΩΜΑΖΕΙΝ *in Greece During the Classical Period* (diss. Pennsylvania 1976) esp. 76-128, 189f., 208-11, 223, and 286: 'By no stretch of the imagination, however . . . can this word [κωμάζειν] refer specifically to and with so narrow a focus upon a "serenade"'; Cairns [2 (1992)] 70f. See also the *Etym. Magn. s.v.* and the *Schol. ad* Theoc. *Id.* 3.1. It is not necessary to presume, as Garte [1] 7 does, that if κωμάζω had a processional sense it would require an aorist participle in this context. The present tense can be explained easily as indicating that Alcaeus is speaking as he arrives at the beloved's house (calling out to announce his imminent arrival), or even by the understandable idea that the komos can continue in one place, as the procession stops but the singing, dancing and general revelling carry on. Minyard establishes clearly that dance is the major concept underlying κῶμος and κωμάζειν, which are usually processional but can refer to revelous dancing in one place, even inside. For a few of the more probable examples of κῶμος referring to a static revel, see Hdt. 1.21.2; Eur. *Alc.* 343, 804, 815; Lysias fr. 17.2. (L. Gernet and M. Bizos [edd.], *Lysias, Discours* 2 [Paris 1926] = Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 11); Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.15; Plut. *Alex.* 38.1 (but not 2 and 4).

[9] Δέχεσθαι occurs by itself in paraclausithyra at *Lyr. Alex. Adesp.* 1.27f. (Powell, *Coll. Alex.*) and Alciphr. 4.17.9. Also compare the arrival of Alcibiades and his fellow komasts at Pl. *Symp.* 212c. *Recipere* is found in Latin paraclausithyra at Ov. *Am.* 1.8.75 and Gell. 4.14.5. The conjunction of δέχεσθαι and κῶμος/κωμάζειν finds a very close parallel at Thgn. 1045f. (quoted below in the main body of the article) and occurs also in two clearly paraclausithyric epigrams by Meleager (*Anth. Pal.* 12.85.1, 7 [Gow-Page, *HE* 65] and 12.167.2, 4 [Gow-Page, *HE* 109]).

[10] It is the first word of Pind. *Ol.* 12 and occurs in the first line of *Nem.* 3. Cf. also *Pyth.* 1.71; *Isthm.* 6.45 (in a prayer to Zeus). For λίσσεσθαι in classical and early Hellenistic authors, see, *inter alia*, Hom. *Il.* 1.14f., 1.373f., 1.500-04, 2.14f., 5.357-59, *Od.* 2.68, 4.328, 6.144, 146; Sappho fr. 1.2; Alcm. 5 fr. 2 col. 2; Bacchyl. 5.100; Soph. *Ant.* 1230, *El.* 1380; Tim. fr. 791.127; Eur. *Andr.* 529, *Bacch.* 1344; Ap. Rhod. 4.1053, 1422. Λίσσεσθαι is rare in paraclausithyric contexts: Paul. Sil. *Anth. Pal.* 5.217.7f. (on Danae) and the possibly paraclausithyric Bion *Aposp.* 16.1-3. Λίτομαι is repeated in the paraclausithyric Meleager *Anth. Pal.* 5.165.1f. (Gow-Page, *HE* 51), but as part of a hymnic address to Night. Its use in amatory contexts begins early: Thgn. 1330 uses it of beseeching a beloved boy.

[11] While anaphora of names or pronouns is more common than that of verbs in hymns or prayers, the latter does occur: Pratin. fr. 708.16f.; *Carm. Pop.* 882.1f.; Soph. *OC* 242-45; Eur. *Hipp.* 61-63, *Or.* 176-78; Ar. *Lys.* 1269f.; Verg. *Aen.* 3.84f.; *Corp. Tib.* 3.10.1f.; Ov. *Fast.* 5.680-82, *Pont.* 2.8.23-25. However, the elevated tone of the passage might be a deliberate

(iambic tetrameter acatalectic) also suits a lighter context but does not rule out a religious or ritual komastic situation.[12]

Anacreon fr. 373 could also be paraclausithyric, but again there is room for significant doubt:

> ἠρίστησα μὲν ἰτρίου λεπτοῦ μικρὸν ἀποκλάς,
> οἴνου δ' ἐξέποιν κάδον· νῦν δ' ἁβρῶς ἐρόεσσαν
> ψάλλω πηκτίδα τῇ φίλῃ κωμάζων †παιδὶ ἁβρῇ†.
>
> I have breakfasted, breaking off a small piece of thin cake, and I drank a jar of wine; now I delicately pluck my lovely lyre, revelling with a sweet, delicate girl.[13]

If this is paraclausithyric, then we must imagine that the speaker has gone on a komos to the dwelling of a beloved *hetaira*, and therefore the present participle can be explained the same way as that in Alcaeus fr. 374 (that is, 'making revel to . . .'). Nonetheless, the passage could refer as easily to a processional komos revel, where the pretty girl is a *hetaira* or music-girl in tow, or to participation in an indoor static komos-revel.[14]

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attempt to use precatory language to flatter or praise the beloved by assimilating him or her to a deity. This, in various forms, becomes more common in later paraclausithyra, particularly in Latin elegy. For Latin elegy, see O. Weinreich, *Gebet und Wunder: Zwei Abhandlungen zur Religions- und Literatur- Geschichte* (Stuttgart 1929) 371-95 on Pl. *Curc.* 1-157; Yardley [1]; L. C. Watson, 'Ovid *Amores* 1.6: A Parody of a Hymn?', *Mnemosyne* 35 (1982) 92-102; McKeown [7] on Ov. *Am.* 1.6. Possibly relevant for the tone of the line is the suggestion by A. Corlu in *Recherches sur les mots relatifs à l'idée de prière d'Homère aux tragiques* (Paris 1966) 304, cited in W. J. Verdenius, *Commentaries on Pindar* 1: *Olympian Odes 3, 7, 12, 14* (Leiden 1987) 89 on Pind. *Ol.* 12.1, that λίσσεσθαι implies that the thing granted will be given only by the grace of the entreated person. On the other hand, Smyth [7] 226 suggests that 'the anaphora recalls folk-song'.

[12] D. A. Campbell (ed.), *Greek Lyric Poetry: A Selection of Early Greek Lyric, Elegiac and Iambic Poetry* (Basingstoke 1967) 286 observes that Alcaeus 'used the same metres for his hymns as for secular poetry'.

[13] Campbell [1] 2.67 suggests that the last words might be a proper name. He and G. L. Hendrickson, 'Verbal injury, magic, or erotic comus?', *CP* 20 (1925) 296 both translate κωμάζων as 'serenade', which seems to indicate that they think the context is paraclausithyric; cf. Copley [1] 14. But see above, n. 8.

[14] For female companions, usually *hetairai*, on komoi, see [Dem.] *Neaera* 33 (might not be a processional komos); Plut. *Alex.* 38.1-4, *Mor.* 596cd; Philostr. *VA* 8.7. Flute girls in particular are a common component of post-sympotic komos processions, and often attracted the amatory attentions of the komasts: Thgn. 939-42, 1063-68; *Schol. ad* Pind. *Ol.* 9.1 (Drachmann [6] 1.267f.); Bacchyl. fr. 4.68; Eur. *Alc.* 343f.; Xen. *Symp.* 2.1; Pl. *Symp.* 212c, *Tht.* 173c-d (not clearly processional); Theopomp. Hist. *FGrH* 115 F 236 (= Ath. 10.435c);

A paraclausithyric interpretation of Theognis 1045f. is possible but not trouble-free: ναὶ μὰ Δί', εἴ τις τῶνδε καὶ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος εὕδει, / ἡμέτερον κῶμον δέξεται ἁρπαλέως ('By Zeus, if someone of these is asleep and even all wrapped-up tight, he will gladly receive our komos').[15] The komos is processional (δέξεται) and it is night-time (τις . . . εὕδει). But if this is paraclausithyric, rather than simply komastic, it is hard to explain who the τῶνδε are. *Eromenoi* in paraclausithyric situations are never identified as being one of a group (as can be case with women in a brothel). While komasts almost by definition come in groups, the lover in paraclausithyra is rarely accompanied (ἡμέτερον), and when he is, it is usually by a slave or slaves, whom he would be unlikely to associate with himself by a first-person plural possessive adjective; after all, the speaker alone would be concerned with admission.[16] It is similarly unlikely that an *erastes* accompanied by friends would want them to be admitted along with himself.[17] Therefore the passage more likely refers to a standard komos procession arriving at a house where its members expect to be able to carry on their revelling.

Duris of Samos *FGrH* 76 F 70; Plut. *Alc.* 32.2); Leon. *Anth. Pal.* 5.206 (Gow-Page, *HE* 43); Diod. Sic. 17.72.1-6; Dion. Hal. *Esc.* 8.1 (17.3); Plut. *Alex.* 57.1f., 67.1f., *Arat.* 17.4f., *Pyrrh.* 13.3; Dio. Chrys. 4.109-11; Lucian *Bis Acc.* 17, *Vit. Auct.* 12; Sext. Emp. *Math.* 6.8; Cass. Dio 9.39.10; Ael. *NA* 1.50, *VH* 13.1; Alciphr. 1.15.1-4; Iambl. *VP* 25.112. For evidence from vase painting, see the abundant illustrations in I. Peschl, *Die Hetaere bei Symposion und Komos in der attisch-rotfiguren Vasenmalerei des 6.-4. Jahr. v. Chr.* (Frankfurt 1987) and M. Kilmer, *Greek Erotica on Attic Red-figure Vases* (London 1993). For κῶμος and κωμάζειν referring to an indoor revel, again see above, n. 8.

[15] Theognis himself was no stranger to komoi: see 885f., 939-42, 1063-68, 1207f., 1351f. and cf. 533f.

[16] The lover is accompanied by a slave in Anon. *Anth. Pal.* 12.116 (Gow-Page, *HE* 34), Plaut. *Curc.* 1-157, *Lyr. Alex. Adesp.* 1.25 (Powell, *Coll. Alex.*), Valerius Aed. fr. 2 (E. Courtney [ed.], *The Fragmentary Latin Poets* [Oxford 1993]; from Gel. 19.9.12), Prop. 1.3.10, Tib. 1.2.1 (if the scene is before the beloved's door), and Liv. *Epit.* 17. Although the speaker in Valerius Aedituus fr. 2 uses *nos* to refer to both himself and his slave, it is not truly similar to Thgn. 1045f. Both the speaker and the slave are clearly going through the streets and thus are both in a position to need, or not need, a torch. Ἡμέτερον could be a poetic plural, but it seems unlikely that the komast would talk to himself in this way.

[17] Lovers in paraclausithyric situations have companions at Theoc. *Id.* 7.122f., Hermesian. fr. 4.3 (Powell, *Coll. Alex.* = Ant. Lib. *Met.* 39), and Paul. Sil. *Anth. Pal.* 6.71. The additional people at Lucian *Bis Acc.* 31 and Chariton 1.2.2f. are not companions but rivals, who are definitely not to be received along with the lover. The speaker of Theoc. *Id.* 2 comments that he could have come with two or three companions (118f.), and Ovid at *Am.* 1.6.33f. denies that he has come with anyone else.

In addition, four other passages could be from or refer to paraclausithyric situations: Anacreon fr. 498; Apollodorus fr. 701; *Adespota Elegiaca* 26,[18] and Pratinas fr. 708.8f. In later paraclausithyra, the lover sometimes transfers his affection for the beloved to the beloved's door, porch, vestibule, or house—Anacreon fr. 498 (from the *Schol. ad* Ap. Rhod. 1.788-89b) could be from such a context: καλῆς διὰ παστάδος ('through a beautiful porch').[19] The Scholiast comments: καλῆς δὲ ἤτοι ὅτι βασίλεια τὰ οἰκήματα ἢ ὅτι ἐρωτικά· τοιαῦτα γὰρ τὰ τῶν ἐρώντων, ὡς καὶ Ἀνακρέων ἐπὶ ἐρωμένης φησίν ('beautiful either because the building was royal or because of its love interest; for that is how lovers speak: so Anacreon says of the woman he loves . . .'[20]). Apollodorus fr. 701—τίς τοιῇδ' ἐν ὥρῃ ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τέρθρον θυράων; ('who has come to the outer limit of our door at such an hour?')—could refer to a late-night komast arriving at someone's home, but it is probably komastic rather than paraclausithyric. While it could have been accompanied by a description of a paraclausithyric situation, it is unlikely that the speaker went on to quote an actual paraclausithyron. It is not until Propertius 1.16 that we find a person (or thing—in this case a door) involved in the paraclausithyric situation reporting the lover's song, and Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 13.789-896 is the first time that a paraclausithyron is quoted by the beloved. *Adespota Elegiaca* 26—of an indefinite date—is tantalizing: τὸν φρουρὸν φρουρεῖν χρή, τὸν ἐρῶντα δ' ἐρᾶν ('the guard has to guard, and the lover love'). West suggests that this was said as an 'amorous caller defends his interests against those of a watchman', and elsewhere the komast does occasionally address a door-keeper, as at Ovid, *Amores* 1.6.[21] But it could as easily be a simple proverb making a pointed and understandable contrast between the opposing needs of two very different people. Finally, Pratinas fr. 708.8f. (Ath. 14.617cf) clearly refers to the common komastic/paraclausithyric topos of the fight with rivals before the beloved's doors: κώμῳ μόνον θυραμάχοις τε πυγμαχίαισι νέων θέλοι [*sc.* ὁ

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[18] M. L. West (ed.), *Iambi et Elegi Graeci*[2] (Oxford 1989).

[19] Of course the door of the beloved receives much attention in the paraclausithyron. For houses, cf. Plaut. *Merc.* 901-03 and Aristaenet. *Ep.* 2.14.9-11 (O. Mazal, *Aristaenetus, Epistularum Libri* 2 [Stuttgart 1971]). Hor. *Carm.* 1.30.3f. mentions a *decoram* / . . . *aedem* ('beautiful house', and see Nisbet-Hubbard [7] 346). The other most likely context is an epithalamium: see Sappho fr. 117A with the note of Campbell [1] 1.141 comparing Catull. 61.161.

[20] Tr. Campbell [1].

[21] M. L. West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus* (Berlin 1974) 12. See also McKeown [7] 2.122f. Φρουρός and its cognates sometime occur in amatory contexts. For boys being guarded, see Aeschin. *In Tim.* 139 and Strato *Anth. Pal.* 12.205.4; for women, see Plut. *Lyc.* 15.8, Xen. Eph. 1.4.7, Philostr. *Imag.* 1.12.4, and Aristaenet. *Ep.* 2.5.29 (Mazal [19]).

αὐλός] παροίνων / ἔμμεναι στρατηλάτας ('may it [the *aulos*] want to be commander only of the komos and fist-fighting door-fights of drunken youths'), but it is obviously not from a paraclausithyron itself or even from a description of a paraclausithyric situation.[22]

These few passages are the more probable fragments from paraclausithyra or references to the paraclausithyric situation from before the probable *floruit* of Gnesippus.[23] As is clear, only Alcaeus fr. 374 and Anacreon fr. 373 have any real probability of being from an actual paraclausithyron, and these are not particularly strong. Arguments from silence can never be conclusive, but it is clear that there is little evidence for the existence of literary paraclausithyra before Gnesippus, and hence that there is no proof that Eupolis' statement is wrong. In contrast, there is abundant evidence for the komos processions that often followed a symposium, and that would often end up before a *hetaira*'s dwelling, or even the dwelling of a beloved boy.[24] Any such arrival would have to be followed by a request for admission, which, no doubt, was sometimes denied. This denial surely sometimes prompted further attempts at persuasion by the lover. Certainly, the social customs of the time would not

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[22] Headlam-Knox [5] 83 seems to identify it as paraclausithyric. Campbell [12] 403 suggests a date 'not long after 500 B.C.', but H. W. Garrod, 'The Hyporcheme of Pratinas', *CR* 34 (1920) favours *c.* 468. For the fights of rivals, see, in addition to the passages cited by Headlam-Knox [above, this note] 83: Lys. 3.6, 4.5 *passim*; Isae. 3.13; Aristoph. fr. 5.7 (Ath. 6.238bc); Mel. *Anth. Pal.* 5.151f. (Gow-Page, *HE* 33f.); Hor. *Sat.* 1.2.66f., *Carm.* 3.14.26; Prop. 2.9.51f., 2.19.5; Ov. *Rem. Am.* 31f., *Met.* 13.864-87; Rufin. *Anth. Pal.* 5.41; Philostr. *Ep.* 29; Nemes. *Ecl.* 4.34 (a variation); John Chrys. *Hom. in 1 Cor.* 37 (Migne, *PG* 61.318.42f.). Also compare Prop. 4.8.47-69.

[23] Mankin's suggestion that Archil. fr. 47 (West [18]) παρθένοι / θυρέων ἀπεστύπαζον ('the virgins clubbed [*sc.* him?/me?] away from the doors') might be paraclausithyric seems very improbable: D. Mankin (ed.), *Horace: Epodes* (Cambridge 1995) 202. The plural παρθένοι fits poorly with almost every other paraclausithyric passage, unless the context is something like 'on many other occasions girls drove me from their doors'. Παρθένος itself is rare in paraclausithyric contexts: in Ael. *VH* 13.1, Atalanta, the object of an amatory komos conducted by the centaurs Hylaios and Roikos, is called a παρθένος, and in Aristaenet. *Ep.* 1.14.6 (Mazal [19]) a prostitute is inappropriately called παρθένος in the songs of inept lovers. Ἀπεστυπάζειν is very vivid and the στυπ- base, which it shares with στύπος ('stem, stump, block'), almost certainly implies actual violence (LSJ *s.v.*). Violent rejection of the lover by the beloved is completely unparalleled in classical paraclausithyra. West [21] 125 suggests plausibly that the 'parthenoi' might be 'virgin priestesses of Hera driving the miscreants away from the temple with sticks'.

[24] References to symposia and komoi in archaic Greek literature and depictions of them in art are too numerous to need citing. For an extensive listing, see Lamer [8] 1293-98. For a survey of a number of depictions of komoi in Greek art, in additon to Lamer, see Peschl [14] and Kilmer [14].

rule out paraclausithyric situations, either heterosexual or paederastic, and therefore we can assume that paraclausithyra were occasionally sung in real life even if they did not make their way into formal literature.[25]

All this fits easily with Eupolis fr. 148, which makes a very specific claim about the songs that Gnesippus invented. There are actually six distinct aspects to the songs: they are songs (1), nocturnal (2), sung by *moikhoi* (3), used to call out (4) women (5), and sung to the accompaniment of the iambyke or trigonon (6). That it is the very peculiar combination of these six factors that was original with Gnesippus is unlikely—such a statement is clearly not worth making and such peculiarly pedantic logic seems out of place in the context of Old Comedy. Several of the details are also conventional. Paraclausithyra are typically sung (ᾄδειν τὸ παρακλαυσίθυρον ['to sing the paraclausithyron', Plut. *Mor.* 753b]) and nocturnal.[26] The iambyke and trigonon are lyre-like instruments, which played a large role in the symposium and the komos along with the more prominent *aulos*. While the ἰαμβύκη is very rarely mentioned (see the list of instruments at Ath. 14.636b), the τρίγωνον seems to have been associated mainly with sympotic and lowly contexts (e.g., Plato Com. fr. 71.11-14 and Lucian *Lex.* 8f.), making it an appropriate instrument for a single post-sympotic komast to use for an adulterous serenade.[27]

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[25] See, for example, S. B. Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity* (New York 1975) 33-42; K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (Cambridge, Mass 1989); O. Murray, *Early Greece*[2] (Cambridge, Mass. 1993) 214-16.

[26] Ἀείσμα (including its alternative forms) is not common in paraclausithyric contexts, occurring only at Lucian *Dial. D.* 1.4 (290) (in conjunction with the πηκτίς) and in the title of Aristaenetus 1.14. Songs and singing are specifically mentioned in paraclausithyric contexts at Theoc. Id. 3.38, 11.13, 18, 39, and 52; Diod. Sic. 17.72.6; Lucian *Bis Acc.* 31; *Musc. Enc.* 10; Ael. *NA* 9.13; Aristaenetus 1.14.3 and 6, 2.19.6 and 7 (Mazal [19]). For νυκτερινός in a komastic context, see Strato *Anth. Pal.* 12.250.1, and for it in similar amatory contexts, see Duris of Sammos *FGrH* 76 F 10 (Ath. 12.542d); Hermesian. fr. 7.63-69 (Powell, *Coll. Alex.*); Phld. *Anth. Pal.* 5.123 (Gow-Page, *GP* 9); Lucian *Icar.* 21.

[27] See Campbell [1] 1.ix. The iambyke is mentioned with the πηκτίς (they will both be forbidden in the ideal state) at Pl. *Resp.* 3.399c-d. For occurrences of the πηκτίς in conjunction with komoi, see Mel. *Anth. Pal.* 5.175.7f. (Gow-Page, *HE* 70), Nicarchus *Anth. Pal.* 6.285.7 (Gow-Page, *HE* 2), Marcus Arg. *Anth. Pal.* 9.270.1-4 (Gow-Page, *GP* 26), and *Anac.* 43.10-16. It occurs in a paraclausithyric context at Lucian *Dial. D.* 1.4. Also see Aristaenetus 1.14.1 (λύρᾳ) and 5 (κιθαρίσματα) (Mazal [19]). For other references to the lyre and lyre-like instruments in sympotic contexts, see Alc. 70.3f.; Anac. 373.3, 374.1; Thgn. 534, 975; Critias *DK* 88 B 1.3f. = Anac. 500 Campbell [1] = Ath. 13.600de); Bacchyl. 20b.1; Ar. *Nub.* 1355-58; Prop. 4.2.32; Leon. *Anth. Plan.* 16.306.8, 307.5; Plut. *Mor.* 143d, 713b-c; Gel. 19.9.3; Antip. Sidon. *Anth. Pal.* 7.30.3; *Anacreont.* 15.27-34; Lucian *Ver. Hist.* 2.5; Gal. *De Meth. Med.* 1.1.4; Eugenes *Anth. Plan.* 16.308.6; Alciphr. 4.11.8. For lyre-like instruments in komos-revels or amatory komoi, see *Hom. Hymn. Herm.* 480-82; Anac. 373;

It is probable, therefore, that the main innovation lies in two areas. First, that Gnesippus wrote a number of such songs (νυκτερίν' . . . ἀείσματ', 3). As the survey of the paraclausithyron given above indicates, actual paraclausithyra seem to have been rare in early Greek poetry. If Gnesippus were the first to write a notable number of paraclausithyra, whatever their generic context, and perhaps had gained some popularity from them, this could easily have attracted the attention of Eupolis, who was in a good position to judge to what extent Gnesippus was innovative. One may compare the ancients' labelling of Alcman as the first to compose erotic songs: καὶ ὢν ἐρωτικὸς πάνυ εὑρετὴς γέγονε τῶν ἐρωτικῶν μελῶν ('and being totally erotic he became the discoverer of erotic songs', *Suda* A 1289 *s.v.* Ἀλκμάν), when such songs must certainly have existed before him.[28] Certainly the number of reasonably clear paraclausithyra and paraclausithyric situations in poetry and drama increases greatly after Gnesippus. In particular, several notable paraclausithyra, paraclausithyric situations, and paraclausithyric parodies exist in the works of Aristophanes (e.g., *Eq.* 725-41; *Lys.* 240-705, 831-950; *Eccl.* 659-701, 702-08; *Vesp.* 65-403), and *Ecclesiazuae* 938-80 offers the earliest surviving complete paraclausithyron.[29] A list of other examples from approximately the next two hundred years after Gnesippus' *floruit* illustrates the point satisfactorily: Euripides, *Cyclops* 495-502 (more properly a komos song, but paraclausithyric in that it refers to a lover seeking admission to his beloved); [Plato] *Anthologia Palatina* 6.1 (Hellenistic); Timocles fr. 25; Antiphanes fr. 5; Menander, *Misoumenos* A1-105; Asclepiades, *Anthologia Palatina* 5.64 (Gow-Page, *HE* 11), 5.145 (*HE* 12), 5.153 (*HE* 3), 5.164 (*HE* 13), 5.167 (*HE* 14), 5.189 (*HE*

Simon. *Anth. Pal.* 7.24.5f.; Antip. Sidon. *Anth. Pal.* 7.27.2; Phld. *Anth. Pal.* 11.34.1-3; Plut. *Mor.* 713b, 760d; *Anacreont.* 42.14-16; Clem. Al. *Paed.* 2.4.41.4. See also the illustrations in Peschl [14] and Kilmer [14].

[28] Of course we know that Archilochus preceded Alcman, but that might not have been clear to the author of the entry on Alcman. Compare Ath. 13.600f, where Chamaeleon is quoted as saying that Archytas ὁ ἁρμονικός ('skilled in music') claimed that Alcman was τῶν ἐρωτικῶν μελῶν ἡγεμόνα ('the inventor of erotic songs'). Nonetheless, the idea that the first erotic songs in the Greek-speaking world were not written until the late seventh century strains credibility.

[29] For *Eccl.* 938-80 see Garte [1] 8-12; Copley [1] 7-9; Bowra [7] 376-91; R. G. Ussher (ed.), *Aristophanes: Ecclesiazusae* (Oxford 1973) *ad loc.*; L. E. Rossi, 'Qui Te Primus '*Deuro De*' Fecit (Petron. 58.7)', *SIFC* 45 (1973) 36; K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Berkeley 1974) 209; S. D. Olson, 'The "love duet" in Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*', *CQ* 38 (1988) 328-30. For the other passages see M. S. Cummings, *Observations on the Development and Code of the Pre-elegiac Paraklausithuron* (diss. Ottawa 1996) 85-126.

42); Callimachus, *Anthologia Palatina* 5.23 (*HE* 73; Pfeiffer[30] 63), 12.118 (*HE* 8; Pfeiffer 42), fr. 378 (Pfeiffer); Theocritus, *Idylls* 2.114-28, 150-54, 3.1-54, 7.96-128, 11.1-81, 23.1-64; Posidippus, *Anthologia Palatina* 12.131 (*HE* 8); Hermesianax fr. 4 (Powell, *Coll. Alex.* = Ant. Lib. *Met.* 39); Leonidas, *Anthologia Palatina* 5.206 (*HE* 43); Herodas 2.24-71.

Secondly, the element of adultery indicated by μοιχοῖς (3) was most likely an innovation. It should be kept in mind, however, that μοιχεία covered a much wider range than the word adultery does today.[31] Isaeus 3.13f. shows that even the mere direction of komastic activity toward a woman was enough to impugn her status. Certainly, clear or probable references to adultery in Greek lyric, elegy, and iambus before Gnesippus are relatively rare, excluding mythological cases.[32] However, in the time of Gnesippus adultery becomes a common source for humour in Old Comedy. More important, there is no evidence for an adulterous paraclausithyron before Gnesippus: the addressee in Alcaeus fr. 374 is probably a boy, for Alcaeus was best remembered for his paederastic verse;[33] Anacreon fr. 373 mentions a female, whose status is unclear; the speaker of Apollodorus fr. 701 is unknown; Theognis 1045f. is

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[30] R. Pfeiffer (ed.), *Callimachus* 2 (Oxford 1965).

[31] See, for example, Dover [29] 209: 'It was *moikheia*, "adultery", to seduce the wife, widowed mother, unmarried daughter, sister or niece of a citizen; that much is clear from the law cited by D. xxiii 53-5'. Cohen's arguments for understanding *moikheia* as applying only to married women or concubines of Athenian citizens are ultimately unconvincing: D. Cohen, *Law, Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens* (Cambridge 1991) 99-118. For recent responses to Cohen, see E. Cantarella, '*Moicheia*: Reconsidering a Problem', in M. Gagarin (ed.), *Symposion 1990: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistichen Rechtsgeschichte* (Cologne 1991) 289-96; L. Foxhall, 'Response to Eva Cantarella', in Gagarin [above, this note] 297-304. Also compare S. C. Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law* (Oxford 1993) 277f.

[32] Archil. fr. 196a (West [18]; *P. Colon.* 7511.1-35) almost certainly depicts an adulterous situation. Frr. 38 and 54 (West) might possibly be adulterous. Although these passages are probably what could be called fictional, that is irrelevant here. Semon. fr. 7.110f. (West [18]) clearly refers to, but does not actually depict, adultery. Thgn. 457-60 and 579-82 might be two further examples. *Carm. Pop.* 853 (Ath. 15.697bc) is probably adulterous, but is hard to date. Nonetheless, as Bowra [4] 83f. observes, the theme of the dawn-song (or *aubade*) was popular in many cultures and it is very likely that there were early Greek equivalents: *pace* A. Lesky (trr. J. Willis and C. de Heer), *A History of Greek Literature* (London 1966) 108; see A.T. Hatto (ed.), *Eos: An Enquiry into the Theme of Lovers' Meetings and Partings at Dawn in Poetry* (London 1965). Ath. 15.697c says that Phoenicia was full of such songs.

[33] Bowra [4] 163 thinks the addressee is female. For Alcaeus' later reputation, see Hor. *Carm.* 1.32.9-12, Cic. *Nat. Deor.* 1.79 (and *Tusc.* 4.33.71), and Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.63. That both Horace and Cicero use only a boy to exemplify Alcaeus' love poetry is particularly suggestive. Fr. 368 mentions a χαρίεντα Μένωνα ('beautiful Menon'). See also Garte [1] 6.

almost certainly paederastic; nothing can be profitably conjectured about *Adespota Elegiaca* 26; finally, the fighting mentioned in Pratinas fr. 708.8f. makes it more probable that the beloved is a *hetaira*.[34] In Greek paraclausithyra or paraclausithyric situations through the end of the Hellenistic era, where the status of a female beloved can be determined with some certainty, she is far more likely to be a *hetaira* or such than free.[35] One should assume that this is the case in passages where there is not some clear indication of the beloved's status.[36] Paederastic situations are also far more common than adulterous ones.[37] Therefore, an emphasis on adulterous situations in Gnesippus' paraclausithyra would probably have been innovative, although it clearly did not establish a norm for later paraclausithyra.

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[34] A parent might endure komastic and paraclausithyric activities directed at a son, as is indicated by Pl. *Symp.* 182d-83b, but it seems unlikely that violence would be tolerated. Such behaviour would probably rule out the *erastes* as a suitable role model for the young *eromenos*. Furthermore, the common komastic/paraclausithyric topos of the fight before the beloved's doors nowhere occurs in a paederastic context.

[35] See the *Schol. ad* Ar. *Plut.* 179; Eur. *Cyc.* 500; Isae. 3.13 *passim* (supposedly free but most likely a *hetaira*); Timocles fr. 25; Men. *Dys.* 59; Herod. 2.24 *passim*; Aristodem. *FHG* 3.310 (Ath. 13.585a). Several other passages have beloveds who are not slaves or prostitutes, but these are oddities that cannot be counted (such as the Nereid Galatea in Theoc. *Id.* 11). Fewer clearly or probably free or married women are shown, and none before Gnesippus: Ar. *Eccl.* 678-86; Hermesian. fr. 4 (Powell, *Coll. Alex.* = Ant. Lib. *Met.* 39); Theoc. *Id.* 2.118-28; Polyb. 10.26.3-5; Anon. *Anth. Pal.* 12.90 (Gow-Page, *HE* 1). The situation is similar for Latin examples before the elegiac poets and for Horace (the status of the elegiac beloved is too problematic to discuss here). Prostitutes or servile beloveds are found at Plaut. *Asin.* 127-248, *Truc.* 633-44, *Merc.* 411, *Curc.* 43-157 (the lover thinks she is a slave); Ter. *Ad.* 84-110, *Eun.* 46-87; Hor. *Sat.* 1.2.64-67, 1.4.49, 2.7.89-92, *Carm.* 1.25. Free beloveds are found at Laber. Mim. fr. 141; Cic. *Consil.* fr. 10.3.1; Hor. *Carm.* 3.7, 3.10.

[36] Of course it is possible to imagine other situations where the husband might tolerate an adulterous wife or not want his cuckolding made public; see Cohen [31] 67, 129f. A husband might also not want to have to divorce his wife; see Dem. 59.87: Ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἕλῃ τὸν μοιχόν, μὴ ἐξέστω τῷ ἑλόντι συνοικεῖν τῇ γυναικί· ἐὰν δὲ συνοικῇ, ἄτιμος ἔστω ('When someone catches an adulterer, let it not be possible for the one who has caught the adulterer to live with his wife; and if he does live with her, let him be without rights'). A metic woman without a *kurios* but with a *prostates* who did not care about her private life is another possibility. These circumstances, however, seem unusual enough for one to presume that there would be some indication of the situation in the text.

[37] See Pl. *Symp.* 18a; Asclep. *Anth. Pal.* 5.145 and 167 (Gow-Page, *HE* 12, 14); Theoc. *Id.* 7.98-127, [Theoc.] 23; Callim. *Anth. Pal.* 12.118 (Gow-Page, *HE* 8; Pfeiffer [30] 42); Mel. *Anth. Pal.* 12.23, 72, 85, 165 (Gow-Page, *HE* 99, 92, 115, 98). There is not enough internal evidence to make any conclusion about Anon. *Anth. Pal.* 12.115f. (Gow-Page, *HE* 6, 24), despite their presence in the overwhelmingly paederastic book 12. Catull. 63.65-67 mentions paederastic paraclausithyric situations in a Greek context.

The fact that the songs are used to call out women fits well with the element of *moikheia*, and is a major piece of evidence helping to support the reliability of Eupolis' statement. Requests for the beloved to come out are unusual in classical paraclausithyra, and would, of course, usually be unnecessary in paraclausithyra addressed to *hetairai* or *meretrices*.[38] None are found in paraclausithyra before Gnesippus, and it is perhaps notable that the paraclausithyric scene at Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae* 938-80, which contains our earliest complete paraclausithyron, has two requests for the beloved to come out (952-54, 960-62). However, such a request for the beloved to come out is understandable in the case of a serenade addressed to a free woman living either with a husband or her parents, where the lover would not want to be caught in another's house.[39] For it is clear that an adulterer caught in the act

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[38] Ἐκκάλειν itself occurs in only one reasonably clear paraclausithyric context, at Ar. *Lys.* 850. Actual requests for the beloved to come out to the lover are rare in both Greek and Latin paraclausithyra: Theoc. *Id.* 3.19f., 11.63f. (addressed to Galatea, so not relevant here); Plaut. *Curc.* 147-54; *Mil.* 1248; Ov. *Met.* 13.838f. (Galatea again); Ael. *NA* 1.50 and 9.66 (a viper calls a moray out from the sea; cf. 9.13). For the beloved going out to the lover in paraclausithyric contexts, see Diosc. *Anth. Pal.* 12.14 (Gow-Page, *HE* 9) (possibly not relevant); Plaut. *Curc.* 162-215; Cic. *Catil.* 1.26; Tib. 1.2.15-22; Lucian *Bis Acc.* 31; Babrius 116. Interestingly, lovers sneaking out to be with someone are far more common, see Semon. fr. 17 (West [18]; possibly not applicable); Thgn. 457-60; Ar. *Thesm.* 476-89.; Lys. 1.9f. *passim*; Theophilus fr. 6 (Ath. 13.559f.); Apollodorus Gel. fr. 1 (Ath. 3.125a); Diosc. *Anth. Pal.* 12.14 (Gow-Page, *HE* 9; possibly applicable); Ap. Rhod. 4.35-67; Theoc. *Id.* 1.6.9-12, 2.136-38; Phld. *Anth. Pal.* 5.120 (Gow-Page, *GP* 7; the woman's relationship to the man is not clear); Plaut. *Curc.* 20-23, 59f., *Mil.* 307f.; Tib. 1.8.65, 2.1.75-78; Prop. 4.7.13-22; Ov. *Am.* 2.3.15f., 12.1-4, 3.1.49-52, *Epist.* 18.53-82 (Leander recalls the first time he sneaked out), 83-104, *Ars* 2.545f., *Met.* 4.83-107; Val. Fl. 7.371-98.; Iuv. 6.116-32 (Messallina), 11.185-92; Plut. *Mor.* 179e; Lucian *Dial. Meret.* 12.3 (a male lover kept at home by his father sneaks out to be with his *hetaira* beloved). See P. Murgatroyd, *Tibullus I: A Commentary on the First Book of the Elegies of Albius Tibullus* (Pietermaritzburg 1980) 79 (on 1.2.19f.), 189f. (on 1.6.9f.); P. Murgatroyd, *Tibullus: Elegies II* (Oxford 1994), 60f. (on 2.1.75f. and 77f.). Note the love spells designed to bring the woman to the man's house: *PGM* 4.2485-90, 2735-84 (K. Preisendanz *et al.* [edd.], *Papyri Demotici Magici: Die griechischen Zauberpapyri* 1 [Stuttgart 1973] 148, 160). *Papryi Demotici Magici* 14.1063-69, 1070-77, 1090-96 (H. D. Betz [ed.], *The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation, Including the Demotic Spells* [Chicago 1992] 246f.) are also for bringing girls out of houses. *PGM* 36.70 (Preisendanz 2.164) says it can make even virgins leap out of their homes (καὶ παρθένους ἐκπηδᾶν οἴκοθεν ποιεῖ).

[39] Note how, in Aristophanes' plays, women who have been outside are suspected of adultery. See *Thesm.* 414-17 and *Eccl.* 520, with Cohen's discussion of these passages: D. Cohen, 'The Social Context of Adultery at Athens', in P. Cartledge, P. Millett, and S. Todd (edd.), *Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society* (Cambridge 1990) 154; Cohen [31] 146-48, 150f., 164.

(ἐπ' αὐτοφώρωι) could be killed, held captive and ransomed, or punished in other extremely painful and degrading ways.[40] While it is not clear what exact level of proof was required, or what exactly ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ was with regard to adultery, it is certain that the greatest risk to an adulterer would come from being caught in another's house, particularly at night.[41] Like the specific mention of *moikhoi*, this is a very unusual detail for Eupolis to include unless it genuinely reflected the content of Gnesippus' songs. If Eupolis had wanted, for some reason, to cite falsely Gnesippus as the inventor of what could be considered typical paraclausithyra, he would have specified that the songs were used by lovers seeking admission, not adulterers calling out their beloveds.

This strong evidence for the reality of Gnesippus' emphasis on adultery in his songs is further supported by Gnesippus' reputation in classical times. Most judgments about the character of any ancient poet were derived from the poet's work. For example, as Campbell notes, the *Suda*'s (A1289) labelling of Alcman as ἐρωτικὸς πάνυ clearly arises from the content of his poetry, even if

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[40] For killing adulterers caught in the act, see Lys. 1.25f., 30; 13.68; Aeschin. 1.91; Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 57.3; Dem. 23.53; Plut. *Sol.* 23.1. Compare Lucian 47.10; Ulp. *Dig.* 48.5.24. For ransoming or extortion, see Dem. 59.41, 65, 67, 71; Isae. 8.44; Lys. 1.49; Callias fr. 1; the law code of Gortyn 2.28-45 (R. F. Willets [ed.], *The Law Code of Gortyn* [Berlin 1967] 40). For the interpretation of ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ, see M. H. Hansen, *Apagoge, Endeixis, and Ephegesis Against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and Pheugontes: A Study in Athenian Administration of Justice in the Fourth Century B.C.* (Odense 1976) 48-53; D. Cohen, *Theft in Athenian Law* (Munich 1983) 52-61; Cantarella [31] 292; Todd [31] 80. Also see D. Ogden, 'Rape, Adultery and the Protection of Bloodlines in Classical Athens', in: S. Deacy and K. F. Pierce (edd.), *Rape in Antiquity* (London 1997) 26 on Lys. 1.30. For the punishment of adulterers in other ways, see Dover [29] 209; Pomeroy [25] 86f. (see n. 21); D. M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (London 1978) 88, 114, and 124f.; Cohen *Law* [31] 85, 114-22, and 131; J. Roy, 'Traditional Jokes About the Punishment of Adulterers in Ancient Greek Literature', *LCM* 16 (1991) 73-76; V. Hunter, *Policing Athens: Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits, 420-320 B.C.* (Princeton 1994), 241; C. Carey, 'Return of the Radish or Just When You Thought It Was Safe to Go Back into the Kitchen', *LCM* 18 (1993) 53-55.

[41] See A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens* 1 (Oxford 1968) 19; Cohen [39] 154; Cohen [31] 66, 73-75, 82f.; Cantarella [31] 293; Todd [31] 202-06. In Lysias 1 Euphiletus repeatedly emphasizes the violation of his household (4, 6, 9, 15, 25, 33, 36, 38, 40, and 41), and compare Dem. 18.132. The law code of Gortyn (2.21-25; Willets [40] 40) specified that 'if someone be taken in adultery with a free woman in a father's, brother's or the husband's house, he shall pay a hundred staters; but if in another's fifty; and if with the wife of an *apeiteros*, ten' (tr. Willets). Similarly, Roman law (e.g., Papin. *Dig.* 48.5.23; Ulp. *Dig.* 5.48.24) explicitly restricted the right to kill an adulterer to those caught within the house. One might also compare Athenian laws allowing householders to kill burglars caught within the house, often with the specification that it happen at night: see Dem. 23.60, 24.113; Pl. *Leg.* 874b; D. M. MacDowell, *Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators* (Manchester 1963) 70-76; Cohen [40] 72-77.

very little of his amatory verse survives.[42] Similarly, the prominence of sympotic verse in Anacreon's poetry caused him to be labelled a libertine and drunkard.[43] Therefore, it is probable that the comment in Telecleides fr. 36 (Ath. 639a) that Gnesippus was a frequent adulterer is derived from the prominence of adultery in his verse: Τηλεκλείδης δὲ ἐν τοις Στερροῖς καὶ περὶ μοιχείας ἀναστρέφεσθαί φησιν αὐτόν ('Telecleides in the *Stiffies* says he was always engaged in adultery'). Athenaeus (incorporating Chion. fr. 4) confirms the general nature of his poetry:

> Ὁ δὲ τοὺς εἰς Χιωνίδην ἀναφερομένους ποιήσας Πτωχοὺς
> Γνησίππου τινὸς μυημονεύει παιγνιαγράφου τῆς ἱλαρᾶς μούσης,
> λέγων οὕτως·
>
> ταῦτ' οὐ μὰ Δία Γνήσιππος οὐδ' ὁ Κλεομένης
> ἐν ἐννέ' ἂν χορδαῖς κατεγλυκάνατο.
>
> (Ath. 14.638d-e)
>
> He who wrote the *Beggars*, which is attributed to Chionides, mentions a certain Gnesippus, a writer of playful poetry with a merry muse, saying this: 'These things, by Zeus, neither Gnesippus nor Cleomenes could have made sweet with their nine strings'.

At this point, it is helpful to put Gnesippus in context. He was a contemporary of Cratinus and Sophocles, giving him a probable *floruit* of *c.* 450. Comedies were first performed at Athens at the City Dionysia in 486 and they came to the Lenaea *c.* 440. The 450s saw the first comedies of Cratinus (the inventor of comedy, according to Arist. *Poet.* 1449b), and the early 420s the first plays of Aristophanes and Eupolis. Satyr plays were already well established by the start of the fifth century. And while Archilochus and Hipponax, for example, had shown little restraint with regard to sex and scatology, there is little firm evidence for adulterous situations in their poetry, especially in that of Hipponax, whose literary milieu is the dissipated lower-classes where adultery is probably an irrelevant issue. On the other hand, adultery becomes a common subject of jokes in Old Comedy. As Eupolis fr. 148 indicates, among certain parts of Athenian society literary tastes were changing: Alcman, Stesichorus, and Simonides, poets of, very roughly, the three immediately preceding

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[42] D. A. Campbell, *The Golden Lyre: The Themes of the Greek Lyric Poets* (London 1983) 9.

[43] See Simon. *Anth. Pal.* 7.24.5f. (Gow-Page, *HE* 3); Antip. Sid. *Anth. Pal.* 7.26.5, 7.27.2 (Gow-Page, *HE* 14f.); Eugenes *Anth. Plan.* 16.308.3f.; Ath. 13.600d.

generations, are considered old-fashioned. In short, it appears that there was a significant market for exactly Gnesippus' new type of poetry.[44]

Therefore it seems very probable that Gnesippus did, in the words of Eupolis, invent nocturnal songs with which adulterers could call out women. It is probable that these songs were what could be called paraclausithyra or amatory komos songs. It is also highly probable that Gnesippus was the first poet to introduce adultery as a regular feature of such songs. Furthermore, the attribution to Gnesippus of a number of these songs when compared to the relative scarcity of clear paraclausithyric references before Gnesippus, in contrast with the increasingly common nature of paraclausithyric situations after him, suggests that Gnesippus might be the founder of the literary paraclausithyron as a distinct and developed genre of content. There is no better candidate.

[44] See the comment of Maas [3] 1479 that Gnesippus is clearly being portrayed 'als weichlicher Neuerer den klassischen Lyriken'. A similar attitude is shown at Aristophanes *Nub.* 1355-58, where Pheidippes, asked by his father Strepsiades, first refuses to sing something by Simonides, declaring that playing the lyre and singing at a drinking party is old-fashioned, and then passes a hostile verdict on Aeschylus when asked to recite something by him. Bowra [4] 86 suggests that 'since Alcman was regarded as ἡγεμὼν ἐρωτικῶν μελῶν ["the discoverer of erotic songs"], the appearance of Stesichorus in his company suggests that he too wrote love songs'. There is, however, little evidence for this, and virtually none for Simonides as a love poet, although there is some evidence for him as a writer of drinking-songs: see *Eleg.* 5-8 and, perhaps, Ar. *Nub.* 1355-58.

'BONES OF CONTENTION': THE CONFLICT BETWEEN HEINRICH SCHLIEMANN AND RUDOLF VIRCHOW IN 1880 OVER THE SKELETAL REMAINS FROM HANAI TEPE

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Abstract. Four years after Heinrich Schliemann put the spade into the ground at Troy, he met Rudolf Virchow in Berlin, the eminent medic who was also a pioneering prehistoric archaeologist. During the next fifteen years Virchow became the most important contact in Schliemann's career. At a crucial point, however, their relationship became severely strained over archaeological material, but Virchow saved the situation and paved the way for ten more years of co-operation.

There can be no question that Schliemann was a complex individual. This is clearly demonstrated in endless attempts by modern critics to assess the many sides of his personality.[1] One of these many sides was a distinct lack of patience and volatility, which not infrequently resulted in disputes with other

[1] See, for instance, C. Schuchhardt, *Schliemann's Excavations: An Archaeological and Historical Study* (London 1891); E. Ludwig, *Schliemann of Troy: The Story of a Gold-seeker* (Boston 1931); W. G. Niederland, 'An Analytic Inquiry into the Life and Work of Heinrich Schliemann', *Drives, Effects, Behavior* 2 (1965) 369-96; Niederland, 'Analytische Studie über das Leben und Werk Heinrich Schliemanns', *Psychology* 18 (1965) 563-90; Niederland, 'Das Schöpferische im Lebenswerk Heinrich Schliemanns im Lichte psychoanalytischer Forschung', *Carolinum* 32 (1966-67) 9-16; Niederland, 'Psychoanalytic Profile of a Creative Mind: Eros and Thanatos in the Life of Heinrich Schliemann', *Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics* 15 (1967) 200-19; Niederland, 'Heinrich Schliemann: Leben und Werk in tiefen-psychologischer Sicht', *Carolinum* 3 (1971) 34-41; Niederland, 'Analytische Studie über das Leben und Werk Heinrich Schliemanns', in A. Mitscherlich (ed.), *Psycho-Pathographien des Altags* (Frankfurt 1972) 91-124; Niederland, 'Das Schöpferische im Lebenswerk Heinrich Schliemann', in S. Drews *et al.* (edd.), *Provokation und Toleranz: Festschrift für Alexander Mitscherlich zum siebzigsten Geburtstag* (Frankfurt 1978) 450-69; E. Meyer, *Heinrich Schliemann: Kaufmann und Forscher* (Göttingen 1969) *passim*; W. M. Calder III, 'Schliemann: A Study in the Use of Sources', *GRBS* 13 (1972) 335-53; H. Döhl, *Heinrich Schliemann. Mythos und Ärgernis* (Munich 1981) *passim*; D. A. Traill, 'Further Fraudulent Reporting in Schliemann's Archaeological Works', *Boreas* 7 (1984) 295-316; Traill, 'Schliemann's Acquisition of the Helios Metope and his Psychopathic Tendencies', in W. M. Calder III and D. A. Traill (edd.), *Myth, Scandal, and History: The Heinrich Schliemann Controversy and a First Edition of the Mycenaean Diary* (Detroit 1986) 48-80; Traill, *Schliemann of Troy: Treasure and Deceit* (London 1995) *passim*; W. Bölke, *Heinrich Schliemann und Ankershagen: Heimat, Kindheit und Elternhaus* (Ankershagen 1988) *passim*.

people. Among the most notable are his various conflicts with Frank Calvert.[2] This might appear to be understandable enough, given, among other things, that each was of a different ethnic origin. Any conflict with Virchow, however, would therefore appear all the more remarkable, and not least in view of the close co-operation and actual friendship between them. It is therefore all the more relevant to examine the major dispute that developed between them over the skeletal material from Hanai Tepe. This dispute assumes all the greater significance because Frank Calvert appears to have played a central rôle in it through his involvement in the excavations at Hanai Tepe.

Let us attempt to put the forthcoming conflict between Schliemann and Virchow in context. Upon his return to Troy in 1878[3] Schliemann reached an agreement with Frank Calvert, according to which he would meet the expenses of Calvert's labourers for the further excavation of Hanai Tepe, at Thymbra, near Frederick Calvert's farm (this latter about seven kilometres south southeast of Hisarlık); Calvert would write up the results, which Schliemann would publish as an appendix in his forthcoming book (*Ilios*). The excavations continued until 4 June 1879. Schliemann and Calvert would also share the finds. Schliemann hit upon the idea of sending his share of the finds as a gift, via Virchow, to the Kaiserliches Museum in Berlin,[4] and persuaded Calvert to do the same.

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[2] See most recently, D. A. Traill, 'Schliemann's Acquisition of the Helios Metope and his Psychopathic Tendencies', in Calder and Traill [1] 48-80; M. Robinson', Pioneer, Scholar, and Victim: An Appreciation of Frank Calvert (1828-1908)', *Anatolian Studies* 44 (1994) 153-68; M. Robinson, 'Frank Calvert and the Discovery of Troy', *Studia Troica* 5 (1995) 323-41; S. A. Heuck, 'In Schliemann's Shadow: "Rediscovering" Frank Calvert, the Unheralded and All-but-Forgotten Discoverer of Troy', *Archaeology* 48 (1995) 50-57; Heuck, '"Finding the Walls of Troy": Frank Calvert, Excavator', *AJA* 99 (1995) 379-407; Heuck, *Finding the Walls of Troy: Frank Calvert and Heinrich Schliemann at Hisarlık* (Berkeley 1999); Heuck, 'Frank Calvert: The Unacknowledged Mentor of the Mythic "Autodidact"', *EMC* 17 (1998) 603-25; E. F. Bloedow, '"Finding the Walls of Troy": Response to Susan Heuck Allen', *EMC* 17 (1998) 627-44; Bloedow, 'Heinrich Schliemann and Frank Calvert in the Troad—1868-1873', *Boreas* 21-22 (1998-99) 5-40.

[3] That season Schliemann dug from 9 October to 27 November.

[4] Schliemann had met Virchow for the first time about 27 August 1875 in Berlin. He wanted to discuss with Virchow the facial urns which the latter had found during his excavations in Eastern Europe, that is, at Pomerellen in the Vistula region. Early in 1879, Schliemann invited Virchow to join him for the excavations at Hisarlık, which he did from 20 March to 3 May. Cobet states that in January 1879, 'Virchow asked whether he could come to Troy' (J. Cobet, *Heinrich Schliemann. Archäologe und Abenteurer* [(Munich 1997] 89). Strictly speaking, this is true (cf. J. Herrmann and E. Maass [edd.], *Die Korrespondenz zwischen Heinrich Schliemann und Rudolf Virchow* [Berlin 1990] 87), but since Schliemann had invited him to come to Mycenae (Herrmann and Maass [above, this note] 53), and greatly

Calvert also assumed the task of packing the finds and transporting them to the Dardanelles. It took longer than expected for them to reach Berlin, but ultimately, on 27 December 1879, Virchow was able to write to Schliemann: 'Ihre und Calverts Sachen sind glücklich angekommen'.[5] In the meantime, both Schliemann and Virchow made strenuous efforts to obtain a medal or some form of public recognition from the German government for Calvert's generous gesture.

Before long, however, a full-blown conflict arose between Schliemann and Virchow. The catalyst of this conflict appears to have been Frank Calvert, thanks to part of a letter he wrote to Schliemann, dated 2 March 1880. Calvert alerted Schliemann to an alleged scheme by Virchow, that is, an intended separate publication on Hanai Tepe. Traill has recently cited Calvert's letter, and offered a brief account of the episode, but his treatment requires amplification and some correction. In order to appreciate what was at issue, it is necessary to look at more details than Traill provides.

Upon receiving Calvert's letter, Schliemann reacted precipitously and blasted off a telegram on 8 March 1880, to Virchow, forbidding him to publish anything.[6] Traill notes that Virchow 'had been invited to Hisarlık on the understanding that whatever Virchow wanted to publish about Troy would be contributed to Schliemann's new book'.[7] That statement had, however, been made in January 1879 before Virchow had gone to Troy, and much had transpired since then. Nor is it entirely clear just how Schliemann at the time envisaged his 'zu Gute kommen'. Virchow pointed out that his highly specialised study would be most unsuitable for Schliemann's book: '. . . in Ihr Buch kann es nicht hineingeschrieben werden, denn eine *in alle Einzelheiten der Messung gehende Darstellung* wäre für Ihre Leser wiederwärtig [sic]'.[8] Traill also points out that since Schliemann's statement of 26 January 1879 almost 100 letters had gone back and forth between them 'without any indication from Virchow that he was planning to publish these results independently'. It is his view that 'Virchow's failure to mention his intentions

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regretted his not having been able to come and so repeated the invitation (Herrmann and Maass [above, this note] 84), one may assume that there was more or less an open invitation—indicated also by Schliemann's enthusiastic response upon receiving Virchow's letter (Herrmann and Maass [above, this note] 84).

[5] Herrmann-Maass [4] 157.

[6] 'Ne publiez rien hanaitepe votre publication nuerait / tuerait notre amitié mon ameur Allemagne' (Herrmann-Maass [4] 169).

[7] D. A. Traill, *Schliemann of Troy: Treasure and Deceit* (London 1995) 201.

[8] Herrmann-Maass [4] 152 (emphasis added).

to Schliemann suggests that he knew Schliemann would disapprove of what he was doing'.[9]

This, I suggest, is a fundamental misreading of Virchow, as a closer examination of the evidence will show. The first thing to note is what preceded all this. Schliemann had indicated that he wanted an appropriate report from Virchow on various aspects for his forthcoming book, that is, in areas where Virchow had specific expertise:

> Mit grösster Ungeduld erwarte ich Ihre Beschreibung der trojannische *Flora* und der Ihnen von London gesandten trojanischen *Schädel* sowie mir die versprochenen *Zeichnungen* der letzten. Ebenso ist es von höchster Wichtigkeit für mich jetzt, wo ich mit der Ethnographie der Troas beschäftigt bin, auch Ihren Bericht über die Sachen von Hanai Tepe, *wenigstens* doch über den untersten, uraltesten Schädel zu erhalten, denn sonst kriege ich schrecklichen Wirwarr in mein Manuskript. Auch erwarte ich von Ihrer Seite noch immer den versprochenen Bericht über *Mineralien* der Troas.[10]

These reports would have to be of a more general nature to coincide with the character of the book. In a letter dated 13 November 1879, Virchow reports on the skulls shipped from London. They did not arrive intact, but this was not of great consequence because the first attempt at restoring them had been so poor that they had all to be restored all over again.[11] He therefore pleads with Schliemann not to be so impatient, as work of this kind, with all the minute measurements involved, is very time-consuming. Moreover, he asks Schliemann to send him the format of the book so that he can produce drawings to fit. As for the 'botany', he cannot do anything until Professor Ascherson returns from Egypt.[12]

Their letters crossed, and in his of only two days later (15 November 1879), Schliemann shows his continued impatience: Virchow had not mentioned anything about the natural resources of the Troad in his last letter, nor anything about the three Trojan skulls, which Schliemann had loaned him from the South Kensington Museum; but he had promised to produce drawings and descriptions of them for the book.[13]

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[9] Traill [7] 201. He also notes specifically that Virchow's study of the skulls of Hanai Tepe and Hisarlık 'were to be contributed to his new book' (Traill [7] 201).

[10] Herrmann-Maass [4] 152 (emphasis added).

[11] This first attempt at restoration had presumably been supervised by Calvert.

[12] Herrmann-Maass [4] 152f.

[13] Thereafter he was to return them to the South Kensington. He also adds that according to Calvert, he [Virchow] speculated that the skeletons from Hanai Tepe represented a 'malaische race', and was this so? (Herrmann-Maass [4] 154).

Virchow answered this letter on 24 November. He assured Schliemann that his misgivings about Ascherson were unfounded, but he would write to him again in Egypt. In any case, he would abide by his (Schliemann's) wishes. As for the skulls, his draftsman was working on them, and could not complete the work any earlier. Moreover, his staff could only work on the material when they had any spare time, 'und Sie glauben nicht, was für Anstrengung es kostet, einen Schädel der sozertrümmert ist, aus dem Gips heraus zu bringen und wieder zusammen zu setzen'. And before that was done, one could not begin to study them. The initial restorer had made a complete botch of the attempt.[14]

A month later Schliemann is still impatient, as emerges from his letter of 18 December 1879:

> I dictate this late in the evening, my eyes are too fatigued and my secretary does not like German. . . . I confess it has been very painful to me, indeed, to give all the measurements of heights as they were made by Mr. Burnouf. . . . But what shall I do, you don't send me yours. Also your mineralogical notes I am anxiously expecting. I have still here one skull which I found at Hissarlik in 1872 or 1873 in a funeral urn with human ashes and a bronze brooch. The skull is perfect, only one jaws [sic] or perhaps both jaws are missing. Can this skull be of interest for your anthropological investigations or must the jaws exist? But speaking of skulls, I remember with deep regret that I have not yet received your drawings and notes of the three skulls sent to you from London.[15]

In his letter of 27 December, Virchow was finally able to give Schliemann quietening information: 'Die Tafel mit den Zeichnungen der 3 Hissarlik-Schädel wird im Laufe der Woche an Sie abgehen zugleich mit den Angaben über die Messungen'. But he adds that his draftsman has still to make some additional changes, as it has not been possible to restore them 'vorwurfsfrei'—in fact, one had come apart five times, and was still not finished. And then he pleads with Schliemann yet again to show some understanding in view of the enormous claims upon his time.[16]

Before this letter could arrive, Schliemann had to express his impatience once more, writing on 1 January 1880: 'Wäre es denn nicht möglich, dass Sie mir jetzt Ihre Notizen über die Schädel, sowie die Zeichnungen derselben und Ihre Beschreibung der trojanischen Mineralien schicken, denn sonst bringe ich

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[14] Herrmann-Maass [4] 155.

[15] Herrmann-Maass [4] 156f. The reason for Schliemann's impatience was that 'I hope to send off by next week's steamer [he was writing from Athens] my Ms. of Troy to the London printer' (Herrmann-Maass [4] 156).

[16] Herrmann-Maass [4] 157.

ja gar vielen Wirwarr ins Buch. Dass ich nicht einmal Ihre 'Botanik' erhielt, ist jammerschade'.[17] Virchow had obviously run into further difficulties (not surprisingly in view of the colossal demands on his time), for at the end of the month (31 January 1880), Schliemann dashes off a somewhat garbled telegram: 'Prie enstamment envoyez immediatement description cranes coyens a continuation votre landescunde Troas'.[18] Finally, on 3 February 1880, Virchow could write: 'Hier haben Sie die Beschreibung der trojanischen Schädel'.[19] Schliemann received this news, as he acknowledges in his letter of 12 February 1880: '. . . Ihren Aufsatz über die Schädel füge ich sogleich bei'.[20] They do indeed appear in *Ilios*: 'Professor Virchow, who kindly recomposed both skulls and made the accompanying excellent geometrical drawings of them (Nos. 969-72 and 973-76), has sent me the following note'.[21] At the end of the note he then adds: 'Professor Virchow kindly sent me also the following note on the skeleton of a foetus which was found in a vase in the third or burnt city'.[22] Virchow's descriptions and notes were entirely adapted to the character of Schliemann's book.[23] The descriptions of the skulls were very brief and general, as were the notes.

We return to the outbreak of the conflict. Virchow's immediate reaction upon receiving Schliemann's telegram on 8 March is not at all surprising: 'Ihr eben, spät am Abend eingegangenes Telegramm,[24] so dass ich morgenfrüh beantworten werde, hat mich in *nicht geringen Erstaunen* versetzt'.[25] Should

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[17] Herrmann-Maass [4] 159.

[18] Herrmann-Maass [4] 161. What he appears to have wanted to say is that Virchow should send him post haste his description of the skulls and a copy of his 'Landeskunde der Troas'.

[19] Herrmann-Maass [4] 162. He adds that the delay over the remainder of his 'Landeskunde der Troas' lay, not with him, but with the people at the press of the Akademie (Herrmann-Maass [4] 162). In his letter of 1 March 1880, Virchow asks: 'Wie steht es mit dem trojanischen Schädel und den Embryonen? Ich warte sehensüchtig darauf, um doch zu sehen ob sich daraus für die Beurteilung der anderen Schädel etwas ergibt.' (Herrmann-Maass [4] 167)

[20] Herrmann-Maass [4] 163.

[21] H. Schliemann, *Ilios: The City and Country of the Trojans* (London 1880) 507, 508-12.

[22] Schliemann [21] 512.

[23] On this, see further below.

[24] Virchow replied immediately, at 9:30 p.m., that is, in this letter.

[25] Herrmann-Maass [4] 169 (emphasis added). He also sent a terse telegram back the following day: 'all stopped letter despatched' (Herrmann-Maass [4] 170).

one take Virchow at his word?[26] I think we can find an answer to this question and to the one raised by Traill's suspicion by going into more detail. If Virchow's 'nicht geringes Erstaunen' is genuine, he will have to offer a convincing explanation. He begins by pointing out that by sending the Hanai Tepe finds to Berlin, Schliemann had in a real sense made them public property: 'Nachdem Sie die ganze Ausbeute des Hanai Tepe dem hiesigen Museum übergeben hatten, ohne irgend eine Beschränkung daran zu knüpfen, so lag das Material gewissermassen in jedermanns Bereich'.[27] After this general statement, he goes on to explain that, to begin with, he sought permission from the Director of the Museum to restore the skulls and identify the bones, and then report the results in a public lecture in the *Akademie*. Moreover, the results were very meagre, not least since Schliemann did not want to include the 'Byzantine' material, and from the lowest stratum at Hanai Tepe there was not a single intact skull, only fragments of three small ones. None the less, since he had already invested so much time in the study of the bones, he felt obliged to complete the project. No information on the other finds from Hanai Tepe had been turned over to him, and on Hisarlık there was nothing archaeologically new that Schliemann had not already published. How, therefore, could his study affect the impact of Schliemann's forthcoming book, for who would read his highly technical study? As a matter of fact, amongst scholars it could only redound to Schliemann's renown.

Schliemann did not write following his telegram, while Virchow continued to take the matter in stride, but at the same time, in a further letter, dated 13 March, went into more detail, beginning with the wry remark: 'Ich befinde mich in der neutralen Zeit, wo weder ein Telegramm von Ihnen mich erschreckt, noch ein Brief mich erfreut'. This almost light-hearted attitude is not the way someone would write who had deliberately been working behind someone else's back. He none the less at the same time treats the matter seriously, and 'möchte daher die Pause bis zu Ihrem nächsten Telegramm benützen, um noch einmal *sine ira et studio* auf die Sache zurückzukommen'. He points out that since it had become impossible to obtain a medal or something comparable for Calvert, he felt obliged 'Ihr und Hrn. Calverts Geschenke bei unserem wissenschaftlichen Publikum einzuführen und bekannt zu machen. Für mich war das ein Akt der Dankbarkeit'. His study of the

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[26] I know of no study that has demonstrated a lack of integrity or honesty on the part of Virchow. He claims in a letter to Schliemann: 'Ich habe ehrlich nach Wahrheit gestrebt' (Herrmann-Maass [4] 164).

[27] Herrmann-Maass [4] 169—thus in his letter to Schliemann, dated 8 March 1880 (cf. Herrmann-Maass [4] 169f.).

material was part of this gesture. Schliemann's telegram gave him the impression that he was trying to steal something from him. He could not imagine what Schliemann was thinking, for his whole approach was well known, beginning with his first letter from Hisarlık.[28] Perhaps he had never read it. He would send him a copy. Accordingly, 'Meine Absicht ging also keineswegs dahin, eine 'Theorie' des Hanai Tepe zu geben, sondern eine ausführliche wissenschaftliche Darstellung der Ausbeute, soweit sie durch Ihr Geschenk hierher gelangt ist'.[29]

One would have thought that these explanations would have satisfied any reasonable person,[30] but not Schliemann, for whose volcanic temperament this was but more fuel on the fire, and so this time he blasted off a letter on 18 March. After announcing that he had received three letters from Virchow, namely of 1, 6 and 8 March, he let fly: '. . . mit grösstem Erstaunen ersehe ich nun aus Ihrem vorliegenden Schreiben, dass Sie im Begriff stehen, sämtliche Schädel von Hissarlik, Hanai Tepe usw. nebst Steingerät, Topferware usw. zu publizieren. Sagen Sie mir doch, bitte, wie ist's nur bloss möglich, dass Sie so handeln können?'[31] This letter Schliemann followed up with a telegram on the same day:[32] 'Promise[z] rien publier, publication turait amitié, forcerait rayer testament Collection trojenne Musée Berlin'.[33]

Virchow sent back a telegram on the same day, and followed up with two letters, one on 21, the other on 24 March. He keeps his cool, but, in the first letter, strongly objects to Schliemann's attack on his integrity, and also asks for clarity on just what it is he wants him to do (or not to do). In the second, he declares himself ready to abandon completely the study of the skulls from

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[28] Published in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* 11 (1879) 179-81.

[29] Herrmann-Maass [4] 171.

[30] Indeed, nothing could indicate more clearly the nature of Virchow's intentions than a comparison of the reports which he provided for Schliemann's book and the specialised study on which he was working and which he did publish two years later. For instance, in the former, the descriptions are very brief and general. The description of the first skull (nos 969-72) consists of eleven lines, while that of the second (nos 973-76) of eighteen lines. The note on these two skulls comes to just over two and a half pages, and is also very general. The note on the 'foetus', including the description, comes to only five lines (Schliemann [21] 508-12).

[31] This represents an over-interpretation of Virchow's letters and an over-heated response, which goes on for another eighteen lines (Herrmann-Maass [4] 172).

[32] It in any event arrived first, indeed, in the middle of the night! Virchow responded with a postcard: 'Eben, Mitternacht, erhalte ich Ihr Telegramm, freilich in zum Teil unverständlichen Worten, indes doch in der Hauptsache deutlich. Das genügt, um die Sistierung zu einem Definitivum zu machen' (Herrmann-Maass [4] 173).

[33] Herrmann-Maass [4] 173.

Hisarlık, Hanai Tepe and Ophrynium. He also shows once more how his proposed study would not detract from Schliemann's forthcoming volume—indeed, could only enhance it. He also points out that upon his return from Hisarlık, everyone was pressing him for information about Troy. It would have been ridiculous in the circumstances to have attempted to suppress everything. His study of the bones was simply an extension of the information Schliemann had provided upon enquiry.[34]

It is in the course of this last letter (24 March) that Virchow puts his finger on what turns out to be the key factor in the whole episode—the rôle of Frank Calvert. To begin with, Schliemann was subject to a misunderstanding—that, *not Calvert* had approached Virchow, *but Virchow had approached Calvert*, for information, thanks to the rather slip-shod manner in which he (Calvert) had packed for shipping the skeletal material.[35] Schliemann wrote in his fuming letter of 18 March also as follows: 'Ihre beabsichtigte Publikation über Hanai Tepe erfuhr ich durch Calvert'.[36] Traill has published part of the relevant letter by Calvert, dated 2 March 1880, which runs as follows: 'This friend [Virchow] writes he is preparing for publication a description of Hanai Tepe, accompanied by plates of the most important objects found in the excavations'.[37] Traill, not surprisingly, comments defensively on this statement, but this seems to be a one-sided approach. One needs, for instance, to note Schliemann's further statement—that it was, according to Schliemann, 'mit grösster Besturzung' that Calvert expressed himself, and 'nicht begreifen kann' how Virchow could have acted the way he did, especially in light of the fact that 'er Sie bei Einsendung der Altertümer so dringend gebeten hatte, ihm über das eine und andere Auskunft zu erteilen, da er—wie er Ihnen ja gleichzeitig

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[34] Herrmann-Maass [4] 174f.

[35] '. . . da seine Schädel in einer für mich ganz unverständlichen Weise bezeichnet waren' (Herrmann-Maass [4] 175).

[36] Herrmann-Maass [4] 172.

[37] It is actually a postscript to his letter of 2 March, and dated the next day'. The full text of the postscript reads as follows: 'March 3. Your letter of 24th has just reached me, together with one from Dr. Virchow. This friend writes me he is preparing for publication a description of Hanai Tepe to be accompanied by plates of the most important objects found in the excavations. How far his intention interferes with your forthcoming publication, you are the best to judge. What are to be done with the remaining objects found in the excavations—these are few for the works have lately been directed to trace out the walls. I shall send you drawings of the most remarkable whorls with patterns in amongst them—insecure blots. I shall send you shortly the accounts of expenses at Hanai Tepe.' (Letter written from Thymbra, now in the Schliemann Archive in the Gennadius Library in Athens, BBB 37 246).

angezeigt—im Begriff steht, mit mir die Ausgrabungen von Hanai Tepe und deren Resultate mit einer Menge Pläne und Illustrationen zu veröffentlichen'.[38]

There is nothing in the way of 'mit grösster Besturzung' or 'nicht begreifen kann' in Calvert's letter. Nor does it seem likely in view of what Calvert wrote in a subsequent letter, dated 27 March: 'I regret your misunderstanding with Virchow. Perhaps he will not interfere with your book, for what he publishes is not for the general reader, but this is a matter which you two alone can arrange between you.'[39] It therefore looks as if Schliemann is indulging in some hyperbole here. Furthermore, that it is not accurate is also shown by Virchow's explanation in his letter of 24 March. It was only in reply to his letter requesting information that Calvert, in a letter of 15 January 1880, 'jede eingehende Erörterung mit folgenden Wörter [verweigerte]: I would wish to give you an account of Hanai Teped [sic] had not Dr. Schliemann requested me to keep the description for his new book'. But Virchow adds, significantly: 'Bei der Übersendung der Sachen hat Hr. Calvert gar keinen Vorbehalt gemacht, sowenig wie Sie bei der Anzeige Ihres Geschenks. Und da dies für eine öffentliche Sammlung bestimmt war, so konnte ich nichts machen, da Sie es der öffentlichen Erörterung entziehen wollten.'[40] In his letter of 8 March, Virchow also explained:

> Beiläufig erfuhr ich dann von Mr. Calvert, als ich um verschiedene Auskünfte ersuchte, dass er sich verpflichtet habe, sie nur Ihnen zu geben, das Sie dieselben veröffentlichen wollten. Natürlich habe ich dann sofort Abstand von jeder weiteren Nachforschung genommen, und meine Absicht ging dahin, mich streng an das vorliegende Material zu halten. Ich fasste daher mein Thema ganz im naturwissenschaftlichen Sinne als 'anthropologische Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen Trojas' und beabsichtige dabei, sämtliche Schädel von Ophrynium, Hissarlik und dem Hanai Tepe in Detail darzustellen. Einige archäologische Abbildungen von Steingeräte und Töpferei waren Belegstücke für das Alter gedacht.[41]

None of Virchow's explanations were, however, good enough for Schliemann, and so, on 15 April, he wrote again, as follows:

> Ich erhielt Ihren lieben Brief vom 5. ds, woraus ich dankend ersehe, dass Sie Ihre neue Publikation über Troas bis *nach* Veröffentlichung meines Buches verschoben haben. Dürfte ich Sie aber bitten, mir genau zu sagen, was Sie

[38] Herrmann-Maas [4], 172.

[39] Gennadius Library BBB 37 250.

[40] Herrmann-Maass [4] 175.

[41] Herrmann-Maass [4] 169.

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> *ausser* Kraniologie sonst noch behandeln werden? Wollen Sie auch die 7 Städte von Hissarlik, Stadt für Stadt systematisch durch gehen, Bilder von Topfware, Steinwerkzeuge usw. geben? Wenn Sie dies beabsichtigen, so tun Sie meinem Buche, wie Sie wohl einsehen werden, gar viel Schaden, und wäre es entschieden besser, Sie beschränkgten sich auf *Kraniologie*. Wollen Sie nur lezteres, so sehe ich keinen Grund, warum Sie eine solche Publikation nicht jetzt gleich machen sollten.[42]

This suspicion was completely unwarranted, and is all the more surprising, coming as it does after all of Virchow's explanations.[43] Virchow could not have made himself clearer.

Why does this suspicion 'stick in Schliemann's throat'? From where did it come? The answer appears to be Calvert. As Calvert had written: 'this friend writes he is preparing for publication a description of Hanai Tepe accompanied by plates of the most important objects found in the excavations'. More important is the question with which he proceeds: 'How far his intention conflicts with your forthcoming publication you are best to judge'.[44] It is of course very difficult to determine just what Calvert's motive may have been at this point, but it is entirely possible that this question more than anything ignited in Schliemann a 'volcanic' reaction. It is a pity that we do not possess Virchow's letter to Calvert, for it would be interesting to see the exact wording. Certainly, his explanations do not coincide with the type of work of which both Calvert and Schliemann suspect him. Moreover, on the ground that the catalyst of Schliemann's suspicion was Calvert's letter to him, one may conclude that at this time Schliemann and Calvert were on very good terms—certainly, *Schliemann appears to be much more inclined to believe Calvert than he is to believe Virchow.*[45] This is all the more important in view of what Schliemann could otherwise have known, and doubtless did know, about Virchow—nor should one overlook Virchow's repeated and detailed explanations.

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[42] Herrmann-Maass [4] 181 (emphasis added).

[43] It seems to me that Meyer also failed to understand the situation when he claimed that Schliemann's 'Temperamentsausbruch . . . weniger ein Aauf-den-Tischhauen als der Unmut eines entäuschten Herzens [ist]', and that 'es scheint als, ob er [Virchow] jetzt doch das Mass und die gegen Schliemanns Buchvorhaben gebotene und anscheinend auch zugesagte Zurückhaltung ganz aus dem Auge verloren hätte' (E. Meyer, 'Schliemann und Virchow', *Gymnasium* 62 [1955] 444).

[44] Cf. above, n. 37.

[45] The position which Calvert takes in his letter, especially the question which he puts to Schliemann, at a stroke cuts the foundations from under Robinson's Schliemann-Calvert conflict hypothesis and her Calvert-Virchow friendship theory.

The suspicions which Schliemann still voiced on 5 April about a comprehensive book on Troy by Virchow, with a systematic analysis of the evidence, city by city from Troy I to Troy VII, and with copious illustrations, is completely unwarranted for two further reasons. For one thing, Virchow being the scientist that he was, would not have attempted a comprehensive study unless he had been able to study *all* the evidence *first-hand*. Being in Berlin, and not in Hisarlık, this was completely impossible.[46] Even less could he accompany such a study with 'Bilder', since he was not in a position to photograph the Trojan material. Secondly, one can appreciate the situation even better from Virchow's perspective, and here we come upon a crucial factor, when one realises just how busy the man was. In his letter of 27 December 1879, he writes: 'Ich bitte Sie gütigst, in Erwägung ziehen zu wollen, das meine Zeit hier so stark besetzt ist, dass ich oft eine Reihe von Tagen mit anderen als mit amtlichen Sachen mich gar nicht beschäftigen kann. Daher rückt manches viel langsamer vor als mir lieb ist'.[47] On 3 January 1880, he gives Schliemann further insight on how busy he is: 'Abdrücke von allen meinen Vorträgen sind jetzt an Sie abgeschickt . . . was noch fehlt, wird in den nächsten Tagen folgen . . . auch der Amsterdamer Vortrag ist heute abgegangen'.[48] Even more so in a letter on 21 February 1880:

> Gleichzeitig mit diesem Brief geht ein Exemplar meiner Abhandlung 'Zur Landeskunde pp.' unter Kreuzband an Sie ab. Sie hätten es längst haben sollen, aber die letzte Zeit unseres Landtages war so anstrengend, dass ich kaum Zeit zu den absolut nötigen Dingen fand. Sie müssen nicht vergessen, dass die trojanischen Dinge mir nur als Erholung für sehr sparliche Mussestunden gestattet sind und das Vorlesungen, Examina, Stizungen allerlei Art, Familie stets die Vorderhand haben.[49]

Schliemann himself acknowledged how busy Virchow was, as he expresses his amazement in a letter 9 days earlier (12 February 1880): 'Die vielen herrlichen Schriften, die Sie mir senden, erregen mein Erstaunen im höchsten Grade; ganz unbegreiflich ist es mir, wie Sie so viel und so ausgezeichnetes fertig

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[46] Moreover, as noted above, Virchow made it plain that his object was 'eine wissenschaftliche Darstellung der Ausbeute, soweit sie durch Ihr Geschenk hierher gelangt ist' (Herrmann-Maass [4] 171). Furthermore, since he would be dealing almost exclusively with a limited amount of material, and especially primarily with that from Hanai Tepe, it could scarcely affect Schliemann's forthcoming book on Troy.

[47] Herrmann-Maass [4] 157.

[48] Herrmann-Maass [4] 159.

[49] Herrmann-Maass [4] 164.

schaffen'.[50] Moreover, already early in September 1879, Virchow had been elected as President of the *Anthropologische Gesellschaft*, which also involved not a little work.[51] Furthermore, he was by this time working towards election as an MP to the Reichstag.[52]

In these circumstances, Virchow was not in a position from simply the standpoint of time to carry out the work necessary for a comprehensive book on Hanai Tepe and Hisarlık that would seriously affect Schliemann's volume on Troy. In light of this, Traill's suggestion that 'Virchow's failure to mention his intentions to Schliemann suggests that he knew Schliemann would disapprove of what he was doing', simply does not convince. In the first place, it was not in his character to work behind someone's back. Secondly, he was much too busy to be able to carry it out, so would not have thought along these lines.

Virchow still felt it necessary to respond to Schliemann's latest suspicions, and in a letter of 22 April 1880, he wrote, promptly. What he has to say bears citing *in extenso*:

> Auf Ihren heute erhaltenen Brief vom 15. erwidere ich, dass ich nichts weniger beabsichtige, als die 7 Städten von Hissarlik zu bearbeiten. Meine Abhandlung hat *wesentlich die Schädel* zum Gegenstand. Nur in sofern, als es für *die Altersbestimmung*, der Schädel aus den *tieferen Lagen* von Hanai Tepe von grosser Bedeutung ist, die gleichzeitigen Funde zu berühren, hatte ich die Absicht, aus den von Ihnen und Calvert hierher gesandten Sachen eine kleine Auswahl von geschlifenen Steinen und Topfscherben mit abbilden zu lassen, und dazu aus den von mir mit gebrachten Topfscherben der *ältesten Stadt* von Hissarlik einige Proben zu geben. Mir ist es mehr darum zu tun, einige sichere Abbildungen zu liefern, als eine eigenliche Erörterung darüber anzustellen. Ich glaube, Sie täuschen sich immer noch über den Charakter meiner Abhandlung.[53]

He adds that the study would be so specialised that it could not in any way detract from Schliemann's book, and also that he cannot finish it now because 'ich bin jetzt im Reichstage'.

When the truth ultimately sank in, Schliemann must have been greatly embarrassed, for in his reply to Virchow's letter of 22 April, namely, of the 29th, although he mentions various other things, there is not a word about Virchow's further attempt to explain his position—no accusation, for instance,

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[50] Herrmann-Maass [4] 163.

[51] Herrmann-Maass [4] 136f.

[52] Herrmann-Maass [4] 184. This came about soon thereafter, and he remained a member of the Reichstag from then until 1893.

[53] Herrmann-Maass [4] 182f. (emphasis added)

of Virchow not having made himself clear in his letters, nor anything of that nature: just complete silence. Nor does Virchow appear to have raised the matter again.

Schliemann was well apprised of just how busy Virchow was. He also knew from his own experience just how much work would have been involved in writing a comprehensive book on Hanai Tepe and Troy at this point. With a little thought, he could easily have deduced that Virchow was not up to anything devious. How is one, then, to explain why he reacted the way he did, and why he stuck to his suspicions so long? Part of the answer must lie in his personality. This is borne out by the later conflict between himself and Virchow over seating arrangements at the banquet at the annual meeting of the Deutsche Anthropologische Gesellschaft in Karlsruhe at the beginning of August 1885.[54] Here too he reacted with the same kind of impetuosity. Here too Virchow was completely innocent.[55] Here too Schliemann jumped to conclusions on the basis of no real evidence.

We must, however, also take into account once more what touched off his suspicions in 1880. As noted above, it was the letter from Calvert. It is of course possible that Calvert's motive in informing Schliemann was entirely honourable. On the other hand, he too could have reached the same conclusion as could Schliemann about Virchow not being able to carry out such a comprehensive study as envisaged by both of them. If Calvert had no intention of precipitating a conflict between Schliemann and Virchow, one can at least say that he showed poor judgement. We must admit that our knowledge is very limited. Most importantly, we do not, to my knowledge, have a copy of Virchow's letter to Calvert, upon which Calvert based his letter to Schliemann. Many other details and nuances are also missing. In view of what Calvert could/should have known about Virchow and what he did know about Schliemann, his letter of 2 March 1880 raises serious questions about his motivation at this point and certainly about the manner in which he proceeded.

Recently, there has been an attempt to rehabilitate Calvert, on the ground that 'Schliemann's egotism and false claims have robbed Calvert of his proper place in the history of archaeology'.[56] There is no question that Calvert has not received his due, and every effort to redress the balance should be welcomed.

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[54] Cf. Herrmann-Maass [4] 458; see also Meyer [43] 449.

[55] The main difference was that this dispute was over an essentially trivial issue.

[56] D. A. Traill, 'Further Fraudulent Reporting in Schliemann's Archaeological Works', *Boreas* 7 (1984) 309.

In recent attempts, however, there seems to be some imbalance.[57] One should at least entertain the possibility that on this occasion not all is light, but that there may in fact also be some shadows.

The individual who comes out of this three-cornered conflict with his integrity manifestly intact is Virchow. Virchow would have been the first one to admit that he himself did not represent all light. On one occasion he wrote:

> Wo ich mich für befügt hielt, mein persönliches Recht zu betonen, da habe ich es ohne Überhebung zu tun versucht, und wenn ich dabei das Recht eines Anderen verletzt haben sollte, so kann ich jedenfalls versichern, dass es unabsichtlich geschehen ist.[58]

The conflict between Schliemann and Virchow (and Calvert) over the skeletal material from Hanai Tepe could not be placed in context more eloquently than by these words. Nowhere do we come upon a similar statement by either Schliemann or Calvert. Grimm has reminded us that the Swiss medical historian, Ackerknecht wrote (in 1957) 'dass Deutschland bei Virchows Tod im Jahre 1902 den Verlust von vier grossen Männern in einem beklagen sollte: seinen führenden Pathalogen, seinen führenden Anthropologen, seinen führenden Hygieniker und seinen führenden Liberalen'.[59] Virchow's integrity in respect of interpersonal relationships would appear to have been of the same order.

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[57] One has, for instance, only to look at the following studies: M. Robinson, 'Pioneer, Scholar, and Victim: An Appreciation of Frank Calvert', *Anatolian Studies* 44 (1994) 153-68; M. Robinson, 'Frank Calvert and the Discovery of Troia', *Studia Troica* 5 (1995) 323-34; Traill [7] *passim*, and Cobet [4] *passim*. In virtually all of these studies, in the references to Calvert (in some cases all) he is presented in terms of all light and no shadows. This can scarcely be so. For the beginnings of a more critical approach, see E. F. Bloedow, 'Heinrich Schliemann and Frank Calvert in the Troad—1868-1873', *Boreas* 21-22 (1998-99) 5-40; E. F. Bloedow, 'Heinrich Schliemann and Frank Calvert and the Excavation of Hanai Tepe in 1878-1880', *Boreas* (in press).

[58] As cited by Meyer [43] 444.

[59] H. Grimm, 'Heinrich Schliemann und Rudolf Virchow in heutiger Sicht', in W. Bölke (ed.), *Vorträge anlässlich des Kolloquiums 'Heinrich Schliemann und Rudolf Virchow' am 6. Juli 1985 in Ankershagen sowie Beiträge zur themengleichen Sonderausstellung* (Ankershagen 1987) 10; cf. E. H. Ackerknecht, *Rudolf Virchow: Arzt, Politiker, Anthropologe* (Stuttgart 1957).

CLINICAL CURES FOR LOVE IN PROPERTIUS' *ELEGIES*

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Abstract. Propertius tends to treat his passion for Cynthia as an affliction that resembles insanity: in his obsession, he is mad, and he resolves to cure himself of his madness. The poet's proposed attempts to cure himself of this madness actually seem to have some basis in common medical beliefs of his time as presented by the medical writer Celsus, who in his *Artes Medicinae* outlines manifestations and cures for insanity.

Repeatedly throughout his elegies, Propertius refers to love, and especially his passion for Cynthia, as a type of madness; this is indeed one of the themes which permeates, especially, book 1 of his elegies, although it is common throughout the *corpus*.[1] Propertius constantly refers to his love as an actual mental illness. He takes a clinical approach to his affliction, analyses it, and actually portrays himself as seeking some kind of cure or relief from his affliction. That is, Propertius wants to find something that will take away the pain of loving Cynthia, and turns to science to remove this pain.

The description of love as some kind of physical illness, rather than mental, is, of course, at least as old as Sappho: Sappho's fr. 31LP describes the physical symptoms which the lover feels when gazing upon the beloved.[2] In Plato's *Symposium*, Alcibiades, in referring to his passion for Socrates, compares himself to someone suffering from snakebite (217c). Much later, Theocritus, *Idyll* 11 describes Polyphemus' love for Galatea as like a wound from an arrow (15f.), which becomes such a commonplace that listing examples would be tedious. As well, in *Idyll* 2, Theocritus described the love-sick Simaetha as suffering from some sort of fever (καπυρὰ νόσος, 'fiery disease'). The same image is common in Latin poetry: in poem 76, Catullus describes his

[1] F. Cairns, 'Some Observations on Propertius 1.1', *CQ* 24 (1974) 94-110 notes that Propertius establishes this metaphor of love as madness especially in 1.1. P. T. Alessi, 'Propertius: *Furor, Ingenium* and Callimachus', in C. Deroux (ed.), *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* 5 (1989) 216-32 argues that 'love as madness' is a common theme running through book 1 of Propertius' elegies.

[2] Even these symptoms can be considered psychological. They are certainly interpreted in this way by G. Devereux, 'The Nature of Sappho's Seizure in FR. 31LP as Evidence of her Inversion', *CQ* 20 (1970) 17-31.

love for Lesbia as a *morbum* ('disease').[3] In the *Cistellaria*, Plautus disdains the idea that there could be a cure for love (74); in *Eunuchus*, Terence has a character wonder at the effects of the illness called love (225f.).

Neither is the concept of love as a mental illness original to Propertius,[4] and indeed it, too, can be traced at least as far back as Sappho, who describes love as 'shaking her wits': ἔμοι δ' ὡς ἄνεμος κατάρης δρύσιν ἐμπέτων ἐτίναξεν ἔρος φρένας ('Love has shaken my mind like a whirlwind rushing among the oaks', fr. 54). Phaedra's agitation and depression in Euripides' *Hippolytus* also indicate that the author of that play considers her affliction, imposed by Aphrodite, to be some sort of mental illness. This is especially clear from the prologue of the play, in which Aphrodite schemes to inflict this frenzy upon Phaedra.

The image of love as madness is also common among Latin authors, as any reader of Lucretius will recall his famous passage in the *De Rerum Natura*, where the Epicurean poet describes love as a form of insanity, labelling it as *rabies* (4.1083). Cicero, as well, wrote of love as a mental affliction in the fourth book of the *Tusculan Disputations* (4.35.74f.). In *Aeneid* 4 Vergil describes Dido as one afflicted by madness in the form of love, and implies that her magic rituals can do her no good: *quid vota furentem, / quid delubra iuvant?* ('How do vows and altars help one who is raging?', 65f.).[5] Vergil had earlier shown his Gallus, in *Eclogues* 10, as wandering through the hills looking for some sort of relief from his erotic sufferings: *haec sit nostri medicina furoris* ('This might be a cure for my madness', 60).[6] We also find

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[3] The imagery of illness in this poem is discussed by M. Skinner, 'Disease Imagery in Catullus 76.17-26', *CPh* 82 (1987) 230-33.

[4] The portrayal of love as a psychological disorder by both Greek and Roman authors is discussed by J. Booth, 'All in the Mind: Sickness in Catullus 76', in S. Braund and C. Gill (edd.), *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (Cambridge 1997) 150-68.

[5] An earlier and perhaps influential parallel to Vergil's portrayal of Dido's love as an illness can be found in the *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius, in book 3, when Medea has been struck by the arrow of Eros and is driven to distraction by her love for Jason: ἄφαρ δέ μιν ἠπεροπῆες / οἷα τ' ἀκηχεμένην, ὀλοοὶ ἐρέθεσκον ὄνειροι ('for deceitful visions haunted her, like the dreams of one in pain', 617f.). Many centuries earlier, Archilochus described the pains of love that afflicted him in a similar way (fr. 29).

[6] J. J. O'Hara, 'Medicine for the Madness of Dido and Gallus: Tentative Suggestions on *Aeneid* 4', *Vergilius* 39 (1993) 12-24 links the two Vergilian passages, arguing that Dido, as the wounded deer, and Gallus, as the wounded lover, are both wandering through the woods searching for the Cretan herb *dictamnum*.

love so described, naturally, by Ovid in the *Remedia Amoris*.[7] There, after noting the tortures people would endure in order to cure a physical ailment (*ut corpus redimas, ferrum patieris et ignes / arida nec sitiens ora levatis aqua*: 'So that you might cure the body, you would suffer iron and fires and, when thirsting, you would not quench your dry mouth with water' 229f.), Ovid asks *ut valeas animo, quicquam tolerare negabis* ('What will you decline to tolerate so that you might regain health in the mind?', 231), implying that love's afflictions, from which he seeks to relieve his readers, constitute mental illness equivalent to the worst physical diseases.

Repeatedly in his elegies, Propertius conveys the idea that love is a disease, picking up on the same images of disease and wounds that these other authors have used to describe love. Propertius also, like Vergil's Gallus and Dido, shows himself attempting to find some cure or relief from his affliction. The cures suggested or attempted by the elegist seem frivolous or at the very least idiosyncratic. Often Propertius seems to merely escape temporarily from his troubles rather than to actually cure himself of his passion for Cynthia, and occasionally he claims that there actually is no cure for what he is suffering: *non ego tum potero solacia ferre roganti, / cum mihi nulla mei sit medicina mali* ('I could not offer solace to any who asks me, since there is no cure even for my own affliction', 1.5.27f.). Love itself, he claims, is immune to any medicines: *solus amor morbi non amat artificem* ('Love alone does not yield to the works of disease', 2.1.58). But despite the seeming frivolity and occasional despair, Propertius does make some serious attempt to apply the techniques of contemporary medical knowledge to the problem of the mental disease, love, from which he sees himself as suffering. In 1.1, when he first acknowledge his affliction as a madness, Propertius begs his friends to help him in a number of ways which include those considered medically common or correct in his times, and he continues to pursue these same cures for his madness at various stages in the progress of his affair.[8]

The best source for the common Roman beliefs about insanity and the possible cures for the condition is to be found in book 3 of the *Artes* of Aulus Cornelius Celsus, of the early first century AD. His is, in fact, one of the most thorough medical works remaining to us from the Augustan age, and it is worth

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[7] P. E. Knox, *Ovid's Metamorphoses and the Traditions of Augustan Poetry* (Cambridge 1986) discusses Ovid's use of the motif of *medicina* in the *Remedia Amoris* and *Metamorphoses*.

[8] It is worth noting that Catullus, Propertius' predecessor in portraying love as illness, makes no attempt to relieve his own suffering. Rather, he simply prays for the gods to take it away: *eripite hanc pestem perniciemque mihi* ('take away this plague and pestilence for me', Catul. 76.20).

noting that Celsus was not himself a practising physician.[9] Thus his analyses of the disease and suggested remedies for mental illness are more like those which would be known to the intelligent and well-read layman of the time, such as Propertius himself, or at least some of his acquaintances, would be. The suggestions of Celsus and the attempts of Propertius both reflect what would have been common Roman attitudes to what doctors would do for the mentally ill patient.

A number of the cures which Celsus reports as common for insanity seem harsh in the extreme, involving tortures such as chains and beatings: *tormentis quibusdam optime curatur ubi perperam aliquid dixit aut fecit, fame, vinculis, plagis coercendus est* ('[The patient] is to be best cured by certain tortures. If he has said or done anything wrong, he is to be coerced by hunger, chains and floggings', *Artes* 3.18.21).[10] Such tortures, summed up in the expression *ferrum et ignes* ('iron and fire'), obviously loom large in the common Roman concept of what doctors do to patients in any medical situation.[11] I have already noted the passage in Ovid's *Remedia Amoris*; we find a similar reference in his *Heroides*: *ut valeant aliae, ferrum patiuntur et ignes* ('Others, so that they may be well, tolerate iron and fire', 20.183). The same attitude is expressed in Seneca's *Agamemnon*: *et ferrum et ignes saepe medicinae loco* ('Often iron and fire are used as medicines', 152). These are the same types of treatments which Propertius applies to himself, or begs his friends to apply to him, in the hopes of curing his madness at 1.1.27. The poet begs that *ferrum et ignes* be applied to him, and these can be equated with the chains and floggings prescribed by Celsus.[12] But these harsh and cruel methods are the 'treatments' which Celsus describes as appropriate for those who are deeply sunk into insanity, and for whom there is little hope of a cure: *tertium genus insaniae est ex his*

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[9] As noted by R. Jackson, *Doctors and Diseases in the Roman World* (Norman 1988) 9. J. Scarborough, 'Romans and Physicians', *CJ* 65 (1970) 298 on the other hand accepts that Celsus was a practising physician.

[10] A. C. Vaughan, *Madness in Greek Thought and Custom* (Baltimore 1919] 44f. notes that another Roman medical writer, Titus (a pupil of the first century BC physician Asclepiades), also advocated the uses of beatings for the correction of the insane. Vaughan [above, this note] 54 also notes that there is little evidence in the remaining Greek literature for the use of such tortures as treatments for madness.

[11] This is consistent with the general Roman mistrust of the largely Greek medical community at Rome. Scarborough [9] 298 notes that both Cato the Censor and Pliny the Elder 'provide long-winded diatribes against the treachery of Greek doctors'.

[12] Cairns [1] *passim* makes this equation as well. On the other hand, D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Propertiana* (Amsterdam 1967) 6 believes that 'there is probably no specific reference to the treatment of insanity' in this line.

longissimum quales insanientem Aiacem vel Orestem percepisse poetae ferunt ('The third type of insanity is the most serious of these [listed by Celsus], the sort of insanity which the poets say Ajax or Orestes suffered from', *Artes* 3.18.19). Thus the *ferrum et ignes* which Propertius calls for are appropriate only in the most extreme phases of his affliction; he himself follows up his cry with the proviso that he should be allowed to speak as his madness prompts him. We can perhaps equate this stage of his madness with the 'wrong things said', by which Celsus says patients earn their beatings and starvation.[13] Celsus does, however, make the distinction between the greatly insane and the mildly mad, and suggests different, gentler treatments for those for whom there is actual hope of relief from their suffering. And it is into this category, of the curable insane, that Propertius most commonly places himself. Despite his occasional protests of the hopelessness of his condition, Propertius does hope for a cure, and will undertake the appropriate treatments for a man with a mild affliction and a chance for improvement.

Of the gentler cures which Celsus suggests, two in particular stand out as especially appropriate to the 'young-man-about-town' *persona* of the Roman elegist: travel abroad for the victim, and direction of the sufferer's attention to arts and culture. And it is with these two remedies that Propertius repeatedly attempts to cure his own love-madness.

Celsus suggests that, if the sufferer is not totally incapacitated by his affliction, mental illness might be eased by regular and repeated travel: *mutare debere regiones et, si mens redit, annua peregrinatione esse iactandos* ('Locations ought to be changed and, if the mind should return, locations ought to be altered by annual trips', 3.18.23). It is interesting to note that Cicero also suggests travel to foreign parts as a potential cure for the madness inspired by love: *loci denique mutatione tamquam aegroti non convalescentes saepe curandus est* ('Finally, he might be cured by a change of scene, as with a sick man who is not getting well quickly', *Tusc. Disp.* 4.35.74).[14] And it is this same method by which Propertius attempts to relieve his sufferings from his attachment to Cynthia.

Often Propertius' wish to travel may seem only a frantic wish to escape from the immediate tortures of association with Cynthia, as seems to be the case in 1.1 when he begs to be allowed to flee from her: *ferte per extremas gentes et ferte per undas, / qua non ulla meum femina norit iter* ('Carry me

[13] Again, Shackleton Bailey's opinion differs, as he [12] 6 believes that this line refers simply to crying out with pain as the treatments are applied.

[14] Horace would not agree: *caelum, non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt* ('They change their skies, not their souls, who run away across the sea', *Epist.* 1.11.27).

through the furthest nations and over the waves, in any way so that the woman can't discern the route', 29f.).[15] As well, in 1.17 Propertius portrays himself as having *attempted* to flee from Cynthia: *quoniam potui fugisse puellam* ('since I was able to flee from the girl', 1). He is now suffering the consequences of that daring: *nunc ego desertas alloquor alcyonas* ('Now, I address my words to the birds of the deserted shore', 2). It is probably because of the frightful consequences which the lover experiences when he does attempt to flee Cynthia that Propertius actually refuses an invitation to go abroad in 1.6, on the grounds that it will not do him any good: *an mihi sit tanti doctas cognoscere Athenas / atque Asiae veteres cernere divitias* ('What good would it do me to see learned Athens and the ancient wealth of Asia?', 13f.). This refusal comes when he is most in thrall to Cynthia, and most subject to her powers. He seems to have no wish for a cure at this time, and accepts that it is his fate to love in this way: *me sine, quem semper voluit fortuna iacere* ('[You will go] without me, whom Fortune has always wished to knock around', 1.6.25). Still later, in 2.30, Propertius does seem to accept that simple flight will not help him: *quo fugis, a demens? Nulla est fuga: tu licet usque ad Tanain fugias, usque / sequetur Amor* ('Whither are you fleeing, madman? There is no flight! You could flee to Tanais, and Love would follow', 1f.).

It is really only in the later portions of his corpus that Propertius *really* begins to desire the cure for his disease, and turn again to the cures he suggested for himself in 1.1. In 3.21, Propertius seems to once again be pondering flight, hoping to escape from the tortures of life and love with Cynthia: *magnum iter ad doctas proficisci cogor Athenas, / ut me longa gravi solvat amore via* ('I have to go on a journey to learned Athens, so that I might be freed of a troublesome love by a long journey', 1f.). At this point, however, flight may be more effective, as the lover has definitely decided to free himself from love:

> crescit enim assidue spectando cura puellae:
> ipse alimenta sibi maxima praebet amor.
> Omnia sunt temptata mihi, quacumque fugari
> posset: at ex omnia me premit ipse deus.
> (Prop. 3.21.3-6)
> Care for the girl grows by continual gazing:
> Love offers the most food to itself.
> I have tried everything, by which it could be escaped,
> but the god himself presses on me after all.

[15] As Cairns [1] 107 notes, a wish to escape from the company of others was often also regarded as a *symptom* of madness in antiquity. Probably both Celsus and Cicero are not expecting the patient to go into isolation, but simply to change scene.

He is now determined to cure himself, and has decided that travel, that is, escape, really can be the answer: *unum erit auxilium: mutatis Cynthia terris quantum oculis, animo tam procul ibit amor* ('There will be only one cure: love will be as far from my spirit as Cynthia is from my sight', 3.21.9).[16]

But this time there is an added aspect to Propertius' plan to escape from love: he is not *only* going to escape. He is instead determined to fill his mind with other things in order to leave no room for thoughts of Cynthia and his passion for her. In the last section of the poem, Propertius sets out his plan for studying philosophy, art and literature in Athens:

> Illic vel stadiis animum emendare Platonis
> incipiam aut hortis, docte Epicure, tuis:
> persequar aut studium linguae, Demosthenis arma,
> librorumque tuos, docte Menandre, sales;
> aut certe tabulae capient mean lumina pictae,
> sive ebore exacte, seu magis aere, manus.
>
> (Prop. 3.21.25-30)
>
> There I shall begin to improve my mind in Plato's playing field,
> or your garden, learned Epicurus.
> Or I shall take up the study of speaking, Demosthenes' weapons,
> or the wit of your books, clever Menander.
> Or surely painted pictures will take my eye,
> or worked ivory or, even better, bronze.

And in this determination to occupy his mind with other pursuits, and dedicate himself to learning as a cure for his madness, Propertius is once again following contemporary medical practices, as would, not much later, be described by Celsus:

> Ad melior mens eius adducenda. Interdum etiam elicienda ipsius intentio; ut fit in hominibus studiosis litterarum, quibus liber legitur aut recte, si delectantur, aut perperem, si id ipsum eos offendit: emendando enim convertere animum incipiunt. Quin etiam recitare, si qua meminerunt, cogendi sunt.
>
> (*Artes* 3.18.11)
>
> The mind is to be turned towards better things. Meanwhile, also, his interest is to be engaged, as may happen in men fond of literature, to whom a book may be read either rightly, if that is pleasing, or wrongly if it annoys them, for by correcting they begin to turn the mind. And they should be forced to recite, if they remember anything.

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[16] In this poem, for the first time Propertius seems to take a positive view of travel upon the sea, and is actually looking forward to the pleasures of the journey, which he outlines in lines 11-24.

And once again we find the same corrective recommended by Cicero for those suffering from love, as by medical opinion for those suffering from madness: *abducendus etiam est non numquam ad alia studia, sollicitudines, curas, negotia* ('Often he is to be distracted to other pursuits, worries, cares and items of business', *Tusc. Disp.* 4.35.74). This same cure for madness is the one which Propertius chooses to apply to his own illness of love. He is going to occupy his mind with difficult and obscure subjects of cultural significance, in order to fill in the space that love and his obsession with Cynthia have occupied. He has finally seen the wisdom of getting completely away from Cynthia and the circumstances of his obsession, and creating a new mental and emotional life for himself. It is clear that, by book 3, Propertius has identified his affliction as not the raging madness for which tortures and confinement are necessary. This milder approach of travelling away from the scene of trouble, and occupying the mind with serious academic pursuits, seems rather more appropriate and effective. For shortly after planning his 'study tour' of Athens, Propertius pronounces himself cured of love: *vulneraque ad sanum nunc coiere mea* ('Now my wounds come together towards health', 3.24.17). Propertius uses the imagery of travel to describe his return to health throughout 3.24, but also announces that he has returned to sanity *non ferro, non igne coactus* ('not forced by iron or fire', 3.24.11). The poet finds himself restored to mental health and sanity not through extreme treatments, but through the mildest cures any doctors or laymen can think of.

Propertius takes the imagery of love as an illness, especially a mental illness, which had been used by a number of authors of his time, and turns it towards himself. Other Latin authors, such as Lucretius or Cicero or, later, Ovid, use the imagery of mental illness to describe other men.[17] Propertius, however, turns this onto himself, bringing the imagery of love into his own version of real life. This importing of literary imagery into real life is reinforced by the poet's use of contemporary medical commonplaces to describe the cures he attempts for his condition. Love as a form of madness is no longer fictional or theoretical: love is madness, Propertius is himself the madman, and the poet is also the physician, prescribing cures for his own affliction of love.

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[17] The idea of love as an illness is always and only applied to men. Women's erotic madness is usually described, in Latin poetry, in terms of divine possession, usually similar to Bacchic possession. Propertius himself uses this imagery to describe Cynthia a number of times (e.g., 1.3, 3.8, 4.8), Vergil uses it of Dido in *Aeneid* 4.300-03 and Catullus of Ariadne in poem 64. The same treatment of a woman in love is later found in the *Ciris* of the *Appendix Vergiliana*.

URBS SATIRICA: THE CITY IN ROMAN SATIRE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HORACE AND JUVENAL

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Abstract. Roman satire with its acknowledged debt to comedy explores, reflects and comments on the tensions that existed between country folk and their urban cousins. Both Horace and Juvenal are concerned with the relationships between *urbs* and *rus*. While Horatian satire takes a more gentle approach, the satire of Juvenal on life in the metropolis seems intent on subverting official Roman views and on volatilising those ideals epitomised by the goddess Roma.

Introduction

Historians of Athens such as Simon Hornblower and Anton Powell make the point that clashes between the interests of the town and country are natural and inevitable.[1] They also indicate that part of the aim of the developed democratic constitution of Athens was to minimise the destructive effects of this rivalry. At Rome it seems unlikely that the risk was appreciated or that any such conscious political effort to massage the rift between town and country was made, despite the fact that there were thirty-one rural and four urban tribes. The authors of the Greek world in Athens and elsewhere were aware of this rift and exploited it in various ways: Hesiod talks of Justice being 'dragged perforce, when bribe-eating men pull her about, and judge their cases with crooked decisions. She follows perforce, weeping, to the city and gatherings of people'[2] (*Op.* 220-28); Dikaiopolis, the honest countryman of Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, complains of the profiteering and war-mongering of citified politicians, diplomats and generals (*passim*, but esp. 1-42); Euripides' Autourgos in the *Electra* is the only honourable soul in the play, 'one of nature's gentlemen' (esp. 368-400), according to the cynical and uncomprehending Orestes; in the *Dyskolos* of Menander there is immediate suspicion on the part of the country folk, Gorgias and Daos, of the motives of Sostratos, the rich young man from town, in approaching Gorgias' half-sister Myrrhine ('Is that him in the fancy cloak?' 'That's him.' 'He's up to no good; you can see that at a glance!', 255-59).

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[1] S. Hornblower, *The Greek World: 479-323 B.C.* (London 1983) and A. Powell, *Constructing Greek Political and Social History from 478 B.C.* (London 1988).

[2] R. Lattimore (tr.), *Hesiod* (Ann Arbor 1959) 45.

This latter type of prejudice is perpetuated in Roman comedy—and thence in Roman satire—in the Plautine and Terentian imitations of their New Comic models.[3] Ultimately this literary exploitation of the rift between town and country expresses itself vividly in that most urban/e of genres, the Pastoral, both in Greece and in Rome, in the works of Theocritus and Vergil, and most vividly perhaps in Rome, in another quintessentially urban/e genre, that of Roman satire.

In the Roman satiric discourse, with its acknowledged debt to comedy (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.1-7), this prejudice and its exploitation is facilitated, strengthened and complicated by a mindset that appears to be especially Roman and which may help to explain the complaisance of the aristocratic Roman politician to the town/country split. For it is a remarkable paradox that the megalopolis of Rome should trace its military and moral greatness to specifically rustic origins, at least in the works of those authors in both the republic and under the empire who gave voice to the 'official' or 'traditional' truth, or who exploited that 'truth' for their own ends, or who, because of their own preoccupations and agenda, reacted against it. As exemplars of the former we have Cato Maior, a massive influence on subsequent reactionary literature, in which category Juvenal's *Satires* may tentatively be placed, and Horace, when in official mode—and sometimes, but more problematically, when *not* in his official mode—and, of course, there is everybody's antidote to Juvenal, Pliny the Younger. Cato's *De Agri Cultura* contains the following, where farmers are compared with citified merchants and usurers:

> At ex agricolis et viri fortissimi et milites strenuissimi gignuntur, maximeque pius quaestus stabilissimusque consequitur minimeque invidiosus, minimeque male cogitantes sunt qui in eo studio occupati sunt.
>
> (Cato, *Agr. Orig. praef.*)
>
> On the other hand it is from the farming class that the bravest men and sturdiest soldiers come, their calling is most assured and free from crime and is looked on with the least hostility, and those who are engaged in that pursuit are least inclined to think evil thoughts.[4]

Horace, *Carmina* 3.6 harks back nostalgically/ironically/humorously to an earlier time, closer to the earth, and to a virtue and a virtuous race far removed in behaviour from the alleged sexual depravity and licence of his

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[3] For example, the attitude of the rustic slave Sceparnio to the urban Plesidippus at the beginning of Plautus' *Rudens* and Laches' preference for a quiet country life in Terence's *Hecyra* .

[4] Virtually the same sentiments are repeated by Columella, *De Re Rustica* 1 *praef.* 13f. in the first century CE.

contemporaries. The tone and subject matter are remarkably anticipatory of Juvenal's sixth satire:

> non his iuventus orta parentibus
> infecit aequor sanguine Punico
> Pyrrhumque et ingentem cecidit
> Antiochum Hannibalemque dirum;
> sed rusticorum mascula militum
> proles, Sabellis docta ligonibus
> versare glebas et severae
> matris ad arbitrium recisos
> portare fustes, sol ubi montium
> mutaret umbras et iuga demeret
> bobus fatigatis, amicum
> tempus agens abeunte curru.
>
> (Horace, *Carm.* 3.6.33-44)
>
> Not sprung from these parents the young men who stained the sea with Punic blood, felled Pyrrhus, mighty Antiochus and dread Hannibal; rather a manly race of yeoman soldiery skilled at turning the sod with Sabine hoe and at the matriarch's stern request carrying fresh cut firewood, when the sun made shadows shift upon the mountainside, removed the yoke from oxen that were tired and drove nigh the friendly time with his departing chariot.

Pliny the Younger, in a manner reminiscent of Horace in his 'Sabine' mood, complains of the bustle and din of the city and praises the peace and quiet of country and seaside resorts so conducive to his perpetual *studium*,[5] but, with an inconsistency parallel to that of Horace, is adamant that the city is nevertheless a nursemaid to the arts, *si quando urbs nostra liberalibus studiis floruit, nunc maxime floret* ('If ever the city flowered with the liberal arts, it does so now!', *Ep.* 1.10). As a lawyer Pliny is presumably well acquainted with the seamier side of city life. He does not dwell excessively on it, although his favourite whipping boy, Regulus, does provide material for quasi-satirical comment on legacy hunting at *Epistulae* 2.20.12, while *delatores* are taken to task at 4.9 and the corruption caused by the organisation of games at Vienne is the subject of 4.22.7, where harsh comment is made on the corrosive influence of the Roman example: *utque in corporibus sic in imperio gravissimus est morbus, qui a capite diffunditur* ('As in our bodies so in the empire the most serious diseases are those which spread from the head.'). Clearly the fulminations of Juvenal against the evils of city life, especially the priority of *panem et circenses*, are not entirely without precedent or perhaps foundation, judging by the comments

[5] Pliny, *Epistles* 1.9 on the distracting bustle and triviality of city life; cf. *Ep.* 2.9 and 7.3.

of this pillar of the establishment and expounder (though sometimes ironical) of official, that is to say of imperial 'truth'.

Horace

What then of the split between city and country and the concept of the city itself in the *Satires* of Horace? As one would expect in as complex a text as that provided by Horace's *Satires* the dichotomy is not nearly as simple as town/bad and country/good. Some of the complexities of the dialectic were pointed out by Brink in 1965 with reference to Horace, *Satires* 2.6,[6] while I myself commented on the fraught nature of the relationship between town and country with reference to *Satires* 2.2 in an article in 1980[7] and with reference to *Satires* 2.6 in 1985.[8]

One of the good things about city life, however, is the fact that it provides Horace with one of his prime *desiderata*, an audience that is *doctus* ('learned'); this is made clear in *Satires* 1.10:

> Plotius et Varius, Maecenas Vergiliusque,
> Valgius, et probet haec Octavius, optimus atque
> Fuscus, et haec utinam Viscorum laudet uterque!
> ambitione relegata te dicere possum,
> Pollio, te, Messalla, tuo cum fratre, simulque
> vos, Bibule et Servi, simul his te, candide Furni,
> compluris alios, doctos ego quos et amicos
> prudens praetereo.
>
> (Hor. *Sat.* 1.10.81-88.)
>
> Let Plotius and Varius, Maecenas and Vergil and Valgius approve these things, and Octavius and noble Fuscus, and would that each of the Visci praises them! And with no hint of flattery I can name you Pollio and Messalla, along with your brother, and at the same time you, Bibulus and Servius, and candid Furnus along with them, and any amount more whom I must pass over consciously, learned friends, each and every one.

This *desideratum*, however, becomes identified as an actual ideal, when the 'ideal audience' itself is transported away from *fumum et opes strepitumque*

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[6] C. O. Brink, 'On Reading a Horatian Satire: An Interpretation of *Sermones* II 6', *The Sixth Todd Memorial Lecture* (Sydney 1965) 3-19, and A. J. Dunstan (ed.), *Essays on Roman Culture* (Toronto 1976) 75-94.

[7] R. P. Bond, 'The Characterisation of Ofellus in Horace, *Satires* 2.2 and a Note on v. 213', *Antichthon* 14 (1980) 112-26.

[8] R. P. Bond, 'Dialectic, Eclectic and Myth(?) in Horace *Satires* 2.6', *Antichthon* 19 (1985) 68-86.

Romae ('the smoke and wealth and din of Rome', *Carm.* 3.29.12) to Horace's country retreat in the Sabine hills, so that Horace can enjoy *noctes cenaeque deum* ('nights and banquets of the gods', *Sat.* 2.6.65), where the after dinner chat concentrates on important matters, on:

> utrumne
> divitiis homines an sint virtute beati;
> quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos;
> et quae sit natura boni summumque quid eius.
> (Hor. *Sat.* 2.6.73-76)
> Whether men are blessed through riches or virtue; what induces us to make friends, expediency or righteousness; what is the nature of the good and what is its highest form.

Conversation in town on the other hand is dedicated to trivia, to fashion and the theatre (2.6.70-72.). In addition, the folly, the discomforts and dangers of the kind of city life which is based upon illusory benefits and a false set of values are represented in the tale of the town mouse and the country mouse at the end of 2.6 and are contrasted with the true values to be derived from an Epicurean life of calm and rustic withdrawal. Similarly in *Satires* 2.2, although no wholehearted approval is given in the text to the reactionary ethics of Ofellus—he would have had no truck with any such Greek nonsense as Epicureanism—Ofellus' rejection of the trivial pursuits of the city folk with their dedication to illusory appearances and ephemeral fashion (2.2, esp. 4-7, 50-52) seems to be consistent with the more hostile of Horace's own attitudes to city life. In fact, in attacking devotion to 'fashion' in the city Horace through the medium of Ofellus anticipates the work of the German sociologist Georg Simmel who, writing in the 1920s, declared:

> Finally, man is tempted to adopt the most tendentious peculiarities, that is, the specifically metropolitan extravagances of mannerism, caprice, and preciousness. Now, the meaning of these extravagances does not at all lie in the contents of such behaviour, but rather in the form of *being different*, of standing out in a striking manner and thereby attracting attention. For many character types, ultimately the only means of saving themselves some modicum of self-esteem and the sense of filling a position is indirect, through the awareness of others.[9]

[9] G. Simmel, 'The Metropolis and the Mental Life' in R. Sennett (ed.), *Classic Essays on the Culture of Cities* (New York 1969) 57.

Simmel explains such extravagances as part of a flight from anonymity and a fight towards individualism, within the anonymous metropolitan mass, precisely those characteristics of behaviour which Horace, via 'Ofellus', in the gustatory context, condemns as a slavish devotion to fashion. One might also compare the strictly urban and modish behaviour of Persius' literary dilettantes in his first satire, and the misguided and would-be modish nouveau riche extravagances of Trimalchio in the *Satyricon*.

Simmel's theories might also suggest that one of the attractions of city life for Horace, despite acknowledged disadvantages was the possibility of making some kind of an individual and permanent mark (*exegi monumentum aere perennius*, 'I have built a monument more lasting than bronze', *Carm.* 3.30.1) through his poetry and its learned audience, in the massed and anonymous megalopolitan society where such individuation was extraordinarily difficult. The paradox is that the ideal environment for the poetical creative process conducive to achieving such an immortality was the country, or more precisely the *urbs in rure* which was the 'rustic' retreat—rudely invaded and disrupted in *Satires* 2.3 by the determinedly urban and Stoic Damasippus—while the city provided the necessary audience to provide the desired acclaim and a kind of immortality.

Simmel's theories help us furthermore to understand Horace's devotion to the ideal of friendship, as expressed in the *Satires* in 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 and re-emphasised in 2.6 and in the first book of the *Epistles*;[10] Simmel suggests that a major characteristic of metropolitan life is 'the brevity and scarcity of inter-human contacts granted to the metropolitan man, as compared with social intercourse in a small town'.[11] Accordingly, the yearning for meaningful contact or friendship is the more poignant in the urban environment, while the rage at the abuse of a friendship achieved is the more extreme, as is indicated by *Satires* 1.9, where the social climber endeavours to exploit Horace's friendship with Maecenas for his own selfish ends. Here Horace anticipates in a mild fashion the abuse of the patron/client relationship, properly a bastion of urban society, which is later paid so much savage attention in the *Satires* of Juvenal.

Other disadvantages attendant upon friendship in the urban environment, especially friendship with the great figures of the day, are the pressures brought to bear by that very friendship upon the lesser partner. As well as suffering the ill-informed jealousy of the urban mass, Horace, the high flier (*Fortunae filius*,

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[10] On this topic see R. S. Kilpatrick, *The Poetry of Friendship: Horace, Epistles 1* (Edmonton 1986).

[11] Simmel [9] 58.

'Fortune's son', *Sat.* 2.6.49), despite being *libertino patre natus* ('born a freedman's son', *Sat.* 1.6.6, 45f.), suffers also from being treated by that same mass as a source of information from on high. This is particularly well illustrated by *Satires* 2.6.20-62, esp. 51-62:

> quicumque obvius est me consulit: 'o bone, nam te
> scire, deos quoniam propius contingis, oportet,
> numquid de Dacis audisti?' nil equidem. 'ut tu
> semper eris derisor!' at omnes di exagitant me
> si quicquam. 'quid, militibus promissa Triquetra
> praedia Caesar an est Itala tellure daturus?'
> iurantem me scire nihil mirantur ut unum
> scilicet egregii mortalem altique silenti.
> perditur haec inter misero lux non sine votis:
> o rus, quando ego te aspiciam, quando licebit
> nunc veterum libris, nunc somno et inertibus horis,
> ducere sollicitae iucunda oblivia vitae?
>
> (Hor. *Sat.* 2.6.51-62)
>
> Whoever I meet asks me: 'I say old man, you must know, being so close to the gods—heard anything about the Dacians?' Nothing at all. 'You always were a bit of a joker!' May all the gods punish me if I do. 'Well then, is Caesar going to give the booty he promised the soldiers from confiscations in Sicily or from Italian land?' When I swear ignorance they are amazed at me as an individual of extraordinary and unfathomable discretion. The whole day is wasted in this nonsense, while all the time I pray, 'O countryside, when shall I see you again? When will I be able to induce oblivion of all these hassles of life by means of the ancient authors, sleep and some hours devoted to leisure?

Gone is the Epicurean ideal of the quiet city life—a paradox in itself?—depicted at the close of *Satires* 1.6, with its picture of a time before friendship with the great brought both the benefit and retreat of the Sabine farm and also the necessity for it. By then official urban *officia* and unofficial *molestiae* needed to be endured with an almost Stoic fortitude, until the next session of rustic rest and recreation came around.

Satires 2.5 identifies the city as a place where legacy hunters prosper. Davus suggests in 2.7 that Horace is as much an urban slave to Maecenas as he, Davus, is himself to Horace. Horace is displeased with this notion and accordingly threatens Davus with exile to hard labour on Horace's country estate. The country is an ideal resort for the privileged urbanite on his 'life-style' block, but not so for his slaves. Confirming, however, Horace's ambivalent/opportunistic attitude to the provinces and their values is *Satires* 1.5, where the provincials are often depicted with disdain, especially when they attempt favourably to impress the VIPs who have descended upon them from

Rome. The comic description of the urban dinner party of 2.8 satirises both host and guests, and the manners of both.

The city then is the chief, but not exclusive setting of Horatian satire. It is not a target in itself, since the city does not seem to figure in the poet's consciousness, in the *Satires* at least,[12] as an entity in itself. Moreover, Horace's *Satires* cannot be understood without reference to the dialectic which takes place in the satirical discourse between the concepts of town and country and the dynamic which exists between them, both in the literary tradition and the historical reality—if such a latter distinction is at all valid. Nor can Horatian satire be understood without reference to the fact that in these poems Horace reproduces in some respects the unofficial voice of the ruling regime. The case with Juvenal is both similar and different.

Juvenal

The similarity lies in the fact that Juvenal does exploit the Cat(at)onic tradition of the rift between town and country, most obviously in *Satire* 3, although the precise nature of that particular exploitation is not at all obvious. The major difference lies in the fact that Juvenal, by contrast with Horace, both depicts himself as, and presumably was, in fact, an outsider vis-à-vis the political establishment, was a member of that class depicted by himself as being progressively more marginalised by the incursions into the city of successful Greeks, Egyptians and other undesirable aliens.

It is the notion that Juvenal represents, presents in a fresh and challenging way, the voices of a section of urban Roman society which was being progressively marginalised, that I wish to explore initially,[13] using some ideas derived from the French theorist Jean Baudrillard; subsequently I will explore Juvenal's treatment of the city and city life in the light of the sociological theories of Simmel, again, and more particularly of Oswald Spengler.

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[12] Hor. *Carm.* 3.3.43f. (*triumphatisque possit / Roma ferox dare iura Medis*, 'let fierce Rome be able to impose laws on the defeated Medes') might suggest a different attitude in Horace's more official poetry.

[13] Some of S. Braund's views on the fictive satirist as expressed, for example in *Beyond Anger: A Study of Juvenal's Third Book of Satires* (Oxford 1988) and in *Juvenal: Satires Book 1* (Cambridge 1996), though clearly argued and imaginative, do seem extreme. Nevertheless, her work, along with that of W. S. Anderson, *Essays on Roman Satire* (Princeton 1982) does stand as a useful corrective to the excessively biographical criticism exemplified by the work of Gilbert Highet and Peter Green.

From the days of the republic attempts had been made to present an 'official' image of Rome. At the time of the Punic Wars coins were issued bearing the head of Roma on the obverse and the figure of Victory on the reverse to encourage the belief that ultimately Rome would prevail over her enemies.[14] Throughout the republican period this type of iconography on coins was common, until such time as individual citizens came to think of their own interests as being at least as important as those of the state or coincident with them. During the civil wars, when Rome was divided against herself, the heads of individual combatants appeared on coins which were specially issued as exercises in propaganda to boost the profiles of the various dynasts. After the final victory of Augustus the coins were peopled by the emperor and his family, indicating the identification of the *princeps*' interests with those of the state. Augustus so much identified his interests with that of Roma that temples were dedicated to this sacred pairing, as is reported by Suetonius:

> Templa, quamvis sciret etiam proconsularibus decerni solere, nulla tamen provincia nisi communi suo Romaeque nomine recepit. nam in urbe quidem pertinacissime abstinuit hoc honore. . . .
>
> (Suet. *Aug.* 52)
>
> Although well aware that it was usual to vote temples even to proconsuls, he would not accept one even in a province save jointly in his own name and that of Rome. In the city itself he refused this honour most emphatically. . . .[15]

Temples had been dedicated to Roma in the provinces at least as long ago as 171 BCE as is reported by Livy,[16] while Tacitus has Tiberius gaining political capital at *Annals* 4.37 from refusing to emulate even Augustus' modest example in this area.

The goddess Roma is represented in a variety of media: on a silver cup of the late first century CE from Boscoreale she appears helmeted, her foot resting on a helmet, and, originally, wielding a spear. On the 'Gemma Augustea' of about 41 CE she sits in state beside Augustus in a grouping similar to the easy companionability of Ariadne and Dionysus depicted on the famous Pronomos Vase in Naples, and is again depicted in military apparel, while similar

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[14] See, for example, the didrachm illustrated and described by C. H. V. Sutherland, *Roman Coins* (London 1951) 27 figs 31f., also figs 33-36, 50f.

[15] J. C. Rolfe (tr.), *Suetonius* (Cambridge, Mass. 1951).

[16] *Alabandenses templum Urbis Romae se fecisse commemoravere Indosque anniversarios ei divae instituisse* ('The delegates from Alabanda reported that they had dedicated a temple to the "city of Rome", and had established annual games in honour of that Goddess', 43.6).

personifications on a monumental scale are a common feature of triumphal arches. Roma appears in mutilated condition on the keystone of the Arch of Titus, while she appears again in full panoply on the left panel of the archway, escorting the emperor in his triumphal chariot. The representation stays constant through the imperial period and she appears in similar fashion on the Arches of Septimius Severus and of Constantine. On the frieze of the former she is seated while 'a cortege of captives and of wagons laden with booty and trophies'[17] advances towards her. On the keystone of the latter she is again represented seated, while in a relief of the period of Marcus Aurelius, on the north facade, first panel from the left,[18] there is the entry of the emperor into Rome, accompanied again by Roma, with a winged *Fortuna Redux* hovering in the background.

All of these representations are strongly reminiscent of Minerva. They portray a figure exuding intelligence, dignity and military prowess. There is a certain severity of expression which is tempered by a responsible concern, even kindness for her succession of imperial companions and clemency towards the conquered. The iconography of the goddess Roma, therefore, indicates an official and idealised view of what constitutes *Romanitas*, a personification of the virtues that had made and kept Rome great, while the monuments themselves were a public demonstration by the emperors of the permanency and majesty of Rome.

This was the 'official' truth of the public splendour, behind which for many, however, even for the majority of citizens—though not the Plinys of that time—lay a world of private squalor and danger. There is no iconography representative of their plight. There was no Roman Hogarth, as far as we know, to depict the plight of the underprivileged. What does exist is the satire of Juvenal and also the *Satyricon* of Petronius in which an alternative or 'unofficial' truth is presented to the reader in vivid, almost pictorial, terms. For Juvenal Rome is unjust, hostile—*iniqua*: *nam quis iniquae / tam patiens urbis, tam ferreus, ut teneat se* . . . ('For who is so tolerant of this god-forsaken city, so iron hearted, that he can control himself, when . . .', Juv. 1.30f.). The busy street of the first satire assail Juvenal's reader with images in quick succession of corruption, of forgers, poisoners, adulterers, deviants, dole bludgers, gamblers, gluttons and Greeks. Simmel's concept of the overstimulation of the senses in the urban environment is illustrated perfectly here, even as it is, in an even more marked and cinematographic manner, in the street scenes of *Satire* 3. Temples there may be to Pax and Fides and Victoria and Virtus (Juv. 1.115),

[17] D. Strong, *Roman Sculpture* (London 1911) 299.

[18] E. Nash, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (New York 1967) 111.

but it is money that is worshipped and wealth that is the criterion of excellence in the city where 'honesty is praised and freezes' (*probitas laudatur et alget*, 1.74), where according to *Satire* 2 every street abounds in *tristibus obscaenis* ('gloomy debauchees', 2.8f.) and Roma receives lessons in morality from hirsute homosexual hypocrites (*habeat iam Roma pudorem, / tertius e caelo cecidit Cato*, 'Let Rome regain her modesty; a third Cato has fallen from heaven', 2.39f.) according to the savage irony and indignation of Laronia, a woman of the streets. Creticus is taken to task in the same passage because his transparent dress is an affront especially to the countryfolk who have come to the city to hear him (2.71-76). There is a disease abroad which has reached crisis point, as the poet claims at *Satire* 1.149 (*omne in praecipiti vitium stetit*, 'every vice now stands a crisis point') and, as in Pliny, *Epistles* 4.2.7, so too in Juvenal's second satire Rome is the seat and source of corruption:

> dedit hanc contagio labem
> et dabit in plures, sicut grex totus in agris
> unius scabie cadit et porrigine porci
> uvaque conspecta livorem ducit ab uva.
>
> (Juv. 2.78-81)
>
> Infection spread this plague,
> And will spread it further still, just as a single
> Scabby pig in the field brings death to the whole herd,
> Or the touch of one blighted grape will blight the bunch.

The translation is that of Peter Green,[19] who in a note on this passage refers to J. R. C. Martyn's preference of *contacta* for *conspecta*: 'Martyn . . . opts for the reading of V10, *contacta*, which he supports by the argument that J. was deliberately echoing, with satirical intent, the plague imagery in Vergil's *Georgics* (3.440-566)';[20] this, if true, might provide an interesting sidelight on Juvenal's attitude to the 'official' poets of the Augustan period and even on their idealisation of the countryside. Be that as it may, the imagery of corruption in this passage is ironically rustic and derived from the honest countryside, which is now itself at risk of infection from the city. Later in *Satire* 2 the horror aroused in the poet by the homosexual wedding of lines 117-26 is expressed again by means of a further reference to Rome's mythic and rustic origins: *o pater urbis, / unde nefas tantum Latiis pastoribus?* ('O father of our city, whence came such a great monstrosity on our Latin shepherds?'). Rome,

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[19] P. Green (tr.), *The Satires of Juvenal* (Harmondsworth 1967) 83.

[20] J. R. C. Martyn, 'Juvenal 2.78-81 and Vergil's Plague', *CPh* 65 (1970) 49f.

however, not only corrupts the countryside which gave her birth, but also the world which she has conquered, if that world is brought within range:

> sed quae nunc populi fiunt victoris in urbe,
> non faciunt illi quos vicimus. et tamen unus
> Armenius Zalaces cunctis narratur ephebis
> mollior ardenti sese indulsisse tribuno.
> aspice quid faciant commercia: venerat obses,
> hic fiunt homines. nam si mora longior urbem
> indulsit pueris, non umquam derit amator;
> mittentur bracae cultelli frena flagellum;
> sic praetextatos referunt Artaxata mores.
>
> (Juv. 2.162-70)
>
> [B]ut what takes place in the people's victorious city would never be done by those we have conquered. And yet one Armenian, Zalaces, is reputed to be more effete than all our young men and to have indulged a lusty tribune. Just see what intercourse brings! He came as a hostage, here they become men. If they are indulged with a longer stay in our city they are never short on lovers. Their trousers, their knives, their bridles and whips will be thrown away and they will take the customs of our youth back to Artaxata.

It is in the third satire, however, that Juvenal concentrates on the city and enlarges on the ideas regarding the city which are anticipated in the previous two poems. The language of moral corruption and disease formerly descriptive of the citizens/victims of the city in the first and second satires is now applied also to the city itself. The city is a death trap subject to conflagration and collapse—*incendia* and *lapsus* and *ruina*, all of which are also terms capable of describing an emotional or moral state. The city is personified, but in a manner far removed from the dignified figure of the monumental Roma. That monumental Roma was the self-conscious creation of the governing group which had a particular agenda in mind, exploiting what Spengler suggests arises naturally and inevitably, namely the 'town-figure'; as Spengler puts it: 'Thenceforward, in addition to the individual house, the temple, the cathedral, and the palace, the "town-figure" itself becomes a unit objectively expressing the form-language and the style-history that accompanies the Culture throughout its life-course'.[21]

In Juvenal's *Satires*, however, there is more especially the poor man's truth, more real and immediate for him than any imperial propaganda. Truth itself is volatilised by the creation of competing hyper-realities, as it is today by the conflicts between 'official' (read 'political') truth and the truth of the mass

[21] O. Spengler, 'The Soul of the City', in R. Sennett (ed.), *Classic Essays on the Culture of Cities* (New York 1969) 66.

media, of tabloid journalism and television and crusading art. New Zealand, for example, has a 'clean green' image sedulously cultivated by government agencies and is touted as a 'wonderful place to bring up kids'. It is 'clean and green', but only because of a minuscule population and a benevolent climate rather than through any enlightened environmental policy, and it is a great place to bring up kids if the kids belong to a white, wealthy middle to upper class family and are not Maori, Samoan, Fijian or belong to beneficiaries supported by the state or to the unemployed. The film of Alan Duff's novel 'Once Were Warriors' and the novel itself volatilises the received truths by daring to present an alternative reality of its own, of poverty, desperation and the consequent domestic violence.

The tone of Juvenal's third satire is problematic, but Spengler's theories may prove helpful. The difficulties begin in the introduction to the poem where the narrator's attitude to Umbricius is unclear, as it is at the end. Despite a protestation of friendship there is a barb in *laudo tamen, vacuis quod sedem figere Cumis / destinet atque unum civem donare Sibyllae* ('Still, I praise his intent to settle at Cumae and give one fellow citizen at least to the Sibyl', 3.2f.). Although Umbricius is not a true rustic, he does share with the rustic characterised by Spengler both a sort of dislocation from and lack of sympathy with the city as it has developed: 'And the yokel stands helpless on the pavement, understanding nothing and understood by nobody, tolerated as a useful type in farce and provider of this world's daily bread'.[22] Umbricius, parallel in his prejudices to Spengler's yokel is a 'useful type' in satire, giving voice to an extreme view not necessarily shared by the poet. Similarly, Horace is not in total sympathy with the effusions of Ofellus or Damasippus and Stertinius. Why, however, if life is so awful in the city does Juvenal not follow Umbricius into the rustic sunset? Spengler again:

> Once the full sinful beauty of this last marvel of all history has captured a victim, it never lets him go. Primitive folk can loose themselves from the soil and wander, but the intellectual nomad never. Homesickness for the great city is keener than any other nostalgia. Home is for him any one of these giant cities, but even the nearest village is alien territory. He would sooner die upon the pavement than go 'back' to the land. Even the disgust at this pretentiousness, weariness of the thousand-hued glitter, the *taedium vitae* that in the end overcomes many, does not set them free. They take the City with them into the mountains or on the sea. They have lost the country within themselves and will never regain it outside.[23]

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[22] Spengler [21] 70.

[23] Spengler [21] 70.

Juvenal is the victim of the city which has with marble and concrete physically concealed and destroyed its earlier rustic and more naive past, an act of vandalism symbolised at 3.17-20 by the 'remaking' of the grove of Egeria. Juvenal may be tortured himself by an atavistic desire to return to the values of the country life, but is realistic enough to realise that any such return is impossible, and anyway he desires elusive success in the city rather than escape. Juvenal's inherited rustic sensibilities are now trapped as he is himself in the megalopolitan environment; indeed, the country is now become simply the environs, the place where the city is not—a subject for pastoral. Accordingly, in *Satire* 3 he empowers the figure of Umbricius to rehearse all the reasons why an honest man should leave the city, when he himself cannot and, simultaneously, he subjects his mouthpiece to a mild ridicule, both in the introduction to the poem and in the urban pastoral of its close.

This is not to say that the strictures against the evils of life in the city are not 'true' from at least one unofficial point of view, that of the poor and unsuccessful man. Spengler again: 'But always the splendid mass-cities harbour lamentable poverty and degraded habits . . . '.[24] One sometimes wonders whether Spengler was taking Juvenal's third satire as his source (*nil habet infelix paupertas durius in se, / quam quod ridiculos homines facit*, 'The very hardest aspect of poverty to bear is that it makes men a laughing stock', 3.152f.) or maybe Dr Johnston's *London* or Heinrich Heine's cynical Harmonia, guardian of Hamburg, in *Deutschland: A Winter's Tale*. We might think ourselves in turn of Fritz Lang's *Metropolis* or Ridley Scott's Los Angeles, so chillingly depicted in *Blade Runner*, or the New York of *Last Exit from Brooklyn*.

Spengler comments also on the sterility of the city and falling urban birth rates in a manner reminiscent of one of Juvenal's main objections to the women who are the targets of *Satire* 6, where they are attacked because they refuse to bear children. In Juvenal's satire the city is particularly the place where women rebel dangerously against their traditional rustic roles of wife and mother, although his depiction of the mythical Golden Age at the beginning of the sixth satire is far from flattering.

Spengler further comments on the lack of real recreative 'play' in the city environment and condemns 'bread and circuses' as trenchantly as Juvenal:

> But the relief of hard, intensive brain-work by its opposite—conscious and practised fooling—of intellectual tension by the bodily tension of sport, of bodily tension by the sensual straining after 'pleasure' and the spiritual straining after the 'excitements' of betting and competitions, of the pure logic

[24] Spengler [21] 79.

> of the day's work by consciously enjoyed mysticism . . . one can find it all in Rome.[25]

Many of these things are part of Juvenal's complaints mouthed by Umbricius in the third satire and by other poetic voices elsewhere in the Juvenalian text. For example, the mysticism of the enthusiastic Eastern religions is scorned in *Satire* 6.314-97 as an excuse for indulgence in sensual pleasure. Horror is expressed at the excesses of gambling in *Satire* 1:

> neque enim loculis comitantibus itur
> ad casum tabulae, posita sed luditur arca.
> proelia quanta illic dispensatore videbis
> armigero. simplexne furor sestertia centum
> perdere et horrenti tunicam non reddere servo?
> (Juv. 1.89-93)
>
> Men go to the gaming tables now accompanied not so much by their wallets as by their entire treasure chest. How great the battles you will see there with the croupier as armour bearer. Is it a simple madness to lose a fortune and not to give a shirt to a shivering slave?

In short, the city is both the essential setting of Juvenalian satire and also is the entity which gives birth and nurture to the vice which it is the satirist's task to explore. More than this, however, the city is itself the subject and the object of Juvenal's satire. Juvenal's satire produces the reverse, perhaps the underside of the imperial coin, an unflattering portrait of Roma, warts and all, or, rather, simply of the warts. The countryside is still present as an idea, but provides no real alternative habitation for a man such a Juvenal. Rustic values do not provide a viable *modus vivendi* for the urban animal, since the urban animal and the rustic animal are recognised now as quintessentially different creatures. There is an awareness of this difference, this tension in Horatian satire also, but the dichotomy has not yet become so marked that no attempt can be made at an accommodation and compromise between the conflicting claims of town and country life. Horace's literary and social success, by contrast with Juvenal's social and literary failure, allowed him, Horace, to make that accommodation and compromise which achieves its finest literary expression in those poems which depict his life on the Sabine Farm. Juvenal remains marginalised in the very city which has become his one and only possible home and lacks the success required to make his urban existence palatable, or capable, even, of being endured.

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[25] Spengler [21] 80.

'HONEY-SWEET CUPS' IN LUCRETIUS, JEROME AND ALAN OF LILLE: *ANTICLAUDIANUS* 7.442F.

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Abstract. Scholars are ever alert to the adaptation of an image by later writers. Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* 1.936-39 provides us with an interesting example of that sort of intertextuality. Both Alan of Lille and Jerome were drawn to his description of cups smeared with honey. For all three writers sweetness can cover up something bitter or dangerous.

As noted by Sheridan in his translation of the *Anticlaudianus*, "Alan . . . considers his adaptation of elements from previous writers one of the great merits of his work."[1] One such adaptation involves an image of cups that have had honey smeared upon their rims in order to entice people to drink up their contents. This is an image that Lucretius used in his didactic poem on Epicureanism, *De Rerum Natura*, to describe the manner he hoped to draw readers to his work:

> sed veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes
> cum dare conantur prius oras pocula circum
> contingunt mellis dulcis Flavoque liquore
> ut puerorum aetas inprovida ludificetur.[2]
>
> (Lucr. 1.936-39)
>
> Thus is it when physicians attempt to dose boys with loathsome wormwood, they first smear the cups with the yellow liquid of sweet honey around the rims so that the boys' short-sighted youthfulness might be deceived.

Lucretius hopes that the charm of his words like honey will attract readers to "swallow" his serious and useful philosophical message.

Several centuries later, Jerome adapted the simile to suit his own purposes. As he was wont to do with all his quotations from Lucretius, he used Lucretius' words to support the position that he himself opposed.[3] In regard to this particular statement, Jerome in two instances "misapplied" its meaning

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[1] J. J. Sheridan, *Alan of Lille: Anticlaudianus* (Toronto 1973) 33.

[2] The Latin text is that of W. H. D. Rouse (ed.), *Lucretius, De Rerum Natura* (Cambridge 1924).

[3] M. V. Ronnick, "Titus Lucretius Carus: *Excerptus Intervallis Insaniae*," *Ceres* 1 (1989) 80-82.

while maintaining its verbal structure. Using such deliberate perversion, Jerome could cleverly lampoon the godless Lucretius and at the same time display his own erudition.

In advising his friend Laeta to protect her daughter Paula from vice, Jerome recast Lucretius' words to read:

> Venena non dantur nisi melle circumlita et vitia non decipiunt nisi sub specie umbraque virtutum.[4]
>
> (Jer. *Ep.* 107)
>
> Poisons are not given unless they are daubed with honey and sins do not deceive unless they come under the guise of shadow of virtues.

Here the honey disguises the flavor, but not of salubrious medicines, but instead of deadly poisons. On another occasion, in *Epistle* 132 written to Ctesiphon, Jerome makes a case against deceptive and heretical writing. There Lucretius' words are quoted verbatim to serve as a general warning to the unwary reader.

The simile appears again in the seventh chapter of the *Anticlaudianus* when Alan of Lille describes the rock where Fortune's house is located (7.405-80). In this case, according to Alan, two streams flow, different in their outward aspect but dangerous both in their effects. The one is pleasurable and addictive, the other raging and ineluctable. The pleasurable rivlet

> predulces habet alter aquas mellitaque donans
> pocula, melle suo multos seducit . . .[5]
>
> (*Anticlaudianus* 7.442f.)
>
> has very sweet waters, and proffering honey-sweet cups, seduces many human beings with its honey . . .

Thus the utility of honey lies in its ability to attract the young or the unwary, and to camouflage the contents of drinking vessels. Whether the contents of the cups will help or hurt their drinkers depends on the author's point of view. But it is clear that Lucretius, Jerome and Alan of Lille see the sweetness of honey as an untrustworthy and powerful allurement.

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[4] The Latin text is taken from J.-P. Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina* 2 (Paris 1844-64) 874.

[5] The Latin text is that of R. Bossuat (ed.), *Anticlaudianus* (Paris 1955).

FAVORINO NELL'*ANTHOLOGIA PALATINA* (E UN EPIGRAMMA CONTESTATO A MELEAGRO)

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Abstract. Favorinus, who is cited in *Anthologia Palatina* 11.223, must be identified with the homonymous philosopher and sophist of the second century AD. Therefore the short epigram, falsely attributed to Meleager, could be ascribed to Strato of Sardi. Its own licentious content and style provide support for this attribution.

Nel capitolo relativo alle testimonianze sulla vita, la cultura e la fama di Favorino, il Barigazzi, ultimo editore del retore di Arles,[1] raccoglie ben cinquantuno passi (provenienti per la maggior parte dalle *Noctes Atticae* di Gellio),[2] in cui compaia anche la semplice menzione del nome di Favorino,

[1] A. Barigazzi (ed.), *Favorino di Arelate: Opere* (Firenze 1966).

[2] Per la fortuna di Favorino nelle *Noctes Atticae*, oltre alle belle pagine di L. Legré, *Favorin d'Arles, sa vie—ses oeuvres—ses contemporains* (Marseille 1878) 86-150, ingiustamente trascurate dagli studiosi, disponiamo attualmente delle agili sintesi, di impostazioni e conclusioni decisamente opposte, di M. Pezzati, «Gellio e la scuola di Favorino», *ASNP* 3.3 (1973) 837-70 e di M. L. Astarita, *La cultura delle «Noctes Atticae»* (Catania 1993) 175-90, alle puali si é aggiunta di recente quella di S. Beall, «*Homo Fandi Dulcissimus*: The Role of Favorinus in the Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius», *AJPh* 122 (2001) 3-27. Cfr., inoltre, tra i numerosi contributi, R. Marache, *La Critique littéraire de la langue latine et le développement du goût archaïsant au II^e siècle de nôtre ère* (Rennes 1952) 251-57; C. P. Jones, «A Friend of Galen», *CQ* 17 (1967) 311sg.; L. Gamberale, *La traduzione in Gellio* (Roma 1969) *passim*; G. Maselli, *Lingua e scuola in Gellio grammatico* (Lecce 1969) *passim*; F. Casavola, «Il modello del parlante per Favorino e Celso», *AAN* 82 (1971) 485-97; F. Casavola, *Giuristi adrianei* (Napoli 1980) 77-105; B. Baldwin, «Aulus Gellius and his Circle», *Acta Classica* 16 (1973) 103-07; A. Ronconi, *Da Omero a Dante: Scritti di varia filologia* (Urbino 1981) 257-71; M. Ducas, «Favorinus et la loi des XII Tables», *REL* 62 (1984) (1985) 288-300; L. Holford-Strevens, *Aulus Gellius* (London 1988) 79-92; Holford-Strevens, «Favorinus: The Man of Paradoxes», in J. Barnes e M. Griffin (edd.), *Philosophia Togata 2: Plato and Aristotle at Rome* (Oxford 1997) 188-217; Holford-Strevens, «Aulus Gellius: The Non-Visual Portraitist», in M. J. Edwards e S. Swain (edd.), *Portraits: Biographical Representation in the Greek and Latin Literature of the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1997) 205-07; C. Miranda, *Teoria e prassi stilistica attraverso la testimonianza dei primi tre libri della Noctes Atticae* (Salerno 1990) 15-32 *passim*; M. R. Lefkowitz e M. B. Fant (edd.), *Women's Life in Greece and Rome: A Source Book in Translation*[2] (Baltimore 1992) 188f. no. 253; M. W. Gleason, *Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome* (Princeton 1995) 138-44; J. Zablocki, «The Image of a Roman Family in *Noctes Atticae* by

arrivando ad includere un luogo di Libanio (*epist.* 1178 Förster[3] = T 17 Barigazzi[4]), prova del fatto che Favorino era ancora letto nel IV secolo d.C.[5] L'editore, invero, non tralascia neppure di indicare le ipotesi, dimostrate infondate, di chi interpreta, ad esempio, le polemiche di Diogene d'Enoanda o dell'*Octavius* di Minucio Felice contro gli insegnamenti della filosofia scettica abili travestimenti di critiche dirette personalmente a Favorino.[6] Per contro, lo stesso Barigazzi ritiene che le parole di Elio Aristide, *Orationes* 34.48 (= 2.248.26 Keil[7]), benché in esse non venga esplicitamente citato il nome di Favorino, riguardino tuttavia un aspetto della sua discussa biografia.[8]

Non mi pare che sia stato dato il giusto peso, invece, ad una testimonianza conservata nell'*Anthologia Palatina*, dove viene canzonato un personaggio di nome Favorino:[9]

Aulus Gellius», *Pomoerium* 2 (1996) 47-59; M.-L. Lakmann, «Favorinus von Arelate. Aulus Gellius über seinen Lehrer», in B. Czapla, T. Lehmann e S. Liell (edd.), *Vir Bonus Dicendi Peritus: Festschrift für Alfons Weische zum 65. Geburstag* (Wiesbaden 1997) 233-43.

[3] R. Förster (ed.), *Libanius, Opera* (Leipzig 1903-27) 1927.

[4] Barigazzi [1].

[5] Non è da leggere, tuttavia, il nome di Favorino in un papiro ossirinchita del III sec. d.C. e pubblicato da M. Norsa, in *Aegyptus* 2 (1921) 17, *verso* 32 (= T 16 Barigazzi [1]): cfr. C. Wendel, «Neues aus alten Bibliotheken», *ZBB* 54 (1937) 586sg. In T 48 Barigazzi [1] è riportato anche un passo di Macrobio (*Saturn.* 3.18.24), che, tuttavia, deriva dalla *Noctes Atticae* di Gellio: cfr. Barigazzi [1] 134. Per la fortuna di Favorino a Bisanzio, vedi invece E. Amato, «Appunti per la fortuna di Favorino a Bisanzio (con un'appendice sulla *Pro Balneis*)», *REG* 112.1 (1999) 259-69.

[6] Tali sono le posizioni rispettivamente di R. Philippson, «Diogenes von Oinoanda», *RE* Supplbd 5 (1931) coll. 157-59 e di W. A. Baehrens, «Literarhistorische Beiträge», *Hermes* 50 (1915) 456-63.

[7] B. Kiel (ed.), *Aelii Aristidis Smyrnali Quae Supersunt Omnia* 2 (Berlin 1898).

[8] Barigazzi [1] 91; L. Pernot, *La Rhétorique de l'éloge dans le monde gréco-romain* 1 (Paris 1993) 392 n. 308. Un ulteriore polemico riferimento all'arleatino potrebbe esserci, però, nella chiusa del *de astrologia* (epp. 27-29) pseuso-lucianeo (vedi E. Amato, «Favorino e la critica scettica alla divinazione artificiale», *Pomoerium* 4-5 (2000-02): in corzo di stampa); è, invece, Favorino il filosofo celta οὐκ ἀπαίδευτος τὰ ἡμέτερα menzionato da Luc. *Herc.* 4 (vedi E. Amato, «Crisoph M. Wieland lettore di Luciano e l'identità del filosofo celta οὐκ ἀπαίδευτος τὰ ἡμέτερα di *Herc.*, 4 [Il *de senectute* oli Favorino e l'esilio a Chio]», in E. Amato, A. Capo e D. Visciolo [edd.], *Weimar, le Letterature Classiche e l'Europa del 2000* [Salerno 2000] 87-125). Secondo D. A. Russell (*Greek Declamation* [Cambridge 1983] 52 n. 42), anche l'eunuco ritratto da Hermog. 60.20 risentirebbe della figura di Favorino.

[9] Né si tratta dell'unica omissione: sono, infatti, sfuggite al Barigazzi le preziose testimonianze di Apul. *De Mund.* 13sg., piuttosto una sintesi—originale o interpolata si discute (cfr. J. Beaujeu [ed.], *Apulée: Opuscules philosophiques [Du dieu de Socrate, Platon et sa doctrine, du monde] et fragments* [Paris 1973] 321; F. Pini, «Una nuova edizione delle

Εἰ βινεῖ Φαβορῖνος ἀπιστεῖς· μηκέτ' ἀπίστει·
αὐτός μοι βινεῖν εἶπ' ἰδίῳ στόματι.

(*Anth. Pal.* 11.223)

Che Favorino s'accoppia non credi. Ma sí, se lo dice
lui che s'accoppia con la propria bocca! . . .[10]

La *pointe* dell'epigramma, che ruota con squisita eleganza formale attorno al doppio poliptoto βινεῖ-βινεῖν e ἀπιστεῖς-ἀπίστει, risiede chiaramente nell'interpretazione finale dell'espressione ἰδίῳ στόματι («con la propria bocca») che può dipendere tanto da εἶπ' («dice») quanto da βινεῖν («accoppiarsi»), e il personaggio in esso preso di mira non può che identificarsi con il famoso retore di Arles, la cui vita non fu esente da critiche e calunnie.

Nell'orazione *Corinthiaca* (33sg.) è Favorino stesso ad informarci che venne ingiustamente calunniato per un fatto di libidine pubblica commesso a Roma ai danni della moglie di uno ὕπατος ἀνήρ (*vir consularis*, «console»).[11] Tale avvenimento, che per il momento non ebbe tragiche conseguenze,[12] creò tuttavia un certo fastidio nell'imperatore Adriano, tanto da ispirare la decisione della rimozione di una statua di Favorino a Corinto. Come sappiamo, infatti, da Filostrato[13] e Polemone,[14] acerrimo nemico dell'arleatino, questi era considerato θερμὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά («bramoso di sesso»), ossia *libidinosus*, per quanto la natura lo avesse generato διφυὴς καὶ ἀνδρόθηλυς («di duplice

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opere filosofiche di Apuleio», *GIF* 5 [1974] 192; L. Gamberale, «Note sulla tradizione di Gellio [in margine alla più recente edizione delle *Noctes Atticae*]», *RFIC* 103 [1975] 37)—di Gell. *NA* 2.22.3-7 (= T 27 Barigazzi [1]), ma soprattutto due capitoli del *Violarium* attribuito all'imperatrice Eudocia Macrembolitissa (J. Flach, *Eudociae Augustae Violarium* [Lipsiae 1880] 91, 18sgg. e 297, 7sgg.), che corrispondono rispettivamente a fr. 74 e fr. 50 Barigazzi [1]. In questo caso, la testimonianza di età bizantina (trascurata pure nell'edizione parziale di E. Mensching, *Favorin von Arelate. Der erste Teil der Fragmente: Memorabilien und Omnigena Historia* [Berlin 1963]) contribuisce non solo ad inserire ben tre frammenti favoriniani di sede incerta nel primo libro dell'*Omnigena Historia*, ma anche a recuperare il senso di un passo dei *Memorabilia*, tràdito ugualmente da Diogene Laerzio, variamente emendato dagli studiosi: cfr. E. Amato, «Pour Diogène Laërce VIII, 83 (= Favorinus, *fr.* 74 Barigazzi)», *EMC* 18 (1999) 397-400 in corso di stampa. Ma per tutti questi problemi, rinvio alla mia prossima edizione di Favorino ne «Les Belles Lettres».

[10] Trad. di F. M. Pontani (ed.), *Antalogia Palatina* 4 (Torino 1980).

[11] Cfr. Philostr. *VS* 1.8 (2.8.23sgg. C. L. Kayser, *Flavii Philostrati Opera* [Lipsiae 1870-71]) = T6 Barigazzi [1].

[12] Come si può dedurre da *Cor.* 35 e Luc. *Eun.* 10.

[13] *VS* 1.8 (2.8.23sgg. Kayser [11]) = T 6 Barigazzi [1].

[14] *De Physiogn.* 1.160.6sgg. R. Förster, *Scriptores Physiognomonia Graeci et Latini* (Lipsiae 1893) = T 3 Barigazzi [1].

natura e androgino»), cioè ermafrodito.[15] E questo aspetto «scandalistico della sua vita è quello messo maggiormente in risalto da Filostrato e Luciano, che chiamano Favorino εὐνοῦχος («eunuco»). Filostrato, in particolare, si serve di questa informazione per sottolineare un paradosso della biografia del retore, che, benché eunuco, lo vide protagonista di una vicenda giudiziaria legata all'adulterio.[16] La fama di questa notizia è documentata da Luciano nell'*Eunuchus*:

> Ἐν τούτῳ τρίτος ἄλλος παρεστώς—τὸ δὲ ὄνομα ἐν ἀφανεῖ κείσθω—Καὶ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὑτοσὶ ὁ τὰς γνάθους λεῖος καὶ τὸ φώνημα γυναικεῖος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εὐνούχῳ ἐοικὼς εἰ ἀποδύσαιτο, πάνυ ἀνδρεῖος ὑμῖν φανεῖται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ψεύδονται οἱ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες, καὶ μοιχὸς ἑάλω ποτέ, ὡς ὁ ἄξων φησίν, ἄρθρα ἐν ἄρθροις ἔχων· ἀλλὰ τότε μὲν ἐς εὐνοῦχον ἀναφυγὼν καὶ τοῦτο κρησφύγετον εὑρόμενος ἀφείθη, ἀπιστησάντων τῇ κατηγορίᾳ τῶν τότε δικαστῶν ἀπό γε τῆς φανερᾶς ὄψεως.
>
> (*Eun.* 10)
>
> A questo punto si presentò un terzo—che il suo nome resti nell'ombra!—«Eppure costui -disse-, o giudici, che ha le guance lisce, la voce femminile, e assomiglia per il resto ad un eunuco, se si spogliasse, vi sembrerebbe davvero virile. Se quelli che parlano di lui non mentono, una volta fu preso in flagrante adulterio, come recita la legge, organo in organo. Ma allora, rifugiatosi nella

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[15] Cfr. Suid. 4.690.16-26 (A. Adler, *Suidae Lexicon* [Lipsiae 1928-38]), *s.v.* Φαβωρῖνος = T 1 Barigazzi [1].

[16] Questa apparente contraddittorietà è stata oggi spiegata col ricorso alla teoria medica: l'anormalità sessuale di Favorino consisteva, in effetti, in una sorta di pseudo-ermafroditismo che permetteva comunque chi ne era affetto di praticare un'attività sessuale maschile. Tale sindrome va sotto il nome di Reifenstein (cfr. H. J. Mason, «Favorinus» disorder: Reifenstein's Syndrome in Antiquity», *Janus* 66 [1979] 1-13; P. delle Ville, «Favorino di Arles: Il geniale criptorchiole (convergente di carattere e di stuoli eruditi fra un retore celtico-romano ed Angelico Aprosio)», *Quaderni dell'Aproziana* 3 (1995) 11; al contrario M. Delcourt, *Hermafroditea: Recherches sur l'être double promoteur de la fertilité dans le monde classique* [Bruxelles 1966] 74, riteneva il retore asessuato). È certo, comunque, che le esagerazioni sessuali di cui fu accusato l'Arleatino da Polemone e Luciano sono solo una caricatura alimentata dall'inimicizia e dall'invidia personale. «Contro questa deformazione della verità sta il fatto che Favorino, invece di essere repellente, ebbe l'affetto di molti discepoli e di altre persone, che l'amabilità del tratto insieme alla soavità dell'eloquio e le altre doti intellettuali facevano dimenticare i segni esterni di uomo ermafrodito» (così A. Barigazzi, «Favorino di Arelate», *ANRW* 2.34.1 [1993] 560). Invero, ermafrodito ed eunuco non designano la stessa cosa: col primo termine si indica in genere un individuo in cui coesistono degli organi sessuali primari femminili e maschili, mentre eunuco è l'uomo privo delle facoltà virili per difetto organico o per evirazione, e come tale era accusato di impotenza o omosessualità (vedi pure Legré [2] 13sg.; M. C. Giner Soria, *Filóstrato: Vidas de los Sofistas* [Madrid 1982] 79 n. 49).

condizione di eunuco e trovata questa scappatoia, venne rilasciato, dal momento che i giudici del tempo non credettero all'accusa almeno per quello che risultava dal suo evidente aspetto.»

Ma già in precedenza Luciano aveva introdotto Favorino, definendolo τις Ἀκαδημαικὸς εὐνοῦχος ἐκ Κελτῶν («un tale eunuco Accademico origina rio della regione celtica') per irridere alle sue velleità filosofiche:

> . . . τέλος δὲ λεπτόν τι καὶ γυναικεῖον ἐμφθεγξάμενος οὐ δίκαια ποιεῖν ἔφη τὸν Διοκλέα φιλοσοφίας ἀποκλείοντα εὐνοῦχον ὄντα, ἧς καὶ γυναιξὶ μετεῖναι· καὶ παρήγοντο Ἀσπασία καὶ Διοτίμα καὶ Θαργηλία συνηγορήσουσαι αὐτῷ, καί τις Ἀκαδημαικὸς εὐνοῦχος ἐκ Κελτῶν ὀλίγον πρὸ ἡμῶν εὐδοκιμήσας ἐς τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. Ὁ Διοκλῆς δὲ κακεῖνον αὐτόν, εἰ περιῆν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων μετεποιεῖτο, εἶρξεν ἂν οὐ καταπλαγεὶς αὐτοῦ τὴν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς δόξαν· καί τινας καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπεμνημόνευε λόγους καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὑπό τε Στωικῶν καὶ Κυνικῶν μάλιστα εἰρημένους πρὸς τὸ γελοιότερον ἐπὶ τῷ ἀτελεῖ τοῦ σώματος.
>
> (*Eun.* 7)[17]
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> . . . alla fine intervenendo con la sua voce sottile e da donna disse che Diocle non faceva bene ad escluderlo, in quanto eunuco, dalla filosofia, cui anche le donne partecipano; e menzionava per confortare la propria posizione il nome di Aspasia, Diotima, Targelia e di un tale eunuco Accademico originario della regione celtica, che non molto tempo prima era stato famoso tra i Greci. Ma Diocle avrebbe escluso anche lui, se fosse ancora presente e avesse praticato i medesimi studi, sprezzante della sua fama presso il suo numeroso pubblico. Ed egli in persona ricordò alcuni discorsi, pronunciati contro di lui da Stoici e Cinici perché fosse messa alla berlina la sua imperfezione fisica.

Alla luce di queste testimonianze, non è, quindi, difficile pensare a Favorino come protagonista del breve epigramma scoptico.[18]

Quanto alla grafia Φαβορῖνος («Favorino») questa è ugualmente documentata accanto alle forme più consuete Φαβωρῖνος, Φαυωρῖνος e

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[17] = T 4 Barigazzi [1]; cfr. pure Luc. *Demon.* 12 = T 5 Barigazzi [1].

[18] Per il motivo, vedi i noti lavori di F. J. Brecht, «Motiv-und Typengeschichte des griechischen Spottepigramms», *Philologus* 22.2 (1930); F. Guglielmino, *Epigrammi satirici del libro XI dell'Antologia* (Catania 1931) e V. Longo, *L'epigramma scoptico greco* (Genova 1967), nonché la «Notice» introduttiva di R. Aubreton alla *Anthologie Grecque*, première partie: *Anthologie Palatine* (*livre XI*) 10 (Paris 1972) 45-60.

Φαβουρῖνος.[19] Né si può certo pensare ad un errore di omofonia nella tradizione manoscritta, dal momento che non è possibile inserire nel secondo piede del primo verso un'altra sillaba lunga.

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[19] *PIR*^{2} F 123. Queste sono le forme che troviamo attestate in Filostrato, Stobeo e Dione Cassio: cfr. Legré [2] 11sg.; Barigazzi [1] 3 n. 5. Tuttavia, va ricordato che nella miscellanea del cod. *Paris. Gr.* 1168, del XIII secolo, contenente ben 22 sentenze favoriniane troviamo sia Φαβορίνου (f. 106^v) che Φαβουρίνου (fr. 117^v), corrette dal Freudenthal («Zu Phavorinus und der mittelalterlichen Florilegien-literatur», *RhM* 35 [1880] 410, 414) in Φαβωρίνου, e ancora nel cod. *Bodl. Barocci* 50 (fr. 108^v), del X secolo, si legge Φαβορίνου ἐνθυμήματα καὶ ἐρωτήματα. Pure in quest'ultimo caso C. K. Callanan e A. Bertini Malgarini («Übersehene Favorin-Fragmente aus einer Oxforder Handschrift», *RhM* 129.2 [1986] 172, 174) correggono in Φαβωρίνου, rimandando al *l.c.* del Barigazzi e spiegando l'errata grafia come uno scambio dei suoni o-ω da parte dello scriba. Φαβορείνου è inaltre il lemma che si legge in un frustulo papiraceo del III secolo d.C. proveniente dall'Egitto (cfr. R. Reitzenstein, «Aus der Strassburger Papyrussammlung. III: Zu Isokrates und den Florilegien», *Hermes* 35 [1900] 608 = fr. 128 Barigazzi [1]), così come la grafia Φαβορίνου è quella presente nel lemma che accompagna le rispettive citazioni favoriniane del cod. *Bodl. Barocci* 143 (frr. 61 e 198^v), del XII secolo, e del *Burney* 124 (fr. 94), del XVII secolo (vedi nel dettaglio E. Amato, «Sentenze di Favorino in tre manoscritti inesplorati di Oxford, Cambridge e Londra (con una nota al fr. III Callanan-Bertini Malgarini), che apparirà su *RhM* 146 [2003]). In latino Gellio lo rende con *Favorinus* e tale deve essere la grafia esatta, non *Phavorinus* come pure talora si legge in alcuni autori moderni (cfr. l'aggiunta di G. C. Harles alla *Bibliotheca Graeca* del Fabricius 2.173 n. l, il quale rimanda all'edizione di Luciano curata da J. F. Reitz, *Luciani Opera* (Amsterdam 1743) 2.380 e all'edizione filsotratea di G. Oehlschläger [meglio noto come Olearius], *Flavii Philostrati Opera* (Lipsiae 1709) 489; J. L. Marres, *De Favorini Arelatensis Vita, Studiis, Scriptis* [diss. Trajecti ad Rhenum 1853] 10 n. 1): *Favorinus* era incontestabilmente un nome latino, come dimostrano un'iscrizione ritrovata a Verona e riprodotta dal Gruter, in cui compare il nome di L. Pontius Favorinus (*Inscriptiones Antiquae Totius Orbis Romani* 1.734) e un'altra dell'età di Commodo, scoperta a Roma e recante il nome di *Favorinus* e *Favorina* (*Novus Thesaurus Veterum Inscriptionum* 1.243 n. 3 = *CIL* 6.5 n. 741); per le altre ricorrenze (dieci in tutto: tre *Favorinae*, sette *Favorini*), cfr. I. Kajanto, *The Latin Cognomina* (Helsinki 1965) 285. Possiamo, però, ipotizzare col Legré che il nostro filosofo adottò questa forma perché era quella che maggiormente si avvicinava al suo nome originario in lingua celtica; ne è una prova da un lato l'incerta grafia greca, dall'altro l'assenza di altri *nomina* (in genere due o tre) che contraddistinguevano i coloni romani (secondo alcuni rilevamenti il 70 per cento della popolazione cittadina era costituita da latini, ma la restante parte era formata da celto-liguri e greci d'Oriente: vedi A. Pelletier, «La Société urbaine en Narbonnaise à l'époque d'Auguste», in C. Goudineau (ed.), *Les Villes augustéennes de Gaule* [Autun 1985] 30). Secondo Gleason [2] 3, il nome *Favorinus* (< *favor*) sarebbe stato scelto per buon auspicio dagli stessi genitori dell'arleatino (per il nome *Favor* in Gallia Narbonense, vedi *CIL* 12.33.1349, 5682.43). Ma di qui a dire, come vorrebbe Holford-Strevens [2 (1997)] 189 (vedi anche B. Sudan, *Le Bel exil de Favorinus d'Arles* [diss. Fribourg 1998] 5), che la tribù d'appartenenza della famiglia di Favorino sia stata la Teretina, stanziata nella valle del Sacco in Italia centrale, da cui arrivarono numerosi coloni di Arles (cfr. Pelletier [*op. cit.*] 30; M. e P. Clavel-Levêque, *Villes et structures urbaines dans*

Orbene, se è corretta questa interpretazione, resta da affrontare il problema della paternità dell'epigramma. In effetti, nell'undicesimo libro dell'*Anthologia Palatina*, in cui il componimento è tramandato, esso è falsamente attribuito a Meleagro di Gadara, come da tempo è stato a buon diritto dimostrato da H. Ouvré.[20] Ad Antipatro di Tessalonica come autore dell'epigramma ha pensato solo lo Sternbach,[21] mentre l'ipotesi più seguita è stata quella di H. Stadtmüller,[22] editore parziale dell'*Anthologia Graeca*, che, per il contenuto licenzioso, avvicinò il componimento alla vena scoptica di

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l'Occident romain [Paris 1984] 209; ma L. A. Constans, *Arles Antique* [Paris 1921] 84, ricorda che nelle iscrizioni arleatine è presente il nome di almeno tre edili provenienti da tribù diverse), il passo è lungo. Se così fosse, Favorino, che nelle sua opere sottolinea la propria origine celta per meglio evidenziare i meriti acquisiti nella formazione culturale (vedi, e.g., *Cor.* 27), non avrebbe certo nascosto questa antica discendenza, su cui insistono in maniera solidale Luciano, Filostrato e Gellio. Quanto, poi, alla scelta del greco come lingua principale, ciò non implica che i genitori di Favorino fossero latini. La conoscenza della lingua latina era un fatto assodato per un cittadino di una provincia romana, mentre il greco rappresentava la chiave d'accesso per tutto l'Impero (cfr. J. Kaimio, «The Romans and the Greek Language», in *Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum* 64 [Helsinki 1969] 207sg., che sottolinea come Favorino rappresenti, assieme ad Eliano e Marco Aurelio, un *unicum* nella letteratura di età imperiale). Anzi, stupisce proprio che un celta romanizzato rievochi le proprie origini barbare. Come ha scritto di recente Christian Goudineau, «chez les élites, les meilleurs agents de la romanisation, l'ancienne langue celte a totalement diparu en trois ou quatre générations et le latin s'est imposé, en doceur. Les rares intellectuels écrivains, orateurs, poètes, s'affirment par leur excellence dans la culture latine» (cfr. *L'Express* del 9 settembre 1999, 13; vedi inoltre M. e P. Clavel-Levêque [*op. cit.*] 57, 220). Questa osservazione potrebbe piuttosto far riflettere sulle effettive condizioni sociali della famiglia di Favorino e spiegare il silenzio di Filostrato sui parenti del retore. In effetti, nell'epistola dedicatoria al proconsole Antonio Gordiano, Filostrato chiaramente avverte che nel corso della sua opera menzionerà solo i genitori dei sofisti che abbiano avuto un'origine illustre (*VS* 479). Ora, dal momento che egli non dice nulla sui natali di Favorino, si potrebbe agevolmente concludere che il nostro retore provenisse da una famiglia poco abbiente (era questo il parere di Legré [2] 12sg., condiviso recentemente da A. Debost, C. e J. Mauger [animateurs], «Favorinus, philosophe Arlesien», in *Arles antique et sa région dans les textes grecs et latins* (il obcumento si legge all'indirizzo elettronico http://pedagogie.ac-aix-marseille.fr/disciplines/francais/Latingrec/arles/favorinus/FAVORINUS.htm); *contra* Marres [*op. cit.*] 11; Barigazzi [1] 7).

[20] H. Ouvré, *Méléagre de Gadara* (Paris 1894) 25. Cfr. pure J. Geffken, «Meleagros», *RE* 15 (1931) col. 484 e A. S. F. Gow e D. L. Page (edd.), *The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams* 2 (Cambridge 1965) 593 (i quali rinviano a P. Wolters, in *RhM* 38, 102 n. 1, che non ho potuto vedere). Si vedano, inoltre, i recenti commenti di A. Cameron, *Callimachus and His Critics* (Princeton 1995) 92 e K. J. Gutzwiller, *Poetic Garlands: Hellenistic Epigrams in Context* (California 1998) 282sg.

[21] L. Sternbach, *Anthologiae Planudeae Appendix Barberino-Vaticanae* (Lipsiae 1890) 3.

[22] *Anthologia Graeca* 1 (Lipsiae 1894) xv.

Nicarco.[23] Ma entrambe le proposte non possono essere accolte, se è vera, come penso sia vera, l'identificazione qui proposta del Favorino ivi menzionato con l'omonimo retore vissuto a Roma tra il I e il II sec. d.C., a cavallo, cioè, tra l'impero di Adriano e quello di Antonino il Pio. Come si sa, il *floruit* dell'attività poetica di Antipatro di Tessalonica è, infatti, da collocare nell'età di Augusto,[24] mentre Nicarco si trasferì nella Capitale al tempo dei Flavi intorno al I sec. d.C.[25] Non resta, dunque, che pensare ad un epigrammatista di età imperiale.

Ora, se non ci si vuole comodamente barricare dietro la trincea dell'anonimato, sarà bene avanzare una timida ipotesi: io penso, cioè, che l'epigramma possa verosimilmente attribuirsi a Stratone di Sardi, l'epigrammatista citato da Diogene Laerzio (5, 61), la cui attività poetica cade attorno alla prima metà del II secolo;[26] in tal modo verrebbe da una parte ulteriormente confermato l'atteggiamento satirico che caratterizzò per taluni aspetti la fama che Favorino ebbe tra i suoi contemporanei, dall'altra si recupererebbe un tassello non insignificante alla tanto discussa Μοῦσα παιδική («Musa puerile») di Stratone.[27]

Com'è noto, la composizione del dodicesimo libro dell'*Anthologia Palatina*, in cui sono tramandati ben 442 versi del poema di Stratone, è controversa e dibattuta, ma pare ormai certo che Costantino Cefala, che con questo libro volle dare esempi della poesia pederotica di Stratone, si sia servito di una raccolta d'autore, come anche in precedenza aveva fatto Diogeniano nel

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[23] Da non confondere con l'omonimo poeta ellenistico, accostabile per il pensiero a Meleagro, cui appartengono gli epigrammi di *Anth. Pal.* 7.159 e 9.330. L'ipotesi era già stata avanzata da G. Setti, *Gli epigrammi degli Antipatri* (Torino 1890) e P. Sakolowski, *De Anthologia Palatina quaestiones* (Lipsiae 1893).

[24] Antipatro celebrò in un'opera perduta L. Calpurnio Pisone Frugi, console nel 15 a.C., in occasione della vittoria sui Bessi: cfr. E. Degani, «L'epigramma», in G. Cambiano, L. Canfora e D. Lanza (edd.), *Lo Spazio letterario della Grecia antica* 1.2 (Roma 1993) 229.

[25] Cfr. Aubreton [18] 58sg.

[26] Cfr. Aubreton [18] 299.

[27] Sui contenuti della poesia di Stratone, cfr. in particolare P. G. Maxwell-Stuart, «Strato and the Musa Puerilis», *Hermes* 100 (1972) 213-40 e, per i problemi concernenti la cronologia, A. Cameron, «Strato and Rufinus», *CQ* 32 (1982) 162-73. In generale sulla pederastia e i rapporti omoerotici in Grecia antica, con riferimento all'*Anthologia Graeca*, cfr. F. Buffière, *Éros adolescent: La Pédérastie dans la Grèce antique* (Paris 1980); Buffière, *Le Fil d'Ariane: Pour un voyage en Grèce avec les poètes de l'Anthologie* (Bordeaux 1990) 95-105; Buffière, «L'Éros des garçons dans le livre XII», in R. Aubreton (ed.), *Anthologie Grecque* 1.10: *Anthologie Palatine* (*livre XII*) (Paris 1994) xxxix-lx; e ancora G. Paduano (ed.), *Antologia Palatina: Epigrammi erotici* (*libro V e libro XII*) (Milano 1989) 5-33.

suo *Anthologion*.[28] Quali fossero le caratteristiche di quest'opera, la giusta collocazione degli epigrammi superstiti e, soprattutto, le fonti da cui Stratone derivò, non è chiaro. In particolare per quest'ultimo aspetto, come ha chiarito di recente Robert Aubreton,[29] «on a voulu démontrer que c'est Straton lui-même qui avait inclus dans son recueil de poèmes les oeuvres de Méléagre»; innegabili sono infatti i legami con alcuni παιδικά («componi menti d'amore puerile») di Meleagro. Ma questa tesi, sostenuta da Knaack,[30] è stata combattuta da Ouvré,[31] per il quale «Straton n'aurait pas connu cette oeuvre de Méléagre—si tant est qu'elle ait existé—et c'est à la *Couronne* qu'il aurait fait ses emprunts, ce qui expliquerait mieux les apports d'autres poètes». Quale che sia la verità dei fatti, a noi interessa ora notare il legame esistente tra la poesia di Meleagro e quella di Stratone, tale da ingenerare confusione nell'attribuzione dei singoli componimenti anche in Planude che nella sua redazione dell'*Anthologia* attribuisce a Meleagro gli epigrammi 234 e 235 di Stratone.[32]

Tornando all'undicesimo libro dell'*Anthologia Palatina*, si sa che esso è costituito da due parti ben distinte (1-64, di argomento simposiaco, e 65-442, di argomento satirico), come attestano due preamboli del cod. *Palatinus Gr.* 23, tali da far pensare addirittura a due libri differenti.[33] Nella sezione relativa agli epigrammi scoptici solo la prima parte (65-248), che pare derivare quasi sicuramente dalle raccolte di Filippo e di Diogeniano, risulta abbastanza ordinata; eppure non mancano alcune intrusioni ingiustificate, spesso senza neppure l'indicazione dell'autore oppure accompagnate dal semplice lemma ἀδέσποτον («anommo»), ἄδηλον («incerto»). Da sottolineare è, inoltre, l'inserimento di un certo numero di epigrammi erotici o di παιδικά («componi menti d'amore puerile»), trasmessi qui piuttosto che nei libri 5 e 12 dove l'argomento è di casa. L'esempio di *Anthologia Palatina* 12.223 ne è una

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[28] Fondamentali restano le conclusioni di R. Aubreton, «Le Livre XII de l'*Anthologie Palatine*: La Muse de Straton», *Byzantion* (1969) 35-52, che qui seguiamo.

[29] Aubreton [27] xxxv.

[30] L'idea dell'esistenza di un'opera di Meleagro diversa dalla *Corona* viene dalla lettura degli epigrammi 256 e 257, in cui è possibile ravvisare rispettivamente il proemio ed il congedo di una perduta raccolta di poesie.

[31] Ouvré [20] 83s.

[32] Cfr. Aubreton [18] xiv-xv, xxvii. Nell'*Anthologia Planudea*, inoltre, si discute se debba attribuirsi a Meleagro ovvero a Stratone anche l'epigramma 213: per il problema, cfr. Gow e Page [20] 679.

[33] Per il problema della composizione dell'undicesimo libro dell'*Anthologia Palatina*, cfr. nuovamente Aubreton [18] 28-39. Il primo a pubblicare le due diverse sezioni in un unico libro fu F. Jacobs, *Anthologia Graeca ad Fidem Codicis Olim Palatini, Nunc Parisini ex Apographo Gothano Edita* (Lipsiae 1813-17).

prova: in questa sezione compaiono anche alcuni pezzi di Antipatro, Ammiano, Nicarco, ma soprattutto di Lucilio, e un epigramma di Stratone (225) sull'amore di gruppo. Tale apparente incongruenza è stata spiegata con l'esigenza del compilatore di raccogliere un numero esemplare di componimenti scoptici, che potesse portare luce su questo aspetto della poesia greca. Perché, allora, non pensare che anche il nostro epigramma appartenesse originariamente alla *Musa puerilis* di Stratone?[34]

Il contenuto beffardamente satirico ben si addice alla materia trattata nel poema di Stratone dove un posto preminente era consacrato all'amore pederotico-omosessuale;[35] inoltre, in quest'opera doveva certamente esservi un attacco pungente contro gli eunuchi, sentiti come una deviazione dall'ideale del pederasta, stando al componi mento seguente:

Εὐνοῦχός τις ἔχει καλὰ παιδία· πρὸς τίνα χρῆσιν;
Καὶ τούτοισι βλάβην οὐχ ὁσίην παρέχει.
Ὄντως ὡς ὁ κύων φάτνῃ ῥόδα, μωρὰ δ' ὑλακτῶν
οὔθ' αὐτῷ παρέχει τἀγαθὸν οὔθ' ἑτέρῳ.
(*Anth. Pal.* 12.236)

Un eunuco ha di bei ragazzetti. A che uso? Ma il danno
che a costoro procura è poco bello:
come un cane che ha nella greppia le rose e da pazzo
latra ma non a sé né ad altri giova.

Sotto l'aspetto formale, si può notare che Stratone nei suoi componimenti utilizza spesse volte nell'avvio la congiunzione εἰ, talora in correlazione con una negativa nella forma «si . . . non» o comunque seguita da un imperativo alla seconda persona (cfr. *Anth. Pal.* 12.10, 15, 188, 194, 201, 211, 234sg., 243).[36]

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[34] Nel libro undicesimo sono conservati altri tre epigrammi certi di Stratone (no. 19, 21 e 22 di argomento omoerotico, che, insieme agli epigrammi 1-18, non hanno nulla a che vedere con il contenuto simposiaco della sezione, mentre i loro autori fanno quasi tutti parte dell'*Anthologion* di Diogeniano. Cfr. Aubreton [18] 33.

[35] Col tempo, i termini pederasta ed omosessuale divennero quasi sinonimici, a causa dell'ambiguità dell'interpretazione del rapporto erasta-eromene. Stratone, tuttavia, formalmente distingue l'omosessualità dalla pederastia, che, a differenza della prima, fu per lo più ammessa nel mondo greco. Sul problema, resta fondamentale lo studio di K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (London 1978).

[36] Dopo che questo contributo era già stato presentato nella sua forma definitiva per la pubblicazione, ho appreso da M. D. Campanile («La costruzione del sofista. Note sul βίος di Polemone'» in B. Virgilio (ed.), *Studi ellenistici* 12 [Pisa/Roma 1999] 296 n. 99), che l'epigramma qui studiato è attribuito ad Ammiano da S. Follet, «Les Cyniques dans la poésie épigrammatique à l'époque impériale', in M.-O. Goulet-Cazé e R. Goulet (edd.), *Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements* (Paris 1993) 375. Per quanti sforza abbia fatto, non sono ancora riuscito a prender visione del contributo della Folet.

AFROCENTRISME D'HIER ET D'AUJOUD'HUI

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Abstract. Afrocentrism involves research on African themes and issues in prehistory and antiquity. The worldwide interest in Afrocentrism has created an international network of writers with diverse approaches to the subject. The main writers on Afrocentrism are Molefe Asante, Martin Bernal, Mary Lefkowitz, Cheikh Anta Diop, Valentin Mudimbe and Claudio Moffa. The work of these writers have resulted in much controversy and disagreement but also have advanced the cause of Afrocentrism in scholarly circles.

Réfléchir sur l'afrocentrisme est une opportunité non seulement pour faire le point sur la recherche dans le domaine des antiquités africaines, mais encore pour réfléchir sur l'historiographie de l'Afrique en général, de ses relations avec des interlocuteurs des temps anciens en particulier. C'est donc une occasion pour réinterroger nos instruments d'analyse, certaines de nos disciplines, en l'occurrence l'histoire ancienne et la préhistoire. Les productions que nous pouvons analyser dans cette perspective sont l'œuvre d'Africains et de non Africains, en Afrique et hors d'Afrique. L'afrocentrisme peut-être défini de manière positive ou négative.

Une définition positive considère l'afrocentrisme ou afrologie comme l'étude des concepts, des questions et des comportements africains. L'afrocentrisme est alors une reconstruction culturelle qui introduit la perspective africaine dans le projet global de la transformation de la condition humaine.[1] Ceux qui sont intéressés par cette approche dans l'Antiquité pourraient rechercher dans les textes égyptiens, méroétiques, axoumites, maghrébins, qu'ils soient profanes ou chrétiens, des éléments de réflexion. Dans ce cadre, afrocentrisme rime avec études africaines. La connotation

[1] M. K. Asante, *The Afrocentric Idea* (Philadelphia 1987) 16: «The term Afrology, coined in *Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change* [Buffalo 1980], denotes the Afrocentric study of African concepts, issues, and behaviors. It includes research on African themes in the Americas and the West Indies, as well as the American continent. . . . » L'auteur est conscient des réactions négatives dirigées contre les démarches idéologistes et particularistes. Il propose alors une transcroissance du projet africain. Asante [au-dessus] 5: «. . . Afrocentricity proposes a cultural reconstruction that incorporates the African perspective as a part of an entire human transformation»; Asante [au-dessus] 18: «Il n'a pas manqué du reste d'évoquer les démarches comparatistes et classificatrices. C'est aussi qu'il parle du «afrocentrism personnalism, Asiocentric spiritualism, Eurocentrism materialism.»

négative, elle, se perçoit dans les travaux de ceux qui s'en prennent aux prétentions afrocentristes. De manière schématique ce qu'on reproche aux afrocentristes contemporains, c'est de considérer l'Afrique comme le berceau de l'humanité et surtout de présenter les civilisations africaines comme initiatrices des autres civilisations, en particulier les civilisations occidentales.

Disons d'emblée que pour ce qui est des textes anciens, s'il est possible de trouver chez des peuples des propos ethnocentristes, il est également possible de trouver dans une même culture la confrontation entre des tendances allophiles et allophobes. Une autre considération consiste à bien articuler des séquences temporelles et des espaces bien délimités pour des analyses pertinentes. Enfin une dernière considération consiste à bien identifier des thèmes, des acteurs ou actrices. La Préhistoire et l'Antiquité sont objets d'études et les auteurs de l'Antiquité peuvent être des acteurs, ils peuvent aussi être objets d'étude de la part des Modernes et des Contemporains.

Le débat sur l'afrocentrisme est donc centré sur la Préhistoire et sur l'Antiquité; et même à ce niveau il est intéressant de signaler des francs tireurs comme l'Italien Claudio Moffa qui considère que l'Afrique était déjà à la périphérie de l'histoire dès l'Antiquité. Cet auteur essaie de démontrer le décalage entre l'Europe et l'Afrique par le retard de cette dernière dans les domaines de l'agriculture, de la métallurgie, la non maîtrise de la charrue, de la roue, du cheval, des technologies de construction, des techniques marines, de l'écriture, etc.[2] Bien entendu sa définition de l'Afrique réelle, qui exclut l'Egypte, l'Ethiopie, le Soudan occidental et oriental, l'ancien Zimbabwé, lui permet facilement de se livrer à son exercice sur une *tabula rasa*. Il ne manque pas de s'en prendre à ceux qui comme Basile Davidson, Samir Amin, Cheikh Anta Diop ont essayé de revisiter l'histoire africaine pour lui redonner ses heures de gloire.

Notre propos d'aujourd'hui est d'analyser les tendances majeures qui focalisent l'attention des spécialistes, et pour ce faire, il est nécessaire de s'entendre sur le terme Afrique. Et à ce niveau nous adoptons la démarche des rédacteurs de l'histoire générale de l'Afrique sous l'égide de l'UNESCO, à savoir considérer ce continent comme délimité par l'Atlantique à l'Ouest, la Mer Rouge et l'Océan Indien à l'Est, la Méditerranée au Nord et qui se termine au Sud par la République sud africaine. Une fois ces précisions faites, nous pouvons maintenant examiner les axes du débat, d'abord en prenant en considération la Préhistoire, puis l'Antiquité.

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[2] C. Moffa, *L'Afrique à la periphérie de l'histoire* (Paris 1995) 151f.

On peut avancer l'hypothèse que ce débat est aussi ancien que la perception de l'altérité; sources orales et écrites nous informent sur la dose d'ethnocentrisme notée dans ce genre d'exercices. Reconnaissons d'emblée que l'Afrique qu'elle soit libyenne, éthiopienne ou égyptienne est bien présente dans les plus anciens monuments de la littérature méditerranéenne et/ou proche orientale (Bible, *Iliade*, *Odyssée*).

En ce qui concerne les sources égyptiennes et gréco-latines, qu'elles soient littéraires et/ou iconographiques, le volume 1 de la série, *L'Image du Noir dans l'Art Occidental*[3] de la Menil Fondation, donne un aperçu des grandes tendances que l'on peut analyser. On peut affirmer sans risque de se tromper que si «le mirage africain» peut être perçu dans certaines œuvres, plus chez les Grecs que chez les Latins, il est très difficile de noter une quelconque dose d'afrocentrisme. On pourrait à la rigueur parler de grand respect pour l'ancienneté des civilisations africaines. Quelques-unes unes des premières approches à prétention scientifique nous ont été fournies par des sources grecques. C'est ainsi que Diodore de Sicile se prononce sur la question de l'origine de l'humanité.[4]

On peut certes souligner des tendances très fortes favorables aux «sagesses barbares» pour parler comme Arnaldo Momigliano, ou proches de l'ancien modèle, pour prendre un terme de Martin Bernal, auteur de *Black Athena*,[5] sur lequel nous reviendrons; ce point de vue fut abandonné par la suite, surtout à partir de l'hégémonie européenne dans le monde, au sortir du Moyen âge et au début de la période moderne; et ce n'est qu'au début et surtout dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle que le berceau à roulettes s'est à nouveau

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[3] J. Vercoutter *et al.* (edd.), *L'Image du Noir dans l'Art Occidental* 1 (Fribourg/Paris 1976).

[4] Diodore 3.2: «On prétend que les Ethiopiens sont de tous les hommes les premiers qui aient existé; et voici les preuves que l'on en donne. D'abord, comme il est presque unanimement reconnu qu'ils ne sont pas venus du dehors, mais qu'ils ont pris naissance dans le pays même, on ne peut sans injustice leur refuser le titre d'autochtones; ensuite il est également clair pour tous que les hommes qui habitent les contrées méridionales sont sortis les premiers au sein de la terre pour commencer à vivre, car la chaleur du soleil, après avoir desséché la terre humide, l'ayant fécondée, et rendue propre à donner l'existence aux animaux, il est vraisemblable que les lieux les plus rapprochés de cet astre ont dû les premiers produire des êtres animés.»

[5] M. Bernal, *Black Athena. The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization* 1*: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece 1785-1985* (New Brunswick 1987); Bernal, *Black Athena. The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization* 2*: Archaeological Evidence* (New Brunswick 1991).

retrouvé sur le continent africain, avec comme corollaire la réflexion sur la place des civilisations africaines dans la naissance et le développement de l'humanité.

Dans ce débat, les points de vue de C. Anta Diop méritent d'être rappelés, points de vue qui reprennent du reste les intuitions des savants de l'Antiquité, en y ajoutant l'apport des sciences modernes, la paléontologie, la biologie, etc. Ainsi partant de la loi de Gloger qui veut qu'une humanité née sous les tropiques soit pigmentée, il en tire les conclusions suivantes: de 150 000 à 20 000 avant notre ère la terre était entièrement habitée par des Noirs; l'espèce européenne, symbolisée par le Cro Magnon fait son apparition à partir de 20 000 avant notre ère; et l'espèce dite asiatique, symbolisée par l'homme de Chancelade apparaît à partir de 15 000 avant notre ère.[6]

La majorité des préhistoriens, sans épouser dans le détail des conclusions de C. Anta Diop, aboutissent à peu près aux mêmes conclusions à savoir: que c'est sur le continent africain qu'il faut situer l'origine de l'humanité; que les différenciations raciales sont le résultat d'un long processus; et que la distribution des «races» humaines n'a pas été la même qu'aujourd'hui.

Aujourd'hui on insiste de plus en plus sur le miroir africain pour comprendre notre humanité, D. W. Phillipson insiste là-dessus dans son ouvrage *African Archaelogy*,[7] S. MacEachern aussi dans le *Journal of World Prehistory*.[8]

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[6] C. Anta Diop, *Civilisation ou Barbarie* (Paris 1981) 19f.: «. . . les recherches poursuivies en paléontologie humaine par le feu docteur Leakey, en particulier, ont permis de placer le berceau de l'humanité en Afrique orientale, dans la région des Grands Lacs, autour de la vallée de l'Omo. Deux conséquences, sur lesquelles on n'a pas mis l'accent jusqu'ici découlent de cette découverte: (1) Une humanité née sous la latitude des Grands Lacs, presque sous l'Equateur, est nécessairement pigmentée et négroïde; la loi de Gloger veut que les animaux à sang chaud soient pygmentés en climat chaud et humide; (2) Toutes les autres races sont issues de la race noire par filiation plus ou moins directe, et les autres continents ont été peuplés à partir de l'Afrique, tant au stade de l'homo erectus qu'à celui de l'homo sapiens qui apparut il y'a environ 150.000 ans; les théories antérieures qui faisaient venir les Nègres d'ailleurs sont périmées. Les premiers négroïdes qui allèrent peupler le reste du monde sortirent de l'Afrique par le détroit de Gibraltar, par l'isthme de Suez et peut être aussi par la Sicile et l'Italie du Sud.»

[7] D. W. Phillipson, *African Archaeology*[2] (Cambridge 1993) 2: «The archaelogists and prehistorians of other regions have much to learn form the African record, not only from its unparelleled evidence for the earliest periods of human development, but also methodologically. Africa also provides excellent opportunities for contrasting the testimony of archaelogy with that of linguistic and oral historical studies, and for interpreting the meaning of rock art in the light of the belief systems of recent peoples.»

[8] S. MacEachern, «Foreign Countries: The Development of Ethnoarchaeology in Sub-Saharan Africa», *Journal of World Prehistory* 10 (1996) 244f.: «There are a number of

Bien entendu le débat continue pour savoir si l'Afrique est le berceau de l'homme moderne, l'homo sapiens-sapiens. Ainsi Milford Wolpoff and R. Caspari proposent une approche multi régionale dans leur ouvrage *Race And Human Evolution*.[9] D'autres, comme le professeur Günter Bräuer, pensent qu'il est possible d'insister sur la place déterminante de l'Afrique,[10] même pour la place finale de l'hominisation.

La place des antiquités africaines

De la même manière qu'il est difficile aujourd'hui de parler de la préhistoire de l'humanité en ignorant la contribution de C. Anta Diop, de la même manière il est inconcevable de parler des antiquités africaines en se taisant sur sa contribution surtout en matière d'égyptologie. Bien entendu l'œuvre de C. Anta Diop dépasse la préhistoire et l'Antiquité; elle déborde sur le Moyen âge, les périodes moderne et contemporaine. Elle intéresse l'histoire de la paléontologie, celle des sciences exactes, des institutions socio-politiques. Sa contribution sur les questions méthodologiques, en matière de linguistique diachronique, sur les migrations africaines, ses réflexions sur l'art, la littérature, la philosophie, sur l'identité culturelle, sur la renaissance politique, culturelle, économique et scientifique de l'Afrique sont une source d'inspiration. Sa contribution offre un champ de réflexion sur: les questions raciales, l'historiographie, les antiquités africaines, le rôle et l'impact des déterminismes (en particulier géographiques), l'histoire des religions, le recours à la linguistique comparée, etc.

Il est révélateur que les critiques de l'afrocentrisme élaborées en Amérique et Europe consacrent des développements importants à cet auteur. En

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reasons for an ethnoarchaelogical concern with the African continent, reasons that appear fairly straighforward at first glance but that are in fact bound up in the assumptions of Euro-American researchers. In the first place, Africa until a short while ago was home to a great variety of communities pursuing what seemed to anthropologists to be traditional life-ways. No other continents had accommodated the number and variety of hunter-gathered adaptations that have existed in Africa over the last century, from the Kalahari Desert to the Central African rainforest to the highlands savannas, and lake shores of the Rift Valley in East Africa.»

[9] M. Wolpoff and R. Caspari, *Race and Human Evolution* (New York 1997) 32: «Multi-regional evolution provides resolution of the contradictions between genetic exchanges and population differentiations in a broad-based theory that links gene flow and population movements, and natural selection, and their effects on population both at the center and at the peripheries of the geographic range of humanity».

[10] G. Bräuer, «L'Origine africaine des hommes modernes», *Ankh* 3 (1994) 133-51.

Amérique ce sont les volumes de la série *Black Athena* publiés depuis 1987 qui ont relancé le débat. Le retentissement a été extraordinaire en Angleterre, aux USA où plus de 60 000 ont été diffusés: l'impact a atteint d'autres publics dans le monde, les versions françaises commencent à circuler, d'autres traductions sont disponibles au moins dans quatre langues. Stanley Burstein a consacré à la controverse une étude fut intéressante.[11]

L'objectif clairement formulé par Bernal lui-même est d'inviter les tenants du modèle aryen, le nouveau modèle, à plus de modestie. La dimension politique de son œuvre consiste à établir un pont entre Afro-américains et Juifs américains. Il n'est pas gêné d'être classé comme afrocentriste modéré ou comme un blanc conciliateur. Si Bernal, spécialiste de science politique à l'Université de Cornell et spécialiste de langue chinoise, a tenté d'intervenir sur l'histoire des contacts antiques entre la Grèce et l'Egypte, il faut reconnaître que ces motivations doivent être profondes. Certes ses relations familiales ont joué: il est le petit-fils de l'égyptologue Sir Alan Gardiner, son père aurait été un militant communiste, etc. Le point de départ de Bernal est d'ordre historiographique: il veut montrer que c'est au XVIIIe siècle de notre ère que s'est produit le phénomène de déplacement de l'ancien modèle vers un nouveau modèle qualifié d'aryen. L'ancien modèle qui était conforme aux témoignages grecs et romains de l'antiquité admettait l'influence de l'Egypte africaine et de certaines civilisations de l'Orient (Mésopotamie, Phénicie) sur la Grèce. La perspective historiographique dégagée, reste ensuite à renforcer l'argumentation sur la base de données factuelles, technologiques, matérielles, spirituelles, culturelles, etc.

Les thèses défendues par Bernal ont suscité des réactions nombreuses et diverses. Les critiques les plus systématiques ont été ressemblées par Mary Lefkowitz dans deux ouvrages d'inégale valeur, *Black Athena Revisited* et *Not Out of Africa*:[12] le premier est destiné aux spécialistes et le second au grand public. Malgré l'aprêté des critiques, la plupart de spécialistes reconnaissent les mérites de Bernal, non seulement pour la réécriture de relations entre les civilisations, mais aussi pour les fraîcheurs méthodologiques entraînées par ses contributions.

En s'attaquant à Bernal, Lefkowitz élargit les cibles et passe en revue les afrocentristes et cite de manière expresse C. Anta Diop et d'autres

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[11] Cf. S. M. Burstein, «The Debate Over Black Athena», *Scholia* 5 (1996) 3-16.

[12] M. R. Lefkowitz and G. M. Rogers (edd.), *Black Athena Revisited* (Chapel Hill 1996); M. R. Lefkowitz, *Not Out of Africa: How Afrocentrism Became an Excuse to Teach Myth as History* (New York 1996).

inspirateurs.[13] Ce ne sont pas seulement les critiques les plus acerbes qui mettent dans la même lignée C. Anta Diop et Bernal; Valentin Mudimbe, qui ne peut être considéré comme hostile aux travaux de C. Anta Diop, opère tout de même la même transition.

C'est dans son ouvrage *The Idea of Africa*,[14] qu'il discute de manière plus approfondie les sources antiques et surtout la contribution de C. Anta Diop et de Théophile Obenga. Dans *The Invention of Africa*,[15] il s'était beaucoup plus penché sur les questions de méthode, sur le pouvoir et la géographie du discours, sur l'altérité les relations entre l'anthropologie et l'histoire, sur la production intellectuelle africaine, etc. Dans *The Idea of Africa* il insiste sur le paradigme grec, sur l'ambivalence des sources grecques,[16] sur les critiques formulées en direction de l'œuvre de Bernal;[17] il analyse les convergences et les différences entre Diop et Bernal.[18]

Enseignements et perspectives

Nous pensons qu'il y'a une certaine continuité entre C. Anta Diop, Bernal et Mudimbe. C. Anta Diop propose une grande rectification dans la réécriture de l'histoire de l'humanité. Il remet en place le rôle de l'Afrique et des civilisations négro-africaines dans le développement de l'humanité. Il a su systématiser le rôle et la place de l'Egypte dans l'histoire des civilisations négro-africaines. Bernal apporte une grande rectification dans l'appréciation

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[13] M. R. Lefkowitz, «Ancient History, Modern Myths», in M. R. Lefkowitz and G. M. Rogers [12] 6f. consacre des passages à l'histoire ancienne telle que perçue par les afrocentristes et passe en revue les thèses de Dubois, Garvey, Asante, C. Anta Diop, G. M. James, etc.

[14] V. Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington 1994).

[15] V. Y. Mudimbe, *The Idea of Africa* (Bloomington 1988).

[16] Mudimbe [15] 80f. C'est ainsi qu'il a su dégager le thème de l'eldorado africain et celui des bizarreries africaines; cf. Mudimbe [15] 80.

[17] Mudimbe [15] 100: «Although I essentially agree with Bernal's analysis of the impact of racism (along with such factors as Christianity, the myth of progress, and Romanticism), for the overthrow as the Ancient Model, I would tend to be more prudent about the history of racism and I would distinguish "race thinking" from "racism"».

[18] Mudimbe [15] 101f.: «Black scholars have, in general reproached Bernal for having played down the contributions of the late Cheikh Anta Diop. . . . Bernal's project considers diffusion patterns originated from Egypt toward the north, the west and the east. Diop, in his controverted publications was more concerned with the interactions between the south and the north. . . .»

des relations entre la Grèce et l'Egypte, il a su montrer le rôle et la place de civilisations du Proche Orient dans l'émergence de la civilisation grecque. Mudimbe a pu affiner l'analyse des discours sur l'Afrique. Tous les trois ont perçu l'importance et la place des humanités gréco-latines et de la germanistique dans le discours de l'Occident, ils entretiennent tous un rapport particulier avec l'appareil conceptuel marxiste dans l'analyse des faits sociaux, culturels et spirituels.

La lecture attentive de leurs œuvres devrait nous inciter à affiner les questions méthodologiques: la critique des sources, la position sociale des auteurs, leurs motivations, le contexte de dissémination des textes utilisés, le contexte de réactivation, les continuités et ruptures, l'élaboration de l'hégémonie, les sous périodisations de l'Antiquité africaine, l'analyse des données factuelles, par exemple les données linguistiques.

Le grand mérite de la polémique autour des œuvres de C. Anta Diop et de Martin Bernal est peut-être de pousser ceux qui sont en accord avec eux, comme eux qui sont contre leurs thèses, de se retrouver autour de certains projets rédactionnels. Ce fut le cas lors de la préparation du vol II de l'histoire générale de l'Afrique avec le fameux Colloque du Caire de 1974 sur le peuplement de l'Egypte; en 1996 le Musée d'Indianapolis a pu ressembler les contributions des tenants des positions diamétralement opposées sous le titre *Egypt, Child of Africa*. Ce titre, à lui seul est révélateur du sens de la tendance générale.

Des offensives et des contre offensives vont être relancées, l'essentiel est que les participants aux débats avancent des arguments rigoureux vérifiables par la communauté de pairs. La publication d'un ouvrage systématique en France sur l'Afrocentrisme[19] montre que, du côté occidental, on a pris bonne mesure de l'importance des questions soulevées et de la nécessité de réponses transversales, de contributions transcontinentales.

[19] F.-X. Fauvelle-Aymar, J.-P. Chrétien et C. H. Perrot, *Afrocentrismes: L'Histoire des Africains entre Egypte et Amérique* (Paris/Karthala 2000). Dans cet ouvrage près d'une vingtaine de chercheurs d'Europe, d'Amérique se proposent d'offrir une perspective critique face aux théories afrocentristes.

REVIEW ARTICLES

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THE RHETORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF ROMAN WARFARE

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Rhiannon Ash, *Ordering Anarchy: Armies and Leaders in Tacitus' Histories*. London: Duckworth, 1999. Pp. x + 246. ISBN 0-7156-2800-3. GBP40.00.

The loss of most of Tacitus' *Histories* is the more tragic when we see what Ash can do with what remains, the extended narrative of just two years' epoch-making events. Ash rightly comments (p. vii) on the remarkable prominence Tacitus affords to these events and, even had all twelve books survived, a study devoted to them would have been justified. She locates herself firmly as a follower of Woodman (and Wiseman) in holding that Roman historiography should be read primarily as a rhetorical construct and that the focus of study should be on presentation more than on facts.[1] Ash aims 'primarily (though not only) to elucidate Tacitus' techniques as a literary artist' (p. viii), through a study of how the historian characterises the four emperors, their forces, and the prominent individual Antonius Primus.

The first chapter, 'Images of Leaders and Armies in Civil War Narratives' (pp. 5-22), examines differing ways in which Julius Caesar, Appian and Cassius Dio faced up to the particular problems of narrating civil war in order to contrast Tacitus' approach. Here, as in the use of Suetonius throughout subsequent chapters, the procedure is not unproblematic: the loss of all Tacitus' predecessors in the writing of annalistic history of the imperial period makes it hazardous and uncertain to attribute innovation or unique subtlety to Tacitus;[2] again dramatic monographs such as Coelius Antipater on the Hannibalic War, or Livy's extended narrative of civil war in the first century BC, may have focused as intently as Tacitus does on the psychology and fragmentation of the troops; thirdly, the scale of Suetonius' biographies is very much smaller than Tacitus' *Histories*, so it is not surprising that Suetonius omits much that

[1] A. J. Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography* (London 1988); T. P. Wiseman, *Clio's Cosmetics* (Leicester 1979).

[2] Cf. D. Wardle, 'Cluvius Rufus and Suetonius', *Hermes* 120 (1992) 466-82 for some of the problems in recreating that lost historiography and the suggestion that Cluvius Rufus, for one, displayed many of the features which had been seen as Tacitus' contribution to the genre.

Tacitus includes; in particular Suetonius is quite ruthless in suppressing personal names.

Chapter 2, 'Galbians and Othonians' (pp. 23-36), deals with Galbians and Othonians and demonstrates the very different characters of the respective armies: the reaction of Galba's army to its austere and stingy commander varies with rank and Tacitus carefully brings out the complexity, whereas Suetonius and Plutarch 'tend to talk more in terms of large, unstratified military groups' (p. 26). The Othonians are similarly analysed by what Ash calls Tacitus' 'internal focalisation' (for example, 1.27.2); by comparison with the Galbians they are devoted to their emperor and suspicious of their superior officers. Ash brings out well the devotion of the Othonians but comments that it is 'perhaps particularly surprising given that they did not have anyone like Julius Caesar to write a flattering account on their behalf' (p. 36). As Plutarch also emphasises this (*Otho* 27.3-5), it must be a part of the historiographical tradition which precedes Tacitus; the Flavians had nothing to fear from a positive presentation of Otho, to whom Vespasian was ostensibly loyal.[3] What would be surprising was a tradition which did not vilify Vitellius!

Chapter 3 deals with the Vitellians and Flavians (pp. 37-72). Ash shows how Tacitus subtly compares the Vitellians with the invading armies of Gauls which had terrorised Italy in 390 BC and in the late second century BC, possessed of a mad lust for plunder: for example, Tacitus gives them no encompassing label until 1.75.1, but before that emphasises the various nationalities of the troops in Vitellius' forces, in effect showing them as non-Roman. In Rome they act like tourists, fall into luxurious ways as well as into illness: 'Tacitus is manipulating a familiar ethnographic stereotype . . . but below the surface may lie the historical reality of a large influx of men who had not been exposed to the endemic diseases of Rome' (p. 47). However, another aspect of Tacitus' depiction which Ash emphasises, over time the rank-and-file Vitellians acquire a certain nobility through their loyalty to Vitellius, whereas their officers are self-seeking and treacherous.[4]

Tacitus' presentation of the Flavian troops differs sharply from that in Josephus—he is no simple flatterer of the Flavians—but he allows some Flavian supporters a positive motivation for their revolt (2.7.2). Ash seems too strong in glossing Tacitus' description of the Flavian troops (2.6.2) as '*desperate* not to miss out on the spoils of civil war' (p. 57). If the Vitellians improved, the reverse was the case

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[3] Ash is keen to provide literary parallels, but we should probably not see Tacitus' *is primus dies Othonianas partis adflixit* ('that was the first day to crush Otho and his supporters', 2.33.13) as an echo of Virgil's *ille dies primus leti* ('that was the first day of doom', *Aen.* 4.169) but within the wider historiographical tradition which goes back at least to Herodotus (5.97) and most clearly to Thucydides (2.12.4). At p. 87 Ash shows how in 69 AD the Flavians accentuated Otho's good qualities to win the support of his troops.

[4] Ash sees in Tacitus' *longus deditorum ordo* ('the long line of prisoners', 4.2.12) a recollection of Virgil's *longo ordine* ('in a long procession', *Aen.* 2.766f., 8.722), but this is far from compelling.

for the Flavians, among whom the desire for plunder becomes dominant and whose behaviour resembles that of Hannibal's Carthaginians.

Chapter 4, 'Galba and Otho' (pp. 73-94), begins Ash's study of the individual emperors. She shows that the characterisation of Galba is notable for Tacitus' rejection of the propagandistic and contemporary association of the emperor as *adsertor libertatis* ('a champion of freedom') and for a concentration on his old-fashioned discipline which lost him the crucial support of his forces and on his old age and feebleness. Tacitus' Galba dies a passive, helpless cripple whereas Suetonius' retains a certain nobility in the face of death.[5]

Otho presented writers with a paradox: his life was riddled with the vices of Nero, yet his death was heroic and selfless. Ash examines the different tendencies of propaganda about Otho which were influential in 69 AD and subsequently under the Flavians, and discusses the contribution of *exitus* ('death') literature to Tacitus' narrative of the suicide. She establishes that there is no fundamental inconsistency in Tacitus' presentation of Otho, but one in which the different traits are well integrated. In passing (p. 89) Ash seems to endorse the approach of David Shotter to the treatment of rumours in Tacitus, positing a thoughtful reconstruction of the 'malicious atmosphere of the times' rather than a Tacitus who deliberately undermines his own narrative.[6] This is an issue which has loomed large in Tacitean scholarship since the 1950s and perhaps the reader could expect a little more than he gets on this.

Chapter 5, 'Vitellius' (pp. 95-125), deals with the emperor whose reputation we would expect to have been traduced most by the Flavians to justify Vespasian's rebellion against him. Ash shows how Vitellius' gluttony and drunkenness were emphasised in Suetonius, Josephus and Plutarch, involving an implicit contrast with the frugality and restraint of Vespasian and how this is downplayed by Tacitus. His Vitellius is passive rather than 'a power-hungry usurper' (p. 106), a convenient figurehead for the mutinous German legions, a commander manipulated by his legates Caecina and Valens. Passive verbs appear frequently (1.56.3, for example) in connection with Vitellius. His weakness as a leader on campaign and in Rome leads to his troops' committing atrocities, losing discipline and becoming enervated by Rome. As defeat approached Vitellius is revealed as out of touch with reality, responding inadequately to crises; his most decisive action is ironically his offer to abdicate, and that is thwarted. Ash suggests that the reader is to feel pity for Vitellius (p. 121) but, as Jason Davies has suggested, we cannot be certain what a second century AD reader might have felt—contempt is as possible as pity.[7] Nonetheless, Ash's reading of the end of Vitellius shows her sensitivity to Tacitus' narrative at its best.

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[5] Many of Ash's putative intertextual links with the death of Pompey (pp. 80-83) are to me somewhat forced, although the overall comparison of Galba and Pompey is appealing.

[6] Among his many articles taking this line, D. C. A. Shotter, 'Tacitus, Tiberius and Germanicus', *Historia* 17 (1968) 194-214.

[7] J. Davies, review of Ash, *BMCR* 00.05.21.

Chapter 6, 'Vespasian, Titus and Domitian' (pp. 127-46), deals with Tacitus' presentation of the Flavians; Vespasian was very little different from his predecessors: 'there was actually a disturbing continuity between the way in which Vespasian and his predecessors gained control' (p. 128). Beginning from Tacitus' words *occulta fati et ostentis ac responsis destinatum Vespasiano liberisque eius imperium post fortunam credidimus* ('After Vespasian's rise we came to believe the mysteries of Fate that by both portents and oracular responses the empire had been predestined for Vespasian and his children', 1.10.3), Ash looks at the omens and prodigies which announced Vespasian's rise. As Davies has pointed out, this section suffers from a less secure grasp of Roman religion than of historiography:[8] *superstitio* should not be translated willy-nilly as 'superstition', rather as religious practices outside the Roman state cults under the control of the Senate; the formulation of Basilides' pronouncement 'whatever it is which you have in mind . . .' would not, I suspect, be 'disturbing' to any Roman familiar with augural procedures (cf. Val. Max. 1.4.1) such as a former magistrate; Vespasian's 'turning' of the omen of a comet against the Parthian king is wholly in accordance with the spirit which pervades the Romans' treatment of omens.[9] These points aside Ash is right to see this religious material as a major means by which Tacitus characterises Vespasian in the extant books of the *Histories* at least.

Ash shows that in his treatment of Vespasian and his two sons Tacitus ignores the contemporary raptures, that at last there was an emperor with adult male sons who could ensure the succession, and to have highlighted the tensions in their mutual relationships (4.52, for example, and the rumour of 4.86). The future despotism of Domitian is alluded to in his budding dissimulation (4.86.2) and blushing (4.40.1).[10] By contrast, Titus appears as initially dwarfing his father in popular estimation and in that of Galba, although his problematic relationship with Berenice is foreshadowed (2.2.1) and doubtless was covered in more detail in the missing books.

The final chapter, 'Antonius Primus' (pp. 147-65), deals in detail with the headstrong general Antonius Primus, whose disobedience won Vespasian his throne at less cost than the agreed policy was likely to have. Ash shows that Tacitus was not the victim of his sources in creating his Primus and that he presents eloquently the problems posed to Vespasian by a man like Primus in peacetime. Her analysis of Primus' speech at *Histories* 3.2 shows him 'reinventing the past in such a way as to orchestrate the present' (p. 154): Tacitus does not contradict himself; rather, a general (like a politician) bends the truth.

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[8] Davies [7].

[9] See examples at Val. Max. 1.5 with my comments, D. Wardle, *Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds and Sayings Book 1* (Oxford 1998).

[10] A rare example of over subtle interpretation is the suggestion that we should see in the name Basilides a reference to Domitian, son of the king, and should interpret his prophecy as a warning about Domitian (pp. 141f.).

Ash has certainly gone a long way towards ordering anarchy in this work. Her subtle literary interpretation has added much to my appreciation of Tacitus' *Histories*.[11]

ROMAN LAW AND THE ROMAN FAMILY

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Carla Fayer, *La familia romana: Aspetti giuridici ed antiquari*. Rome: 'L'Erma' di Bretschneider, 1994. Pp. 728. ISBN 88-7062-875-2. ITL450 000/USD283.00.

For a review of a book published in 1994 to appear in a journal in 2001 is somewhat unusual and requires a word of explanation. First of all, *La familia romana* only became available for review in New Zealand in 2000. But more importantly, the book warrants a review still, because it has been rather neglected, at least in English-speaking countries. Possible reasons for such neglect (apart from the obvious, that it is not in English) shall be explored presently.

This book is a useful research tool for anyone investigating the Roman family. Interest in this area has grown phenomenally over the past two decades, and progress has been concomitant; the initiative of Beryl Rawson's Roman family conferences (I in 1981, II in 1988, and III in 1994, held at Canberra, Australia, and published in 1986, 1991, and 1997 respectively) continues, with IV having taken place in Ontario in September 2001.[1] Advances in social and cultural history have been made in many diverse contexts; not only literary but also epigraphical, papyrological, archaeological, iconographical, and statistical, as well as legal material has been brought to bear on the subject. It is evident that in order to be able to speak intelligently about the workings

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[11] Ash's translation of extracts from Tacitus is good. I have only quibbles: there is inconsistency in the translation of *et obsequia meliorum nox abstulerat* (1.80.2) between page 29 ('night had taken away the obedience of the better men') and page 33 ('the darkness even demolished the obedience of the better men'); the translation of *abrupta* (3.63.1) by 'collapsed' (p. 53); the wrong positioning of 'only' on 2.8.2 (p.58; cf. page 127: 'Tacitus only owed his career'); on 2.62.1 'he had a . . .' is better for *epularum foeda et inexplebilis libido* than 'it was his . . .' (p. 114). The standard of proof reading is exemplary and Duckworth has done its usual job of providing a solid appealing book (even if having endnotes instead of footnotes makes the act of reading more tedious).

[1] B. Rawson (ed.), *The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives* (London/Sydney 1986); B. Rawson (ed.), *Marriage, Divorce and Children in Ancient Rome* (Canberra/Oxford 1991); B. Rawson and P. Weaver (edd.), *The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space* (Canberra/Oxford 1997). Details of the 2001 conference may be found at <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~classics/togo_conference>.

and functions of the family and/or household in the Roman world, one needs to be well acquainted with many aspects; arguably, the legal is the most fundamental. The juridical sources present a wealth of information and detail; they also notoriously create a minefield for the uninitiated and the unwary. We must remain critically aware that the legal texts typically describe legal constructs or opinions (and of a specific time and place), not social norms or, necessarily, realities. It is also vital that we maintain a healthy caution with respect to terminology. Most fundamentally, *familia* does not equal 'family';[2] the main title of the book under review specifies *familia*, not *famiglia* (as it is sometimes quoted).

Recent years have seen some excellent examples of the way literary and legal testimony can be utilised together in order to develop our understanding of the patterns and varieties of social groupings that may be subsumed under the title 'Roman family'; one thinks immediately of works by, for example (and in no particular order), Beryl Rawson, Paul Weaver, Suzanne Dixon, Susan Treggiari, Keith Bradley, Jane Gardner, Thomas Wiedemann, Richard Saller, Brent Shaw, Judith Evans-Grubbs, and Antti Arjava. All these are scholars publishing (predominantly) in English. Books and articles of related interest in French (by Mireille Corbier and Joelle Beaucamp, not to mention Paul Veyne)[3] and in German (such as work by J.-U. Krause, as well as Angelika Mette-Dittmann) certainly exist, but they are far less numerous, and—unless I am merely displaying my own narrow perspective—much less noticed by most scholars working on the Roman family. Perhaps that is inevitable, but it is certainly not desirable. *La familia romana* should have helped to an extent to correct the situation, but as far as I can see it has not.

Fayer's book is a case where the subtitle (*Aspetti giuridici ed antiquari*) is absolutely vital. This is not an Italian contribution to the literature on the sociological/historical study of the Roman family (of this there has been very little in Italian, although note Maurizio Bettini's idiosyncratic book[4]). The Italian book on the Roman family to which I turn most often is Riccardo Astolfi's on the Augustan marriage legislation,[5] and it is certainly in the legal domain that the Italian contribution has been greatest. I can well remember the first time I visited the Bodleian Law Library, in 1987, and browsed the shelves of the Roman law section. I had gone there, in my first year as a graduate student, to find juridical material on *patria potestas*. I had never realised until then just how much has been published in Italian on the legal

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[2] In this context note now J. F. Gardner, *Family and Familia in Roman Law and Life* (Oxford 1998) 271 n. 9.

[3] See also the trilingual edition by J. Andreau et H. Bruhns (edd.), *Parenté et stratégies familiales dans l'Antiquité romaine: Actes de la table ronde des 2-4 octobre 1986* (Paris 1990).

[4] M. Bettini, *Antropologia e cultura romana: Parentela, tempo, immagini dell'anima* (Rome 1988). There is an English translation by J. van Sickle, *Anthropology and Roman Culture: Kinship, Time, Images of the Soul* (Baltimore 1991).

[5] R. Astolfi, *La Lex Iulia et Papia* (Padova 1996).

and historical constructs of Roman law. Even if fluent in the language, it would be impossible for the historian of the Roman family to take all this Italian legal scholarship on board. Fayer's book does help to correct that situation, so it deserves to be better known and better utilised.

La familia romana is not, then, social history. One will not find much reference here to a name such as Beryl Rawson, apart from some notice of Roman Family I (specifically the papers by Crook and Lacey); Alan Watson is mentioned but not Paul Weaver; Carcopino is here but not Corbier; Saller and Shaw scarcely feature; as for Suzanne Dixon, there is reference to only one paper by her, and that of a legal nature; Susan Treggiari features on occasion, but on marriage there is far more from Brini;[6] Jane Gardner's *Being a Roman Citizen*,[7] now fundamental for many aspects discussed by Fayer, clearly appeared too late to be used (Fayer's preface is dated 5 February 1993); hence, of course, there is also no Evans-Grubbs or Arjava, but a great deal of Sargenti for the later empire. In this volume the prominent names, familiar to many of us but perhaps more as bibliographical items than for their content and ideas, are the likes of Solazzi, Albertario, Costa, Bonfante, Arangio-Ruiz, De Francisci, Volterra, Biondi, Lanfranchi, Guarino, Pugliese, Voci, and Franciosi, as well as, outside the Italian realm, such names as De Visscher and Kaser.

I list names rather than topics because it seems to me that such a catalogue, more than anything else, makes very clear the nature of *La familia romana*. There is nothing original in the ideas or arguments of this book, and there is very little here to reflect the wider state of knowledge, even as of 1993, about the Roman family as a social construct. The book is a survey of several centuries of scholarship on aspects of Roman private law, particularly on the evolution and development of the laws; it also deals on occasion with aspects of antiquarianism (for example, the origin of the *gentes*), a particular interest of the author, as her previous publications make clear.[8] The book's target audience is not legal historians (Fayer herself is not one), but social historians, those who otherwise would not be able to cope with and benefit from the vast scholarly literature Italy in particular has produced.

In over 700 pages Fayer aims to treat the 'vastissimo e complesso problema delle istituzioni romane private' which relates to 'la costituzione e la composizione della *familia* romana' (p. 11). There is detailed analysis, with abundant citations of ancient texts (in Latin and occasionally Greek, with Italian translation; predominantly legal evidence, some literary, and a very little epigraphical and papyrological) and of modern scholarship, relating to: (1) specific meanings of *familia Romana*, its composition and constitution in legal senses; *adgnatio* (and its extinction through *capitis deminutio*), *cognatio*, *adfinitas*, *gens*, et cetera, as well as discussion of the meaning of such terms as *familia* and *domus*; (2) *patria potestas*: its meaning and extent, its relation to private and public law; the powers it theoretically entails, notably

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[6] G. Brini, *Matrimonio e divorzio nel diritto romano* (Bologna 1887).

[7] J. F. Gardner, *Being a Roman Citizen* (London 1993).

[8] Especially C. Fayer, *Aspetti di vita quotidiana nella Roma arcaica* (Rome 1982).

ius vitae ac necis, *ius exponendi*, *ius vendendi*, *ius noxae dandi*; the position of the *filius familias* and his *peculium*, and what happens when the *pater familias* dies;[9] (3) *adoptio*, including *adrogatio*. Much here is superseded by Jane Gardner's 1998 book;[10] Gardner's work is also vital on the subject of emancipation, of which there is relatively sparse discussion in Fayer (cf. p. 224); (4) *tutela* and *cura*: a very thorough treatment and very useful on, for example, *tutela mulierum*, and *cura furiosi* (pp. 559-82). Again, the reader will find more perceptive and concise studies elsewhere,[11] but it remains helpful to have primary and secondary material collated here. The volume concludes with an extensive bibliography and indices.

As a work of reference—and the indices are indeed excellent—this book is extremely useful. Fayer conveys complex material in a clear and well-structured manner, albeit at times too protracted, with good cross-referencing. Digressions only occasionally become bewildering. One will find here a veritable wealth of information; examples of particularly useful detail include discussions of *adrogatio* (especially pp. 294-305), the *ius liberorum* (pp. 516-18), and the meaning of *infantia* (pp. 398f.). For a striking example of lengthy discussion, more than one ever perhaps wanted to know, see the index references to *vino*—the entry on *divieto di bere vino*, incidentally, is a rare example of rather circuitous referencing. The principal discussion of wine-drinking, pp. 146-63, might be compared with Treggiari's rather more concise treatment in her 1991 book on Roman marriage. Anyone who despises long footnotes will be dismayed by this book. Personally, I found them, much more than the extensive citation of legal texts, very useful. For some particularly extensive examples see pp. 123-26, 148, 182, 295-98, 314, 491-501, 601f.; a number of notes are in effect bibliographical essays in their own right.[12]

But what should be a very useful reference tool for historians of the family has been largely overlooked, I think, simply because of the price. The book is currently advertised on the 'L'Erma' di Bretschneider webpage as ITL450,000 or USD283.[13] In their 2001 catalogue it is advertised at ITL473,000, USD249 and EUR245. Whatever the current price and exchange rates, this is a phenomenally expensive book, especially

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[9] In this connection—and for the way in which the scholarly tradition may build upon itself—see now B. D. Shaw, 'Raising and Killing Children: Two Roman Myths', *Mnemosyne* 54 (2001) 31-77.

[10] See above, n. 2.

[11] Particularly in R. Saller's *Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family* (Cambridge 1994).

[12] There are also some errors, but relatively few: an occasional slip in the Latin text, an infelicitous translation, and a number of errors in bibliographical references, especially those that are not in Italian. It is regrettable than the *stemma cognationum* reproduced from *FIRA* also reproduces two typographical errors from the original: *in mano [sic] viri* and *qnae [sic] in manu* (p. 39). It is also dismaying to see how unattractive the Greek font is (cf., e.g., pp. 83f., 140f., 148-52). This dismay is exacerbated in view of the cost of the book.

[13] The URL is <http://www.sysin.it/erma/italiano/ifamilia.htm>.

for a paperback. Few scholars will have it on their shelves; in fact, as library budgets dwindle, especially in countries which experience crippling exchange rates, not many universities will have this book either. Only one library in New Zealand has it (because I ordered it in 1994 before I knew how much it cost). Searching, with help from the interlibrary loan people in my University library, has revealed only five other copies in libraries throughout the southern hemisphere; predictably, there are many more in libraries in the northern hemisphere, but even then the count does not reach the century mark. To put it bluntly: this book is worth having, but not at the price it is currently being offered.

One further point needs to be made. I stated earlier that this is a case where the subtitle is vital. This is also a case where the sub-subtitle (*Parte prima*) appears to mislead: it is clearly stated that this is part one, and we are told in the preface (p. 11) that part two will deal with *i momenti più salienti della vita umana di ogni tempo*, namely (and the list is a little surprising) betrothal, marriage, adultery, and divorce. There is no mention of a third volume, though one might have expected some discussion of (inter alia) inheritance law in the context of the family. In any event, the second part has not appeared, and the New York Public Library catalogue,[14] for example, includes the following message: '"Please note [a typographical error] in this volume. The volume has been erroneously labelled Part one"—Inserted errata slip.' My copy has no such slip, nor has 'L'Erma' di Bretschneider been able to clarify the situation, apart from telling me that there are currently no plans to publish part two. I have been unable to contact Professor Fayer, but it would be good to know if a further volume is forthcoming. I would certainly welcome it, but one hopes that it will be at a much more affordable price if and when it does appear.

THE ROMAN-DUTCH LAW OF EVIDENCE AT THE CAPE

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M. L. Hewett (tr. and ed.), *De Testimoniis: A Thesis by Gysbert Hemmy on the Testimony of the Chinese, Aethiopians, and Other Pagans*. Cape Town: private publication[1] 1998. Pp. xxxiii + 125. ISBN 0-620-22647-1. ZAR150.

The fall of the Nationalist government in South Africa in the last decade of the previous millennium has been followed by a reconsideration of the history of the country. Many recent books have focused particularly on the question of slavery at the

[14] Accessed online at <http://catnyp.nypl.org>.

[1] This book is available from the translator at the following address: 'Stekjeshof', Fleetwood Avenue, Claremont, Cape Town 7700, South Africa.

Cape between the date of the first arrival of slaves in 1658 and the emancipation of the slaves there in 1828 (finally taking effect in 1838).[2] These studies omit all mention of the work under review—here translated into English for the first time. This is a doctoral thesis on the Roman-Dutch law of evidence presented to the University of Leiden in 1770, consisting of prolegomena (pp. iv-xix), a short bibliography (pp. xx-xxii) and a facsimile of the original Latin dissertation with a facing English translation (pp. 9-67). It is of enormous interest to those engaged in a reappraisal of the impact of European colonialism on the cultural history of South Africa, the reception of Roman Law, and neo-Latin.

In her prolegomena (p. x-xi), Hewett gives four reasons for undertaking the work. These are that it will shed light on: (1) 'the history and circumstances of the settlement' at the Cape of Good Hope in the eighteenth century; (2) 'the attitude of at least one of the company servants to the legal problems at the Cape'; (3) 'the subject of evidence as acceptable in the Netherlands and *ius commune* countries'; and (4) 'the interface between researchers and the source material available in the court records'. To be fair, the thesis deals fully with only the second and third of these points.

The first three chapters of the work address the third topic. Chapter 1 (pp. 9-17) focuses on the importance of reliable witnesses for establishing the truth in legal cases in Roman-Dutch law and the qualities that such witnesses should ideally possess. This subject is pursued further in the second chapter (pp. 18-30), which discusses the circumstances in which the evidence of slaves, the mentally or physically handicapped (specifically the deaf and the blind), close relatives of the accused, criminals, and people of ill-repute (*infames*, women, non-Christians) can be accepted in court. Chapter 3 (pp. 21-45) outlines the grounds on which evidence can be ruled inadmissible (*impietas*, 'impiety' and *malitia*, 'wickedness'; *infamia*, 'disrepute'; *odium*, 'hatred' of the accused; and *utilitas*, 'self-interest').

Thus far the thesis addresses standard issues in the Roman-Dutch law of evidence.[3] What makes the treatise unique, however, is the discussion of the admissibility of the evidence of 'Aethiopians, Chinese, and Other Pagans' (including the complaints of the 'East Indian slaves' against their masters) at the Cape in the fourth (pp. 45-58) and fifth chapters (pp. 59-67), which broadly deal with the second topic mentioned above. Hemmy argues that the testimony of these peoples (more recognisably the slaves imported from Malaysia, Mocambique, Madagascar, and Angola, to work at the Cape, and the indigenous Khoi-Khoi tribal group) should be accepted, with the standard provisos concerning the credibility of evidence in a court

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[2] R. Shell, *Children of Bondage: A Social History of the Slave Society at the Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1838* (Hanover 1994); R. L. Watson, *The Slave Question: Liberty and Property in South Africa* (Hanover 1990); N. Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa* (Cambridge 1985); R. Ross, *Cape of Torments: Slavery and Resistance in South Africa* (London 1983).

[3] For the problem of the testimony of slaves in the Roman empire, see L. Schumacher, *Servus Index* (Wiesbaden 1982).

of law. His attitude clearly reflects a fairly conventional eighteenth century view of the world and was determined by four factors: his own personal background and interest in trade between the Cape and Europe, the ideas of the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment, Tacitus' description of the innocent lives of barbarians unaffected by the vices of civilization (the 'noble savage' topos), and the statutes of the Dutch East India Company.

First, Hemmy's personal background (conveniently summarised in Hewett's prolegomena, pp. xii-xvii) is apparent in his discussion of Christian persecution of pagans, which soon turns into a polemic against the Catholic attempts to suppress Protestants during the Reformation (pp. 45-49)—Hemmy's mother was Dutch and his father was from Bremen in Northern Germany. His interest in promoting trade between Europe and the Cape is particularly evident in his statement on p. 53f. that 'the interest of trade with these people seems to demand this particularly, namely that credence be given to their testimony. . . . For how does anyone make a contract in good faith with a perjured and *intestabilis* man or how do these people accept our people in a trading relationship if they feel they are not only suspected of bad faith by us but also regarded as *infames* and *intestabiles*?' Hemmy's interest in trade is also evident from his earlier description in a speech delivered to the Hamburg Academy of the establishment of a settlement in the Cape of Good Hope by the Dutch to supply their ships en route to the East.[4]

Secondly, Hemmy vehemently upholds the principle of liberty of conscience (p. 48) and consequently adopts an enlightened attitude (for his times) towards pagans who 'are not unbelievers through their own fault' (p. 49). Hemmy's liberal ideas are based closely on the philosophy of the English philosopher John Locke, whose discussion of the relativity of knowledge and culture is paraphrased closely on p. 62.[5] A comparison between the two texts is instructive. First Hemmy (as rendered by Hewett):

> For if, perhaps, that most brilliant of English philosophers, the great Newton, had been born in Saldanha Bay[6] his thoughts, I am sure, would not have differed much from the thoughts of the Hottentots living there and, on the other hand, if by chance some Hottentot had at that time been born in England, he would perhaps have left the men learned in the science of mathematics, philosophy and astronomy many parasangs behind him [see Locke, *De Intellectu*, 1.4. n. 12].

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[4] K. D. White (tr. and ed.), *De Promontorio Bonae Spei (The Cape of Good Hope): A Latin Oration Delivered in the Hamburg Academy 10 April 1767* (Cape Town 1959).

[5] For a discussion of the views of the Enlightenment to slavery and race, see D. Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (Ithaca 1966) 391-482. The attitude of Locke to slavery is discussed by J. Vogt (tr. T. Wiedemann), *Ancient Slavery and the Ideal of Man* (Oxford 1975) 201.

[6] Saldanha Bay lies just to the northwest of Cape Town.

Next Locke (the reference is in fact to his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* 1.3.12):

> Had you or I been born at the Bay of Soldania, possibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded those brutish ones of the Hottentots that inhabit there. And had the Virginia king Apochancana been educated in England, he had been perhaps as knowing a divine, and as good a mathematician as any in it; the difference between him and a more improved Englishman lying barely in this, that the exercise of his faculties was bounded within the ways, modes, and notions of his own country, and never directed to any other or further inquiries.

Thirdly, Hemmy describes the Hottentots of the Cape in much the same terms as Tacitus does the Germans in his *Germania*. First Hemmy (p. 62, transliterated): *misera ambitione aut avaritia pectora illis non fervent, quae reliquis mortalibus otium et quietem eripiunt. Libidine non ardent. Invidia haud laborant. Nulla malarum curarum anxietate torquentur. Nullius sceleris conscientia animum mordet.* This is translated by Hewett as follows: 'Their breasts do not seethe with wretched ambition or greed, which disrupts the peace and quiet of other mortals. They do not burn with lust; they do not simmer with envy; they are not tormented with anxiety for evil purposes. No consciousness of crime gnaws at their minds.' Compare Tacitus on the Chauci: *sine cupiditate, sine impotentia, quieti secretique nulla provocant bella, nullis raptibus aut latrociniis populantur* ('Untouched by greed or lawless ambition, they dwell in quiet seclusion, never provoking a war, never robbing or plundering their neighbours', *Germ.* 35).

Lastly, Hemmy's argument is quite simply based on the *Statutes of the East Indies* which decreed that 'credence must be given' to the testimony of 'Moors (Mohammedans) and Heathen when it is given by honourable people, of good name and repute' (p. 54).[7] Similarly, the *Statutes* lay down that slaves at the Cape should be allowed to give testimony against their masters in case of cruel treatment: 'It shall be allowed to a bondsman to lay a claim with the Judge or Magistrate if he has been cruelly treated by his master or mistress, provided he has good and significant reason therefor'. Thus Hemmy's thesis closely follows the line of the company for which he worked for most of his life.

The prolegomena to the work do not fully address all the aspects of the work discussed above in this review. Instead the reader is provided with a summary of the contents of the treatise (p. ix), a discussion of the editor's reasons for embarking on the project (pp. x-xii, quoted above), and biographical notes on the life of Hemmy (pp. xii-xvii) including his years in the Cape, in Europe, and in Japan. This section of the edition concludes with bibliographical notes on most of the legal texts on which Hemmy drew (pp. xvii-xix).

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[7] Hewett does not appear to have supplied the bibliographical details for this reference.

The bibliography itself is divided into two sections: legal sources (pp. xxf.) and non-legal sources (p. xxii). The first shows that Hewett has made a considerable effort to check the references to ancient, medieval, and later legal discussions of the law of evidence—an area to which she brings considerable experience.[8] References to legal texts are given in their modern format and the editor carefully notes those citations which are clearly irrelevant to the discussion (cf., e.g., pp. 18-21). The translation is annotated, although too lightly in my opinion (only forty-six explanatory notes are provided and the reader is often left ignorant of important contextual information.)

The second section of the bibliography consists mainly of the classical authors and works that are cited in the thesis (an indication that the translator had non-classicists largely in mind in putting together this edition). In keeping with the usage of his age, Hemmy does not hesitate to quote classical poets and playwrights such as Juvenal, Ovid, Terence and Plautus, prose authors like Cicero and Plutarch, as well as the Old and New Testaments, in his juridical dissertation. While Hewett argues that there is no evidence that the author knew Greek, allusions to parasangs (see the quotation above), the Greek myth of Ariadne and the labyrinth (p. 11), and Plutarch's reference to a woman defending a case in the Roman forum (p. 27), suggest the opposite. Some of these literary citations have regrettably not been properly identified, including Juvenal's *rara avis* (6.165) on p. 31 and the reference to Plutarch mentioned above.[9] Also cited in this section is the work of the Abbé de la Caille who wrote a historical account of his journey to the Cape in 1751-1753.[10] Some other bibliographical citations are given in the footnotes to the prolegomena (especially n. 6 p. xii). These could usefully have been collected in a third section of the bibliography for the convenience of readers. Again, the references for some works cited, such as Kolb, do not appear to have been given fully anywhere in the work.[11]

This work is certainly of great interest to academics in a number of disciplines and also potentially to a wide general readership. It is regrettable that the book was not produced by an international publisher. If this had this been done, the book would have received greater publicity, some of the unnecessary deficiencies of the present

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[8] Hewett has also translated the three volumes of A. Matthaeus, *De Criminibus* (Cape Town 1996, Cape Town 1994 and Pretoria 1993). Nevertheless, a number of sources (admittedly obscure ones such as Carpzov, Vinnius and Donellus) remain unidentified.

[9] A further unidentified quotation, which does not appear to be classical but may be based on Cic. *Fam.* 15.6.1, also occurs on p. 43: *plus valent duo Catones turba quam Quiritium.*

[10] An English translation of this work, *Travels at the Cape 1751-1753*, by R. Raven-Hart (Cape Town 1976) is available and could usefully have been cited.

[11] P. Kolbe, *Caput Bonae Spei Hodiernum: Vollständige Beschreibung des africanischen Vorgebürges der guten Hofnung* 1-2 (Nürnberg 1719). This work has been translated by P. Kolb into English as *The Present State of the Cape of Good Hope, or a Particular Account of the Several Nations of the Hottentots with a Short Account of the Dutch Settlement at the Cape* (London 1731) and has now been edited by W. Jopp under the title *Unter Hottentotten 1705-1713* (Tübingen 1979).

edition might have been avoided,[12] and the editor may have been persuaded to provide fuller contextualisation for a very rare and fascinating document in the reception of Roman law and the history of colonialism in South Africa.

THE CLASSICAL IN GREEK ART

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Mark D. Fullerton, *Greek Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. 176, incl. 79 colour illustrations, 34 black-and-white, 7 line drawings and 1 map. ISBN 0-521-77973-1. GBP11.95.

The title of this book is slightly misleading, especially in view of the accessible format and wealth of colour illustrations. Instead of being an introductory book on Greek art that might be suitable for beginners, it is more about concepts of 'Classical' art, challenging widely held assumptions, arguing in particular that the organic model of growth which underlies most descriptions of the development of Greek art is misleading in the emphasis it places upon Classical art as a 'mature' period and in the way it implies a single, pure, identifiable, Classical style. It is a book for more mature students and their teachers. I found it interesting, well written and generally persuasive.

In addition to the introduction, there are five chapters, each of which begins by examining an aspect of the Parthenon sculptures. Fullerton explains his approach on pages 10f.:

> Rather than suppress or deny the central role of the Classical in our understanding of ancient Greek art, this book instead pushes that centrality to the foreground. The ambiguity inherent in the term classical is exploited, since this text uses the term Classical narrowly defined (as the period 480-323 BC) to explore certain common features of the term classical broadly defined (as Greek and Roman culture generally). In the . . . introduction, I shall present an

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[12] For example, the printer has mangled the right margin of p. 50 (the author supplied a corrected page). The rather stilted translation (but legal texts are hardly stylistically elegant) should be evident from the passages quoted in the course of the review. Note further that *mei Amantissim[us]* in the *Oratio* is inappropriately glossed as 'most beloved by me' rather than 'most fond of me' or perhaps 'my very dear friend' (tr. K. D. White). Typographical errors certainly exist, though these are relatively rare; cf., e.g., 'are know for treachery' (p. 64); 'the interface . . . These are a major source . . .' (p. xi); 'Constantiople' (p. xviii). In addition, rather more help was needed with Hemmy's Latin text, its idiosyncracies (*emti*, p. 65; *paean*, p. 64) and patent errors (*confirmaverinr*, p. 67).

> overview of developing concepts of the Classical from antiquity to the present day. Each succeeding chapter identifies a theme crucial to the reading of ancient Greek art—the political purposes of art (Chapter One), its role in self-definition and the depiction of the 'other' (Two), its narrative and historical function (Three), the importance of style in the construction of meaning (Four), and the afterlife of the Classical (Five). Each chapter begins by illustrating its particular theme through the example of the Parthenon. A structure which has stood continually and conspicuously since its completion in 432, the Parthenon more than any other single monument has captured the imagination of succeeding generations as the very symbol of Classical (and classical) civilization. It is unusually well documented, it was richly embellished with figurative imagery, and its materials are, despite the vicissitudes of time, exceptionally well preserved. In the second section of each chapter, the chosen theme serves as the key to exploring one specific period in the development of Greek art; a concluding section demonstrates the universality of that theme throughout Greek art. The object is to respect the chronological development of the visual arts in Greece while at the same time acknowledging the unity of Greek art, especially in terms of the functions it served and the values it reflected.

In contrast to most treatments, therefore, this one commences in the middle and works backwards and forwards. For those with experience it is thought-provoking. Surely Fullerton is right that the Classical period is fundamental to the way we conceive of the development of Greek art and the character of all the major periods. In the introduction he shows that special concentration on the Classical age was already a feature of ancient views, especially at the time of the Second Sophistic (pp. 11-19). Modern constructs owe much to Winckelmann, writing in the mid-18th Century, who was the first to apply the organic model of development to Greek art (pp. 21f.). Unfortunately, he relied largely on Roman copies, was often unaware of this fact, produced a synthesis based upon misdated pieces, assumed linear stylistic development, and so on. The Riace warriors (pp. 23-25) show that different styles were contemporaneous, the result (in their case) of bronze-casting techniques rather than stylistic evolution governed by a fundamental desire for naturalism.

Chapter 1 opens with a discussion of the Parthenon pediments (pp. 27-35). Themes of local relevance are noted amid an air of iconographic ambiguity (p. 34). The Parthenon is described as a 'communal product' (p. 33), which made a statement about the greatness of the Athenians. The ancients did not distinguish between concerns that might today be classed as political, religious, social, or economic (p. 34). It was fundamentally a matter of status—that of the individual within the *polis* (and the people were the *polis*) or of the *polis* in relation to other *poleis*. Individual behaviour was marked by co-operation and competition. These conditions were fundamental to the production of Greek art, a point underlined by studying the emergence of Geometric art in the context of the rise of the *polis*. Funerals were one prominent social ritual which served to differentiate the nobles, and the social

pressures of the age lay behind the emergence of human figures on painted vases. *Kouroi*, *korai* and grave reliefs may similarly be read as public statements of service to the state (pp. 43-51).

Chapter 2 notes that Greek art is heavily concerned to mark otherness. The Parthenon metopes illustrate conflict between Greeks and others (pp. 53-59). The message is quite general in its application; precision is avoided; there is ambiguity (e.g., p. 58). Did the Athenians empathize with the Trojans? Should we read misogyny into the metopes? Subsequent topics include Orientalizing as a means of indicating otherness (pp. 59-67), self-definition (pp. 67-77), the characterization of alien races, distinguishing women from men, and the marginalization of women in the context of character studies for men (with notable reference to the famous statue of Demosthenes, pp. 76f.). Greek art, it is argued, was always fundamentally generic (p. 77), but artists developed ways to distinguish generic types—men from women, human from bestial, animal from monster. Much attention has been given to the youthful male as ideal figure. Fullerton sees reason to change the focus: 'The construction of other is indeed the construction of self' (p. 77).

Chapter 3, which examines the intersection between myth, history and narrative, commences with the Parthenon Frieze and once more finds unresolved ambiguity (pp. 79-88). Identification and meaning are not at all the same thing. Fullerton draws attention to the over-readiness of scholars to tie specific objects and changes in style to precise historical events. A dated monument like the Siphnian Treasury at Delphi assumes inordinate importance for the dating of works of Archaic art. The *kouroi* identified as 'Kleobis and Biton' are commonly linked to the famous tale in Herodotus (1.31) about the pious sons of a priestess of Hera at Argos. When it comes to narrative, 'The differences between synoptic and monoscenic narrative, or even between narrative and emblematic images, is [sic] not always clear-cut and is most often reader-determined' (p. 101). History and allegory work together, as can be seen with the sculptures of the Temple of Athena Nike (pp. 103-06), for example.

Chapter 4, concentrating on matters of style, is particularly rewarding. The metopes of the Parthenon, notably those on the south, vary in style (pp. 109-15), but this fact should not be taken to support Rhys Carpenter's idea that there was a Kimonian Parthenon (p. 109). Fullerton is surely right to assert that '. . . style is not determined by date alone: subject, function, pose, and even narrative play their roles in determining the appearance of sculptures' (p. 114). Rather than a steady evolution in style over time, major changes should be linked to the nature of Greek society, '[which was] participatory, inquisitive, rational, and highly competitive' (p. 115). The organic model thus fails as a universally applicable principle. Style becomes a matter of choice among co-existing possibilities (p. 115). The events of 480 BC were not as pivotal as has long been held (pp. 121-23). Style change in the fourth century has often been linked to a shift in interest from the ideal to the real, which in turn is often seen as a product of the decline of the *polis*. Fullerton shows that pluralism rather than evolution is characteristic of the period. It was an age of local and regional differences, and of

eclecticism (pp. 128-38). The major change in style came around the time of the Parthenon rather than the end of the Peloponnesian War (p. 138).

The fifth and final chapter, entitled '(Re)constructing Classicism', ties together a number of strands of the argument. It begins with an examination of Pheidias' statue of Athena Parthenos (pp. 141-50). Types that may be connected in some way to it become ubiquitous later. But are they reflections of the Parthenos in particular or of successive reworkings of the Classical (pp. 149f.)? This kind of question complicates our understanding of the Hellenistic Classicism of, for example, Pergamon, the new Athens (pp. 150-54). There is no question that later ages have found a variety of uses for Classical art. The Romans were skilled in doing so, notably Augustus (pp. 160f.) and Hadrian (pp. 163-65). Even the well known 'composite' statues, such as the Pseudo-Athlete from Delos (pp. 154-56), should not be dismissed as ignorant quotations. The 'verism' detected by modern viewers owes much to the fact that we have become conditioned to think that things should look Greek. Roman portraits were in fact motivated by the same desire to capture the nature and character of the subject which produced the study of Demosthenes (p. 154). Ultimately, 'the Classical was and is both momentary and timeless; that is its perpetual power and that is its eternal appeal' (p. 167).

There are no footnotes but a modest bibliography of four pages appears at the back, arranged chapter by chapter (pp. 170-73). It struck me that Greek art and Roman art appear more alike in this book than in any other that I have read. Both sets of peoples were choosing and modifying for reasons fundamentally related to status. Both saw something special about the age which produced the Parthenon. The Greeks were not more intellectual, humanistic, freedom-loving or 'artistic' than the Romans. Their choices were different and they made different combinations of things 'Classical'. Style, therefore, did not evolve smoothly, in a linear manner; it was irregular, multi-directional, unpredictable. But if this was stimulating, the recurring emphasis upon generic depiction and ambiguity was slightly disturbing. Certainly, that which is 'Classical' has been much-constructed by numerous generations. But does this mean that there were no specifics? The discussion of the Parthenon frieze, for instance, seemed to permit open-ended indeterminacy in respect of the subject of the frieze (pp. 79-88). We do not, of course, have literary testimony as to the subject, nor have generations of scholars been able to agree completely on what the frieze represents. There have been powerful attacks recently on the traditional view that the frieze represents a contemporary celebration of the Great Panathenaia. I do not mean to undermine in general the point about identification and meaning being things of a very different order. Yet the frieze represents a procession which ends with (what can most naturally be taken to be) the Panathenaic *peplos* being handed over. The frieze is located on a temple of Athena that is in turn located on the Acropolis at Athens. There were other festivals, processions, and sacrifices at Athens, but how many of them involved all these elements: Athena, Acropolis, *peplos*? How many specifically

celebrated Athena's birth, and apparently also her role in the defeat of the giants,[1] as depicted in the pediment and metopes at the front of the Parthenon?[2] And what of the lavish scale of the event depicted? The Great Panathenaia was the greatest of the Athenian festivals. Our literary sources may mention details which cannot be traced in the frieze, but this is hardly surprising, for the frieze is not a comprehensive record. Nor, for that matter, are our literary sources, which turn out to be snippets of information preserved here and there in scholia and late lexica.[3] There is no warrant in this case for implying that the literary sources form a control against which to measure the art. Ambiguity should not, I imagine, frustrate but stimulate. Multiple meanings can be a way to create meaning, to add meaning to meaning in a positive way, to engender dynamism and power around something deemed worthy enough to contemplate or debate. It is not clear to me why we should shrink from thinking that the Athenians had some primary subject in mind that would not necessarily preclude the evocation of other subjects and ideas.

There is much to admire about this compact and stimulating book. Its presentation and price will be attractive to students but I would reiterate that it is not really suitable for beginners. One senses that challenging books like this one are the prelude to a new kind of history of Greek art. Perhaps Fullerton himself will now move on to such a project.[4]

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[1] J. M. Hurwit, *The Athenian Acropolis: History, Mythology, and Archaeology from the Neolithic Era to the Present* (Cambridge 1999) 228, 233.

[2] A gigantomachy was also woven into the *peplos*: Eur. *Hec.* 466-74; Pl. *Euth.* 6b-c; E. J. W. Barber, 'The Peplos of Athena', in J. Neils (ed.), *Goddess and Polis: The Panathenaic Festival in Ancient Athens* (Princeton 1992) 103-17, esp. 112-17.

[3] J. B. Connelly, 'Parthenon and *Parthenoi*: A Mythological Interpretation of the Parthenon Frieze', *AJA* 100 (1996) 54: 'disparate sources mostly of Hellenistic through Byzantine date'; 76 n. 150: 'the later sources . . . conflict in so many ways'; J. Neils, 'The Panathenaia: An Introduction', in Neils (ed.), *Goddess and Polis: The Panathenaic Festival in Ancient Athens* (Princeton 1992) 14: '[many of our literary sources] are Hellenistic, Roman, or even Byzantine commentaries on classical texts and so considerably later than the period under consideration'; J. Neils, 'Pride, Pomp, and Circumstance: The Iconography of Procession', in J. Neils (ed.), *Worshipping Athena: Panathenaia and Parthenon* (Madison 1996) 182: 'all of the surviving ancient testimonia on the Panathenaia are later than the vases and the frieze.' The written sources are discussed most fully in L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin 1932); L. Ziehen, 'Panathenaia', in *RE* 18.3 (1949) 457-89; H. W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* (London 1977) 37-50; E. Simon, *Festivals of Attica* (Madison 1983) 55-72. Neils (1992) 14, is good on the limitations of all types of relevant evidence, including inscriptions and pottery.

[4] Some minor infelicities should be corrected in a second edition; for example, fig. 35, a ground plan of the Parthenon, has transposed the subjects of the east and west friezes; for fig. 45 there should be a space between the '10" and the '1/4"'; and fig. 62 has a space between 's' and 'houlders'. More surprising and regular throughout are failures to deploy the possessive apostrophe properly.

REVIEWS

Scholia *publishes solicited and unsolicited short reviews. Short reviews to be considered for publication should be directed to the Reviews Editor,* ***Scholia****.*

George W. M. Harrison (ed.), *Seneca in Performance*. London: Classical Press of Wales/Duckworth, 2000. Pp. xi +260. ISBN 0-7156-2931-X. GBP40.00.

In 1998 the Theater Program of Xavier University, Cincinnati, mounted a production of Seneca's *Trojan Women* under the direction of Gyllian Raby 'to test the question' (as Harrison says on p. vii) 'of whether the plays were meant for performance or for recitation'. To coincide with this production a two-day conference was arranged by the Department of Classics of Xavier University, at which invited speakers were given an hour 'to develop and demonstrate his or her point of view' (p. vii). The collection under review consists of rewritten versions of the papers presented at the conference, plus two additional ones: the opening paper by John Fitch on the performance issue itself and the contribution by the editor on the physical setting of the plays. Despite almost inevitable flaws, the book in many ways succeeds. The two main blemishes of conference proceedings—disparate focus and uneven quality—will be apparent to the most casual reader. In fact half of the essays have little or no bearing on issues of stage performance or production. Nevertheless the clash of ideas is both valuable and remarkable. Fantham and Goldberg ring the changes on the recitation thesis;[1] Marshall, Harrison, Raby, Volk and (essentially) Fitch argue for stage production, with Marshall offering production criticism at its most nuanced and Fitch a complex hypothesis, in which he opts for Seneca as a full-scale performance dramatist who yet started his dramatic career 'for purely "literary" reasons, thinking only of *recitatio*' (p. 11: Fitch's 'problem' is the 'unstageable' scene of animal sacrifice in *Oedipus*, which, as Fitch notes, is not a problem for everyone).

[1] I append a list of the book's contents: G. W. M. Harrison, 'Introduction' (pp. vii-xi); J. G. Fitch, 'Playing Seneca?' (pp. 1-12); E. Fantham, 'Production of Seneca's *Trojan Women*, Ancient?, and Modern' (pp. 13-26); C. W. Marshall, 'Location! Location! Location! Choral Absence and Theatrical Space in the *Troades*' (pp. 27-51); B. S. Hook, 'Nothing Within Which Passeth Show: Character and *Color* in Senecan Tragedy' (pp. 53-71); H. M. Roisman, 'A New Look at Seneca's *Phaedra*' (pp. 73-86); J.-A. Shelton, 'The Spectacle of Death in Seneca's *Troades*' (pp. 87-118); E. R. Varner, 'Grotesque Vision: Seneca's Tragedies and Neronian Art' (pp. 119-36); G. W. M. Harrison, '*Semper Ego Auditor Tantum*?: Performance and Physical Setting of Seneca's Plays' (pp. 137-49); F. Ahl, 'Seneca and Chaucer: Translating both Poetry and Sense' (pp. 151-71); G. Raby, 'Seneca's *Trojan Women*: Identity and Survival in the Aftermath of War' (pp. 173-95); K. Volk, 'Putting Andromacha on Stage: A Performer's Perspective' (pp. 197-208); and S. M. Goldberg, 'Going for Baroque: Seneca and the English' (pp. 209-31).

On the issues of Senecan characterisation and the plays' manipulation of audience sympathy, similar divergence is evident. Hook seems to see 'rhetoric' and 'psychological characterisation' as disjunctive categories, and aggressively attacks the notion of the latter in Senecan tragedy; Fantham, Raby, Volk and Goldberg entertain no such disjunction and underscore Seneca's psychological subtlety and nuance (Goldberg well observes that 'Seneca's philosophic education suggested new ways to see human character and the sources of human behavior', p. 212). Most contributors draw attention to the sympathy created for the Trojan women by the movement, action and language of the *Troades*; Shelton boldly opposes such a view, arguing for an absence of sympathy on Seneca's part toward the victims of the arena and for the Greeks as an aspirational model for Roman respectful, morally superior viewing of justified execution (although it is left unclear how Shelton's argument is to be reconciled with the moral outrage and pity of the Greek messenger, whose account not only underscores the paradoxical conjunction of brutality and 'unSenecan' pity in the Greek army but also the evil of the spectacle itself: *scelus*, *nefas*). Ahl's discussion of Senecan wordplay brilliantly illuminates the dramatist and Chaucer, underscoring both the centrality of wordplay to poetic meaning and its continued neglect by translators. Unfortunately Ahl's own attempts to capture this wordplay in translation seem (perhaps necessarily) to neglect other constituents of meaning.

The collection is especially strong on contextualisation. Varner suggests connections between Senecan tragedy and Neronian art (particularly useful are his comments on the 'foregrounding' of observation and vision, including 'the physical act of viewing' in fourth-style wall painting, p. 127), although the claim that this is a 'new perspective' both puns badly and misleads (p. 132). Shelton focuses sharply and commendably on the arena; Goldberg underscores elite literate culture and the practice of declamation. Perhaps the most innovative and courageous claim is that of the editor himself, who proposes (alas, without argument) 'that Seneca was the first playwright, or among the first, to compose with an enclosed *odeum* or small theater in mind' (p. 145). Not all will agree with the conclusions drawn from the cultural analyses of this volume's contributors, but it is to those contributors' credit that they bring to the reader's notice the dynamic, semiotic interplay between the Senecan text and late Julio-Claudian Rome.

In such a diverse and energetic body of work it is easy to take issue with individual points. Let me mention two things which surprised me. It is clear from the director's own highly intelligent and rewarding essay that she made such substantial changes to the Senecan text that her production could in no sense function as a test-case for Senecan stageability (Shelton's comment to the contrary on p. 112 is gesture of *xenia*). Furthermore, perhaps equally as strangely, no contributor targets the innovative nature of *Troades*: its extraordinary plethora of characters, including two separate messengers (strangely collapsed into one in the Xavier production), the first terrified, the second (*pace* Shelton) compassionate and self-critical; its highly individualised chorus (Marshall has a few comments here) and that chorus' role in creating a dramatic form which plays against the five-act structure; its paradoxical

employment of a disjunctive dramatic action (which extends to the male characters of the play, each of whom speaks in only one scene) within an overall concentric design, which climaxes uniquely for Seneca in a messenger scene where the play's passions are stilled in the aesthetics of language; and the extraordinary symmetry of the central act which again freezes violence with form. I do not wish to conclude on what is not said. For much is said in this generally well-edited book, in which ironically the outstanding paper on performance issues is one not performed at the conference itself, the vigorous opening chapter by Fitch with its detailed, cogent analyses of scenes in *Medea* and *Thyestes*, whose intelligibility is demonstrated to depend upon enactment before an audience. Perhaps the only essay not meriting a place in the volume is that of Roisman, who is concerned neither with *Troades* nor with general issues of Senecan production, language and dramaturgy, but offers a reading of *Phaedra* containing (despite its title) nothing 'new' except an unpersuasive simplification of the character of Phaedra herself. The book is well produced (I noticed few misprints), and has a useful bibliography and index.

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Sarah Annes Brown, *The Metamorphosis of Ovid: From Chaucer to Ted Hughes*. London: Duckworth, 1999. Pp. viii + 246. ISBN 0-7156-2882-9. GBP40.00

This selective account of the reception of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* in English literature comes at a time of generally increased interest in the reception and translation of the *Metamorphoses* from scholars of Latin poetry. This can be seen, for example, in the proceedings of the 1997 Cambridge conference on Ovid and his reception, now published as *Ovidian Transformations*,[2] in the new edition of the great eighteenth century collective translation edited by Samuel Garth (see further below) produced by Garth Tissol,[3] and in the selection of versions from Chaucer to the 1990's in Christopher Martin's Penguin anthology *Ovid in English*.[4] It is also a period in which major modern poets have become interested in translating the *Metamorphoses* again, most notably Ted Hughes' *Tales from Ovid* and the volume by many hands (including Seamus Heaney as well as Hughes himself) which preceded Hughes' larger

[2] P. Hardie, A. Barchiesi and S. Hinds (edd.), *Ovidian Transformations: Essays on the Metamorphoses and its Reception* (Cambridge 1999).

[3] Sir S. Garth's edition was originally published as *Ovid's Metamorphoses in Fifteen Books* translated by Mr. Dryden, Mr. Addison, Dr. Garth, Mr. Mainwaring, Mr. Congreve, Mr. Rowe, Mr. Pope, Mr. Gay, Mr. Eusden, Mr. Croxall, and other eminent hands, adorn'd with sculptures (London 1717). This work was edited by K. K. Hulley, S. T. Vandersall, and L. Bush (Lincoln 1970) and a facsimile edition was published in the Garland Press (London 1976). Tissol wrote an introduction to the work for the Wordsworth Classics series (Ware 1998).

[4] C. Martin (ed.), *Ovid in English* (Harmondsworth 1998).

undertaking, Michael Hofmann and James Lasdun's *After Ovid: New Metamorphoses*.[5]

Brown's methodology is close to that of Stephen Hinds' work on dynamic allusion and intertextuality in Latin poetry, though it was a shame that his *Allusion and Intertext* came out too late for her to engage with it in full detail.[6] She is interested in the active and creative interplay between allusion and original, but also in isolating a literary tendency of English 'Ovidianism', involving witty allusion, verbal punning and play, and an explicitly self-reflective attitude towards the process of poetic creation. She rightly notes that these postmodern qualities which have led to the characterisation of Ovid as 'Pomo Pat' (in the late Don Fowler's inimitable phrase) have been appreciated and admired for centuries; she also rightly notes the prominence in Ovid of intratextuality, the way in which Ovid's later works look back to and transform the *Metamorphoses*, on which there has been so much recent work by Stephen Hinds, Alessandro Barchiesi and others. In general, she is aware of literary theory but uses it with a light touch, eclectically and illuminatingly.

Brown's work may be conveniently broken up into two parts: the material on poets from Chaucer to Samuel Garth's translation of 1717 (to p. 139), and that on later texts. The former is where Brown clearly feels most at home, and where the meat of the book lies. Chaucer's *House of Fame* receives some good analysis as a version of *Met.* 12.39-69, matching its metapoetic qualities (pp. 23-37); likewise, there is some effective comparison of Ovid and Chaucer as poets of visuality and ekphrasis (pp. 39-56), and of the metapoetic metaphor of weaving which both show as 'spinners of yarns' (p. 44) and as fundamentally concerned with the analogy between poetical and cosmological creation.

The chapter on Shakespeare (pp. 57-84) succeeds well in finding new ground after Jonathan Bate's *Shakespeare and Ovid*,[7] making some attractive arguments, for example, that the mildly indecorous language of Golding's famous 1567 translation of the *Metamorphoses* encouraged both the specific burlesque of Ovid in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and the more general tendency of Shakespeare to end up by viewing Ovid as an essentially frivolous poet after the more portentous views of Spenser and others, or that the topsy-turvy Bacchic stories in *Metamorphoses* 4 contribute strongly to the 'analogous inversion of an ordered world by riotous nature' fundamental to *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. Prospero's magic scenes in *The Tempest* are plausibly related to that of Ovid's Medea in *Metamorphoses* 7, though the analogy between Prospero's master book and the book of Ovid's in *Metamorphoses* itself may be a little overblown (p. 84).

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[5] T. Hughes, *Tales from Ovid* (London 1997); M. Hofmann and J. Lasdun (edd.), *After Ovid: New Metamorphoses* (New York 1994).

[6] S. Hinds, *Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry* (Cambridge 1998).

[7] J. Bate, *Shakespeare and Ovid* (Oxford 1993).

The later seventeenth century is represented by Marvell and Milton (pp. 85-122), Marvell is seen as 'perhaps the most unreservedly Ovidian writer in this book' (p. 85), and Brown rightly points out that the two poets have 'a shared disdain for boundaries' (p. 86), persuasively identifying reflection, ekphrasis, metamorphosis and explicit interest in the creative poetic process as further shared elements through an intriguing analysis of Marvell's 'Upon Appleton House'. Milton would not be everyone's idea of an Ovidian, and Brown's view is clearly balanced: Milton is an 'anxious Ovidian' or 'a snake in the grass in Eden' (p. 101) and the difference between the weighty world of *Paradise Lost* and the lighter universe of the *Metamorphoses* is rightly stressed, though the use of the latter for Milton's Creation, Flood, and divine assemblies (partly mediated as Brown well proves through another influential translation, that of Sandys) is well observed;[8] amongst many neat points of literary reworking here, most striking perhaps is the echo of Pyrrha and Deucalion in Adam and Eve: 'The metamorphosis of stones into men is reinvented as the hardness of Adam and Eve's fallen hearts which become softened by repentance' (p. 110), and the clear and appropriate reworking of Vertumnus the shape-shifter and Pomona the apple-goddess in the confrontation of Eve and Satan (pp. 111-20).

The third important translation of the *Metamorphoses*, that edited by Samuel Garth in 1717 (already mentioned above), receives a chapter to itself (pp. 123-39)—fair enough given the presence of Dryden, Addison, Pope, Gay, Rowe, and Tate on Garth's team of translators, though it would have been nice to have similar space granted to Golding and Sandys (Brown also adds Swift's separately published version of the Baucis and Philemon episode).[9] Brown rightly sees this as the summation of the Ovidian age of the seventeenth century, with taste in the eighteenth century passing to the more decorous Horace and Vergil; this can be seen in Dryden's hypocrisy, translating and imitating Ovid with subtle transformation (e.g. of his Pygmalion episode) but pillorying him as 'frivolous'. There are a number of good points here (e.g. Addison's Apollo in book 2 as the 'Sun King' Louis XIV); the observation at p. 126 that English couplets suit translations of the *Metamorphoses* can be supported by the consideration that this matches a feature of the Latin versification pointed out by sensitive critics such as Guy Lee in his edition of *Metamorphoses* 1,[10] who have shown that Ovid, who after all until the *Metamorphoses* had produced most of his work in elegiac couplets, retains some recognisably couplet-features in the hexameters of the *Metamorphoses*.

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[8] G. Sandys (ed. and tr.), *Ovid's Metamorphosis English'd, Mythologiz'd, and Represented in Figures. An Essay to the Translation of Virgil's Aeneis* (Oxford 1632). There is an index to this edition by C. Grose (Malibu 1981).

[9] A. Golding, *The Metamorphoses* (London 1567; rpt London 1904). Swift's version of Philemon and Baucis can be found in the three volumes of H. Williams (ed.), *The Poems of Jonathan Swift* (Oxford 1937).

[10] A. G. Lee, *P. Ovidi Nasonis Metamorphoseon Liber 1* (Cambridge 1953).

As suggested earlier, the later part of the book on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries finds less convincing material. Keats' Grecian Urn, though it can be seen to share general Ovidian interests in mythological metamorphosis, ekphrasis and the poetic process, provides a thin harvest of persuasive detailed allusions (a clear contrast with what has gone before). Beddoes' 'Pygmalion', though clearly going back to Ovid's episode through the prism of previous English versions and engaging with a number of generally Ovidian themes, likewise provides few truly tangible links; Browning's 'The Ring and the Book' clearly picks up on this theme and specifically echoes some of Ovid's episodes of tragic erotic metamorphosis, but it is difficult to see this as a consistent poetic plan rather than as quasi-Renaissance wallpaper. Likewise, the few scattered allusions to Pygmalion and other episodes in Eliot, Joyce and H.D., though showing that Ovid has some modernist afterlife, are a little desultory. More successful is the chapter on Woolf's *Orlando*: the allusion to Daphne (p. 202) and the clear links with Ovid's tales of transgendered metamorphosis and constant mental contents are evident, though Brown's view that 'Daphne's story is being reinvented as an emblem of complementary harmony between the sexes' here (p. 205) seems a little hard to take.

A final chapter looks at the Ovidian renaissance of the 1990s in English literature that I alluded to at the outset. Brown makes the good point that some of the striking anachronisms and puns at tragic moments in Ted Hughes' versions forcefully replicate real qualities of the original, and that Hughes' view is bleaker and more brutal (as one would expect from the poet of *Crow*), and takes a brief look at episode-versions by Michael Longley, at the adventurous recent translation of the whole *Metamorphoses* by the scholar-poet David Slavitt, and at the intriguing novel *The Last World* by Christoph Ransmayr (in which Ovid, arriving at Tomis, finds it full of characters from the *Metamorphoses*. In all these she rightly sees the continuing fertility of the Ovidian tradition, and the endlessly metamorphic quality of the *Metamorphoses* itself.

This is a thoughtful guide to some of the chief elements of Ovidian imitation in English literature, which shows much persuasive detailed analysis in its more effective first part, and which throughout points clearly to those qualities and ideas which the author views as fundamental to Ovid's literary identity. It is not complete (not a task for a single volume), and its selections of what to discuss could occasionally be questioned, but there is no doubt that it has significantly advanced the knowledge and understanding of the reception of the *Metamorphoses*.

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R. MacMullen, *Romanization in the Time of Augustus*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 222. ISBN 0-300-08254-1. USD25.00.

The verb 'to Romanise' first appeared in the seventeenth century, used both of making Roman in character and of joining the Roman Catholic Church. But the noun

'Romanisation' in the senses of 'assimilation to Roman customs' and 'alteration under Roman influence'[11] is late nineteenth century. In passing it may be noted that Romanisation also bore a linguistic sense, referring to Roman influence on English.[12] A similar metaphor has now been suggested, creolisation.[13] But this word is being used as a substitute for cultural Romanisation, especially the mutual influence of Roman and local civilisations. In Roman provincial studies Romanisation was first applied to the process by which provincials became Roman (essentially, that is), adopted Latin as their language and accepted a (Graeco-)Roman lifestyle, using 'Roman' artifacts. Some[14] believed that this was encouraged by the Romans, presumably the emperor, the provincial governors and prominent Romans working in or emigrating to the provinces. However, it is clear that Romanisation was not enforced from above: it was an entirely voluntary process.[15] Not that the Romans did not notice it occurring and disapprove. Virgil (*Aen.* 6.851-53) claimed that it was the mission of Rome to impose *mos*, her value system, on the pacified provinces. Tacitus (*Agr.* 21) commended his father-in-law Agricola for encouraging the local élite in Roman Britain to adopt the trappings of Roman civilisation. The Elder Pliny (*HN* 16.3) said of a German people, the Chaucans, that their almost sub-human way of life was a punishment from the gods because they had spurned the benefits of Roman peace. Elsewhere (*HN* 3.31) he says that southern Gaul (Provence) was more Roman than Italy.

Ramsay MacMullen, known for his many instructive books on Roman social phenomena and a shrewd article, 'Notes on Romanization',[16] has now written on Romanisation during the principate of Augustus. In his preface (p. ix) he states: 'My object is to point out and explain the appearance of a way of life in areas of the Roman empire outside of Italy just like that prevailing inside Italy. I focus on those decades when Augustus was alive.' His main concern is with processes by which the 'Roman civilisation of the Empire' (p. x) became the universal way of life.

In chapter 1, 'In the East' (pp. 1-29), he discusses the Roman or Italian immigrants who settled in the East, the effects of Roman control on public institutions (including the introduction of the imperial cult), the introduction of Roman architectural forms (such as fora) and the response of local power-holders to Rome, especially their accommodation to her. Chapter 2 (pp. 30-49) is devoted to Africa.

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[11] Simpson, J. A. and E. S. C. Weiner (edd.), *Oxford English Dictionary*^{2} (Oxford 1989) *s.vv.* 'Romanize' and 'Romanization'.

[12] Simpson and Weiner [12] *s.v.* 'Romanization'.

[13] J. Webster, 'Creolizing the Roman Provinces', *AJA* 105 (2001) 209-25.

[14] For early accounts of Romanisation cf. P. Freeman, 'British Imperialism and the Roman Empire', in J. Webster and N. Cooper (edd.), *Roman Imperialism: Post-Colonial Perspectives* (Leicester 1996) 19f.

[15] D. B. Saddington, 'The Parameters of Romanization', in V. A. Maxfield and M. J. Dobson (edd.), *Roman Frontier Studies 1989: 15th International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies* (Exeter 1991) 413-18.

[16] R. MacMullen, 'Notes on Romanization', *BASP* 21 (1984) 161-74.

Here the sub-headings are 'The Occupation of the Land', 'Leptis Magna' (as a case study), 'Juba's Kingdom' (that is, Mauretania)—which corresponds to 'Behavior' (especially that of Herod the Great) in chapter 1. The final sub-section deals with 'Acculturation through the Plastic Arts'. Spain is discussed in chapter 3 (pp. 50-84). The topics covered are 'The Transformation of the Land', 'Urban Structures', 'The People Responsible for Change' (both Roman administrators and local dignitaries), 'The Formal Articulation of Change' (the locals adapting to Roman administrative procedures) and, finally, 'Arts, Letters, Private Life'. Gaul is the subject of chapter 4 (pp. 85-123). It deals with 'What the Romans Found' (that is, the existing 'Celtic' civilisation), 'Re-Ordering Gaul on an Urban Basis', 'The Province Narbonensis' (modern Provence), 'Artists and Patrons', 'Public versus Private' (that is, the use of Roman motifs on private monuments). The last chapter is called 'Replication' (pp. 124-37): its headings are 'The Means'; 'The Opportunity'; 'The Motive'.

It can be seen that broadly the same themes are discussed in the various different regions of the empire, but with interesting differences which underline the point that there was uniformity neither in the culture of the provinces the Romans administered nor in the responses of the locals to Roman control.

A number of remarks may be made on some points of detail:

p. xi: MacMullen valuably recognises the diversity in Roman civilisation itself: cf. p. 2 on the Greek element in it (where perhaps he might have referred to *philanthropia* as the antecedent of *humanitas*). But the distinction between 'Roman' and 'Italian' is not particularly helpful. By the first century AD the culture of the wealthy in Italy was entirely Roman, so that the distinction is only geographical. Cf. 'Italian' on p. 68.

p. 4 n. 12: It seems odd to quote Deiotarus among local Romans exercising influence through the governor of a province.[17]

p. 10: More explanation of technical terms might have been given for the non-technical reader. *Duumviri*, aediles, *quattuorviri*, *sufetes* appear as such on p. 10. (On p. 39 *chalcidicum* is explained only on its second appearance.) 'Colonial government' as a description for city administration in Italy could be misleading for a modern reader.

p.11 n. 30: Reference to ancient inscriptions and other documents are sometimes only recoverable from a modern author quoting them or are often rather cryptic. MacMullen includes Ehrenberg and Jones in his bibliography, so could have assisted the reader in p. 90 n. 30 by referring to EJ 311 and 322. On the first, the Edict from Nazareth, a reference to A. Giovannini's recent article[18] would have been useful: he places the edict in the context of Augustus' eastern policy.

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[17] Deiotarus is the subject of my article 'Preparing to Become Roman: The 'Romanization' of Deiotarus in Cicero', in Vogel-Weidemann, U. (ed.), *Charistion C. P. T. Naudé* (Pretoria 1993) 87-98.

[18] A. Giovannini, 'L'inscription de Nazareth: nouvelle interpretation', *ZPE* 124 (1999) 107-31.

p. 12: MacMullen rightly stresses the political and cultural effect of the settlement of veterans in the provinces. But they were sometimes only dubiously 'Roman'. Some of them who settled in Dalmatia under Augustus chose not 'Roman' style tombstones but a type common in Asia Minor.[19] Many legionaries in the East had in fact been recruited locally and given Roman citizenship on enlistment.

p. 19: On occasion MacMullen refers to 'Commanders of the Engineers' as a type of specialist officer dealing with building and the infrastructure. From p. 127 it is apparent that he was thinking of *praefecti fabrum*. However, there is very little evidence of these officers dealing with building or engineering.[20] By the time of the early Principate *praefecti fabrum* had in fact become (administrative) adjuncts to the legionary commander. With regard to the M. Cassius Denticulus, whom MacMullen quotes on p. 20 (*Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae* 7729), he was not *architectus* 'after his demobilisation' but before: his military tribunate was the summit of his career. Most urban *architecti* were in fact recruited from freedmen. The document claimed to refer to an army architect quoted from Donderer (the reference might have been given: it is *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae* 2.660 or *Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas Pertinentes* 1.1236) does in fact not do so: the architect in the inscription (Mersis) is a different person to the soldier (Mommogaius Bataiou of the *Cohors Nigri*). The text of the *Liber Coloniarum* (244 Blume, line 5) which MacMullen quotes on p. 20 is in fact corrupt, and does not seem to refer to soldiers assisting in land surveys in the Triumviral period: Mommsen, *Corpus Iinscriptionum Latinarum* 10 p.560, emends to date the incident to 126 AD. Cf. *Real-Encyclopädie* 1a 1110f.

p. 78: *Hispanenses* (which in any case should be *Hispanienses*) is a strange lapse. *Hispanienses* were Romans resident in Spain: the local Spaniards were called *Hispani*, which is in fact what Tacitus has in the text. But even so, 'natives' is perhaps not the best translation for it. Roman residents in the province would not have been behind in promoting the imperial cult: Tarraco was after all a Roman colony. Cf. Dio Cass. 51.20.6: a special temple for the incipient cult for Roman residents in Ephesus.

p. 135: *honoris aemulatio* is a difficult phrase. But MacMullen's translation 'competition for promotion' (in disagreement with A. Birley's version quoted on p. 176 n. 27) is too concrete. *Honor* can of course refer to political office in Rome, but at this stage in Britain Agricola would have had no posts to offer British noblemen, who are not even attested as commanders of auxiliary regiments. The correct nuance is suggested by the 1938 translation of G. J. Acheson, 'competition for the honour of his (that is, the governor's)

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[19] Cf. J. J. Wilkes, 'Army and Society in Roman Dalmatia', in *Kaiser, Heer und Gesellschaft: Gedenkschrift E. Birley* (Stuttgart 2000) 330f.

[20] Cf. B. Dobson, 'The *Praefectus Fabrum* in the Early Principate', in *Britain and Rome: Festschrift E. Birley* (Kendal 1965) 61-84, and my article, '*Praefecti Fabrum* of the Julio-Claudian Period', in *Römische Geschichte, Altertumskunde und Epigraphik: Festschrift A. Betz* (Vienna 1985) 529-46.

approbation'. Ogilvie and Richmond *ad loc.* have 'competition for honour (that of being praised)'.

MacMullen's extended essay is a tour de force and will set the agenda for succeeding analyses of Romanisation. Its chief merits are its regionalisation and its restricted time-scale. It refuses to look for a single process of acculturation operating empire-wide and it concentrates on a specific period, the initial consolidation of the territorial empire under a new system of Roman government. Its main omission is a full discussion of the emergence of local élites into Roman society and its governing structures. Thus figures such as Theophanes of Miletus (and his descendants under Augustus) and Cornelius Gallus, administrator but also an important poet and a friend of Virgil, together with whom he was educated,[21] could have been singled out and discussed (as in fact the Spaniard Cornelius Balbus is, but there are many more). At the lower end of the social scale the experiences of the non-Roman auxiliaries in the Roman army might have been considered: Augustus formalised their permanent use alongside the legions. And the impact of the ordinary legionary in his provincial camp—apart from his role as a purchaser—might have received more reflection.

By concentrating on specific areas within the empire MacMullen has been brilliantly able to show how organic the process of Romanisation was: the East responded differently from the West, where Gaul and Africa, with their stronger local tradition of town life, were different from Spain. The adoption of a very brief synchronic, rather than a lengthy diachronic, approach enabled MacMullen to bring out the real significance of the similarities and differences he was able to highlight.

The richness of his scholarship is apparent from the footnotes. His style is refreshingly simple and there are useful brief summaries of scattered details. The maps and drawings are excellent. MacMullen is usefully iconoclastic of old certainties: compare, for example, his scepticism about the presentation of the 'ideology' of the art of the capital into the provinces on pp. 113f. The work is indeed a reliable contribution to Roman provincial studies.

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Thomas Harrison, *The Emptiness of Asia: Aeschylus' 'Persians' and the History of the Fifth Century*. London: Duckworth, 2000. Pp. 191. ISBN 0-7156-2968-9. GBP40.00.

The usefulness of this book is above all as a full presentation and fine-combing of modern views about the play. Harrison seems to have consulted and digested most of the scholarly work on *Persai* known to me (and some not known)—I count 469

[21] Ps. Probus in Verg. *Ecl. praef.* (G. Thilo and H. Hagen [edd.] *Servii Grammatici Qui Feruntur in Vergilii carmina Commentarii* 3 [Leipzig 1881-1902] 328) calls him a *condiscipulus* ('school-mate') of Virgil.

items in the bibliography—and he is not sparing in his citation of other's views, especially those with whom he disagrees. His own position can be stated simply—and it is not a particularly new one—Aeschylus' work is not a 'tragedy' in any accepted sense of that term, but rather an historicised mythologem, a cautionary tale, intended to celebrate the intense Athenocentrism of author and audience; it is nothing short of 'triumphalism' (his term, p. 112) run rampant.

The chapters are a series of extended glosses on various topics or themes in the play. Within fairly broad limits of historical accuracy (since this was a play some of whose audience, at least, fought in the battles described or mentioned), Aeschylus was free to embroider or even distort the facts to suit his own purposes, emotional, patriotic, artistic or other (chapter 1, 'Aeschylus the Historian?', pp. 25-30). A propaganda battle may have been being waged in Athens at the time, involving, among others, the figure of Theseus, but those who over-subtly look for political allusions in the play 'presume that the Athenians sat in wait for such allusions' (p. 36), and such allusions in any case 'would surely have undermined the dramatic impact of the play' (p. 39); for Harrison the work 'belies any black and white political interpretation' (p. 38, chapter 2, 'Politics and Partisanship', pp. 31-39). The Queen Mother, whether really named 'Atossa' or not, is only an extrapolation from a distorted Greek vision of the role played by women at the Persian court (chapter 3, 'Aeschylus, Atossa and Athenian Ideology', pp. 40-48). The dramatist, following 'a concerted strategy of patriotic stimulation' (p. 53), 'frequently . . . finds the opportunity to highlight patriotic Athenian themes' (p. 52, chapter 4, 'The Use and Abuse of Persia', pp. 51-57). The tendency of Greek writers to exaggerate the degree of Persian interest in things Greek is another species of Athenian self-representation (chapter 5, 'Where is Athens?', pp. 58-60). The Athenocentrism of the play looks to the future: ' . . . implicit in the *Persians'* celebration of Athens' achievements are Athens' imperial ambitions' (pp. 63f.); the play ' . . . provides . . . a charter for the Delian League' (p. 64, chapter 6, 'Athens and Greece', pp. 61-65). So much emphasis is put on the variety and number of Persian forces, as well as their splendid and exotic accoutrements, because 'such magnificence reinforces the impression of the heaviness of the fall to come and of the achievement of the Athenians and Greeks in being the instrument of the Persians' destruction' (p. 72, chapter 7, whose heading, 'The Emptiness of Asia', pp. 68-75, gives the book its title). Harrison here brings out clearly and forcefully the 'special relationship between the Athenians and the sea' (p. 68) and correctly notes how important control of the sea was to Athens' plans and imperial ambitions. (I here interrupt my sequential synopsis of Harrison's thesis in chapters 8 and 9 because I will take a closer look at these chapters below.) The play represents 'the high-water mark of Athens' conviction in her imperial project' (p. 110), and so cannot have been intended, as is sometimes maintained, to be read as a warning to the Athenians to rein in their own expansionist tendencies. In fact, those passages that seem to highlight 'more bloodthirsty or vengeful episodes'—Harrison cites under this heading verses 424-27 and 459-64—are just another sign of 'the triumphalism evidenced elsewhere in

the play . . . [S]uch passages reflect a relish in the details of the slaughter of the Persians' (p. 112, chapter 10, 'Athens and Persia', pp. 103-15).

So far, readers may judge for themselves the cogency of Harrison's position. The arguments in chapters 8 and 9, which seem to me to be the core of the book, warrant closer scrutiny. In chapter 8, 'Democracy and Tyranny' (pp. 76-91), Harrison argues that all other apparently valid 'tragic' readings of the play must be subordinated to—and are in fact displaced by—one continuous, single-minded and incessant attack by Aeschylus on tyranny/monarchy as in every way inferior to democracy (especially, of course, Athenian democracy). Thus we must resist the temptation to see this as a domestic or familial tragedy: 'you cannot have a domestic tragedy about the Persian royal family; in monarchies, the personal is political' (p. 77). Nor should we be seduced into feeling any sympathy whatever for the Queen who, according to Harrison, 'emerges as selfish, sceptical, and petulant' (p. 81). The Chorus, too, are continually sending us mixed signals: 'though the elders are constantly threatening to assert themselves, ultimately they remain perfectly supine' (pp. 81f.). Harrison appears to be objecting to what he takes to be inconsistency or vacillation on the part of the Chorus: they are 'loyal counsellors' but fall down abjectly before the Queen, and the counsel they give her is 'ineffectual,' 'equivocal.' They ascribe to Xerxes responsibility for the defeat at Salamis, but are not slow to gather round their defeated King and offer solace at the end.[22] But what else were we to expect? They may be for purposes of the play Persian elders, but they are also a Greek tragic chorus, and thus no more (or less) 'ineffectual' than the elders in *Agamemnon*. It is a mistake, or so it seems to me, to try to read into all of this a 'message' that individual initiative must inevitably collapse before or be overridden by totalitarian autocracy. Over-subtle, too, I believe, is Harrison's attempt to draw a contrast between on the one hand a democratic attitude to oracles as evidenced by the way Themistocles persuaded the Athenians that his interpretation of the Wooden-Wall oracle was the correct one, and on the other Darius' anguished realisation at 739-52 that he had failed to understand an oracle concerning some disaster the Persians were destined to suffer. To me this is not a negative comment on the Persian King's 'monopoly over oracles' (p. 87), but rather a dramatic heightening of the inevitability of the Persian downfall.[23] I am unable to assess the truth of Harrison's assertion 'there is no evidence that the Persians believed that their kings were gods' (p. 87) although it seems certainly true that the 'impression that the Persians believe their kings to be divine is one that is built up

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[22] 'The Chorus' violent mourning . . . through its implication of effeminacy, again suggests that Persia is beyond remedy' (p. 91). To me it suggests no such thing, but rather that King and subjects are united in a display of grief which, though it may seem immoderate, is defensible in view of the enormity of the disaster that they feel has befallen their nation.

[23] Harrison, like other commentators, suggests that this may be a back-reference to an actual oracle delivered or alluded to in one of the preceding plays, perhaps *Phineus*; or it may be one of those loose ends that appear sporadically in Aeschylus and other writers: see R. Scodel, *Credible impossibilities: Conventions and Strategies of Verisimilitude in Homer and Greek Tragedy* (Stuttgart 1999).

progressively through the play' (p. 88). Once again this is grist to Harrison's view of the play's loaded political intent: 'the Chorus . . . look forward to the end of proskynesis as one of the consequences of Persian defeat (588). Their dread and reverence on being confronted with Darius show, however, that their slavishness of mind is too deep-rooted' (p. 89).[24]

In chapter 9, 'Themistokles and Aristides' (pp. 95-102), Harrison reveals what he believes to be Aeschylus' true message to the Athenians. He points out that the play's eulogy of Themistocles is muted by the fact that he is never named and is in fact balanced by the emphasis given to Aristeides' (again, not named) exploit on Psyttaleia (for that matter, Miltiades' success at Marathon too is given a passing nod at v. 475). This balance, Harrison suggests, is possibly 'connected to the theme of individual submission to the collective' (p. 97). The work is 'a snapshot in the development of Athenian democratic discourse' (p. 98). 'Everything in Aeschylus' play tends to the impression of Athenian unity, Athenian singleness of purpose' (p. 99). He urges us to understand the play 'as indicative of a consensus of values that the vast majority of Athenians could have subscribed to' (p. 100). This to me seems unobjectionable, if a trifle vague; and I confess myself mystified when Harrison attempts to counter the view that the play may have a religious (as distinct from a political and social) message by remarking that 'the religious argument of a play such as the *Persians* is one embedded in its other arguments' (p. 102).

Harrison wishes to subsume all other aspects of the play under the purpose that he deems to be overarching: glorification of Athens, her democratic institutions, the diversity of the points of view that must be given a voice in hers as in any democracy, and above all, her nascent empire. But to privilege the play's political message (even if this were the correct political message to be read into the work) at the expense of all other interpretations seems to me a distortion, a position that is unnecessarily exclusionist and one which must be belied by any ordinary spectator's or reader's reaction to the work. Our response to this, as to most great works, can be at many levels. Harrison seems to feel one must choose: praise of Themistocles' cunning, even duplicity, at Salamis or admiration for the unified Greek will to resist the invader; praise of Athens or a sympathetic understanding of Xerxes' predicament; sensitivity towards the Queen, Darius and Xerxes as a family, albeit as royal family, in distress or condemnation of collective Persian hubris. But an interpretative strategy that may give more weight to one aspect while not at the same time denying validity to others seems to me more productive; interpretation is not, to use a phrase Harrison himself adopts, a 'zero-sum game'. Whatever emphasis one favours (my own has been to see the work as a defence of Themistocles at a critical time in his career), one must also recognise that its universal and continuing appeal has been that it so movingly and convincingly

[24] A further refinement of the prostration-theme: 'The Persians on Psyttaleia involuntarily perform proskynesis through their deaths (προσπίτνοντες, 461). They have learnt the proper object of their proskynesis (i.e. the Earth, whose divinity is genuine, not specious, like the King's), but too late' (p. 91). To me this is far-fetched.

portrays the tragedy, the real tragedy, of Xerxes the overreacher, and the consequent collapse of his and his people's misguided imperial ambitions, at least as far as Greece was concerned.

Harrison's book, like the drama it analyses, is bound to stir some controversy of its own, but if it challenges assumptions that some of us have held for a long time and perhaps rather uncritically, and gets us to look again at this enigmatic masterpiece and our aesthetic reactions to it, so much the better.

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Ellen O'Gorman, *Irony and Misreading in the Annals of Tacitus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. vii + 200. ISBN 0521-66056-4. GBP37.50.

After reading two pages of Tacitus, any reader is bound to be struck by the author's extraordinary style, his black pessimism, and his cynical view of the Roman Empire, notably of the 'bad emperors' such as Tiberius or Nero. One cannot do justice to this historian by studying the events described by him without taking into account *how* he describes them. It is surely not an exaggeration to say that Tacitus' style is the key to understand his work and that its interpretation should not remain the exclusive domain of historians. Fortunately, Tacitus also attracts the attention of scholars with refined literary interests and talents.

In the first pages of O'Gorman's new study of Tacitus, we find an interesting close reading of the opening paragraph of the *Annals*. The Latin text consists of a series of clauses on the control of power in Rome:

> urbem Romam a principio reges habuere; libertatem et consulatum L. Brutus instituit. Dictaturae ad tempus sumebantur; neque decemviralis potestas ultra biennium, neque tribunorum militum consulare ius diu valuit. Non Cinnae, non Sullae longa dominatio; et Pompei Crassique potentia cito in Caesarem, Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere, qui cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit.
>
> (Tac. *Ann.* 1.1)
>
> In the beginning, Rome was ruled by kings; L. Brutus established a free state governed by consuls. Dictatorships were held at times of crisis only. The power of the decemvirs did not last beyond two years, nor did the consular rights of the military tribunes last long. Cinna and Sulla dominated the state briefly; the power of Pompeius and of Crassus was soon succeeded by that of Caesar; the armies of Lepidus and Antonius passed to Augustus, who received a world wearied by civil strife under his command though he called himself only its leader.

At first sight this looks like a neutral enumeration of successive forms of power, arranged chronologically without evaluation. However, it clearly confronts the reader

with some pressing questions: is Augustus' principate the end of *libertas* and the resumption, under another name, of the power of the early kings? Or is Augustus' command the continuation and fulfilment of *libertas*? These conflicting views could both find support in the Latin text, as O'Gorman shows. In other words, Tacitus leaves it up to reader to decide. Because of Tacitus' highly ambiguous and richly evocative words, the reader inevitably becomes responsible for the interpretation. He must 'create a plot' in order to make '"full" sense of the passage' (p. 9). And whatever the choice he makes, he is 'implicated from the very outset of the narrative in the process and politics of historical interpretation' (p. 9).

This initial analysis looks promising enough, and the range of texts discussed by O'Gorman further enhances the reader's expectations. After an introductory chapter, 'Introduction: Irony, History, Reading' (pp. 1-22), she concentrates on a limited number of passages, which seems a sensible decision, given the obvious impossibility of covering all of the *Annals*. Chapter 2, '*Imperium sine fine*: Problems of Definition in *Annals* I' (pp. 23-45), is followed by chapters concerned with the passages on Germanicus (chapter 3, 'Germanicus and the Reader in the Text', pp. 46-77); the portrait of Tiberius, interpreted as a representation of Tacitean narrative itself (chapter 4, 'Reading Tiberius at Face Value', pp. 78-105); and the paradox of the 'obliteration' of the literate emperor Claudius (chapter 5, 'Obliteration and the Literate Emperor', pp. 106-121). Perhaps inevitably, much room is devoted to Agrippina (chapter 6, 'The Empress's Plot', pp. 122-143) and Nero (chapter 7, 'Ghostwriting the Emperor Nero', pp. 144-175). A brief, concluding chapter with the rather ominous title 'The End of History' (pp. 176-183), completes the book.

So is this study a success? I have my doubts. The book starts with some good questions, but almost always tends towards extreme positions and thereby fails to convince. Let me illustrate my point with some detailed remarks.

'Deconstructing' texts is one thing (in the case of Tacitus certainly a method not to be despised), but arriving at conclusions that openly contradict a given text is something else. In *Annals* 1.28 Tacitus vividly describes a threatening mutiny by Roman soldiers. When it is about to break out, an eclipse of the moon occurs. The ignorant soldiers (*miles rationis ignarus*, 'soldiers ignorant of reason', as Tacitus says) take this as an omen of the coming events and become frightened. They start to produce all kinds of noises in order to make the moon shine again. When clouds cover the moon, they start to lament, *ut sunt mobiles ad superstitionem perculsae semel mentes* ('since minds once shocked are prone to superstition'), and fear that the gods have left them. This happily ends their rebellion, and order is restored.

It is difficult to miss Tacitus' scorn of the superstitious soldiers here, but O'Gorman actually manages to do so. In her view, 'the judgment of the soldier as ignorant is undermined by the way in which his interpretation fits with the narrative of the mutiny as a whole'. The soldiers interpret the waning of the moon as a symbol of the army's neglect of its duties, 'arguably a plausible recognition of one similarity between the two events. . . . Indeed, it is arguable that Tacitus stacks the cards against his explicit judgement of the soldier as ignorant by the semantic subtlety with which

the 'ignorant' interpretation is represented' (p. 32). So the soldiers seem to be right, if only because of the widespread interpretation of eclipses as omens elsewhere in ancient texts. This of course in turn produces a difficult question: 'Why does Tacitus tell us that the soldier is ignorant while demonstrating the range and complexity of his interpretation?' (p. 33) So O'Gorman suggests that the soldiers are right, while Tacitus openly says that they are not.

But what is the point of undermining a text so far as to make it say what it actually does not? Surely, if we try to establish what Tacitus means, we must say that he generally disapproves of the mob, of mutiny and chaos, and of superstition. Here the result of the army's silly superstition, however widely it was held, is felicitous, but that does not prove that its motive (its 'reading') was correct. Events may simply turn out positively on the basis of false arguments or defective reasoning. The fact that the soldiers discern a parallel between the eclipse and their own behaviour does not prove them to be rational: it is, on the contrary, the essence of magical thinking to believe in patterns of 'analogy' and 'sympathy'. And magical thinking is nothing more than superstition, in Tacitus' terms, even if he occasionally lapses into this same mode of thinking himself.

This does not mean that it is not legitimate for a scholar to make this kind of argument, to produce complex 'readings' in which modern interests and preoccupations shine through (e.g., Agrippina representing the suppressed 'female voice' in Tacitus, p. 123; soldiers gathering bones for burial being seen as inventive 'readers', because the verb used is *condere*, p. 52; or the 'unattainability of certain knowledge through a process of reading', p. 88), but I would contend that all this does not help us understand Tacitus. And such deeper understanding, whatever form it takes, in my view remains the primary task of students of historiography.

O'Gorman seems to be inclined towards the extreme also on the level of style. Her academic language is difficult to read and regularly involves the reader in prolix expositions. One example must suffice here. Speaking about Claudius' invention of letters which had fallen into disuse but which were still to be seen in bronze inscriptions (*Ann.* 11.14.3), O'Gorman concludes (p. 112):

> In that sense the letters come to stand for the potential meaninglessness of the past, and their continued presence, fixed on bronze, can be read as the intransigence of past traces in the face of present attempts to comprehend them. From this perspective Claudius loses control over a history of continuous power. His own writings, the letters in use *only* during his reign, stand as a monument to his mortality.

I prefer to think that Claudius' invention simply made him immortal in the end, even if it was a failure.

O'Gorman remains focused on the process of 'reading'. The word is actually used at every page for almost any human activity whatsoever. Sejanus 'reads' Tiberius and we 'read' Tiberius, as if he were no more than text; Claudius 'could be read as a warner to the reader of history' (p. 109); Roman soldiers 'read bones' on the

battlefield (p. 52), and so forth. As a metaphor for attributing sense and meaning, the concept of reading is surely attractive, but not everywhere and all the time.

We may be tempted to 'read' the enigmatic Tiberius as if he were a symbol of Tacitus' ambiguous *Annals* itself (p. 78), but would it not be reasonable to assume that Tacitus ultimately wanted to teach us something about Tiberius through his words, rather than vice versa? Certainly, Tacitus' style is the key to understand his work, but this style serves an aim: in the end it is concerned with something other than reflecting upon itself.

O'Gorman's book has made me think again about the limits of interpretation, about the extent in which one may deconstruct an ancient text, and about the nature of style. But I must admit that I have not learned a great deal about Tacitus that a careful reading of the Latin text has not already given me.

By overstating the case about 'reading', this study will disappoint not only historians who look for reconstructions of the past or historical facts, but also literary scholars, who want to understand more about the great stylist that Tacitus was. I am not arguing that a reading of Tacitus should produce clear-cut results, or a reliable reconstruction of objective truth, or of the undoubted intentions of the author. But what I do suggest is that an interpretation of his style, while shaking our certainties, in the end must make us learn something about Tacitus rather than about the limitations of our own minds.

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Claude Pansiéri, *Plaute et Rome, ou les ambiguïtés d'un marginal*. Brussels: Latomus, 1997. Pp. 807. ISBN 2-87031-176-1. BF3750

Pansiéri's lengthy examination of Plautus is divided into five sections, which combine interesting detail with flawed approaches to produce a thorough though often frustrating examination of the poet's relationship with Rome, his adoptive city. Plautus is, for Pansiéri, always an outsider, and his liminality is the key to understanding him. There are five sections, accompanied by an introduction (pp. 17-42) and a conclusion (pp. 749-56): the historical and biographical givens of the playwright's life (pp. 43-250), the presence of Rome in his work (pp. 251-390), what the plays say about Plautus' attitudes (pp. 391-509), Plautus' personal beliefs and the Roman *mos maiorum* (pp. 511-94), and, finally, his subconscious response to the Rome that has been described (pp. 595-747). Each section has five subdivided chapters except for the third, which has four. This detailed structure, with indices, means that the work can be consulted selectively. The introduction presents Plautus as the voice of Rome, and though there are very few hard facts about his life, Pansiéri's use of *la nouvelle critique* (p. 42, though not in the sense that I understand the term) can enable Rome to speak for Plautus. Pansiéri adopts a positivist position, believing that more can be said about Plautus and the Rome of his day than most would allow (p. 20). At the same

time Plautus is treated conceptually as a focalising agent for what can be said about Rome generally (p. 30). While acknowledging the difficulties posed when getting to the author through a literary text (pp. 32f.), Pansiéri seems almost to revel in the ambiguities created (p. 35): 'Notre propos étant plus psychologique qu'historique' (p. 41), and this justifies a number of guesses about the poet's life.

Section 1 begins with an examination of Plautus' origin (pp. 45-57). Plautus is an Umbrian, born *circa* 254 (p. 149), who probably never claimed Roman citizenship. While plausible, this makes assumptions that are not addressed. Acting in his own plays, Plautus played Tranio in *Mostellaria* (pp. 46f.) and the soldier in *Miles Gloriosus* (p. 53, with the soldier's age, *Mil.* 629, coinciding with Plautus' own). His principal connection, as we shall see, is with the *servi callidi* ('clever slaves'). Discussion of his Roman *tria nomina* (pp. 55f., 170-80) is made without reference to Gratwick,[25] which is severely limiting. The discussion of Umbrio-Roman relations (pp. 58-94) reinforces Plautus as an outsider, '*vrai Huron à Paris*' (p. 93). Problems with Pansiéri's positivism emerge: what is largely true generally becomes certainly true particularly, and so Plautus' biography becomes increasingly detailed, albeit in broad strokes. What Varro says (pp. 95-146) is to be trusted: 'we shouldn't take the ancient biographers to be more naïve and more lying than they were' (p. 102).[26] Nevertheless, wishful associations with the early careers on stage of Shakespeare and Molière (p. 105; cf. p. 170) do not prove anything for Plautus, whom Pansiéri presents as a young idealistic actor coming to Rome between the first two Punic wars, an event later dated without evidence to *circa* 224 (p. 180; cf. p. 162). His little real knowledge of Greek (pp. 205-20) indicates that he arrived in Rome late in life. Supposed similarities with Aristophanes might therefore be accidental (p. 216). Discussion of the (autobiographical?) early play *Addictus* (pp. 126-40) leads to speculation that after arriving in an economically flourishing inter-war Rome, hard times followed during the war with Hannibal. My more skeptical reading of the primary evidence means that I was not carried along by Pansiéri's prose as some might be. Even asking when Plautus moved to Rome (pp. 148-55) presupposes that he did. There may have been others who made the trip, and it may have been favourable for them, but for all we know Plautus' troupe was based in Umbria (though even that connection may be questioned), and only traveled to Rome when hired. Nor do I believe the presence of military imagery and vocabulary (pp. 163-68) requires Plautus himself to have been a soldier. I am certain Atellan elements have been under-appreciated in Plautus' work, but the discussions of *Casina* and *Rudens* along these lines are unconvincing (pp. 185-91). Pansiéri then discusses Rome's treatment of outsiders such as Plautus, who in turn adopts characteristics of a Roman citizen and a plebian (pp. 223-50).

Space does not permit me to examine more than a single chapter in each of the remaining sections, though my principal difficulties with Pansiéri's approach should

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[25] A. S. Gratwick, 'Titus Maccius Plautus,' *CQ* 23 (1973) 78-84.

[26] Nor is mention made of the wider criticism of ancient biography, such as M. Lefkowitz, *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (Baltimore 1981). Citations in English are my own translations.

be clear. In every case in what follows, only selected problems are discussed, though further similar examples could be provided. Section 2's chapter on 'the world of the theatre' (pp. 263-77), describes one aspect of the historical Rome seen in the plays. Claims for theatrical reference being unique to Plautus are not tenable, however, and the lack of reference to Wright's *Dancing in Chains*[27] undermines Pansiéri's claims. Discussions follow concerning the few allusions to the actor Pellio (pp. 266-68), metatheatre (pp. 268-72), improvisation (pp. 272-74), the adaptation from Greek models (pp. 274-76), and the use of masks (pp. 276f.). Each of these is an interesting topic that could profitably have been explored. However none is examined with a thoroughness that leads to a conclusion; one is left only with tendencies and possibilities. The discussion of masks, for instance, while referring to relevant articles, advances only one argument in favour of their use: that it facilitates scenes involving identical twins (e.g. *Menaechmi*, *Amphitruo*). Yet this is one argument that is demonstrably empty: Shakespeare's *Comedy of Errors*, derived from these Plautine plays, is habitually performed unmasked, and it has two sets of identical twins.

Section 3's chapter on 'the marginality theme' (pp. 434-76) is framed by chapters on 'the poverty theme' (pp. 409-33) and 'the double-personality theme' (pp. 477-509), all of which argue for the importance of these motifs to the plays. But marginality is key to Pansiéri's understanding of Plautus. Marginality is created by poverty, certainly, but also by the city's reluctance to allow full integration of outsiders (pp. 436f.), and this is seen when strangers receive comic abuse (pp. 439-41; cf. Hanno in *Poenulus*, Harpax in *Pseudolus*, and the merchant in *Asinaria*). For Pansiéri, Plautus writes such scenes because he too is marginalised. And when Plautus' characters refer to their ancestors as a Roman might, this is Plautus overcompensating for the way he feels, which creates the ambiguities of the book's title (p. 446): similarly Plautus exhibits both xenophobia (pp. 455-68) and Roman patriotism (pp. 468-76). This all creates (at least the appearance of) subversion, which Rome embraced: it is later claimed the *collegium scribarum histrionumque* was founded in 207 in part to maintain the subversive role of playwrights like Plautus and Naevius (p. 753; their friendship is examined on pp. 51-53, 220-22, 288f. and 447f.).

Having established Plautus' distance from Cato (pp. 563-77: 'such comparisons are specious,' p. 570), section 4 concludes with a chapter on 'Plautus and the Bacchanalia' (pp. 578-94). Pansiéri argues that Plautus is sympathetic to the Bacchic cult, as is Naevius (who wrote a *Lycurgus*). This places Plautus far from the traditional Roman that has been posited by Della Corte (p. 593). Plautus projects himself onto his characters, and this response is subsumed under the term '*un subconscient vindicatif*' (a phrase found in the title of section 5). Following discussions of Saturnalian reversal (pp. 597-607) and 'obscenity' (pp. 608-26), Pansiéri reveals the Plautine worldview, a 'personal myth' (p. 636), found in the plays: there are oppressors—fathers, *lenones* ('pimps'), soldiers, pp. 639-64—and there are the oppressed (pp. 664-89). Among the

[27] J. Wright, *Dancing in Chains: the Stylistic Unity of the Comoedia Palliata* (Rome 1974).

latter, Plautus identifies particularly with the *servus callidus* ('clever slave'). The *callidus* is an outsider and is insubordinate (pp. 693-35). The *callidus* enacts vengeance against fathers, *lenones* and soldiers (pp. 707-26), who as oppressors embody the intolerance of Rome Plautus himself has experienced. The details are uncontroversial, but the conclusions, tying Plautine characters, imagery and plot lines to the author's mind-set, are tendentious.

This book should have been much better than it is. Aggressive editing and familiarity with more of the exciting work done on Plautus over the last three decades would be a start: names like Bain, Bettini, Fantham, Gratwick, Lowe, and Zwierlein are absent, and no advantage has been taken of Slater's *Plautus in Performance*.[28] At heart, though, a methodology whereby individual lines in a play taken out of context are used to produce a psychological portrait of the author is unlikely to find wide support.[29]

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H. J. Walker, *Theseus and Athens*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. x + 224. ISBN 0-19-508908-1. GBP30.00.

The author of this book (only recently received for review) makes his intentions totally clear in the preface (pp. viif.), both negatively and positively: his book is 'nothing like an analysis of the myth of Theseus as a whole. It concentrates instead on his image as an ideal ruler of Athens, and as a model for Athenian citizens to follow' (p. vii). In fact, Walker is being unnecessarily modest: the book discusses virtually every important element in the Theseus myths, dividing them into earlier, probably original parts and later distortions and adaptations, and tracking down the various elements to their probable regional and chronological origins (see, e.g., 'The Origins of the Myth of Theseus', pp. 9-15, and 'The Myth of Theseus', pp. 15-20); but it is true that he is mainly interested in Theseus as a paradigm (of varying significance) for Athenians in particular.

That this type of hero (aggressively self-assertive, and prone to lawlessness and violence) should be admired and publicly flaunted as a representative figurehead by the most democratic of the Greek city-states is indeed remarkable. Walker describes the Theseus of Archaic art and literature as 'something of a wild bandit' and 'a menace to those around him' (p. 15). He also notes, 'I have always been surprised at the powerful grip that the idea of monarchy had on the citizens of Athens and has continued to hold on those of many other democracies since' (p. vii); and he observes

[28] N. W. Slater, *Plautus in Performance: The Theatre of the Mind* (Princeton 1985).

[29] A final criticism must be leveled against the publishers for the poor production of an expensive volume. Even before I cut the pages, the spine was broken in several places and the wraps were separating from the glue at top and bottom, yielding a substantial tear.

further the seeming paradox that 'the very popularity of the Homeric epics among the Greeks of [the eighth century BC] reveals how fascinating they found those heroes whom they could not have tolerated for one moment as their peers' (p. 48). If that is true of the eighth century, how much more so of the fifth!

This phenomenon of veneration for individualistic, sometimes socially dangerous heroes, even in avowedly democratic or indeed socialist societies, is a widespread one with psychological dimensions, rooted in the individual psyche, as Walker himself admits (p. vii), and probably involves what may be termed the craving for an 'Ultimate Rescuer'[30] but as Walker makes plain, he is 'more interested in the phenomenon as it affected the Athenians as a whole' and so he tends to 'adopt more political explanations for it.' (p. vii). This political, historical and sociological approach characterises most of the book: Walker's analyses and evaluations of various parts of the Theseus myths are mostly undertaken in the context of specific, documented institutions in Athenian society, such as (most obviously) democracy (see especially chapters 5 and 6: 'The Democratic Ruler' pp. 143-69, and 'Theseus at Colonus' pp. 171-93) and the *Ephebi*. No Jungian interpretations here!

A slightly indirect but very useful result of Walker's approach is that the book contains a great deal of interesting material about Greek and especially Athenian society and history *per se*, presented in concentrated, clear form: matters such as the origin, development and importance of Hero-cults in Greece (pp. 4-9), the institution of the *Ephebi* (pp. 94-104 and elsewhere) and the emotive issue of paternity (pp. 84f.) are all dealt with in limited but concentrated compass.

Chapters 1 and 2 of the book ('Myth and Ritual: Hero Worship in Greece and the Origins of the Theseus Myths' pp. 3-33, and 'Benevolent Dictators and the Paradox of a Democratic King' pp. 35-81) examine the image of Theseus up until the fifth century. There is a helpful section on hero-cults in general (heroes were '[I]ronically, illogically, and yet quite definitely . . . patrons of aristocracy' and not ''prototypes of monarchy'', p. 48); and there is a cool-headed refutation of theories which see Theseus as part of the propaganda-programme of (firstly) the Peisistratid tyranny ('Under the Peisistratids, the most popular hero on Attic vase-paintings is Heracles', p. 46) and (secondly) the Cleisthenic reforms (Walker concludes: 'all Athenian politicians used Theseus as a model; he stood for the whole of the Athenian state', p. 47).

The most substantial section of the book is chapters 3 to 7, which involves detailed discussion of crucial literary works. In chapter 3 ('The Trozenian Outsider' pp. 83-111), Walker examines Bacchylides 17 and 18: he shows (as regards the former poem) how Bacchylides depicts Theseus primarily as 'The Man from the Sea' (son of Poseidon, but nurtured in the depths of the sea by female divinities, and so neither an autochthonous Athenian nor what might be called a 'normal land-creature' nor a patriarchally accredited hero, but rather one whose 'identity as a hero is established by

[30] See, for example, J. Hollis, *The Eden Project: In Search of the Magical Other* (Toronto 1998).

feminine powers', p. 92); and (as regards the latter poem) he examines the poet's treatment of Theseus as son of Aegeus, representative of the 'marginal' status of the *Ephebi* in Athenian (and other) society, and a foreigner to Athens. (This is a striking demonstration of the well-known fact that radically different 'slants' can be given to a single mythical hero by [even] a single author.) In chapters 4 and 5 ('The Democratic Ruler' pp. 113-41, and 'Theseus at Colonus' pp. 143-69), Walker provides a thorough analysis of Euripides' *Hippolytus* (and the *Suppliant Women*, *the Madness of Heracles* and the lost *Hippolytus Veiled*, and of Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, in all of which Theseus plays an important part, as well as various works of fifth-century art and architecture. At times, Walker is inclined to devote too much detail to sections and issues in the plays which have almost nothing to do with Theseus (though readers are treated to a thorough and worthwhile discussion of the plays themselves); but these chapters also, and mainly, show with great clarity how the two tragedians use the figure of Theseus to probe difficult social, political and ethical issues (such as those presented by the presence of a dominating public figure—Theseus in the plays, Pericles in history—in the midst of an avowed democracy.)

Finally, chapter 7 ('Theseus Enters History' pp. 195-205) discusses his portrayal by Thucydides and Hellanicus, both of whom treat Theseus as a (somewhat ambivalent) historical figure; and the book concludes with a brief (one-page) glance at writers after 400 BC, from the Atthidographers to Plutarch. Walker remarks that 'with the advent of the Atthidographers Theseus leaves the poets and becomes the property of historians and politicians' (p. 201).

The book has an eight-page bibliography of secondary works and each chapter is liberally sprinkled with always-interesting if perhaps over-frequent footnotes. Walker's book is a very solid, thoroughly researched, coherent and well-laid-out examination not only of an important corpus of myths but of the intimate interplay between those myths and the developing society of ancient Athens.

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John E. Atkinson, *Curzio Rufo, Storie di Alessandro Magno* 1*: Libri III-V*, trr. Virginio Antelami and Maurizio Giangiulio. Pp. xcix + 449, incl. 7 maps. Milan: Fondazione Lorenzo Valla / Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1998. ISBN 88-04-43468-6. ITL48 000.

This handsome volume, produced with the usual scrupulous care lavished on the Mondadori series *Scrittori Greci e Latini*—few classical texts or editions are so pleasant to look at or work with—forms part of a group bearing the overall title *Le Storie e i Miti di Alessandro*. In addition to Q. Curtius Rufus, we are to have editions of Arrian, Plutarch, and the Alexander Romance, plus companion volumes of essays by various scholars on *Alessandro in Oriente* (nothing by A. B. Bosworth) and *Alessandro nel Medioevo Occidentale* (nothing by Richard Stoneman, though he has

been tapped to edit Pseudo-Callisthenes). One striking omission from the Mondadori plan is the earliest surviving source for Alexander, book 17 of Diodorus Siculus, and it is hard to fathom why this crucial text is being so pointedly ignored. There is no indication that it will appear elsewhere in the series and since Curtius Rufus and Pseudo-Callisthenes are both getting the full treatment, the absence of Diodorus can hardly be ascribed to a lofty contempt for the so-called 'vulgate tradition'. Would someone in the Fondazione Lorenzo Valla care to explain?

Meanwhile, Curtius Rufus is off to a very promising start. Atkinson was the obvious—indeed, virtually the only—choice for this onerous task, having devoted twenty years to the *Historiae Alexandri Magni*, including the publication of English-language commentaries on books 3-4 and 5-7.2, besides a recent survey in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*.[31] As all scholars working in the area are only too well aware, Curtius Rufus abounds in horrendous problems, both textual and interpretative, which may explain why Atkinson has had so little competition over the past two decades. We lack the first two books of the *Historiae*, and with them any statement of methodology or self-identification the author may have provided (e.g. in a preface). Numerical corruptions and lacunae (especially in books 5, 6, and 10) abound. Despite endless rehashing of the same internal evidence, it is still not at all certain either who Curtius was or when he wrote: dates from Augustus to Severus Alexander have been proposed. Indeed, in her recent stimulating work Elizabeth Baynham writes (p. 7): 'A survey of modern scholarship on Curtius' date from . . . 1959 to 1995 leaves one with an impression comparable to viewing an Escher drawing'.[32]

Baynham's and Atkinson's books both appeared in 1998, and Baynham acknowledges the receipt of references and an advance copy of a publication (apparently the *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* survey) from Atkinson. Yet there is no evidence, on the face of it, that either discussed the other's on-going work, though both resulted in major studies; and with an author as little investigated as Curtius Rufus this can only be accounted a regrettable, and surprising, omission. (But then neither Atkinson nor Baynham seem aware of two recent Oxbridge dissertations: see below.) As Rüdiger Kinsky has pointed out,[33] though Atkinson's preference for a Claudian date is possible, nevertheless 'die Bezeichnung des *princeps* als *nouum sidus* (Curt. 10.9.23)'—a point Atkinson stresses—'ebenso auf Vespasian paßt', and Baynham in a well-argued appendix (pp. 201-19) makes a very persuasive case for Curtius Rufus having been a contemporary of Vespasian. Atkinson himself is now far less exclusively wedded than he was in 1980 and 1994 to a Claudian context—which

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[31] J. E. Atkinson, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus Historiae Alexandri Magni Books 5-7.2* (Amsterdam 1994); *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni Books 3 and 4* (Amsterdam 1980); 'Q. Curtius Rufus *Historiae Alexandri Magni*', *ANRW* 2.34.4 (1997) 447-83.

[32] E. Baynham, *Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius* (Ann Arbor 1998).

[33] *IJCT* 4 (1997-1998) 474.

carried with it identification of our author as both the senator Curtius Rufus (Tac. *Ann.* 11.20f., Plin. *Ep.* 7.27.2-3) and the rhetorician Quintus Curtius Rufus (Suet. *De Rhet.*, index)—and seems (p. xiv) to be conceding the equal likelihood of Vespasian as the *nouum sidus*.

Does the date matter? At one level, not for the Alexander historian, once it has been established that the *Historiae* was written 'posteriore a Diodoro e Trogo e anteriore a Plutarco e Arriano' (p. xv). But then comes the kicker: 'Ma la differenza è di importanza cruciale per la ricerca circa la possibile esistenza di un sub-testo.' This sub-text is closely bound up with the authoritarian habits of various Roman emperors: in particular with the notorious trials conducted *intra cubiculum* under Claudius, but more generally with the atmosphere of terror induced by the arbitrary exercise of *regnum* by rulers from Augustus to Domitian, the widespread reliance on informers (*delatores*), and the coded rhetoric employed by intellectuals (cf. Czeslaw Milosz's description of 'ketmanism' in *The Captive Mind*) to voice their opposition to such imperial practices.

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Marta Anna Wlodarczyk, *Pyrrhonian Inquiry*. Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, 2000. Pp. x + 72. ISBN 0-906014-24-7. GBP15.00.

'There is much to debate, and plenty of room for disagreement'. That is a quotation from the preface to a recent collection of the five papers (one by Jonathan Barnes, and two each by Myles Burnyeat, and Michael Frede) that between 1979 and 1984 radically transformed the modern study of ancient Scepticism.[34] Wlodarczyk's monograph is a revised Cambridge dissertation that takes up this challenge. It covers, sometimes laboriously, and often rather paraphrastically, all the key concepts of sceptical method used in the works of Sextus Empiricus, but it should be primarily consulted for its attempt to criticise a feature of the five papers mentioned. Wlodarczyk, that is, starts from Sextus' account of sceptical method at *Pyr.* 1.8, where the suspension of belief (ἐποχή) is, as she rightly says, presented 'not in terms of a set of views or doctrines' (chapter 1, 'Introduction' [pp. 1-9], p. 7, the reference for the remaining quotations in this paragraph), and then goes on to claim that Barnes, Burnyeat and Frede all mistakenly emphasise that the sceptic suspends judgment 'about those things, belief in which would involve a criterion of truth and reasoning'.[35] Wlodarczyk's goal is to show that 'scepticism has its roots in criteria of a different

[34] M. F. Burnyeat and M. Frede (edd.), *The Original Sceptics: A Controversy* (Indianapolis 1997) x.

[35] She is quite right. The unsigned preface to the collection cited in the preceding note states (p. x) that all three contributors agree that the 'central sceptical question' is "Have you any reason to believe?"'

kind: inquiry and disagreement,' and that the sceptic 'questions, and suspends judgment about, everything which is a matter of inquiry and disagreement, and assents to everything which is not'. Since 'the importance of the sceptical method for solving controversial issues concerning scepticism has not been recognised', her study 'will try to fill the lacuna'.

Frankly, one must wonder why Wlodarczyk did not pursue this goal in an article, and busy scholars may want to read selectively in five of her chapters (2-5 and 7, 'The Sceptical Method' [pp. 10-20], 'Dogmatism' [pp. 21-25], '*Epoche*' [pp. 26-31], 'Assent' [pp. 32-39], and 'Truth' [pp. 57-63]), and her Appendix (on the ὑπομνηστικόν σημεῖον, the 'recollective sign' [pp. 64-69]),[36] and focus primarily on the section of chapter 6, 'Belief' (pp. 40-56), where (particularly at pp. 51-56) Wlodarczyk considers the familiar problem of how the sceptic can live an active life while being committed to suspension of judgment. For it is relatively uncontroversial (and surely compatible with an emphasis on truth and reason) to argue that suspension of judgment occurs when subjects are open to inquiry and disagreement. More problematical is the nature of a sceptic's assent, where he applies rather than withholds judgment. Such assent will necessarily involve subjects that are not open to dissent, but also needs more positive characterisation. This Wlodarczyk provides by arguing controversially that it involves belief, a position on which the remainder of this review will concentrate.

Wlodarczyk (pp. 54f.) not surprisingly draws on Sextus, *Pyr.* 1.23f. (the account of the practical criterion), where he claims that a sceptic can engage in the activities of thinking and perceiving, feeling, obedience to the laws, and teaching skills. Although she admits that even the subjects identified here can produce suspension of judgment, the sceptic is not rendered inactive because, for example, doubt about the existence of a fire before him is compatible with his acting as though it does exist, for in such a case he can make the 'non-epistemic' claim, 'There seems to be a fire' (p. 55). Yet Wlodarczyk also wants to say in such cases the sceptic still holds a belief. Sextus may say that the sceptic lives ἀδοξάστως (*Pyr.* 1.23), but the δοξαί in question for Wlodarczyk (p. 56) are (predictably) limited to 'decision, judgment or choice about that which is the subject of inquiry or disagreement'. So what sort of special beliefs does the sceptic hold? Her answer (p. 56) is: 'any beliefs as long as they are not formed by inquiry, decision or some dogmatic method'; these are 'uninquired into, undoubted, unchosen but accepted passively without thought. Such beliefs are enough for instinctive or habitual actions.' Then in a footnote she slips in the all-important supporting principle, that acting in a certain way 'is a sufficient condition for holding a belief' (p. 56 n. 31).

Readers familiar with the recent literature will see that Wlodarczyk has positioned herself with those who want to make the Pyrrhonian sceptic a somewhat

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[36] Wlodarczyk invariably, and, I think, unhelpfully, translates it as 'the suggestive sign', simply because of her faith in the translation of R. G. Bury (ed. and tr.) *Sextus Empiricus* (Cambridge, Mass. 1933).

less alarming and paradoxical figure by assigning him beliefs for the ordinary and active portion of his life. But is she still describing beliefs? In a brief review I can only state (dogmatically, I fear) that I doubt that she is, and say that I incline to the position that Pyrrhonians can live without belief, one that Jonathan Barnes has recently restated by pointing to organisms like plants and slugs. As he says, they live complicated lives without beliefs, so 'why think that it is impossible for *homo insipiens*?'[37] Certainly, Wlodarczyk could have offered a richer philosophical rationale for the alternative position. Her idea that acting in a certain way (not sticking your hand into a non-epistemically credible fire?) is a sufficient condition for belief needs careful thought. Wlodarczyk herself, for example, without offering any justification, has relied on R. G. Bury's edition for most of her translations in this monograph.[38] Of what belief, or beliefs, is that action a sufficient condition? That Wlodarczyk thinks this the best English translation available? That it was the only one she could find? I have no idea, and similarly when I see *a known sceptic* being pious (praying in the temple?; cf. Sext. *Pyr.* 1.24), his actions would surely not be a sufficient condition of any specific beliefs, and in that case not necessarily of any beliefs at all.[39]

Wlodarczyk's use of *Pyr.* 1.23f. as the key to the sceptic's ability to act and hold minimal beliefs (ones 'without thought') also invites criticism. She takes this text at face value, and so is willing to commit to the sceptic having *inter alia* 'instinctive' beliefs in the laws and customs of his society, without asking whether such mindless conservatism should be the lot of any philosopher. That question has been raised by Voula Tsouna-McKirahan in a fascinating paper that Wlodarczyk ignores.[40] Tsouna asks whether such beliefs may not be compatible with varying courses of action: for example, when traditional laws and customs that the Sceptic is said to accept at *Pyr.*

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[37] See Barnes in the new introduction to the reprint of the 1994 translation, J. Annas and J. Barnes, *Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism* (Cambridge 2000) at p. xxv. Barnes' essay would be a valuable introduction for beginners to the collection of papers referred to in n. 34.

[38] Bury [36]. At p. 2 n. 4 Wlodarczyk claims that she follows Barnes and Annas (cited in the preceding note) as well as Bury's edition, but the latter unfortunately predominates. For example, at p. 28 (*Pyr.* 2.79) Bury's 'deduce' for συνάγειν is too technical (Barnes and Annas's 'conclude' is superior), and at p. 102 Barnes and Annas's 'fictions' for ἀναπλαττόμενα is more accurate than Bury's 'inventions', which Wlodarczyk calls 'ironical', as it may be in English but not in Greek. Also, R. Bett's translation of Sext. Emp. *Math.* 11 (*Sextus Empiricus Against the Ethicists* [Oxford 1997]) is in Wlodarczyk's bibliography and might have been used instead of Bury at p. 41 for *Math.* 11.112f. At p. 33 Wlodarczyk suddenly adopts J. Brunschwig's translation of *Pyr.* 1.19f., where τὸ φαινόμενον, elsewhere translated as 'appearance,' is rendered as 'the phenomenon'.

[39] For some illuminating criticism of the notion of passive assent see C. J. Shields, 'Socrates Among the Sceptics', in P. A. Van der Waerdt (ed.), *The Socratic Movement* (Ithaca 1994) 350-54.

[40] V. Tsouna-McKirahan, 'Conservatism and Pyrrhonian Skepticism', *Syllecta Classica* 6 (1995) 69-86.

1.24 conflict with *existing* ones (p. 55 n. 29 shows that such a contrast has not struck Wlodarczyk.) In such a case the action required of a sceptic might require reflection on the beliefs that for Wlodarczyk are 'instinctively' accepted, and that is hardly compatible with such beliefs being 'without thought'. This line of criticism might also serve to suggest how a life without belief might also be one *with* thought.

Debate and disagreement regarding the ancient sceptics will doubtless continue, and Wlodarczyk's monograph may play some role in this ongoing project. I have addressed only one issue, and have inevitably had to run roughshod over some complex evidence in Sextus, but I think that any enduring value that this monograph may have will rest on the limited extent to which it helps us grapple further with the central problem of how to be a sceptic and still live a human life.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Books for review should be sent to the Reviews Editor, ***Scholia****.*

Francisco Rodríguez Adrados, *History of the Graeco-Latin Fable 2: The Fable during the Roman Empire and in the Middle Ages*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000. Pp. xviii + 756. ISBN 90-04-11583-8. NLG416.50.

W. Geoffrey Arnott (ed. and tr.), *Menander* 3. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Loeb Classical Library. Pp. ix + 639. ISBN 0-674-99584-8. USD21.50.

Timothy D. Barnes, *Athanasius and Constantius*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. Pp. xviii + 343. ISBN 0-674-00549X. USD26.50.

Carlin A. Barton, *Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Pp. xiii + 326. ISBN 0-520-22525-2. USD47.50

Shadi Bartsch, *Ideology in Cold Blood: A Reading of Lucan's Civil War*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997. Pp. x + 224. ISBN 0-674-00550-3. USD20.95.

Maurizio Bettini, *Classical Indiscretions: A Millenial Enquiry into the State of the Classics*. London: Duckworth, 2001. Pp. 160. ISBN 0-715-62970-0. GBP12.99.

Phebe Lowell Bowditch, *Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Pp. x + 281. 0-520-22603-8. USD22.50.

G. W. Bowersock, Peter Brown and Oleg Grabar, *Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 767. ISBN 0-674-51173-5. USD49.95.

Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A New Edition with an Epilogue*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Pp. v + 548. ISBN 0-520-22757-3. USD19.95.

Jacques Brunschwig, Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd, Pierre Pellegrin and Catherine Porter, *Greek Thought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 2000. Pp. xv + 1024. ISBN 0-674-00261-X. USD49.95.

Paul Cartledge, *Spartan Reflections*. London: Duckworth, 2001. Pp. xii + 276. ISBN 0-7156-2966-2. GBP14.99

E. Lo Cascio and D. W. Rathbone (edd.), *Production and Public Powers in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society 2000. Cambridge Philological Society Supplementary Volume 26. Pp. 99. ISBN 0-906014-25-5. GBP32.50.

Catharine Edwards (tr.), *Suetonius: Lives of the Caesars*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xxxvii + 392. ISBN 0-19-283271-9. GBP7.99.

H. R. Fairclough and G. P. Goold (edd.), *Virgil 2: Aeneid 7-12, Appendix Vergiliana.* Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pp. 590. ISBN 0-674-99586-4. USD21.50.

William Fitzgerald, *Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 129. ISBN 0-521-77969-2. GBP11.95.

Mark D. Fullerton, *Greek Art.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. viii + 176. ISBN 0-521-77973-1. GBP11.95.

Tomas Hägg and Philip Rousseau, *Greek Biography and Panegyric in Late Antiquity.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Pp. xii + 288. ISBN 0-520-22388-8. USD50.00.

Lorna Hardwick, *Translating Words, Translating Cultures.* London: Duckworth, 2000. Pp. 160. ISBN 0-7156-2912-3. GBP9.99.

Thomas Harrison, *The Emptiness of Asia: Aeschylus Persians and the History of the Fifth Century.* London: Duckworth, 2000. Pp. 191. ISBN 0-7156-2968-9. GBP40.00.

John Henderson, *Telling Tales on Caesar: Roman Stories from Phaedrus.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. x + 286. ISBN 0-19-924095-7. GBP40.00

Vincent Hunink, *Apuleius of Madauros: Florida.* Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 2001. Pp. 258. ISBN 90-5063-218-1. NLG120.00.

Micaela Janan, *The Politics of Desire: Propertius IV.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Pp. xi + 255. ISBN 0-520-22318-7. USD19.95.

R. Johnson, *Lucretius and the Modern World.* London: Duckworth, 2000. Pp. 163. ISBN 0-7156-2882-8. GBP9.99.

Brian W. Jones, *Suetonius: Vespasian.* London: Duckworth, 2000. Pp. xviii + 142. ISBN 1-85399-584-3. GBP11.99.

John T. Kirby, *Secret of the Muses Retold: Classical Influences on Italian Authors of the Twentieth Century.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. Pp. xviii + 167. ISBN 0-226-43747-7. USD44.00.

Blake Leyerle, *Theatrical Shows and Ascetic Lives: John Chrysostom's Attack on Spiritual Marriage.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Pp. xv + 244. 0-520-21558-3. USD45.00.

Ramsay MacMullen, *Romanization in the Time of Augustus.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 222. ISBN 0-300-08254-1. GBP16.95.

E. I. McQueen, *A Commentary on Herodotus Book VI.* London: Duckworth, 2000. Pp. xvi + 232. ISBN 1-85399-586-X. GBP11.99.

John H. Molyneux, *Simonides: A Historical Study.* Wauconda: Bolchazy-Carducci, 1992. Pp. vi + 375. ISBN0-86516-223-9. USD24.00.

A. D. Moore, and W. D. Taylour, *Well Built Mycenae: The Helleno-British Excavations within the Citadel at Mycenae, 1959-1969. Fascicule 10: The Temple Complex.* Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1999. Pp. x + 131 + computer disc and microfiche. ISBN 1-84217-000-7. GBP20.00

J. V. Muir (ed.), *Alcidamas: The Works and Fragments*. London: Bristol Classical Press/Duckworth, 2001. Pp. xxxiii + 94. ISBN 1-85399-610-6. GBP10.99

Christopher Nadon, *Xenophon's Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Pp. xiii + 198. 0-520-22404-3. USD38.00.

Ellen O'Gorman, *Irony and Misreading in the Annals of Tacitus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. vii + 200. ISBN 0-521-66056-4. GBP35.00.

Roberta Belli Pasqua, *Sculture di Età Romana in 'Basalto'*. Rome: 'L'Erma' di Bretschneider, 1995. Pp. 163, incl. 89 black-and-white plates. 88-7062-885-X. ITL200 000

P. Riemer, W. Weißenberger, and B. Zimmermann, *Einführung in das Studium der Gräzistik*. München: C. H. Beck, 2000. Pp. 252. ISBN 3-406-46629-X. EUR19.90.

Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (edd.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xx + 745. ISBN 0-522-48136-8. GBP75.00.

Rosanna Sardiello, *Giuliano Imperatore: Simposio i Cesari*. Galatina: Mario Congedo Editore, 2000. Pp. lix + 202. ISBN 8880863282. No price supplied

John Scheid and Jesper Svenbro, *The Craft of Zeus: Myths of Weaving and Fabric*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. Pp. viii + 226. 0-674-00578-3. GBP13.95.

Aldo Schiavone (tr. Margery J. Schneider), *The End of the Past: Ancient Rome and the Modern West*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pp. viii + 278. ISBN 0-674-00062-5. GBP30.95.

D. R. Shackleton-Bailey, *Cicero: Letters to Friends* 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. Loeb Classical Library. Pp. 497. 0-674-99588-0. GBP12.95.

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D. R. Shackleton-Bailey, *Cicero: Letters to Friends* 3. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. Loeb Classical Library. Pp. 497. 0-674-99590-2. GBP12.95.

D. R. Shackleton-Bailey, *Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings* 1: *Books 1-5*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Loeb Classical Library. Pp. ix + 639. ISBN 0-674-99541-4. USD19.95.

D. R. Shackleton-Bailey, *Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings* 2: *Books 6-9*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Loeb Classical Library. Pp. ix + 639. ISBN 0-674-99542-2. USD19.95.

Eric Shanover, *Age of Bronze* 1: *A Thousand Ships*. Orange: Image Comics, 2001. Pp. 223. ISBN 1-58240-212-4. USD29.95.

G. M. Sifakis, F. I. Kakridis, I. Touloumakos and O. Tsagkarakis, *Kterismata: Philological Studies Dedicated to I. S. Kampsitis (1938-1990)*. Herakleion: Crete University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 474. ISBN 960-524-113-7. No price supplied.

Giulia Sissa and Marcel Detienne (tr. Janet Lloyd), *The Daily Life of the Greek Gods*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 287. ISBN 0-8047-3614-6. USD17.95.

Ilona Skupinska-Lovset, *Portraiture in Roman Syria: A Study in Social and Regional Differentiation with the Art of Portraiture*. Lodz: Wydawnictwo Universytetu Lódskiego, 1999. Pp. 280. 83-7171-279-0. No price supplied

Alan H. Sommerstein (ed.), *The Comedies of Aristophanes: Vol. 11. Wealth*. Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 2001. Pp. xiv + 321. ISBN 0-85668-739-1. GBP17.50.

Nicolas Chr. Stampolidis, *Reprisals*. Rethymno: University of Crete, 1996. Pp. 253, incl. 224 colour and black-and-white figures. 960-85468-4-2. No price supplied.

Rosalind Thomas, *Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. viii + 321. ISBN 0-521-66259-1. GBP40.00.

Piero Totaro, *Le seconde parabasi di Aristofane. Beiträge zum antiken Drama und seiner Rezeption Beiheft 9*. Stuttgart: Verlag J. B. Metzler, 1999. Pp. xxv + 219. ISBN 3-476-45229-8. EUR29.90.

Vincenzo Tusa, *I sarcofagi Romani in Sicilia*. Rome: 'L'erma' di Bretschneider, 1995. Pp. xvi + 119, incl 181 black-and-white plates. 88-7062-895-7. ITL 250 000.

M. R. Wright, *Reason and Necessity: Essays on Plato's Timaeus*. London: Classical Press of Wales/Duckworth, 2001. Pp. xvi + 191. ISBN 0-7156-3057-1. GBP40.00.

IN THE UNIVERSITIES

This is the last In the Universities section, which ***Scholia*** *has published since 1992, to feature information about programmes in Classics at the university level in Africa.*

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS, CHANCELLOR COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF MALAWI

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Although the University of Malawi was established in October 1964, Classics as a distinct entity with its own department only emerged in the mid-1980s at what was then a relatively new campus devoted to the arts and sciences situated on the outskirts of Zomba, the former capital of Malawi. This new constituent of the university had been named Chancellor College after its founder and first Chancellor, the Life President of Malawi, H. Kamuzu Banda, and the appearance of Classics at the college was due in no small measure to his vigorous advocacy of the studies. Banda apparently gave up lecturing on the national language, Chichewa, in 1978[1] and thereafter devoted much of his time to furthering the cause of Classics in education. In 1981, he opened his own school, Kamuzu Academy. Situated in splendid isolation at Mtunthama, Banda's home village thirty kilometres from Kasungu Boma, and sporting massive Roman arches and an artificial lake, this 'Eton of Africa', as it became known—or more familiarly, in both senses of the word, this 'Eton in the Bush'[2]—was designed to cater for the country's academic elite who were to be offered a curriculum which had at its core the compulsory study of Latin and Greek, a curriculum in other words which had never existed before in any Malawian secondary school.

The depth of Banda's knowledge of the Classics is debatable (some Latin and less Greek?), but his belief that it was impossible 'to understand the mind of the West—"our conquerors"—without knowledge of the West's psychological and historical heritage'[3] was genuine enough. His cause became political when a resolution to implement the establishment of a Department of Classical Studies at the University of Malawi was passed at the annual convention of the Malawi Congress Party in

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[1] P. Kishindo, 'Politics of Language in Contemporary Malawi', in K. M. Phiri and K. R. Ross (edd.), *Democratization in Malawi: A Stocktaking* (Blantyre 1998) 260.

[2] S. Chimombo, 'Kamuzu Academy in the Millenium', *First* 1.1 (2000) 66.

[3] C. Alexander, 'Personal History: An Ideal State', *The New Yorker* 67/43 (16 Dec. 1991) 57 (quoting Alexander; 'our conquerors' is Banda's phrase).

September 1978. The following year, the Vice-Chancellor of the University, David Kimble, invited a distinguished Roman historian, Robert Ogilvie of the University of St Andrews in Scotland, to come to Malawi and assess the feasibility of establishing a Classics Department at Chancellor College. Ogilvie's report, written during his visit in June-July 1979, recommended *inter alia* a 'separate Department of three members'; that a professor should be appointed in 1979-80 'to undertake detailed planning'; and that the Department of Classical Studies should offer its own courses 'but should participate wherever appropriate in the courses of other Departments'.[4] The report favoured the advancement of Latin at the expense of Greek for reasons which probably reflected the presence of Latin in some twenty Malawian secondary schools in the years 1978-79, with Ogilvie urging close co-operation between these schools and the new department.

The report also countered a suggestion by J. B. Webster, the Professor of History at Chancellor, that Classical Studies 'should be integrated into a number of existing Departments, a classical historian assigned to the History Department, classical literature taught within the English Department, Latin within the Languages Departments', and so on.[5] Ogilvie rejected the notion that Classical scholars are such narrow specialists, and that Latin can be taught without reference to its literature or to social, political, and philosophical contexts. 'Classical Studies is a unity', he affirmed.[6] This was the first round of an argument which has now become a crucial issue, as we shall see.

The university authorities, however, were slow to respond to these developments. Consequently, at the opening ceremony of the new academic year at Chancellor in October 1982, an audience composed of parents and university dignitaries was reproached with a now famous rhetorical question posed by Banda himself: 'How can you people call yourselves a real university if you don't have a Department of Classics?'[7] In fact, the Ogilvie Report had been quietly shelved until the university administrators were embarrassed into re-examining it again when, some months before the opening ceremony, Banda reiterated his views on the role of the Classics in education. Shortly after his reproach to the assembled dignitaries, a letter of application arrived on the desk of the Dean of Humanities; it was addressed to the university by a woman in Florida who had degrees in Classics, Theology, and Philosophy, had decided to live in Africa, and had written to almost every English-speaking academic institution on the continent.[8] Caroline Alexander was under no illusions that her appointment was purely academic. Under the terms of her contract,

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[4] R. M. Ogilvie, *Classical Studies in Malawi: A Report* (written during a visit from 27 June to 13 July 1979) 16f.

[5] Ogilvie [4] Appendix 2.

[6] Ogilvie [4] Appendix 2.

[7] Alexander [3] 57.

[8] Alexander [3] 53.

she was to teach Latin, Greek, and Classical Studies and to develop a four-year undergraduate programme initially without any material resources whatsoever. 'There are probably few Classics Departments in the world's universities,' she wrote, 'which owe their existence to the personal mandate of an absolute dictator.'[9]

But a fully fledged Department of Classics was almost three years in the future when Alexander arrived in October 1982. She taught Classical Studies within the Department of Philosophy until the recommendations of the Ogilvie Report were finally approved for the 1985-86 academic year at an extraordinary meeting of the Faculty of Humanities in June 1985. That Classics at Chancellor was finally awarded full departmental status by the Senate can be attributed ultimately to Alexander's talents and energy. She established links with other Classics Departments in Africa, especially with the Department of Religious Studies, Classics, and Philosophy at the University of Zimbabwe, and used such connections to alleviate the crippling shortage of relevant Classics texts at Chancellor. The Greek Government too was approached via the consulate in Malawi, and contributed over ten thousand kwacha towards the purchase of books.[10]

Alexander's report, written towards the end of her third year at Chancellor, proposed certain amendments to the Ogilvie Report. The need for Greek to be introduced at the second year of studies is stressed for two very cogent reasons: that it is a major and integral part of the Classics; furthermore, without Greek, Chancellor graduates would be disadvantaged when applying for graduate programmes overseas.[11] The report made several other proposals in the wake of the Ogilvie Report, notably in the area of interdepartmental studies: the Classics Department could offer courses in ancient philosophy to philosophy students and courses in Greek tragedy to drama students; theology students could be taught New Testament Greek; the first-year Classical Civilisation course should become a requirement of all second-year history majors. Problems inherent in these proposals soon emerged, however. Interdepartmental links with the English Department failed to materialise,[12] and have never materialised with the Philosophy Department. Moreover, the course structures at Chancellor, where students in their second to fourth years are discouraged from taking first-year courses, create serious obstacles to the interdepartmental approach.

The long shadow of Banda's one-party dictatorship fell across Chancellor College during Alexander's three-year tenure (1982-85), and she writes graphically of the (presumably) special branch operative she discovered one day leafing 'nonchalantly'' through her papers in her office; he smiled and turned up the collar of

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9 Alexander [3] 57.

10 These books had still not been ordered by the university when Alexander wrote her report. See C. Alexander, 'Classical Studies at the University of Malawi: A Report' (Chancellor College, June 1985) 9.

11 Alexander [10] 1.

12 Alexander [10] 5.

his coat as though such a manoeuvre would make him invisible.[13] The 'suspicious' behaviour of lecturers and students alike was reported by government 'plants', one of whom was thought to be present in every class. The more inquiring and individualistic students might be arrested for periods of up to a year.[14] Banda espoused Plato's conception of the 'Ideal State' with its emphasis on order and stability at the expense of novelty and self-expression. As in *The Republic*, song and poetry were appraised solely for their role in promoting the morality sanctioned by the state.[15] Naturally, this was a period of heavy handed censorship which classics like Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* and Sophocles' *Antigone* survived because they were classics, and yet in the context of Banda's totalitarian regime they are actually about as subversive as *Animal Farm*, which was of course banned![16]

Though the establishment of Classics at Chancellor was interpreted by a number of academics throughout the University of Malawi as a blatantly political move, it was generally welcomed, especially by scholars in the Humanities elsewhere in Africa, and in Europe and North America. Alexander, however, felt that she had accomplished what she had set out to do. Accordingly, the university administration advertised for three members of staff (including her replacement) for the year 1985-86, a move she interpreted as a 'reward' for extending her contract.[17] But the expatriates who replaced Alexander in the two years following her departure were all short-term for one reason or another. Fulbright scholar Gloria Duclos arrived from the United States early in 1986 with an externally funded teaching fellowship. The fellowship had actually been negotiated by Alexander before she left office, and, of course, represented a considerable financial advantage to both the recipient and the University of Malawi. Duclos, however, suffered badly from arthritis and left before the end of the year. Richard Evans from South Carolina and Albert Devine from Australia had protracted arguments with the administration regarding their terms of contract and departed at the end of the 1986-87 academic year.

The broken two-year contracts of Devine and Evans obliged Rodney Hunter, who had divided his teaching between Chancellor and Zomba Theological College since 1984,[18] to serve as acting head of department from September 1987 until the arrival of Maryse Waegeman and Jozef de Kuyper in January 1989. Hunter, a former Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford, was joined in October 1987 by Eric Ning'anga,

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[13] Alexander [3] 66.

[14] Alexander [3] 66; P. Ó Máille, *Living Dangerously: A Memoir of Political Change in Malawi* (Blantyre 2000) 20.

[15] Alexander [3] 71.

[16] S. Chimombo and M. Chimombo, *The Culture of Democracy: Language, Literature, the Arts and Politics in Malawi, 1992-94* (Zomba 1996) 1-3; Ó Máille [14] 45.

[17] Alexander [3] 88.

[18] Hunter was actually appointed as a part-time lecturer at Chancellor in 1983 but for political reasons was prohibited from teaching until 1984.

the first Malawian member of staff, who eventually left to further his studies in Germany.

In 1985, the Greek Government had pledged to sponsor a lecturer seconded from a Greek university, but support from this quarter failed to materialise despite Alexander's initiatives.[19] Very valuable help, however, came from another European source at the end of the decade when the Belgian Government not only offered to pay the salaries of Maryse Waegeman and Jozef de Kuyper for a period of five years, but stocked the department with a number of badly needed texts.[20] The comparatively long service of this husband and wife team (with Waegeman as head of department) was a period of consolidation in which the department gradually extended the range of its courses. There were now three complete undergraduate course 'cycles' from first to fourth year in Greek, Latin, and Classical Civilisation, the last named consisting of a general course in Ancient History (first year), Classics in Translation (second year), Ancient Philosophy (third year), and Art and Archaeology (fourth year). Innovations included an 'Introduction to Computational Research' offered to students in the Faculties of Arts and Education, and courses in the methodology of teaching Latin offered to secondary school teachers on behalf of the Curriculum and Teaching Studies Department in the Faculty of Education.[21]

Waegeman and de Kuyper returned to Belgium when their government's subvention of the department ended in 1993. The former was replaced as Head of Department by Thomas Knight, an American scholar from the University of Colorado, whose three years of service coincided with the relatively peaceful transition of Malawi from a one-party dictatorship to a democracy. Knight noted, however, that in this changed political climate, 'the study of classical antiquity had to establish a relevance for itself in Malawian society afresh',[22] the danger being that the discipline might become too closely associated with Banda's regime and, as a consequence, suffer from the tendency of the ruling party, Bakili Muluzi's United Democratic Front, to cut back on university spending. And yet during Banda's time, enrolments in Classics were low and only began to increase dramatically in the mid-1990s, as can be seen in a comparison of first-year enrolments during Knight's tenure: six in 1993-94, twenty-three in 1994-95, and fifty (of a total first-year intake of 300) in 1995-96, eight of these fifty students taking Latin and ten, Greek. Knight attributes the increase partly to the growing popularity of the introductory courses in Classical Civilisation at first-

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[19] Alexander [3] 88.

[20] After eleven years (1985-95) the departmental library consisted of 1 200 books, a number double that of the books on classical subjects in the College library noted by Ogilvie in his 1979 report. See J. Hoffmann, 'Draft Plan for Restructuring Classics: Towards a Department of Cultural Studies' (Department of Classics, Chancellor College, 12 Dec. 1997) 3 (unpaginated).

[21] See J. de Kuyper, 'Classical Studies in Malawi', *Scholia* 2 (1993) 147.

[22] T. Knight, e-mail 4.12.01.

year level, and partly to a new factor, computerisation. Once the timetabling of classes was computerised, degree requirements became a matter of necessity. Students in the Humanities were now permitted to take only one course outside the faculty, which compelled a larger number than usual to take Classics as a minor.[23] But the contribution to the increase of the new Malawian members of staff, Stephen Nyamilandu, Thokozani Kasakula and N. E. T. Nthete, who all joined the department as assistant lecturers in 1994, should not be overlooked. In particular, Nyamilandu's first-year course in historical linguistics (which he began to teach singlehandedly in 1995-96 after sharing it with Knight) has consistently proved to be the most popular in the department's curriculum.

After the departure of Knight, who left in 1996 for the more secure financial rewards of a lectureship at the University of Zimbabwe, the department consisted of his replacement, Henri de Marcellus from the United States, Rodney Hunter and the three assistant lecturers. But with the departures of Hunter in July 1996 to take charge of nine parishes in Nkhotakota District and of Nthete to study for an MA at the University of Durham, the department began to suffer from an acute staffing shortage: de Marcellus and the two assistants were required to teach a programme of courses across four years, and it was proving difficult to recruit new staff. Students intending to major in Classics were drawn into related disciplines such as Philosophy and Religious Studies, having been advised that the department would probably close.[24]

Ironically, the number of students enrolled in Classics courses for the year 1996-97 was comparatively high, with forty plus from BAH (Bachelor of Arts and Humanities) and BEd/Hum (Bachelor of Education/Humanities) programmes studying Classics. The number increased slightly in the following academic year, which has been described as 'the nadir of a three-year downward slide' at Chancellor that began with the devaluation of the kwacha and shortly thereafter a 'substantial exodus' of lecturers from the college.[25] The numbers make an interesting comparison with Ogilvie's 1979 prediction of 'between 10 and 20 students per year',[26] the twenty-five in 1985-86 and the twenty-three first years in 1994-95, and present a strong argument for the increasing appeal of Classics (the Civilisation courses rather than the languages) from the first year of establishment. In 1997, twenty-nine students enrolled in first-year Ancient History, but other courses in the Classical Civilisation cycle disappeared in 1996-97 with the lecturers who taught them, the assistants being unable, or unwilling, to handle courses of a specialised literary or historical content. The assistants had, after all, been trained principally to teach the languages.[27]

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[23] Knight, e-mail 4.12.01.

[24] Hoffmann [20] 7 (unpaginated).

[25] Hoffmann [20] 20 (unpaginated).

[26] Ogilvie [4] 7.

[27] Hoffmann [20] 7f. (unpaginated)

Recruiting efforts proved to be successful at last in the latter half of 1997, thanks to the activities of de Marcellus and his successor, Joseph Hoffmann, who arrived from the United States in October of that year. When the new academic year began in March 1998, the department had a complement of three lecturers and two assistants, Hoffmann being joined by Michael Chappell from England and Edward Jenner from New Zealand. The tone is buoyant, if frankly propagandist, in Hoffmann's response to the proposals for restructuring drawn up by the University of Malawi and aimed at eliminating redundancies in both courses and administrative structures. In his 'Draft Plan for Restructuring Classics', a bulletin published by the department in December 1997, Hoffmann argued against the parcelling out of Classics piecemeal into departments of cognate studies and maintained that the Department could be run cost effectively with an 'establishment' of up to four lecturers.[28]

But events were to decide otherwise. In August 1998, the United Democratic Front government devalued the kwacha for the second time that year, and a student strike over the poverty of resources and adequate nourishment on campus brought the college to a halt for a period of eleven weeks as the administration waited for the government to increase its subvention to the University of Malawi. Unable to support a family on his university salary, Hoffmann removed to Kamuzu Academy in October. Meanwhile, in the interests of cost efficiency and the sharing of resources, the plan of merging with the Philosophy Department was revived. Chappell, now Head of Department, was not convinced that larger units are necessarily more efficient and cost-effective than small departments and argued that, if restructuring is inevitable, a merger should respect the integrity of the Classics Department, citing the Department of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy at the University of Zimbabwe.[29] In fact, Classics was to remain intact as a department throughout Chappell's period as Head.

Both Chappell and Jenner completed a two-year contract (1998-2000) and then extended it for one more year. In May 1999, Nyamilandu joined them as a third lecturer, having completed the requirements for an MA at the college. Student numbers continued to rise steadily: there were ninety students enrolled in Classics courses in 1998-99, 110 in 1999-2000, and 131 in 2000-01 (with first-year Ancient History claiming almost fifty that year).[30] In this three-year period, the Civilisation cycle comprised Greek and Roman History (first year), An Introduction to Historical Linguistics (first year), Classical Literature in Translation (second year), Ancient and African Mythology and Oral Traditions (second year), Greek and Roman Philosophy (third year), The 'Black Athena' Controversy and the History of Classical North Africa

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[28] Hoffmann [20] 9f. (unpaginated)

[29] M. D. Chappell, 'Classics and Restructuring Issues' (Department of Classics broadsheet, 3 March 1999).

[30] The numbers in the Civilisation courses might have been even higher each year if students in the BEd/Hum programme were not, after their first year, restricted to the subjects taught in high schools.

(two one-semester courses comprising this fourth-year course). All courses had been modularised under the semester system recommended by the University of Malawi Reform [restructuring] Study of 1997 and implemented by the Classics Department in March 1998 under Hoffmann's aegis. It was Hoffmann too who had advocated an increased amount of African content in the department's curriculum.[31] Chappell put his recommendation into practice by introducing courses on 'Black Athena' and North African history.

But though Classics at Chancellor appeared to be thriving in the first years of the new millenium, serious threats to the department's existence persisted. Plans to close or dismember the department in the name of reform or cost-effectiveness have always been encouraged by the reluctance of the United Democratic Front Government to increase the university's subvention. (In April 2001, Treasury actually decided to reduce the approved subvention in response to directives from the International Monetary Fund.) Again, the departures in May of Chappell and Jenner for their respective home countries and the ensuing difficulties experienced by Nyamilandu (now Head of Department) in securing replacements only served to emphasise just how dependent the department had become on expatriates who were prepared to fulfill a two-year contract only, or, at best, extend it by one more year. But the comparatively low income (in first-world terms), the high rates of inflation, the frequent devaluations, the level of taxation, and the marked increases in the cost of living together constitute a raft of disincentives for lecturers from the first world intending to embark on a two-year contract, let alone renew or extend that contract. A reliance on expatriates is in itself a liability for an underfunded university committed to meeting the airfare and freight expenses of such a staff. The political threat to Classics at Chancellor must also be described as serious, as Knight foresaw in 1994. The discipline is tainted in the eyes of many (especially staunch United Democratic Front supporters) because it is closely associated with the name of the now discredited autocrat, Kamuzu Banda. Political opponents of the Classics at Chancellor feel that the studies were imposed by the dictator upon a largely reluctant administration.

And so to the present academic year (2001-02) in which the paradox of high enrolment (a record number of 169 students) and the very real threat of closure obtains to a more excruciating degree than ever before. The staffing crisis has never been so serious: just one lecturer, Stephen Nyamilandu, and an assistant, Thokozani Kasakula, to cope with the large numbers in the Civilisation courses. Efforts were made to recruit a replacement from South Africa, but the reluctance shown by the administration to pay for his airfare (let alone his salary) does not bode well for the future of the Department. Its fate seems to rest with a subcommittee of deans and heads of department that has been authorised to examine and report back on restructuring issues. Nyamilandu believes that the department's survival depends on the popularity of the first- and second-year Civilisation courses, the language-based courses having

[31] Hoffmann [20] 14 (unpaginated).

failed of late to attract adequate numbers.[32] But if closure is inevitable, it is his express hope that Classics remain as a subsection within a major department (English? Philosophy?) rather than suffer total dismemberment with different courses parcelled out to different departments, which can only mean a loss of identity.[33] However, the final decision (already delayed by some weeks) will not be reached until sometime in the new year, for the administrators now have another, much more urgent problem on their hands. On 11 December 2001, a student protest on campus (prompted mainly by the death in police custody of Rastafarian singer Evison Matafale) ended in the shooting of a student by police. The student later died in hospital. Five days after the shooting, while Heads and Deans were in emergency session, Muluzi ordered the Vice Chancellor, David Rubadiri, to close the college early (for the Christmas-New Year break) to avoid further unrest.[34]

CLASSICS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

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The Democratic Republic of Congo (capital Kinshasa) is situated in Central Africa with a population of 56 000 000, and is approximately one-quarter the size of the United States. In the west of the country, 500 kilometres from Kinshasa, is Kikwit, a free town with around 600 000 inhabitants. It is the home of the University of Kikwit, a Catholic institution. When the Democratic Repuglic of Congo's first university was established in Kinshasa in 1954, it offered courses in classical philology (Latin and Greek language) and Catholic theology.

The study of classical philology has been a central part of Congolese education since the country's time as a colony of Belgium. The majority of prominent Congolese political figures have learned the classics, but today the study of the classics is in decline. This mainly due to the country's constant political and social upheaval and the 'foreign' nature of the study of Latin; the Mediterranean is separated from the Congo

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[32] The few Classical language students at Chancellor in recent years have come from Kamuzu Academy. 'The Ministry of Education is quietly abandoning the teaching of Latin in schools' (Kishindo [1] 261 n. 25), and Ministry directives indicate that Latin will soon be dropped from the Junior Certificate syllabus. At the privately financed Kamuzu Academy, however, the Classics 'are still firmly in place' (Chimombo [2] 69).

[33] S. Nyamilandu, e-mail 27.11.01.

[34] *Daily Times* (Blantyre) 12 Dec. 2001; S. Nyamilandu, e-mail 19.12.01.

[1] Dudu Musway is Chef de Section Lettres et Sciences humaines at the University of Kikwit and is the founder of the graduate school for doctoral research in Classics in Kikwit.

in terms of time, distance, and culture. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, classical philology now consists only of Latin philology, although classical civilisation, classical art and Greek and Latin literature are also taught. There is no archaeology taught; Greek is only taught in senior seminaries and faculties of theology, and it is more oriented towards the Byzantine period. The place of Greek in the curriculum has been superseded by Old French in accordance with the Francophone policy of the colonial power. In 1975 Old French was incorporated into Classics because Belgium and France wanted to promote French language and culture.

Ninety percent of the professors of classical philology in the Democratic Republic of Congo are foreigners, mainly Belgian priests of advanced age. There are Congolese professors with doctorates in other Classical fields such as archaeology, ancient history, mythology, classical civilisation and art history, but in Latin philology there are only two Congolese professors with doctorates: Yves Mudimbe and myself. The majority of other classicists are senior lecturers without doctorates, and Yves Mudimbe now lives in exile in the United States. Therefore, according to the most recent statistics, I am now the only professor of Latin philology in the Democratic Republic of Congo. For a country of 56 000 000 people, this is remarkable.

Latin is taught in almost all the universities and colleges of higher education in the Democratic Republic of Congo, through the faculties or departments of arts and humanities. Two major universities teach Latin philology, these are the University of Kikwit and the University of Lubumbashi. The University of Kikwit, however, has only twenty-seven students of Latin philology from the first-year undergraduate level to second-year graduate level (de la graduat en 2e licence). Very few of these are likely to go on to take up university positions in the teaching of the classics; the majority of Latin philologists become teachers of Latin at secondary school level. While this means that there is a focus on Latin at secondary school level, it does not bode well for the future of Latin in the universities. Another factor influencing the future of Latin in Congolese universities is the availability of publications in Classics. It is difficult for philologists to keep up to date with advances in the field due to the lack of recent books and articles in the country, and this difficulty is compounded by the fact that we have little contact with our colleagues around the world. I take every opportunity to obtain books or journals when I travel abroad, particularly to Germany.

In our universities Latin is an indispensible branch of the curriculum for students in the faculties of arts, law, medicine, literature and humanities. Yet despite Latin's great importance, it is always at risk of being cast aside in order to make room for more modern subjects such as information technology.

Congolese classical philologists invariably encounter problems of methodology resulting from the use of old Belgian editions of classical texts. The use of such texts means that translation goes only from Latin to French and not from Latin to indigenous languages, which would make the subject more accessible to students. Textbooks specifically designed for the teaching of Latin in secondary schools are rare, and those which are available are inadequate because they take no account of the

student's language, or cultural and social environment. Instead, they are vehicles of a culture which is strange and unknown to Congolese learners.

The textbooks that are used consist of excerpts of classical Latin authors but do not include information or exercises on grammatical structure.[2] Moreover, these passages reflect a culture which is foreign to the Congo's young African pupils. The texts expect a prior knowledge of European culture which the students do not possess. Students therefore lack motivation to learn. In order for the study of classical philology in the Democratic Republic of Congo to survive, an effort must be made to find ways to make the teaching of Latin interesting for and relevant to our secondary school students.

With this aim in mind, I have compiled an anthology of Latin passages selected from those discussed in my doctoral thesis (*Das Bild Schwarzafrikas in der lateineschen gelehrten Literatur*) for the use of students in their first two years of Latin study. The criterion for selection of passages was that they must cover topics which are accessible for Congolese Latin students. The excerpts focus on the discussion of black Africa in the ancient world, as well as more general themes on Rome, Greece, and Europe. While the portions of text in the anthology are not all from the classical era (for example, it includes some mediaeval Latin texts), the non-classical usages are noted as such so as not to encourage mediaeval style in composition. The excerpts are accompanied by an introduction to provide a background to the text and to facilitate discussion and by commentary and grammar notes to aid translation. It is hoped that the provision of a better textbook will not only encourage students to learn but also to allow for a change in teaching practices. While the text is still designed for translation from Latin to French, it encourages the Latin to be read aloud so that correct pronunciation and intonation may aid translation and comprehension. This in turn is intended to encourage participation by the students so that they translate more of the Latin themselves rather than the more common current practice of the teacher doing the majority of the translation. The use of this anthology hopefully will encourage teachers to alter their use of time in Latin class by reducing the amount of time spent on translating passages and learning vocabulary in favour of spending more time on grammatical exercises and cultural studies based on the passages. The anthology has been in use at the University of Kikwit for an experimental period and, judging by the fact that student numbers have increased markedly, the initial results are encouraging.

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[2] The standard texts used by the majority of Latin teachers are *Vita Nova*, which contains excerpts of *De Bello Gallico* and is used in the first year of Latin learning; Sallust's *De Bello Jugurthino*, which is used in the second year of Latin learning; Cicero's *In Catilinam* and Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*, used in the third year; and Cicero's *Pro Archia* and Tacitus' *Agricola* of Tacitus, which is used in the fourth year of teaching.

IN THE MUSEUM

This is the tenth and last In the Museum section, which ***Scholia*** *has published annually since 1992, to feature news about Classical exhibitions and artefacts in African museums.*

MUSEUM OF CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF NATAL

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In 2000-2001, a donation from Joan Law made possible the acquisition of a small Mycenaean stirrup-jar, dating from the Late Helladic III B period (*circa* 1300-1190 BC).[1] This distinctive shape, with stirrup-like handle positioned over a central false spout while the functional spout is off-centre on the shoulder, was popular in the Bronze Age Aegean, produced in Minoan Crete as well as on the Greek mainland in the latter half of the second millennium BC. While larger examples of the shape can be elaborately painted (where an octopus wth spreading tentacles is a popular device), the simple, linear decoration on this example is typical of smaller pots. The light tan colour of the painted lines is also fairly standard for the period; an increased temperature in the kiln would have resulted in a darker tone.[2] Small pots similar to the Durban example have been found all over the Greek-speaking world of the time; one might compare, for instance, some examples from Cyprus, mostly found in tombs at Enkomi,[3] or one from Kolophon in Asia Minor, now in the British Museum, of similar date.[4]

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[1] Figures 1a-c: 2000.44, height 84 mm. Charles Ede Limited, *Antiquities Catalogue* 168 (1999) no. 40.

[2] For a detailed analysis of ancient Greek pottery production and firing techniques, see J. V. Noble, *The Techniques of Painted Attic Pottery* (London 1988).

[3] See V. Karageorghis (ed.), *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum* (Cyprus 1963) fasc. 1 pll. 21 and 22, especially Nicosia A 1608, but also 1595, 1588, 1609.

[4] London GR 1884.2-9.3.

Figure 1a. Durban 2000.44. Mycenaean stirrup-jar (top).

Figure 1b. Durban 2000.44. Mycenaean stirrup-jar (profile).

 Scholia ns Vol. 10 (2001) 172-74 ISSN 1018-9017



Figure 1c. Durban 2000.44. Mycenaean stirrup-jar (profile).

B. X. DE WET ESSAY

This is the tenth B. X. de Wet Essay to be published in ***Scholia****. The paper judged to be the best African undergraduate student essay submitted to* ***Scholia*** *by 30 June for the preceding year has been published annually since 1992 in honour of South Africa classicist B. X. de Wet. The prize of R250 has been sponsored by the Classical Association of South Africa.*

SENECA THE STOIC AND EPICUREANISM

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Seneca collected and collated the principles of his philosophy from various different schools of thought. He did not bind himself to the dogmas of any particular philosophical school. Seneca, however, did ally himself most closely to the Stoics. His early writings reveal him as somewhat eclectic, since he was influenced by various philosophers such as Sotion the Pythagorean, Attalus the Stoic and Demetrius the Cynic. He writes, 'I can dispute with Socrates, doubt with Carneades, achieve tranquility with Epicurus, conquer human nature with the Stoics, but exceed it with the Cynics' (*De Brev. Vit.* 14.2).[1] Therefore, as Motto observes, Seneca was no 'sectarian dogmatist' but rather a 'seeker of truth':[2] '"Epicurus," you say, "said this. What have you to do with the philosophy of another school?" What's truth is mine' (*Ep.* 12.11).[3]

The two most popular schools of philosophy in imperial Rome were the Stoic and the Epicurean, both of which were devoted to ethical conduct. Seneca found the teachings of these schools to be fundamentally similar yet conflicting in some aspects. The Stoics taught that virtue was the *summum bonum* ('highest good'), while the Epicurean school believed that pleasure was the highest good. Even though the Epicureans shared the same basic moral goals as those of Seneca's Stoics, they still differed markedly in their view of how one should live life and attain happiness, of the 'highest good', and of individual mortality and its relation to the pantheistic gods.

1

The fundamental problem of all Greek and Roman philosophy is the idea of the *summum bonum*. The Stoics respond to this problem in the same way that most

[1] L. A. Motto (tr.), *Seneca: Moral Epistles* (San Francisco 1985) 9.

[2] Motto [1] 9.

[3] Motto [1] 9.

classical and Hellenistic systems of belief respond. They assert that the highest good in life was *eudaimonia*, which can be defined literally as 'having a good guardian spirit', that is, the state of having an objectively desirable life. This objective aspect distinguishes *eudaimonia* from the modern concept of happiness, which is to lead a subjectively satisfactory life. While the Christian is given blessedness by the 'God who bestows hope and with its fulfillment of hope, the pagan philosopher believes it possible to reach happiness in this "unhappy life" by himself. For the Stoic, therefore, the aim of life is identical to a life of virtue.'[4]

The Epicureans differed slightly from this viewpoint even though the Epicurean and Stoic philosophies in principle are very similar. Epicurus believed that philosophy was merely the 'art of making life happy'. By happiness he does not mean that state of well-being and perfection of which the consciousness is accompanied by pleasure but rather pleasure itself. Epicurus would not have viewed pleasure in terms of the later distorted and purely hedonistic idea of wine, woman and song. He felt that one cannot lead a life of pleasure without leading a life of honour, prudence and justice; nor can one lead a life of honour, prudence and justice without leading a life of pleasure, and he believed that this pleasure is the immediate purpose of every action in this life.

The Stoic supreme ideal of 'virtue' is described by Campbell as 'a combination of four qualities: wisdom (or moral insight), courage, self-control and justice (or upright dealing). It enables a man to be 'self-sufficient', immune to suffering, superior to the wounds and upsets of life (often personified as Fortuna, the goddess of fortune). Even a slave armed with these virtuous qualities can be called 'free', or indeed titled 'a king' for even a king cannot touch him.[5] 'If there is aught that causes slaves to blush / It is the name; in all else than the free / The slave is nothing worse, if he be virtuous' (Eur. *Ion* 854-56).[6] These duties, or 'supreme qualities', were self-evident to many of the Romans and corresponded closely to the idea of *virtus* ('excellence').

Seneca believes that philosophy and virtue were inseparable and alike insofar as they both have a contemplative and a practical side to them. Virtue is part training and part practice: one must first learn; then by practice one must reinforce what one has learned. Seneca points out that the 'highest good is a mind that . . . rejoices only in virtue' (*Dial.* 7.4.2).[7] and that the mind has the capacity to be unconquerable, wise from experience, and calm in action while it shows great courtesy and consideration in its interaction with other minds. Timothy illustrates the important role of virtue in Senecan philosophy as revealed in *De Vita Beata*. Seneca says that the happy man is the one who 'acknowledges no good and evil other than a good and evil mind, who cherishes honour, who is content with virtue . . . and whose life is characterised by the

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[4] L. Edelstein, *The Meaning of Stoicism* (Boston 1966) 1.

[5] R. Campbell (tr.), *Letters from a Stoic* (Harmondsworth 1969) 16.

[6] J. Maritain, 'Moral Philosophy 4. Ethics Triumphant : Stoics and Epicureans'. 12 May 2001. <http://www.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/jmoral04.htm>.

[7] H. B. Timothy (tr.), *The Tenets of Stoicism* (Amsterdam 1973) 35.

mental attitude that counts virtue the only good and baseness the only evil' (4.2.5-7; 3.3f., 6f.).[8]

According to Epicurus, pleasure is a state that involves the absence of bodily pain and mental anxiety; however, it contains the prerequisites of honour: prudence and justice. The English word 'pleasure' does not quite do the aims of Epicurus justice. This is evident in the reading of his letter to Menoeceus where the following is said to describe the highest good of the Epicureans: 'Pleasure is the beginning and the end of the blessed life. For we recognise pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good' (*Ep. Men.* 129a).[9]

Pleasure is a term that would better describe a momentary sensation. Although a collection of momentary sensations may serve to make an intrinsically 'happier' person, it should be viewed from a different angle. 'Happiness' is a better term to describe what one should strive for, according to Epicurus. The reason for this is that he prefers the pleasures of the mind, which imply an enduring condition, above the pleasures of the body. This simple life of undemanding happiness that involves a withdrawal from political and social life is described by Tennyson in his poem 'Lucretius' as 'the sober majesties / Of settled, sweet, Epicurean life' (2.217f.).[10]

2

Seneca's *Moral Epistles* are actually moral essays in disguise. Campbell believes they were real letters that were always intended for publication and were most probably circulated privately among fellow philosophers or friends.[11] The fact that no replies have been uncovered supports this theory. Of the 124 letters written to his friend Lucilius, only the first twenty-nine are specifically of a Stoic nature. Seneca writes about Stoic concepts such as the value of time (*Ep.* 1), friendship (3), the joy of sharing one's possessions with one's friends (6), and the advantages of old age (12). Two letters stand out in regard to concept of the 'highest good' and the ideas of Epicurus: *Epistle* 9 concerns philosophy and friendship and *Epistle* 27, which deals with virtue, is given the title 'Virtue Alone Gives Everlasting Joy' by one scholar.[12]

Seneca commences *Epistle* 9 with reference to a point that Epicurus had made in one of his letters and writes, 'you desire to know whether Epicurus is right in . . . criticising those who maintain that the wise man is content with himself and therefore

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[8] Timothy [7] 35.

[9] W. J. Oates (ed.) *The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers* (New York 1940) 31f.

[10] G. E. Benfield and R. C. Reeves, *Selections from Lucretius* (Oxford 1967) 26.

[11] Campbell [5] 21.

[12] Motto [1] 97.

needs no friend' (9.1).[13] Here Seneca makes reference to the Greek and Epicurean concept of *apatheia* ('freedom from suffering') and raises the issue of whether or not it is possible to translate this word with the Latin *impatientia* ('freedom from emotion') without causing ambiguity. According to Seneca, the Epicureans use the Greek to describe 'the man who is unable to endure anything that goes badly for him' (9.2)[14] and accepts everything as fated, whereas he himself uses the Latin to refer to a man who refuses to allow anything that goes badly for him to affect him. Seneca says that these meanings show one of the differences between the Epicurean school and the Stoics and qualifies it by saying 'our wise man feels his troubles but overcomes them, while their wise man does not even feel them' (9.2).[15] Seneca follows this statement with the acknowledgement that both Stoicism and Epicureanism share the belief that the wise man is content with himself; however, although he is self-sufficient, he requires a friend or companion. According to Seneca, a wise man is so self-contented that he may be satisfied with what remains of himself after losing an eye or an arm in war or from disease, but he partly wishes that it had not happened. The same applies to friends. One is able to live with the loss of a friend; however, when Seneca uses the word 'able' he means that one may bear the loss of a friend with equanimity.

From this point it is apparent that Seneca holds friendship in high esteem in terms of experiencing great pleasure. He finds pleasure in maintaining friendships and building new ones; this is shown in his citation of the philosopher Attalus: 'an artist derives more pleasure from painting than from having completed a picture' (*Ep.* 9.8).[16] Although this idea forms only part of the Stoic conception of pleasure, it is important to note the relevant views of Epicurus on the matter of pleasure and to discuss the manner of the Epicurean striving for hedonism.

The emphasis that the Epicureans placed on pleasure earned a negative reputation in both ancient and modern times; this negative aspect survives in the archaic meaning of the word 'epicure', which according to the *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* refers to 'one who is devoted to sensual pleasure'.[17] This meaning is clearly a misunderstanding of Epicurus' teachings, for he was not a hedonist in the modern, derogatory sense of the word. He saw pleasure as the absence of pain and pain as an unsatisfied desire for pleasure. But not every desire had to be satisfied. Epicurus divided these bodily pleasures into three categories:

> *Physical and necessary*: Examples of these are food, drink, clothing and shelter. This is a desire that must be satisfied in order for a person to survive.

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[13] Campbell [5] 47.

[14] Campbell [5] 48.

[15] Campbell [5] 48.

[16] Campbell [5] 49.

[17] 13 May 2001. <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary>.

Physical and unnecessary: The primary example of this is sex. Although sex is necessary for the procreation of the species, it is not a vital factor in individual survival and should thus be enjoyed in moderation or, if one considers Epicurus' letter to Menoeceus, with a measure of prudence as with all things in life.

Neither physical nor necessary: This would be luxurious clothing, perfumes and other similar items. This type of pleasure is completely aesthetic and should therefore be avoided at all costs, according to Epicurean philosophy, because the striving for the luxurious can only be detrimental to the individual.

Pain will thus only result when the desires for the pleasures in the first category are not satisfied. But perhaps even more critical to human happiness, according to Epicurus, is the avoidance of mental pain, which typically ruins human happiness; this pain includes anxiety caused by involvement in public affairs, remorse brought about by a guilty conscience, and the fear of the gods and of death. To avoid this physical and mental pains is to experience the pleasure of the mind and thus achieve *ataraxia* ('freedom from anxiety'). To attain this *ataraxia*, Epicurus says that 'prudence . . . teaches us that it is not possible to live life pleasantly without living prudently and honourably and justly nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honour and justice without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life and the pleasant life is inseparable from them' (*Ep. Men.* 132b).[18] Another important aspect of Epicureanism is that its adherents were by no means atheist. Epicurus believed that the gods exist in the interspaces between the innumerable worlds and, because they have no involvement with the world and the troublesome life of mankind, are models of *ataraxia*.

The importance of this self-sufficient happiness is stressed in *Epistle* 9. The Epicurean concept of happiness, which is achieved through the state of *ataraxia*, is negated if one does not believe oneself to be truly happy. Seneca maintains that the Stoic agrees with Epicurus, who generally disagrees with the philosopher Stilbo, in his thinking that 'a man is unhappy, though he reign the world over, if he does not consider himself to be supremely happy' (9.23).[19] Thus the Stoic and Epicurean ideas of happiness converge on this point in that they believe that the mere fact of having everything does not make one happy. This 'everything' is only enough if one firmly believes it to be enough. Thus it is apparent that Stoicism is in accordance in many senses with Epicurus' philosophy and is opposed to it in others. The Stoic values friendship and the making thereof as being a part of the happy and self-sufficient 'wise' man, but the Epicurean deems it as unnecessary: he views *ataraxia* as the supreme state of pleasure and finds friends necessary only 'for the purpose of having someone to come and sit beside his bed when he is ill or come to his rescue when he is

[18] Oates [9] 32 (tr. C. Bailey).

[19] Campbell [5] 53.

hard up or thrown into chains' (9.9).[20] Both schools do agree, however, on the fact that one can only be happy with what one has if one believes it to be sufficient.

From *Epistle* 27 it is evident that Seneca believes that virtue is the most important quality of an individual. He advises Lucilius to 'look around for some enduring good' since a 'good character is the only guarantee of everlasting, carefree happiness' (27.6).[21] He uses the analogy of a cloud drifting in front of the sun and stopping the full flow of its light to describe an obstacle in the way of a good character. A proverbial Chinese saying declares the same of the virtuous man: 'riches adorn the dwelling; virtue adorns the person'. As in the case of the unhappy man who rules over everything, it is not about what you have but how you view the world and your possessions that makes you a truly wise and self-sufficient man, a Stoic sage. *Epistle* 27 deals mainly with Seneca's advice on how Lucilius and all other intended readers should go about attaining the happiness of the virtuous life. Seneca emphasises that one can only attain this through hard work: 'You must devote all your waking hours and all your efforts to the task personally' (27.6).[22] This is along the same lines as his comment that 'nature does not bestow virtue; to be good is an art' (90.45). These two quotations reinforce the idea proposed in a Chinese proverb regarding virtue: 'virtue: climbing a hill; vice: running down'. Virtue is a task that requires work, and the antithesis of virtue, which is vice, is far easier to attain.

Seneca ends *Epistle* 27 with a reference to Epicurus to pay his outstanding 'debt' to Lucilius. He says that 'poverty brought into accord with the law of nature is wealth'(27.9).[23] This is another significant Epicurean concept that Seneca has adapted from a Greek fragment of Epicurus: 'The man who follows nature and not vain opinions is independent in all things. For in reference to what is enough for nature every possession is wealth, but in reference to unlimited desires even the greatest wealth is not possession but poverty' (fr. 45).[24] Epicurus conceptualises nature, ultimate reality and the universe as all being one and the same. Nature is the universal domain of possible investigation that excludes all that is not accessible to reason and sensation: it is the opposite of supernatural. Nature is the collection of facts, events and objects that have space, time and motion as their sufficient and fundamental defining characteristics. In defining nature in this way, Epicurus asserts that what is 'natural', 'material' and 'physical' is ultimately 'real' even though it may appear to us at times to be otherwise. In classical Epicurean terms, everything that is real is resolvable into matter, motion, space and time: these concepts are sufficient to yield a fundamental knowledge of nature. Therefore whatever is real must be a concrete physical object that can be quantitatively measured and assigned a specific size and mass, a locus in space, and a date in time.

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[20] Campbell [5] 49.

[21] Campbell [5] 73.

[22] Campbell [5] 73.

[23] Campbell [5] 75.

[24] Oates [9] 49 (tr. C. Bailey).

These basic teachings can be traced back to the Greek philosophers Leucippus and Democritus in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC. They maintained that all things could be scientifically analysed and understood in terms of their ultimate constituents, atoms and void. Although nature may appear to contain more than what is physical or material, atoms and space are all that ultimately exists in 'reality'. Later, Plato and Aristotle formulated ideas that conflicted with those of Democritus' atomic theory, which prompted Epicurus to revise and reintroduce the atomic theory in the late fourth and early third centuries BC.

3

According to Benfield and Reeves, 'religion' is the enemy for Lucretius in his description of the nature of the universe and Epicurean philosophy.[25] Lucretius feels that religion is the cause of impious actions and illustrates his lack of faith in what he calls 'superstition' by describing the sacrifice of Iphigenia at Aulis. The unfortunate first-born and most beautiful daughter of Agamemnon was put to death in the presence of her father merely 'so that a fleet might sail under happy auspices'.[26] Such a senseless loss of life and constant fear of the gods is all that can result from religion in Lucretius' eyes. The Epicurean displays his frustration at this concept in the often-quoted line 'such are the heights of wickedness to which men are driven by superstition'.[27]

Benfield and Reeves point out that, although Lucretius and Epicurus abhor traditional religion, they do leave room for positive religion in the sense of the right relationship between men and the divine.[28] Three points are adduced in evidence:

1. The knowledge that he has nothing to fear from the gods enables the Epicurean to contemplate the world with an untroubled mind and aids toward his living a life of *apatheia* and *ataraxia*.
2. The Epicurean is committed to the imitation of the tranquil life of the gods; it is promised that he will 'lead a life worthy of the gods' (Lucr. 3.322).
3. Both Epicurus and Lucretius speak of men receiving visions of the gods in language that suggests communion between gods and men.

From the first two points it is apparent that the Epicureans perceived deities as positive yet entirely impotent beings. They expounded that if man were to strive for and achieve the perfect state of happiness and *ataraxia*, then they would be on a par with these gods. Although Epicurus writes, 'if God listened to the prayers of men, all men would quickly have perished, for they are for ever praying for evil against one another'

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[25] Benfield and Reeves [10] 14.

[26] R. E. Latham (tr.), *The Nature of the Universe* (London 1951) 30.

[27] Latham [26] 30.

[28] Benfield and Reeves [10] 14.

(fr. 58).[29] This is related to his view that the gods are impotent beings and separate from humans, although it also shows that he was by no means an atheist in the modern sense of the word. The fact that he saw the gods as having no power over the fate of human beings and living in bliss is a unique one and is explained by Lucretius: 'The majesty of those gods is revealed and those quiet habitations, never shaken by storms nor drenched by rain clouds nor defaced by the quiet rifts of snow which a harsh frost congeals. . . . All their wants are supplied by nature, and nothing at any time cankers their peace of mind' (3.18-21, 23f.).[30]

According to Seneca, 'there is only one cause or creative agency, and this is the creative reason or God' (*Ep.* 65.4.1f.).[31] 'The virtue the Stoics aim at raises one to a splendid eminence, not so much because escape from vice is in itself a blessed thing, but rather because the soul is liberated, prepared for the knowledge of heavenly things, and rendered worthy of entering into communion with God' (*Q. Nat.* 1 *pr.* 6).[32] God to Seneca and the Stoics is rational, 'although mortal eyes are so sealed because of error that that men [particularly the Epicureans] believe this vast frame of things [the universe] is nothing but a fortuitous concourse of atoms, the toy of chance'.[33] This 'fortuitous concourse of atoms' is a reference to the Epicurean theory of *clinamen* ('swerve of atoms') that Lucretius promotes, which involves atoms falling down through space in parallel lines swerving from the perpendicular by a minute amount at undetermined times and places (2.216-24). Without such a swerve there can be no atomic collisions and therefore no creation. Seneca disagrees with this concept and holds thought that 'matter and God . . . comprise the universe. God orders matter which envelops and follows Him as its ruler and commander. The place He occupies in the universe . . . is the place that the soul occupies in man. What matter is in the universe, the body is in us' (*Ep.* 65.23.3-5, 24.1-3).[34]

Seneca's theory of divinity also differs from the Epicurean theory in his concept of the 'divine spark'. The divine spark is something inside very human being of which one cannot deny the existence and is something that makes each person different and in a sense divine. It is essential that each person nurture this spark because it is the very thing that differentiates us from our neighbours. In the *Epistles* Seneca refers to this process as man's rationality and by describing man as a 'rational animal' (41). What this means is that it is our ability to reason and to develop this divine spark makes us different from and superior to an animal. Another point that he implies in his philosophy is that one must tolerate a neighbour's particular divine spark.

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[29] Oates [9] 50.

[30] Latham [26] 96.

[31] Timothy [7] 48.

[32] Timothy [7] 42.

[33] Timothy [7] 42.

[34] Timothy [7] 48.

Therefore we can see that the theories of Epicurus and Lucretius differ greatly from those of Seneca and the Stoics regarding what makes up the universe and what controls it. Epicurus and his adherents tend towards a form of atheism and naturalism, while Seneca and his followers show themselves to be somewhat religious in the sense of expounding upon a god who exists and controls all matter in the universe yet upholding man's rational qualities as possessing some aspects of the divine.

4

On a fundamental level, the two rival schools of philosophy in ancient Greece and Rome appear to have very similar bases of thought. Stoicism argues for pursuit of the highest virtue, while Epicureanism advocates a life of pleasure. While the philosophies of Seneca and of Epicurus may agree on some points and disagree on others, this does not necessarily mean that the two schools of thought are strongly opposed. Seneca himself says that he is bound by no particular philosophy: 'Am I . . . a follower of none of my predecessors [Stoics]? On the contrary. I do, however, give myself leave to discover something new, to alter, to reject. While giving them my approval, I am not enslaved to them (*Ep.* 80.1.7-10).[35] While Seneca agrees with the Stoics more than any other school, many of his theories agree with Epicureanism and not with Stoicism. The views of Seneca and Epicurus attempt to define what constitutes a human being, what motivates his actions, and what these actions should be to live a full life. If one looks at it from this broad perspective one can see that these philosophers and their schools do not really view the universe in a vastly different way, but rather they display divergent views on the randomness of the universe and on the nature of the gods.

[35] Timothy [7] 118.

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

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







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224 pp. (2001) Paperback, ISBN 0-86516-487-8

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





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1000 Brown St., Unit 101, Wauconda, IL 60084
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