SCHOLIA

Studies in Classical Antiquity

Editor: W. J. Dominik

NS Vol. 12 / 2003

New Zealand / South Africa
Scholia features critical and pedagogical articles and reviews on a diverse range of subjects dealing with classical antiquity, including late antique, medieval, Renaissance and early modern studies related to the classical tradition; in addition, there is news about museums and articles on classical artefacts in museums in New Zealand and the J. A. Barsby Essay.

Manuscripts: Potential contributors should read the ‘Notes for Contributors’ located at the back of this volume and follow the suggested guidelines for the submission of manuscripts. Articles on the classical tradition and the teaching of Classics are particularly welcome. Submissions are usually reviewed by two referees. Time before publication decision: 2-3 months.

Subscriptions (2004): Individuals: North America, Europe and Asia USD25/NZD50; Australasia and South America NZD40; Africa NZD20. Libraries and institutions: North America, Europe and Asia USD40/NZD80; Australasia and South America NZD60; Africa NZD30. Institutional and personal cheques should be made out to ‘Scholia/University of Otago’. Credit card payments are preferred; please use the credit card authorisation at the back of this volume. Foreign subscriptions cover air mail postage and bank charges on institutional and personal cheques. Payments from Africa, however, must be made with an international bank draft or by credit card in New Zealand currency because of foreign exchange regulations in many countries. After initial payment, a subscription to the journal will be entered. All back numbers are available at a reduced price and may be ordered from the Business Manager.

Editing and Managing Address: Articles and subscriptions: W. J. Dominik, Editor and Manager, Scholia, Department of Classics, University of Otago, P. O. Box 56, Dunedin 9015, New Zealand. Telephone: +64 (0)3 479.8710; facsimile: +64 (0)3 479.9029; electronic mail: william.dominik@stonebow.otago.ac.nz.

Reviews Address: Review articles and reviews: J. L. Hilton, Reviews Editor, Scholia, Programme in Classics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041, South Africa. Telephone: +27 (0)31 260.2312; facsimile: +27 (0)31 260.2698; electronic mail: hilton@ukzn.ac.za.

New Series: Scholia is indexed and abstracted in L’Année Philologique, indexed in Gnomon and TOCS-IN, and listed in Ulrich’s International Periodicals Directory. The contents of Scholia and information about the journal are available on the world wide web at http://www.otago.ac.nz/classics/scholia. Faxed copies of articles and other sections of Scholia are available through UnCover; photocopies are available from the British Library Document Supply Centre (BLDSC no. 8092.54348). Scholia Reviews, an electronic journal that features the pre-publication versions of reviews that appear in Scholia, is available on the world wide web at http://www.classics.und.ac.za/reviews.

Cover Illustration: Drawing by E. A. Mackay (University of Auckland) based on an Attic black-figure fragment (inv. L.1989.K) in the Museum of Classical Archaeology, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban (on permanent loan from A. Gosling).

Typesetting: W. J. Dominik, S. Pedersen, C. Harper

Printing: Otago University Print Copyright: Otago/KwaZulu-Natal Classics 2004
### SCHOLIA

*Studies in Classical Antiquity*

ISSN 1018-9017

### EDITORIAL COMMITTEE (2002-03)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W. J. Dominik (Otago)</td>
<td>Editor and Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. L. Hilton (KwaZulu-Natal)</td>
<td>Reviews Editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. A. Hannah</td>
<td>In the Museum Editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. C. R. Hall</td>
<td>J. A. Barsby Essay Editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O. J. Banks, S. Pedersen, C. Harper</td>
<td>Assistant Editors / Assistant Business Managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Pedersen, B. Knowles, C. Harper</td>
<td>Web Site Managers (Otago)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. J. Ryan</td>
<td>Web Site Manager (KwaZulu-Natal)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD (2002-03)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J. E. Atkinson</td>
<td>University of Cape Town, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. A. Barsby</td>
<td>University of Otago, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. F. Basson</td>
<td>University at Buffalo, State University of New York, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. J. Blyth</td>
<td>University of Auckland, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. P. Bond</td>
<td>University of Canterbury, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Calboli</td>
<td>University of Bologna, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. G. Christiansen</td>
<td>Texas Tech University, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. M. Claassen</td>
<td>University of Stellenbosch, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Davidson</td>
<td>Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. J. Davis</td>
<td>University of Tasmania, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. S. Dietrich</td>
<td>University of Tasmania, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. A. Frangoulidis</td>
<td>University of Crete, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. A. Gallivan</td>
<td>University of Tasmania, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Garthwaite</td>
<td>University of Otago, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Gosling</td>
<td>University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. N. A. Hankey</td>
<td>University of Otago, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Hannah</td>
<td>University of Otago, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. G. W. Henderson</td>
<td>University of Cambridge, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. J. Henderson</td>
<td>Rand Afrikaans University, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. E. Izzet</td>
<td>University of Cambridge, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. B. Jackson</td>
<td>University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Konstan</td>
<td>Brown University, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. P. P. Kytzler</td>
<td>University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. A. Mackay</td>
<td>University of Auckland, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. W. Marshall</td>
<td>University of British Columbia, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. C. Montefusco</td>
<td>University of Bologna, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. T. Newmyer</td>
<td>Duquesne University, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. J. Pomeroy</td>
<td>Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. V. Ronnick</td>
<td>Wayne State University, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. A. Sussman</td>
<td>University of Florida, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. M. W. Tennant</td>
<td>University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Thom</td>
<td>University of Stellenbosch, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. A. Whitaker</td>
<td>University of Cape Town, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. V. Wheatley</td>
<td>University of Queensland, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. J. Williams</td>
<td>Queen’s University, Belfast, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. J. Wilson</td>
<td>University of Auckland, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Worthington</td>
<td>University of Missouri, Columbia, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. V. Zadorojnyi</td>
<td>University of Liverpool, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

Editorial Note 1

ARTICLES

Sophocles’ Philoctetes and Odyssey 9: Odysseus Versus the Cave Man 3
Daniel B. Levine

Moral Decisions in Homer 27
Stuart E. Lawrence

Locating Power: Spatial Signs of Social Ranking in Homer and the 34
Tale of the Heike
Naoko Yamagata

‘Self’ and ‘Other’: The Ideology of Assimilation in Vergil’s Aeneid 45
James Allan Evans

Impius Aeneas, Impia Hypsipyle: Narrazioni menzognere dall’Eneide alla 60
Tebaide di Stazio
Sergio Casali

Der Regenbogen der Gefühle: Zum Kontrast der Empfindungen im antiken Roman 69
Bernhard Kytzler

Apuleius, Qui Nobis Afris Afer Est Notior: Augustine’s Polemic Against Apuleius 82
in De Civitate Dei
Vincent Hunink

Nautical and Marine Imagery in the Panegyrics of Eustathios of Thessaloniki 96
Andrew F. Stone
REVIEW ARTICLES

War as Addiction
K. Raaflaub and N. Rosenstein (edd.), *War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds: Asia, the Mediterranean, Europe, and Mesoamerica* (Tom Stevenson) 114

Literature and Religion in the Roman Empire

The Economics of Poetry
Phebe Lowell Bowditch, *Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage* (Suzanne Sharland) 124

Genre in Ancient Greek and Latin Literature
Mary Depew and Dirk Obbink (edd.), *Matrices of Genre: Authors, Canons, and Society* (Philip Bosman) 130

The Comic Tradition
Erich Segal, *The Death of Comedy* (Betine van Zyl Smit) 134

The Death of Oratory?
Roland Mayer (ed.), *Tacitus: Dialogus de Oratoribus* (William J. Dominik) 140

Reviews 145

Books Received 165

In the Museum 168

J. A. Barsby Essay 184

Exchanges with Scholia 192

Notes for Contributors 193

Forthcoming in *Scholia* 13 (2004) 196

Subscription Form 197
EDITORIAL NOTE

Scholia continues to expand its presence on the internet and is increasingly being listed on the web sites of libraries, departments, bibliographical indices and journals. A sole example of this is the citation of all Scholia articles in Le Bulletin Analytique d'Histoire Romaine, a printed publication appearing annually that lists all articles that touch upon Roman history; an electronic data base of such articles can be found at http://mishal.u-strasbg.fr/ANTIQUITE. The new Scholia web site, which can easily be searched and found at http://www.otago.ac.nz/classics/scholia, contains not only information about the journal but also the contents of all volumes except for the most recently printed volume. The web site has a link to the electronic journal Scholia Reviews, which features not only the pre-publication versions of reviews that appear in Scholia but additional reviews; these can be located at the University of KwaZulu-Natal web site at http://www.classics.und.ac.za/reviews.

Scholia 12 (2003) features articles written in English, German and Italian on Greek literature and Latin literature, including late antiquity and the medieval period, by scholars from New Zealand, Australia, United States, Canada, South Africa, Netherlands and Italy. It features the second In the Museum section containing news about classical museums in New Zealand and articles on classical artefacts in museums. This volume's 'In the Museum' section highlights a number of new Attic and Apulian vases received on loan by the James Logie Memorial Collection at the University of Canterbury. Information about classical exhibitions and artefacts in New Zealand museums and collections is welcome and should reach the In the Museum Editor by 1 September.

This volume also includes the 2003 J. A. Barsby Essay, which is the paper judged to be the best student essay in New Zealand submitted to Scholia by 1 September 2003. The winning essay has been composed by Graham Day (University of Auckland) and is entitled 'Cyrus the Great: Was He a Real Threat to the Development of Greece'? The runner-up essay, 'Why Were Gladiatorial Games So


3 See pp. 168-83.

4 See pp. 184-91.
Popular in Roman Society?’, was written by Karen Pickford (University of Otago), and the third-place essay was composed by Sean McConnell (University of Otago). Entries for the 2003 competition were received from the universities of Auckland, Canterbury, Massey, Otago and Victoria of Wellington. The competition was adjudicated by Robin Bond (University of Canterbury), Dougal Blyth (University of Auckland) and Matthew Trundle (Victoria University, Wellington). Scholia expresses its appreciation not only to the adjudicators and contributors but also to the Classical Association of Otago for sponsoring the prize of NZD100.

The J. A. Barsby Essay competition, which is sponsored by the Classical Association of Otago, invites entries from undergraduate students every year and entries from fourth-year students in even-numbered years. Therefore essays submitted for the 2004 competition should have been completed for first-, second-, third-, and fourth-year courses. Essays may deal with any area of Classical Studies but should not exceed 3000 words. The author of the winning essay should be prepared to edit her or his paper so that it conforms to the ‘Notes for Contributors’ set out at the back of this volume and on the web site at http://www.otago.ac.nz/classics/scholia/contributorsnotes.html.

William J. Dominik
Editor, Scholia
Abstract. Sophocles’ *Philoctetes* alludes to the *Odyssey*’s Cyclops scene structurally, verbally, and thematically. The play examines the cave man’s defeat by a clever antagonist in the context of savagery versus civilization and other common elements. It suggests that Sophocles invites his audience to sympathize with the unhappy Philoctetes, while simultaneously comparing and contrasting him with the monstrous Polyphemus. The parallelism underlines Philoctetes’ pitiable condition.

Introduction

Tragedy’s debt to epic is deep, as Aeschylus’ dictum that his plays were merely scraps from Homer’s banquet testifies (Ath. 8.347E).¹ Sophocles’ debt to the Homeric poems was no less, as observers have noted from antiquity to the present.² Sophocles’ *Philoctetes*, specifically, has had its share of analysis

---

¹ The author presented earlier versions of this paper in 1992 at the annual meeting of the Classical Association of the Middle West and South (Austin), and at the University of Cincinnati. He is grateful for his colleagues’ generous help, in particular, John Davidson, Dave Fredrick, Don Lateiner, Rick Newton, Christine Panas, and the editor and manuscript referees of *Scholia*. Special thanks also to Bernie Fenik, in whose Sophocles course the roots of this paper lie.

² Ath. 7.277E: ἔξωρε δὲ Σοφοκλῆς τὸ ἐπίκων κύκλω, ὡς καὶ ἄλλα δράματα ποιήσαι κατακολούθων τῇ ἐν τούτῳ μυθοποιίᾳ (“Sophocles took pleasure in the epic cycle, so as to write all of his plays emulating the μυθοποιία [myth-making] in it.”). The ancient *Life of Sophocles* is more emphatic: τὸ πᾶν μὲν ὄνομα ὃμηρικῶς ὄνομαζε, τοὺς τε γὰρ μῦθους φέρει κατ’ ἵχνος τοῦ ποιητοῦ καὶ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν δὲ ἐν πολλοῖς δράμασιν ἀπογράφεται (“He spoke of everything in a Homeric way. For he both brings the μῦθοι [myths] right on the track of the poet, and he represents the *Odyssey* in many plays,” *Sophoclis Vita* 20 [S. Radt (ed.), *TrGF* 4 (1985) 39f.]). J. F. Davidson (“Sophocles and the *Odyssey*,” *Mnemosyne* 47 (1994) 375-79) has investigated and explicated this section of the *Vita*. For an opposing ancient view, see Longinus *On the Sublime* 13.3, who does not include Sophocles as one of the “most Homeric” of writers, instead listing Herodotus, Stesichorus, Archilochus, and Plato. Modern comments: B. M. W. Knox, *The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy* (Berkeley 1964) 52: “Sophocles might have taken for himself the Aeschylean claim”; C. R. Beye, “Sophocles’ *Philoctetes* and the Homeric Embassy,” *TAPhA* 101 (1970) 63: Sophocles is “the most Homeric of the tragedians”; in general, see S. Goldhill,
vis-à-vis the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Beye points out that *Philoctetes* suggests parallels with the embassy scene in *Iliad* 9. Fuqua has shown that the Sophoclean Neoptolemus has much in common with the Odyssean Telemachus. Greengard shows how the "*Odyssey* is an important literary precursor and referent for *Philoctetes*," and Segal makes comparisons between *Philoctetes* and the Cyclopes. Garner suggests that *Philoctetes* contains some reference to the Polyphemus scene in the *Odyssey* (9.105-566). Davidson points out that *Philoctetes* recalls Odyssean patterns, especially in regard to landscape, caves, sleep, seashore, animals, nymphs, and young men and bows. He concludes that there is "a considerable verbal and situational correspondence between the *Odyssey* and the *Philoctetes*," the purpose of which "would appear to be to highlight the ironic perversity of Odysseus' mission to Lemnos and his alienating behavior in the course of it, the injustices inflicted on Philoctetes, and the appropriateness of Neoptolemus' resolution of his conflict of loyalties."

Whitby stresses Sophocles' general debt to Homeric epic, and outlines similarities between Sophocles' Neoptolemus and the Odyssean Telemachus, and sees the *Odyssey* and *Philoctetes* as "parallel texts." She sees Sophocles' use of Homer as an enhancement of key themes of the play, such as fathers and sons, truth and falsehood. She notes that the Odysseus of Homer and Sophocles each visit "a cave-dwelling sub-human foe . . . and urges lying tales upon his protégé."

While Davidson notes several specific parallels between the *Philoctetes* and *Odyssey* 9 (especially in respect to landscape and caves), his general observations tend to associate the characters Philoctetes and Odysseus.  

---


Garner does not see a deep connection between the two works: "But even here Sophocles has been sparing: no striking hapax word, for example, which might be associated specifically with the Cyclops episode, occurs in Philoctetes." Garner shows that Sophocles uses four words that occur in the epic scene, and then states: "But the elliptic style Sophocles has chosen for Philoctetes provides nothing beyond these early hints at comparisons with Polyphemus." He concludes: "Sophocles merely drops the allusion into the surface of his play and allows the implications to ripple, if they will, across the following scenes."11

This paper's thesis is that the play and the epic scene are much more closely tied than is generally acknowledged: Sophocles' Philoctetes and the Cyclops scene in Odyssey 9 share a basic structure, involving a primitive "cave man's" defeat by a clever antagonist in the context of the motif of Savagery versus Civilization.12 Sophocles' debt to this epic mythos is deeper than a few hints and surface allusions. Not only are there many more verbal parallels than Garner points out, but there exist numerous identical structures that go beyond simple parallels, allusions, and imitations. Sophocles has not merely imitated some superficial elements of this traditional Homeric material; rather, he uses the basic elements of the Cyclops scene—and the myth on which it is based—as background and coloring for his tragedy. Sophocles uses allusion as Marshall describes it: "Properly effected, allusion functions as a built-in footnote to the earlier passage, and the audience, or a segment of it, is aware (in some sense) of both texts simultaneously. The audience, aware of the former text, re-contextualizes the present passage in, with, and through that light."13 This paper suggests that Sophocles invites his audience to remember the Odyssean Cyclops scene while viewing his Philoctetes. They are to think of the monster Polyphemus who must be defeated, and yet are constantly reminded of the unhappy Philoctetes and the need to pity him.

Common Structural and Verbal Elements

We may summarize the structural and verbal elements which Philoctetes shares with the Polyphemus episode in Odyssey 9 as follows. Odysseus and companions sail from Troy, landing at an island without people, where wild

---


animals, hunted by bows, provide food. They find a spring below a cave, which is near the shore and high above its surroundings. The cave’s inhabitant is absent while Odysseus (planning to get something from the cave dweller) insists on proceeding, contrary to his companions’ opposition. He posts a guard while the cave is examined. The men await its inhabitant, who soon returns.

The resident of the cave lives alone and has no use of ships. He is a wild man, whose companions are shaggy animals, to whom he talks, and which he expects to commiserate with his pitiable condition. The cave’s inhabitant suffers from a hot, crippling, bloody wound, but is still a formidable adversary, who threatens Odysseus and his men with deadly missiles, which they successfully avoid. He blames Odysseus for his unhappy lot. He groans in the pain of his agony; his voice is heavy, and when he cries, his surroundings echo the sound. He asks the strangers who they are, and whence they come. The strangers, who consist of a single hero and a group of sailors, reply that they are Greeks sailing back from Troy. The main body of the men remains behind with the ship. Although the adversaries are superficially host and guest, the relationship is ironical. The leader of the expedition begins his account truthfully, but then mixes lies into his story. His ruse is characterized as a trick, and specifically contrasted with outright force. Sleep seizes the cave man at a critical moment, leaving him vulnerable as he falls asleep lying face up. The interlopers take a weapon from their sleeping adversary, resulting in his great misery. When he awakes, he reacts with anguish, and standing on the edge of a cliff, curses the departing Odysseus, praying that he perish miserably. Odysseus, leaving, taunts his foe.

Discussion: Philoctetes and Odyssey 9

The above summary, of necessity, conflates much. The Odyssean descriptions include both “Goat Island” and the mainland home of the Cyclopes. The temporal sequence of individual elements is not the same in epic and drama: Philoctetes gets his wound years before the play opens, whereas the Cyclops is blinded at the end of the tale in the Homeric version. Such “logical” inconsistencies might bother modern sensibilities; an ancient audience would presumably notice the Homeric resonance without worrying about the strict order of time or place. In addition, Neoptolemus and Odysseus both serve as

---

14 Sophocles might be attempting to compensate for this difference with a re-creation of Philoctetes’ wounding, when the hero goes into a paroxysm of pain and unconsciousness (730-826).
the adversary of the cave man in Philoctetes.\textsuperscript{15} It is generally acknowledged that Sophocles intentionally makes an Odysseus out of his agent Neoptolemus;\textsuperscript{16} the young man—as an actor on stage—at first does exactly what his director Odysseus tells him to do, and even reflects the language of his master.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, Sophocles emphasizes Neoptolemus' Odysseus-like character by means of prosody. Newman has pointed out that Sophocles uses meter to underscore the personalities of the characters in Philoctetes,\textsuperscript{18} and shows how Neoptolemus’ speech is metrically similar to Odysseus’ as long as he is under his influence. When Neoptolemus becomes loyal to Philoctetes, his speech contains four times more resolutions, bringing it into closer conformity with Philoctetes’ highly resolved emotional language. Although the youth eventually breaks free of Odysseus’ influence,\textsuperscript{19} Sophocles shows how the Ithacan succeeds—temporarily—in re-making Neoptolemus in his own image.

The structural and verbal similarities between the two works often serve to point out a major difference in outlook. Sophocles, alluding to the Odyssey, emphasizes the pity we are to feel for Philoctetes’ suffering, by the implicit contrast between his situation and that of the Cyclops. Bad things happen to Polyphemus; Philoctetes suffers worse. Pity for Philoctetes is a central theme in

\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, W. M. Calder III, “Sophoclean Apologia: Philoctetes,” \textit{GRBS} 12 (1971) 153-74 has even proposed that Neoptolemus, more than Odysseus, is the “arch deceiver” of the play, which I find an attractive hypothesis, since it ties his role more closely to that of Odysseus in both \textit{Philoctetes} and \textit{Odyssey} 9.

\textsuperscript{16} A. J. Podlecki, “The Power of the Word in Sophocles’ \textit{Philoctetes},” \textit{GRBS} 7 (1966) 244: Odysseus makes Neoptolemus “a copy of himself.” Blundell has pointed out both that the chorus at the parodos stands “in the same relationship to him as he does to Odysseus,” and that it uses ὅπουργειν (“to render service”) for its role, as it is used of Neoptolemus’. M. W. Blundell, \textit{Helping Friends and Harming Enemies; A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics} (Cambridge 1989) 193 and n. 37.

\textsuperscript{17} I. Lada-Richards, “Staging the Ephebeia: Theatrical Role-Playing and Ritual Transition in Sophocles’ \textit{Philoctetes},” \textit{Ramus} 27 (1998) 1-26 speaks of Odysseus as Neoptolemus’ “stage-director” (3) for this “play within the play” (7). The role Odysseus asks Neoptolemus to play is the persona of the “Odyssean” Neoptolemus” (16).

Similar language: see the contexts of Neoptolemus’ repetitions of Odysseus’ words: ἀκε (“always”) 131, 148; φορβής (“fodder”) 43, 162; Ἀχιλλέως παῖς (“son of Achilles”) 57, 240f.; οἶκον (“home”) 58, 240.


Sophocles' play,\textsuperscript{20} forms of οἰκτος ("pity," "compassion") and ἔλεος ("pity," "compassion") occur sixteen times to describe the castaway.\textsuperscript{21} By comparing Philoctetes and Polyphemus, Sophocles stresses the hero's pitiable plight, in contrast to the feelings of fear and revulsion the audience would naturally have towards Polyphemus.\textsuperscript{22}

We may now discuss the individual elements of the tale. Some of the parallels adduced here may not be meaningful in themselves, given the situations present in the epic and the tragedy. For instance, it makes sense for "strangers" to be called ξένοι, for "islands" to be called νῆσοι, and for Philoctetes and Polyphemus to ask who their visitors are. The individual elements, however, do not stand alone. Taken together, the common words and structures show that Sophocles' play actively alludes to the Cyclops scene of Odyssey 9.

1. Odysseus and his Greek companions sail from Troy and land at an island (νῆσος) without people, where wild animals, hunted by bows (τόξα), provide food.

The Odyssean Cyclops episode begins at 9.106: Κυκλώπων δ' ἐς γαῖαν ὑπερφύλαον ἀθεμίστων, / ἵκόμεθ' ("And we arrived at the land of the overbearing and lawless Cyclopes.").\textsuperscript{23} The island on which Odysseus and his men land is uninhabited; it is close to the coast of the Cyclopes' land. From here Odysseus and his men approach the cave of Polyphemus (9.116-80). Odysseus describes this island as inhabited only by wild animals; there is no tread of men, nor is it visited by hunters, shepherds or farmers (9.119-24). Odysseus and his men kill some wild goats, using bows (τόξα, 156) and javelins. They feast and drink abundant wine (161-65).

In Philoctetes' speech to Neoptolemus outlining his condition (246-315), the abandoned hero tells how his companions left him on Lemnos, where there was not a single man (280f.). He says that he feeds himself by killing doves with his bow (τόξον τόδ', 287-90). Sophocles replaces goats with birds. In


\textsuperscript{21} Philoctetes 186, 227, 308, 468, 502, 507, 756, 870, 930, 964, 968, 1042, 1043, 1074, 1130, 1167. On the importance of οἰκτος and πάθος in the play, see Lada-Richards [17] 7-11.

\textsuperscript{22} Greengard [5] 83.

\textsuperscript{23} The Odyssey does not specify whether the Cyclopes live on an island or on the mainland. C. S. Byrne "The Rhetoric of Description in Odyssey 9.116-41: Odysseus and Goat Island," CJ 89 (1994) 361 does not allow that the arrival at the island is part of the "Cyclops Scene" proper, in spite of the introduction of Od. 9.106f.
contrast with the Odyssean heroes, Philoctetes has no opportunity to enjoy a
drink of wine; he can only make his painful way to a stagnant pool for a drink
(715f.). Philoctetes says that no sailor willingly comes there, for there is no
anchorage, nor any place where a ship might approach. Those who do land
there by accident are soon on their way, leaving Philoctetes alone (300-13).

2. They find a spring (κρήνη) below a cave.

When Odysseus’ men come to the island, they find at the head of a harbor a
spring below a cave (9.140f.). This parallels Sophocles’ play when Odysseus
tells Neoptolemus where to seek the cave of Philoctetes (15-21). The hero tells
the youth to look for the two-mouthed cave, and a little below on the left, he
says: βαιών δ’ ἔνερθεν εξ ἀριστερᾶς τάχ’ ἄν / ἱδοις ποτόν κρηναῖον, εἰπερ ἐστὶ σῶν (“you might see the spring, if it is still flowing.” 20f.). By using the
optative, Sophocles has Odysseus doubt the spring’s continuing existence, and
by adding εἰπερ ἐστὶ σῶν (20), he stresses the contrast between the weak
trickle on Lemnos and the epic ἀγλαὸν ὄδωρ (“shining/splendid water”) of the
Odyssean spring. Thus, though Philoctetes’ surroundings match the cave/spring
combination in the Odyssey, the tragic hero’s situation is more pitiable by
contrast with the parallel epic scene.

3. The cave (ἀντρον, πέτρα) is close to the shore (ἐσχατ-) and “high” above
its surroundings.

When the heroes’ ship reaches the land of the Cyclopes, Polyphemus’ cave
comes into sight. Odysseus says: ἔνθεα δ’ ἐπ’ ἐσχατῇ σπέος εἰδομεν ἀγχιτ
θαλάσσης, / ὕψηλον, δάφνις κατηρεφές (“There at the shore [ἐπ’ ἐσχατῇ]
we saw a cavern near the sea, / high [ὕψηλον], with laurels growing all
around,” 9.182f.).

In the seashore opening of Philoctetes, when Neoptolemus finds the
cave, Odysseus asks whether it is above or below. Neoptolemus answers that it
is τοδ’ ἐξουπερθε (“high up,” 29). Neoptolemus tells the chorus that Philoctetes
dwells in a τόπον ἐσχατῶς, in Jebb’s translation, “the place on ocean’s verge”
(144). Both Jebb and Webster suggest that Sophocles’ thoughts were on

24 Segal [6] 300f. points out that the Homeric Cyclopes have wine, and that Philoctetes’
plight is “more striking as Lemnos from Homer on was famous for its wine.”

25 Segal [6] 359f. compares Philoctetes’ cave to the Cave of the Nymphs on Ithaca (Od.

Polyphemus’ cave when he chose this language. Garner also notes the use of this word in setting up a parallel between the Odyssean and Sophoclean scenes. Sophocles again emphasizes the cave’s seaside location when Philoctetes describes his life ἐπὶ ἀκτῆς ἐν καταρρεφεῖ πέτρᾳ (“in the shelter of a cave upon the shore,” 272). In addition to the insularity of Lemnos, the fact that he lives in a cave against his will also contributes to Philoctetes’ wretched state.

Caves in the Cyclops scene, and in the *Odyssey* as a whole, are not generally negative places. The Odyssean Cyclopes all live in caves (9.114, 400). Polyphemus’ cave is his home; it is spacious enough for his flocks (and their dung), for Odysseus’ men to hide in, and for his giant unfinished club (εὐρύ, “wide,” 9.237, 337; cf. 330). Polyphemus’ cave presumably suits him. It is not an unpleasant place. In the *Odyssey* the word σπέος (“cave”) is often formulaically used with the adjectives γλαφυρός (“hollow,” “deep”), μέγα (“great”), and εὐρύς. Calypso lives in such a deep place, where she and Odysseus make love (Od. 1.15; 5.57, 63, 68, 77, 155, 194, 226; Cf. 23.335). Polyphemus’ mother had lain with Poseidon in such a cave (1.73). Proteus, the Old Man of the Sea, sleeps in a hollow cave (4.403). In contrast, Philoctetes’ cave is his tiny shelter (286), the place where he gets out of the elements, but only barely. This dwelling is an οἰκουμένη στέγη (“inhabited hut,” 298). Convention does not allow Sophocles to use the epic word σπέος to describe Philoctetes’ cave; the word does not occur in extant tragedy. Rather, Sophocles calls the dwelling a πέτρα (“rock,” 16, 160, 272, 952, 1082, 1262) or ἄντρον (“cave,” 27, 1263). Polyphemus’ cave can be σπέος (182, 237, 337, 402, 447, 458), but is also repeatedly ἄντρον (9.216, 218, 235, 236, 298, 312, 407) and πέτρα (9.395, 243).

Borgeaud points out that civilized humanity does not dwell in caves, unless compelled. Such a description suits Philoctetes, who is rejected by his own kind and forced to live in primitive surroundings. Polyphemus, the rejecter of the laws of gods and man, is at home in his cave; Philoctetes, the

---

28 Garner [7] 147; Davidson [8] 28: “The cave of the Cyclops is not the only cave in the *Odyssey*, and there seems to be a strong case that Sophocles was making other Odyssean caves work for him as well in his presentation of the cave of Philoctetes which Odysseus arrives on Lemnos to locate.”
29 See also the caves of Circe (10.404, 424) and Scylla (12.80, 8493); and on Thrinakia (12.316-20), Ithaca (13.349, cf. 13.366, 367; 16.232), and Crete (19.188).
castoff from the Achaean army, is a wretched and unwilling cave man. This contrast emphasizes Philoctetes’ pitiable plight.

Polyphemus is a pastoralist, one who raises and consequently lives with animals. However, as Borgeaud points out, although shepherds use caves, none ever live in them: they live in huts nearby.\(^{32}\) Clay puts it clearly: “In the Odyssey, only subhuman (Scylla, Polyphemus) or superhuman (Calypso and the Nymphs) creatures make their homes in caves.”\(^{33}\) A cave is a natural place for the inhuman semi-divine Polyphemus to live, but Philoctetes’ dwelling represents an unfortunate man’s reduction to savage conditions against his will.

4. The cave’s inhabitant is absent. Odysseus, who plans to get something from the cave dweller, insists on proceeding with his plan, contrary to his companions’ opposition. He posts a guard (beside ship/cave) while the cave is examined. The men await (μεν) its inhabitant, who soon returns.

In the Odyssey, Odysseus orders his shipmates to guard the ship while he goes with twelve companions to explore (9.193-96). The party enters the Cyclops’ cave, but does not find him within. Odysseus’ companions beg him to leave with their booty of cheese, but he rejects their advice and stays in hopes of receiving guest gifts. The men eat and wait for Polyphemus (216-32).

The Sophoclean Odysseus, arrived from Troy, asks Neoptolemus if Philoctetes still dwells in the cave. The youth finds the cave and reports that its inhabitant is missing. Odysseus orders Neoptolemus to send a companion as watchman so that Philoctetes does not come upon them unawares (22-46). Neoptolemus expresses his distaste for deception, and urges that Odysseus adopt a more straightforward strategy. Odysseus does not yield to this argument, convinces Neoptolemus to accept his own approach, and tells Neoptolemus to wait for Philoctetes (86-123). The chorus discusses Philoctetes’ plight with Neoptolemus (135-291). The Sophoclean scene describes the difficult condition of the absent cave-dweller’s life, while the Odyssean scene emphasizes the fearsome nature of his lair. By playing on a reminiscence of Homer, Sophocles’ description is able to inspire both pity and fear in its fifth-century audience.

There is a further epic echo in Sophocles’ account. The Homeric Polyphemus is a shepherd, whom the waiting men observe returning to the cave with his flocks, and seeing to their needs (9.233-49). The chorus of Philoctetes

---


seems to refer to this image when it hears Philoctetes’ painful approach: οὗ μολπάν σύριγγος ἔχων, ὡς ποιμήν ἀγροβότας (“not like flute music as of a field-dwelling shepherd,” 213f.) Robinson calls these lines “a puzzle.” Why would the chorus use the expression “not piping like a shepherd” in discussing Philoctetes? Robinson suggests that the wounded man is dressed in skins: a shepherd’s guise.34 However, Sophocles’ text gives no indication that Philoctetes is so clothed. Rather, his dress is characterized by ῥάχη (“rags”). Neoptolemus observes those rags in the cave (39) and Philoctetes mentions the rags (274) left for him by his companions, and the (presumably woven) clothing (στολήν) which a passing mariner might donate (309). Indeed, if Sophocles’ audience is aware of the allusion to the Cyclops episode, an echo of Polyphemus’ pastoral profession in Sophocles’ play would be logical and expected.

5. The resident of the cave lives “alone” (οἶος / μόνος), “away from others” (ἄπ' ἄλλων).

Odysseus describes Polyphemus as a solitary character: he shepherds his animals alone, and far away, nor did he associate with his fellows, but he spent his time afoof (9.187-89). His very appearance was like a mountain peak “which appears alone, apart from the others” (ὁ τε φαίνεται οἶον ἄπ' ἄλλων, 9.192).

Sophocles’ Lemnos is deserted; its only inhabitant abandoned. Indeed, the chorus says that Philoctetes is always alone (172), and that he “lies alone, separate from the others” (κεῖται μοῦνος ἄπ' ἄλλων, 183). Not only are the words ἄπ' ἄλλων identical to the similar Homeric description, but the word οἶος is identical in meaning with μοῦνος, and the last two feet of each line are metrically equivalent: dactyl/spondee. Μοῦνος ἄπ' ἄλλων is an epic phrase (Hymn. Hom. 3.193, Od. 16.239).35 Sophocles’ apparent reflection of the Polyphemus episode seems intentional: the wounded hero, left by his companions, is like the isolated Cyclops, who lives a life away from his fellows, both before and after his mutilation. This status is voluntary for Polyphemus, but imposed on pitiful Philoctetes.

6. He has no use of ships (ναυα). 

Odysseus describes the isolation of the Cyclopes in the *Odyssey*, using the word "ship" four times in five lines to stress his point (*Od. 9.125-29*). The poet also emphasizes the excellence of the harbor at Goat Island, opposite the land of the Cyclopes, which is so calm that there is no need for cables or anchors (*9.136-39*).

Sophocles’ castaway bewails his isolated life. Philoctetes’ first speech stresses the uninhabited nature of his situation by emphasizing the fact that his part of Lemnos is specifically *not* what the anchorage at Goat Island is, specifically negating λιμήν εὔορμος (“harbor with good anchorage”) of *Odyssey* 9.136: οὔτε εὔορμον οὔτε οἰκουμένην (“neither endowed with a good anchorage nor inhabited,” 221). The chorus hears his groans before he enters and speculates that he is gazing at ναὸς ἄξενον ὄρμον (“the haven that hath no ship for guest,” 217).

The Cyclopes, with excellent anchorages near their land, are nevertheless without ships (and thus isolated) because they possess no knowledge of the craft; they do not miss what they do not have. Philoctetes lives on an island with such poor harbors that ships rarely stop there, though he wishes they would, to relieve his solitary misery. Such a contrast with the Odyssean Cyclopes increases pity for Philoctetes.

7. He is a “wild man” (ἀγριος), whose companions are shaggy (λάσιος) animals, to whom he talks. He expects them to commiserate with his pitiable condition.

Philoctetes and Polyphemus are both ἄγριος (“wild”), and associated with animals. The numerous goats on the island near the land of the Cyclopes are ἄγριαι (*Od. 9.119*). Odysseus hints that the Cyclopes might be wild as he ventures toward Polyphemus’ cave (175), and suspects that Polyphemus would be such a character (215), as indeed he turns out. In these latter two passages, “wild” is coupled with “unjust” (without dike). Finally, Odysseus’ companions are amazed when their captain antagonizes the wild monster as they leave: Σχέτλει, τίπτε ἐθέλεις ἐρεθίζειν ἄγριον ἄνδρα; (“You amazing creature, why do you wish to arouse a man who is ἄγριος?”), 494).

The adjective is also appropriate to Philoctetes. He lives alone with animals on Lemnos, an island that Ares in the *Odyssey* describes as the home of

---

36 Tr. Jebb [26].

37 Davidson [8] 27 notes the contrast, and compares Scheria.
the Sintians, who are ἀγριος in their speech (Od. 8.294). In the play’s prologue Odysseus speaks of the ἀγριος cries with which Philoctetes filled the camp of the Achaeans on that same island (9). Philoctetes’ first words to Neoptolemus are a warning not to shrink in fear from his appearance, which is wild (226). At play’s end, cheated and threatened, he mistrusts everyone, even Neoptolemus, who notes that he has become ἀγριος (1321). The word describes Sophocles’ protagonist in voice, visage, and character, although it was not part of his original nature. Philoctetes had become wild; the Cyclops Polyphemus was always so. The contrast favors sympathy for the abandoned hero who has lost his humanity.

Animals are the normal companions of both Polyphemus and Philoctetes, and objects of their speech. The Cyclops as shepherd is surrounded by sheep during his daily routine (Od. 9.188, 217, 237-39, 308, 315, 336-42, 425f.). He is particularly fond of his large ram, whom he speaks to with affection (9.447-60), not knowing that Odysseus is hiding beneath, clinging to its “shaggy” (λάσιος, 433) belly.

The parodos of Philoctetes introduces the inhabitant of Lemnos as lonely, having only shaggy wild animals as his companions: λασίον μετὰ θηρῶν (184f.). Sophocles has taken the theme of the wounded man speaking to an animal and developed it with rhetorical elaboration. Philoctetes addresses creeks, promontories, his ξυνοσίας θηρῶν ὑρείων (“companion-wild mountain beasts”), and cliffs (936-38). He calls on his cave (951), and his volcanic island home (987). He addresses his hands (1004) and his bow (1128). He speaks to the birds who, he says, may fly near unafraid and even attack him, since Odysseus has taken his bow (1146-61). Philoctetes addresses his foot (1188), and his last words are a final farewell to his cave, the nearby spring, and Lemnos itself (1452-68). The isolation of Philoctetes makes more pitiable his invocations of his non-human surroundings. Polyphemus has only

38 Greengard [5] 56: “Odysseus’, and consequently the chorus’ expectation of a wild and inhospitable savage reinforces the suggestiveness of the setting in preparing the way for the entrance of a shaggy Cyclopean figure.”

39 On Philoctetes as being savage in relation to the gods as well, see Segal [6] 315f.

40 Λάσιος is a hapax in Sophocles.

41 The fact that by the fifth century the Cyclopes were associated with the volcanic region around Mt. Aetna makes the Sophoclean references to the Lemnian volcano (800, 987) possible referrers to the Cyclopes. Greengard [5] 56 n. 32; Segal [6] 308-10; A. Scarth, “Volcanic Origins of the Polyphemus Story in the Odyssey: A Non-Classicist’s Interpretation,” CW 83 (1989) 89-95.

42 Greengard [5] 40 observes that Philoctetes’ words to his surroundings represent “erotic” poetic language.
his ram to console him; Philoctetes has his own body and natural surroundings. Their addresses to these silent interlocutors emphasize their closeness to the non-human and their solitary suffering. However, we should note that Polyphemus and his domesticated flocks take care of each other, while the animals on Lemnos are Philoctetes’ adversaries: he must struggle against wild nature in a hard life.

8. The cave’s inhabitant suffers from a hot (thēμ-) crippling, bloody wound (αίμα-).

As Odysseus and his men turn the stake in the monster’s eye, “blood [αίμα] flowed around the hot [thēμόν] stake” (τὸν δ’ αίμα περίρρεε θερμόν ἐόντα, Od. 9.388). When the Cyclops pulls the olive-wood pole from his eye, it is stained with much blood (397).

Sophocles’ castaway also has a bloody wound—of long standing—and appears in a much more sympathetic light than his Homeric counterpart. The members of the chorus sing of the hard lot of Philoctetes, who had harmed no one, but was unworthily left to die (676-85). How, they wonder, could he deal with his loneliness and his flesh-eating and bloody wound (695)? Nobody comforted him when his blood flowed hot from his foot (θερμόταταν αίμαδα, 697). Furthermore, they say, his life was made more miserable by the fact that for ten years he had not enjoyed the taste of wine, but drank only whatever standing water he could find (714-17). Here Sophocles makes an effective contrast between the wounded Cyclops—filled with wine from Odysseus—and the wounded castaway who had not had a drop for ten years. The sympathy for the starving cripple increases when held up against his drunken prototype in the Odyssey, who possessed wine even before the arrival of the Achaeans (357-59). In addition, Sophocles seems to improve on his model further and increase sympathy for his hero when referring to the heat of Philoctetes’ wound. Whereas Polyphemus’ blood flows around the “hot” (θερμόν) stake in his eye, Sophocles chooses the superlative: Philoctetes’ bloody ooze is θερμόταταν (“very hot,” 697).

Philoctetes’ speech to Neoptolemus (1348-72) contains an allusion to the Cyclopes and blinding. Philoctetes wonders how he will be able to see and be seen by the sons of Atreus: πῶς, ὃ τὰ πάντ’ ἱδόντες ἀμαρ’ ἐμοὶ κύκλοι, ταὐτ’ ἔξανασχήσασθε . . . (“How, o eyes of mine [ἐμοὶ κύκλοι] which have seen everything, will you bear these things . . .?”, 1354f.). The association between the word κύκλοι and the Cyclopes is reinforced with the reference to

seeing and not seeing. The plural use of this word referring to eyes occurs twice elsewhere in Sophocles, both times in relation to blinding. Sophocles uses κύκλοι in Antigone (974) in the context of the blinding of the sons of Phineus, and in Oedipus Tyrannus 1270, when the messenger tells how Oedipus put out “his own eyes” (τὼν αύτῶν κύκλων).

The Antigone and Oedipus parallels with Philoctetes 1354 suggest that Sophocles associated the word κύκλοι (eyes) with blinding, and thus an association with Odyssey 9’s blinding of Polyphemus gains strength, especially considering the possibility that Sophocles chooses the term κύκλοι because it reminds him of the Κύκλωψ blinded by Odysseus.

9. However, he is still a formidable adversary, capable of inflicting terrible punishment on Odysseus and his men, who for their part are careful to avoid his deadly missiles (βέλος).

In Odyssey 9, βάλλω (“throw”) and βέλος (“bolt”) describe Polyphemus’ attempts to sink Odysseus’ ship. He throws down the top of a great mountain (Od. 9.482), and causes Odysseus’ men to beg their leader not to further arouse the monster, who had just endangered their ship by throwing his bolt (495). If he had heard any of them speaking, they say, the monster would have killed them all, casting at them with a jagged stone (497-99). Finally, Polyphemus throws a much larger stone, driving the ship to shore (539-42).

In Philoctetes, Odysseus tells Neoptolemus that Philoctetes’ shafts are irresistible and death-dealing (105); these weapons alone will take Troy (113). Neoptolemus echoes Odysseus, telling the chorus that Philoctetes is destined to wield irresistible shafts of the gods against Troy (197). Philoctetes himself says that using (βάλλων) his bow he is able to hit (βάλλοι) birds that he must laboriously recover (289). He reiterates this when addressing the birds in despair when his shafts are no longer available to him (1151). Neoptolemus eventually offers the βέλη back to Philoctetes (1287), who immediately threatens to send a βέλος against Odysseus (1299), while Neoptolemus holds him and orders him not to shoot (1300). Still, the threat of Philoctetes’ bolt was enough to frighten Odysseus away. When Neoptolemus fears that the Achaeans will punish him for taking Philoctetes safely home, the bowman confidently promises to protect his young friend against them all with the shafts of Heracles (1406).

Polyphemus’ missiles are fearful, dangerous and crude; they cause great consternation, but do not strike their mark. Philoctetes’ shafts are also deadly—and unerring. However, he never gets the chance to use them against his enemies. The contrast between the two evokes pity for Philoctetes: he can
kill birds with his weapons, but must drag himself to where they fall. He is prohibited from using his unerring weapons against those whom he hates. Polyphemus’ βέλη also fail to kill his tormentors, but he at least has the chance in his wrath to cast twice against Odysseus. Philoctetes’ impotence in this regard is striking: possessed of his weapons and face to face with Odysseus, he is prevented by Neoptolemus from sending even a single shaft against his foe.

Polyphemus is no Bowman, but it is of interest to note that Odysseus compares the Cyclops’ closing of his cave with the giant rock to the ease of a Bowman putting a cover on a quiver (Od. 9.314). The epic thus possibly implies that Odysseus already had Philoctetes in mind when he relates the Cyclops story to Alcinous and his court, for Odysseus refers to Philoctetes before beginning the Apologoi. Victorious over the Phaeacians in the discus contest, Odysseus challenges the islanders to other contests, and boasts in particular of his prowess with the bow: εὖ μὲν τὸξον οἶδα ἐξουσίαν ἀμφιθαλασσεῖς . . . οἷς δὴ μὲ Φιλοκτήτης ἀπεκαίνυτο τόξῳ / δὴμῳ ἐνι Ῥώσῳν, ὅτε τοξοίμεθ᾽ Ἀχαιῶν ("I know well how to hold the well-polished bow . . . indeed only Philoctetes surpassed me with the bow in the land of the Trojans, when we Achaeans shot our bows there," 8.215-20). Odysseus, whose own skill with the bow would play such a major role in recovering his throne on Ithaca, thinks of Philoctetes before telling the story of Polyphemus. It appears then that Sophocles’ play recalls both Odyssey 8 and 9, associating the deadly bolts of Philoctetes, Odysseus, and the Cyclops.44

10. He blames Odysseus for his pitiable condition.

When first blinded, Polyphemus tells the other Cyclopes that Outis has wounded him (Od. 9.408), and repeats this charge when speaking to his ram (455). When Odysseus reveals his real name (504), the Cyclops recalls a prophecy that had predicted such treatment at the hands of this very man (508-16). He tries to entice Odysseus back, but only receives insults in return (517-25). He thereupon asks his father Poseidon to destroy Odysseus and his men, and Poseidon heeds his prayer (528-36).

Just as the Homeric Odysseus takes credit for his deeds against the Cyclops, so also in Sophocles’ play Odysseus immediately takes credit for exposing the wounded Philoctetes on Lemnos (5). When Philoctetes introduces himself to Neoptolemus, he immediately identifies those who abandoned him:

44 Davidson [8] 34 speaks of the parallels between Philoctetes and Odysseus as bowmen: "It is still hard to believe that Sophocles’ original audience would fail to notice the inherent irony in the situation with regard to Odysseus’ efforts to gain possession of a crucial bow."
the twin generals and the lord of the Cephalenians (263ff.). His speeches continue full of loathing for Odysseus as the author of his (and Neoptolemus’ feigned) misfortunes (405-09, 429-39, 791ff., 1016ff., 1034). When Odysseus reappears, Philoctetes immediately identifies him as the one who took him and robbed him of his arms (979).

Both the Cyclops and Philoctetes charge Odysseus with actions which he admits. Philoctetes has brooded on his mistreatment by Odysseus for the duration of the Trojan War, and in Sophocles’ play is again Odysseus’ victim. His grudge against “the Cephalenian” is long and painful. Polyphemus’ outrage is shorter-lived, and with hopes of vengeance. Philoctetes has no such hope that his curses will have any effect; his aporia increases the audience’s sympathies, especially in contrast to the Cyclops scene.

11. His voice (φθογγ-) is heavy (βαρός). When he cries out (οἴγμα-), his surroundings echo his voice (ἴαξ-/ήξω). He groans (στεναγ-) in the pain (ὀδύνη) of his agony.

Odysseus and his men are terrified by Polyphemus’ heavy voice (φθόγγον βαρόν, Od. 9.257), and when the monster’s eye is lost, he shouts (ὁμώξεν) so terribly that the whole cave “re-echoes” (ἴαξε) the sound (395). The Cyclops groans in agony when he mounts guard at the mouth of his cave to prevent his captives from fleeing (στενάξων τε καὶ ὀδύνων ὀδύνησι, 415).

Sophocles’ play verbally echoes each Odyssean groan. The chorus first hears the “voice” (φθογγά) of Philoctetes, as he makes his way along. His cry is “grievous” (βαρεῖα) as he comes (206-08); his “pained cries” (οἴμωγάς), like those of Polyphemus, are so loud as to “re-echo” (ἀχώ) in their surroundings (188-90). Philoctetes’ collocation of the words ἀχώ and οἴμωγ- seems to be intentional, as appeared the doubling of φθογγά and βαρεῖα. The tragedian takes his cue from epic, in order to show the Cyclops-like appearance of his protagonist.

Philoctetes also groans (στεναξ-) in his agony. Odysseus thus describes the inhabitant of Lemnos who vexed the whole camp with his shrieking and moaning (11). It so characterizes Philoctetes that Neoptolemus tells him not to make that sound in anticipation of bad news (917).

Both wounded cave men suffer pains when wounded and groaning (Od. 9.415, Phil. 827). Sophocles’ Philoctetes—in voice and in pain—matches Homer’s Polyphemus depth for depth, echo for echo, and groan for groan.
12. He asks the strangers (ξένοι) who they are (τίνες), and whence they come. The strangers, who consist of a single hero and a group of sailors, reply that they are Greeks sailing back from Troy. The rest of the men remain behind with the ship.

The basic structures of the first encounters are identical. When Polyphemus meets Odysseus and his men, he says: ὃ ξένοι, τίνες ἔστε; πόθεν τλείθ' ὑγρὰ κέλευθα; (“O strangers, who are you? Whence do you sail over the watery ways?”, Od. 9.252). Odysseus had told his companions to remain with his ship, except for a group of twelve whom he chose to accompany him, and who were thus trapped with him in the cave (193-96). When Odysseus answers his host’s questions about their point of origin, he says that they are Achaeans on their way back from Troy (259).

Neoptolemus’ encounter with Philoctetes follows the same pattern. Philoctetes’ first words to his “guests” are almost identical to Polyphemus’: ἰὼ ξένοι (“O Strangers”), and τίνες ποτ’ ἐς γῆν τήνδε . . . ποίας πάτρας . . . (“Who are you . . . from what land into this land . . . ,” 219-22). Neoptolemus (like Odysseus in the Odyssey) is in the company of fellow sailors; the tragic chorus approximates the epic companions. Odysseus, the stage-manager of this charade, has put Neoptolemus nominally in charge, while he stays at the ship with the others (132). As Odysseus had done in Odyssey 9, Neoptolemus identifies himself and his group as Hellenes (233), and tells the shipwrecked man that they sail from Ilium (245). Thus, the initial Philoctetes-Neoptolemus scene parallels the Polyphemus-Odysseus encounter in (1) the grouping of characters, (2) the questions, (3) the answers, and (4) the location of the other Greeks. Sophocles’ structure imitates the Homeric scene.

13. Although the adversaries are superficially host and guest (ξένοι), the relationship is ironic.

Both Polyphemus and Philoctetes are technically “hosts” to Odysseus and Neoptolemus, and thus refer to each other as xenos. Odyssey 9 parodies the guest-host relationship. Odysseus’ original motivation was to see the monster and get guest gifts (229, 267). The Cyclops twice calls Odysseus ξένος (252, 273). Odysseus does not use the term of his “host,” but when he presents Maron’s wine to Polyphemus, he seems to treat it as a guest gift to the monster

Davidson [8] 28 n. 15 also notes both the parallel and the irony of the reversal of supplications.
Lada-Richards [17]; Greengard [5] 25 n. 16
while twitting the Cyclops’ hospitality (345-52). Polyphemus continues the hospitality charade, saying that his own guest gift will consist of eating his guest Outis last of all (355f., 369f.). As he makes his escape, Odysseus tells Polyphemus that Zeus and the other gods have punished him for eating his guests (478f.). When he learns Odysseus’ name, the blinded monster pretends that he wants the fleeing Ithacan to return in order to receive guest gifts and safe passage (517f.). This ironic portrait of hospitality plays on the scene’s perverted guest-host relationship. 

*Philoctetes* likewise treats the relationship between *xenoi*. The members of the chorus set the scene by describing themselves as strangers in a strange land (135). Philoctetes’ first words are ίδον ξένοι (219), and when Neoptolemus first addresses the castaway, he begins ἀλλ' ὁ ξέν' (232). Philoctetes sees the irony of his “entertainment” of strangers, and remarks that because of the island’s remote and rugged location, no sailor is able to receive a hospitable welcome (ξενώσεται, 303). Sympathetic to Neoptolemus’ false story, Philoctetes warmly invokes his new friends as *xenoi* (404). When he pretends to be ready to carry Philoctetes from the island (524f.), Neoptolemus refers to Philoctetes as his *xenos* (here, a “host” turned guest). The roles are reversed: the stranger becomes host to his unfortunate former “host.” Philoctetes calls Neoptolemus and his band *xenoi* (868); the chorus calls Philoctetes *xenos* (1045) and, urging him to trust their leader, reminds him that Neoptolemus is his *xenos* (1162).

The play contains another use of ξένος that is quite Odyssean, and may take inspiration from the theme of ironic hospitality in the Cyclops scene. Philoctetes, in anguish from his wound, calls out to his “guest-friend” Odysseus (ὦ ξένε Κεφαλλην), only to wish that the pain would seize his chest instead (791f.). Kamerbeek comments: “If the phrase has a scornful tone (as some commentators feel it has) this is to be sought in *xene* rather than in *Kephallen*, expressing the absolute estrangement from a man who once was his comrade in arms.” Reading *Philoctetes* in the light of *Odyssey* 9, we may see this expression as a tragic reflection of the Cyclops’ epic rage at his own “*xenos,*” who had wronged him and had fled beyond his reach. Furthermore, when Neoptolemus reveals to Philoctetes that he intends to take him to Troy, Philoctetes’ reaction is the anguished question: τί μ', ξένε δέδρακες; (“*O xenos,* what have you done to me?”, 923). Philoctetes had taken Neoptolemus’

---


friendship seriously, and the betrayal of this trust evokes this special, distancing use of *xenos*. While the insincere banter about guest-gift giving in *Odyssey* 9 has an almost comic ring, the use of *xenos* in *Philoctetes* is always heartfelt and sincere, if ironic.

Indeed, Philoctetes gives Neoptolemus the bow of Heracles because of the trust the youth has established with him. Eventually, Neoptolemus gives the weapon back to its owner. It is tempting to see the "gift" of the bow to Neoptolemus and its subsequent return as an exchange of gifts between host and guest, and parallel to the comic dialog on guest-gifts in the *Odyssey*.

Gift exchange properly affirms a relationship between the former strangers, and is discussed but unaccomplished in the *Odyssey*. In *Philoctetes*, a gift is actually exchanged, showing both the sympathetic relationship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus, and the gratitude of the former to the latter. The allusion invites Sophocles' audience to contemplate Philoctetes' sincere gift-giving in contrast with Polyphemus' insincere and false gift-exchange offer in *Odyssey* 9.

14. *The leader of the expedition begins his account truthfully, but then mixes lies into his story.*

Odysseus veraciously answers the Cyclops that he and his men are Achaeans, Agamemnon's followers, on their way home from Troy when pushed by contrary winds to the land of the Cyclopes (*Od.* 9.259-66), but Odysseus lies about the location of his ship, saying that Poseidon has destroyed it (266-86). After Polyphemus devours some men, Odysseus hatches the scheme of blinding the monster. He offers him wine, and gives the pseudonym *Outis* (287-367). Odysseus has given as much truth as he needed to, and has told falsehoods to gain his objective.

*Philoctetes* follows the same pattern. Neoptolemus truthfully responds to Philoctetes' questions by saying that he and his men are Hellenes (233). He gives his correct birthplace, parentage, and name, and truthfully says that he is sailing from Troy. However, he falsely asserts that he is sailing homeward (239-45), and tells the distraught hero that he had never heard of him (253), and then rehearses the story of the loss of his father's arms and his (feigned) hatred of the Atreidae and Odysseus (319-90). In the course of his tale he includes factual information: the death of his father, his summons from Scyrus, and the award of Achilles' arms to Odysseus.

49 Belfiore [47] 123f.

50 Greengard [5] 23f.: "Neoptolemus' skillful blend of dramatic 'truth' and 'fiction' . . . creates an internally consistent story that has the power of a new myth."
Philoctetes acts as Neoptolemus had hoped he would, just as Polyphemus was taken in by Odysseus' tapestry woven of lies and truth. The Sophoclean hero interacts with his guest in a context of familiarity and sympathy, while there is no hint of such warmth of feeling between Odysseus and Polyphemus in *Odyssey* 9. Whereas the Homeric audience cheers at the demise of the monstrous Polyphemus when Odysseus fools him, Sophocles' listeners empathize with the entrapped and deluded Philoctetes, caught in a web of deceit.

15. *The hero's ruse is characterized as trickery (δόλος), and specifically contrasted with outright force (βία).*

Odysseus characterizes his first speech to Polyphemus as *dolos* (282). When the Cyclops has been blinded, his neighbors ask if someone is killing him by deceit (*dolos*) or by outright force (*bia*, 406). From within his cave, Polyphemus replies that Outis is indeed killing him: not by *bia*, but by *dolos* (408). Odysseus successfully attacks the giant by weaving guile (πάντας δὲ δόλους καὶ μὴν ὤφαινον, 422), not in an open battle, where he would have been doomed to failure. The Cyclops episode is part of a larger context of *dolos*, as the *Apologetoi* begin with Odysseus' revelation of his name to the Phaeacians: ἐὰν Ὅδυσσεὺς Λαέρτιδης, δὲ πᾶσι δόλοισιν ένθρώποισι μέλῳ...("I am Odysseus the son of Laertes, who am known among all men for my *dolos*...", 9.19f.).

The issue of "craft versus force" is the main issue in Neoptolemus' objection to Odysseus' plan to take Philoctetes. Achilles' son is not one who by nature indulges in shameful artifice (88). Rather, he is ready to take his man by force (πρὸς βίαν, 90, 92) instead of by fraud (μὴ δόλοισιν, 91). Neoptolemus only gives in when Odysseus explains that in this instance the tongue is better than the hand, and that Neoptolemus cannot take Troy without Philoctetes (96-120). In the process, Odysseus stresses that *dolos*, not *bia*, is the only way to take their man (100-09).

Deceit is a major theme of the play. As Odysseus leaves Neoptolemus, he invokes Hermes *dolios* (133). The merchant uses the same epithet of Odysseus (608). Philoctetes says that Odysseus would never have captured him in his prime: *dolos* was the key to his success (947f.). The chorus calls the scheme a *dolos* (1117), and Neoptolemus insists that he used shameful deception and

---

**dolos** in his actions (1228). Philoctetes says that his life has been robbed by the **dolos** perpetrated against him (1282).

Comparing the craft/force dichotomy in the two works, we observe that Philoctetes is more to be pitied. Whereas Polyphemus is a powerful man-eating monster who must be deceived so the humans might escape his lair, Philoctetes is a miserable castaway. Odysseus takes delight in his ruse against the Cyclops, and the audience is on his side. Sophocles portrays the deception practiced on Philoctetes in the context of a young man’s reluctant betrayal of a new-found friendship; Neoptolemus uses **dolos** against a crippled man, making him more miserable. Odysseus uses it in the *Odyssey* to extricate himself and his men from an ogre’s lair.

16. Sleep (ὡπνος) “seizes” the cave man at a critical moment, leaving him vulnerable. He sleeps lying face up (ὡπτίος). The interlopers take a weapon from their sleeping adversary. The theft results in great misery for the cave dweller. When he awakes, the reality of the deception strikes him with great force.

Odysseus and his men plan to spin a huge beam of olive wood in the Cyclops’ eye when “sweet sleep” comes to him (9.333). The green beam was to have been his “club” (ῥόπαλον) when properly dried (319). That evening, Odysseus offers strong wine to the monster, who drinks it and falls down on his back (ὤπτιος, 347-71), and καὶ δὲ μὲν ὡπνος / ἥρει πανδομάτωρ (“sleep who wears down all seized him,” 372f.). When the men plunge the hot beam into his eye, the giant cries out terribly from the shock, removes the bloody weapon, and calls his fellow Cyclopes from their caves (382-408). Filled with human flesh and unmixed wine, deluded by his guest’s false name, and lying on his back with wine and flesh dribbling from his throat, Polyphemus is a vulnerable target, as the Achaeans blind him with a weapon they stole from him.

Philoctetes falls asleep and awakes under different circumstances, but the structural parallels with the *Odyssey* are clear nevertheless. The cripple has an attack of pain from his foot that sends him into a frenzy. He gives his bow to Neoptolemus for safekeeping, telling him λομβάνει γὰρ οὖν / ὡπνος μὴ ὁταν περ τὸ κακὸν ἐξή τόδε (“sleep takes me when this malady passes,” 766f.). He tells Neoptolemus to let him sleep quietly, and charges him to give the bow to nobody, lest he bring death to them both (767-73). As he succumbs to the pain, Neoptolemus observes that sleep (hypnos) will soon take him, for his head is tilting back (ὑπτιάζεται, 821f.). Thus, sleep overcomes him, and his head’s position is similar to that of the Cyclops (ὥπτι-). Rather than the vomit that had issued from the mouth of the sleeping Polyphemus, Neoptolemus observes
sweat flowing from Philoctetes' body and black blood flowing from his foot (823f.). The chorus invokes Hypnos, "Ὑπνός ἄνω ἀνόης, Ὑπνός ἀνόης ἀλγέων ("Hypnos, ignorant of pain, Hypnos, ignorant of distresses"), and then turns to Neoptolemus, expecting him to flee with the bow (827-64). When Philoctetes awakes, Neoptolemus admits his true mission, and refuses to restore the bow. Philoctetes' response is a long stream of angry invective mixed with prayers, curses, and invocations of his environment (910-62).

Philoctetes' awakening to the reality of his situation is more emotionally sympathetic than Polyphemus' just deserts. Although Philoctetes had not suffered the indignity of being attacked with his own weapon, as Polyphemus had, his weapon has been stolen, and he is betrayed by a man whom he truly thought was his friend and savior; the Cyclops simply lets down his guard before his natural enemy. The blinding of Polyphemus was self-defense: he was struck by his victims who were doomed to fall at his hands had they not acted first. In Philoctetes, the deception of a wounded man in pain, by the one who had promised to help him gain his heart's desire, arouses pity for the victim, as reflected in Neoptolemus' own indecision. Sophocles increases his audience's sympathy for Philoctetes by constructing a situation structurally similar to the Cyclops scene, but with a strongly contrasting emotional content. The inhuman Polyphemus bellows, makes his cave echo, and summons his fellow monsters. Philoctetes' human cries throw Neoptolemus' betrayal back into his face.\(^5\)

17. He reacts with anguish (ἀλυφη), and, standing on the edge of a cliff, curses the departing Odysseus, and prays that he perish miserably (οὐ-, κακῶς). Odysseus, leaving, taunts his foe.

When Polyphemus is blinded, he pulls the pole from his eye and, distraught (ἀλῶων), throws it away from himself (Od. 9.396-98). The other Cyclopes come, and, standing outside the cave (ἵσταμενοι, 402), they address their brother within. In Philoctetes, the chorus tells Neoptolemus that they pity the suffering and lonely inhabitant of the cave who, it reasons, "is distraught" (ἀλυφη) at every requirement that arises (169-75). Garner points out that this passage too contains a participial form of ἵσταμαι: in reference to the "standing forth" of Philoctetes' needs (ἵσταμένῳ, 175).\(^5\)

Polyphemus stands on a cliff above the sea and throws a massive stone towards the departing ship of Odysseus, who reveals his name, tells the enraged

monster that he wishes that he had the power to send him to Hades, and reminds him that his blindness is permanent: not even his father Poseidon will be able to restore his sight (480-525). Polyphemus curses Odysseus (528-35), calling Poseidon either to destroy his homecoming, or to make him come home after a long time, “miserably” (κακώς), and having lost all of his companions (ὅλεσας ἄπο πάντας ἐταίρους, 534). Poseidon hears his son’s prayer (536). The Cyclops punctuates his imprecation by launching another πέτρας (“boulder,” 541; cf. 484) towards the ship of the departing Achaeans, almost swamping it.

As Polyphemus curses the departing Odysseus, so Philoctetes curses his tormentor as Odysseus has announced that he is going to leave the hero alone on Lemnos (1047-80). Philoctetes too stands at the edge of a seaside cliff when hurling his malediction. Before Philoctetes curses Odysseus, he attempts suicide, intending to throw himself from the steep cliff to the rocks below (999-1002). Perhaps recalling the rain of stones from the Cyclops’ cliff to the sea below, Sophocles has his wounded hero attempt to cast himself from above (ἀνωθεν, 1002) onto the stones beside the sea. The emphatic repetition of the word πέτρα (1002) reinforces the structural parallel with the Odyssey’s flying boulder.

Restrained before he can throw himself to his death, Philoctetes expresses his hatred of Odysseus: “May you perish” (ὅλοιο, 1019), the same verb which Polyphemus had used in his own curse of his enemy. Like Polyphemus, Philoctetes realizes that his wish for Odysseus’ death is not to be fulfilled (1020-24). He repeats the imprecation—twice, in the plural (κακῶς ὅλοιο: ὅλείσθε δ’ ἥδικηκότες, may you perish miserably, and you shall perish, since you did wrong . . . , 1035), and calls upon his fatherland and the gods to punish his tormentors, if not immediately, then at a later time (1041, cf. Od. 9.534). If he could see the Achaeans perish (ὅλωλότας, 1043), he would be comforted. The cursing scenes have much in common. Both Philoctetes and Polyphemus use the adverb κακῶς in the same line with ὅλλομι (Od. 9.534, Ph. 1035). Each of them, realizing that the immediate death of Odysseus is impossible, pray for future vengeance (Od. 9.534, Ph. 1041).

The Homeric departure of Odysseus closes the encounter with Polyphemus, and represents temporary safety for the hero. But Odysseus’ departure in Philoctetes is feigned, and parallels the Odyssean taunt of Polyphemus. Odysseus tells Philoctetes that he no longer needs the wounded hero; others could wield the bow, and Philoctetes ought to “rejoice” as he paces alone on Lemnos. Odysseus mocks Philoctetes by saying that his bow would bring honor to himself, at Philoctetes’ expense (1055-62).
Sophocles' imitation of the structure of the Cyclops scene increases, by its contrast with the Homeric tale, the pathos of his Philoctetes. Polyphemus, blind and enraged, throws rocks from a cliff as he curses his departing foe. Philoctetes, hopeless and suicidal, realizes the inefficacy of his own curses, and attempts to throw himself from the cliff onto the rocks below. Odysseus' taunts lead the Cyclops to utter his mighty curse that is heard—and heeded—by Poseidon. No one hears Philoctetes' prayers. Sophocles uses the allusion to provide a pathetic contrast.

Conclusion

There are numerous structural similarities, verbal echoes, and shared mythic constituents between the Cyclops scene in Odyssey 9 and Sophocles' Philoctetes. The individual correspondences, if taken alone, might seem superficial, as Garner has suggested, but when seen together, these similarities show how the epic informs the tragedy. I have argued that the common elements in these works are more than fortuitous. The numerous verbal and structural parallels—and their contexts—seem to indicate that the tragedian drew from the Cyclops scene in crafting his play. "What Odysseus expects to find on Lemnos is another Cyclops."54

Sophocles alludes in his cave-man story to the Homeric Cyclops scene in order to add dramatic pathos to Philoctetes by the implicit contrast. The tragedy's audience is invited to react to Philoctetes as a Homeric audience would react to the Cyclops, but in each instance the playwright reminds them that Philoctetes is no Polyphemus. Sophocles uses his audience's epic experiences to provide another dimension to his tragedy. Seen in light of the Homeric version of the cave-man myth, Sophocles' presentation of Philoctetes' story gains in narrative effectiveness, characterization, and pathos. Philoctetes supports the ancient claim—and the view of modern scholarship—that Sophocles was the "most Homeric" of the tragedians.

MORAL DECISIONS IN HOMER

Stuart E. Lawrence
Programme in Classical Studies, Massey University
Palmerston North 5301, New Zealand

Abstract. Deliberating characters in Homer evince varying degrees of commitment to heroic morality, ranging from a straightforward sense of shame to a more inward adherence to moral imperatives however critically or uncritically adopted. The moral dimension arises spontaneously for them rather than through a conscious decision to act morally. The conflict between morality and the desire to survive varies in form and resolution with the deliberators and is a major index of character.

Much useful work has been done on the ‘reality’ of Homeric deliberations and decisions, together with their psychological mechanisms and structural features. From these careful analyses we have become more aware of the subtlety and flexibility of the Homeric formula and its sensitivity to character and context, while our appreciation of the elements in the psychological conflicts of the deliberators (their anxiety and self-doubt, for example, in the face of the moral pressures of heroic society) has been greatly enhanced. The present essay will resume this discussion in order to examine more closely what might be called the terms of reference of those deliberations with a moral component. How are we to identify this component and how and in what framework do the deliberating characters recognise it and then balance it against other factors, including, most obviously, self-interest?

What is perhaps the locus classicus of Homeric decision-making, at least in the Iliad, appears at 11.401-10. In danger of being encircled by Trojans now that his comrades have fled in fear, Odysseus ponders the appropriate course:

---

1 I would like to thank one of the anonymous editorial readers of Scholia whose helpful suggestions led to recasting of the introduction and conclusion.
namely whether to ‘stand’ or ‘retreat’. He considers it a ‘great evil’ (μέγα κακόν) to run away but ‘chillier’ (όμηρον) to be caught. These deliberations are conducted with reference to the so-called heroic code, or Homeric morality, which requires courage in the face of death, and the ‘great evil’ consists in violating that requirement. We can call this a moral consideration in that the code lays down a series of unwritten rules concerning socially required or virtuous behaviour. We need not worry if Odysseus has thought out his morality for himself or adopted it uncritically through social conditioning; it remains in either case a moral consideration. 3

Odysseus does not set out to find the morally correct course. Rather his (implicit) terms of reference are more open (τί πώθω; ['What will become of me?', 404]), so that the best course may turn out to be the morally correct one or it may involve the pursuit of self-interest. Nevertheless, though Odysseus’ impulse, and thus his first option, may appear to be to run away, it is, more precisely, the wrongness of running away (μέγα μὲν κακόν αἰ κε φέβωμαι / πληθυν ταρβήσας, ‘It will be a great evil if I run away, fearing their multitude’, 404f.). This is not a man who has to measure a cowardly impulse against his moral code and then force himself to obey the latter. Rather the code springs first to his mind as the very context of the rejectable option. And yet he does not act automatically from moral conditioning, but makes a conscious choice. 4 His thoughts of escape (which show that the context is wider than the moral) are barely entertained before being rejected as the formulaic line (407) intercepts them and returns him to the code which he now formulates with brief explicitness, clearly, as Fenik 5 remarks, subordinating all prudential considerations to the observance of that code (410).

Odysseus’ morality here appears to be more profound than a concern to avoid being seen doing the wrong thing. At any rate, he does not, unlike Hector at 22.99-107, imagine the consequences of cowardice in terms of personal shame and decide that death would be (emotionally) preferable to the experience of dishonour. He merely consults, as it were, the book of rules. And yet it is always finally impossible to know in such cases (especially in Homeric

3 On the other hand, the famous deliberations of Achilles at Il. 1.188-221 and of Odysseus at Od. 20.1-30 do not revolve around moral considerations but involve conflicts between impulses crying for immediate gratification and tactically wiser courses of action.


5 This monologue is one of ‘blank sobriety, spare and unembellished’ which ‘confirms Odysseus’ stature... . We note that his chances of success carry no weight and are not even mentioned. They are irrelevant. No distinctions or mitigating allowances are permitted to blur the absoluteness of his choice’ (Fenik [2] 72).
'shame-oriented' society, but even in our own) whether the agent is motivated by abstract principle or a kind of 'higher' self-interest. We may have long ago decided that a certain kind of immoral action has such intolerably unpleasant social consequences for ourselves that we no longer have to imagine them in order to be deterred from the action in question, and this may be Odysseus' position here.6

Menelaus' decision to play it safe (17.90-112) provides a useful contrast to Odysseus' decision to 'be brave'. The consequences of running away are here more specific than the situation faced by Odysseus in book 11. Menelaus would not simply be running away—which is in general contrary to the warrior code—but he would be abandoning the dead Patroclus and the armour. Moreover, he is quite clear and explicit about his relation to Patroclus who came to Troy on his behalf and has now in a sense died for him. Given his full awareness of the moral implications of desertion in general (the situation faced by Odysseus) and of this desertion in particular with its more personal dimension, his contemplation of such an act seems all the more outrageous. His formulation of the retreat option is contemptibly feeble and might be paraphrased: 'If I behave badly, I hope no one will see it, and if they do I hope they will not condemn me for it'.7 Menelaus is motivated not by principle, but solely by embarrassment and shame. The syntax of passivity and futile hope is carried on into the second option: 'If I fight Hector and the Trojans alone, I hope I won't be surrounded.' Odysseus saw the 'chilly' possibility of being 'caught alone' (11.405f.), but the form of his expression, especially when contrasted with that of Menelaus (who fearfully expresses a negative wish) suggests greater emotional detachment from that possibility. The formulaic line (17.97=11.407) in Menelaus' case contains a diametrically opposite implication, contributing to the rhetoric of his self-deluding rationalisation ('Why waste time talking nonsense? Obviously I have to run away!'). He finds it as ridiculous to consider staying as Odysseus the opposite course. When originally posing the options, Menelaus had seen staying as tantamount to trying to fight Hector and a mass of Trojans who would doubtless surround him. Now as he opts for flight he adds another reason which has the odour of a rationalisation: Hector is fighting with divine support and is therefore insuperable. He then returns awkwardly to his earlier imagined situation of

6 Plato's Republic (441d-444e) may suggest a third possibility: the truly righteous man does not act out of a concern for the personal consequences of being righteous or unrighteous, nor again by recognising an abstract principle and consciously choosing to conform to it, but because his psyche is so organised that righteous acts spring spontaneously from it.

7 Note the similarity of 93 and 100, which shows Menelaus' preoccupation with honour (cf. Petersmann [4] 152).
Danaan contempt for his flight, adding the argument that such contempt would be unjustified because (he implies) no one would fight against a man supported by a god. Pleading divine will is, of course, a convenient (though spurious) tactic for avoiding responsibility. Staying to fight Hector thus can be made to appear not only suicidal but downright quixotic. So Menelaus resolves the conflict between self-interest and right by convincing himself that there is after all no conflict at all.8

At 21.550-80 Agenor ponders two options which he hopes will allow him to avoid facing Achilles. He rejects the first as bound to lead to a cowardly death and then the second as likely to have a similar outcome. He therefore chooses a third option: to face Achilles in the hope that he may defeat him. Both of Agenor’s options appear tactical, rather than moral, with the aim of staying alive: (1) to run away with the others and still be caught by Achilles, or (2) to run away in another direction and escape completely. But the second option might not work; Achilles might catch and kill him. But what about facing Achilles with some chance of success (a third option)? As Petersmann9 observes, Agenor never actually comes to a decision in the course of the monologue itself. Odysseus and Menelaus, faced with two priorities, bravery and survival, felt that the claims of honour or morality had been met. Now, superficially at least, Agenor’s debate can be read as informed by the single priority of survival.10 Thus the first two options are both unacceptable because they will in all probability result in Agenor’s death. The third option, though far from guaranteeing survival, at least seems to hold out a greater chance of it. On the other hand, it is impossible to miss an underlying concern with heroic honour: not only, in terms of the scenario of the first option, will Achilles cut his throat, but Agenor will thereby die ‘like a coward’. The first option combines death with dishonour, while the third offers an honourable outcome, if not survival. Death with honour then is preferable to death with dishonour.

In a similar debate at 22.98-130 Hector ponders two options, which he hopes will allow him to avoid facing Achilles. He rejects the first at once as dishonourable and the second as impractical. He must face Achilles after all. Here again we find a more complex pattern than the straight choice between


10 ‘No question of honor: the chances for bare survival determine his choice’ (Fenik [2] 78).
two tactical options aimed amorally at pure survival. Hector might: (1) withdraw into the city and survive dishonourably—but as he formulates this option he finds that honour asserts itself: it would be better to face Achilles and kill or be killed; (2) try to negotiate with Achilles—but this, while not apparently dishonourable, is certainly impractical. I have here formulated the options in accordance with the syntax. The two (grammatically) major options (both predicated on the priority of survival) are introduced by ‘if, on the one hand’ (99) and ‘if, on the other hand’ (111). The third, honourable option of facing Achilles obtrudes itself as it did for Agenor, for few heroes can long exclude the claims of honour from their thinking. The element of self-delusion in the second option, however, makes for a more sophisticated narrative than we find in the monologues of books 11 and even 17.11 Particularly piquant is the way in which the very length and detail of Hector’s second option, his imagined reconciliation with Achilles, produces an ever-increasing sense of its utter implausibility until the speaker pulls himself up with the formulaic ‘Why did my θυμός (“spirit”) say these things?’ (which has a different context and implication in each of the four passages) and then seems to smile at his own naivety through the parallel of the courting couple.12

Odysseus is admirable for unequivocally choosing bravery and honour over survival in book 11. But he is faced clearly and starkly with two options and only two—the first involving escape with dishonour, and the second probable death with honour. Given that there are no other options, Odysseus as an honourable warrior must and does reject (1), and does so, as we saw, quickly and without fuss or self-delusion. Hector, on the other hand, does not at first know how many options are available to him. Rather he must gradually appraise the situation. His first option, like that of Odysseus, offers escape with dishonour, and so he rejects it—though not so unequivocally as Odysseus did

11 Scully [2] 18 explains how ‘the range of Hector’s reflection encompasses a broader view of life and the war than found in the other soliloquies.’

12 ‘Here the suspension of the conditional clause is maintained over eleven whole verses, producing an effect of climax as Hektor’s offer grows progressively more extraordinary in value, until it reaches the point where he himself realizes that this is all just day-dreaming. At this point (122) he breaks off, without reaching an apodosis’ (N. Richardson, The Iliad. A Commentary 6: Books 21-24 [Cambridge 1993] 119 ad 22.111. W. Schadewaldt, Von Homers Welt und Werk (Stuttgart 1959) 302 describes Hector’s self-delusion about bargaining with Achilles as ‘eine Art Flucht in der Seele noch vor der Flucht in die Mauern Trojas’. K. Crotty, The Poetics of Supplication: Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey (Ithaca 1994) 85 observes that Hector’s imagined supplication of Achilles is ‘notable for its lack of a clear purpose. . . . he never articulates precisely what he hopes to accomplish by all his renunciation’. For the epanastrophe of 22.126-28 see R. P. Martin, The Language of Heroes (Ithaca 1989) 138 and Crotty [above, this note] 86.
Now it is not immediately clear at this point that there remains only a single option involving probable death with honour, as was the case for Odysseus; so Hector, whose first priority is to survive, if only he can do so honourably, casts about for a second option. He finds it, but, as he is forced to acknowledge, it will not work. So he is left with the only genuine alternative to his first option—to confront Achilles. Hector’s priorities then are closer to those of Odysseus than might at first appear. Nevertheless, Odysseus makes reference to a general principle (11.408-10), while Hector is moved by imagining a particular unpleasant situation (22.99-107). Fernik expresses well the difference between the two men: ‘Odysseus thinks within the categories of the heroic code. . . . Hector lives by the same precepts, but for him the imperative presents itself as specific ingredients, past and present, of his own life and dilemma. Poulydamas’ rejected advice of the night before comes back to haunt him. . . . avoidance of disrepute has become shame already incurred that he cannot endure to face.’ Agenor, on the other hand, does seem prepared to accept survival without honour. What he cannot accept is the worst of both worlds: death and dishonour (21.555).

The purely moral decision, however, is reserved for a woman, Penelope in *Odyssey* 19, who explains that she is torn, undecided, between two options: whether (1) to stay by her son and look after the property, remaining faithful to Odysseus or (2) to marry the best of the suitors (19.525-34). However, while she once leaned towards the first option, she is now leaning towards the second (there is a shorter statement of her *aporia* at 16.73-7.). This passage is notable for being an ongoing deliberation without closure, so that the emphasis is on the state of mind of the deliberator rather than on a decision reached. Accordingly it lacks the urgent immediacy of some deliberations, especially the Iliadic stand-or-retreat, life-and-death deliberations in the heat of battle. Penelope’s state of mind during her deliberations, as she describes it here, is not calmly rational; rather she is subject to uncontrolled and anxious thoughts (an idea reinforced by the accompanying simile). Her recounting of the options then is clearly not a record of particular repeated events, but a rational distillation of those options as she now sees them. What actually repeatedly goes on in her mind is more complicated, less rational and less ordered. One is reminded of the contrast between Agamemnon’s rational and ordered deliberations over Iphigenia’s sacrifice in the parodos of Aeschylus’ play and his counterpart’s *aporia* in the anapaestic prologue of the *Iphigenia at Aulis*.

---

14 According to Zanker, *The Heart of Achilles* (Ann Arbor 1994) 61, guilt is ‘the ultimate driving force’ in Hector’s decision.
where there is a strong sense of an acutely anxious decision-making process protracted and endlessly repeated without closure (Aesch. *Ag.* 205-17, Eur. *Iliad* 34-42). The absence of closure in the present passage is aggravated by Penelope’s feeling that the situation itself about which she is deliberating is changing, now that Telemachos is pressuring her (she feels) effectively to abandon her much-cherished fidelity to her absent husband. However, the central issue for the present discussion is the nature of the options. She is trying, in a sense, to do justice to the requirements of her husband and family, and because she is a woman in a man’s world, she is perhaps less distracted by self-interest, being used to subordinating her needs to those of her male relatives. As Foley puts it, Penelope, when she finally decides, ‘makes a fully conscious and autonomous decision that entails rejecting hope and desire for obedience to social responsibilities’.

The moral component of all these deliberations can be identified in the claims of heroic society clearly recognised and accorded relevance by the deliberating characters, though they evince different levels of moral commitment ranging from a simple shame to what appears to be an inner adherence to moral imperatives however critically or uncritically adopted. The moral dimension arises spontaneously for them (since they are people whose whole thinking is thoroughly imbued in the values of their society) rather than through a conscious decision to try to act morally or even just to take the moral dimension into consideration. Indeed, when the characters appear to be attempting to exclude the moral perspective, it nevertheless subtly overtakes them, as was especially striking in the case of Agenor. The resolution of the conflict between morality and self-interest varies with the deliberators and is a major index of character. Odysseus’ commitment to the code is unequivocal once he clearly apprehends its demands in his situation; Menelaus’ desire to survive, on the other hand, is so strong that we feel it powerfully shaping his whole argument in spite of his clear recognition of the claims of morality. Agenor and Hector move beyond their initial options, impelled by both morality and the desire to survive. The impression is conveyed that if survival had offered itself unequivocally as an option Agenor at least would have been unable to resist it, whereas in a climate of uncertainty morality is better able to assert itself: Hector, on the other hand, rejects at once a possible but overwhelmingly dishonourable course, and when he does, briefly, delude himself, it is not, in the manner of Menelaus, over the morality of a course of action, but concerns the psychology of his unforgiving adversary.

---

LOCATING POWER: SPATIAL SIGNS OF SOCIAL RANKING IN HOMER AND THE TALE OF THE HEIKE

Naoko Yamagata
Department of Classical Studies, The Open University
London NW1 8NP, United Kingdom

Abstract. How do Homeric characters ‘position’ themselves spatially and figuratively in relation to each other? By comparing their behaviour and language with those of their counterparts in the Tale of the Heike, the medieval Japanese epic tale of warriors, it is evident that the spatial metaphor of ‘high’ and ‘low’ in ranking, common in Japanese and English, does not appear to be shared by Homer.

Who are the heroes? This question is implicit in virtually every study of Homer and can be and has been tackled in a number of ways.¹ We can look at the use of the word ἤρως (‘hero’) itself, or we may look at those being described as ἀγαθός (‘good’), ἀριστός (‘best’) or as possessing ἀρετή (‘virtue’), which primarily refers to their military excellence and accompanying honour and wealth. They are also called βασιλῆς (‘kings’), whose common epithets are βουληστήρ (‘counsellors’) and δίοτρεφεῖς (‘Zeus-nurtured’), which emphasise their responsibility as the leaders of their people and their Zeus-given authority and privilege. Many of them are indeed ‘half-gods’ (cf. Hesiod’s byname for heroes, ἱμίθεοι, at Works and Days 160), having one divine parent or at least some divine blood through their ancestors. Their divine connection often also means that they have noble, god-like features distinguishable from others, both in their physical appearance and in their manners (e.g., Il. 3.166-70, Od. 4.62-64).

The aim of the present study is to examine further Homeric heroes’ relationship with other human beings by looking at the way they are ‘positioned’ in relation to others. I believe that this examination of spatial relationships, both physical and figurative, will reveal a fundamentally egalitarian perception of humanity in Homeric society. I am also using the Tale of the Heike, a medieval Japanese heroic tale of warriors, as an additional resource, to provide an example of more clearly hierarchical society that makes

¹ Earlier versions of this article were read at a Classics Seminar at the Open University in London in 2000 and at the Classical Association Annual Meeting in Manchester in 2001. I would like to thank the members of the audience at both meetings for the discussion which contributed much to the subsequent revision of the paper. Thanks are also due to the editor and the two anonymous referees of Scholia for their helpful comments and suggestions.
a striking contrast. This I hope will help to highlight some remarkable aspects of Homeric—and to some extent later Greek—society.

The choice of the *Tale of the Heike* as Homer’s ‘foil’ here among many other ‘epic’ traditions around the world may at first appear arbitrary. However, similar characteristics of Japanese and Homeric societies have been implicitly pointed out since E. R. Dodds’ study which famously applied the terms ‘shame-culture’ and ‘guilt-culture’ to Homer (especially the *Iliad*) and to Hesiod and some other later Greek authors respectively. Those were the terms first used by anthropologists to compare Japanese society to western (especially American) society in early to mid-twentieth century. Despite D. L. Cairns’ more recent and detailed study which criticises the use of the terms, I believe that Dodds’ general observation still stands, that Homeric heroes’ behaviour is largely governed by their concerns for what others think of them, the feelings expressed in such terms as τιμή (‘honour’), αἰδώς (‘shame’) and νέμων (‘indignation’). In this respect they are very much comparable to the Japanese in early to mid-twentieth century (as observed by Benedict) and in the twelfth-century *Tale of the Heike*, especially when we examine where they ‘place’ themselves in relation to others around them.

The choice of the *Tale of the Heike* rather than any other of the numerous classical Japanese literary works may also need explanation. The *Tale of the Heike* chronicles the rise and fall of the Heike, a powerful warrior clan who married into the imperial family and virtually ruled Japan for nearly two decades in the latter half of twelfth century (1168-85). They eventually lost the power struggle against the Genji, another warrior clan with the backing of the former emperor’s court, and became a government in exile within their own country. Their rule ended with the sea battle at Dan No Ura in 1185 when the majority of the members of the clan chose to drown themselves rather than to be captured, including the eight-year old emperor, Antoku. The Heike’s dramatic rise and fall deeply touched the nation and before long their tragic story was widely sung as the *Tale of the Heike* by blind bards with accompanying music played on a type of lute (*biwa*). Thanks to the popularity

---

5 Rather like in the case of Homer the authorship of the *Tale of the Heike* is not certain, but according to the most famous tradition reported in *Tsurezuregusa* (1330) of Yoshida Kenko, it was first composed by writing but for the purpose of oral performance by a blind
of the story and its oral media, which made it accessible to all social groups, the *Tale* has achieved the status of national epic and its warrior ethics has had fundamental influence on the Japanese moral codes in much the same way as Homer did in ancient Greece.\(^6\) Because of such similarities as these, I believe that the *Tale* provides the best comparative example from Japanese literature, a product of another ‘shame-culture’. How, then, did the heroes in each epic world place themselves in relation to others?

In the *Tale of the Heike*, spatial terms to indicate ranks are very prominent, reflecting the hierarchical society, with the emperor and aristocracy as the ruling class at the top, supported by the increasingly influential warrior class (some of whom are becoming part of the aristocracy) and the rest of the populace below. Many such terms employ the metaphor of ‘high’ and ‘low’ which is familiar in English and other modern languages. For example, the most common word for the emperor in the *Tale* is *shushou* which literally means the ‘Lord above’.\(^7\) The imperial court is referred to as ‘*tenjou*’, which literally means the ‘residence above’, some high place, to which only those granted certain ranks may enter. The capital city where the emperor lives naturally has a higher status than the rest of the country, hence if you go there, you ‘go up’ and if you go away from there, you ‘go down’.\(^8\) The underlying ideas behind these expressions are undoubtedly the indigenous myth of the divine ancestry of the imperial family as well as the concept of the emperor as the Heaven’s child imported from China.\(^9\) This is in stark contrast with Greek words άναβαίνω and καταβαίνω, which merely refer to physical movement of bard. Cf. H. C. McCullough (tr.), *The Tale of the Heike* (Stanford 1988) 7. In this article, all the quotations from the *Tale of the Heike* are taken from this translation.

\(^6\) For the *Tale of the Heike*’s lasting appeal, see McCollough [5] 9.

\(^7\) Another common term for the emperor, *tenshi* (a Chinese loan word literally meaning ‘heaven’s child’) points to the same connotation.

\(^8\) The most prominent example of this expression is the word that McCullough [5] translates as ‘the flight from the capital’ in a series of sections (e.g., ‘The Emperor’s Flight from the Capital’, ch. 7.13; ‘The Flight of the Heike from the Capital’, ch. 7.19) the original of which is *miyako-ochi*, literally meaning ‘the fall from the capital’.

\(^9\) See ‘The Flight from the Dazaifu’, ch. 8.4 (McCullough [5] 264), where the divine ancestry of the emperor is explicitly stated by Tokitada, a senior member of the Heike: ‘Our master is the direct forty-ninth-generation descendant of the Sun Goddess, and the eighty-first human mikado.’ The audience is reminded of this most poignantly by the young emperor’s final moments when he prepares to die by bidding farewell to the Grand Shrine of Ise, the seat of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, his mythical ancestor. Cf. ‘The Drowning of the Former Emperor’, ch. 11.9 (McCullough [5] 378).
going up towards higher places, such as the inland, and going down towards lower places, such as the sea, respectively.\textsuperscript{10}

The comparison with this aspect of the \textit{Tale of the Heike} brings us to the question whether Homer associated height with superior ranks in any way at all, either physically or figuratively. A simple survey of the words meaning high, that is, \textit{ύπατος} (‘highest’), \textit{ὑπέρτατός} (‘highest’), \textit{ὑπέρτερος} (‘higher’) and \textit{ψηλός} (‘high’) will give us an overview.

The word \textit{ύπατος} can literally refer to the highest point, but is applied exclusively to Zeus (six times in \textit{Il.}, four times in \textit{Od.}) when it takes on the figurative meaning. The best example is Zeus as \textit{θεών ουπατος καὶ ἄριστος} (‘the highest and best of gods’), as in \textit{Iliad} 19.258, 23.43 and \textit{Odyssey} 19.303.\textsuperscript{11} The word \textit{ὑπέρτερος} (‘higher’) occurs only once (at \textit{Il.} 11.786) and refers to Achilles’ superior birth in comparison with Patroclus’. Menoitius is telling his son of his role as Achilles’ advisor:

\begin{quote}
\textit{τέκνον ἐμόν, γενεὴ μὲν ὑπέρτερος ἐστιν Ἀχιλλεύς, πρεσβύτερος δὲ σὺ ἐσσί . . .}

My son, by birth Achilles is higher
but you are the elder . . .
\end{quote}

In its context (\textit{Il.} 11.786-89), however, the emphasis is on Patroclus’ superior counsel due to his age, and therefore Achilles’ ‘higher’ status in one respect is counterbalanced by Patroclus’ ‘higher’ status in another. The passage presents the two heroes more as equals than as a master and a servant.

The word \textit{ὑπέρτερος} is applied to the glory of warriors on four occasions in the \textit{Iliad} (ἐὔχος, \textit{Il.} 11.290; κύδος, \textit{Il.} 12.437, 15.491, 644):\textsuperscript{12}


\begin{quote}
οἴχετ' ἀνὴρ ἄριστος, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέγ' εὐχὸς ἔδωκε
Ζεὺς Κρονίδης· ἄλλ' ἱθὺς ἐλατύνετε μόνυμας ἱπποὺς
ἴφθιμον Δαναῶν, ἵν' ὑπέρτερον εὐχὸς ἄρησθε.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{10} The word \textit{καταβάλων}, however, does take on some symbolic connotation when it means the descent to the underworld. Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, \textit{The Greeks and Their Gods} (London 1950) 227.

\textsuperscript{11} Other references to Zeus as \textit{ύπατος} are \textit{Il.} 5.756, 8.22, 8.31, 17.339; \textit{Od.} 1.45, 81, 24.473. There are two examples of \textit{ύπατος} not applied to Zeus but to Hector’s funeral pyre (\textit{Il.} 23.165, 24.787).

\textsuperscript{12} Translation of longer passages from the \textit{Iliad} in this article are quoted from R. Lattimore (tr.), \textit{The Iliad of Homer} (Chicago 1951) with occasional modification.
Their best man is gone, and Zeus, Kronos’ son, has consented to my great glory; but steer your single-foot horses straight on at the powerful Danaans, so win you the higher glory.

2. II. 12.436-38: the narrator describes Hector’s success.

their best man is gone, and Zeus, Kronos’ son, has consented to my great glory; but steer your single-foot horses straight on at the powerful Danaans, so win you the higher glory.

so the battles fought by both sides were pulled fast and even until that time when Zeus gave the greater glory to Hektor, Priam’s son who was first to break into the wall of the Achaians.

3. II. 15.488-93: Hector calls out to his friends, seeing Teukros’ bow-string snap.

how by the hand of Zeus their bravest man’s arrows were baffled. Easily seen is the strength that is given from Zeus to mortals either in those into whose hands he gives the surpassing glory, or those he diminishes and will not defend them as now he diminishes the strength of the Argives, and helps us.

4. II. 15.644: After the description of excellent qualities of Periphetes, soon to fall victim to Hector (Zeus is supporting Hector as in II. 636f.: ‘Ἀχιλλειον / θεσπεσίως ἐφοβήθησαν ὁρ’ Ἐκτορι καὶ Δίι πατρί, ‘the Achaians /fled in unearthly terror before father Zeus and Hektor’).

Thereby now higher was the glory he granted to Hektor.

It is striking to note that in each case above it is emphasised that glory, or indeed the ‘higher’ glory, is something to be granted by Zeus. Our example (1) above in particular makes it clear that anyone, with Zeus’ support, can achieve greater glory than that Hector has just achieved. There may be a hint of ‘higher’ rank here for those who receive the god’s favour, but the emphasis on Zeus as the dispenser of glory reminds the reader that such glory is only temporary and limits the prestige enjoyed by the heroes concerned. The words ὑπέρτατος

The remaining examples of the use of ὑπέρτερος in Homer are all in the expression κρέας ὑπέρτερα (Od. 3.65, 470, 20.279), referring to the outer layer of meat, which is not necessarily the most ‘highly’ rated portion.
and ὑψηλός, on the other hand, can only apply to physical height of places or objects, most frequently fortifications, walls and parts of buildings, including palaces of kings such as Priam, Alcinous, Nestor and Odysseus. It may be argued that there is some association of high ceilings with the prestige of the dwellers of the building in some examples. However, that is not likely to be the case regarding the use of ὑψηλός for the Cyclops’ cave (Od. 9.183, 304) or Eumaeus’ enclosure for his pigs (Od. 14.6).

As far as this quick overview goes, there appears to be no one except Zeus to whom the ‘highest’ rank is attributed, and no human being is placed ‘higher’ than others in absolute terms. It is true that kings are often said to be respected ‘like the gods’ (e.g., II. 12.312, 24. 258f.), and Zeus as the ultimate source of their superiority is inherent in the epithets διογενής (‘Zeus-born’) or διοτρεψής (‘Zeus-nurtured’) applied to them. However, their association with Zeus does not seem to place them any ‘higher’ than the others. This is in stark contrast with the effect that the myth of divine origin has had on the language to describe the emperor and the imperial family in the Japanese tradition. There are, however, some other spatial signs that mark out prominent heroes. In the battle, the most obvious action to assert one’s superiority is to be the first to get to the battlefield and fight at the front. We have also seen in our example

---

14 ὑψηλός (applied to dwellings and parts of dwellings, e.g., pillars, gates, stairways): Paris’: II. 6.503; Hector’s: II. 22.440; Priam’s: II. 24.281; Achilles’ hut: II. 12.131, 455, 24.449; Odysseus’: Od. 1.126, 426, 18.32, 21.5, 22.176, 193; Nestor’s: Od. 3.402, 407, 17.110; Menelaus’: Od. 4.304; Alcinous’: Od. 7.131, 346; Eurytos’: Od. 21.33; the Cyclops’ cave: Od. 9.183, 185 (fence of his yard), 304 (door). The adjective is also applied in a simile to a mountain compared to the Cyclops himself (Od. 9.192). Other examples include the descriptions of defensive walls and towers (Troy’s: II. 3.384, 16.702, 21.540; Achaeans’: II. 7.338, 437, 12.386, 388, 16.397, 512, 18.275; Phaeacians’: Od. 6.263, 7.45) and mountains, especially as the seat of Zeus (II. 12.282, 16.297).

15 Greek cosmology, Homer’s included, does have a very clear spatial division between those who live above (ὁφάντων), those who live on the earth (ἐπὶ χόνων) and those who live below (χόνων or καταχόνων). Whilst the superiority of the heavenly gods to the earthly mortals is undoubted, the fact that some divinities who are as powerful as the Olympians dwell below the earth must have prevented the automatic association of high and low with superior and inferior in a hierarchical sense. For the distinction between humans and gods, and that between heavenly and chthonic gods, cf. Guthrie [10] 205-23 and C. G. Yavis, Greek Altars: Origins and Typology (Saint Louis 1949) 92f. Another important axis in Greek cosmology can be formulated as gods-humans-beasts, which can be applied to illustrate such cases as Pelops and Bellerophon who became very close with the Olympian gods but later fell to bestiality. Cf. C. Segal, Tragedy and Civilisation: An Interpretation of Sophocles (Cambridge, Mass. 1981) 3.
(2) of ὑπέρτερος above (Il. 12.436-38) that Hector achieved his greater glory by being the first to breach the Achaean wall.

To be among the first and foremost is an important article in the heroic code in Homer, as is stated clearly in Sarpedon’s famous address to his cousin Glaucus:

Γλαύκε τί η δή νοϊ τετιμήμεσθα μάλιστα ἐδρή τε κρέασιν τε ἰδε πλείοις δεπάεσσιν ἐν Λυκίῃ, πάντες δὲ θεοὺς ὡς εἰσορόσσι,
καὶ τέμενος νεμώμεσθα μέγα Ξάνθου παρ’ ὕθας καλὸν φυταλιῆς καὶ ἀρόφρης πυροφόροιο;
tὸ νῦν χρή Λυκίοις μέτα πρώτοισιν ἐόντας ἐετάμεν ἢδὲ μάχης καυστείρης ἀντιβολὴσαί,
ὅρα τις ὁδ’ εἴη Λυκίων πῦκα θωρηκτάων·
οὐ μᾶν ἀκλέεσες Λυκίνην κάτα κοιρανέσουσιν ἡμέτεροι βασιλῆς, ἐδοῦσι τε πῖναν μῆλα
οἴνον τ’ ἔξαιτον μελιθῆδα· ἂλλ’ ἄρα καὶ ἰς ἐσθῆλη, ἐπεὶ Λυκίοις μέτα πρώτοισι μάχονται.

(II. 12.310-21)16

Glaucus, why are you and I honoured before others
with pride of place, the choice meats and the filled wine cups
in Lycia, and all men look on us as if we were gods,
and we are appointed a great piece of land by the banks of Xanthos,
good land, orchard and vineyard, and ploughland for the planting of wheat?
Therefore it is our duty now in the forefront of the Lycians
to take our stand, and bear our part of the blazing of battle,
so that a man of the close-armoured Lycians may say of us:
‘Indeed these are no ignoble men who are lords of Lycia,
our kings, who feed upon the fat sheep appointed
and drink the exquisite sweet wine, but indeed there is strength
of valour in them, since they fight in the forefront of the Lycians...'

However, we see Sarpedon in a rather different situation shortly after this passage:

κέκλετο δ’ ἀντιθεοίσιν ἐλεξάμενος Λυκίοισιν·
ὁ Λύκιοι, τί τ’ ἄρ’ ἄδε μεθίετε θούριδος ἄλκης;
ἀργαλεν δὲ μοι ἐστὶ καὶ ἰφθίμῳ περ ἐόντι
μοῦνῳ ῥήξαμεν τέσσερα παρὰ νησαὶ κέλευθον·
ἀλλ’ ἐφοιμαρτεῖτε· πλεόναν δὲ τε ἔργον ἀμεινὸν.
’Ως ἔφαθ’, οἱ δὲ ἄνακτος ὑποδείσαντες ὄμολῆν
μᾶλλον ἐπέβρισαν βουληφόρον ἀμφί ἄνακτα.

(II. 12.408-14)

16 See also the same sentiment in Hector’s words at Il. 6.441-46, especially the phrase πρώτοισι μετά at 445.
He whirled about and called aloud to the godlike Lycians:
‘Lycians, why do you thus let go of your furious valour?
It is hard for me, strong as I am, to break down
the wall, single-handed, and open a path to the ships.
But come with me. The work is better if many do it.’
So he spoke, and they, awed at their lord’s command,
put on the pressure of more weight around their lord of the counsels.

This passage effectively places the leader in the middle, which seems to
contradict or at least compliment Sarpedon’s earlier comment that his position
should be ‘in front of’ or ‘ahead of’ all the others. The remark seems to
emphasise the importance of teamwork rather than the valour of the champion
in isolation. This may well be a reflection of the spirit of the age in which
Homer was composing, when a more democratic social structure based on
hoplite warfare was emerging. 17

‘The First Man Across the Uji River’ (eh. 9.2) is possibly the best
example of ‘to be the first is to be the best’ in the Tale of the Heike. Earlier in
the episode, a young warrior named Sasaki Takatsuna is given the best horse of
the army by Yoritomo, the general of the Genji. He is so honoured by this gift
that he vows to be the first to cross the river to engage with the enemy. Now
that so much of his honour is at stake on this pledge that he is resolved to kill
himself if he does not manage to be the first. Here is the same sort of pressure
of honour and shame at work as forced Hector to face Achilles outside the city
wall when it almost certainly meant his death (cf. Il. 22. 99-110). Fortunately
Sasaki does manage to be the first man to cross the river thanks to the
superiority of his mount:

Takatsuna stood in his stirrups and announced his name in a mighty voice.
‘Sasaki Shiro Takatsuna, the fourth son of Sasaki Saburo Hideyoshi and a
ninth-generation descendant of Emperor Uda, is the first man across the Uji

---

17 Cf. O. Murray, Early Greece (London 1980) 131f; H. Bowden, ‘Hoplites and Homer:
Warfare, Hero Cult, and the Ideology of the Polis’, in J. Rich and G. Shipley (edd.), War and
and Heroes in the Iliad’, CQ 38 (1988) 1-24, takes a different view on Homeric warfare in
which the difference of the ‘champions’ from the ‘mass’ is that they spend more time
engaging with the enemy in the front rank and less time in the relative safety of the ‘crowd’ at
the back. In my view van Wees’ reading of Homeric warfare is a convincing one (as a picture
in the poet’s mind’s eye at any rate, whether or not such warfare actually worked), but he also
observes the importance of co-operation in fighting (p. 6) and that the champions are not
fighting alone (p. 17, citing Il. 12.410-13). Significantly, he also highlights the tension
between the importance of the mass and the importance of ‘champions’ in Homer’s
presentation of warfare (p. 17).
River! If any here consider themselves my equals, let them grapple with me!"
He charged ahead, yelling.

('The First Man Across the Uji River', ch. 9.2)\textsuperscript{18}

Combined in this episode are the importance of one’s good name and noble birth as well as the demonstration of superiority by being the one ‘in the forefront’. It also shows the importance of being true to one’s words. What is not found in Homer (not very explicitly at any rate) is the utmost importance of loyalty to one’s overlord, which ultimately is what is tested in Sasaki’s case here. This can be contrasted with loyalty to one’s people such as we see in Sarpedon’s or Hector’s obligation towards the people of Lykia or Troy respectively.

Another set of prominent spatial signs in Homer is the location of the ships of the Achaeans. As Cuillandre has pointed out, the arrangement of the ships reflects the arrangement of the army as they face the Trojan opposition.\textsuperscript{19} The most explicit example of this is found in \textit{Iliad} 11.5-9, which places Achilles’ and Ajax’ ships on the ends and Odysseus’ in the middle. This highlights the military might of Achilles and Ajax and the relative weakness of Odysseus, but that is not all. The central position that Odysseus occupies has a special significance as is evident in \textit{Iliad} 11.806-08, that is, his ships are near the assembly place where sacrifices to the gods are also made.\textsuperscript{20} Similarly, Nestor’s ships are said to be near the place of the counsel of the kings (βουλή... γεφωντων, \textit{Il.} 2.53f.), hence near Odysseus, appropriately for his prominent role as the wise counsellor and master orator of the army, just as Odysseus.

The impression these passages give is again a sense of teamwork, the equal weight given to individual contributions. Achilles and Ajax undoubtedly stand out as the strongest who are prepared to be exposed to the enemy’s attack, but the central position of the meeting-place and its proximity to Odysseus’ and Nestor’s ships also place them in the centre of power. The army cannot function

\textsuperscript{18} McCullough [5] 287.
without both types of the champions. There seems no sense of 'ranking' between the physical and intellectual prowess that the two pairs of heroes embody.  

Finally, we turn to one's home as one's power base. In the *Tale of the Heike*, this is made most apparent when the entire Heike clan go into exile following the eight-year-old emperor. The emperor in exile without his palace and capital city becomes utterly helpless, and cannot command any authority even over local lords in the remotest western province (‘The Flight from the Dazaifu’, ch. 8.4). After a series of military defeats, the Heike with their emperor perish at the sea battle at Dan No Ura, on the western edge of the main island, hundreds of kilometres away from the capital Kyoto. When it becomes clear that the battle has been lost, Tokiko (‘the Nun of the Second Rank’ in the text, the matriarch of the Heike), tells the emperor, her grandson, what they must now do: she shall take him away to a happy realm called Paradise.

His majesty was wearing an olive-grey robe, and his hair was done up in a boy’s loops at the sides. With tears swimming in his eyes, he joined his tiny hands, knelt toward the east, and bade farewell to the Grand Shrine. Then he turned toward the west and recited the sacred name of Amida. The Nun snatched him up, said in a comforting voice, ‘There is a capital under the waves, too,’ and entered the boundless sea.

(‘The Drowning of the Former Emperor’, ch. 9.11)  

This tragic scene of the child emperor’s suicide is made all the more poignant by the words his grandmother utters a moment before they jump into the sea, ‘There is a capital under the waves, too.’ Nothing symbolises the Heike’s fall

---

21 For the importance of excellence in counsel (euboulia) as a heroic virtue, cf. M. Schofield ‘Euboulia in the Iliad’, *CQ* 36 (1986) 6-31. Cuillandre [19] 22-24 has worked out that Achilles occupies the right end and Ajax the left which can also be supported by Sophocles’ *Ajax* (cf. Cuillandre 24) and Euripides’ *Iphigenia at Aulis* (289f.; cf. D. Wiles, *Tragedy in Athens* (Cambridge 1997) 108). This arrangement seems to reflect the superiority of the right hand to the left hand prominent in Greek thought (cf. G. E. R. Lloyd, *Methods and Problems in Greek Science* (Cambridge 1991) 27-48). However, I think that it is significant that Homer does not state explicitly which end is occupied by which of the two heroes. At least in this context he appears to be presenting them as equals. The Japanese in the time of the Heike, on the other hand, followed the Chinese model and made the left hand side superior to the right. This is explicit in a number of titles of officials, e.g., the Minister of the Left (Sa-daijin) being senior to the Minister of the Right (U-daijin).

more clearly than the distance between Dan No Ura and the capital city to which they belong.  

The same spatial symbolism would apply to Priam's night visit to Achilles' hut (II. 24.485-506). He has left his city, his palace and all the power and protection that usually surround him. With Hector's death he has all but lost his city. Only in this position of vulnerability, in this temporary 'exile', is he able to ransom his son's body, by approaching Achilles as a suppliant (ικέτης, II. 24.158, 187, 570) who can claim divine protection from Zeus on the one hand and appeal to Achilles' humanity on the other.

Those who have home and hearth have a degree of power and those who are away from home do not, and in Homer the latter group are called ξεινοι. However, those most vulnerable, that is, strangers, beggars and suppliants, like the kings, have divine patronage, especially of Zeus which elevates their status. Spatial differentiation according to the distance from home is not a ground for placing one group of human beings above another in the world of Homer.

We have seen that Homer does have the association of power with 'height', but only prominently in the case of Zeus. Homeric heroes are very much aware that their glory is something to be granted only temporarily by Zeus. Kings can claim Zeus' patronage, but so can wanderers, strangers and suppliants, the most powerless members of Homeric society. This perspective appears to place no human being 'above' another. This is in clear contrast with the intricate hierarchy of medieval Japan, the world of the Heike, where the myth of divine descent of the imperial family ensured their 'high' status. This difference may be regarded merely as a matter of expression, whether or not they use the metaphor of 'high' and 'low'. After all, as in the Priam-Achilles scene in Iliad and in the final episodes of the Heike's fall, the underlying message of the both epic worlds is ultimately that all humans are equal in their mortality and no human glory lasts forever. However, it is also possible that this difference in perspective is rooted in the difference in mentality, one more egalitarian than the other. If so this may have something to do with the fact that the Greeks went on to invent democracy and that the Japanese still talk about going 'up' to or 'down' from their capital city Tokyo.

---

23 Contrast this with the way the Regent Motomichi keeps his status by choosing not to follow the emperor into exile and remaining in the capital, his power base ('The Emperor's Flight from the Capital', ch. 7.13 [McCullough [5] 243]).

24 For Zeus as the ικέτης (‘patron of suppliants’), see Od. 13.213.

25 For Zeus as the god of hospitality cf., e.g., Od. 6.207f = 14.57f: πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἐπαντεῖς / ξείνοι τε πτωχοί τε (‘for all visitors and beggars are under the protection of Zeus’).
"SELF" AND "OTHER": THE IDEOLOGY OF ASSIMILATION IN VERGIL'S AENEID

James Allan Evans
Department of Classical, Near Eastern and Religious Studies, University of British Columbia
Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z1, Canada

Abstract. There is a persistent sub-theme in the Aeneid: the assimilation of the “other” to Rome's imperial destiny: the “self” of Rome. Dido, the quintessential “other,” is destroyed by her love for Aeneas. Pallas, the Greek “other,” helps Aeneas and is slain. Turnus, the Italian “other,” yields to the Roman “self” by his death. Aeneas himself, the Asian “other,” abandons his plans for a new Troy and assimilates to Rome's destiny.

“Self” and “other” are interdependent concepts. The “other” is what we are not, and, in turn, what we are not serves to define ourselves. It may be hostile, or friendly, or something in between: different, but willing to interact with us, and in an evolving society, the “other” has the potential for assimilation with a result that is something new. The twenty-first century is familiar with assimilation, whereas most citizens of a classical polis acquired their citizenship by birth and even in the Hellenistic world, when culture defined Hellenism, there was a sharp divide between Greek and oriental, whether he was an Asian or an Egyptian. Vergil began to write his Aeneid in the immediate aftermath of the battle of Actium which, in Augustan propaganda at least, turned aside the threat of orientalism that threatened Rome's destiny. Yet Aeneas is an Asian—an oriental—and his oriental past is a blemish he must shed. He moves from defeat and despair to victory, and, steadfast in his goal, he escapes the fall of Troy, the danger of Dido’s love, and the threat of primitive Italy represented by the forces which Turnus leads against him. But as he moves towards victory in war, he gives up his Trojan traditions and even his Trojan language, all of which belonged to an Asian past, and abandons his plan of founding a new Troy. The epic may end on a note of victory in warfare, but for Aeneas and his Trojans, it is cultural defeat.¹

It is a truism to say that the Aeneid is Rome's national epic, and Vergil has purposely fused various epic traditions into the poem. The salient model is Homer: the Odyssey for the first six books and the Iliad for the final six.

Aeneas' narrative to Dido (Aen. 2 and 3), the descent into the underworld (Aen. 6) and the rearming of Aeneas by Venus (8.607-728) are all easily recognized topoi of the epic tradition, Vergil's model allows him to use subtle touches which a learned reader would notice: for instance, the Dido episode begins and ends with oblique allusions to Odysseus' encounter with the Laestrygonians where most of Odysseus' men perished and Odysseus himself was in deadly peril.² There was also the model of Naevius and Ennius: the historical epic celebrating the Roman achievements in the past. There was the epic of eulogy which bursts through the constraints of the narrative when Aeneas encounters the shade of the unborn Augustus in the underworld and the dactylic hexameter grows breathless:

hic vir, hic est, tibi quem promitti saepius audis
Augustus Caesar, divi genus, aurea condet
Saecula . . .

(Aen. 6.791-93)

Here's the man—here he is—whom you have often heard foretold, Augustus Caesar, spring from a deified race, who will found a Golden Age . . .

There was also, as Teivas Oksala³ has pointed out, the prophetic epic, such as Lycophron's Alexandra, and the Hellenistic psychological epic, such as the Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius, and even the short epic, such as Catullus 64, the "Marriage of Peleus and Thetis." Binding the whole together is the central figure of Aeneas, who is first presented to the reader, numb with fear (Aen. 1.92f.), asking the gods why he was not allowed to die with his fellow heroes at Troy, and who takes his leave, victorious, killing his rival Turnus in a flash of rage (12.946-51).⁴ Aeneas, willingly following his destiny,⁵ has emerged from the ruins of Troy and made a new beginning in Italy which the same destiny will develop in due course into Augustan Rome.

As Nicholas Horsfall⁶ has noted, Aeneas sets forth from Troy as an oikistes, taking with him the sacra and Penates of Troy.⁷ They are carried by

---

² Cf. Aen. 1.159-64 with Od. 10.87-91; also Aen. 4.579f. with Od. 10.126f.
⁴ At Aen. 1.92 Aeneas is unmanned by fear: extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra ("at once Aeneas' limbs grew slack with chill terror") and the line is partly repeated to describe Turnus succumbing to death: ast illi solvuntur frigore membra vitaque cum gemitu fugut indignata sub umbras. ("his limbs grew slack and chilled, and with a cry of distress his life fled resentful to the Shades," 12.951f.). This hardly an accidental repetition.
⁵ Cf. fatis egere volentem ("driven me in willing obedience to my destiny," Aen. 8.133).
Anchises who sat on the shoulders of Aeneas, while Ascanius took his hand and Creusa followed at a distance (2.707-11, 717), a “beautiful emblem of paternal hierarchy.” He does not know his destination: the prophecy of Creusa’s ghost and terram Hesperiam venies (“you will come to the land of Hesperia,” 2.781) means nothing to him yet. Apollo’s oracle tells the Trojans to seek the land which gave them birth: antiquam exquirite matrem (“seek out your ancient mother,” 3.96). The Trojan right to a homeland was sanctioned by a law of return. But Crete, where Aeneas tried to found a new Troy, is not the antiqua mater of Apollo’s oracle; Aeneas gets a new prophecy, this time from the Trojan Penates who reveal that Dardanus came from Hesperia, now renamed Italia (3.163-66). Yet his aim is still to refound Troy. Helenus sends him off with the command vade age et ingentem factis fer ad aethera Troiam (“then go on your way and exalt great Troy to the sky by your deeds!”, 3.462). Troy, not Rome. When the river god Tiber appears to Aeneas in Latium (8.31-65), he thanks Aeneas that he is bringing back the city of Troy to Italy.

But in the end, Aeneas does not found a new Troy. He does not even give his name to his foundation: it is to be called after his wife, Lavinia (12.194). Unlike the Greek colonies which once studded Magna Graecia, the Trojan colonists will not retain their language or their national dress. Like Aeneas himself, they will intermarry, for the women who would have borne a new generation of pure-blooded Trojans have stayed in Sicily. The alliance which Aeneas made with the Latins did not diminish the power of king Latinus. (12.176-94). As for the sacra which Aeneas brought from Troy, Aeneas himself says sacra deosque dabo (“I shall introduce the rites of Troy and our gods,” 12.192), but it is by no means certain that Jupiter agrees. Morem ritusque sacrorum / adiciam faciamque omnis ore Latinos (“I shall impose the custom and rites of sacrifice, and I shall make them all Latins with one language,” 12.836f.) is what Jupiter promises Juno. It seems that the final decision about Rome’s religion will not rest with Aeneas after all. Jupiter will decide.

7 Aen. 2.293 and 3.148-50 make it clear that these are the Penates of Troy and not simply the Penates of Aeneas’ household. Aeneas is to take them to a new Troy.


9 Cf. serva altera Troiae / Pergama (“vouchsafe a second citadel of Troy,” 3.86f.) and ergo avidus muros optatae molior urbis / Pergameamque voco (“then eagerly I begin work on the walls of the city I wished to build, and I call it Pergamea,” 3.132f.)

10 See the remarks of R. O. A. M. Lyne, Further Voices in Vergil’s Aeneid (Oxford 1987) 18f., who sees this as a “packaging” of the truth by Jupiter, who is soothing his bitter wife by not revealing the whole truth to her. I think we should take Jupiter’s words at face value. Rome will have sacra that are sanctioned by Jupiter, not necessarily imported from Troy.
Aeneas the Trojan "self" has encountered the "other" in Italy and has yielded. Yet his quest from the ruins of Troy to Latium has been a story of encounters with various "others" and his reactions to them. Some of these encounters deserve examination, for they reveal the qualities which Augustan Rome accepted or rejected.

First, the Greeks. We encounter them first as the quintessential "other": they are the enemies who sack Troy. They are duplicitous, whereas the Trojans are straightforward and honest, and like honest folk, easily deceived by rascals. The wily Sinon allows himself to be captured by the Trojans and claims to be a refugee, playing upon their honest simplicity, He accepts their generosity and then betrays them. The Trojans had never met treachery on this scale before. They were ignari scelerum tantorum artisque Pelasgae ("unaware of what depth of wickedness Greek cunning could reach," 2.106). As Aeneas retold the story, Sinon related to the gullible Trojans that the Greeks had been destined for human sacrifice to secure favorable winds for their retreat from Troy, and the horror of this savage rite is manifest:

iamque dies infanda aderat; mihi sacra parari
et salae fruges et circum tempora vitiae.

(Aen. 2.132f.)

Now arrived the day of horror; the instruments of sacrifice were made ready, the salted meal was prepared, and bands of cloth were put about my brow.

Infanda ("abominable") was the day set aside for this Machiavellian human sacrifice which would be a mendacious repetition of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. Aeneas was himself an Asian and therefore an oriental, but here the standard stereotypes are reversed: Sinon, a Greek, is the treacherous oriental and the Asian Trojans display the honest generosity which westerners like to assign to themselves.

Sinon foreshadows the Greek "other" that shows its character in the sack of Troy that follows his act of treachery. Panthus, priest of Apollo, whose flight to Aeneas' house carrying the sacra and dragging along his little grandson (2.318-21) foreshadows Aeneas' own flight, is slain, his priesthood and his pietas notwithstanding (2.429f.). The Greeks pull Cassandra by her hair from the shrine of Minerva, caring nothing for the sanctity of the place (2.403-05). Pyrrhus, son of Achilles, who is compared to a venomous snake that has shed its skin (2.469-75), pursued Polites, one of Priam's sons, to the altar where

11 It was not human sacrifice itself which was abominable, for Vergil knew the Romans had practiced it. Aeneas was to capture eight young Latin warriors to be sacrificed in Pallas' funeral rites (Aen. 10.517-20) and they are duly slaughtered over the funeral pyre (11.81f.).
Priam sought refuge and there, at his father's feet, Polites dies. Courageous in the face of death, Priam curses his son's killer and hurls his spear at him, but Pyrrhus does not care: telling Priam to take his complaints to Achilles in the underworld, he drags him by the hair from the altar and plunges a sword into his side (2.526-53). Pyrrhus not only disgraces the proud old king but also his own father. Priam's death is avenged, for Anchises will show him the shades of Mummius and Aemilius Paullus who would humble the descendants of Agamemnon and Achilles (6.836-40). For the Trojans and by inference their Roman descendants, the Greeks are the "other," and they are a treacherous, merciless and impious ethnic group. Their eventual subjection to Rome is simple justice.

But the Greeks improve. At Aeneid 3.590-654 we meet a genuine Greek refugee, Achaemenides, one of Ulysses' company whom Ulysses' crew had abandoned in their haste to flee from the land of the Cyclops. This Greek with a Persian-sounding name is the inverse of Sinon. He is an honest man who has survived real suffering. Vergil extends a note of commiseration even to Ulysses: he calls him infelix ("unhappy," 3.691). Once the Trojans reach Italy, the Greek role reverses. The Sibyl prophesies that in a new Trojan War in Italy, Greeks, will be Trojan allies, odd as it may seem:

\[
\text{via prima salutis} \\
\text{quod minime reris, Graia pandetur ab urbe.} \\
(Aen. 6.96f.)
\]

The first road to your preservation will open up where you least expect it: a Greek city.

Quod minime reris ("it's the last thing you'd imagine," 6.97), the Sibyl says, to judge from the Greek behavior at Troy.

The Greeks, it seems, have ceased to be the paradigms of "otherness." When the Trojan ships push up the Tiber to Evander's settlement on the site of Rome, young Pallas generously invites Aeneas to be his father's guest (egredere o quicumque es, "pray, disembark, whoever you are," 8.122) and he clasps his hand. The Trojans and the Greeks are kin, Aeneas explains to Evander, united not only by mea virtus et sancta oracula divum ("my valor and the holy prophecies of the gods," 8.131) but also by pedigree. Evander in return recalls the friendly relations between the Trojans and the Greeks before the Trojan War separated them into "self" and "other" (8.154-68). As a youth he had met Anchises when he came in Priam's retinue to visit Arcadia, and

---

Anchises had given him gifts, including a pair of golden bridles which Evander has passed on to his son Pallas (8.168). Thus between Pallas and Aeneas there is already a link through their fathers. But it is Evander’s recognition of Aeneas as a valiant warrior which seals the link:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maxime Teucrorum ductor, quo sospite numquam} \\
\text{res equidem Troiae victas aut regna fatae bor} \\
\text{(Aen. 8.470f.)}
\end{align*}
\]

Greatest of those who led the Trojans, which you live on I shall never admit that the fortunes of Troy’s empire have been conquered . . .

Evander recognizes Aeneas the Trojan as the proper leader of an alliance against the Rutulians, and he sends his young son Pallas *qualis ubi Oceani perfusus Lucifer unda* ("like the morning star bathed in the Ocean’s wave," 8.589) along with him.\(^{13}\) Evander has another son, it appears, but he is disqualified by his mixed blood: his mother is Sabellian (8.510f.).\(^{14}\) It is Aeneas, the Trojan “other” who is the warrior who can weld this alliance together.

Dido, queen of Carthage, is a different case. She is an oriental queen, an archetype that should have provoked a visceral reaction among Vergil’s contemporaries who remembered Cleopatra, and yet it is she who nearly approaches the ideal of Hellenistic kingship, far more than does Aeneas.\(^{15}\) She is generous, hospitable and just, and a founder of cities, or at least one important city, Carthage, all of which is characteristic of ideal monarchs. When the Trojans first encounter her, she is seated on her throne in the unfinished temple of Juno, dispensing law and allotting the work of building that was to be done (1.505-08). Until she meets Aeneas, she possesses the indispensable quality of self-control. She points out to Aeneas that she herself has suffered and consequently she has learned to succour others who have suffered:

\[^{13}\text{There is the hint of a comparison here with the young Octavian who was little older than Pallas when Julius Caesar was killed. In the battle of Actium, as shown on the shield of Aeneas, Octavian’s \textit{patrium sidus} shines on his brow (Aen. 8.681). Pallas is likened to the star which Venus loved.}\]

\[^{14}\text{Why has Vergil included this detail, which adds nothing to the story? He may have intended to point out the contrast between the relatively inclusive Roman concept of citizenship and the exclusive Greek concept. In Periclean Athens, a citizen had to have parents who were both citizens. A son of an Athenian citizen by a non-citizen mother would not be a citizen, like Evander’s son by a Sabellian mother.}\]

\[^{15}\text{On the concept of the ideal king, see F. Cairns, \textit{Virgil’s Augustan Epic} (Cambridge 1989) 1-28.}\]
"Self" and "Other": The Ideology of Assimilation in Vergil's *Aeneid*, J. A. Evans

non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco.

*(Aen. 1.630)*

I know how to bring help to men in distress, for I am not unacquainted with misfortune.

She attempts to bridge the "otherness" that separates Trojan and Carthaginian by invoking a common experience of suffering. She was an ideal Hellenistic queen of the best sort.

Nonetheless, the conventional wisdom of Aeneas' supporters in Heaven was that the Carthaginians were treacherous and given to prevarication:

quippe domum timet ambiguam Tyriosque bilinguis ...

*(Aen. 1.661)*

For she is afraid of the double-dealing home of the deceitful Tyrians ...

is the reason given for Venus' perfidious trick which she played upon the hospitable Dido by kidnapping Ascanius and substituting her own son Cupid. Venus is as crafty as Sinon. Dido is young, chaste and recently widowed: no match for Venus' wiles and readily susceptible to Cupid's poison. The undercurrent of sexuality begins early: Venus appears to Aeneas in the guise of a Spartan huntress (1.314-17) and Aeneas addresses her like a suitor with flattering words (1.326-34). Then, pretending that she is a Tyrian herself, Venus relates Dido's story (1.340-68). "A sexy virginal mother, your own mother—it is a troubling thought," Richard Jenkyns remarks. "There is something faintly sinister and slithery in this," and then Vergil moves on swiftly to Aeneas' first sight of Dido, who is compared with Diana leading her nymphs in a dance along the banks of the Eurotas River in Sparta, or on the ridges of Mt. Cynthus. Aeneas watches, unseen. The epic machinery here borrows from the Nausicaa episode in the *Odyssey*, but without Odysseus' sense of decency. Aeneas is closer to Actaeon, who was killed by his own hounds, than to Odysseus. Venus may believe that the Carthaginian "other" is treacherous, but in fact, the treachery is all on her side.

Yet the gods recognized the Carthaginian "other" as hostile and dangerous. Jupiter is explicit when a prayer from Iarbas awakens him to Aeneas' dalliance:

quid struit? aut qua spe inimica in gente moratur?

*(Aen. 4.235)*

---

What is he up to? What does he hope to gain by lingering among a people who are his enemies?

What, demands Jupiter, does Aeneas hope to achieve by lingering among a hostile people? To be sure, Jupiter has the advantage of foresight as well as hindsight, and could base his judgment on history yet to happen. But up to this point, Carthage had shown no hostility whatsoever, and Mercury amends Jupiter’s message slightly when he delivers it to Aeneas:

*quid struis? aut qua spe Libycis terias otia terries?*  
*(Aen. 4.271)*

What are you up to? What do you hope to gain by wasting time in the land of Libya?

Mercury’s message is a call to duty. Vergil’s Aeneas was a paradigm of *pietas* which was one of the imperial virtues proclaimed by Augustus and perhaps the most important one. Jupiter’s challenge to his *pietas* transforms him from a lover to a stoney-faced soldier.

It was not so much the Asian origin of Carthage that made it a dangerous “other.” Aeneas was an Asian himself, and Iarbas’ prayer to Jupiter made no bones about it:

*et nunc ille Paris cum semiviro comitatu.*  
*Maeonia mentum mitra crinemque madentem subnexa, rapto potitur ...*  
*(Aen. 4.215-17)*

Now that fine Paris with his eunuch followers, with a Phrygian cap tied under his chin covering his greasy hair, steals and keeps what he has stolen ...  

The dangerous “other” was the attraction of Hellenistic monarchy. Aeneas wore the dress of a Hellenistic prince (4.261-65). Dido and Aeneas whiled the winter away in luxury, living the kind of life which the Vergil’s contemporaries associated with the Ptolemaic court of Alexandria (cf. 4.292-94). Yet Carthage had shown no overt sign of enmity or perfidy. The Trojan fleet was refitted without incident. Dido did think of military action at one point, when the reality of Aeneas’ desertion struck home, but she repressed the thought (4.593-95). Yet in the night, Aeneas received a warning from a morsel of ectoplasm that looked like Mercury, and he made a precipitous departure, leaving a sword and

17 Cf. G. K Galinsky, *Aeneas, Sicily and Rome* (Princeton 1969) 53. The first chapter of this book is a study of Aeneas’ *pietas*. It is hard to find an exact English equivalent of the Latin *pietas*. It means behavior which meets the approval of a Roman’s gods and his *maiores*. 
his clothes behind in Dido’s bedroom. But he does find time to take with him an antique krater which surfaces at Aeneid 9.266 and a couple purple robes shot with gold thread which appear at 11.74f.—both of them Dido’s gifts. He does, however, have another sword with which he slashes through the hawser that tied his ship to the quay of the Carthaginian harbor. The Carthaginian “other” is rejected with cold steel.

As the Trojans looked back at the walls of Carthage aglow with Dido’s funeral pyre, their hearts were filled with foreboding, but they were unaware of what they have done. Their foreboding arises from history yet to come. In the Aeneid, Carthage is judged by her future, not by her past. Her “otherness” consists of possessing a destiny that was other than Rome’s, and was opposed to it in some sense by nature itself.

Even geography makes Carthage the unbridgeable “other.” When it is first mentioned in the, it lies opposite Rome:

Urbs antiqua fuit (Tyrii tenuere coloni)
Karthago, Italiam contra Tiberinaque longe
Ostia . . .

(Aen. 1.12-14)
There was once an ancient town called Carthage, where emigrants from Tyre lived, and it confronted Italy and the mouth of the Tiber, though far away . . .

Vergil has in mind a map such as the Peutinger Table, where Rome and Carthage face each other across a strip of water—which is the Mediterranean Sea. They represent the “other” in nature as well as culture, in geography as well as destiny.

In the underworld, Aeneas encountered Dido again and told her that he was sorry: he had never imagined what the consequence of his desertion of her would be:

infelix Dido, verus mihi nuntius ergo
venerat exstinctam ferroque extrema secuatam?
funeris heu tibi causa fui?

(Aen. 6.456-58)
Unhappy Dido, was the news true, then, that came to me that you were dead and had ended your life with the sword. Alas, have I been the cause of your death?

The truth comes home to him. He would like forgiveness:

quem fugis? Extremum fato quod te adloquor hoc est.

(Aen. 6.466)
Who are you escaping from? This is the last time fate will let me to speak to you.
There is no absolution to be had. Dido averted her eyes, and turned to seek the love of her first husband, Sychaeus. Her affair with the Trojan "other" is over and done with, and she returns to her past. As for Aeneas, he hurries away to meet the shade of Anchises who will show him Rome's destiny. Anchises makes a brief reference to the Dido episode:

quam metui ne quid Libyae tibi regna nocerent!
\((\textit{Aen.} 6.694)\)

How I feared that the kingdom of Libya would do you some harm!

Dido, the foreign "other," the representative of romantic love, sexual passion, and orientalism had been a fearful peril.

But the encounter of Dido and Aeneas was perilous for both of them. The last mention of Dido in the \textit{Aeneid} is significant. The corpse of Pallas, who was even more youthful than Dido, went to its last rites shrouded in robes woven by her (11.72-75). Pallas and Dido, the former a Greek and the latter a Carthaginian, are two "others" who welcomed Aeneas and offered help; and paid for it with their lives. Aeneas has a lonely destiny which can be deadly to friends as well as foes.

But how does Dido perceive Aeneas, for from her point of view, it is he who is the "other"? She receives him with delight and generosity. She remarks on the common bond between them: both had suffered ill-fortune (1.628-30). The Trojans are desirable immigrants and she invites them to join her colony. She offers them equality with her Tyrian colonists:

\begin{quote}
vultis et his mecum pariter considere regnis
urbem quam statuo, vestra est; subducite navis;
Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.
\((\textit{Aen.} 1.572-74)\)
\end{quote}

Would you like to settle in this kingdom with me on an equal basis? The city I am building, it is yours! Draw up your ships on the beach! I shall treat the Trojans no differently from the Tyrians.

She guarantees equal laws for both communities.\(^{18}\) She has no reason to think that Aeneas objects until she learns that he is secretly preparing to leave.

Aeneas comes off poorly in the confrontation scene between Dido and him (4.305-93). Kenneth Quinn argues that Vergil is trying to present Aeneas as a "decent, feeling man."\(^{19}\) Rather he is presenting him as a "decent" Roman

\(^{18}\) Horsfall [6] 19f. thinks Dido is offering a kind of \textit{sympoliteia} (19f.) where citizenship, council and magistrates would be shared.

\(^{19}\) K. Quinn, \textit{Vergil's Aeneid} (London 1968) 143.
“Self” and “Other”: The Ideology of Assimilation in Vergil’s Aeneid, J. A. Evans

who represses his feelings for the sake of pietas, and it is well to remember Polybius’ remark (6.56.6-8) that the Romans were the most pious of all people. Aeneas has been conscripted by Rome’s destiny which he does not yet comprehend (if ever) but his instinct is to obey. He has already abandoned a wife, Creusa, whom he forgot when he took to his heels in a panicky moment as he was making his way out of Troy, saving his old father, his son and the sacra of Troy, and when he discovered his loss, he blamed everyone but himself:

    quem non incusavi amens hominumque deorumque.

    (Aen. 2.745)\textsuperscript{20}

I went mad! I upbraided every man and cursed every god!

He may say that it is not of his own volition that he is leaving for Italy (4.361), but he accepts his fate. He is a man driven willingly by the fates: \textit{fatis egere volentem} (8.133).

As a foreigner, Dido is an “other” for whom one may weep, but without any change of heart. Puccini, we should remember, modeled his Madame Butterfly on Henry Purcell’s Dido, who was in turn modeled on Vergil’s literary creation.\textsuperscript{21} Did Aeneas leave her pregnant? Ovid (\textit{Heroides} 7.133) thought so. Vergil is ambiguous.\textsuperscript{22} However we interpret the story, there is little doubt that if Dido was a danger to Rome, she was also a reproach.

Aeneas in due time arrives in Latium, and there it is he who is the foreigner, wearing foreign dress. His foreign appearance has thus far been only an undertone, though Iarbas (4.215-17) had been forthright about “this second Paris,” with his eunuchs and perfumed hair, but Iarbas was a barbarian and a rival for Dido’s love. The Trojans had not been “others” in Carthage; that role belonged to the Carthaginians. But they were “others” compared to the Italian norm. When they reached Italy, their strangeness was immediately noted. Word was brought to Latinus that men wearing bizarre dress had appeared, and they were big men! (7.167f.). The foreign appearance of the Trojans (as well as their physical size) remain an insistent undertone. Amata weeps over her daughter’s marriage to a Phrygian! Speaking as a mother might (\textit{solito matrum de more,}


\textsuperscript{21} As D. R. Slavitt, \textit{Vergil} (New Haven 1991) 103 points out. Slavitt [above, this note] 102 also compares Aeneas with Abraham, whose willingness to sacrifice Isaac is at least as repellent as Aeneas’ flight from Carthage.

\textsuperscript{22} How should we interpret \textit{Aen.} 4.327-30? Is Dido asking Aeneas to delay his departure until their son is born?
7.357) she wants Latinus to tell her why Lavinia could not marry a nice Italian boy, particularly since she had been promised to one. Turnus, a Latin de souche, warns of the adulteration of the Latin stock by Teucrian foreigners (7.577-79). In the prayers of the Latin mothers to Pallas Athena, Aeneas is called a "Phrygian pirate" (Phyrgii praedonis, 11.484). Turnus taunts the Trojans with racist stereotypes of Asians: vobis pica croco et fulgenti murice vestis / desidiae cordi, iuvat indulgere choreis, / et tunicae manicas et habent redimicula mitrae. / O vere Phrygiae, neque enim Phryges . . . ("You like your clothes dyed with yellow saffron and the bright juice of the purple fish. You delight in dancing and idleness. You are Phrygian women, not Phrygian men!", 9.614-17). Juno calls them the "detested race" (stirpem invisam, 7.293) of the Phrygians.

In contrast, the muster of Turnus' army had the smell of the good earth of Italy about it. It was the Italian "self" opposed to the "other" of the immigrant Asians from Troy. Among Turnus' men was Clausus (7.707), ancestor of the Claudii, and though Vergil could not have known that modern history books would name Augustus' dynasty the "Julio-Claudians," he must have recognized the piquancy of placing the ancestors of the Julii and the Claudii in opposite camps, alien versus native. Aequi and Sabines and Oscans join Turnus, and yet for all that, his army is a diverse group too, which includes some Greeks, such as the Argives Catillus and Coras (7.672) and Halaesus (7.724).

The Trojans were also irresistible men with well-developed large physiques. To be sure, the great physique of Turnus excites comment a number of times (9.734, 10.446f., 10.478), but the disparity between his strength and that of Aeneas was apparent to all the Rutulians when the two champions made their treaty to decide by single combat who would have Lavinia (12.216-21). We had some hint of Aeneas' impressive musculature in Aeneid 1, when he slew seven stags on reaching Libya, and carried them off casually to his ships. In the episode from the Odyssey which this incident imitates, Odysseus had managed to carry just one stag! Moreover, the Trojans were tough-minded: reversals served only to make them more determined. The Trojans might be beaten but they would never accept defeat:

Bellum importunum, ait, cum gente deorum
invictisque viris gerimus, quos nulla fatigant
proelia nec victi possunt absistere ferro.

(Aen. 11.305-07)

We are waging a distressing war, citizens, against the offspring of gods: invincible men, who battles never weary, and even when they are defeated they cannot lay down the sword.
Those were the words of King Latinus, and in these *invicti viri* of huge strength we can recognize the future *populus Romanus*. But these Trojans are still the alien “other,” speaking an Asian tongue and wearing strange garb. Their otherness has still to be resolved.

The resolution comes at the end of the epic. Juno and Jupiter map out a blueprint in Heaven for national unity. Juno surrenders:

> et nunc cedo equidem pugnasque exosa relinquuo.  
> (Aen. 12.818)

> And now I, for my part, withdraw and abandon the battle for I've come to hate it.

But she demands terms. The marriage of Aeneas and Lavinia will take place and with it will come peace, but the Latins must be allowed to keep their name, their language and their national dress. Troy has fallen and so shall it remain:

> occidit, occideritque sinas cum nomine Troia.  
> (Aen. 12.828)

> Troy has fallen; permit her to remain fallen, name and all.

Jupiter agrees:

> do quod vis, et me victusque volensque remitto,  
> sermonem Ausonii patrui moresque tenebunt.  
> utque est nomen erit; commixti corpore tantum  
> subsident Teucri. morem rituque sacrorum  
> adiciam faciamque omnis uno ore Latinos.  
> (Aen. 12.833-37)

> What you want I grant you. You win, and willingly I yield. The ancient folk of Italy will maintain their native language and their way of life. Their name shall be what it is now. The Trojans shall only blend and assimilate into the breed. I shall impose the custom and rites of sacrifice and I shall make all Latins, with a single language.

The immigrant Trojans would be absorbed by the Latins. Their otherness would be submerged. What, then, of the *Penates* and *sacra* of Troy which Aeneas had saved from the ruins of the city? The founder of a colony would be expected to establish them in his new foundation, and light the hearth-fire of Hestia with a fire-brand from the mother city. Yet Jupiter reserves the right for himself to make the decision about religion. “Self” and “other” reach a consensus, and the consequence is that Aeneas and his Trojans are expendable. There will be no resurrection for Troy, and it appears that with Troy’s death, its *sacra* will perish too, though the terms of the treaty between Juno and Jupiter allow for some
ambiguity. At least, anything of them that survives will bear the *imprimatur* of Jupiter, and they will be distinctively Roman.

Yet like Dido, Turnus died. He was the "other" that could never be anything else, and Aeneas dispatched him in a sudden surge of anger as he begged for mercy. It is true that Turnus exulted at Pallas' death but the two death scenes are not quite parallel: Pallas' wound was mortal and when Turnus stood over him and took his baldric as a trophy, Pallas was already dead (10.486-89). Turnus was brought down by a wound in the upper leg. He could have survived if Aeneas had shown mercy. But *furii accensus et ira terribilis* ("his wrath kindled by the Furies and terrible in his rage"), he killed him (12.946f.).

The final lines of the *Aeneid* have attracted a great deal of scholarly literature, but none of the interpretations of them are entirely satisfactory. Vergil was at pains to show Turnus as the underdog in the final duel between him and Aeneas, and to arouse our pity for him. He is deserted by his comrades and marked out for death by the gods. Philip Hardie\(^2\) calls the killing of Turnus one of the most personal moments in the epic; the motive for it was Aeneas' private passion, but it was "pre-scripted" by divine will. Yet that cannot be entirely true. The gods have abandoned Turnus to Aeneas, but they have not taken away Aeneas' liberty to make a choice. He was free to show mercy or deny it.

Yet Aeneas has become a man who has suffered too many hurts. He has lost Pallas whom he should have protected, and he has brought tragedy to Evander who is left with a half-breed son. Aeneas is victorious but what does his victory consist of? He will settle in a new foundation named after his new wife, learn Latin, and give up his Asian garb. Aeneas the Trojan "other" will be assimilated. In him, "self" and "other" are merged into a consensus which marks a new beginning, but in the process Aeneas has had to abandon his own past and be absorbed into Rome's destiny.

Aeneas' motive for killing Turnus is rooted in his psychology. The private Aeneas, the man of feeling and passion who witnessed Priam's death in the sack of Troy and immediately thought of Creusa and little Iulus (*subiit deserta Creusa et direpta domus et parvi casus Iuli*, "I saw an image of Creusa left forlorn, and my house plundered, and little Iulus' fate," 2.563f.), had been transformed by his mission to found a new Troy which would carry on the

past.\textsuperscript{24} He repressed his emotions. Once he started on his mission, he forgot Creusa and forsook Dido. The image of him facing Dido’s reproaches is of a man under strict self-control:

\begin{quote}
ille Iovis monitis immota tenebat
lumina et obnixus curam sub corde premebat.
\end{quote}
\textit{(Aen. 4.331f.)}

He, mindful of Jupiter’s warnings, held his gaze steady and with an effort, mastered the anguish within his breast.

Now in the final scene, with Aeneas’ mission accomplished in a way he never imagined when he fled the ruins of Troy, the self-control breaks down and the passionate man re-emerges. He has become simply a bitter warrior avenging the death of a young friend.

\textsuperscript{24} Note the names which Aeneas gives his first two foundations: 	extit{Aeneadae} in Thrace (\textit{Aen.} 3.18) and 	extit{Pergamea} in Crete (3.133). “Pergamon” and “Troy” are used interchangeably: cf. \textit{Aen.} 109f.
IMPIUS AENEAS, IMPIA HYPsipyle:
NARRAZIONI MENZOGNERE DALL’ENEIDE ALLA TEBAIDE DI STAZIO

Sergio Casali
Dipartimento di Antichità e Tradizione Classica, Università di Roma ‘Tor Vergata’
1-00133 Rome, Italy

Abstract. The unreliability or otherwise of Hypsipyle’s narrative of the Lemnian massacre in Statius, Thebaid 5 parallels the (un)reliability of Aeneas’ narrative concerning the last night of Troy in Vergil, Aeneid 2. Just as Dido after her desertion by Aeneas might think that his narrative about his escape from Troy is false, so Lycurgus and Eurydice might believe that Hypsipyle’s narrative concerning the death of their son Opheltes is false.

In un articolo pubblicato qualche anno fa su questo giornale, S. Georgia Nugent ha discusso la narrazione che Hypsipyle fa del massacro di Lemnos nella Tebaide di Stazio da un punto di vista molto interessante. Quanto è affidabile Hypsipyle come narratrice? In che misura possiamo prestar fede al suo racconto? Hypsipyle si presenta ad Adrastus come ‘quella famosa Hypsipyle’, quell’Hypsipyle che salvò il padre dal massacro degli uomini di Lemnos. Il suo racconto, però, non è privo di aspetti problematici: è reticente e ambiguo, soprattutto per quanto riguarda il ruolo avuto dalla donna nel massacro. La narratrice seleziona accuratamente i dati della narrazione in modo da sottolineare la sua completa estraneità al misfatto di Lemnos; eppure varie spie e vari segnali sembrano mettere in crisi la sua versione degli eventi. In particolare, nella lettura di Nugent, viene messa in crisi l’attendibilità di Hypsipyle per quanto riguarda quello che è il punto assolutamente cruciale della sua narrazione, e cioè il salvataggio del padre Thoas. ‘Che cosa è davvero successo a Thoas?’ si chiede Nugent. Siamo proprio sicuri, possiamo essere proprio sicuri che le cose siano andate come Hypsipyle vuole fare credere ad Adrastus, e a noi? Nugent vuole fare collassare l’affidabilità di Hypsipyle come narratrice, e insinua il sospetto che forse Hypsipyle non ha affatto salvato il padre. In fondo, abbiamo una versione del mito, attestata in Herodotus (6.138), in cui Thoas moriva assieme agli altri maschi nel massacro di Lemnos.

Il punto in questione nell’articolo di Nugent riguarda dunque l’attendibilità del narratore epico—del narratore metadiegietico, ma per riflessione anche del narratore epico stesso. Stazio riflette sulle pretese di veridicità della narrazione epica, mostrando come noi lettori ci troviamo nell’impossibilità di discernere la veridicità di una narrazione in prima persona, quando nulla ci permette di assumere un criterio di verità assoluta. Le narrazioni sono manipolazioni. Hypsipyle è una narratrice interessata, ha una strategia discorsiva da portare avanti, un’intenzione che regge il suo racconto—difendersi, agli occhi di Adrastus, dalle possibili accuse di una sua implicazione nel massacro di Lemnos; e quando un narratore parla di se stesso, e vuole dare un’immagine di se stesso, diventa difficile riconoscere se il suo racconto è vero o meno.

Il mio proposito in questa nota è di ampliare un poco il discorso di Nugent, mostrando che il collasso della credibilità di Hypsipyle come narratrice nella Tebaide non è solo il risultato di un’operazione decostruttiva di chi legge il racconto (l’operazione che Nugent conduce nel suo articolo), ma è un tema esplicito che il testo tratta e discute; e soprattutto che questa tematizzazione dell’inaffidabilità del narratore epico autobiografico è svolta da Stazio cogliendo e sviluppando l’analoga tematizzazione che era presente nell’Eneide.

La narrazione che Hypsipyle fa agli Argonauti della notte fatale di Lemnos è chiaramente modellata sulla narrazione che Enea fa a Didone della notte fatale di Troia. Il racconto di Hypsipyle si apre con un segnale evidente del parallelismo: *immania vulnera, rector, / integrare iubes* (Theb. 5.29sg.) ~ *infandum, regina, iubes renovare dolorem* (Aen. 2.3). La fama di Enea dipende interamente, come quella di Hypsipyle, dal comportamento glorioso e pio tenuto durante la notte della caduta di Troia, e, come nel caso di Hypsipyle, del comportamento glorioso e pio di Enea in quella notte sappiamo solo ed esclusivamente quello che è il protagonista stesso a raccontare, a Didone e a noi. Dobbiamo fidarci di Enea, se vogliamo credere che le cose siano andate

---

2 Nugent [1] 47-50. Possiamo aggiungere che Hypsipyle non allude solo all’inizio del libro 2 dell’Eneide, ma anche all’inizio del libro 3, la seconda metà del racconto di Enea. Il ‘prologo’ di Hypsipyle si apre con un’allusione al ‘prologo’ di Aen. 2; poi, in 5.49, Hypsipyle comincia la narrazione vera e propria con una descrizione dell’isola di Lemnos che recupera la descrizione della Tracia che apriva il libro 3 dell’Eneide: *Incipit: ‘Aegaeo premitur circumjlua Nereo / Lemnos... / Thraces arant contra, Thracum fatalia nobis / litora et inde nefas’* (‘inizia: “Lemnos è un’isola tutta circondata dalle onde del mare Egeo... di contro arano i Traci, vi sono le spiegge dei Traci a noi fatali, origine del delitto”’). Cf. Aen. 3.13sg.; 17 ‘Terra procul vastis colitur Mavortia campis, / Thraces arant contra, Thracum fatalia nobis / litora et inde nefas’ (‘A una certa distanza sta la terra di Marte dalle vaste pianure, la arano i Traci, un tempo regno del bellicoso Licurgo... sbarcato con fatti contrari...’).

A un certo punto, Nugent segnala rapidamente un possibile parallelismo con Enea, a questo riguardo: ‘This indeterminate or perhaps opportunistic stance toward the events of one’s narration may find a parallel in Aeneas’ oddly detached and sometimes voyeuristic account of the fall of Troy. Such a parallel would be particularly charged if, as F. Ahl, ‘Homer, Vergil, and Complex Narrative Structures in Latin Epic: An Essay’, ICS 14 (1989) 1-31, has argued, Aeneas’ rhetoric in Aeneid 2 is designed to disguise or revise his role in the events of the tale’.3

La lettura che Ahl dà di Eneide 2 è in effetti simile a quella che Nugent dà di Tebaide 5. Ahl non si fida di Enea, e fornisce una lettura estremamente sospettosa del suo racconto. Come Nugent a proposito di Stazio, così Ahl a proposito di Virgilio tralascia un fatto importante, e ciò che la sua mancanza di fiducia nella narrazione di Enea, il suo ‘non credere’ a Enea, sono in realtà parte integrante ed esplicita del testo dell’Eneide. In particolare, Ahl ‘non crede’ alla versione dei fatti che Enea dà riguardo al suo ruolo nella notte fatale di Troia. Per esempio, lo stravagante racconto di come Enea, assieme ad alcuni compagni, si sarebbe trovato ad indossare armature di soldati greci uccisi (2.387-401), per essere quindi, apparentemente Greci, immixti Danaïs (‘mescolati ai Greci’, 2.396), viene giustamente visto da Ahl come un tentativo da parte di Enea di ‘mettere le mani avanti’, di spiegare come potrebbe essere nata e aver iniziato a circolare la nove alquanto imbarazzante del tradimento di Enea. Secondo versioni antiromane della leggenda, infatti, Enea non si salvava da Troia nel modo impeccabile di Eneide 2; Enea si salvava perché tradiva la patria, e ‘diventava uno degli Achei’ (Menecrates di Xanthos, FGrHist 769 F 3 = Dion. Hal. 1.48.3). Quando Enea racconta a Didone che a un certo punto, si vestì da greco e ‘si mischiò ai Danai’, accogliendo la non brillantissima idea del suo compagno Coroebus, il suo intento è dunque, secondo Ahl, quello di trovarsi un alibi, di coprire la vergognosa verità del suo tradimento.

Ora, questa lettura antagonista che dà Ahl del racconto di Enea sembrerà a qualcuno estrema, azzardata, improbabile. Invece, e di questo neppure Ahl è consapevole, una simile lettura antagonista del racconto di Enea è già presente nel testo stesso dell’Eneide. Già nell’Eneide abbiamo qualcuno che, dopo aver

ascoltato il racconto di Enea, e dopo avergli inizialmente prestato fede, capisce in seguito che quel racconto è falso; capisce che la storia gloriosa e commovente della notte fatale di Troia che Enea racconta non è vera, ma che sono vere invece le altre versioni del ruolo di Enea nella caduta di Troia, quelle che attribuiscono la sua salvezza al tradimento della patria. Didone inizialmente crede a Enea, anzi il suo racconto contribuisce a farla innamorare di lui. Ma poi Enea la tradisce, la abbandona, parte da Cartagine adducendo vaghi pretesti. È allora che la regina apre gli occhi, quando in Eneide 4.584-90, vede la flotta troiana spiegare le vele al largo della sua città. Allora vorrebbe uccidere Enea, il traditore, che la sta abbandonando—ma ormai è troppo tardi: avrebbe dovuto farlo allora, quando i Troiani giungevano in Libia a chiedere il suo aiuto. Allora Didone avrebbe dovuto capire quello che capisce ora: che il racconto che Enea le ha fatto riguardo al suo ruolo nella caduta di Troia è falso:

‘pro Iuppiter! ibit hic’, ait ‘et nostris inluserit advena regnis?
non arma expedient totaque ex urbe sequitur,
deripientque rates alii navalibus? ite,
ferte citi flammas, date tela, impellite remos!
quid loquo? aut ubi sum? quae mentem insania mutat?
infelix Dido, nunc te facta impia tangunt?
tum decuit, cum sceptrab dabas. en dextra fidesque,
 quem secum patrios aiunt portare penatis,
quem subiiisse ueris confectum aetate parentem!
non potui abreptum divellere corpus et undis
spargere? non socios, non ipsum absumere ferro
Ascanium patriisque epulandum ponere mensis?
verum anceps pugnae fuerat fortuna. fuisset
 quem metui moritura? faces in castra tulisse
implessemque foros flammis natumque patremque
cum genere extinxem, memet super ipsa dedisse.’

(Aen. 4.590-606)

gettare fiaconle contro le navi, riempirne le tolde di fuoco, e annientare il figlio
e il padre con tutta la loro stirpe, e poi gettarmi io stessa nel rogo.'

Quando Enea parte, tradendo la sua fiducia, ella capisce che il racconto
che lui le aveva fatto della caduta di Troia e della sua fuga gloriosa dalla città in
fiamme non era che una menzogna. Enea non si è comportato nobilmente
durante la caduta di Troia: non è vero che ha salvato i Penati ed il padre
Anchises nel modo che ha raccontato in Eneide 2. In 4.596-99 Didone si
rimprovera per non avere capito fin da subito qual era il vero carattere di Enea:
perfido e traditore. Troppo tardi i facta impia di Enea toccano il suo cuore:
infelix Dido, nunc te facta impia tangunt? / tunc debuit, cum sceptras dabas
(Aen. 4.596sg.). Solo ora la toccano i facta impia di Enea? Avrebbbero dovuto
toccarla prima, avrebbe dovuto capire prima che Enea era un bugiardo. Da cosa
avrebbe dovuto capirlo? La risposta la dà Didone stessa: en dextra fidesque, / quem secum patrios aiunt portare penatis, / quem subiisse umeras confectum
aetate parentem (4.597-99). Didone fa riferimento alla caduta di Troia e al
salvataggio di Enea durante la notte fatale, e dice che il racconto fatto da Enea
riguardo al suo ruolo nella caduta di Troia falso. Se il ruolo svolto da Enea
nella caduta di Troia non è quello che lui, nel libro 2, afferma di avere avuto,
quale è stato il suo vero ruolo? Esattamente questo è ciò che avrebbe dovuto
mettere in guardia Didone circa la lealtà di Enea. Se Enea (a quanto ora Didone
crede) non si è salvato da Troia grazie alla sua pietas, nel modo irreprensibile
narrato dall’eroe stesso nel libro 2, ciò significa che Enea si è salvato da Troia
grazie a facta impia, e cioè grazie al tradimento e all’inganno. È vera l’altra
versione, quella antiromana, del ruolo giocato da Enea nella notte fatale di
Troia.

Molto prima di Ahl, dunque, già Didone non crede al racconto di Enea.
Questo è lo schema: abbiamo un personaggio che racconta la sua storia, e
presenta le proprie azioni come caratterizzate da nobiltà e pietas. Ma poi questo
personaggio compie un atto empio e vile, e chi aveva dapprima creduto al suo
racconto ora non ci crede più. La malvagità del narratore dimostra la falsità del
suo precedente racconto, e chi da quella malvagità si sente colpito perde ogni
fiducia in lui, e anzi vorrebbe ucciderlo. Esattamente lo stesso schema troviamo
nella Tebaide. Come molto prima di Ahl qualcuno non credeva al racconto di

4 Facta impia è solitamente frainteso dagli interpreti, secondo cui le azioni empie
sarebbero azioni di Didone invece che di Enea. Questo è impossibile, come ha visto per es. R.
C. Monti, The Dido Episode in the Aeneid (Leiden 1981) 62-68, spec. 64. Per la spiegazione
qui presupposta, con il riferimento alla leggenda del tradimento di Enea, vedi S. Casali,
‘Facta Impia (Vergil, Aeneid 4.596-99)’, CQ 49 (1999) 203-11, a cui rimando anche per
maggiori dettagli sulla storia di Enea traditore.
Enea, così molto prima di Nugent abbiamo qualcuno che non crede al racconto di Hypsipyle, che non crede che Hypsipyle abbia davvero salvato il padre. Infatti, anche Hypsipyle, come Enea, compie un atto che per qualcuno svela la sua falsità. Mentre racconta ad Adrastus la sua storia, Hypsipyle si dimentica del bambino che le è affidato in custodia, il piccolo Opheltes, figlio del re di Nemea, Lycurgus, e di Eurydice. Abbandonato solo nel bosco, Opheltes viene ucciso da un serpente (Theb. 5.499 sgg.).

Nel libro 6 della Tebaide vengono descritti i funerali di Opheltes e i giochi istituiti in suo onore, aition dei Giochi Nemi. Durante la cerimonia funebre, la madre di Opheltes, Eurydice, si abbandona al pianto e al lamento, e attacca duramente Hypsipyle (6.135-92). In particolare, Eurydice afferma che la condotta scellerata di Hypsipyle nei riguardi del bambino che le era stato affidato dimostra la falsità della sua versione dei fatti di Lemnos:

Quidni ego? Narrabat servatum fraude parentem
insontesque manus. En quam ferale putem
abiarasse sacrum et Lemni gentilibus unam
immunem furis! haec illa—et creditis ausae!—
haec pietate potens solis abiecit in arvis
non regem dominumque, alienos impia partus,
hoc tantum, silvaeque infamis tramite liquit
quem non anguis atrox—quid enim hac opus, ei mihi, leti
mole fuit?—tantum caeli violentior aura
impulsaeque noto frondes cassusque valeret
exanimare timor.

(Theb. 6.149-59)

E perché non avrei dovuto farlo (sc. di affidarle il bambino)? Andava narrando di aver salvato con l’inganno il padre e di avere le mani innocenti. Ecco colei che dovremmo credere che si sia sottratta al giuramento di morte, che sia stata l’unica non toccata dal furore che prese le genti di Lemnos! Ecco colei (e ancora credete a chi ha osato tanto?), ecco questa regina di pietà, che ha abbandonato in mezzo a un campo deserto non un re o un padrone, ma, l’empia!, il figlio di un’altra, niente più di questo, lo ha lasciato, l’infame, su un sentiero nel bosco, un bambino per uccidere il quale non c’era bisogno di un serpente orrendo (ahimè, perché c’è voluta una così grande macchina di morte?), ma sarebbe bastata una brezza appena più violenta nel cielo, le frondi agitate dal vento, un vano timore?

La pietas vantata da Hypsipyle nel suo racconto (haec pietate potens, 6.153) viene negata: Hypsipyle è impia (alienos impia partus, 6.154; cf. illa tuos questus lacrimososque impia risus / audiiit . . . , ‘è stata quest’empia ad ascoltare i tuoi lamenti, a vedere i tuoi sorrisi misti alle lacrime . . . ’, 6.164sg.). Il suo racconto non era che una menzogna, come dimostrano le sue empie

Stazio riproduce la situazione dell’Eneide. Il punto di vista di un personaggio antagonista mette in crisi la credibilità del narratore metadiegetico. Eurydice, la madre che vede il proprio figlio morto per la disattenzione della nutrice, non crede più al racconto di Hypsipyle, così come Didone, abbandonata senza pietà, non crede più a quello di Enea.

La reazione dell’altro genitore di Opheltes, il padre Lycurgus, è ancora più significativa, perché nel metterla in scena Stazio segnala ancora più chiaramente il rapporto intertestuale che ha stabilito con Virgilio. Quando il re Lycurgus viene informato della morte del figlio, se la prende (comprensibilmente) con Hypsipyle. Le parole che egli pronuncia sono un’aperta denuncia della falsità del racconto di Hypsipyle riguardo al suo comportamento nella notte fatale di Lemnos. Lycurgus chiede che gli sia portata subito colei che tiene così poco conto della morte del figlio suo, o forse ne gioisce, ed egli porrà fine alle menzogne che lei racconta riguardo al salvataggio del padre, e alla sua pretesa discendenza divina.

Illa autem ubinam cui parva cruoris
laetave damna mei? Vivitne? impellite raptam,
Jmpius Aeneas, Impia Hypsipyle', S. Casali

ferte citi comites; faxo omnis fabula Lemni
et pater et tumidae generis mendacia sacri
exciderit.

(Theb. 5.656-60)

Dov'è colei che reputa cosa da poco aver sparso il mio sangue, o persino si rallegra della mia perdita? Forse che è viva? Portatemela, trascinatela qua, presto portatemela compagni! Farò in modo che sia distrutta tutta la favola di Lemnos, le menzogne sul padre, e il vanto mendace della stirpe divina!

Queste parole, con cui Lycurgus esprime il proposito di uccidere Hypsipyle (forse che lei deve vivere, rallegrandosi del suo delitto, dopo avergli ucciso il figlio?), sono una precisa allusione alle parole con cui in Eneide 4 Didone, dopo avere visto la flotta di Enea ormai partita, esprime, furente, il proposito di uccidere Enea (forse che lui deve andarsene libero, dopo essersi fatto beffe del regno di Cartagine?):

ite,
ferte citi flammam, date tela, impellite remos!

(Aen. 4.593sg.)

Andate, presto, portate fiamme, issate le vele, spingete sui remi!


Il salvataggio di Anchises diventa il simbolo delle menzogne di Enea: aiunt . . . quem subiisse umeris confectum aetate parentem! (Aen. 4.598sg.). Allo stesso modo nelle parole di Lycurgus il salvataggio del padre Thoas durante il massacro di Lemno viene dichiarato una menzogna: faxo omnis fabula Lemni / et pater et tumidae generis mendacia sacri / exciderit. Inoltre,

5 Il nesso ferte citi compare nel passo del discorso di Didone, poi in Aen. 9.37 (Caicus) ferte citi ferrum, date tela, ascendite muros ('Eportate in fretta le spade, preparate i dardi, salite sulle mura'), e quindi nel passo del discorso di Lycurgus in Stazio in tutta la letteratura latina. Ferte in correlazione con impellite ricorre solo ed esclusivamente nei due discorsi in questione.
Lycurgus afferma esplicitamente che la pretesa discendenza di Hypsipyle da Bacco è una menzogna: *Tebaide* 5.659 *tumidae generis mendacia sacri*. Questa negazione della discendenza divina di Hypsipyle richiama ancora una volta la reazione di Didone: *nee tibi diva parens, generis nec Dardanus auctor, perfide . . .* ('non è una dea tua madre, né Dardanus il fondatore della tua stirpe, perfido . . .', *Aen*. 4.365f.).

Stazio aveva già messo in parallelo il salvataggio di Thoas da parte di Hypsipyle con il salvataggio di Anchises da parte di Enea. Ora le due storie vengono ancora accomunate dai dubbi che personaggi antagonisti (Didone; Eurydice e Lycurgus) gettano sulla loro autenticità. Con ciò Stazio fornisce un saggio di interpretazione dell’*Eneide*, in particolare del discorso di Didone di 4.590-606: le parole di Didone, infatti, non sono così chiare e perspicue (tanto che molti, nello sviluppo dell’esegesi virgiliana, le hanno fraintese); sono ambigue, vaghe: domandano interpretazione; le parole di Eurydice e Lycurgus, invece, sono chiarissime ed esplicite, e il loro legame intertestuale con l’*Eneide* ne costituisce, non solo un’imitazione, ma anche un’acuta interpretazione.

Stazio individua e sviluppa nella sua epica un motivo importante dell’*Eneide*, un motivo profondamente destabilizzatore: non può esistere alcuna verità quando parla un narratore interessato, che sia Enea o che sia Hypsipyle, che sia Virgilio o che sia Stazio.

---

6 Cf. Casali [4].

DER REGENBOGEN DER GEFÜHLE: ZUM KONTRAST DER EMPFINDUNGEN IM ANTIKEN ROMAN

Bernhard Kytzler
School of Graduate Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Durban 4041, South Africa

Abstract. Emotions play a very important role in the ancient novels. While they motivate the actions of the characters, they also are discussed by the authors as material for a deliberation on which course of action to take. In crucial moments the hero or heroine pauses to think about his or her antagonistic feelings; a cluster of emotions is described by the text. This study analyses these clusters and discusses their textual situation and their internal set-up.

Quartäre Cyclen—Szenen,
doch keine macht dir bewußt,
ist nun das Letzte die Tränen
oder ist das Letzte die Lust
oder beides ein Regenbogen,
der einige Farben bricht,
gespiegelt oder gelogen—
du weißt, du weißt es nicht.

(Gottfried Benn, Quartär)

Das Phänomen


Bienek war sich bestimmt nicht bewußt, daß er hier, in seiner gegenwartsbezogenen Erzählung, einen weit etablierten Topos der antiken

¹ H. Bienek, Die erste Polka (München 1979) 363.

**Termini**

Der Titel der vorliegenden Studie, der für diese Erzähltechnik von einem ‘Regenbogen der Gefühle’ spricht, ist in dieser Form gewiß nicht mehr als eine moderne Metapher. Benutzen wir demnach, schlimm anachronistisch, einen munter malenden modischen Namen für etwas, was wir Neuzeitler heutzutage beobachten, was die Antike selbst aber übersah? Nicht bemerkt oder gar nicht bedachte? Ganz im Gegenteil: Der antike Roman\(^4\) beschreibt und benennt selbst seinerseits dieses Phänomen. Er tat es in klassischem Griechisch, vielfach und

---


Der Regenbogen der Gefühle", B. Kytzler 71


Zum einen wurde die **Gleichzeitigkeit** der Empfindungen betont durch Wörter wie ἀμα und ὀμοῦ (‘zugleich’, ‘zusammen’, z.B. Char. 1.9.3; 3.5.3). Zum anderen wurde nachdrücklich die **Vielfältigkeit** unterstrichen durch Formulierungen wie πολλὰ πάθη (‘viele Empfindungen’, Hel. 7.7.3) oder gar μύρια πάθη (‘tausend Empfindungen’, Char. 6.6.1; 8.5.8; μύρια βούλαι, ‘tausend Gedanken’, Hel. 6.3.1). Schließlich aber wurde der Blick auch gerichtet auf die **Gegensätzlichkeit** der einander widerstreitenden Gefühle, ausgedrückt durch Wendungen wie πολλὰ καὶ ἄμα ἄντιων ἔπασχον (‘empfanden vieles gleichzeitiges gegensätzlich’, Hel. 6.7.3) oder πάθη ποικίλα (‘verschieden Empfindungen’, Char. 3.3.4 und 4.5.10) oder γνώμαι διάφοροι (‘unterschiedliche Gedanken’, Char. 4.6.5) beziehungsweise γνώμαι ποικίλα (‘verschiedene Gedanken’, Char. 3.7.6). Desgleichen ist vom ‘Sturm der Gefühle’ die Rede κλάδων φροντισμῶν περιστοίχιστο (Hel. 7.4.1) beziehungsweise ψυχῆς κυματουμένης (‘erregte Seele’, Hel. 10.16.2). Endlich wird auch das Wort παντόθαπος (‘vielfältig’) verwendet (Ach. Tat. 2.29.1; 7.1.1).

So sind einerseits die drei Elemente der Gleichzeitigkeit, der Vielfältigkeit und der Gegensätzlichkeit der Gefühle die Grundlage jener umschreibenden beziehungsweise analysierenden griechischen Bezeichnungen. Andererseits stehen auch mehrere Wendungen nicht nur für den aktuellen Vorgang im einzelnen, sondern auch für das Phänomen an sich zur Verfügung. So werden etwa die ‘vermischten Gefühle’ (πάθη συμμιμάγη, Xen. 3.7.1) genannt oder die schon angesprochenen ‘zahlreichen gleichzeitigen Gefühle’ (πολλὰ ἄμα πάθη, Xen. 5.13.3). Wie sich so zeigt, ist die Benutzung des hier behandelten erzähltechnischen Mittels schon in der Antike theoretisch durchaus bewusst. Das heißt aber auch: Sie ist demnach in der Praxis genau gezielt eingesetzt. Hinter ihrer Benutzung stehen Intentionen, über die nachzudenken sein wird.

klassisch kurz formuliert in seinem berühmten Epigramm-Beginn *odi et amo* (85).


Das gilt bezeichnenderweise nicht nur von den vollständig erhaltenen 'großen' Romantexten, sondern vom gesamten Genre. Auch die Fragmente sind einbeschlossen. Es genüge, aus Fragment A des Ninos-Romans zu zitieren: 'Sie war hin und her gerissen zwischen Hoffnung und Angst, Sehnsucht und Scham. Ihre Leidenschaft wurde kühner, doch fehlte ihr die Entschißkraft, und so schwankte sie in großer Verwirrung'.

Daß mit diesem Mittel ein poetisches Instrument benutzt wird, hat Horaz klargestellt:

\[\ldots \text{poeta meum qui pectus inaniter angit, inritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus inplet, ut magus, et modo me Thebis, modo ponit Athenis.}\]

\((\text{Epist. 2.1.211-13})\)

\[\ldots \text{ein Dichter, der allein mit seinen Phantasien mein Herz beängstigt, beunruhigt, besänftigt, es mit erfundenen Schrecken erfüllt, wie ein Zauberer, und der mich bald nach Theben, bald nach Athen entrückt.}\]

Dementsprechend verfährt Statius auch in seiner Gefühls-Kontrastierung beim Beginn des Pferderennens:

\[\ldots \text{stant uno margine clausi spesque audaxque una metus et fiducia pallens.}\]

\[\text{nil fixum cordi. pugnant exire paventque concurrít summós animósus frígus in artús.}\]

\((\text{Theb. 6.393-95})\)

\[\ldots \text{hier stehen sie eng in der Boxe, Hoffnung und Kühnheit zugleich mit bleicher Furcht und Beherztheit. Nichts im Herzen steht fest. Mut kämpft mit Angst vor dem Aufbruch, Hitze und Kälte durchschauern ihnen sämtliche Glieder.}\]

\[5\text{H. Rupprecht (Hrsgb.), *Statius, Thebais* (Mitterfels 2000) 4.}\]
Auch Cicero weist in dem viel diskutierten Lucceius-Brief (epist. fam. 5.12.20) expressis verbis auf die Möglichkeit des Einsatzes der Fülle verschiedenster Gefühle bei Schilderungen hin: ... variique casus habent admirationem expectationem laetitiam molestiam spem timorem ... (‘... die unterschiedlichen Vorfälle erregen Bewunderung, Erwartung, Freude, Besorgnis, Hoffnung, Furcht ...’). Wie der Dichter, so setzt auch der Orator das simultane Empfinden unterschiedlicher Gefühle als allgemein bekannt voraus und bestimmt es als eine anzustrebende Aufgabe für den historiographischen Autor.

**Personen**


Um bei Xenophon zu beginnen: Hier sind es dreimal die beiden Hauptfiguren des im Mittelpunkt stehenden liebenden Paares (1.9.1; 1.11.1; 5.13.3); in einer weiteren Szene ist es die Heroine allein (3.7.1). Nur ein einziges Mal wird das Mittel, mehr en passant, eingesetzt zur Charakterisierung einer Nebenfigur, der Manto (2.5.1). Ähnlich bei Longos: Es sind nur zwei Szenen zu nennen, und beide Male ist es Chloë, die Heroine, auf deren Gefühlsverwirrung eingegangen wird (1.13.6; 1.31.1). Auch in den Roman-Fragmenten finden wir, bei Jamblich wie im Ninos-Roman, die weibliche Hauptfigur in den Blick genommen: Sinonis bei Jamblich in den Babylonika, Semiramis im Ninos-Roman (Fragment 42).

Es fällt auf, daß in den bislang erwähnten kurzen beziehungsweise fragmentarischen Texten es ausnahmslos weibliche Figuren sind, die uns begegnen, sei es allein, sei es mit ihrem Partner. Das Bild in den noch zu besprechenden drei umfangreicheren Texten ist natürlich differenzierter. Charitons Erzählung hebt sich in unserem Zusammenhang dadurch ab, daß gern von den Gefühlen einer Personengruppe die Rede ist. Das kann generell das Volk sein (3.4.1 und 5.3; ferner 8.4.1); es mag sich auch um Hofleute handeln (4.6.5) oder um das Publikum im Gerichtssaal (5.7.2), um eine Jagdgesellschaft (6.4.4) oder eine Frauengruppe (8.4.10). Gegen Ende ist gar eine ganze Stadt angesprochen (7.6.5). Die beiden Protagonisten sind freilich nicht vergessen. Sie werden gleich zu Anfang einbezogen: Chaireas ist erfüllt von ‘Hoffnung und Angst und Neugier’ (μεστὸν ποιήσας ἑλπίδος καί φόβου καὶ πολυτραχυμοσύνης, 1.4.4), Kallirhoë erlebt ‘Angst und Freude, Schmerz und Verwunderung, Hoffnung und Zweifel, all dies zugleich’ (ὁμοῦ πάντω, φόβος, χαρά, λύπη, θευμασμός, ἑλπίς, ἀπιστία, 1.9.3). Selbst der Großkönig wird
zweimal im Wirbel seiner gegenstrebigen Gefühle gezeigt: Er schwankt zwischen 'moralischer Entrüstung' (μισαμενημ) einerseits und den Gedanken an 'Vorsicht und Behutsamkeit' (ευλαβεια) andererseits (4.6.6); und beim Lesen eines Briefes ist gar 'sein Inneres erfüllt von tausenderlei Gefühlen' (μυριων παθην επιρούεται και γάρ όργαι δέθος . . . και μετενδεί . . . και χάριν, 8.5.8), er ist wütend, er bereut, ist dankbar, 'vor allem ergriff ihn aber Neid' (μάλιστα δὲ πάντων φόνος, 8.5.8).

Heliodors Verwendung des Topos fügt sich gut in das bislang gewonnene Bild. Entsprechend dem Figurenreichum seiner Erzählung sind es zahlreiche Haupt- und zusätzlich einige Neben-Rollen, die im Erleben ihres gedanklichen Widerstreits erscheinen: Die Heroine Chariklea erlebt 'zwischen Trennungsschmerz und freudigen Erwartungen schwankende Empfindungen' (λύπης τε ἐπὶ τῷ χωρισμῷ καὶ χαρᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑλπιζομένοις ἐν μεταχθμώ σαλεύουσαν, 6.1.2), und wiederum ein andermal, mit 'Schweiß auf der Stirn, die verschiedensten Empfindungen' ('Ϊδρώτι πολλῷ διερεῖτο . . . καὶ δήλη παντοίως ἃν χαίρουσα μὲν . . . ἀγωνιώσα δὲ . . . ἐρυθρίωσα δὲ . . .): Freude, Hoffnung, Scham (4.11.1). Ihr Pflegevater Kalasiris (4.9.1), ihre Mutter Persinna (10.13.1 und 16.1) wie auch ihr königlicher Vater (10.16.2) sind ebenfalls in solcher Verwirrung gezeigt. Wiederum ist auch mehrfach die Volksmenge einbezogen (7.7.1; 10.15.1 und 38.4). Endlich sind Nausikles (6.3.1) und die Söhne des Kalasiris (7.7.3) zu nennen; schließlich Arsake, in deren 'Brust ein wahrer Sturm von Empfindungen tobt' (κλύδωνι φροντισμάτων περιεστοίχιστο, 7.4.1).

Achilleus Tattos schließlich, unter den uns erhaltenen griechischen Romanautoren der allzu engagierte Freund der Rhetorik mit all ihren Mitteln und Möglichkeiten und Mängeln, bringt es auf volle zwanzig Benutzungen des Topos. Unserer Erwartung gemäß sind es die Protagonisten Kleitophon (1.4.5 und 6.4; 2.6.1 sowie 18.6 und 23.3f.; 5.19.1 und 21.1) und Leukippe (2.29.1; 6.6.2), die im Widerstreit ihrer Gefühle gezeichnet werden. Daneben sind es aber auch mehrfach die Gegenspielerin Melitte (5.24.3 und 27.1; 7.8.2), der Mitbewerber Thersander (6.18.6 und 19.1) sowie die Volksmenge (7.14.1), die derart zur Darstellung kommen.

Einen eigenen Weg aber geht Achilleus Tattos, indem er das Kunstmittel nicht nur im Verlaufe der Erzählung für deren Figuren, sondern auch bei eingelegten Bildbeschreibungen einsetzt: Andromeda (3.7.23), Prometheus (3.8.7), Philomela und Prokne (5.3.7) werden so vorgestellt. Gerade hierin erreicht der Autor besonders delikate Verfeinerungen: Andromeda ist von des Romaniers fikтивem Maler dargestellt mit einer Mischung, in der sich Schönheit und Furcht paaren: 'Εν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς παρειαῖς τὸ δέος κάθηται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν όφθαλμῶν ἀνθεῖ τὸ κάλλος. ἀλλ' οὔτε τῶν παρειῶν τὸ ὠχρόν
'Der Regenbogen der Gefühle', B. Kytzler

"Der Regenbogen der Gefühle", B. Kytzler 75


Szenen

Interessanter noch als die Personenwahl erscheint die Szenenwahl der Autoren. Wieder und wieder sind es die Hauptmomente der Erzählung, die durch das Ausmalen eines solchen Regenbogens der Gefühle gesteigerten Glanz gewinnen.

Das tritt bei Xenophon auß deutlichste hervor. Es ist zunächst die Hochzeitsnacht, die das Wechselbad der Gefühle bewirkt (1.9.1). Danach ist es der Abschied zur langen Fahrt aus der Heimat fort (1.11.1), der so unterstrichen wird; und schließlich, ganz am Ende (5.13.3), das späte Wiederfinden der getrennten Liebenden: κατείχε δὲ αὐτοὺς πολλὰ ἀμα πάθη, ἡδονή, λύπη, φόβος, ἢ τῶν πρώτερον μνήμη, τό τῶν μελλόντων δέος . . . (‘Viele verschiedene Gefühle übelfüllten sie zugleich—Freude, Trauer, Schrecken, Erinnerung an das Vergangene, Furcht vor dem Kommenden . . .’). Auch die der Anthia gewidmete Einzelszene ist ein besonders bedeutsamer Augenblick: In der Mitte des Romans (3.7.1) muß die Heroine sich auf eine zweite, eine gewaltsam erzwungene Hochzeit innerlich vorbereiten: Ἐνενοεῖτο δὲ ᾧμα πολλὰ, τόν ἔρωτα, τοὺς ὄρκους, τῆν πατρίδα, τοὺς πατέρας, τῆν ἄνάγκην, τὸν γάμον (‘Immer wieder ging ihr alles zugleich durch den Sinn—ihr Lieb, ihr Schwur, die Heimat, die Eltern, ihre Notlage, die Hochzeit’, 3.5.2). Schließlich noch die Nebenfigur der Manto: Sie erregt sich über die ihrem Liebeswerben vom Helden Habrokomas erteilte Abfuhr (2.5.5), und es ‘erfaßte sie unbezähmbarer Zorn. Neid kochte in ihr und Eifersucht, Ärger und Furcht, alles durcheinander. Sie dachte nur an eines: Rache an dem Hochmütiyen!’ (ἐν ὀργῇ ἀκατασχέτῳ γίνεται καὶ ἀναμίξασα πάντα, φθόνον [καὶ], ξηλοτυπίαν, λύπην, φόβον, ἐνενοει ὅπως τιμωρήσαιτο τὸν ὑπερηφανοῦντα.)
Auch bei Longos sind die beiden Szenen, in denen unsere Darstellungsfugur erscheint, von besonderem Gewicht: Es handelt sich zunächst um das erste Liebeserwachen der beiden jungen Menschen, auf das Chloë so reagiert: ἀση δὲ αὐτῇς εἶχε τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν οὐκ ἐκράτει καὶ πολλὰ ἐλάλει Δάφνιν τροφῆς ἡμέλει, νύκταρ ἡγύπνει, τῆς ἀγέλης κατεφρόνειν νῦν ἐγέλα, νῦν ἐκλαίει εἶτα ἐκάθευδεν, εἶτα ἀνεπήδα ὠχρία τὸ πρόσωπον, ἐρυθήματι αὐθεὶς ἐφλέγετο (Milßmut beherrschte ihre Seele; der Augen war sie nicht Herr, Nahrung verabsäumte sie, bei Nacht wachte sie, die Herde verachtete sie, bald lachte, bald weinte sie, bald sprang sie auf, ihr Angesicht ward blaß und wiederum von Erröten glühend’, 1.13.6). Ähnlich zeigt das Mädchen sich auch bei der Wiedervereinigung nach schmerzlich-gefährlicher Trennung, wo Daphnis seine Chloë ‘lachend zugleich und weinend fand’ (γελώσαν ἀμα καὶ δακρύσασαν, 1.31.1).

Die längeren Texte des Chariton, Achilles Tatios und Heliodor können hier nur kurz angesprochen werden. Heraus heben sich markante Szenen wie Abschiedsschmerz (Char. 3.5.3) oder Wiederfinden (Char. 5.7.2; Heliodor 7.7.1: über Kalasiris 10.16.2) oder auch die Schwierigkeiten einer neuen Situation gegenüber (Char. 3.4.1; 4.5.10). Am interessantesten aber erscheint die umfängliche krönende Klimax am Ende der komplexen Darstellung Heliodors (10.38.4), wo die vielfältigen Emotionen, Empfindungen und Erregungen der Erzählung, in klarer Kontur konzentriert, kulminieren:

... der Wille der Götter, der so wunderbar den Knoten gelöst, ließ sie die Wahrheit erkennen. Hatte er doch die stärksten Gegensätze miteinander ausgesöhnt:

Freude und Leid vereinat,
Lachen und Weinen vermischt und
tiefstes Unglück in ausgelassenen Jubel verwandelte.
Man lachte unter Tränen,
freute sich unter Bekümmerten,
fand, was man nicht gesucht, und
verlor, was man gefunden zu haben glaubte.
Schließlich verwandelte sich auch
das erwartete Blutvergießen
in fromme Opferhandlung.
Nicht weniger als vierzehn Emotionen werden hier resümiert und beschworen, handlich zu sieben komplementären Komplexen komprimiert. Sie sind gebündelt unter der Sammeldefinition der ‘stärksten Gegensätze’: Es stehen da einander gegenüber Freude und Leid, Lachen und Weinen, tiefstes Unglück und ausgelassener Jubel; danach abermals Lachen unter Tränen, Freude unter Bekümmerten; schließlich noch das Finden des Ungesuchten und der Verlust dessen, was man gefunden zu haben glaubte; endlich das fromme Opfer anstatt des erwarteten Blutvergießens. Dieses resümierende Arsenal abweichender Anmutungen aber führt uns auf den wichtigsten Beobachtungspunkt dieser Studie: auf die Frage nach den Kategorien, Inhalten, Wertungen solcher Cluster von Emotionen.

Inhalte

Wie ist der Topos vom ‘Regenbogen der Gefühle’ aufzufassen? Welche Ebenen seiner Benutzung erschließen sich? Welche Elemente treten auf?


Neben der ersten grundlegenden Stufe, in der die Kontraste erscheinen, zeigt sich aber auch eine weitere: die der breiteren Auffächerung und Aufzählung, in welcher mehr die Nuancen, weniger die Gegensätze angesprochen sind: Ratlosigkeit, Wut, Verwunderung, Hoffnung, Zorn, Scham, Ungläubigkeit, Verwirrung, Begierde. Dabei kann ein antiker Autor so weit gehen wie Achilles Tatos, der gern der Benennung auch die Begründung der Empfindungen zierlich genau anfügt. Sein Schema ist etwa: Die Romanfigur empfand die Emotionen (a), (b) und (c); und zwar (a), weil sie alpha bedachte, (b), weil sie beta im Sinne trug, und (c), weil ihr gamma nicht aus dem Kopf gehen wollte. Hier hat sich der Sieg der sorglich sichtenden Rhetorik über die frei
fliegende Poesie in schönster Deutlichkeit dokumentiert, hier ist der Regenbogen der Erregungen mechanisch-rechnerisch rationalisiert.

Als ein gutes Beispiel hierfür mag die Verwirrung der Leukippe dienen (2.29.1). In ihrer Brust hatten die Reden ihrer Mutter ‘mannigfache Empfindungen erweckt’, nämlich: ‘Unwille, Scham und Zorn durchkreuzten sich in ihr’ (παντοτακὴ τις ἣν ἢχθετο, ἡσχύνετο, ὀργίζετο). Während die anderen antiken Romanautoren im allgemeinen hier mit der Feststellung als solcher einhalten würden, fährt Achilleus Tatos jedoch detailliert analyserend fort: ἢχθετο μὲν πεφωραμένη, ἡσχύνετο δὲ ὀνειδίζομένη, ὀργίζετο δὲ ἀπιστούμενη (‘Sie war unwillig darüber, daß sie ertappt worden war; schämte sich, daß ihre Mutter sie geschmäht hatte; und war erzürnt, daß sie ihr nicht glauben wollte’). Aber nicht genug mit dieser begründenden Auffächerung: Noch 25 weitere Zeilen lang ergeht der Autor sich in einer verschlungenen Gedankenkette über die Entstehung dieser Leidenschaften (aus eines anderen Rede) und ihre Bekämpfung (durch eigene Gegen-Rede). Sie werden durch Lästerung, Vorwurf, Schimpf erregt, die sich in den Augen, in der Brust und im Gemüt manifestieren und die als ‘Flut der Leidenschaften’ den Sinn des Menschen bedrücken.


Ziele

Warum benutzen die antiken Romanautoren die hier betrachtete Technik der Beschreibung von Gefühlsballungen? Welchen Nutzen zieht die Erzählung aus ihnen? Inwiefern wird der Text bereichert? Dem modernen Blick des
interessierten Lesers eröffnen sich vor allem drei Wege für diese Motivierungsanalyse.


Lösungen

Diese Studie begann mit einem Blick auf Bieneks Beschreibung, die die widerstreitenden Gefühle einer einfachen Frau nach einem tiefen Schock darstellt. Wir schließen mit einem Blick auf die ‘unvereinbaren Empfindungen’ einer anderen Frau, welche von einer zeitgenössischen Autorin so berichtet werden: ‘... Erstaunen, Rührung, Bewunderung, Entsetzen, Verlegenheit, und, ja, eben auch eine infame Erheiterung...’.

Gegenüber Bieneks Zehnergruppe werden hier nur sieben Elemente genannt; beide Texte teilen miteinander nur einen einzigen Ausdruck, nämlich ‘Entsetzen’. Während Bieneks Emotions-Cluster in die Ratlosigkeit mündet (‘... sie wußte nicht, warum er das getan hatte...’), hält Christa Wolf in ihrer Erzählung Kassandra eine befreiende Lösung der Spannung bereit.


degradiert die Kämpferin, die herrscherliche Heroine, zur komisch skurrilen Figur.

Zwei moderne Schriftsteller, die in den letzten Jahren des vergangenen Jahrhunderts ein Jahrtausende altes Erzählmuster als aktuellen Ausdruck benutzt haben, um die dramatische Dichte einer gespannten inneren Situation eindringlich darzustellen; und dazu noch eine besondere, eine 'unverzeihliche' und 'infame' Lösung aus den 'unvereinbaren Empfindungen' der uralt-modernen Mythengestalt Kassandra: ein befreiendes Lachen der in die Moderne heraufbeschworenen sonst so düster ernsten Seherin. Ein Lachen, das, in der Literatur wie gewiß auch im Leben, so mancher angespannten Situation Entspannung, Erleichterung und Lösung bringen könnte. Daß dann diese Art Lösung hier und da 'unverzeihlich' erscheinen mag, das ist freilich ein ander Ding.
APULEIUS, QUI NOBIS AFRIS AFER EST NOTIOR: AUGUSTINE'S POLEMIC AGAINST APULEIUS IN DE CIVITATE DEI

Vincent Hunink
Vakgroep Klassieken, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen
NL-6525 HT Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Abstract. Augustine studied his fellow-African author Apuleius intensely. Various links between these authors can be traced, as shown in the polemic of Augustine in De Civitate Dei against Apuleius' writings on demonology. Augustine's discussion of Apuleius must of course be considered in the context of the general aims of his work. Nonetheless, it shows a remarkable one-sidedness and does not fully do justice to the actual content of Apuleius' text.

Like so many church fathers, Augustine (AD 354-430) occupied himself intensely with the authors of non-Christian ancient literature. In Augustine's day, pagan culture was essential to the cultural elite from which he had sprung. Formal training in the classics was a standard element in the education of young men, and by this means Greco-Roman culture was the natural setting within which Christians found their personal direction. Augustine himself was well versed in classical philosophy and rhetoric, and could expect much the same from the audience he usually addressed.

It is, therefore, no surprise that Augustine's works show pervasive influences from pagan authors. Some of his favourites belong to the top of the Latin canon: Cicero and Vergil are mentioned or referred to most often. But other authors seem less obvious: Sallust, for example, provides him with both arguments and fine phrases to support his rather dark views on Rome and its historical development. Sallust's moralistic analysis of the decline of Rome seemed a welcome point of reference to Augustine.

One of the least expected names here is that of Apuleius of Madauros (ca. 125-ca. 180). According to the Augustinus-Lexikon, Augustine pays more

---

1 I thank S. J. Harrison (Oxford) and the referees of Scholia for their valuable suggestions.
3 Many details concerning Apuleius' life remain vague. Only his date of birth is relatively certain, since it can be deduced from indications in his work. The date of death depends on the date one assumes for Apuleius' novel Metamorphoses, which is a highly debated question; see
attention to Apuleius than to any other post-classical author from Latin literature. Starting from this curious fact, the following contribution aims to examine this relationship more closely. After a survey of some scattered references to Apuleius, I shall focus on Augustine’s treatment of Apuleius in *De Civitate Dei*, a polemic discussion that dominates most of books 8 and 9, and attempt to analyse to what extent Augustine’s criticism is justified by Apuleius’ texts as we know them, and what may have caused the bishop to deal with the earlier author in the way he does.5

_Africa_

The first reason for Augustine’s knowledge of Apuleius is a simple one: they share a native country, being both from Africa and originating from the same Roman culture. Augustine himself explicitly makes the link:

> Apuleius enim, ait ut de illo potissimum loquamur, qui nobis Afris Afer est notior . . . 
> 
> *(Ep. 138.19)*

> But, to speak more especially of Apuleius, who as an African is better known to us Africans . . .

Their fathers belonged to the higher classes, although Augustine's father does not seem to have been very rich.7 While there is a gap of time of more than two centuries between both authors, in antiquity this distance in time was probably felt to be less important than it would be nowadays. Apuleius certainly
remained a famous writer for many centuries after his death, and it is beyond doubt that this must also have been the case in his native town Madauros.

It was in this city Madauros where Augustine went to school from 366 to 370. He was already a techumen, but had not received baptism, and his studies were not yet directed towards the teaching of Christianity. On the contrary, he was an avid and passionate reader of Vergil and he detested Greek (Conf. 1.20-23). Given his preference for Latin and Latin literature, it is simply unimaginable that during his formative years in Madauros, the young, fiery Augustine did not read the works of Apuleius, with all their thrilling rhetoric and fascinating stories about magic.

Apuleius’ fame was even manifest on the streets in African towns. Apuleius himself tells of statues erected for him in Carthage, which may still have been extant in the year 370. Augustine also mentions a statue of Apuleius in the town of Oea (Ep. 138.19). Likewise, Apuleius’ native town almost certainly had erected statues of its celebrated author. In the town, a base of a statue has been found with the following inscription: <phi>losopho <Pl>atonico <Ma>daurenses ciues ornamento suo (“The citizens of Madauros to the Platonic philosopher who confers glory upon them”). Apuleius, who was commonly known as a philosophus Platonicus, seems to be the only candidate for the statue, as is widely held by modern scholars. We do not have any solid evidence for Apuleian readership in fourth century Madauros, but we may readily assume that his works were circulating and were widely read.

Augustine’s later writings prove that he did know several of Apuleius’ works. First, there is Apuleius’ great speech in defence of himself, the Apology, delivered in 156 in Oea. The author had stood trial for ‘magical practices’, with which he allegedly bewitched a rich widow, Pudentilla, who was a local celebrity, into marrying him, even though he was a poor man and an

---

11 Cf., e.g., S. J. Harrison, Apuleius: A Latin Sophist (Oxford 2000) 8 with n. 32.
13 For a new English translation with introduction and notes, see S. J. Harrison et al. (edd.), Apuleius: Rhetorical Works (Oxford 2001) 11-121.
outsider. In the speech, a brilliant, and indeed unique, piece of Latin oratory, the speaker uses all the possible means of ancient rhetoric to deny the charge and refute all the arguments of the prosecution as clumsy lies, forged by silly, evil, envious barbarians, and to praise himself and celebrate his own splendid achievements. Meanwhile, the reader easily observes that the charges may have been misplaced but that Apuleius knew quite a lot about ancient magic. It is, to put it briefly, a text that is un-Christian to the highest degree.⁴

Put against this background, it is rather surprising to find Augustine extolling the speech as a magnificent piece of literature:

Huius autem philosophi Platonici copiosissima et disertissima exstat oratio, qua crimen artium magicarum a se alienum esse defendit seque aliter non vult innocentem videri nisi ea negando, quae non possunt ab innocente committi.

(De Civ. D. 8.19)

But of this Platonist philosopher [Apuleius], there survives a very full and elegant speech, in which he defends himself against the charge of practising the arts of magic and shows no desire to appear innocent except by denying actions which cannot be performed by an innocent man⁵

The brief quotation already shows some of Augustine's ambivalence towards Apuleius. As an oratorical achievement, the speech is given lavish praise, but the speaker himself does not seem entirely free of charges. For whoever denies only what cannot possibly be admitted, one could say, is probably not without blame and may even take pride in it. Any reader of the Apology will readily agree with the implication of Augustine's words, for in the speech Apuleius even ventures to show off his knowledge of magic, and does not even shrink from using menacing words that look like magical incantations.⁶

---

⁴ There may even be some anti-Christian allusions in the speech; cf. V. Hunink, ‘Apuleius, Pudentilla, and Christianity’, VChr 54 (2000) 80-94.


⁶ E.g., Apol. 64.1f.: At tibi, Aemilian, pro isto mendacio duit deus iste superum et inferum commoveor utrorumque deorum malam gratiam semperque obuias species mortuorum, quidquid umbrarum est usquam, quidquid lemurum, quidquid manium, quidquid larbarum, oculus tuis oggerat, omnia noctium occursacula, omnia bustorum formidamina, omnia sepulchrorum terriculamenta, a quibus tamen aeuo et merito haud longe abes (‘May this god, the messenger between upper world and underworld, call the wrath of the divine powers of both upon you, Aemilianus, as a punishment for your lie! May he continually bring appearances of the dead before your eyes, and whatever shades, malevolent ghosts, spirits and spooks there are; and all nocturnal phantoms, all fears of the grave—from which you, through age and merit, are not that far away’; tr. V. Hunink in Harrison et al. [13] 86).
Nowadays, Apuleius’ fame rests chiefly on his novel *Metamorphoses* or *Asinus Aureus* (‘The Golden Ass’). In this book, the protagonist Lucius shows a marked interest in magic and wishes to be transformed into a bird. His metamorphosis, however, ends rather differently than had been envisaged, for by accident he is changed into an ass. In this asinine form, he goes through various adventures and misfortunes, to be changed into a man again at the end of the book, by the intervention of Isis, after eating roses out of the hands of her priests. He then becomes a priest of the goddess and enters in her service in Rome.

The reception of Apuleius’ novel in antiquity is a largely obscure matter. Except for a few scattered remarks in late sources, we do not know to what extent the novel found favour with contemporary readers and later generations. But the way Augustine mentions the novel may well be symptomatic. In a key passage in *De Civitate Dei*, he tackles the subject of ‘transformation of men into animals’. Expressing his personal disbelief in the whole phenomenon, Augustine goes on to warn his readers against the many, widespread stories about it. He tells how in Italy he had heard stories about female innkeepers who used to enchant visitors and temporarily change them into beasts of burden, without their losing their human capacity for thought.

... sicut Apuleius in libris, quos asini aurei titulo inscripsit, sibi ipsi accidisse, ut accepto ueneno humano animo permanente asinus fieret, aut indicauit aut finxit. Haec vel falsa sunt vel tam inusitata, ut merito non credantur.

*(De Civ. D. 18.18)*

... as was the case real or imagined of Apuleius, who in *The Golden Ass* tells how he drank a potion and was turned into an ass, preserving throughout this experience his rational powers. Now, such phenomena are either too unfounded in fact or too far beyond general experience to deserve belief.

Augustine’s testimony is quite remarkable for several reasons. First, it is a rare reference to the novel as such; a firm proof of the fact that it was still known in his day, and it may even be taken to suggest certain renown. Moreover, it raises a still burning question for specialists: what was the exact

---

title of the novel? Was it *Metamorphoses*, as is now commonly assumed on the basis of the manuscripts, or was it the rather more appealing *Asinus Aureus* ('Golden Ass'), for which Augustine is the main witness? Since Augustine is such an important author, his authority is by no means to be despaired, and time and again scholars attempt to reopen the discussion in favour of *Asinus Aureus*.\(^{20}\) It is a nice title indeed, and various arguments have been brought forward in support of it, notably some alleged allusions to Egyptian religion.\(^{21}\) However, the fact remains that Apuleius' story nowhere mentions a 'golden ass' (or any other golden animal),\(^{22}\) and that the ass can hardly be called 'golden', given his miserable fate and bad habits throughout in the novel.

Nonetheless, Augustine's remark remains also highly interesting because he does not hesitate to interpret the novel as a piece of autobiography. In his view, Apuleius tells how he changed into an ass while retaining his human intelligence. Only at the end of the quotation does the church father express some doubt: Apuleius either states or fakes this transformation. So while it may well be a lie, a fiction, the possibility remains that it is real after all. This also shows in Augustine's final sentence: such stories are simply not true, or else they are so uncommon that they should not be believed. But in the second case, the argument seems rather curious, for whatever is highly uncommon, may still be completely true and should not be ruled out in advance. In what follows the quotation given above, Augustine develops the theory that such metamorphoses are physically impossible but may involve cases of extreme illusion or hallucination, possibly under the influence of poison or the activity of demons.

So the traditional notion, cherished by so many generations of readers and scholars, that the protagonist in Apuleius' novel is none but Apuleius himself, seems to date back at least to Augustine. Of course, literary studies in the twentieth century have shown the great importance of making a distinction between the 'I' in any literary text and the person of its author (even where the author is manifestly writing about 'himself'), and this has by now become a basic rule in interpreting literature.

In the case of the *Metamorphoses*, it is, in fact, surprising how this lack of distinction between the 'I' and Apuleius could come about in the first place,

---

\(^{20}\) For the discussion see notably J. J. Winkler, *Auctor and Actor, a Narratological Reading of Apuleius's 'The Golden Ass'* (Berkeley 1991) 291-98. Winkler strongly supports *Asinus Aureus* as part of Apuleius' title.


\(^{22}\) The most natural assumption here is that an ancient title would either have to occur somewhere in the text as a phrase, or be a traditionally formed name (*Aeneis*) or a neutral indication (*Annales*). Literary titles that carry jokes, hidden meanings and ironical turns are a typical feature only in modern literature.
and how it could persist. The protagonist in the text calls himself ‘Lucius’ and states on the first page that his roots were in Attica, Corinth and the Peloponnese, from where he went to Rome and learned Latin. The rest of the story is located in Thessaly. So what reason is there to equate the African Apuleius from Madauros with this Lucius from Attica? It is strange indeed that this elementary point was not noticed by an intelligent philosopher such as Augustine. For if he had made the point, he could easily have reinforced his point about the non-reality of metamorphoses: look, this is not about Apuleius, but about some fictional character. One cannot help wondering whether the prologue of the novel as we have it, was indeed the first page in Augustine’s copy too.

In this connection one may refer to a curious remark of Peter Brown. Speaking about the ‘gifted African’ who ‘delighted in the sheer play of words, in puns, rhymes and riddles’, briefly, in the ‘African fire’, he notes that these writers also composed novels. He then mentions ‘the only two books from Latin literature that a modern man can place with ease beside the fiction of today’, the Asinus Aureus by Apuleius, and the Confessiones by Augustine. Brown’s judgement on Apuleius’ book will be shared by many modern readers; most would even agree that it is very good fiction. But as far as the Confessiones are concerned, we are in for a surprise. Here we find Augustine’s book drawn into the sphere of fiction, whereas it generally counts as a famous example of autobiography. Fact or fiction: the question remains complex.

---

23 It is only at the end of the novel that there is some cause for concern. In a famous passage (Met. 11.27) Lucius refers to himself as Madarensen, sed admodum pauperem (‘a man from Madauros, but a very poor one’). In that case, the author Apuleius of Madauros deliberately confuses his own identity with that of his protagonist and narrator Lucius of Corinth. On the passage, see notably R. T. van der Paardt, ‘The Unmasked “I”: Apuleius, Met. 11.27’, in S. J. Harrison (ed.), Oxford Readings in the Roman Novel (Oxford 1999) 96-106 (= Mnemosyne 34 [1981] 96-106).

24 The prologue of Apuleius’ novel (a mere 119 Latin words) is notorious for the many problems it involves. Cf. A. Kahane and A. Laird (edd.), A Companion to the Prologue of Apuleius’ Metamorphoses (Oxford 2001). The twenty-four discussions in the volume (over 300 pages) all tacitly assume that the prologue is the opening of the novel as Apuleius wrote it (and a majority of contributors support the view that it is Lucius who is speaking there). Surely, in the context of an extensive inquiry to the prologue, the academic question whether it really is the prologue, should at least have been put. Another recent contribution on the prologue is A. P. Bietel, ‘Quis Ille Asinus Aureus? The Metamorphoses of Apuleius’ Title,’ Ancient Narrative 1 (2000-2001) 208-244.


26 Several other attempts have been made to associate the Confessiones and Metamorphoses. Cf. M. Tasinato, Sulla curiosità: Apuleio e Agostino (Parma 1994), an essay on the motif of
Apart from the Apology and the Metamorphoses, several other works of Apuleius have been preserved, but about these Augustine is mostly brief or remains silent. He briefly refers (De Civ. D. 4.2) to the De Mundo, Apuleius' Latin translation of the pseudo-Aristotelian Peri Kosmou but he does not mention either the Florida, a collection of fragments from speeches, or the De Platone, a minor, rather conventional treatise on the teachings of Plato.

Much attention, by contrast, is given to a small, philosophical speech by Apuleius that does not find many readers today but which for centuries was Apuleius' most popular and most influential text, the De Deo Socratis. The small book, with its curious (only partly appropriate) name, deals with middle Platonic demonology. The text was probably delivered as a popular philosophical lecture before a huge audience gathered in a theatre. This rather short text (what is left of it amounts to no more than twenty pages) is the target of a heated discussion by Augustine in books 8 and 9 of De Civitate Dei. This may seem surprising. What prompted Augustine to devote so much space and effort in attacking this innocent little speech?

Let us first have a look at Augustine's text. In books 6 to 10 of De Civitate Dei Augustine discusses various questions concerning pagan polytheism. The earlier books had shown that the pagan cult of gods was by no means a guarantee of success and prosperity on earth, the sad fate of the Roman Empire being a case in point. This in turn now prompts the further question,
whether such pagan cult may be important for life after death. Hardly surprisingly, here too Augustine strongly opposes pagan religion.

In the eighth book of *De Civitate Dei* he enters into discussion with the Platonists. In Augustine’s view they have some ideas that are correct, such as Plato’s concept of a single god, but inevitably they also cherish many ideas that he feels obliged to object to. Among the latter there is the notion, common among middle Platonists, of a partition of the world into three spheres: heaven and earth are inhabited by, respectively, gods and men, whereas the air is the special reserve of *daemones* (demons), beings between gods and men, who share the immortality of the gods and the passions of men, notably that for the theatre. It is these demons that are the main target of Augustine’s discussion, and it is in this context that the name of Apuleius is immediately mentioned (esp. 8.14-22). Augustine explicitly mentions Apuleius’ work about Socrates:

Apuleius tamen Platonicus Madaurensis de hac re sola unum scripsit librum, cuius esse titulum voluit ‘de deo Socratis’, ubi disserit et expont, ex quo genere numinum Socrates habebat adiunctum et amicitia quadam conciliatum a quo perhibetur solitus admoneri ut desisteret ab agendo, quando id quod agere volebat non prospere fuerat eventurum

*(De Civ. D. 8.14)*

The Platonist Apuleius of Madaura wrote a single book about this subject alone, choosing to call it *On the God of Socrates*. In it he discusses and explains to which category of divinities belonged the familiar spirit that Socrates had attached and bound to himself by a kind of friendship, and which, as is generally believed, was accustomed to warn him against a meditated action, when such an action would not have had a happy conclusion. 31

But critical remarks follow right away. Had not Plato rightly banished poets from his ideal state? And was this not done to rob the demons of their pleasures of the theatre? So, Augustine argues, either Apuleius is simply wrong, or Plato gives contradictory advice concerning demons (both allegedly honouring them as well as fighting their pleasures), or, worse still, Socrates’ friendship with a demon is bad (8.14). 32 In that context, Augustine somewhat maliciously suggests that Apuleius himself felt shame to use *de daemone* in his title and deliberately chose the (incorrect) *de deo*. Then follows a passage (8.14) which sums up Augustine’s view of *De Deo Socratis*. Not even Apuleius, so he suggests, could find anything to praise in these demons, except for the combination of fine structure and firmness in their bodies and the loftier region

---


32 Fick [5] 198 not unjustly ranges this argument among the ‘sophisms’ of Augustine preparing for his disqualification of Apuleius’ work.
they inhabit; the demons are bad in many respects, and it is no wonder that they wanted to include shameful stage displays among their sacred rites, and wished to pass themselves off as gods.

In what follows, Augustine resumes the various points raised here. He argues at considerable length that Apuleius' demons really do not have anything that is good. Neither their superior bodies, nor their high position puts them above man, for else we would also be surpassed by birds and other creatures (8.15). And as to their character, Apuleius' text says that they are liable to the same emotions as men, such as confusion or anger. The whole sphere of magic and prophecy belongs to the demons too, something which in Augustine's eyes can hardly count as a recommendation. So why should we honour these demons? Because they are eternal, perhaps? The answer is typical for Augustine: ... quod tempore aeterna, quid boni est, si non beata? ('... that they are eternal in time, what does that profit them, if they are not blessed?' De Civ. D. 8.1634). Christian bliss is unknown to the demons, so their eternity is worth nothing. If Apuleius had at least ascribed some virtus to them, they would have been worth something, although veneration would have to be directed towards God only (8.16).

Apuleius' demons are thus clearly considered from a Christian view and strongly rejected. Augustine's position here must be related to the development of the word 'daemon', which in the course of centuries before him had acquired an increasingly negative sense: it had almost exclusively come to refer to evil spirits and frightful creatures.

For many chapters the church father keeps on attacking the demons with all the arguments his great intelligence and considerable rhetorical talents can furnish: the demons are eternally unhappy, forever prey to emotions, entirely unworthy of our veneration. Again and again Augustine returns to what seems his main concerns: the theatrical love of the demons and the forms of magic with which they were intimately connected. Talking about magic, he subtly adds that it was not only rejected by the Christians, for the earliest of Roman laws already condemned it. And was not Apuleius himself arraigned on account of the very accusation of magic (8.19)?35

33 The point is indeed made in De Deo Soc. 13 (147). All the references in brackets to De Deo Socratis in this article are from the edition by F. Oudendorp, Apuleii Opera Omnia 3 (1823).


A new point of criticism is the notion that demons would stand, as it were, between gods and men. In the Platonic theory, there is no direct communication between gods and human beings, but here the help of intermediate beings is needed. A god who communicates with evil demons rather than with men? This is of course completely unacceptable to Augustine, and he launches a vehement, rhetorically colourful attack against the idea (8.20f.).

A fine example is his concluding argument in 8.21. The question is raised of what the demons have told the gods about Plato’s abhorrence of poetical fictions about the gods. Did they tell them, but remain silent about their own preference for such tales (1)? Or (2) did they keep secret both facts, or (3) tell about both? Finally, (4) they may have remained silent about Plato but expressed their own liking.

This argument with two variables neatly produces four possibilities, which are then subsequently presented as unacceptable: for if (1), the gods would not communicate with the good Plato while keeping in touch with evil demons. If (2), what would be the point of having intermediaries at all, if they suppress the truth? Possibility (3) would even be insulting to the gods and (4) would be the worst option, for it would leave the gods with the bad news only.

The conclusion, then, is clear: Apuleius’ theory is untrue, his demons are bad and should be rejected. They are malicious spirits keen on injustice and evil, holding human beings of light belief spell-bound (8.22).

**Christian View**

This discussion, extending for well over a page, may seem a school exercise in rhetoric rather than a theological discussion, and an inexperienced reader may have some difficulty following it. Apuleius, a great lover of such arguments, might well have been amused by Augustine’s reasoning.

Meanwhile, he could have easily defended himself against several points raised here. For instance, nowhere in *De Deo Socratis* does he mention a specific connection between demons and the theatre,\(^{36}\) and nowhere does he argue that the demons work against men or keep them away from the gods. Moreover, he might have argued that Augustine refers exclusively to the first part of his speech (1-15),\(^{37}\) thereby leaving out of account all that is positive in

\(^{36}\) The point is also made by Fick [5] 198. At most, there is a link in *De Deo Soc.* between demons and religious ceremonies or forms of sacred cult; see *De Deo Soc.* 14 (148-50).

\(^{37}\) The point is made by Hagendahl [2] 682. Hagendahl further observes that Augustine does not refer to Apuleius’ treatise in his *De Divinatione Daemonum* (written between 406 and 411),
it. Augustine tacitly assumes that the demons are always evil, a claim that seems unwarranted by Apuleius’ text. On the contrary, that text even suggests that demons can exert a positive influence on the people they accompany. Thus, Socrates is explicitly said to be restrained by his demon whenever he starts doing something that is wrong or dangerous (De Deo Soc. 17 [157], 19 [162f.]). And this demon is nothing else but the genius, the inborn spirit that can be said to be identical with a person’s mind (De Deo Soc. 15 [151]), or, in a second sense, the guardian spirit that each man receives at birth. This demon is the inseparable witness of every soul, and if it is rightly cultivated by virtuous behaviour, it will offer protection, warnings, and help. It wards off evil and supports the good. No wonder, then, Apuleius concludes, that Socrates honoured this God within him (De Deo Soc. 16f. [155-57]).

It is quite clear that according to Apuleius this highest species of daemones functions as a ‘conscience’ and promotes the good; it must be honoured with purity and justice, after the shining example of Socrates. The notion expressed here can fairly easily be combined with any of the ancient philosophical systems (except, perhaps, Epicurean and Sceptical teachings) and does not show the slightest trace of moral decadence or extravagance.

Augustine’s starting points are, obviously, not those of the source he is attacking. He rather presents the evidence from his own perspective, and then uses logical means to extrapolate matters ad absurdum. His starting points are firmly Christian: demons are evil and they have a strong connection with the theatre. As to the latter view, Augustine is not the first one to adopt it, for it can be found as early as Tertullian’s De Spectaculis. Augustine himself repeatedly refers to the theatrical link with demons, for example, in the famous passage in the Confessiones where he tells of his own fascination for the theatre (Conf. 3.4f.).

Only at the beginning of book 9 of De Civitate Dei, when the discussion of the Apuleian demons has in fact been concluded, Augustine brings up the question of whether there exist good demons, and in that context he mentions Apuleius again (De Civ. D. 9.2f.). But immediately he returns to the point which is crucial for him: the demons’ liability to emotions. He then even quotes from De Deo Socratis, as if to prove that this is conceded by Apuleius (De Civ. D. 9.3; De Deo Soc. 12 (145f.). Except for two minor points, Augustine’s quotation of some 10 lines is accurate, as far as we can see. This seems proof that he had a written edition of the text at his disposal.

38 In De Deo Socratis the existence of evil spirits is not denied, but the class of demons it is mainly concerned with obviously does not belong to that category.

39 De Civ. D. 9.3; De Deo Soc. 12 (145f.). Except for two minor points, Augustine’s quotation of some 10 lines is accurate, as far as we can see. This seems proof that he had a written edition of the text at his disposal.
himself. What he does not tell us, is that the quoted remark about the demons in *De Deo Socratis* forms the starting point for an account of the majestic, eternal gods, who are entirely free of passion, unlike the demons, who, being intermediaries between gods and men, possess characteristics of both. In other words, what Apuleius is concerned with in the context of the lines quoted by Augustine, is not the demons, but the majestic status of the gods.

Several times, Augustine resumes the issue of the demons’ passions (*De Civ. D.* 9.6, 9.7), and the alleged lack of positive qualities ascribed by Apuleius to the demons (9.8). Their place in the cosmos and their inevitable eternal unhappiness are also discussed again (9.12f.).

Finally, Augustine mentions the only real intermediary between God and man, namely Jesus Christ. In his view, demons do exist, but they are only evil spirits who keep men away from the good and lead them into temptation. God does not need any help from demons to communicate with men, whom he can address directly (9.16). Neither does man need the help of demons, but only the intercession of Christ (9.17). At this point, Apuleius’ little work on demons is no longer mentioned.\(^{40}\)

*Other Aims*

Augustine’s concept of demons has clearly been formed by the Christian tradition, whereas Apuleius remained in the Platonic and middle Platonic tradition. Against the background of Augustine’s general aims with *De Civitate Dei*, particularly books 6-10, it is no surprise that he strongly condemns the theories of his African predecessor. He may not even have wished to do justice to Apuleius or the finer points of his teaching, let alone to consider them in the context of middle Platonism. Augustine is not writing a philosophical textbook, but clearly takes sides in a heated debate of great, even essential relevance to himself. Whatever he discusses serves the higher aims he pursues in *De Civitate Dei*.

\(^{40}\) In the scholarly literature on Augustine and Apuleius, the church father’s polemics are generally justified, if they are analysed at all. Even Fick [5], after showing how Augustine uses ‘sophismes’ (p. 198), ‘extrapolation’ and ‘extrème simplification’ (p. 199), so as to make a caricature of Apuleius’ views (p. 200), seems eager to defend Augustine’s approach: ‘Sous l’apparence d’une critique textuelle, la diatribe contre le *De Deo Socratis* revêt les caractéristiques d’une éloquence fidéiste qui utilise toutes les ressources de la rhétorique traditionelle pour affirmer un message exclusif’ (p. 205). Fick points to Augustine’s pastoral concerns: wishing to increase his flock, he does not so much want to convince but to persuade, to invite people to accept a complete, fundamental change, briefly, to be converted (p. 205f.).
Having said this, one cannot help wondering why Augustine reacts in so strong a manner, and why he simply omits the positive aspects of Apuleius’ theory of demons. His attitude may partly be explained by the sheer popularity of the middle Platonic system ‘men—demons—gods’. The notion was widespread, if only because it easily combined with much of ancient philosophy and mythology. Its simplicity and intrinsic clarity must have made it a serious rival to Christian theories on the organization of the world, which are rather more complicated. Faced with the attractive pagan theory, Augustine may have felt obliged to combat it at some length.  

The specific tone and approach may also betray an element of personal concern. To Augustine, with his strong, direct experience of God, it must have been utterly unacceptable that God could not communicate with man, or that man could not reach God, but that both would be in need of intermediate powers. Maybe his own experience was so strong that it prevented him from taking a clear and fair view of the old pagan system. He may simply have been unable to give up some of the fundamental thoughts of his belief, even for the length of the discussion.  

Meanwhile, Augustine’s discussion of Apuleius’ *De Deo Socratis*, for all its one-sided approach, is not as exceptional as it may seem. For many centuries, rhetorical polemics had always aimed at bringing forward one’s own point of view in as powerful a manner as possible, not by carefully scrutinizing the opponent’s theory, but rather by identifying some points that were best suited for strong criticism. Apuleius’ own works, such as the colourful and powerful *Apology*, had been full of such personal polemics, even to the point of insults and invective, depths to which Augustine certainly does not sink here. Posthumously, one could say, Apuleius received no more than his fair share, having become a target of polemic himself. Nonetheless, it remains strange to see how an acute reader such as Augustine could misrepresent his views, in spite of their common background as Africans.  

---

41 One may perhaps add that generally a theory tends to be opposed all the more fiercely as it comes closer to the views held by the speaker himself. This universal notion may be relevant in Augustine’s case as well.
NAUTICAL AND MARINE IMAGERY IN THE PANEGYRICS OF EUSTATHIOS OF THERASSALONIKI

Andrew F. Stone
Department of Classics and Ancient History, University of Western Australia
Crawley, Western Australia 6009, Australia

Abstract. The panegyrics of twelfth-century Byzantium, with their conventional images such as those of the sea, have tended to be disregarded due to a feeling that these images are both derivative and predictable. This is not to appreciate the dynamic interplay between the models from an idealised literary past and their twelfth-century reworkings. Eustathios of Thessaloniki could manipulate audience expectations in this way and was a master of techniques more usually found in poetry.

This study is based on a reading of a representative sample of the panegyrics of the famed late twelfth-century rhetor Eustathios of Thessaloniki. The sample chosen consists of the seven which were edited in the nineteenth century by Wilhelm Regel,¹ and recently re-edited by Peter Wirth in a collection of selected Eustathian opera minora,² and a handful of other encomia, some published by Wirth for the first time,³ others edited by Gottfried Tafel.⁴ This represents the main body of panegyrics composed in the 1167-80 period. During this time, Eustathios held first the chair granted to the μαίστορ τῶν ρητόρων (‘master of the rhetors’) at Constantinople, before receiving the throne of the metropolitan diocese of Thessaloniki in 1176. He did not, however, go to his diocese until 1178, only to return to Constantinople where he sojourned between 1179 and 1180.⁵ The speeches chosen for this study represent the peak of Eustathios’ rhetorical production.

Eustathios is most famous for his erudite and extensive commentaries on the Homeric poems, but his activity as master of the rhetors required him to compose both set-pieces (such as encomia for the emperor on Epiphany,

¹ W. Regel (ed.), Fontes Rerum Byzantinarum 1 (St Petersburg 1892) 1-131 (nos. 2-7)
⁴ T. L. F. Tafel (ed.), Eustathii Metropolitae Thessalonicensis Opuscula (Frankfurt 1832); in particular the oration delivered over the grave of the emperor Manuel I Komnenos (196-214), and other speeches of this period: the so-called ‘First Lenten Homily’ (1-7), ‘The address to a stylite’ (182-96).
6 January, and for the patriarch on Lazaros Saturday, the day before Palm Sunday) and pieces for special occasions, such as the arrival in Constantinople of the French princess Agnes of France in 1179 and her wedding to the crown prince Alexios in 1180, to say nothing of the emperor Manuel I Komnenos' funeral oration in September 1180.6

The genre of panegyric, in particular Byzantine panegyric, has been regarded by many with distaste for being seemingly overly derivative and predictable. As P. Magdalino has noted, Kap-Herr referred to the 'tasteless bombast and hollow rhetoric' of Comnenian literature,7 and Krumbacher, in his key work on Byzantine literature, opined that 'it lacks the freshness of life . . . it is more like a carefully reconstituted mummy than a living organism.'8 We shall come to review this assessment in due course.

It is true that a reading of this panegyrical material does reveal the recurrence of favoured types of metaphor and other imagery. For example, Eustathios, although claiming not to favour them,9 nevertheless displays the contemporary propensity towards metaphors of the sun to describe the emperor (and it may be added, the patriarch). Other favoured images are those from the worlds of farming and gardening, and of the gold, regalia and precious stones worn by the recipient of the oration. The natural world of wild beasts and birds, and of natural phenomena, is also heavily exploited: Eustathios emulates the one who must be considered his primary model, Homer, in this. Also Homeric is the use of analogies from everyday life of the common folk. This mimesis or aemulatio of earlier models has caused recent scholarship to consider the whole question of the degree to which Byzantine literature is original and that to which it is imitative or derivative. In this article I wish to investigate the use of a specific type of imagery, that concerned with sailing and the sea. This is a useful exercise because maritime imagery is among the most conventional types of imagery in Graeco-Roman literature.10 A few interesting, but representative,

---

8 K. Krumbacher, Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur von Justinian bis zum Ende des oströmischen Reiches (527-1453)2 (New York 1897) 17: 'ihr fehlt die Frische des Lebens . . . Sie gleicht mehr einer sorgfältig hergerichteten Mumie als einem lebendigen Organismus'.
10 Indeed, D. Page, Sappho and Alcaeus (Oxford 1955) 182 n. 1 calls the comparison of the city to a vessel 'one of the commonest of commonplaces'; cf. the scholion on
examples from the sample of the author we are interested in will be taken, and then an endeavour will be made to address the question of his originality—does he show any capacity for invention, or does he merely follow in the tracks of his classical and Biblical forebears? Additionally, we shall try to find any other literary merit that Eustathios might have.

But first, we need to define the terminology, only relatively recently gaining currency (since the 1930s), that will be employed in this study. Most are familiar with terminology such as simile, metaphor and allegory (which will be used in the sense of a representation of a real event or situation in the guise of something else, that is, in a sustained metaphor; analogy is by this reckoning a sub-type of allegory). We need, however, to define the three parts of such images: the tenor, vehicle and ground. The tenor in a simile, metaphor or allegory is the thing which is described in terms of another, this tenor generally being expressed in the case of a simile, suppressed but hopefully understood in the case of metaphor or allegory. The vehicle is the image that is used to describe the tenor, whereas as the ground consists of those properties held in common by the tenor and vehicle. For example, in the image ‘he is the helmsman of the ship of state’, the tenor is ‘leader of the state’, the vehicle ‘helmsman of the ship’, the ground ‘commander of that which is commanded’. The less obvious the connection between the vehicle and the ground, the more interesting the image.

Let us commence the survey with what is perhaps the most striking of all the Eustathian nautical images in the sample studied, a descriptive analogy (or, if one chooses to use Greek terminology, the more general term synkrisis), his description of the good helmsman in a speech addressed to the emperor of late 1179.11 The point of comparison is that the emperor, like a good helmsman, is appreciated more in a period of turbulence. The passage runs as follows:

"Επαινεῖται καὶ κυβερνήτης σύν, ὅτε γαλήνιον ἢ ναῦς ἐπισκιρτὰ τῇ θαλάσσῃ καὶ καταχροεῖ τῆς χαράποι, ὅτε καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν πράγμα πλέειν καὶ τὴν χέρσον περιφρονεῖν τηνικάυτα γὰρ ἢ τοῦ κυβερνήτου τέχνη ἐξαθερήζεται, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀν εἰὴ διενηνοχως, μὴ ὅτι γὰρ εἰς τὸ πάν υποδείς προφεῖος τε καὶ εἰ τί ἄλλο ναυτικὸν καταπλουτοῖ άξίωμα· ὅτε δὲ ἢ ναῦς ἐν κακοῖς καὶ ἢ μὲν θάλασσα κορυφοῦται ὡς εἰς ὅρη καὶ λοιπὸν οὐδὲν ἄλλῳ καὶ κατά φάραγγος τοιαύτης βάψαι τὴν νίφα καὶ μακαριστὸν ἡ μήτηρ γῆ τοῖς πλέουσι καταντλουμένοις ὑόκ εὐκταῖρ

Aristophanes, Wasps 29: ἅε ὦ ποιητὰ τὰς πόλεις τοῖς παραβάλλουσι (‘Poets always compare cities to boats’).

A helmsman is not praised when the ship bobs up and down on a calm sea and dances because of its fair aspect, when what is desired is to sail and think about the dry land; for at this time the skill of the helmsman is made light of, and in no way could this be endured, not least because it would lead to total helplessness of the look-out man and of anyone else rich in nautical knowledge; but when the ship is among evils and the sea comes to a head as if into mountains and nothing else, other than (causing) the dipping the ship into such chasms, and mother earth to become most blessed to those sailing and bailing out the water which they did not pray for, the helmsman indeed challenges such terrors and, as if over the plain, he drives either a chariot of the sea, as other poetry says, or a horse, as in Homeric verse. At this time there is no word from the others, who fill the hull, only the excellence of the helmsman is manifest and everyone shouts out his name.

Why, is not that the emperor has also been appointed in the position of a helmsman? And if and when things are terrible, at the particular time he himself remains in his appointed position as a saviour, would he not be the best helmsman in the empire and as much of the world as he rules? Indeed, in all ways.

The vehicle of this analogy is a description of a helmsman during a storm, its tenor, reference to the oration will show, is the emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1089-1183) during the turbulence of his reign, with special reference to his struggle with the Seljuk Turks. Eustathios has already compared Alexios to a lion, a headland resisting the smiting of the waves (to which we shall return), and the key part of a building which keeps the entirety intact in an earthquake. The rhetor wishes to demonstrate the need for an emperor such as this (as presumably the Byzantines have in Alexios' grandson Manuel).

The question is, in the case of the helmsman image, where could one start looking for models? Eustathios makes it clear that he is overtly alluding to earlier poetry. These allusions are in fact to to Homer's *Odyssey* 4.708 (for the horse of the sea: νηών ὄκυπόρων ὤπιβαινέμεν, α' θ' ἀλός ἵπποι, 'they embarked on their swiftly-sailing ships, and mares of the brine'), and Oppian's *Halieutica* 1.190 (for the chariot: ἀμφιπερισκαίροντες ἐνζυγον ἄρμα

---

These are therefore insertions of echoes of ancient literature for the benefit of the more scholarly members of the audience, although the Homeric echo may have been identified by a larger number, given the importance of the Homeric epics in the teaching of grammar among the Byzantines. This phenomenon of verbatim repetition was named by Latin rhetoricians as retractatio. Indeed, the ‘horse of the sea’ developed into something of a topos.13

However, for the passage as a whole, one would be looking for a passage in which a good helmsman is described in similar terms. The helmsman par excellence in ancient lore was the Argonauts’ Tiphys. But a search through Apollonios of Rhodes’ Argonautica turned up no comparable passage. Nor, come to that, did a search through Homer. However, given that Eustathios uses the helmsman image of the patriarch also in his 1176 patriarchal oration,14 it seems likely that the ship of state metaphor, found as early as Alkaios and Theognis15 (where the polis and the aristocratic element within it is compared to a ship and its helmsman), though perhaps better known from the tragedians and Pindar, to name a few,16 continued to be used right up to this time. It is to be noted that our passage is not directly mimetic of any of these early poets. We note however that the occurrence of the word κυβέρνητης (‘pilot’, ‘helmsman’) comes soon after the first word, ἐπαινεῖται (‘is praised’) of this extended analogy. This is a kind of ‘code-word’, a standard allegorical representation for a man in charge, and signals the beginning of the synkrisis. The rhetor wishes to manipulate audience expectations by creating a gratifying tension in the

16 For the use of the helmsman-king equation in Pindar, see Péron [13] 111 (where he discusses Pindar, Pythian 1.86 and 91); cf. also D. Steiner, The Crown of Song: Metaphor in Pindar (London 1986) 67, and for the development of the image of a ship in a storm up to Aischylos, J. Dumortier, Les Images dans la poésie d’Eschyle (Paris 1975) 27-55; it is the Leitmotif of the Seven against Thebes, occurring at 1-3, 32f, 62-4, 283, 652, 760, 795-8; also Persians 656, Agamemnon 1617f., Eumenides 16, 765, Suppliants 440f.; Sophokles, Ajax 1082f., Antigone 163f., 189f., 994; Euripides, Suppliants 473f., 880; Aristophanes, Wasps 29, Frogs 361, 704; as J. Taillardat, Les Images d’Aristophane (Paris 1965) 381 points out, the image had become by Aristophanes’ time banal; cf. Demosthenes, Or. 19.20. For the use of the image in Plato, see P. Louis, Les Métaphores de Platon (Renne 1945) 156.
dynamic interplay between audience expectation and his actual treatment of a topical theme.

As we proceed, we find examples of fine-tuning in the selection of vocabulary. The use of interesting vocabulary within this topical image was no doubt intended to elicit audience surprise. There is the choice of the word ἐπισκίρτω to describe the ship’s bobbing up and down on the waves; the choice of verb, meaning properly ‘to bound up and down upon or over’, could be regarded as ‘intrusive’, as Silk called the phenomenon, and creates a particularly vivid picture of the ship’s buoyancy on a calm sea. Then there is the use of the word χαροσφόν to describe the ‘fair aspect’ or ‘benevolent gaze’ with which the sea accepts the ship on its surface; this, as need hardly be said, is an example of personification. The image of a calm sea and the subsequent depreciation of the helmsman is then further developed by the principle of amplification, or as Hermogenes of Tarsos called it, ‘abundance’.

The adversative δέ breaks off the imagery of calm, and the harsh-sounding κοκοίς (a blessing to the Greek language) prepares us for the second half of the image. There is the choice of the word φάρογξ to describe the chasms between the waves on a rough sea (themselves compared to ὁρή, ‘mountains’, in an extension of the terrestrial metaphor that the chariot suggests); this word φάρογξ does occur in Apollonios, but only to describe a deep cleft between rocks. A very treacherous sea is evoked by the selection of the term. Regel believes that we have a Homeric echo in the choice of the word καταβάσσα to describe waves peaking. It is possible that Eustathios is trying to evoke Iliad 4.426—if he is, the passage is all the more pictorial for it, for in this Homeric passage we have a description of waves crashing against the shore. The destructive power of the waves is in this way emphasised. We may have an echo of Aischylos’ The Seven Against Thebes 16 (τεκνοῖς τε γῆ τε μητρί, φιλάττῃ τροφό, ‘children and mother earth, the dearest nurse’) in Regel 72/31 = Wirth 242/56 where Eustathios talks of ‘Mother Earth’, although this has by now become a topos. An intensifying compound of ἀντλέω (‘bail out’), καταντλομένοις, helps convey the desperation with which the crew members are bailing out water. We might then contrast the ‘mountains’ with ἔπι

---

17 I use the word in a more general sense here than M. S. Silk, Interaction in Poetic Imagery with Special Reference to Early Greek Poetry (Cambridge 1974) 138f. because the ‘intrusion’ discussed by Silk involves the intrusion into the vehicle of words belonging properly to the tenor. We shall see an example of this in due course.

18 This idea is elaborated by H. Rabe (ed.), Hermogenes of Tarsos: Opera (Leipzig 1913) 277-96; C. Wooten (tr.), Hermogenes’ ‘On Types of Style’ (Chapel Hill 1987) 32-54; see A. F. Stone, ‘On Hermogenes’ Features of Style and Other Factors Influencing Style in the Panegyrics of Eustathios of Thessaloniki’, Rhetorica 19 (2001) 307-39.
πεδιάδος (‘over the plain’), at Regel 73/2 = Wirth 242/59, a gratifying irony. Eustathios may be florid, but in a very evocative and pictorial sort of way. Word searches for ἐπίσκυρτα and φώρογξ in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae produced no comparable usages of these words; Eustathios, more than most writers, was capable of applying vocabulary in an original and evocative way, in a style more poetic than prosaic.

There are further merits to the passage, among them the inclusion of aural effects such as the assonance in καταχορεύει τής χαροποδιον19 (‘it dances because of its [i.e., the sea’s] fair aspect’) and μακαριστόν ἡ μήτηρ (γῆ)20 (‘mother [earth] is a most blessed thing’), which by juxtaposition of the latter two words is probably intended to evoke the Blessed Mother of God, Constantinople’s patroness, in addition to the possible echo of Aischylos.

In response to the critic, it must be admitted that Eustathios is also being derivative in this passage. Not only is the helmsman/ship of state allegory a topos, but the image of a rough sea in the latter part of the image invokes similar usage in earlier authors, not only Homer but Aischylos, Pindar and so on, to represent the vicissitudes in life over which one has no control; in particular, one should point out here, war (cf. Theognis 667-81). So it is that correspondingly a metaphor of calm is used to describe the peacetime situation in the 1176 Epiphany oration. The relation between model and copy, however, was a dynamic one. By mention of the rough sea Eustathios, as I have already said in different words, is activating the audience’s familiarity with this vehicle and its varying forms in earlier literature. But one cannot yet call the metaphor of a rough sea a truly dead metaphor; Eustathios, in his 1176 Epiphany oration also betrays the trepidation with which most Byzantines regarded voyaging by sea in the twelfth century;21 indeed, one could argue that Byzantines dreaded the watery element even more than their Greek forebears, for whom seafaring was a way of life; it is precisely because of the reluctance of the Byzantines to have recourse to the sea that the maritime Italian states, Venice, Genoa and Pisa gained trading concessions within the empire, their reward for service in Byzantine naval actions. We shall see other images which play on this fear of the sea at its most powerful in due course.

---

The next image which I wish to consider is the Typhon allegory of Eustathios’ 1176 Epiphany oration.\textsuperscript{22} This is what is said:

\begin{quote}
Οὐχ ἂν οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦ μεγάλου κῆτος σιγῆσωμαι, τὸν νέου Τυφώνος, ὅπως ἦθελε μὲν ἐκ μακροῦ ἀνασαλευθῆναι καὶ φλοίσθην θέσθαι καὶ τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς γῆς εἰς κλάδωνα κατερεύξεθαι, οὐκ εἰχε δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἀλλ’ ὁ βασιλικὸς φόβος ὡσα καὶ σκότος βαθὺς ἐπιπροσθεῖν πίπτον τῇ ὑγείᾳ (ὅποιον δὴ τι πάσχειν καὶ τοῖς βαρυτέροις κῆτεσιν ἔπεσι) μὲνεν τὸν θῆρα ἐπὶ τῶν οἰκείων ἥθιν κατηνάγκαζεν. Ἀλλ’ ὅτε που ἐναγχος ἀνασαλευθεῖ ἐκ τῆς ἑσπέρας ὑπὸ ὀδηγῷ τῇ ἄσθενει θρασύτητι, καθὰ που καὶ ὁ θελάσσιος θὴρ ἡγεμόνα προβάλλεται τοῦ πλέειν ἱχθυδίων τι φαυλόσατον, ἔξεφορε μὲν τινας φολίδας προισχόμενοι ναυμαχικον ὁπλῶν προβλήματα, καὶ τὶς λοφίας ἐξεύθησεν ἀνακύψας θρασύτερον, καὶ τῆς κυματοτρόφου κατεχόμεναν εἰς κένουν, καὶ ποι καὶ εἰς ἀλαζονείαν τινα ἐξεφύτευσε, μικρὸν ὡς ὅσον ὁ μὲν ἡγεμόν τῆς ὁδοῦ, τὸ ποίησαν θράζοι, ἀπίλθην, ὁ δὲ τῆς δειλίας ἀντεπειθὴκε καὶ βαθύτερον ἐπισκεδασθεὶς ἀνακάμψεις ἑκείνου πεποίθησεν ὡς ἄγρας προσαγάμενον καὶ οὐδὲ ἀποκαταστάντα τοῖς οἰκείως ἢθεσιν εἰς ὀλόκληρον, οἷς ἐντούθα κακεὶ προσαρασάμενον ἐκολουθείτο. Τι ἐδὲν, ὁ παρόντες, τὸ θηριόν ἑκείνο πάθοι ἀν ὡσάς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πάσχον κακῶς, οἷς ἔστελεν, εἰ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἡμῶν προσεπειθήσεμαι: ἡ πάντως Αἰτνῆς ἐπέρας ἐγχώπιον δεήσειν, ὡς ἂν τὸ Τυφώνιον τοῦτο πεσεῖται κακῶν.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

I will also not be silent about the things which we applauded in celebration at the time, that is, about the great sea-monster, the new Typhon, concerning how he wanted to be shaken up from afar and to make a roaring noise, and come belching in a wave over our land. But he was not able to do this: the fear of the Emperor, like a deep darkness, falling before his sight, something which occurs to even heavier sea-monsters, forced the beast to remain in its accustomed haunts. But just now it was shaken up from the west by a guide with weak courage, just as I suppose also the sea-beast sends before the voyage a very trifling little fish as leader; it bristled with a few scales, offering a defence against naval weapons, and it revealed something of its dorsal fin, having lifted up its head more boldly and danced triumphantly over the city nurtured by waves in vain, and it also puffed something out in false pretension. But in a little while its leader on the journey, the boldness which guided it, went away; and the darkness of cowardice entered instead, and having spread more deeply, made it return, without capturing its prey, and it was not even reestablished with all its forces in its native abode, to which it was restricted after having being dashed here and there. What, indeed, O ye who are present, would that beast suffer, thus experiencing evil at its own hands on account of the things which it dreads, if our actions were laid on him besides? Indeed in all ways there is a need for another native Etna under which this Typhonian evil will fall. But what it will suffer, the right moment will show, and will give us the occasion for a great and beautiful speech.

\textsuperscript{22} So dated by Magdalino [6] 455.
We see that the image is essentially one of a sea-beast, despite being described as 'a new Typhon' later condemned as a θηρίον ('little beast'), failing to catch its prey due to its fear of the emperor. The mention at the conclusion of the passage of Etna, the famous Sicilian volcano, said to be ἐγχωρίου ('native'), makes it quite certain that the new Typhon (i.e., the vehicle) is an allegorical guise for the Norman rulers of Sicily (the tenor, not expressed but to be understood). The word 'Typhon' therefore is another one of these 'code-words' used to describe allegorically real people or events. In this instance, reference is made to some historical incident, well-known to the audience, but, when the passage is presented to the modern reader, obscured by the rhetor's allusiveness; in an earlier article I suggested that we had reference to a Norman shipwreck off the Balkan peninsula in 1173 or thereabouts, only to revise my opinion following Michael Angold, who is probably right to see a reference to the passage of a Norman fleet through Byzantine waters of July 1174, which did indeed suffer a shipwreck. What the rhetor is doing here is cloaking the occurrence in an allusive allegorical garb for his contemporaries to savour; the function of such allegory was to tease, and the pleasure for the Byzantine audience will have been in understanding the allusion. This is one of the ways Eustathios and other rhetors use allegory. We see much the same thing in his description of the Venetians in the previous paragraph; he calls them ἦ Ἀδριανή πομφόλυξ, ὁ χερστόδρος ὕφις, ὁ τελμιτὶ βάτραχος . . . τὸ πειρατικὸν ἔθνος τὸ ἐξ Ἀδριάνος, τὸ ὄπουλον, τὸ κακόβουλον ('the Adriatic scum, the amphibious serpent, the marsh-dwelling frog . . . the piratical race from the Adriatic, the treacherously festering, evil-plotting one'). For comparison, we see the Normans described as a dragon in the funeral oration.

What is interesting to see in such an instance as we have here is the tailoring of a topos, the imagery associated with the 'code-word', 'Typhon', with its mythological connotations, to a new and specific situation. Once again, the application of topoi to real events involves dynamic interplay. This particular passage is of interest not only to students of literature, but also to historians, because the ‘decoding’ of such an image, that is, arriving at the tenor, could potentially furnish us with additional historical information. Therefore the identity of the ‘trifling little fish’ is of interest, as is the mere fact

that the naval expedition was not led by the Sicilian king in person. Admittedly, this is not as good an example as we find elsewhere, since the rest of the image can be explained: Eustathios crows over the failure of the Sicilian Norman expedition against Alexandria, which required their fleet to pass through Byzantine waters, due to shipwreck. They could have suffered even more, the rhetor claims, had the Byzantines retaliated against them for infringing Byzantine territory.

From the point of view of literary criticism, one can identify a number of points of interest in this passage. First of all there is Eustathios' choice of word for 'roaring noise', φλοίσβων. This word is first used by Homer of the roar of battle in *Iliad* 5.322. Therefore, the choice of the word for the roar of this New Typhon has more martial overtones than it would have had if the rhetor had selected a word such as βροχή, the roaring and gnashing of the teeth of a lion. It should also be noted that the word for 'dashed', προσαρασσόμενος, is used especially of shipwrecks, and, further, the simple verb σαλεώω ('shake') again was used historically technically of ships. The choice of the words, φλοίσβων, άνασαλεώω ('shake up') and προσαρασσόμενος, enacts therefore in a fairly gentle kind of way the device which occurs in poetry which is called by Silk 'intrusion', since the terms belong properly to the tenor rather than the (allegorical) vehicle, and hence 'intrude' within it. Altogether harsher is the intrusion of τοῦ πλέειν ('the voyage'), and προσάχωμεν ναυμαχικῶν ὄλων προβλήματος ('offering a defence against naval weapons').

We also have examples of another phenomenon commented on by Silk, that of 'aural suggestion', the 'belching in a wave' is represented by the Greek words κυλύδωνα κατεπεύξεται, with its gratifyingly clattering κ sounds; even more skilful is the use of θ sounds to show the contempt with which the leader of the expedition should be regarded: ἀσθενεῖ θρασύτητι καθά . . . θαλάσσιος θηρ . . . ἱχθύδιον ('a sea-beast with weak courage . . . a small fish') There is also ἐπέφριξε . . . φολίδας ('bristled with scales', where, by 'aural suggestion', the f and s sounds suggest the bristling), and, as evocative as the repetition of θ, κυματοτρόφου κατεχόρευσεν εἰ κενὸν ('it danced

28 Cf. Stone [5].
29 Silk [17].
triumphantly over the city nurtured by waves in vain’), where there is an antithetical juxtaposition between the nurtured city and the cheated beast.

As for other devices, we might also consider the repetition of parts of the verb ἀνασαλεύω (‘shake up’),\(^{35}\) and the noun σκότος (‘darkness’),\(^{36}\) in the Greek, is both emphatic and serves to knit the passage together as a unit. The same could be said of the repetition of the θράσ- root, on all occasions occurring at the end of a komma.\(^{37}\)

Finally, there is the power of suggestion in choice of vocabulary. The word σκότος, used of the darkness that fell in front of the beast’s (or Sicilian’s) field of vision, is always used in the Iliad of the darkness of death; surely, Eustathios, as a Homeric scholar, wished to evoke this association. Then there is the word ἐξηράσσησε; not only does the word ‘expire’ suggest death, but the ἐξ- prefix in its own right is suggestive of something done to completion, thereby the termination of the beast’s life.

We should therefore concede to Eustathios a considerable measure of rhetorical skill. There is again the question of the combination of the constituent elements of this allegorical ekphrasis. Eustathios, like other rhetors, would try to accomplish a new permutation of the different elements which were at his disposal to use. He would not have been much appreciated by his audience if he were merely repeating the same combination of images used of this foe by someone else. The challenge Byzantine rhetors of the period imposed on themselves was how to create something new each time even though using a limited set of topos.

I would turn my attention next to another helmsman image, this time from the 1174 Epiphany oration.\(^{38}\) This passage draws on the rough sea/war metaphor even more overtly than the above one. In this second passage, the German Crusaders of the Second Crusade are represented as a gigantic wave which once threatened to knock the steering oars out of the ship of state:

καὶ οὐ πολλοῦ ἐγκεχείρισο τὴν τοῦ κυβερνήσιν, καὶ τοίχων εἰπήθην ἐκείνος λογίσασθαι, ὡς ἄρα κύμα τοιοῦτον ἑαυτοῦς κορυφώσαντες ἐκκρούσουσι τοῦ κυβερνήτου τοῦς οίκας καὶ τι κακόν διάθετον τὸ

---


\(^{38}\) Also dated by Magdalino [6] 455.
And not long before, you were entrusted with the government of the universe, and therefore it came upon them to reckon that, by heaping themselves up to a great height like a wave, they would knock the steering-oars out of the helmsman’s hands and place some great evil in this vessel of the world, for which God, having put it together and setting it at another time under other helmsmen, has now found the best man and ceased from his labours.

Eustathios seems particularly fond of the helmsman image, even within our limited sample, he uses it three times. He is also fond of the verb κορυφώ (‘bring to a head’), for it recurs in this passage. There is also an echo of Genesis 1.31 and 2.2 in the conclusion of the passage, but Biblical echoes are again not particularly original. Even the choice of vocabulary is not original; ἐκκρούσσωσι (‘knock out’, 107/7) is not a particularly uncommon verb, and the word σκάφος (‘keel’, 107/9) is commonly used in tragedy by metonymy for a vessel, and indeed of the ship of state. However, the true power of the image is lost in translation, because in the Greek there is a series of harsh κ sounds (ἐγκεχείρισο ... κόσμου ... κυβερνησίν ... ἐκέινος ... κύμα ... κορυφώσαντες ... ἐκκρούσσωσι ... κυβερνήτου ... οίκας καὶ τι κακόν ... οἰκουμένης σκάφος). Bearing in mind that the speech was designed to be heard, the sound-picture thus created helps to emphasise the smiting power of the crusader-wave. Interwoven with this is the recurrence of the broad οὐ sound (κύμα τοιούτων ἑωυτοὺς κορυφώσαντες ἐκκρούσσωσι τοῦ κυβερνήτου) which could suggest the swelling and billowing of the crusader-wave. As we have seen, Silk refers to such evocation as ‘aural suggestion’. We must credit Eustathios here with a near-poetic rhetorical ability.

Before continuing to consider the imagery of waves, we must include in our survey an all-important example of nautical imagery; the ναός-ναῦς (‘church-ship’) equation and the regarding of the patriarch as helmsman of the Church. There is an extensive passage in Eustathios’ 1176 oration for the patriarch, which can be summarised here as follows:

---

41 The speech may be dated by the mention by the rhetor of his coming once again under Michael’s jurisdiction, in this case the relationship being that between the chief patriarch and a Metropolitan bishop.
Thus the affair was settled and the seething was becalmed and the ship of the Church (allow me then to speak in this way in tropes of the Church of God, the sacred ark) remained settled under dexterous helmsmen, both the one who has received the helm of the universe from God most divinely, our emperor, and that most holy and blessed arch-shepherd; when in this way, one of the two oar-steerers, as it seemed good to God, who is pleased with our affairs, was taken up (to heaven); straight away one wave welled up and a second in addition to that relentless one, swollen by the wind, and they wished to roll on to sink the ark, just as if the other helmsman was not ambidexterous and able to manage both of the steering oars; and the most divine emperor having done this and established the ship in safety, so that those sailing in it might not suffer sea-sickness, was concerned to fill the deficiency and receive favourably the one who would assist with the other steering oar; and the most wise emperor showed this understanding and concern, but the most divine bridechamber of the Church in other ways sought its spiritual bridegroom, who will not only stand fast in the spirit of helmsmanship against the tempest so evoked, but will hold fast to the rest of these holy matters.

The context of the passage and its internal content show that we have a maritime metaphor being used here to allude to a disturbance in the Church, which the incumbent patriarch, under the guiding hand of the emperor, had put to rest. The image is then interwoven with a second, topical, image, one with Biblical precedent, that of the Church as a bridal chamber, with the emperor (rather than Christ) as its bridegroom. Here we are struck by the lack of compunction with which the Byzantines would use mixed metaphor. Silk has suggested that this often occurs in early Greek poetry when one of the...

metaphors is felt to be a dead metaphor, but we can appreciate in this instance that surely Eustathios hopes that the underlying marine metaphor upon which the ‘Church as bride’ metaphor is superimposed will be felt vividly.

But here we must ask: to what is Eustathios alluding? Fortunately the allusion is obvious to the student of the history of the Orthodox Church at Constantinople of the twelfth century. In 1170, with the death of the patriarch Luke Chrysoberges, a debate which had temporarily been stilled flared up again. There were two dissenting voices to the emperor’s pronouncement on the correct interpretation of the saying of Christ, ‘My Father is greater than I’ (John 14.28). Both Luke, and Michael Anchialos, in his capacity as ὀπατος τὸν φιλοσόφων (‘consul of the philosophers’), had supported the imperial line (hence the image of a couplet of oar-steerers), namely that Christ the Son was equal to the Father with regard to His divinity but inferior with regard to his manhood. This had been regarded as nonsensical by many of the Orthodox clergy, but Manuel had imposed his doctrine as an act of Caesaropapism. Now two clergymen, two ‘waves’, voiced their disagreement with this pronouncement. Manuel (and Michael) presided over two Synods, one on 30 January of 1170, which denounced the Metropolitan of Corfu, Constantine, the second being on 18 February, which examined John Eirenikos, Abbot of a local monastery (that on Mt Boradeion). Both men were convicted and deposed. The mention of two oar-steerers, one taken up (to heaven, a reference to Luke’s death), resulting in two waves (of dissent) surely make it certain that this indeed is what the rhetor is referring to. It can be appreciated that the imagery of waves, a tumultuous sea, is a topos for any kind of adverse fortune, particularly those which are perceived to be beyond the control of man, and are rather visitations of a wrathful God.

Before passing to the next passage, there are a few minor points of interest from a literary perspective to be noted. First there is what Silk would classify as a ‘glide’ into the metaphor of a ship for the church in έκκλησιοστικὴ ναυς, the ‘neutral’ term έκκλησιοστική, which belongs both to tenor and vehicle, prepares us for the vehicular term ναυς. Then there is the assonance between ἀναλαμβάνεται at the end of a colon and

---

44 Magdalino [6]; Angold [43]; Sakkos [43] 341-44.
ἀναβράττεται near the beginning of the successive colon, terms which are
adversative in meaning, so that the contrast is in this way intensified. The word
Ἀναλάμβανε is paralleled at the end of the successive colon with another
compound of λαμβάνω (‘take’), ἐπιλαμβάνομαι. Finally, there is pointed
use of the dual number, particularly in οἰκοστρόφοι, to describe the
patriarch-consul couplet, which suggests their equal importance in the
navigation of the Church-ship. The way that the nautical image is sustained, the
suggestion that disruption, ‘sea-sickness’, was avoided due to the action of the
emperor in appointing Michael Anchialos to the patriarchate, is also noteworthy
(is it too far-fetched to suggest that the μ and ε sounds in ἐμπλέοντας . . .
ἐμελέταν are suggestive of the struggle to stop vomiting?).

Let us continue to consider the imagery of waves. Although I could
adduce three of these from the sample, I shall focus only on the
chronologically latest passage of wave imagery, a simile from the oration of late 1179:

καθάπερ οι κρατερῶς ἐρριζώμενοι προβλήτες, ὅτε ποτὲ καὶ
καταστεἰσθεῖν κυμάτων ἐμβολαῖς, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἀγγελῶς μεταπιπτοῦσιν,
ἀλλ' εἰς προβλήτας πάλιν ἵστανται καὶ τὰ κύματα μάτην πονοῦν,
προσαπασόμενα, οὕτω καὶ τῆς στρατιάς πρόβολοι, οἱ κρατερῶς ὑπὸ
σοφοῦ τεχνῆ τεθεμέλιωνται τῷ θεῷ, οὐκ ἄν ποτε καταπέσοιεν.  

. . . just as those headlands which are strongly rooted, when at some
time they may be shaken by the tossing of waves, not even because of this
ignobly fall afterwards, but resist as headlands and the waves labour at their
smiting in vain, thus also those projecting forward of the army, who are
powerfully founded under the wise architect God, would not ever fall.

The tenor is the commander of the army, in this case the emperor Alexios
I (we alluded to this passage above on the first helmsman image), the vehicle a
headland such as we find in the Homeric Iliad 2.394-97. It is probably
worthwhile to reproduce the passage here:

---

205/5-20
So he spoke, and the Argives gave a great cry, as when a wave is sent upon a sheer cliff, when the south wind comes on the craggy headland; the waves do not keep off it, blown by every type of wind, coming at times here and others there.

It can be appreciated that there are no direct echoes of this passage in Eustathios, we have *aemulatio* rather than *verbatim retractatio*, even though the basic idea of a headland resisting the waves is repeated. The choice of these words, προβλήτες (‘headlands’) 52 and κυμάτων (‘waves’), 53 is the same in both Eustathios and Homer, so that in Eustathios they would seem to be acting as ‘key-words’ which activate the audience’s memory of the Homeric passage. Accordingly, there is a dynamic interplay or tension between the parent simile and that created by Eustathios. We may care to compare it also with Sophokles, *Oidipous at Kolonos* 1240-48. The Homeric wording is, however, closer.

What original touches does Eustathios use? Well, once again the repetition of κ is used to evoke the smiting power of the sea (κατασεισθείειν κυμάτων 54) and, what is interesting, as with the first passage dealing with waves that we examined, the dull thud of enemy/waves on the resisting emperor/headland is suggested by the repetition of π (εἰ προσβλήτας πάλιν . . . πονοῦνται, προσπαρασσόμενα . . . πρόβολοι 55).

We come finally to a clever image from the Nicholas Hagiotheodorites funeral oration. The rhetor here again talks of the way in which the deceased archbishop of Athens can no longer exercise his art:

1 Ἐχονσι τὸ τῶν πράξεων τελεσφόρημα, κάνταθα πέλαγος ἐγκωμίων αὐτοῖς παρανοίγεται καὶ εἰς ἄπλετον ἀναχέεται. Καὶ εἰθε μοι καὶ αὐτῷ ἢ ἐπαρκοῦν πνεῦμα πρὸς τοιοῦτον πλοῦν· ἢ γάρ ἄν ὄκνησα τούτον καὶ ἢ φορτὶς εἰχέν ἀν τὸ ποθούμενον. Νῦν δὲ μὲ τὸ πάθος ἄνακόπτει καὶ κατακολπίζειν ταχὺ προτρέπεται. 56

---

Their actions are brought to fulfilment and here a sea of encomia is opened for them and it flows out boundlessly; and if only there had been for me and him sufficient wind to sail for a voyage of this kind! Indeed even I myself would not have shrunk from this and my vessel would have achieved the desired end; but now suffering cuts me short and urges me to harbour swiftly.

Remarkable here is the quadruple meaning of the word πνευμα: 57

(1) it signifies the wind which drives a sailing-ship.
(2) it signifies the animating breath of life, of which the dead metropolitan is now devoid.
(3) it refers to the breath required to make a speech.
(4) it even suggests the rhetorical ‘inspiration’ which the rhetor would require to do the metropolitan justice.

Eustathios here has doubled the double-entendre of which Byzantine rhetors were so fond.

We might also note here the πέλαγος (‘sea’), the vehicular ‘code-word’, evokes the idea of infinite extent (elaborated by the term εἰ ἄπλετον, ‘boundlessly’), and the allegory of the speech as a voyage, is developed accordingly. For a model, one poet who comes to mind is Pindar. 58 As in this poet, the literary creation is compared to a vessel tracing out its course. Again πνευμα is both the wind which drives the vessel and the inspiration of the litterateur. Eustathios’ image is clever in exploiting this multiple meaning of word, but he did have precedents.

In our survey, we have seen analogies and other types of allegory, allusion and echoes, passages which are original, and indeed which one can put on a par with poetry, since poetic devices, ‘intrusion’, ‘aural suggestion’, ‘pivot’ and ‘glide’ are employed. However, on the other hand there are clear examples of emulation and derivation. There is therefore a mixture of degrees of originality; there is recapitulation of the greats (in the employment of the time-honoured tradition of retractatio and mimesis), alternating with the employment of a well-worked topos in a novel new way, and with original but what can only be regarded as gratuitously self-conscious tours de force. But the presence of emulatory or mimetic passages would not have demeaned them in the eyes of a Byzantine. In the twelfth-century, with an empire focused in extent more closely on the capital, a Hellenising ‘nationalism’ arose,

57 Wirth [2] 10/65
demonstrated by the writings of several authors, such as Anna Komnene. At such a time there was nostalgia for an idealised literary past, and litterateurs delighted in activating their fellows' knowledge of the Greek literary tradition by dropping allusions to it in their works. Audience anticipation could alerted by the use of a topical ‘code-word’ here, the use of an allusion to literature there, and the pleasure for the audience would hopefully arise from the tension created between the similarities and differences in the way in which the rhetor treated his subject. Magdalino has compared the exercise of delivering imperial panegyric to executing elaborate manoeuvres within a confined space.\textsuperscript{59}

In conclusion then, we should not assume that Eustathios, as an example of a Byzantine panegyrist, was necessarily devoid of creative capacity. Eustathios could at times employ clever word-play and evocative sound pictures. Even where he was drawing on sanctioned topoi and the Hellenic literary tradition, he used this to good effect. It can be said that Eustathios must have been successful at the game of manipulating audience expectation for so many of his works to come down to us. As in the case of other authors of the time, the Hellenic tradition and the Bible alike supplied inspiration, and echoes of these two pillars of Byzantine civilisation were combined by Eustathios in a quite natural way. Therefore we might refute Krumbacher’s claim that Byzantine rhetoric, though elaborate, was dessicated; that of Eustathios, if it were read aloud to a student of Greek literature of the time, would have seemed vital and evocative of a glorious literary past, despite the use of even the most clichéd imagery. Eustathios’ rhetoric lives if we care to read it a little more closely.

\textsuperscript{59} Magdalino [6] 353.
WAR AS ADDICTION

Tom Stevenson
School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics, University of Queensland
Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia


This volume sprang from papers presented at a colloquium held in June 1996 at the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, D.C.\(^1\) The editors have sought to produce a book about the social history of war in the pre-industrial age. They have encouraged their contributors to write not about army organisation, battles, tactics and so on, but about the social and political contexts of war and also about the interrelationship between war and the institutional structures of the various states surveyed. The result, aimed at both the specialist and the non-specialist (pp. vii, 3), is a volume of broad scope with much potential for comparison and cross-fertilisation. It certainly comes across as a work of solid scholarship and interesting insights which should appeal to a wide audience.

A variety of general points can be made. For a start, there is a pleasing overall coherence to the collection. Each chapter contains approximately thirty pages, with around twenty pages of text and ten or so of endnotes and a generous bibliography. All the writers appear to have attained a uniformly high standard. I found that even those

chapters on topics completely new to me (e.g., Mayan warfare) were both readable and comprehensible. The editors and contributors deserve great credit for these and other positive features. As an introductory textbook for an American college course on war and society, it would be hard to beat the book under review. Yet in any light it stands as a useful and authoritative work about the ‘social history of war from the third millennium B.C.E. to the tenth century C.E. in Europe and the Near East, with parallels of Mesoamerica and East Asia’ (p. 2). As a classical scholar, primarily a Romanist, I was naturally interested in the content of the Greek and Roman chapters, especially since the editors are well known for their contributions to the study of Greek and Roman war respectively. I was also hopeful that comparisons with other pre-industrial societies might prove illuminating. The relevant chapters did not disappoint for high quality and innovation.

Kurt Raaflaub’s chapter on ‘Archaic and Classical Greece’ (chapter 6, pp. 129-61) contains a condensed version of the case he has been developing in recent years against the pervasive idea that there was a ‘hoplite revolution’ in ancient Greece. According to the traditional view, military change prompted political change. In other words, the rise of hoplite warfare created a class of powerful men who subsequently challenged the aristocracy for political rights. Raaflaub argues for a more nuanced version of polis development. He sees economic, social and political changes producing the hoplite phalanx ca. 650 BC (p. 134). Population growth produced a rise in the number of landholders and saw competition for land intensify. Massed forms of fighting proved effective in repelling invaders. Military and technological reforms accompanied rather than caused such warfare. Hoplite battles had a strong ritual character; the idea was to defeat rather than to annihilate. There was a long evolution rather than a hoplite revolution (p. 135).

Why did the hoplite style of open-terrain fighting last so long? For a start, the fighting was taking place on the hoplites’ own land. In addition, as time passed the system was maintained for the sake of tradition, shared values and social prejudice (p. 137). Hoplite warfare was for prestige rather than for the survival of a polis (p. 138). Sparta was an exception to the rule: her hoplites were ‘permanent and essential’ rather than ‘occasional and ritual’ (p. 139). The existence of egalitarian structures in poleis at the end of the archaic period was not the result of hoplite pressure on the aristocracy as a class. It had more to do with recognition of the detrimental effects of aristocratic competition. Instability resulting from such competition made the polis vulnerable, and so the entire community, elites plus masses, opted for the more egalitarian model for purposes of stability (p. 140). It seems certain that the evolutionary model is destined for severe questioning and refinement in the future, but there can be little doubt that it provides a stimulating and generally plausible alternative to the revolutionary model which has held sway for so long.

In the second part of his chapter, Raaflaub describes how the emergence of naval warfare in the fifth century BC made war permanent, professional and total. Athens’ decision to commit to a large-scale fleet was pivotal. Politics and wars henceforth increasingly involved large alliance systems and empires (p. 132). Scholars
have argued that the rise of naval warfare was crucial to the rise of democracy because it enabled the *thetes*, indispensable to the fleet as rowers, to win political concessions from the upper classes. Once again, Raaflaub believes that the process was more complex. Athenian hoplites, for instance, were supporters of democracy too (p. 141). His preferred view is that Athenian society as a whole embraced enthusiastically the structures and consequences of empire-maintenance by means of a large fleet. This included the gradual realisation that, since war had become more intense and ‘total’ (p. 141), the *thetes* had to be integrated politically (p. 145). Fifth-century Athens emerges as a hybrid between intermittent and permanent warfare—and also between foreign and Greek forms of imperialism.

Charles D. Hamilton’s chapter on ‘The Hellenistic World’ (chapter 7, pp. 163-91) opens with an effective summary of developments in Greek warfare in the fourth century BC, especially the rise of peltasts and mercenaries and the increased role of cavalry. It was the reforms of Philip II, however, which were decisive for Macedonian success and the form of later Hellenistic armies (pp. 166-71). Revenues from the mines of Mt Pangaeus funded a professional army that was marked by payment for service and use of the *sarissa*. The success of this army imbued the Macedonian soldier and the *sarissa* phalanx with an almost sacred aura. This was perhaps a big reason why the phalanx failed to adapt when faced by the flexible, manipular legions of Rome. Philip and Alexander may have been esteemed too highly (p. 185). Several interesting views are floated during the course of this discussion: there was considerable emigration of Macedonian hoplites to Asia and into Hellenistic armies (that is, it was not just a matter of non-Macedonian hoplites being armed in Macedonian fashion; p. 174); and divine kingship was a vital integrating mechanism in the east (p. 179).

Nathan Rosenstein’s chapter on ‘Republican Rome’ (chapter 8, pp. 193-216) seems to be a distilled version of a forthcoming book. Its central thesis is that war helped Rome to mitigate socio-economic and political conflicts. The major issue was not so much ownership of land but access to public land (*ager publicus*). Small farmers, it is argued, depended on access to *ager publicus* in order to make ends meet. Perhaps certain matters will be made clearer in the larger scope afforded by a book, but I wondered about the ways in which access to *ager publicus* might have assisted the profitability of small farmers. Were they after pasture or an extra plot for cultivation? How would such land relate to their ‘family’ plots and to the religious connotations of ancestral land? It seems unlikely that contiguous plots of land were at issue, so how precisely did the exploitation of *ager publicus* by small farmers work in practice? And if conflict between rich and poor Romans for access to *ager publicus* was palliated by war, it was apparently not solved by war (p. 198). Each Roman conquest in Italy was followed by land confiscations that created a new class of needy people. One group in need was only satisfied by creating another group in need. So

---

why maintain an imperfect ‘solution’? Rosenstein’s answer seems to be that the Romans (and subsequently the Italians) were content with a string of ad hoc solutions. Of course, this accords with much ancient practice and it has a reasonably plausible air, especially for the period of Roman expansion in Italy. Yet even if one is prepared to allow that Roman war-making was inextricably tied to constant pressure for land and expansion, several additional questions arise. In describing how the Roman war-machine adapted to the never-ending demands placed upon it, Rosenstein emphasises that the introduction of pay during the Samnite wars enabled Rome’s soldiers to stay in the field longer (p. 201). At this point, it is argued, recruits into the legions became those in their teens and twenties who were not primarily responsible for the profitability of family farms (p. 202). In addition, Roman war increased the number of prosperous farmers who paid the tax which funded military pay (tributum) (p. 202). Pay and longer service permitted the development of the manipular army, ‘the most effective infantry the ancient world ever knew’ (p. 203). It is even said that the Romans credited the maniples rather than their commanders with victories, so that iteration of the consulate became less common in the middle and late republics (p. 205). This seems to underestimate the esteem in which great military commanders were held. It also masks the military reasons behind iteration of the consulate during (say) the Second Punic War, and it tends to deny the extent of political opposition to iteration of the consulate which existed in the second and first centuries BC.

At any rate, this reconstruction certainly stands at odds with the traditional theory of Peter Brunt and others that Rome experienced a manpower shortage and decline in the number of small farms and farmers in the second and first centuries BC.\(^3\) I would like to see more work done on the younger brothers and other recruits who were apparently not vital for the profitability of their ancestral farms (p. 207). Rosenstein repeats that the problem was not one of declining smallholders and recruits but of access to the ager publicus. He does concede, however, that landlessness and poverty are crucial to understanding the army of the late republic and its impact on society (p. 208). So to some extent the debate remains a matter of relative wealth and a matter of the viability of farms in relation to one another. Are we left with a situation substantially different in its consequences? Rosenstein is inclined to downplay the significance of the ‘client’ army and to think that no socio-economic crisis precipitated the fall of the republic: most soldiers continued to serve Rome rather than their generals; soldiers did not fight to overthrow the res publica; they all hoped to join rather than overthrow the status quo; they did not question the legitimacy of the traditional order; Caesar’s legions were loyal to Caesar and the republic, and not necessarily in that order (pp. 209f.). This seems a bit too one-sided. It tends to underestimate the personal loyalty that soldiers felt for men like Pompey, Caesar and

Augustus; it downplays the severe questioning of the morality of Rome’s leaders which is a major feature of the second and first centuries BC; and in general it misses the point that it is tension between loyalty to the general and to the res publica that is the crucial thing; this tension continued well into the imperial period, even after Augustus ended the problem of landlessness in Italy by putting an end to confiscations and assigning discharged legionaries to colonies in Italy and overseas. In the end I find myself stimulated but also perturbed by aspects of this chapter and want to read the forthcoming book to appreciate the argument in more detail.

Brian Campbell writes about the relationship between the Roman imperial army and the provincials in chapter 9 (pp. 217-40). The army which began under Augustus as a permanent, professional occupation force of Italians gradually became a force of non-Italians with strong local ties. In fact, in opposition to theories which highlight the separation of soldier from civilian under the empire, Campbell emphasises the integration of the army into its local area. Its economic impact was considerable: canabae grew up around legionary camps (p. 224) and vici around auxiliary camps (p. 225). These provide evidence for a range of trade, supply and social contacts. By the second century CE, recruiting was largely conducted on a local basis (p. 226). The process of Romanisation probably owed more to the army than to the Roman elite, who had little in common with rural dwellers in the countryside (p. 227). When change occurred in the third and fourth centuries CE with the development of mobile field armies, traditional Roman conservatism meant that it took some time for the full consequences to be felt. The soldiers’ local links and loyalties actually helped the resilience of the empire during the third-century crisis (p. 233). Subsequently, the enlistment of ‘barbarians’ meant that the ‘Roman’ army became a non-Roman mercenary force. Local loyalty bonds between soldiers and civilians were finally broken (p. 235). This led in the west to the collapse of imperial power through the inability to find and maintain reliable soldiers (p. 236).

It might be said, then, that the Greek and Roman chapters are innovative and solid by turns, and each is valuable in its own right. What is also valuable, it seems to me, is the clear demonstration through comparison that war for the Greeks and Romans was not, as the sources so often imply, merely a response to external aggression or a matter of fear or revenge. Alongside such psychological and specific factors, there were institutional and general factors which link the Greek and Roman experiences of war with the experiences of other pre-industrial societies as they emerge from this collection of studies. The most important point to note is that warfare is pervasive in human society (p. 440). It often depends on an agricultural surplus, which permits the formation of large armies, and major population growth over time is commonly responsible for territorial friction and war (p. 423). The reasons for war seem to be rational. Time and again, the contributors to this volume describe political or economic reasons for war which brought material benefits to the societies concerned (p. 441). It was also a matter of ritual and prestige (e.g., p. 442), though scholars (especially anthropologists) seem to have over-estimated the ritual aspects (p. 420). Geography and terrain are crucial to the particular experience (p. 444). Western
military systems have perhaps shown a greater readiness to change, and they have certainly been more inclined to obliterate and to send forces beyond their borders (p. 445).

As to the future of war, Victor Davis Hanson and Barry S. Strauss sound a number of pessimistic notes in the ‘Epilogue’ (chapter 16, pp. 439-53). Given that humans are essentially vain, fearful and illogical, and that we depend upon natural resources so heavily, ‘war is likely to continue forever’ (p. 452). Regrettably, this may be so. But is it inevitable? One lesson from this book is that pre-industrial war was a rational business. Another is that protracted war and protracted peace contribute to their perpetuation (p. 426). War is a habit, a learned behaviour, ‘a societal addiction’ (p. 427). This implies that it can be unlearned if the collective will can be made strong enough. It can hardly be made a less attractive habit.

LITERATURE AND RELIGION IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE


Alex Nice
Department of Classics, Reed College
Portland, Oregon 97202, USA

The last decade has been kind to Valerius Maximus.¹ In the latest offering Hans-Friedrich Mueller argues that the rhetoric of virtue observable in the exempla of the Facta et Dicta Memorabilia is saturated with the vocabulary of ritual and ‘traditional’ Roman religion. This, he suggests, has implications for the intersection of morality in imperial Rome and demonstrates that Roman religion, for Valerius and the Roman populace of Tiberius’ day, has a strong emotional content. Mueller, therefore, also contributes to recent debates regarding Roman religion and supports views which would argue that the Livian depiction of Roman religion as somewhat static and

strictly controlled by the mechanisms of the republican state conceals a far richer vein of religious and divinatory activity.  

The introductory chapter stresses the importance of Valerius’ preface and invocation of Jupiter for Tiberius. Mueller argues that the *alacritas* towards the emperor is not simply a rhetorical standpoint. This is the kind of enthusiasm likely to be bestowed on a pre-eminent political figure who was also *pontifex maximus*. Tiberius is regarded as a god on earth, created by men to be sure, but one whose close connection with the other deities ensures the survival of Rome and its people. In turn this divine status is closely associated with Tiberius’ promotion of *virtus* and the punishment of vice (*vitia*). From the outset then Mueller establishes his central theme that ‘religion and virtue in Valerius are inextricably linked’ (p. 20).

Chapter 1, ‘Juno Valeriana’ (pp. 21-43), is the first of three to consider *exempla* pertinent to the state deities: Juno, Vesta and Jupiter. The Valerian Juno is one concerned with *pudicitia* in particular, which for Valerius was essential to the political stability of the state. She has the power to punish and even to kill as in the case of Q. Fulvius Flaccus who had marble tiles brought from the temple of Juno Lacinia in Locri to Rome (Val. Max. 1.1.20; pp. 35-39). This episode also reveals something about Mueller’s (and Valerius’) methodology. The confusion over the temple of Juno at Locri with that at Croton, in addition to the topographical confusion over the temple of Juno Moneta, is not of significance since it is the *exemplum* that matters and what Juno could mean rhetorically. The emphasis is on how people should respond. In this case the senate, on behalf of the Roman state, corrected the irreligious act of Flaccus and ordered Juno’s property restored *circumspectissima sanctitate* (‘with prudent sanctity’, 1.1.20). Valerius expects himself and his audience to act with the same reverence and regard for the gods (which include Tiberius).

In chapter 2, ‘*Vesta Mater*: Mother Vesta’ (pp. 44-68), the concept of *pudicitia* is also important but especially so since Vesta’s power revolves around the chaste conduct of her priestesses who maintained Vesta’s hearth. Of the ten examples the first five examine the conduct of individual Vestals, the latter five Vesta herself. Through the examples we see the importance of duty, piety and reverence through prayer for the goddess. Mueller is also careful to exploit the contemporary relevance of Vestal chastity, equating it with the chastity of Livia and women of the imperial household. Vesta’s power also extends to the protection of the state and the liberty of its male citizens. The example of the plebeian L. Albinius who ordered his family from his cart so that the *flamen Quirinalis* and the Vestal Virgins might ride in it is a case in point (Val. Max.1.1.9; pp. 63-65). He sacrifices his private concerns for the religion of the state just as Metellus sacrificed his eyesight to save the Palladium (Val.  

---

Max. 1.4.4; pp. 56-59). Furthermore in the case of Clodius, the Lentuli and Cicero social harmony is regarded as better than political enmity (Val. Max. 3.5.4, 4.2.4; pp. 59-63). Clodius acts as a friend to his former enemy Lentulus while gazing on the shrine of Vesta, which is an indication, in Mueller’s view, of the kind of stabilising religious force necessary for good political and legal practice.

Some thirty-four of Valerius’ exempla refer to Jupiter. Chapter 3, ‘In Jovis Sacrario: In Jupiter’s Inner Sanctuary’ (pp. 69-107), is partly divided between Roman and foreign Jupiters. The main focus of the chapter, however, is Jupiter’s special relationship with Scipio Africanus. This allows Valerius to relate Scipio’s pretended relationship to his contemporary situation and Tiberius’ association with divinity. Religion, politics and virtue are intertwined. Even if Scipio simulates his religious relationship the people have a duty to follow him just as they have a duty to Tiberius in Valerius’ own day. In a sense Scipio is a proto-Tiberius. Jupiter is Tiberius’ special protector and Tiberius is portrayed accompanying the gods (Val. Max. 5.5.3), gods that include Piety, Virtue and Jupiter. For Mueller this is a ‘lonely’ ride (p. 89) but given the strong connection between this portrayal and the invocation of the preface we might legitimately wonder if another interpretation is not possible. In this portrait Tiberius is a man removed from the mortal realm taking his rightful place in the company of those with whom he is most inextricably associated in Valerius’ world view—the immortal gods.

There is a Livian theme in the acceptance of divine messages from Jupiter. If they are accepted and acted upon then success follows. If not, as in the case of Latinus, disaster ensues. The discussion of foreign Jupiters allows Mueller to cast vitriol against foreign leaders, contrasting Roman moderatio (for example, the self-control of Horatius Pulvillus who bore his grief without emotion [Val. Max. 5.10.1; pp. 84f.]) with foreign intemperance (for example, Alexander the Great [Val. Max. 9.5.ext.1; pp. 95f.]); we may add the expulsion of the astrologers and Jews (Val. Max. 1.3.2; pp. 100f.) which likely had contemporary significance) and Dionysius of Syracuse (Val. Max. 1.1.ext.3; pp. 96f.). He is also able to explore Valerius’ understanding of individual free will (voluntas). This is most aptly demonstrated in the example of Hannibal and a dream in which he viewed the destruction of Italy by an enormous snake (Val. Max. 1.7.ext.1, pp. 100f.). In the exemplum, despite the explicit warning of Jupiter not to look back, Hannibal does so. Mueller suggests this is different from the Livian version which does not have the same hostility to voluntas. However, in Livy the act of looking back may be seen as foreshadowing Hannibal’s eventual lack of success in Italy. In this sense neither version differs greatly from the other. A Roman, like Scipio or Tiberius, would presumably follow Jupiter’s advice and success would ensue.

Chapter 4, ‘Ritual Vocabulary and Moral Imperatives’ (pp. 108-47), is more generally concerned with the role played by ritual in Valerius’ moral rhetoric. The chapter begins with the example of Papirius Cursor (Val. Max. 7.2.5; pp. 108-17) who received a false report from the keeper of the sacred chickens and subsequently placed the lying ministrant in the front line whereupon he was killed by the first spear cast.
This exemplum allows Mueller to compare the Valerian version with that of Livy. The latter retains an archaic tone, distancing it from the present; Valerius uses the language of ritual to impose on his audience the message that the gods care about the conduct of individuals and as such it becomes part of the language of moral persuasion. The chapter trawls various aspects of republican religious practice: divination by liver, military imperium and the taking of the auspicio, sacrifice, ritual violation (vitia). These lead to more general observations about the relationships between friends and family, public interest and private grief, state cult and personal interest.

Chapter 5, ‘Sanctitas Morum, or the General Intersections of Religion and Morality’ (pp. 148-74), purports to examine how religion intersects with morality in general terms, first by looking at virtue and then at religion to examine how the ancient search for virtue appealed to divinity and the sacred as part of its procedure. From the elements of virtue of Valerius’ book 3, Mueller skims through humanitas and clementia (Val. Max. 5), the importance of religion in lawcourt trials (Val. Max. 8), ‘Justice’ (Val. Max. 6.5; pp. 161-63); marital affection (Val. Max. 4.6; pp. 163f.); freedom which is situated somewhere between virtue and vice (Val. Max. 6.2; pp. 164-66); vice (pp. 166-68); repentance and reverence (pp. 168-72); faithful devotion (pp. 172f.). The author attempts to demonstrate that the rhetoric of these exempla, to which the Roman youth should apply themselves with ‘reverent devotion’ (p. 173), is increased by the continual presence of the gods, of religious vocabulary, and by the genuine religious emotion that he observes from the outset of the Facta et Dicta Memorabilia.

Mueller’s work ranges widely. He is careful to draw on and to compare the Valerian exempla with his predecessors, Cicero and Livy in particular, and shows how he anticipates the emotional outpourings of later Christian writers. Mueller consistently argues for an association of ‘traditional’ republican ideals and practice with the religious and ideological programme of Augustus and Tiberius wherein Roman religion was intrinsically bound to morality. It was somewhat disappointing then that nowhere does the author attempt to define the concept of ‘traditional’ religion upheld by Valerius Maximus, especially given new approaches to republican religion. For example, Cicero’s concept of ‘traditional’ Roman religion must have been very different from that of his colleague and friend, Appius Claudius Pulcher, who believed in the prophetic power of augury.

There were a few minor problems in Mueller’s analyses. In chapter 1 (pp. 27f.) L. Aemilius Paullus (Val. Max. 5.10.2) who lost his sons is said to have ‘invok[ed] Juno by name’. Footnote fifty-three reveals that Juno is solicited but only as one of the Capitoline Triad. Mueller’s discussion of the scourging of a vestal by P. Licinius, 3 For example, see the collection of essays in E. Bispham and C. Smith (edd.), Religion in Archaic and Republican Rome and Italy: Evidence and Experience (Edinburgh 2000); D. C. Feeney, Literature and Religion at Rome: Cultures, Contexts, and Beliefs (Cambridge 1998).

3 For example, see the collection of essays in E. Bispham and C. Smith (edd.), Religion in Archaic and Republican Rome and Italy: Evidence and Experience (Edinburgh 2000); D. C. Feeney, Literature and Religion at Rome: Cultures, Contexts, and Beliefs (Cambridge 1998).

pontifex maximus, because she allowed the flame to go out is compared to Livy 28.11.6. The date should be 206 BC, not 207 BC. Here Mueller forces his comparison when he argues that Livy ‘feels some need to justify the severity of the punishment’ (p. 48). Levene suggests that there is nothing unusual in this prodigy notice. Indeed the expiation by means of full-grown victims and a day of prayer at the Temple of Vesta would seem to be in keeping with Livy’s normal procedure for reporting prodigies. Another example of a forced interpretation seems to be at pp. 39f. where he suggests that Valerius does not cast any doubt on miracles. This is not what Valerius says. Rather he suggests that one should not omit the unexplained, allowing the reader to interpret miracula as evidence for the influence of deities on the natural world. Indeed, this passage could be read in much the same way as Livy’s preface (especially sections 6f.) which argues for the inclusion of material that he knows to belong to the realm of myth. On p. 118 Mueller suggests that priests in the republic were ‘free agents’. This phrase is left inadequately explained. The attribution of Valerius as ‘middle brow’, a phrase originally introduced in the introduction (p. 2; attributed to Weileder at p. 106) requires fuller explanation as to what this means in the context of Roman society of the early empire. More troublesome was Mueller’s analysis of ‘divination by liver’ (pp. 118-21) and of ‘sacrifice’ (pp. 125-27). Mueller failed in these sections to adequately differentiate between Etruscan extispicy and Roman litatio. Finally, in discussing Val. Max. 9.11.ext.4 at p. 179, Mueller was not troubled by the debate over the date of publication of the Facta et Dicta Memorabilia, noting that Valerius ‘makes no mention of Capri, Macro, or even Sejanus’ name’ but yet takes the passage to imply Sejanus’ rupture of the bonds of friendship (p. 180).

Despite its title, this is not really a book about religion in Valerius Maximus. Mueller does not offer, for example, as one might expect, a detailed analysis of book 1, which deals of itself with material appropriate to religion and divination. It is something of a surprise that he comments on Valerius’ categorical, rather than chronological organisation. Mueller himself largely eschews this approach. Throughout the book, which ranges widely and attempts an all-inclusive analysis of Valerius’ approach to religion, Mueller’s concentration on the human elements follows his source. He is interested in how religious vocabulary and references assist Valerius’ depiction of human example to imitate or to avoid. The structure of the book is partly a commentary, partly a series of vignettes, which address the intersection between rhetoric, morality and religion. Mueller encourages us to see Valerius Maximus not as a ‘mere compiler’ but as an author in touch with past, present and

---

5 D. S. Levene, Religion in Livy (Leiden 1993) 66.
6 Cf. too Livy 43.13.1f. on the recording of prodigies.
7 Valerius Maximus may have been a member of the patrician gens Valeria and possibly of senatorial rank. See C. Skidmore, Practial Ethics for Roman Gentlemen (Exeter 1996) 113-17.
8 For the problems on the date of publication see Wardle [1] 2-6, who concludes that ‘its publication date [must] remain uncertain’.
future. The *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* is unveiled as a work of complexity offered by a grateful subject to his living god. In this respect Mueller’s book will offer scope for scholarly investigation into the relationship between the *princeps* and subject and also further speculation on the association of literature, religion and ritual practice under the republic and early empire.

**THE ECONOMICS OF POETRY**


Suzanne Sharland
School of Literature and Language Studies, University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg 2050, South Africa

Bowditch’s volume is the seventh in the series ‘Classics and Contemporary Thought’ edited by Thomas Habinek. In this work Bowditch examines a selection of Horace’s poetry against the backdrop of its socio-economic context, with emphasis, as could be expected, on the exchange relationship of patronage (*amicitia*). Bowditch focuses on what she asserts is the role of Horace’s poems in his relationship with his patron Maecenas. At the start of her study Bowditch sensibly indicates (p. 2) that she will attempt to steer a middle path between the ‘isolated text’ approach of some *persona* theorists on the one hand and the naive readings of traditional historicists on the other, who tended to view virtually every statement made in a poem as biographical fact. While such a balanced approach is undoubtedly welcome, at the same time, as I think aspects of Bowditch’s work demonstrate, steering a middle path between these extremes is immensely difficult. As readers of ancient texts in general and of Horace in particular, we all tend to fall into one of two camps: the starry-eyed believer or the wary cynic. Either we swallow what Horace says to us through the medium of his poetry, or we laugh. In the end, as readers and interpreters, we are all human and therefore truly *nil medium est* . . .

Bowditch’s theoretical roots are New Historicist and ultimately Marxist. The economics of the exchange relationship are what Bowditch, using anthropological studies of gift exchange, is aiming to uncover in the text of Horace’s poems. Many of Bowditch’s insights and revelations illuminate Horace’s works in a manner that is thought-provoking, but there are also a number of assumptions underlying her interpretation as a whole. One such assumption is that the world to which we are privy in Horace’s poems is neither a purely literary one nor one entirely divorced from real life, but one which, consciously or unconsciously on the part of the writer, reflects the economic and social circumstances in which the poems were manufactured. In Bowditch’s view, these economic and social circumstances are discernible within the
very poetic themes and rhetorical tropes used by the writer. The poets’ economic relationship with his patron is, accordingly, at the heart of his persona’s textual interactions with this figure. In order to accept Bowditch’s approach, therefore, one has at least to believe that the text reflects aspects of the historical Horace’s socio-economic reality with reasonable accuracy. If, however, one is a dissenting cynic who suspects that the poet is always having his readers (including his patron) on at any cost, as it were, then this New Historicist approach is something to which one cannot seriously subscribe—one will continuously be objecting ‘yes, but . . .’.

Nevertheless, Bowditch’s is a closely woven, densely embroidered text with many viewpoints and observations that are both interesting and instructive. The fact that she approaches Horace’s oeuvre from a fresh theoretical direction makes the study in itself valuable. I think that Bowditch has a point when, defending her recourse to modern theory, she observes (p. 15) that works of, for example, Cicero and Seneca which treat Roman amicitia, are not only too prescriptive but also too involved in the ideology of this exchange relationship itself to present a ‘critical distance on their own historical context’. Appealing to cultural anthropological theories of gift-giving, Bowditch provides a fascinating analysis, beginning in chapter 1, ‘The Gift Economy of Patronage’ (pp. 31-63, especially pp. 39-63), of Roman amicitia as an embedded economy—in other words, one in which gifts exchanged and services rendered between individuals have, as in many early human societies, a special meaning or significance attached to them far in excess of their actual monetary or practical worth. Bowditch observes that in ancient societies it appears to have been common for a gift economy (as in the case of Roman amicitia) to exist alongside a monetary one: ‘the literature of the ancient world provides abundant evidence of both premonetary gift exchange and its continued influence on social interaction even after coin was introduced’ (p. 39). Thus the debt or rather indebtedness that is brought about by the gifts and officia can never really be fully paid for. Bowditch looks extensively at what she argues was the ‘psychology of debt in the form of gratia’ (p. 21) that drove Roman amicitia as a gift economy. Also, ‘in a highly stratified culture in which “gifts” are exchanged as beneficia and officia across the invisible lines of status, the recipient of a benefaction remains, in a sense, forever indebted to a benefactor of a higher order’ (p. 51). As symbolic capital (p. 40) they retain a surplus value that serves to bind people

\[1\] Elements of the early belief in the ‘magic’ of gifts can also be traced, of course, in the binding quality of the ‘guest gifts’ of Homeric and early classical convention, and even today the complex and sometimes seemingly inexplicable conventions surrounding birthday presents and gifts in general in our own contemporary and very ‘disembedded’ capitalist societies. For example, taking the price off a gift, saying ‘it’s the thought that counts’, and the idea that a gift taken back by the giver is somehow cursed—these all seem to be survivals of an earlier type of economy. They may equally be attempts at negating the effects of capitalism’s assigning of specific monetary values to the items employed as gifts. The idea that the emotional bonds brought about by gifts between individuals should be stronger than, or somehow go beyond the limits of, a monetary economy, is still with us and is testament, perhaps, to the cultural legacy of ‘embedded’ pre-capitalist economies.
to one another by means of a sense of obligation and with feelings of gratitude—in Latin, gratia—so that their relationship is ultimately longer lasting and more meaningful (and thus potentially also more problematic) than one of mere economic exchange: ‘contrary to the exchange of commodities in a fully disembedded economy, where the precise monetary value of an object allows for the liquidation of the relationship between the contracting parties, gift exchange (ideally) serves to create social bonds’ (p. 48f.).

Dedicated to Maecenas as part of the exchange relationship of patronage, Horace’s poetry is itself both a gift and a commodity, bestowing on the patron and dedicatee status in his lifetime and immortality thereafter (p. 46). Who would deny that Maecenas is, at the start of the twenty-first century CE, still reaping some of the benefits of this exchange, albeit unwittingly? Bowditch’s work is devoted primarily to uncovering what she identifies as the real economic interests beneath the lofty ideals of Roman amicitia, in particular the relationship between Horace and Maecenas. In spite of my misgivings about other aspects of her work, I nevertheless found it exciting that, in course of her revelations of these underlying economic interests, Bowditch chooses to shoot down a long-cherished and very holy Horatian cow—the sacred Sabine farm. In socio-economic terms, Bowditch notes, this gift of land is Maecenas’ most enduring and valuable contribution to Horace both on a practical and a symbolic level. Significantly, this grant lends the poet the status of a landowner, but, in addition, ‘expenditure such as this, in turn, creates the symbolic capital that encourages Horace to celebrate his patron, creating the ultimate cultural value of Maecenas’ immortality . . .’ (p. 46). While Bowditch observes that, in terms of chronology, the gift of the Sabine property may have been an expression of gratia for the dedication of Horace’s first book of Satires to his patron, and for the generally positive presentation of Maecenas’ circle therein,² she also points out that the gift of land would have continued to demand Horace’s gratia towards his patron(s) and would have bound him to them—to Maecenas first and through him to Octavian/Augustus. Thus Horace’s Sabine estate ironically ‘symbolizes that very ambiguity and disequilibrium of debt so characteristic of a gift economy . . .’ (p. 58). Horace, it seems, had to pay off the bond on his beloved symbolic Sabine farm after all, just as most of us have to pay off our own meagre properties.

In chapter 2, ‘Tragic History, Lyric Expiation, and the Gift of Sacrifice’ (pp. 64-115), Bowditch shows how Horace performs a public service or munus by writing his political odes. As sacerdos Musarum (pp. 4, 66f.) he is involved in an act of purification of the populace in the aftermath of the civil wars (Bowditch prefers the official term sacerdos to the traditional vates to describe the ritual role the poet plays

² Bowditch (p. 58) refers to the seminal chapter by I. M. Le M. DuQuesnay ‘Horace and Maecenas: The Propaganda Value of Sermones I’, 19-58, in T. Woodman and D. West (edd.), Poetry and Politics in the Age of Augustus (Cambridge 1984). Such propaganda potential of Satires book 1 would of course have boosted the work’s value with Maecenas and his amici even more, especially if the presentation was made to appear voluntary.
in the imagery of religious renewal in the Augustan era). In this manner Horace's political odes are naturally part of the whole Augustan ideology and articulate the evolving Augustan vision. While this is hardly a new idea, Bowditch is far more direct than previous scholars in her deduction that it was as an advance for all his pro-Augustan ‘spin-doctoring’ that Horace received Maecenas’ gift of the Sabine farm. The real economic aspects of the exchange, Bowditch argues, were cleverly and deliberately hidden. Just as gift-exchange ‘embedded’ societies have been observed to disguise the economic interests behind apparently disinterested gifts, so Bowditch suggests (p. 40), the protagonists of Roman amicitia likewise preferred to obscure the economics of their gifts and services. The real economic exchanges between Horace and his patron, and the obligations entailed therein, are, according to Bowditch, largely disguised by an ideology of voluntarism. The true propaganda value of Horace’s poetry lies in the fact that his praise of the Augustan regime and of those in support of it is presented as though it is voluntary—Horace’s poetry is merely presenting us with the illusion that the exchanges between him and his patron are voluntary expenditures. Maecenas’ gift of the Sabine property is, in terms of this view, actually a loan. Likewise, some of Horace’s Satires and all of his political Odes are not a spontaneous act of praise and thanksgiving, but a calculated one of commission and contract.

However, another major premise of Bowditch’s work is, as suggested above, that Horace’s poems speak to the circumstances in which the poet finds himself. Much like someone of servile status in the eyes of Roman law, Horace’s poems are not only a donated commodity but an articulate and opinionated commodity—a res that also happens to talk. And the poems, Bowditch suggests, do talk back at the patron and address the dynamics of the exchange relationship. In fact, a large portion of Bowditch’s thesis hinges on her claim that Horace’s gift of poetry to Maecenas permits him to negotiate rhetorically with the patron and to have his audience(s) witness these negotiations. Thus the initial expenditure on the poet’s part in writing the political odes on behalf of Maecenas, and ultimately Augustus, is merely one foray in the lively exchange dynamic that Bowditch goes on to explore throughout the remainder of her book, from the perspective of Horace’s other genres, most notably the Epistles. Bowditch stresses the weight carried by the wider audience to whom the poems speak, which, she suggests, gives Horace more leverage with his patron. Bowditch’s views on the extent and breadth of Horace’s contemporary audience are unorthodox; she goes against the grain by suggesting that Horace ‘presents his poems as aspiring to reach a wide—that is, public—audience’ (p. 38; my emphasis; cf., e.g., Sat. 1.4.70-74, where the opposite is suggested). It is, however, clearly in Bowditch’s interests to argue for a broad public audience or at least widespread circulation for Horace’s poems, as she attempts to convince us that, for Horace’s patrons, the poems had widespread propagandistic potential.

Apparently it is in the Epistles that Horace for the first time dares to lay bare what Bowditch claims was the real nature of his earlier relationship with Maecenas: ‘... Horace’s epistles to Maecenas ... coyly flirt with demystifying their past relationship as one of patron-client exchange rather than friendship’ (p. 21). This is
bound to irritate, if not enrage, many Horatian scholars. What of some of the outrageous posturing that many scholars have identified in the *Satires*? Surely many of the attitudes Horace adopts as early as *Satires* book 1 can only suggest an atmosphere of intimate and jocular friendship between Horace and Maecenas, whatever the more formal societal structures (and strictures) that may have bound the two of them? Admittedly, as the title of chapter 4 (‘From Patron to Friend: Epistolary Refashioning and the Economics of Refusal’, pp. 161-210) indicates, Bowditch is far from suggesting that the relationship between Horace and Maecenas was always one of thinly disguised commercial exchange: she is arguing that their relationship gradually developed from one of basically patron-client exchange to one of intimate friendship, and she is not alone in this view. Bowditch envisions the Horace of the *Epistles* looking back at and reflecting on the prior status of his relationship with Maecenas from his present perspective of a more idealistic type of *amicitia*. This latter perspective allows Horace to expose what Bowditch sees as the oppression of patronage, and to criticise its restrictions more sharply. In fact, the greater intimacy of personal friendship is essential in order for the retrospective subversiveness and resistance to patronage that Bowditch is claiming for the *Epistles* to be credible.

At several places in her work Bowditch indicates that she thinks that Horace’s past experience of patronage, with all its constraints of debt, loyalty, and obligation, has led him to the conclusion that the system is ‘exploitative’ (p. 16). She often speaks of the poet’s ‘gestures of autonomy’ and of his ‘resistance’ to what she terms ‘patronal discourse’ (p. 4). Indeed, central to Bowditch’s thesis of Horace’s ‘resistance’ to patronage is what she terms ‘the aesthetic subversion of the patronal discourse’ (p. 28). Bowditch argues that it is through various strategies in his poetry that Horace lays bare the underlying economic aspects of patronage. At the same time, she sees Horace as renegotiating his own relationship with his patron and (now) friend Maecenas by establishing, in his poems, an impression of himself engaging in aristocratic *otium* on his Sabine property, and enjoying egalitarian *amicitia* with its associated free and voluntary giving. In other words, Horace can be seen to pull apart, to tear down, to re-sort, and eventually to reconstruct, and finally even to elevate his relationship with Maecenas above average *amicitia*, all through the medium of his poetry. The way in which Horace achieves this, Bowditch suggests, is through his own aestheticism, focused on the Sabine farm as a recurring *locus* of his writing.

In chapter 3, ‘The Gifts of the Golden Age: Land, Debt, and Aesthetic Surplus’ (pp. 116-160), Bowditch observes that all of Horace’s representations of the Sabine farm emphasise the poet’s aesthetic construction of his estate as a *locus amoenus*, an idealised location having much in common with such literary themes as the Golden Age and that other image of abundance appropriated by the Augustan regime, the *cornucopia* (pp. 155f.). The ownership of land bequeaths to Horace the luxury of leisure (*otium*) that is required to compose poetry. Through the poetry thus composed, Horace can express, directly or indirectly, his gratitude towards his benefactors, and therefore by means of this ‘produce’ or at least, the ‘aesthetic returns’ of his estate, he may begin to repay his debts. But like Vergil’s *Eclogues*, which Bowditch argues
display a deliberate ‘misrecognition’ of the economics of literary benefaction’ (p. 120), Horace’s emphasis of his farm’s ‘pastoral aestheticism’ creates the rhetorical strategies whereby the poet ‘resists ideas of debt, constraint, and potential deprivation paradoxically associated with the estate as a gift’ (p. 142). 3 In other words, Horace’s literary immortalising of his estate in the Sabine hills entirely divorces the image of the farm from the commercial issues of debt and obligation that cripple the real world of literary benefaction. Through the transfigured image of the estate as locus amoenus, therefore, Horace offers resistance to the limitations of economics. Bowditch’s reading highlights the irony that it is the economic reality of Horace’s debt to his patron(s) within the gift economy of Roman amicitia, that results in the fabled presentations of his Sabine farm as something beyond economics, something of strictly literary and symbolic value. The farm, ‘the very gift that obliges, simultaneously allows Horace the liberty to renegotiate his debts’, by providing the poet with the ‘rhetorical means of resisting the demands of reciprocity and reclaiming his ‘spent’ self . . . ’ (p. 118).

Bowditch’s study is a new type of resistance reading, only now on an economic rather than a strictly political scale. But to what extent can we (or should we) believe that Horace seriously set out to offer resistance to the system or the person who bankrolled him and his work? The problem with all resistance readings as applied to Horace is that they start out from the wrong set of premises, premises based mostly on the world-view of the usually privileged scholars who advance them. In my view, the developing world provides a much better model for grasping some of the experiences, both economic and political, of ancient Romans such as Horace. As noted above, I am a reluctant believer in biography, but what we do know about the historical Horace is that, as a survivor of Rome’s civil wars, he had suffered the vicissitudes of fortune. Having been on the wrong side at Philippi, he had been given another chance at the good life through his amicitia with Maecenas and later, Augustus. But Horace was far from a yes-man. Everything in his work suggests that he was intimate enough with his patron to joke quite outrageously with him. In the end, however, most of the evidence points to the fact that Horace was content with the status quo. At Epistle 1.7.29-33, the poet self-depreciatingly compares himself to a little fox who remains stuck in a corn-bin because he has eaten too much and grown too fat to get out the way that he came in. The only way to get out, as revealed by what is perhaps the more sinister side of this fable, is to stop eating altogether and to starve oneself out, as it were. But Horace does not do this. Instead, we have the little plump fox discoursing philosophically on the nature of its captivity, while remaining fat and happy in the corn-bin. What good would it do to bite the hand that fed him?

3 Cf. p. 153: ‘One way in which the speaker makes the farm his own—proprius—is to convert it into a pastoral locale that has affinities with a particular literary tradition’. 
GENRE IN ANCIENT GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE


Philip Bosman
Department of Classics, University of South Africa
Pretoria 0003, South Africa

This volume consists of a collection of eleven papers on genre and generic definition in Greek and Roman literature. The contributions are divergent in both subject and approach, ranging from seldom considered, even single-instance genres, to the reception of generic traditions in Hellenistic and Roman poetry. In a joint editorial introduction (pp. 1-14), Depew and Obbink ask for a reconsideration of ancient genres and their constituent criteria from a historical perspective, through which two models emerge: genre as enabling literary production, performance and communication, and genre as a set of metadiscursive rules inferred by philosophers, scholars and critics. As the second model emerged only later, genre in—predominantly oral—archaic and classical Greece should be approached as performance-based in real-life situations, during which generic communication was negotiated between the conventions expected by an audience, and their enactment during the performance itself. As a common point of departure, genre is defined as ‘a conceptual orienting device that suggests to a hearer the sort of receptorial conditions in which a fictive discourse might have been delivered’ (p. 6).

The set theoretical parameters apply best to early Greek literature. Closest are perhaps the contributions by Joseph Day and Mary Depew, both focusing on genre as emerging from performance. Day, ‘Epigram and Reader: Generic Force as Reactivation of Ritual’ (pp. 37-57), attempts to define dedicatory epigrams as a poetic genre meant to activate and reactivate an original ritual offering to a god. As the epigrams were meant to be read out aloud and to be heard in the sanctuary, the genre should be defined in terms of this context of performance, negotiated between text, reader, and audience, and hinging on the element of *charis* (‘pleasure’, ‘joy’). Depew, ‘Enacted and Represented Dedications: Genre and Greek Hymn’ (pp. 59-79), explores the performative context of hymns, and how the deictic language typical of hymns is intended to draw attention to their celebratory context. Hymns should rather be paired with sacrifice and libations than with prayer. The genre is unified by its character as a dedicatory *agalma* presented to a deity on behalf of a community, implying that hymns have cultic functions parallel to other dedications within cultic spaces. Cultic *deixis* should be understood as an element of the agonistic culture of archaic Greece, causing the god to delight in the gift and to acknowledge the status of its giver. Deictic
Review Articles

language characterising hymns poses a radically open invitation to enactment, and hymnic performers link a shared past moment to the communal present.

The majority of contributors, however, remain within established paradigms of genre research. Ironically, the stronger contributions are apparently not equally optimistic about, and even tend to neglect, performative context. These are, in my view, those of Boedeker, Rutherford, Csapo and Hinds. Deborah Boedeker, ‘Herodotus’s Genre(s)’ (pp. 97-114), in an old-fashioned textual analysis, explores the views of Herodotus on various kinds of narrative, in order to establish his own ‘avowed parameters, methods, and intentions’ (p. 98). Herodotus is consciously engaging in the process of finding a new discursive form. Owing much to Homeric epic, he claims that his incipient genre differs from epic in having more exacting standards with regard to truth. He often criticises the trustworthiness of poetry, as poets tend to conceal their sources rather than reveal them openly to the inspection of their audiences, while their genres often compel them to distort facts. He hints at a hierarchy of credibility in archaic poetry, and views himself as in competition with prose contemporaries, making an effort to differentiate his own voice from theirs. When Hecataeus (the only prose author mentioned by name) is criticised for not being critical of his sources and for not acknowledging the limits of his information, Herodotus sets up markers for his own genre. Although tolerant of digressions, he guards against straying too far from his stated purposes, and remains careful to include only material ‘worthy of commemoration within the framework of Persian-Hellenic relations’ (p. 109). Within the included material, various levels of credibility are retained and explicitly referred to. Unresolved issues, references to his own ignorance/limits of knowledge, and evaluating the truth-claims of contending reports, all testify to the authority of the author and the superiority of his genre. Boedeker neatly aligns the rules of Herodotus’ budding genre with the politics he admires: giving many voices their say, being aware of the constraints of likelihood and plausibility, and linking success to good information/quality sources and correct/critical assessments.

Ian Rutherford, ‘Formulas, Voice, and Death in Ehoie-Poetry, the Hesiodic Gunaikon Katalogos, and the Odysseian Nekuia’ (pp. 81-96), investigates the probable generic features of catalogue poems, which may throw light on generic antecedents of the Homeric catalogues. Rutherford argues that the Hesiodic Gunaikos Katalogos represents the culmination of a tradition of catalogue poems which adhered to certain formal and thematic features, such as the epic hexameter, the ehoie-formula, rapid presentation, narration rather than speech, and the predominance of female characters. These warrant the identification of a separate genre. The discrepancy between the distinguishing the ehoie formula and the genre’s genealogical structure can be explained by postulating earlier stages of development from an initial list of heroines included in a god’s aretalogy. The Nekuia in the Odyssey 11 preserves such an earlier stage in the development of ehoie-poetry. Rutherford posits four stages in the evolution of the genre: (1) loosely arranged catalogues of prominent women; (2) a stage where these are crossed with genealogical poetry; (3) the canonical form in the
Hesiodic *Gunaikos Katalogos;* and (4) a final stage of creative reuse of the genre in Hellenistic erotic elegy.

Glenn Most, ‘Generating Genres: The Idea of the Tragic’ (pp. 15-35), also deviates from the set parameters by restricting himself to ancient and modern theorising. Most argues that the notion of ‘the tragic’ contaminates a clear view of the ancient examples of ‘tragedy’, and that the two notions must therefore be conceptually divorced. The modern term ‘tragic’ refers, in more or less complex forms, to a particular view of the human condition as defined by notions such as fate, blindness, guilt, personal responsibility, and nobility over against an arbitrary universe. In contrast, the Greek adjective is used most often with the negative connotations of ‘splendid, grandiose’ (as opposed to ‘clear’), ‘magnificent, pompous’ (as opposed to ‘plain’), ‘mythical, fictional, philosophically unserious or historically unverifiable’ (as opposed to ‘scientific’). This proves the quite different associations with the genre in antiquity. Aristotle does not give any indication of knowing anything like ‘the tragic’. Only Romantic concentration on the emotions ideally elicited by ‘proper tragedy’, brought Schiller to consider the genre as the supreme vehicle for expressing ‘the tragic’. This idea fundamentally influenced modern notions of the genre through the various directions on the issue taken by German philosophers.

Eric Csapo, ‘From Aristophanes to Menander? Genre Transformation in Greek Comedy’ (pp. 115-33), challenges the traditional division of comedy into three distinct historical phases. This division, he contends, is due much more to the method of canonical selection than to the transformation of the genre itself. Csapo also touches on the issue of the role specific authors play in genre definition, as each so-called phase of comedy is virtually tied to one author only (significantly, the distinction between Old and New Comedy is only attested well after Menander, and only in scholarly literature). Perhaps overestimating the influence of Aristotle, Csapo contends that the philosopher’s view, that comedy evolved through the progressive purging of political content, determined canonical selection. This elevated Aristophanes, Cratinus and Eupolis into the chief exponents of the genre’s initial phase (‘Old Comedy’), while Menander, Philemon and Diphilus ‘were canonized precisely because they were least political’ (p. 116). Stemming from the Aristotelean evolutionary model, Menander’s ‘superiority’ is not so much the reason for his canonisation as its result. The era of Old Comedy suggests a variety of styles, even within the *oeuvre* of a single author. What is referred to as Old, Middle and New Comedy designate synchronic styles rather than epochs. Therefore, an era should be characterised by its preference for a particular style of comedy, more than by a supposed stage in the evolution of the genre. Csapo levels legitimate criticism against the biogenetic evolutionary model of genres which divides their ‘lifetime’ into stages of youth, maturity, and old age. Rather, a genre’s evolution should be seen as ‘continuous adaptive change toward a more efficient performance of art’s social function’ (p. 128).

It seems as if performative contexts are even more difficult to establish in later literature. Ineke Sluiter’s claim, ‘The Dialectics of Genre: Some Aspects of Secondary Literature and Genre in Antiquity’ (pp. 183-203), that commentaries assume a
classroom setting, borders on the obvious. Focusing on non-literary commentaries, Sluiter finds that while the ancient commentators resorted to generic distinctions of source-texts, they rarely reflected on their own work as belonging to a particular genre. Nonetheless, from a modern perspective the parameters of the ancient commentary are easily recognisable. Commentators associated distinctive objectives and tasks with their work, themselves trying to maintain a dual professional affiliation between the grammarian true to his text, and being an original thinker in his own right.

In Hellenistic and Roman literature, the focus falls on definition and redefinition of generic types. Stephanie West, ‘Lycophron’s Alexandra: “Hindsight as Foresight Makes No Sense?”’ (pp. 153-66), feels her text is nowadays neglected precisely because of its generic elusiveness. The genre’s essence should be linked to the post eventum prophecy containing references to Roman matters. Such prophecies are also found in apocalyptic literature of the Hellenistic era. Lycophron is generating a new hybrid genre by isolating, and elaborating on, the traditional messenger speech of Attic drama. Unlike Herodotus, however, this new genre did not find followers, and died with the Alexandra as its solitary example. In regard to the bucolic and encomiastic poetry of Theocritus, Marco Fantuzzi, ‘Theocritus and the “Demythologizing” of Poetry’ (pp. 135-51), argues that the poet deliberately excludes the characters, gods and heroes of hexametric poetry from his work as a poetic strategy to create credible human-rural contexts. This feature explains Theocritus’ insistence to write hexametric encomiastic poems for contemporary men and not for gods and heroes as required by tradition.

Alessandro Barchiesi, ‘Rituals in Ink: Horace on the Greek Lyric Tradition’ (pp. 167-82) is concerned with the differences in tenor between ‘typical’ Greek poetry, and Augustan poetry, which he finds in three features of the latter as exemplified in the lyric Horace. By the notions of thematisation and dramatisation, Barchiesi refers to the fact that genre itself becomes a theme in literature, a problematic but productive condition for literary output. The poetry also betrays a sense of rift and loss from what the genre used to and should be. Finally, genre becomes ‘politicized’, meaning that particular genres start to imply specific political and social values.

In a seminal article, Don Fowler, ‘The Didactic Plot’ (pp. 205-19), isolates the typical plots underlying or implied in didactic poetry, such as the progress of the student from ignorance to knowledge. Taking his cue particularly from Epicurean texts, Fowler discusses various metaphors and myths by which this plot is textually structured, such as the journey, the path, following in the footsteps of the teacher/guide, the (investigative) hunt for the truth, the child growing up, initiation, homecoming, conquest, and so on. Fowler draws the general implication that generic analysis cannot be divorced from wider systems of social construction, and that both primary and secondary notions of genre play a part as guidelines in composition.

Stephen Hinds, ‘Essential Epic: Genre and Gender from Macer to Statius’ (pp. 221-44), attempts a fresh approach to genre in Roman poetry by exploring the recurrent unepic elements of women and erotic love in the Roman epic tradition. Scholarship in the previous century oscillated from asserting the genre-specific
features of a literary work (which necessarily involves down-playing the work’s non-generic features), to stressing hybridisation, regarding genre as irrelevant to interpretation, and the invention of new genres, back to reasserting the identity of genres, but now without being embarrassed by generic discrepancies. Hinds, a self-confessed supporter of ‘dynamic impurity’ (pp. 222, 235) argues that the actual distinction lies between Roman generic theory/ideal and practice. Roman poets thought about genre in essentialising, normative terms, but in practice consistently incorporated themes considered to be foreign to the genre. In theory, mostly specified in the opposing genre of elegy, epic was expected to be restricted to res gestae ducumque et tristia bella (‘achievements of kings and leaders and sad wars’, Hor. Ars P. 73). Even after the rapid institution of the Aeneid as the Roman ‘code model’, Virgil’s epic was not considered an achieved hybrid. Female and erotic elements were still treated as threatening genre identity a century later, in Statius’ Achilleid, in which a cross-dressed epic hero still challenges audiences to renegotiate (and reassert) generic boundaries.

Despite the occasional indulgence in jargon, the volume contains scholarship of a high standard with stimulating contributions both in the higher and lower genres. It can be recommended to all interested in this apparently flourishing branch of literary analysis.

**THE COMIC TRADITION**


Betine van Zyl Smit
Department of Foreign Languages, University of the Western Cape
Bellville 7535, South Africa

Erich Segal is a well known and respected classical scholar.¹ *Roman Laughter* proved that he had a good understanding of what the attraction of Plautus was to the crowds in ancient Rome. He proved that he also understood what pleases the masses in the modern world by writing popular fiction such as the bestseller, *Love Story*. Segal’s fluent and appealing style is again evident in *The Death of Comedy*. This is a history of the comic theatre from a rather subjective point of view. ‘It traces the evolution of the classical form from its early origins in the misogynistic quip by the quasi-legendary sixth-century BC Susarion of Megara, through countless weddings and happy endings, to the exasperated monosyllables of Samuel Beckett’ (p. ix).

¹ His *Roman Laughter: The Comedy of Plautus*² (Oxford 1987) brought a breath of fresh air to Plautine studies. He has published many other academic works, for instance, his edited book entitled *Oxford Readings in Aristophanes* (Oxford 1996).
It is hard to imagine that Segal was not aware that his choice of title would call to mind George Steiner’s *The Death of Tragedy*. Comedy and tragedy are the two kinds of theatrical performance that the western tradition has inherited from the Greeks via the Romans. According to Steiner tragedy had its origin in the Homeric epics (pp. 5f.) and came to an end in the twentieth-century Theatre of the Absurd. Segal again, finds the origin of comedy in Homeric epic (pp. 27f.) and its end in the Theatre of the Absurd. Segal maintains that *The Death of Comedy* is ‘a metaphor, not a history’. It is difficult to know how to interpret this statement, as the book follows a chronological pattern from the opening sentence of chapter 1, ‘Comedy was born at night’ (p. 1), to the last sentence of the last chapter, ‘The traditional happy ending is no longer possible—because comedy is dead’ (p. 452). It seems that Segal is not denying the continued existence of different kinds of comic plays, films, novels, TV series, but that for him the comedy that matters is a special kind of comic drama which still carries traits that can be traced back to performances in ancient Greece. These may be summarised as plays which provide a joyful holiday from the realities of everyday life and celebrate human fertility.

Segal’s style of writing is lively and entertaining. He wears his erudition lightly but the solid substratum of the wealth of references to sources ancient and modern is contained in the endnotes. Even the short chapter 1, ‘Etymologies: Getting to the Root of It’ (pp. 1-9), has fifty-five endnotes! Segal’s love of the various verbal devices of comedy comes to the fore in numerous quotable quips, for instance: ‘As the proverb says, it may not be true, but it is a great idea’ (p. 1); ‘Comedy, the mask that launched a thousand quips’ (p. 9); ‘In the typical comic dénouement, High Noon turns magically into lunchtime’ (p. 10); ‘The tragic hero dies for what is nobler in the mind, the comic hero lives for what is humbler in the flesh’ (p. 12); ‘And the happiest of Happy Endings is . . . laughter in the house’ (p. 26).

The book’s basic plan is an account of the development of the genre starting in ancient Greece. Chapter 1 seeks to define the nature of comedy by discussing the etymological roots of the word. Segal describes the case made for the derivation from *koma* (‘deep sleep’) and *kome* (‘country village’), before that of *komos* (‘revel’) which is accepted as the true origin. Segal nevertheless maintains that the two other words also have legitimate psychical and poetic associations with the true nature of comedy as they offer opportunities for the untrammelled freedom of a holiday from the conventions of everyday life.

Chapter 2, ‘The Song of the *Kômos*’ (pp. 10-26), takes the discussion of the nature of comedy further. Aspects covered are the ‘heart of darkness’ at the core of some of the most frivolous comedies; the orgiastic release from aggression provided by the *komos*, which helps maintain the stability of society; release from other constraints such as that of social and sexual identity and the reintegration into the everyday world provided by the happy ending. Segal refers to theories of Plato, Freud, Frazer, Eliade, Burkert and Bergson and cites literary examples from the Homeric

---

The second part of this chapter turns to comedy in the theatre. The omnipresence of the phallus in Attic Old Comedy is linked with fertility rites closely associated with Dionysus, the deity presiding over the festival. The importance of ithyphallic invective in worship and prayer linked to fertility is shown to be widespread. Laughter as a characteristic unique to human beings is a vital sign of humanity and thus comedy that provokes laughter is an important healing power for individuals and society. Segal postulates that the 'agelast (Greek a-gelastes, “not laughing”)... is thus the antithesis of the comic hero’ (p. 25).

Chapter 3, 'The Lyre and the Phallus' (pp. 27-43), deals with early comedy in Greece. The title refers to the blend of melodic purity and discordant grossness that mark comedy. Various characteristics of the genre are highlighted: misogyny, Schadenfreude, the unfettered use of language, attacks on contemporaries, verbal inventiveness, scatological humour and the like. Then Segal briefly discusses the predecessors and contemporaries of Aristophanes of whom we have only fragments: Cratinus, Crates, Pherecrates, Eupolis and Plato Comicus.

The next four chapters concentrate on Aristophanes. Chapter 4, ‘Aristophanes: The One and Only?’ (pp. 44-67), first investigates the question of why Aristophanes alone of all the writers of Attic Old Comedy survived. Segal stresses that Aristophanes is neither modern nor an intellectual and that his success was probably due to the fact that he had an organising principle, ‘even in his most ramshackle plots’ (p. 45). Segal describes this as the recurring central character or Aristophanic hero who appears in six of the extant nine comedies: ‘a dyspeptic old man who gets fired up by an idea and in pursuing it turns the world topsy-turvy’ (pp. 46f.). The old man not only succeeds in his quest but gets an additional reward, sexual rejuvenation. The remainder of this chapter analyses the comic features and themes of Acharnians (pp. 47-57), Knights (pp. 57-60) and Peace (pp. 60-67). Throughout the book the approach followed to the discussion of individual plays is one of summarising the plot, with quotations (mostly from Segal’s own translations) and commentary.

‘Failure and Success’, the title of chapter 5 (pp. 68-84), alludes to the two comedies it discusses: Clouds (pp. 70-77) and Wasps (pp. 77-84). Segal attributes Aristophanes lack of success with Clouds to the fact that it ‘lacks the essence of the festival spirit’ (p. 70). It is one of the comedies that does not celebrate fertility by featuring the rejuvenation of an old man, and it has no female characters. ‘There can be no comedy without a komos, and no komos without ready, willing, earthy females’ (p. 70). Wasps, on the other hand, reverted to the tried and proven formula. Segal regards the Birds as Aristophanes’ masterpiece and devotes the whole of chapter 6, ‘The Birds: The Uncensored Fantasy’ (pp. 85-100) to it. At the same time he sees it as signalling the end of Old Comedy. Thus chapter 7 is titled ‘Requiem for a Genre?’ (pp. 101-23). Segal analyses the Frogs in the opening pages. He rightly distinguishes it as a play sui generis that reflected the time in which it was written. Segal spends the central part of this chapter on an overview of Old, Middle and New Comedy and points out that Menander laid down a pattern for comic drama that was to last for two
millennia. The last part of the chapter considers Aristophanes’ *Plutus* as a forerunner of New Comedy (pp. 116-123).

Chapter 8, ‘The Comic Catastrophe’ (pp. 124-152), explores the relationship between Aristophanes and Euripides. The term ‘catastrophe’ is used here in its sense as an early critical term for the dénouement of a comedy. Segal refers to reciprocal borrowing and parodying between the two playwrights, but then also examines some of Euripides’ works which represent a significant step towards New Comedy. Segal discusses *Ion* (pp. 126-35), *Iphigenia in Tauris* (pp. 135-40), *Helen* (pp. 141-48) and finally the *Andromeda* fragments and points out the features they have in common with New Comedy plays. For Segal the essential adjustments made by the New Comedy authors to the structure of the Euripidean plays discussed here were that they reversed the order of *cognitio* and *frustratio*. He therefore dubs Euripides the ‘grandfather of modern comedy’ (p. 152).

Chapter 9, ‘O Menander! O Life!’ (pp. 153-81), starts with a brief account of the vicissitudes of the texts of the Hellenistic playwright and the reaction of various critics, ancient and modern, to his work. Next the typical characters of New Comedy are listed and the typical elements of a Menandrian plot detailed. The point is made that Menander brought the plot of his plays to the lives of ordinary people. The setting of his plays is metropolitan, or even cosmopolitan, the language chaste but the link with fertility still preserved in features such as marriages and babies. The plays and fragments are described and analysed: *Perikeiromene:* (pp. 163-64), *Misoumenos* (pp. 164f.), *Samian Women* (pp. 165-71), *Georgos* (pp. 171f.), *Dyskolos* (pp. 172-76) and finally *Aspis* (pp. 176-180). Segal concludes this chapter with an important comment: ‘Menander provides an anodyne for the painful realities of everyday life. He dares not say all’s right with the state, because manifestly it was not. But he can offer that a happy ending is still possible in the private life of the spectator. This has been the balm of comedy ever since’ (p. 182).

In chapter 10, ‘Plautus Makes an Entrance’ (pp. 183-204), we are taken from the Greek to the Roman world. Segal sketches the transition of New Comedy from Greece to Italy in less than two pages and then briskly summarises the native Italian elements of farce and comedy before introducing Plautus. After some discussion of the main characteristics of Plautine comedy, (the Greek setting which permitted him to show characters behaving in an ‘unRoman’ way, the creation of the clever slave who schemes for the lovesick young man to obtain his pleasure and is the pivot of the Saturnalian inversion of ordinary Roman life) and the use of the term *vortere* for his adaptations of Greek originals, Segal proceeds to analysis of individual comedies. He first deals with *Menaechmi* (pp. 191-96) and then with *Casina* (pp. 196-202). Special attention is given to Plautus’ attitude to wives and matrimony as it is manifested in these and other plays. These are both targets of comic hostility, especially the wife who has a dowry and is in a position to boss her husband. Unlike Aristophanes, Plautus does not show the *senex amator* in triumph at the end of the play, but youth wins the day. Surprisingly there are only two chapters on Plautus, and the second, chapter 11, ‘A Plautine Problem Play’ (pp. 205-19), deals only with the *Amphitruo*.
This play is unique in two respects: it is the only surviving Latin comedy that deals with a mythological subject and the only one in which adultery is consummated. Segal’s discussion also deals in passing with the term *tragicocomedia*.

Two chapters are also devoted to Terence. Chapter 12, ‘Terence: The African Connection’ (pp. 220-38), starts with the contrasting fates of Plautus and Terence. The former enjoyed success and praise in his lifetime and the latter posthumously. Terence it also was, according to Segal, who perfected classical comedy. His work ‘established the classic paradigm for all subsequent comic drama until the twentieth century’ (p. 226). Terence’s own contribution, the invention of dramatic suspense, is still a staple of dramatic entertainment today. Another innovation of his, the double-plot, also found a number of imitators. *Andria* is analysed (pp. 230-38) as an example of how Terence creates dramatic suspense and manipulates two plots simultaneously. Chapter 13, ‘The Mother-in-Law of Modern Comedy’ (pp. 239-54), opens with a short discussion of Terence’s most successful play with the Romans, *Eunuchus*. It then treats the problem of why the *Hecyra* was such a failure with audiences and concludes that it was ahead of its time. It plays with the familiar conventions of Roman comedy and canonises a new form ‘that would dominate the stage for the millennia to come’ (p. 254).

The first part of chapter 14, ‘Machiavelli: The Comedy of Evil’ (pp. 255-72), reviews the afterlife of the comedies of Plautus and Terence, their eclipse during many centuries, their rediscovery in the Renaissance period and subsequent productions and imitations. Then the ‘first author of stature to write stage comedies in the classical tradition’ (p. 261), Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), is introduced. Segal deftly depicts his circumstances and alludes to some of his plays. To the form and style (although his plays were in prose) of his classical models he added ‘hard-nosed Realpolitik’ (p. 263) which made his work relevant to his age. Machiavelli’s masterpiece, *Mandragola* (*The Mandrake*), is considered with reference to classical influences and innovation. Scheming, knowledge, manipulation and lewd humour abound. For Segal this play ‘represents a moment in history where classical tradition meets Florentine cunning—and the result is a theatrical masterpiece’ (p. 272). Segal next moves to England. Chapter 15, ‘Marlowe: *Schade* and *Freude*’ (pp. 273-85), deals mostly with Marlowe’s *Jew of Malta*. Segal follows T. S. Eliot in interpreting this play as ‘not tragedy but farce’ (p. 277).

Throughout *The Death of Comedy* there are references to Shakespeare and his work. Chapters 16, ‘Shakespeare: Errors and Erōs’ (pp. 286-304) and 17, ‘Twelfth Night: Dark Clouds Over Illyria’ (pp. 305-28), bring the bard to centre stage. First the influence of Plautus’ *Menaechmi* on *The Comedy of Errors* is traced. Segal finds an extra depth and dimension in the English play which is ‘suffused with Christian coloration’ (p. 287). He also notes some echoes of the *Amphitruo*. *Twelfth Night* is discussed in some detail and Segal concludes that the play goes ‘from comic chaos to cosmic order’ (p. 328).

The next author who represents Segal’s comic tradition is Molière, whose life and theatrical achievements constitute chapter 18, ‘Molière: The Class of ‘68’ (pp.
Segal writes admiringly of Molière's genius and the melancholy he overcame to produce his masterpieces. He produced three comedies in 1668. All three are discussed by Segal. The first, *Amphitryon*, adapts Plautus' play with liberal doses of the earlier French version of Rotrou. The second was *George Dandin*, where the hero's humiliation by his young wife echoes Molière's own unhappy marriage. The third was destined to become one of the most popular plays in theatrical history, *L'Avare (The Miser)*.

Chapter 19, 'The Fox, the Fops and the Factotum' (pp. 363-402), moves back to Elizabethan England and the comedies of Ben Jonson. His work is contrasted with that of Shakespeare: Jonson's realism, sharp, satirical comedies often set in the streets of London as against Shakespeare's romances in exotic places. However, *Volpone*, his masterpiece is set in Venice. Segal reviews this play (pp. 370-81) before proceeding to a condensed history of the fate of the theatre in England up to 1675 and then jumps to France in 1781 and Beaumarchais' *Marriage of Figaro*. This play successfully blends a political purpose with familiar comic devices. For Segal, Beaumarchais had achieved the 'ultimate perfection' in comedy and after that, thus starts chapter 20, 'Comedy Explodes' (pp. 403-30), 'comedy had nowhere to go but down' (p. 403). Segal admits that 'the genre continued to flourish in the form we have been studying until the eve of the twentieth century' (p. 401), but he does not present any further examples. This chapter concentrates on the 'assassins of comedy' and they 'are all intellectuals of one sort or another'. The chief perpetrators named by Segal are George Bernard Shaw, Alfred Jarry, Guillaume Apollinaire, Jean Cocteau and Eugene Ionesco. Segal analyses some of the work of each of them and shows how language and coherence progressively begin to falter. The final blow in the process of dehumanisation was dealt by Samuel Beckett. This last stage is covered in chapter 21, 'Beckett: The Death of Comedy' (pp. 431-52).

Segal uses wordplay to illustrate how the anti-classical movement and modern culture first emasculated the comic hero and then silenced him: 'the decline is from the autonomy of the classical hero, to automatons like Ubu, to the autism of Samuel Beckett' (p. 431). He notes the influence of Chaplin and other heroes of silent film on the writers of the Theatre of the Absurd. Segal discusses Beckett's plays in their English and French versions. To Segal Beckett's plays present the polar opposite of Aristophanic comedy: instead of *parrhesia*, the license to say anything, there is *aphasia*, the inability to say anything. The inability to communicate is linked to sexual impotence. Where most comedies ended in an energetic *gamos*, even a rejuvenation of the hero, Beckett's heroes are all 'incapables' (p. 435). 'The phallus is conspicuous in his dramatic work—for its total absence' (p. 435). One may of course question whether Beckett's plays are indeed comedies. Segal acknowledges this and suggests that they may perhaps be better described as 'anti-comedies' (p.450). He maintains that there is an explicit link between Aristophanes' *Birds* and *Waiting for Godot*. Beckett as 'a chimerical post-modern classicist and supreme ironist' (p. 450) deliberately denies the audience their traditional expectation of a happy ending. Because of Beckett's abundant recognition of previous literature, it is clear that his
final blow to the comic genre is premeditated and intentional. Thus the last sentence of this chapter reads: ‘The traditional happy ending is no longer possible—because comedy is dead’ (p. 452). In spite of the finality of this judgement, Segal has attached a coda to the book in which he discusses Kubrick’s film Dr. Strangelove. Segal’s view of this film’s attempt to deal humorously with the possibility of a nuclear holocaust is bleak. For him it seems impossible after the mass slaughter of two World Wars ‘to find any more Freudian objects of wit—moral or religious precepts that command so much respect that they can only be approached in comedy’ (p. 453).

As one expects from a writer of Segal’s reputation, The Death of Comedy is written with great flair. There is little to mar the pleasure of the style. The only misspelling I noticed was of Hecyra on p. 253. The index disappointingly contains only proper nouns and titles, so that if one wanted a quick guide to, for instance, dramatic suspense, it is not possible to find help there. Because of its highly personal view of the history of comedy and because it does not take much account of recent theory and scholarship this book will probably find more favour with the general public than with an academic audience. Nevertheless, it provides a valuable and sprightly introduction to and overview of the subject.

THE DEATH OF ORATORY?


William J. Dominik
Department of Classics, University of Otago
Dunedin 9001, New Zealand

While recent commentaries on Tacitus’ Dialogus de Oratoribus have appeared in Italian by Bo (1974) and in German by Güngerich (1980), this edition of Roland Mayer in the green and yellow Cambridge series is the first commentary in English on the Dialogus since those of Bennett (1894) and Gudeman (1898). As he explains in the section on the transmission of the text in the introduction (pp. 47-50), the copies of the Dialogus left to us by the humanists are fraught with textual difficulties requiring conjectural emendations, and a significant lacuna. Mayer reconstructs the text (pp. 53-86) from earlier editions, especially those of Winterbottom (1975) and Güngerich

1 D. Bo (ed.), Taciti Dialogus de Oratoribus (Turin 1974); R. Güngerich (ed. H. Heubner), Kommentar zum Dialogus des Tacitus (Göttingen 1980).
2 C. E. Bennett (ed.), Tacitus, Dialogus de Oratoribus (Boston 1894); A. Gudeman (ed.), Tacitus, Dialogus de Oratoribus (Boston 1898).
(1980); however, he does not provide an *apparatus criticus* and relies instead upon those of Peterson (1893), Winterbottom (1975) and Köstermann (1970).

The introductory section (pp. 1-50) and the commentary (pp. 87-216) are informative particularly on matters of dating and style and are supported by full indices of literary terms (pp. 222-27). Mayer rightly argues that there are good reasons for dating the *Dialogus* after Quintilian's *Institutio* despite the Ciceronian resemblances in style, which can be attributed to the genre and theme (pp. 23, 26f.). As Mayer points out, Tacitus suggests the style of Cicero without merely imitating it in his use of diction, balance, syntax, periodic structure and prose rhythm (pp. 27-30). There are differences from the Ciceronian style in degree and use of these stylistic elements. Tacitus is more Ciceronian in the *Dialogus* than he is when writing history, but his style in this work is still not as conversational as Cicero is in his own dialogues. In the notes themselves Mayer's observations on stylistic issues buttress the general remarks he makes in the introduction. Mayer often points out where Tacitus' thought and expression are similar to those of Cicero with reference to the major Latin grammars, while in matters of diction he often refers readers to the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*.

While Mayer excels on textual and stylistic issues, the introduction and commentary are constructed on contestable, if not dubious, grounds when dealing with the literary and political background of Tacitus' age. Mayer argues that Tacitus was moved to reflect upon the morality of oratory and 'found it either morally compromised or a sham' and believed that oratory had become 'politically dead' (p. 8); maintains that Tacitus thought it 'better to abandon it' (p. 8); declares that 'Tacitus used the rejection of contemporary oratory which he put in Maternus' mouth to justify his own defection from the ranks of the active pleaders' (p. 33); contends that 'Tacitus accepts, along with Fabius, that the oratory of the present day is inferior to that of the late Republic' (p. 33); asserts that Aper's defence of modern eloquence is 'somewhat playful' (p. 138); and believes that 'irony seems out of place' when considering Maternus' favourable remarks about the new dispensation (pp. 43f.). There is plenty to contest here. What follows is not intended to be a wholesale rebuttal of Mayer's conventional views but rather a brief response illustrating that the issues are more complex and open to very different interpretations. Basically Mayer assumes that (1) political role of oratory under the emperors had ceased to be important; (2) Tacitus had ceased to practice oratory; (3) the state of oratory had declined since the days of the republic; and (4) Aper's defence of modern eloquence is lighthearted and therefore presumably not very credible. All of the aforementioned assumptions are open to question.

There is little question that political oratory was constrained within the limits imposed by the new political order. The languishing of deliberative oratory in the

---

3 M. Winterbottom (ed.), *Cornelii Taciti Opera Minora* (Oxford 1975); Güngerich [1].

empire was partly due to the loss of the senate as a venue for serious political debate under emperors who became progressively authoritarian in their rule. Despite its diminished importance in the political arena, it seems overstated to suggest that oratory became 'politically dead'. In any event, as Mayer notes (pp. 14ff.), there were still plenty of opportunities to display oratorical skill, for oratory continued to assume a considerable role in the courts, in the schools, and even an increased role on the public stage despite its diminished importance in the political arena. The conventional view, which Mayer embraces, is that Tacitus rejected the modern practice of oratory and abandoned it for a literary career, but this is an argumentum ex silentio. Although we have no record of Tacitus practising oratory after the publication of Quintilian’s Institutio in 95 CE, it is apparent that his reputation as an orator continued into 106-107 CE. In Epistle 9.23 Pliny relates how Tacitus, when asked if he was an Italian or a provincial by a Roman knight, replied, nosti me et quidem ex studiis (‘But you know me from your studies’). Although it is impossible to say whether or not Tacitus still practiced oratory, the verb nosti suggests that he was still known for his oratorical talent.

Mayer, like most critics before him, maintains that oratory declined during the imperial period and that this was another reason why Tacitus abandoned it. Modern scholars have also argued that Quintilian believed there had been a decline in the standard of oratory although in Institutio 10 he speaks highly of the orators of his own day for their powers of expression and description. Admittedly it is easy to claim that there was a decline in eloquence since Romans themselves argued for it, as evidenced not only in Tacitus but also in Petronius, the elder Seneca, the elder Pliny, Persius, Juvenal, Velleius Paterculus and Longinus, a few of whom Mayer cites in support of his own belief (pp. 12-16). But there was much debate and disagreement about whether there was such a decline. Since the various Roman discussions of decline are made with considerable articulacy and occur in contexts where they are brought to bear upon a series of essentially unconnected social, moral and political issues, it is questionable whether we should take them too seriously. Aper makes this very point about oratory in Dialogus 15, where he insists that Messalla’s predilection for past standards blinds him to his own eloquence and that of his contemporaries. Undoubtedly there were bad orators, just as there were during the time of Cicero. Aper holds in the Dialogus that the main difference between his age and that of Cicero is one of style, not standard (17-20).

Mayer maintains that it ‘is generally agreed among the other interlocutors that Aper does not hold with the case he urges... and Aper neither assents to the charge... nor, more tellingly, does he deny it... Now since everyone—Tacitus, Fabius Justus, the other characters in the dialogue—are all agreed about the inferiority of modern eloquence, it would suggest a perverted judgement in Aper if he alone stood out against them in finding contemporary oratory the match of antiquity. It was more

---

respectful of his judgement to stress that he was basically in agreement with all the others’ (p. 46). So are we really to disregard Aper’s viewpoint about the eloquence of the orators of his own day? There are some important points to consider when examining this question. Aper significantly has a larger share of the debate and is delineated more clearly than any of the other interlocutors. It is true that Messalla and Maternus remark that Aper has taken on the role of an opponent. But why should Aper deny this? His point lies elsewhere. Aper argues against an absolute relativity of standards in style and the idea of a decline in oratorical standards. He is able to view the situation from a historical perspective and sees the necessity of adapting oratory to the requirements of a new age. What is important is that Aper gives no such indication himself that the views he advances are anything but his own. It should also be noted that his arguments in defence of the contemporary oratory are never refuted by the other speakers.

Although Mayer rightly contends that no ‘one character . . . wholly represents the views of Tacitus himself’, he believes that Maternus ‘up to a point’ is ‘the mouthpiece of the author himself’ (p. 47). While it is also possible, even likely, that Tacitus has offered some of his own opinions in the speeches of Maternus and even Aper and that these different voices reflect his ambivalent feelings, Tacitus may have identified himself most with the voice of Aper, whose preference for oratory over poetry mirrors that of Tacitus. Given the pointed stylistic qualities of his later prose works, he probably sympathised with Aper’s arguments on the necessity of a change in style consistent with prevailing conditions and tastes (18-20, 22f.). Tacitus, like Aper, realised language must change not only to prosper but to survive, as his own works bear witness. To Tacitus, as attested in the comments of Aper and in his own style in the Histories and the Annals, this new style was a better way of reflecting upon contemporary society than the classical style.

 Probably the most disturbing aspect of Mayer’s edition is his tendency to ignore recent scholarship that directly challenges his views. There is no mention of the recent scholarship of Dominik (1997), for example, who not only argues on stylistic grounds that Tacitus may have identified himself most with the voice of Aper but also for an ironic interpretation of Maternus’ remarks in his second speech (36-42).6 Instead Mayer cites only the dated work of Costa (1969) when aligning Tacitus with Aper’s opinion regarding the literary aspects of oratory (pp. 41f.)7 and two German references on an ironic interpretation of Maternus’ final remarks, one of them also somewhat dated (1973) and leading to earlier foreign language references in support of such an interpretation and one in English against it (p. 43).8 This is strange indeed given his

---


apparent intention to provide a commentary mainly for Anglophone university students (p. vii).

A more unfortunate omission, however, is that of Bartsch (1994), who argues most powerfully for an ironic interpretation of Maternus’ comments. Both Dominik and Bartsch maintain that the praise of the emperor by Maternus as sapientissimus et unus (‘one man wise before all others’, 41) seems tainted with irony, or at least is double-edged, given that he appears to have offended the emperor Vespasian by reciting a potentially subversive play praising Cato, an archetypal republican hero, and plans to write a political drama on Thyestes, a mythical tyrant (Dial. 2-3). If this is the Maternus mentioned in Dio Cassius 67.12.5 who was executed for delivering a practice speech against tyrants under Domitian or the one alluded to in Dialogus 13 who suffered death as a result of offending Vespasian, his death would have served to enhance the irony inherent in his praise of the imperial system. Mayer believes, however, that irony is not to be attributed to Maternus’ comments (p. 44). He is entitled to this position and his view about Aper’s role in the Dialogus, of course, but his lack of reference not only in the introduction and notes but also in the bibliography (pp. 217-21) to recent scholars who argue otherwise is regrettable given that his edition is likely to be consulted by readers who are uninformed about these issues and the debates that surround them.

Mayer’s particular strength as an editor and commentator is on textual matters, which is fortunate given the nature of the sole manuscript of the Dialogus that emerged only in the fifteenth century and then disappeared again. Despite the lack of his own independent apparatus criticus, Mayer produces a text that is based upon good common sense. The accompanying notes on textual matters reveal a solid understanding of the textual issues at stake. The result is the best text yet produced of the Dialogus. Mayer is also particularly good in the introduction on issues of the dating (pp. 22-27) and style (p. 27-31) of the Dialogus. His comments on syntax and diction, which seem generally to be aimed at scholars as much as at undergraduates, are especially helpful. Although Mayer’s traditional approach to the literary and political issues of the Dialogus is open to challenge, his edition on this undervalued treatise is a welcome addition to scholarship on Tacitus.

---


This book is an exploration of Greek and Roman perceptions of dual-sex (hermaphroditism) and dual-gender (androgyny), mostly within the realm of myth, and takes the form of a collection of four loosely related essays, much of it a reworking of the author's earlier publications dating back to the mid-1970s. The author tells us in the preface that the book is 'intended as a working aid for all those interested in the question of dual sexuality, whether in the domains of psychoanalysis, gay or gender studies, the history of medicine or zoology, the history of ideas, or even the history of art' (p. xiii). It is indeed written so as to be accessible to the general educated reader, though there are helpful notes for the professional classicist. The main achievement of this book is that it collects in one place a number of obscure and difficult texts that bear on the theme of dual-sex and dual-gender, particularly in the area of cosmogonic myth.

Given that much of the material in this book was conceived in the 1970s, it should perhaps not be surprising that the author's approach is typical of the work of French structuralists a generation ago: it is a mostly a historical exploration (Brisson frequently does not even distinguish between Greece and Rome) of broad patterns of thought divorced, for the most part, from any socio-political or rhetorical context. One would have no inkling, from reading Brisson, of the neo-historicist revolution that has taken place in the history of sexuality in Greco-Roman antiquity in the last fifteen years, a movement inspired in part by the work of Michel Foucault, but really developed in earnest by a group of American classicists under the leadership of David Halperin, John J. Winkler, Amy Richlin and Craig Williams. Brisson does not cite the work of any of these scholars. If the explanation is that much of the material in this book was originally written prior to 1990, one cannot help wondering why the University of California Press has decided to publish older work that the author has made little effort to update to reflect major advances in the field.

In chapter 1, 'Monsters' (pp. 7-40), the author argues that attitudes toward the birth of a hermaphrodite child underwent a change in the first century BC from superstitious revulsion (usually leading to the burning or drowning of the child) to rational understanding. This chronological argument, the author's only real attempt in the book to present his material in some historical context, is undercut in great part, as the author himself seems to recognise (pp. 39f.), by the promiscuous resort to texts from both Greece and Rome, and from very different genres. And the historical
analysis is only skin deep. For example, the author observes that all sixteen of the hermaphrodite prodigies recorded in Livy come from the years 209 to 92 BC, even though Livy's history continued down to 12 BC. The author offers only that these were 'years fraught with wars and crises of all kinds' (p. 23). He does not explain why the 'wars and crises' of the subsequent period, say 92-31 BC, did not give rise to similar prodigies. Nor does he consider literary explanations for the distribution of prodigies in Livy's work, such as the use of different sources for the second and first centuries or the possible use of prodigies as a rhetorical device for punctuating events in the more distant past.

The Greek Diodorus is supposed to mark a shift to a more rational attitude. It is true that he expresses disgust at two quasi-historical instances in which a biological hermaphrodite was burned alive. But Brisson also cites Diodorus' discussion of two cases in which a child who is taken to be a girl at birth develops male genitals around the time of marriage. In both cases, the person is purged of his female organs with the help of surgery and becomes a full-fledged man. The author concludes, 'Diodorus found a strategy for undermining the superstition that surrounded the appearance of androgynous beings ... [H]e showed that androgyne is a natural phenomenon that can be resolved by means of surgery ...' (p. 37). But these two stories are not really examples of hermaphrodites whose ambiguous position is resolved by enlightened medicine, but are stories of sex change, and the result is always a male, never a female. Diodorus says of one case: 'Thus she who was born a woman took on a man's courage and renown' (p. 35), and of the other '[the surgeon] received a female invalid and made her into a healthy young man' (p. 36). What Diodorus—or more likely, his source—has done is to assimilate these cases of biological hermaphroditism to a mythical paradigm in which a girl is transformed into a boy at puberty, a pattern best known from the myths of Leukippos (Nic. fr. 45) and Iphis (Ov. Met. 9.666-797). This is not a triumph of rationality, but a naked statement of masculinist teleology.

Chapter 2, 'Dual Sexuality and Homosexuality' (pp. 41-71), uses an extended analysis of Ovid's version of the Hermaphroditus myth (Met. 4.285-399) to explore the relation, in Greek and Roman thought, between dual-sex and passive homosexuality. Brisson illustrates persuasively how Ovid has joined two separate tradition—the myth of Hermaphroditus' merger with Salmacis and a folk belief in the enervating properties of a Carian spring named Salmaci—by having the dual-sexed Hermaphroditus pray to the gods that men who enter Salmacis' waters in the future 'become soft' (mollescat). But Brisson goes farther and argues that Ovid's myth 'sets out to explain the origin of passive homosexuality' (p. 42), which requires him to understand mollescat in the narrowest sexual terms. Although there is much semantic overlap, the word mollis is not a synonym for 'passive homosexual'. Only Vitruvius' statement that Salmacis' waters could make men molles et impudicos comes close to making the link explicit (pp. 52, 166f. n. 18). I think it is wrong to impose so narrow a reading on Ovid in the absence of further clues in the text. But my main reason for quibbling with Brisson's translation of mollescat is that it serves as the foundation for an assumption that permeates the remainder of this chapter that dual-sex and
dual-gender are fundamentally analogous. Such an assumption requires much more argumentation as well as a dose of theoretical sophistication.

Chapter 3, 'Archetypes' (pp. 72-114), explores the theme of dual sexuality in creation myths drawn from Orphic and Gnostic texts, the Chaldean Oracles and the Hermetic Corpus. Brisson provides a useful survey of the different traditions, but does not go much beyond description. Because he tends to think of ‘male’ and ‘female’ as abstractions, he does not seem attracted to questions like why most of the ‘dual-sexed’ creator figures are really male gods that possess attributes or powers of both sexes. Nor does he seem interested in historical questions: At what historical moments were dual-sexed creator figures most attractive to the Greeks? To the Romans? Why? Instead, he tends to think in terms of a single broad mentalité that stretches from Homer to Proclus: his title for this chapter, ‘Archetypes,’ is quite revealing. But I think it does matter, particularly to the general reader at whom this book is aimed, to know when Damascius and Proclus are writing, and what biases they bring to their accounts of earlier cosmogonic speculation. Indeed, it is surprising that no mention is made whatsoever of Martin West’s Orphic Poems,¹ the most serious attempt (however controversial) in half a century to sort out the different historical layers of the Orphic tradition.

Brisson also pays little attention to the rhetorical contexts of texts he canvasses. The area that suffers most is his discussion of the cosmogonic ‘myth’ in Plato’s Symposium. Whereas Aristophanes himself introduces the original double male, androgyne and double female to make the argument that male-male love is superior to male-female love, Brisson privileges the original androgyne as the model for an undifferentiated primordial union of opposites, and in effect replicates the heterosexual teleology that he so shrewdly observes (p. 80) in Freud’s treatment of the same ‘myth’ in Three Essays on Sexuality. Brisson clings to the old-fashioned notion that Aristophanes is channeling a genuine primitive ‘myth,’ and ignores excellent recent work that demonstrates how artificial a confection this Platonic ‘myth’ really is.

In chapter 4, ‘Mediators,’ Brisson revisits material from an earlier work.² With Tiresias, Brisson shifts from figures that possess attributes of both sexes simultaneously to figures that become male and female successively. His argument in this chapter has a familiar structuralist ring: such figures mediate not only between male and female realms (thus Tiresias helps settle an argument about whether men or women enjoy sex more), but also between gods and men (Tiresias is a diviner) and between humans and animals (Tiresias is turned into a mouse in the perverse version of the notorious ‘forger’ Ptolemy Chennos [p. 126]). The argument is valid as far as it goes, but tends, as structuralist arguments often do, to elide issues of a more socio-political type: does the male Tiresias, who gives the correct ‘male’ answer to Hera’s question, really mediate in any meaningful way between male and female?

---

Brisson covers some fascinating material in this book is to be credited with making this material accessible, much of it for the first time, to the general reader and professional classicist alike. But he does not ask the important socio-political, historical, or theoretical questions that most historians of sexuality in the English-speaking world tend to pose nowadays. For those issues the reader is on his own.

David D. Leitao


This is a detailed commentary on the *Odyssey*, applying, as the title states, a narratological approach to the text. This approach, for those who are unfamiliar with it, focuses on the writer’s techniques as a narrator and especially on the recurring patterns in the way the story is told, in the ways characters speak and are spoken of, and so forth. De Jong’s starting point is thus the identification of the *Odyssey*’s many narrative devices (for example, rejected suggestion, distraction) and its recurring motifs (for example, sleep, one against many), type-scenes (for example, god meets mortal, reception of guests), story-patterns (for example, delayed recognition, stranger meets with local inhabitant); narrative techniques (for example, catch-word, description by negation), and many more, including key motifs and such linguistic features as puns, similes and recurring words. With great conscientiousness, and aided by the studies of other narratologists, she notes the appearance of every narrative feature—most broadly interpreted—and applies the appropriate narratological label or labels to every passage on which she comments.

The close attention to pattern and technique that is evidently fostered by the narratological approach yields, in de Jong’s treatment, a wealth of insights on every aspect of the text. For example, commenting on lines 1.96-101, de Jong observes that the insertion of a ‘dressing-type scene’ gives extra weight to Athena’s mission to send Telemachus in search of information about his father; she compares Athena’s dressing-type scene to that of Hermes and notes how her dressing in armor and the ominous tones of the description of her spear ‘alerts the narratees to the fact that her arousing of Telemachus is the first step on the road to Odysseus’ revenge, which will take the form of a battle’ (p. 19). Concomitant with her mention of the epic’s first ‘visit-type scene,’ she briefly relates the significance of visit-scenes in the *Odyssey*, the importance of hospitality, and the various types of hosts (pp. 17f.).

The constant comparison and contrast that is promoted by this method issues in the identification and explanation of typical Homeric procedures—for example her discussion of Homer’s treatment of scenery (5.63-75) and the observation that ‘the device of repeated prolepsis is one of the narrator’s strategies designed to make the bloody outcome of his story acceptable’ (p. 21)—as well as the observation and exploration of variants and anomalies. Thus, from her analyses of visiting type-scenes,
de Jong is able to tell us that Hermes’ reception in Calypso’s cave deviates from the usual pattern and to suggest that the deviation stems from his being there as a messenger rather than a guest. Similarly, by looking at the way different characters are introduced, she is able to tell us that ‘Nausicaa is the only Homeric character to enter the story while lying asleep’ (6.15-19)—a fact that has implications on every level: thematic, dramatic and characterological. The comparisons and contrasts also yield astute observations on characterisation—for example that Telemachus’s characterisation is mostly implicit and that he is the only character who develops in the course of the *Odyssey* (p. 20). Her comparison between Nausicaa and Telemachus (6.15-19, 7.7-13) is similarly productive, and especially her observation that ‘whereas the Telemachy showed us his family’s longing for Odysseus, the *Nekuia* reveals Odysseus’ longing for his family’ (p. 271).

Among the richest sources of insight are de Jong’s analyses of Homer’s motifs and linguistic patterns. For example, tracing the ‘forgetting-remembering’ motif in her remarks on 1.57, de Jong shows how forgetting and remembering are determining factors in Odysseus’s return. By following Homer’s application of the word *kleos* to Telemachus at various points of the epic and combining that with observations of other characters’ reactions to him, she turns her commentary on 1.94f. into a short piece on the place given to the young hero’s search for renown. In the same way, when tracing the various pronouns by which Telemachus refers to Odysseus before he calls him ‘father,’ or by name, she observes that ‘the suppression of Odysseus’ name motif reflects his uncertainty about himself and his father’ and that Mentes’ speaking of Odysseus as his father ‘brings home . . . that he really is Telemachus’ father’ (p. 18).

Her analysis of puns, similes and dramatic ironies is equally informative, insightful and enriching.

The commentary is enlightening, with sharp insights and interesting information on almost every page. For this reviewer, it was nice to see a reading that considers characters’ intentions behind their words and actions as demonstrated in *The Odyssey Re-Formed*. Even the (very welcome) glossary of literary and narratological terms and the more important narrative devices goes beyond mere definitions to noting, for example, how ‘type-scenes’ may be expanded or condensed, Homer’s methods of bringing about a ‘change of scene,’ the functions of the ‘ring composition,’ and so forth. Adding to the value of the commentary is the care that de Jong takes to point out the continuities of the Homeric text—that is, to trace developments and changes in the story line, characters, narration, events and anything else that can be followed. This mitigates the disconnectedness that results from treating the text line by line and creates a certain sense of flow. So, in a different way, does de Jong’s analysis of overlapping structural units. De Jong often begins by noting and discussing the pattern of a large chunk of text of up to several hundred lines; she then breaks that down into smaller units in which she points to different narratological features; finally, she splits each of those units yet further into sub-units of only a few lines exemplifying

---

1 F. Ahl and H. M. Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed* (Cornell 1996).
yet other narratological features. The method permits analysis of the same text several times from different perspectives, gives a sense of the richness of Homer's narrative technique, and, at times—but not always—enhances the coherence of the commentary.

Still, I have some reservations. For those of us not well versed in narratological theory, the labelling can become overwhelming. I freely confess that at times I wished that de Jong had offered her insights without the jargon. For example, on 7.233-39, she observes that 'we are dealing with an exceptional and highly effective combination of the 'action-perception-reaction' pattern and the 'belated reaction presentation' device (cf. note on 16.190): the action of Odysseus entering in Phaeacian clothes (144f.) is separated from—the presentation of—Arete's perception (234f.) and reaction (237-39); now only does it become clear that all the time Arete must have been entertaining anxious thoughts in her head.' I wonder whether the observation following the colon could not have been made without the naming—and demonstration—of the patterns. Tracing and classifying the patterns probably helped de Jong to reach the insight; but her naming and then demonstrating them without explaining their meaning or effect does not add much to my understanding of the Odyssey.

Such presentations of unelaborated narratological information or analysis occur with great frequency and at many levels. At the level of the narratological feature, we read dozens of comments like this one on 1.120, 'Telemachus' focalisation triggers the use of xeinos, which belongs to the character type-language; 197 times in speech, seven times in an embedded focalisation (1.133; 3.34; 7.227; 13.48; 20.374), and only thirteen times in simple narrator-text' (p. 21). There are dozens of content descriptions, like the following from 5.43-148: 'Hermes' visit to Calypso is an instance of the 'visit' type-scene, he (1) sets off (43-54; expanded by a 'dressing' type-scene, description of the journey, and simile); (2) arrives (55-58a; doubled: first on the island, then at the cave); (3) finds Calypso in her cave (58b-75; expanded with a detailed description of the scenery surrounding the cave); (4) is received by Calypso (79-91); (5) is given a meal (92-94), and (6) a conversation follows, in which Hermes delivers his message and Calypso reacts to it (95-148). There are also numerous structural breakdowns of chunks of dialogue into letter patterns (for example, ABCAD), as one might analyse a musical score. Often, such information or analysis is followed by astute insights, but the two are rarely connected and all too often the information itself is not connected to meaning. Reading such comments, it was hard for me not to ask 'so what' or simply to skim over them.

All in all, though, the book is a stimulating and thought-provoking addition to the previous commentaries on the Odyssey. It is also a potentially useful resource for scholars and advanced graduate students, who can avail themselves of its extensive cross-referencing to examine any number of subjects, including relations between narratology and meaning not considered here. The book's index of Greek words and

2 To profit even more from this resource, one might read it along with de Jong's earlier book, Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad (Amsterdam
six appendixes are also helpful. A number of trade-offs seem to have been made to save space and keep the book, of 627 pages, to a single volume. The cross-referencing is done in the text itself, at the key mention of each narratological element dealt with, and is not repeated in the subject index, which cites only that key occurrence. The footnotes, rare in commentaries and welcome, are restricted to the barest listing of authors and texts—presumably (but this is not clear) those to whom de Jong is indebted for her observations on the passage or point at hand. I would have preferred two volumes to the single bulky tome, with a less abbreviated index and fuller notes. I would also have liked, in both the notes and the text, inclusion of variant interpretations.

Hanna M. Roisman
Colby College


This is an excellent book, lively, thought-provoking, full of insights—a book that will stimulate discussion for many years, both on the broad sweep of Aristophanic comedy and on its meaning, especially its political import. Equally it will generate scholarly heat on the many insights that it offers into stage-management, direction, and the significance of particular words, lines and actions in the plays. Without doubt it will become a sine qua non of Aristophanic scholarship. I want to make all these points up front because I have a number of concerns about the book and some of its arguments. But those concerns are to be viewed in the light of the stimulating variety of ideas that the book throws up. It is an exciting move forward in Aristophanic scholarship; it is likely to be as influential as Dover’s book was in its day, or the commentaries of Sommerstein on Aristophanes (both of which it leans on heavily), in that it develops new fields of criticism deriving from Slater’s earlier book on Plautus.¹

The book focuses on the role of metatheatre in Aristophanes and the unwillingness of Slater to accept that it was purely a technique for parody. He sees it as a much more—a powerful strategic weapon in Aristophanes’ theatrical bag of tricks and one that can be persuasively coupled with the long-standing debate over the poet’s politics—whether ‘conservative or democrat, satirist or clown, even subversive or agent of repression’ (p. ix).

The first chapter is devoted to metatheatre and its role. Here Slater states that 'a central contention of this book is that Aristophanes believes that teaching his audience to be aware of, and think critically about, performance, both in the theatre and elsewhere in the life of the city, is a matter of vital importance to the Athenians. His ambition for comedy to rival tragedy as a teacher of the people is intimately related to precisely this self-consciousness about acting and stage technique in which his comedy is so rich' (p. 5). He goes on to argue (pp. 6f.) that Aristophanes uses metatheatre as a means to critique a certain type of politics, namely 'spectator politics', where the *demos* views the activity as a kind of spectator sport but itself plays little part in it and refuses to become involved. By the use of metatheatre, the poet opens up to the gaze of the audience the techniques and goals of theatrical performance and thereby provides a message about how they should view politics. Slater maintains (p. 10) that peculiar to Aristophanes is the claim of a teaching function for comedy and he criticises tragedy for neglecting that crucial duty. A necessary part of his argument is naturally the question of whether Aristophanic comedy was illusory or non-illusory, which he discusses well.

Chapter 2 reviews the emergence of the actor and how that affects performance, since, arguably, the audience is now conscious of the actor *qua* actor and the performance therefore as a performance. Green has shown that on vase depictions tragic actors are shown as 'real', while comic actors are shown as 'actors', which Slater takes as evidence of the view of the comic audience to a performance. The 'Choregus vase' is held up (p. 34) as a good example of the technique. While this is undoubtedly true, the contest of tragic actors preceded that of comic ones, and one might have thought it too would have affected the way tragic audiences viewed what they saw on the stage.

The remaining chapters of the book are devoted one to each play of Aristophanes (with the exception of the *Wealth* which is dealt with, surprisingly, in a brief paragraph in the final chapter, 'Reprise—And Coming Attractions', pp. 235-39) and provide a detailed discussion of the staging of the plays in the light of the metatheatrical techniques that Slater concentrates on and the political line he pursues. These detailed reviews are argued with an attention to performance, both stage and cultural, that makes it both refreshing and original. Far too many books on Aristophanes forget that the plays were performed on the stage and, with the famous exception of *Frogs*, probably only once.

Reception-based performance criticism lies at the heart of this work and Slater argues that Aristophanes uses this to persuade his audience to cease being passive consumers of spectacle to become active participants in politics. This concern with the state of politics has considerable resonance with contemporary issues in the USA, and in a sense then, Slater follows on from the *Black Athena*, feminist and other

---


2 Of these chapters, those on the *Acharnians, Wasps, Birds* and *Ecclesiazusae* have appeared in article form elsewhere.
re-interpretations of the ancient world in the light of modern preconceptions. As a concept this is unproblematic—every generation needs to re-interpret the ancient world in the light of its own concerns and such interpretations have brought a wealth of new insights. However, two questions here are troublesome. The first is why we have so little evidence from the ancient world that the spectators did indeed view Aristophanes’ plays in this way or acted on them and second, why we need to view Aristophanes as having a single political line to push throughout all his works. A priori one might have thought that a lifetime of writing, apparently unsuccessful in its political purpose, since he had to keep repeating the point (even if in new and pleasing ways), might have led him to try something different. The case Slater makes is indisputably a good one, but not wholly persuasive.

Further, it leads to some questionable argument. On the Thesmophoriazusae to give one example, there is an excellent discussion of the problems associated with Mnesilochus’ address (lines 466ff.) and how it is to be interpreted (pp. 163ff.). Slater wants to argue that not only parody of the Telephus lies behind the speech, but that Aristophanes wants to call to mind his own previous version used in the Acharnians so as to argue that Mnesilochus’ speech is more than just a joke but has serious intent. Yet we have a period of fourteen years separating the productions, a whole range of lost plays by Aristophanes himself, not to say all his competitors and, indeed, a different audience. It is difficult to believe that he could be referring to his earlier production and expecting the audience to recognise it. Indeed, Slater himself later recognises the difficulty of the argument when he dismisses a suggested recollection of Eupolis on the grounds that it lies twenty years earlier and any visual allusion could only be familiar to an older generation of audience (p. 187). Even more problematic is the suggestion that the ‘we are alone’ of line 472 might spark a reminiscence of Ach. 504 where the words are repeated. This is to forget how tiny a selection of the plays have reached us.

Or take the Frogs. Slater concludes his otherwise excellent discussion of the play, with the following words: ‘Moreover, spectatorship, as Aristophanes has been arguing from the Acharnians on, is not a purely passive pursuit, but one which requires the right kind of active contribution. One can hardly say that Dionysus becomes a successful performer in the first half of the play, although he does improve his skills. In the second half, however, he does finally master what is required of him to become a successful tragic spectator (Slater’s emphasis), and in doing so models that behavior for the rest of Athens’ (p. 206). The argument is challenging but ultimately, to this reviewer, an unsatisfactory explanation of the end of the play because it places too much emphasis on the connection between the role of Dionysus and the audience and too little on the play itself.

But these are small quibbles in a book overflowing with ideas. The individual plays are considered in a wealth of detail, a multitude of insights and a great deal of judicious discussion of earlier scholarship. There is something new on every page and while views will differ on the value of each of the myriad of suggestions (for excellent comments on Frogs see p. 182 on the Frog Chorus, p. 183 for Dionysus, p. 185 for the
equation of the theatre with Hades and the audience as underworld inhabitants, p. 186 on the Lenaea, p. 187 on the use of anapaests, p. 189 on Theramenes, etc.), they all drive one back to re-read and reconsider the text as a theatrical document and challenge the arguments that Slater makes. This is a book that is almost as inventive as the work of Aristophanes himself. It is a must for all interested in fifth-century BC theatre where the wealth of ideas will provide stimulation for Aristophanic studies for many years to come.

Chris Dearden


This book sets out to ‘place the senatorial aristocracy at the centre of analysis’ (p. xiii, cf. pp. 3-5). Saltzman claims the point of view is novel (p. 3); previous discussions have drawn, by necessity, on the same élite sources, but questions have frequently been different, and at times unsuited to the source body. Salzman avoids the latter with questions tailored to the concerns of the Roman élite as she conceptualises them. Attendant factors (in particular the emperor and his court) are treated as secondary, and not allowed to dictate the direction of the discussion.

‘Approaches to a Paradox’ sketches the programme (pp. 1-19, esp. p. 6). The evidential centrepiece is ‘short biographies’ of 414 Western aristocrats from 284 to 423 AD (pp. 6f.). Eastern evidence is rightly not allowed to dictate a reading of the contemporary West (p. 8), a practice largely adhered to, even if Salzman cannot help citing Chrysostom on some important points (e.g., pp. 61, 158f.). Salzman accepts for her database only those aristocrats ‘for whom there was certain or near certain explicit evidence of religious affiliation’ (p. 7); the criteria on which these decisions are made are discussed in Appendix 1 (see below). At the centre of her analysis Salzman places aristocratic concerns with status and honour, which she sees behind the aristocratic drift towards Christianity in the fourth century. It was Christianity’s successful appeal to these values which for Salzman primarily explains the ‘conversion’ (a term which here does ‘not entail a radical reorientation’, p. 202) of the Roman nobility: emperors, preachers and Christian aristocrats all contributed to a grafting of aristocratic ideals onto Christianity, with consequent Christian influence on those ideals.

‘Defining the Senatorial Aristocracy’ requires a substantial chapter (pp. 19-68), preparation for the ‘understanding of status components of aristocracy’ which Salzman’s model of Christianisation requires (esp. pp. 43-58). Criteria for inclusion in the target group are detailed, and changing composition and character charted. Religion’s role in this ‘status culture’ is left until last, with Salzman arguing for the survival in prestige of the pagan priesthoods into the last quarter of the fourth century (pp. 61-66). ‘Christianisation’ (pp. 66-68) could only proceed by appeals to these same
status mechanisms. ‘Aristocratic Men: Social Origins’ (pp. 69-106) rehearses much material available elsewhere, charting geographical, social and vocational distinctions against religious preference. In not a few cases Salzman finds that her data concur with well-established hypotheses. Here, however, such axioms as the persistence of paganism in fourth-century Rome (p. 77) are placed on a secure footing. The approach to ‘Dating the Conversion’ of Rome is conservative (‘a compelling resolution . . . still eludes us’, p. 79). Nevertheless, Salzman’s data indicates that the last two decades of the century are significant.

A correlation of ‘Career Paths’ (pp. 107-38) and religious identification shows pagans predominant in the senatorial cursus until the period 367-83. By contrast, Christianisation was more rapid in the Imperial bureaucracy, with social and cultural networks more important than the influence of the Emperor in promoting conversion: Christianity became part of the ‘common culture’, rather than a career-based option. Salzman confirms that no great correlation existed between high military office and Christianity (pp. 127-32), and charts the ‘religious career’, that is, Church offices and pagan priesthoods (pp. 132-35). Despite well-known cases, Salzman demonstrates that aristocratic participation in Christian leadership was rare during the fourth century: only in the fifth does Peter Brown’s ‘double oligarchy’ appear.1 By way of summary, Salzman contrasts older notions of defensive conservatives with revisionist assertions of fluidity, and offers an alternative: a gradual turning away from pagan institutions was accompanied in ‘episodic fashion’ by slow but steady convergence of Christian and pagan career paths, as Christianity became a ‘prestigious, status-laden option’ (p. 137).

‘Aristocratic Women’ (pp. 138-77) contributes much to Salzman’s revision. Engaging on multiple fronts with the long shadow of Harnack, feminist readings and the social world constructed by Brown,2 Salzman argues against the existence of close ties between Christianity and aristocratic women (‘I think not’; p. 140). For Salzman, nothing reveals women to be dominant figures in the spread of Christianity; she seeks rather a better understanding of the influence of aristocratic men on their wives, sisters and daughters. Looking beyond writers with other agendas (Jerome is repeatedly cited), Salzman’s evidence does not suggest that Christianity broke the traditional patterns of Roman family life. Salzman insists on the continuity of traditional Roman female ideals into Late Antiquity: these were threatened not by the conversion of Roman noblewomen to Christianity, but instances where ascetic or celibate lifestyles threatened family continuity (pp. 151-55). When women were praised by men such as Jerome, the lexicon of old Roman values was still used. Nor, for Salzman, should such enthusiastic testimony be given undue weight: this leads inevitably to the

overestimation of the importance of such ascetic women to the spread of Christianity (pp. 166f.). Ascetic ‘career paths’ were taken up by women after conversion to Christianity, rather than being the impetus for it (pp. 167-69). Nor were women ‘critical, active converters’ (p. 140); such engagement with the world outside the family was a man’s job (p. 161). In both Christian and pagan familial and educational contexts (pp. 158-61), children largely followed the paterfamilias, as wives did husbands. Only between mother and daughter can much influence be detected (pp. 160f.); the influence of mothers on their children and in family contexts was, as it had always been in the world of the Roman aristocracy, secondary. It is a point emphasised repeatedly by Salzman, a repetition both necessary and appropriate given how entrenched opposing views are.

Salzman sets out to place imperial influence in the background, but scholars from Gibbon on have emphasised the opposite, and Salzman is forced to engage with the issue in chapter 6, ‘The Emperor’s Influence on Aristocratic Conversion’ (pp. 178-99). The influence of ‘active’ and ‘inactive’ emperors is assessed, with the 360’s and 370’s again shown to form a crucial period of change. But the emperor, rather than guiding the aristocracy towards Christianity, became a ‘new symbolic figure’, an ‘exemplar of how to be aristocratic and Christian at the same time’ (pp. 197-99).

In the final chapter, ‘The Aristocrats’ Influence on Christianity’ (pp. 200-19), Salzman assigns most importance to the way in which the message of Christianity was communicated: explicitly placed within ‘prevailing modes of discourse’, targeted to appeal to aristocratic concerns. Pace Hadot and Nock, it was this assimilation of key traditional issues, rather than ‘changes within the mentalité of the aristocracy’ (p. 201) which accounts both for the conversion of the Roman aristocracy, and the type of Christianity which emerged from this process. Honour and office, wealth and patronage, remained primary (pp. 202-09); new ‘careers’ were discussed in terms of the old values. Neither in education nor in friendship did Christianity seriously affect aristocratic ideals, although it is unfortunate that Salzman does make clear whether her lack of discussion of amicitia between Christians and pagans reflects a lack of evidence for such connections.

Nobilitas rightly closes the discussion (pp. 213-18), with Salzman showing how the bases on which the quality was awarded and admired were redrawn (especially in relation to asceticism), and an attempt made to promulgate a new definition. Through forced engagement with the aristocratic tradition, and the need to assimilate to its values to be successful, the message of Christianity was changed. Concepts of universal salvation, often tendered as an explanation for Christianisation, were rarely given public airing by aristocrats or bishops. The message itself was less important than aristocratic identity and status culture: only in the interaction of message with

---

pre-existing culture can be found the explanation for the ‘aristocratisation’ of Christianity (pp. 218f.).

There is much to praise here. Salzman makes a coherent and believable case, and argues it well. She provides statistical derivatives of her database in the form of tables, from which others may form further conclusions. The sixteen tables are impressive, and so too the lists of office-holders by religion in Appendix 4. A list of all aristocrats with ‘Religious Affiliations’ is provided in Appendix 2 (pp. 243-53). Appendix 1 is devoted to the conception and construction of the database. It strikes one that if, as Salzman asserts, there were few atheists in the Roman empire (p. 61), then all those who do not make the database will have been part of the process, yet receive no voice. Source biases are addressed in individual cases (e.g., pp. 141-43), but require more systematic treatment.

Divining an individual’s religion with such sources as we have for the ancient world is never easy. Salzman recognises the problems documentary texts in particular can pose in this regard (pp. 236-39). Often we find ambiguous symbolism or phraseology; behind that, the problem of what sort of belief (if any) such public displays reveal. Here, Salzman proceeds with somewhat disarming pragmatism, simply asserting that evidence such as epigraphic attestation of Christian phraseology, imagery and symbolism ‘reflect[s] evidence of behaviour’. This will be true in many cases, but cannot, surely, be simply assumed.

Salzman’s list of criteria (pp. 236f.) seems sound. Names are disallowed as indicative of personal beliefs. Merely writing a letter to a pagan does not mark one as such, nor does the inclusion of a religiously neutral formulaic phrase. A parent’s religion is not allowed to speak for that of a child, nor, apparently, are family connections given much weight at all. All of this is sound, but the inflexible application of fixed criteria (on which Salzman prides herself, p. 237) does not always produce viable results. There is much still to be learnt in areas such the use of epistolary formulae. Many phrases are formulaic, but it is not at all apparent that none of them carry religious significance. People who are ‘religious’, but not demonstrative about it in a certain way, are lost.

Furthermore, we hear little from Salzman about these ‘doubtful cases’: people are excluded if there is any ambiguity, but surely such cases are among the most illuminating. A die-hard convert to Christianity may not tell us as much about how cultural norms assimilated the religion as a case in which stages in the process (rather than merely the end result) may be glimpsed. Such cases might assist in filling out the somewhat dry picture which emerges, and answering the real questions which remain about how aristocrats—and all inhabitants of the later Roman empire—of differing beliefs interacted with one another. However, Salzman cannot be criticised for not addressing issues which would take her outside her focus. As it is, she has elucidated one piece of the puzzle, and provided a wealth of data and approaches for others to take outstanding questions forward.

Malcolm Choat  
Macquarie University

Why did the ancient Greeks and Romans find fault with anger? Why did they so insistently advocate the reining in or the elimination of angry emotions? Rather than offering a mere analysis of arguments presented in our primary texts, Harris' study undertakes to provide an answer from a social-anthropological perspective, taking due cognisance of the groups whose interests were served by the discourse of anger control in Greco-Roman antiquity. Most importantly, he demonstrates the relevance of his historical enquiry by relating it to discussions on the subject in our contemporary culture.

The book consists of four parts, which focus on ‘Approaches’ (pp. 1-128), ‘Anger in Society and in the State’ (pp. 129-282), ‘Intimate Rage’ (pp. 283-336), and ‘Anger and the Invention of Psychic Health’ (pp. 337-99) consecutively, and concludes with a comprehensive bibliography and less comprehensive index. References to scholars with whom Harris engages in debate are unfortunately indexed selectively. Nussbaum, for example, whose *Therapy of Desire* is frequently the subject of apt criticism in the footnotes, is not listed in the index at all. Neither is Sorabji, whose *Emotion and Peace of Mind* receives favourable mention in several footnotes. Peter Brown, on the other hand, who appears only in one footnote, or Paul Veyne, who is mentioned only once in the text of the book, are listed. A clearer indexing of primary texts discussed would have enhanced the usefulness of the work.

In part 1 (‘Approaches’) Harris not only discusses the anthropological approach in some detail, but also applies it to his analysis of Greco-Roman anger terminology. Cross-cultural studies of the emotions emphasise that emotional terms may not fully overlap in different languages. This means that we should not simply assume that English ‘anger’ is an exact equivalent for Greek *orge*. Harris concludes that *orge*-terms (and *thumos* when it refers to anger) refer, in classical Greece at least, specifically to intense anger—a fact that should be taken into account when examining the classical critique of *orge*. Latin *ira*, on the other hand, according to Harris, had a broader meaning and could include intense as well as less intense forms of anger. Harris insists that the primary sources to be examined should include not only philosophical but also non-philosophical texts on the angry emotions, and that these should be analysed while constantly keeping the audiences in mind.

Further, although it is imperative that the subject of anger control be related to the broader discussion of the control of emotions and the virtue of *sophrosune* and *enkrateia* in Greco-Roman antiquity, Harris emphasises that the Greeks did not have a

---

word to refer to the emotions as an inclusive category before the fourth century BC. Since it is only then that *pathe* came to be used in this sense, it will not suffice to explain the archaic and classical Greek critique of anger in terms of a general admiration of emotional control at that time. We should rather, he maintains, look for very specific social and political forces that brought about and sustained the archaic and classical discourse on anger control.

Before continuing his ambitious project which will consider also non-philosophical texts within their social-political contexts, Harris concludes the first part by surveying explicit philosophies about the angry emotions, beginning with Plato. Plato portrays his hero Socrates as being superior to anger and apparently does not admit the possibility of just *orge*. *Thumos*, on the other hand, needs to be ruled but can be noble. Unfortunately Plato does not define the difference between the two terms. Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition differ from Plato in that they defend the importance of appropriate *orge* directed at the right people at the right time for the right reasons and in the right manner (the doctrine of the mean). But, like Plato, Aristotle does not clearly define the difference between *orge* and *thumos*. Although some Hellenistic philosophers tried to clarify the distinction, they did not really succeed in doing so, in Harris’ view. The Stoics initially condemned all passions (the ‘absolutists’), but the criticism was sometimes softened—a course that is charted with reference to Chrysippus, Panaetius, Poseidonius, Seneca, Epictetus and their influence on non-Stoic absolutists or near absolutists like Cicero, Plutarch and Galen.

Having dealt with these preliminaries, Harris now turns to a discussion proper of the ideological reasons for Greco-Roman disapproval of anger. Part 2 focuses on politics, part 3 on the family and slavery. Harris’ basic argument in part 2 is that the constantly negative attitude towards anger displayed in public, from archaic Greece to Rome, served definite *ideological* purposes: it helped to create a stable political and legal system. In the *Iliad* the harmful effects of Achilles’ unrelenting anger (his *menis*) are appropriately taught in an age of Greek state formation—a lesson that is adapted by Solon for citizen government in early sixth-century Athens. On Harris’ reading of the evidence (drama, speeches, historians), Athenian citizens became more critical about public *orge* towards the final years of the Peloponnesian War—an attitude which is to be ascribed to the thought that it brought on *stasis*. In the next century Aristotle’s argument for appropriate anger did not legitimate the expression of strong anger in the political sphere, and Polybius and Philodemus are shown to be even more hostile to it. At Rome provincial governance and the reputation of Caesar made the issue particularly important. The Roman governor who behaved like a tyrant would create risks for himself, and in the case of Caesar and later imperial rulers—at least during their lives—the reputation of being even-tempered and exercising *clementia* became a standard part of image propaganda.

Harris concludes part 2 with a thesis about women and anger. He argues that throughout Greco-Roman antiquity anger was associated with women (to name just two examples: Medea and Galen on his mother), and that this stereotype and the critique of anger functioned as an instrument of male domination. However, he points
out that in our times some feminists consider anger essential to women’s struggle for liberation, while others claim that it is largely counter-productive.

In part 3 Harris argues that Greco-Roman criticism of anger within the family (*oikos/familia*) and towards one’s slaves facilitated the smooth functioning of society. It would be in the interest of husbands to restrain their anger towards their wives, of fathers towards their sons, and of slave-owners towards their slaves. Rage towards the latter could provoke them to murder or make them less inclined to work. Harris notes that the last quarter of the fourth century (Menander being the prime evidence) marks an important point in the disapproval of anger towards *philoi* (family and close friends), and that Philodemus and Cicero were particularly concerned about the anger of fathers towards children and of husbands towards wives. The advice that one should avoid showing anger towards one’s slaves is first encountered in Xenophon and Plato, loftier theorisations are found in Seneca, and some emperors introduced modest reforms concerning the treatment of slaves (motivated mostly by practical considerations, but in the case of Antoninus Pius also due to philosophical influence).

When Harris turns to anger control as an objective of the individual’s psychic health (part 4), he admits that it is more difficult to explain the reasons for the emergence of this introspective concern, according to which it would be in the interest of the individual’s health to rule his/her own passions. What is clear is that the control of anger came to be regarded during the Hellenistic period (with definite antecedents already towards the end of the fifth century) as part of the larger problem of the individual’s need to control his/her own emotions (*enkrateia* of one’s *pathe*). Within this broader argument emotions came to be regarded as illnesses in need of therapy which philosophy could offer in the individual’s interest. Epicureans promised partial and Stoics total tranquillity by rational means (*ataraxia* or *apatheia* by means of persuasive arguments). Although these methods show remarkable similarities with contemporary psychotherapies (notably with cognitive psychology), Harris points out that ancient theories placed more emphasis on habit (the importance of establishing habitual control over one’s angry emotions) and on the total elimination of *orge*. In contrast modern therapies stress the dangers of bottling-up angry emotions and the need to vent them.

The ambivalent view which Christianity held on the matter of anger control is discussed in a brief chapter, ‘From Sickness to Sin: Early Christianity and Anger’ (pp. 391-99). Although in Harris’ view Christianity generally disapproved of *orge* and took this message to a wider audience than had previously been the case, some ambiguity remained on account of certain Jewish and Christian traditions. Not only was God portrayed as angry, but so was Jesus on several occasions. The question of justified anger in the Hebrew Bible and earliest Christianity—whether in historical fact or apocalyptic fantasy—is of paramount importance here, and deserves a fuller discussion than the one offered by Harris. It is also remarkable that Harris shows, in his discussion of Paul, no awareness of the crucial distinction between Pauline and Deutero-Pauline material (he treats Ephesians, for example, simply as authentically Pauline).
In a concluding chapter (pp. 401-18) Harris offers a summary of his arguments and indicates some hermeneutical implications of his study. In answering the question whether we would benefit from living without anger, he insists that any such evaluation of the angry emotions should not only distinguish between the different types and forms of anger (annoyance versus intense rage, angry feelings versus angry speech and action, for example) but should also consider both the merits and demerits of these in our private and public lives—whether the level of anger is bad for our health, harmful within our families and workplace, counterproductive to social-political and psychological liberation, or not. Harris holds that civilised local and international governance will create and maintain ‘institutions which will limit the harmful actions of anger (terrorists, ethnic cleansing) without taking away people’s opportunities of expressing anger over communal causes’ (p. 417).

Recent studies on the emotions in Greco-Roman antiquity have fruitfully focused on the argumentative structure underlying ancient philosophical discourse on the topic. With this monograph Harris makes an important contribution to the current debate about the emotions, specifically anger, in antiquity by offering a convincing social-anthropological explanation for this pervasive interest in the Greco-Roman world. In addition, his constant engagement with modern psychological and social debates on the topic undoubtedly adds to the value of the study. A translation of Latin texts in the footnotes would, however, have made the work more accessible to a broader audience of anthropologists and psychologists with limited or no classical background.

John Strijdom


Why did the Roman empire fall? For Edward Gibbon, the answer lay with the triumph of superstition and barbarism. Other answers have been sought, from manpower supply to lead poisoning. More recently, scholars have preferred to think in terms of continuities and innovations that make the world of late antiquity a vigorous one, and well worthy of study. Now along comes Aldo Schiavone with a different analysis. For him, the study of late antiquity is a valuable enterprise: the age presents the historian with ‘an entirely new universe . . . in which simplistic and teleological explanations have no part’ (p. 24). At the same time, however, he suggests that the study of late antiquity ‘tends to overshadow an essential point’, by ‘downplaying the disruptive and catastrophic aspects of the changeover’ between antiquity and the Middle Ages (p. 25). For Schiavone, then, there is still an essential disjunction in

---

1 A paperback edition of this book has now been published by Harvard University Press.
history to be explained: why did western history not follow an untraumatic path of linear evolution between the Roman empire and our own era (pp. 23f.; cf. p. 175)? To this end he suggests a new analysis; namely, that the roots of Rome’s fall are to be found not so much in the centuries of imperial collapse, as in the centuries of its apparent greatness. Put baldly, it is that the slave-based economy of the Roman empire could not expand in the way that modern economies do, and that the empire’s fall was, in some respects, inevitable.

Schiavone is an established figure in Italian scholarly circles (this book is a translation of La storia spezzata: Roma antica e Occidente moderno, published at Rome in 1996), at least from the days when he was instrumental, with Andrea Giardina, in the organisation and publication of the Istituto Gramsci seminars on slave-based production in Roman antiquity. His approach is a discursive one. Along the way, readers will find themselves in the company of, amongst others, Daniel Defoe (pp. 91f.), Milan Kundera (p. 205) and (of course) Karl Marx (e.g., pp. 72f., 169-71); searching criticism of the ideological underpinnings of arguments by modern historians of the ancient world, notably Mikhail Rostovtzeff, finds lengthy exposition (esp. pp. 19-29, 46-52). I have a feeling that such an approach, which integrates the study of modern historiography with ancient historiography and history, might still strike some Anglophone readers as continental idiosyncrasy. But I would urge them to persevere with Schiavone: his interpretations are thought-provoking.

The book begins its account of Rome’s fall, just as Gibbon did, with the ‘Golden Age of the Antonines’; Aelius Aristides, eulogising Rome before Antoninus Pius, occupies centre stage. Amid the praise, however, Schiavone detects ‘a veil of uneasiness, perplexity, and anxiety’ (p. 9; cf. 11). Here, as so often in the course of his argument, Schiavone undercuts our expectations. This anxiety is not that spiritual distress that E. R. Dodds once thought he had identified, and which more recent analyses of late antiquity have done much to discount. For Schiavone, rather, the anxiety is this: if, as Aristides would like us to believe, the Roman empire had now reached the apogee of its existence, then the only way for it to go thereafter was down; in other words, no future progress was conceivable (pp. 12-15). This issue lies at the crux of Schiavone’s analysis: for him, the reasons for the collapse of the ancient world are to be sought within its own socio-economic structures at the very moment of its greatness. In Schiavone’s view, this period stretches from the third century BC to the second century AD, its limits set by the first Punic war at one end and Trajan’s conquest of Dacia at the other (p. 53). Throughout these centuries, he identifies a number of key factors that characterise the imperial economy and set it apart from both what went before and what was to come after. Trade flourished, and with it came the rise of merchants and the expanded use of coinage; the population of Roman citizens grew and with this arose a new context within which social relations occurred; above all, slaves came to be used in large numbers (pp. 56-59). This last factor provides the key to Schiavone’s thesis.

For such an analysis to be valid, Schiavone argues that we must be quite sure about what we mean by ‘the ancient economy’. Yet again, we find that Schiavone will
not allow us to think in terms of the categories to which we have grown comfortable; instead he argues that we must rethink what we think we know about the economy of the ancient world. He is critical of efforts to understand the ancient economy through the application of modern economic theories. Nor does he have much time for debate about the relative ‘primitivism’ or ‘modernism’ of the ancient economy (how retarded or advanced it was when compared with modern economies): in Schiavone’s view, such analysis get us nowhere (pp. 46-52). Indeed, he suggests that it is une question mal posée, since elements that we would describe as ‘primitive’ (such as limited, localised trade and subsistence production) and ‘modern’ (such as long distance maritime trade) existed side-by-side (pp. 63-69).

Similarly, he is sceptical about the ultimate value of efforts to bring statistical analysis to bear on ancient economic life: ‘we must abstain’, he insists, ‘from almost all of the formulas, both verbal and mathematical, that economic historians of the modern era are accustomed to employing so abundantly’ (p. 60). The reasons for this have less to do with the absence of sufficient raw data (pp. 33f.) than with the conceptual frameworks that guide ancient and modern economies. At the most basic level, the difference is this: central to modern economics is the concept of growth generated from within the economy (pp. 60-62); in the ancient world, however, such growth as occurred was caused by external factors, primarily wars of conquest (pp. 60, 70-74, 80-86). In short, the economies of the modern capitalist world and classical antiquity are fundamentally different (pp. 91-107; cf. 175-78).

This prompts Schiavone to undertake a different analysis of the ancient economy, one that has much in common with the basic principles elucidated by Moses Finley. Put basically, this is that the Roman economy was embedded in a culture where elite attitudes categorised manual labour either as something that happened in a distant idealised past (the early Roman state of the citizen farmer that Tiberius Gracchus sought to recreate) or as a phenomenon that was associated with the activities of slaves (pp. 108-42). Associated with this was a complete lack of cogent technological innovation of the sort that was so important to development of the modern economy at the time of the Industrial Revolution (pp. 142-64). Production was in the hands of chattel slaves, not paid labourers, and hence there was little interest on the part of those involved in production to engage in any activity that might be comparable with the growth dynamics found in modern economies (pp. 164-75). In other words, the primacy of slavery in agricultural and industrial production ‘cut off any possibility of further evolution’ in the Roman economy (p. 174). Once it came under pressure with the end of imperial wars of expansion, and thus the drying up of a major source of slaves, the system was too rigid to develop in any dynamic way, and collapse was inevitable (pp. 196-202).

Some might view Schiavone’s central argument as too bleak: was the Roman world incapable of the sort of growth dynamic with which we ourselves are familiar? For Schiavone, in his most whimsical moments, it is a tale of missed opportunities. By setting side-by-side Hero of Alexandria’s steam engine and the liburna, the oxen-powered paddle ship described in the fourth-century AD treatise De Rebus Bellicis 17,
He argues that the Romans had the technological capability to develop something akin to a paddle steamer. Crucially, however, the connection between the two mechanisms was never made, precisely because of the different conceptual frameworks that drove the Roman empire and the industrial revolution (pp. 145ff.). He suggests also that the Roman world could have developed along different lines: in the social upheavals of the late republic there existed conditions that could have led to a very different society and economy, and one less reliant on slavery: again, however, the possibility was never realised (pp. 179-90).

Throughout, Schiavone articulates his arguments forcefully, and he is not afraid to be controversial. To see Henri Pirenne’s *Mahomet et Charlemagne* (Paris 1937) dismissed as ‘possibly overrated’ (p. 25) might shock those early medievalists who have extolled the Belgian historian’s greatness. Yet the combative nature of such remarks may be appropriate to the bold thesis that Schiavone is arguing. There are still many late antique historians content to stress the continuities apparent in the age that they study, while ignoring or downplaying disjunctions. Much of this is in deliberate counterpoint to Gibbon’s insistence on *Decline and Fall*. Hence the emphasis on more neutral terms, notably ‘transformation’, as in the recent European Science Foundation project on *The Transformation of the Roman World*. And yet there are signs that the notion of a cataclysm at the end of antiquity is making a comeback. For example, Wolf Liebeschuetz’s recent study of late Roman urbanism deliberately evokes Gibbon in its title: *Decline and Fall of the Roman City*. As Liebeschuetz remarks (pp. 414ff.), any verdict on whether the changes engendered by late antiquity were ‘an improvement, or the reverse, is a value judgement’; nevertheless, by analysing the variety of aspects of urban life that were obliterated he argues that ‘it abundantly merits to be described as a decline’. But others will undoubtedly disagree, and the rejection of the sort of precipitous and catastrophic collapse for which Schiavone argues so stridently (for example, on p. 32 he describes it as a ‘historical thrombosis’) seems set to remain entrenched as the scholarly orthodoxy. In such circumstances, it may be inevitable, even necessary, that the heretics adopt a combative tone. I hope that such polemic does not distract readers, for Schiavone has produced a volume that deserves to command our attention, whether or not we agree with its central arguments.

Mark Humphries

*National University of Ireland, Maynooth*

---

2 For a sample of the output from this project, see L. Webster and M. Brown (edd.), *The Transformation of the Roman World: AD 400-900* (Berkeley 1997).

BOOKS RECEIVED

Books for review should be sent to the Reviews Editor, Scholia.


IN THE MUSEUM

Scholia publishes news about classical museums in New Zealand and articles on classical artefacts in museums. Information about classical exhibitions and artefacts is welcome and should reach the In the Museum Editor by 1 September.

THE JAMES LOGIE MEMORIAL COLLECTION,
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY

Roslynne Bell, Curator
James Logie Memorial Collection, University of Canterbury
Christchurch, New Zealand

In 2003 the Logie Collection was pleased to receive on loan seven Attic and Apulian vases belonging to the Collection of Kosta and Sophia Voukelatos, Melbourne. These works illustrate a number of vase shapes and are decorated with scenes ranging from mythological to commonplace.

Attic Black-figure Neck-amphora, Ca. 520-510 BC, Attributed to the Circle of the Antimenes Painter (R. Guy). Inv. No. VKL 2/03¹

Side A depicts the Rape of Cassandra. The prophetess appears in the centre of the composition, cowering before the onslaught of Ajax. She turns towards her attacker, who approaches from the left, and raises her right hand to ward off his sword. The strangely masculine Cassandra, in added white, is nude save for a mantle draped around her shoulders. Ajax wears a chitoniskos, a himation tied around his waist, and a Corinthian helmet; he is shown striding forward, his sword in his right hand, its empty scabbard grasped in his upraised left hand. On the right the goddess Athena is shown as a conventional Promachos (not Palladion) but without her traditional aegis, her shield partially covering Cassandra’s head. The letters ΑΘΕ (retrograde) and ΑΙΔΙΔ appear in the field between the heads of the two eponymous figures. Side B shows the infant Achilles being delivered to Chiron by his parents Peleus and Thetis. The centaur stands at the left, his latest catch (a fox (?) and a rabbit) hanging from a

¹ Figures 1a-b. Height: 467 mm.; diameter of body: 306 mm.; diameter of rim: 224 mm.


168
branch over his left shoulder, his right hand extended to take the child; a hunting dog stands at his side. In front, facing left, Peleus presents Achilles, the latter shown as a miniature adult who reaches out to grasp the mantle worn by his father. At the far right Thetis, in added white, stands looking on; she wears a peplos and a himation, the latter drawn up over her head and covering her right hand, which she raises to her face. Subsidiary decoration includes a mirrored lotus and palmette chain on the neck, alternating black and red tongues on the shoulder, a palmette cross with large pendant lotus under each handle, and a lotus bud chain and rays below the figural scenes.

A marked contrast exists between the treatment of the two mythological scenes. While side B presents the episode of Chiron and Achilles in conventional fashion, the combination of a number of iconographic anomalies set side A apart from other black-figure representations of the rape of Cassandra. Notably these include Cassandra’s physique which, lacking breasts and given muscular legs, resembles that of a young boy; the prominence given to the empty scabbard held by Ajax; and the depiction of Athena without her aegis. The first of these unusual features has been taken as further evidence that at the time Cassandra was not yet perceived as a fully mature woman. It is not unusual for Ajax to be shown with his left hand raised, but nowhere else does he hold his scabbard aloft; this unique feature serves to emphasise the speed and imminence of his attack. The fact that Athena lacks her aegis is but one trait that militates against the attribution of the vase to the Antimenes Painter himself. Instead similarities in the decorative ornament to that of the Group of Toronto 305, who were associated by Beazley with the Antimenes Painter, would suggest that this work be placed within the circle of this master. (Anna Skilton)

---

2 For a black-figure amphora by the Diosphos Painter, ca. 500 BC, in which an inscription unequivocally identifies a similar petasos-wearing figure as Peleus (as opposed to Hermes, who often appears in this scene), see A. Kossatz-Deissmann, s.v. ‘Achilleus’, LIMC 1 (1981) 46 no. 34, pl. 60.

3 H. Jackson, ‘A Black-figure Neck-Amphora in Melbourne: The Nudity of Kassandra’, MedArch 9-10 (1996-97) 65. Such representations are a far cry from later red-figure works by artists such as Onesimos (see O. Paoletti, s.v. ‘Kassandra I’, LIMC 7 [1994] 962 no. 104, pl. 680) and the Kleophrades Painter (see O. Touchefeu, s.v. ‘Aias II’, LIMC 1 [1981] 341 no. 44, pl. 259: the Vivenzio hydria), where Cassandra is imbued with a ripe sexuality reminiscent of contemporary depictions of hetairai (Jackson [above, this note] 59).

4 For other black-figure vases displaying Ajax in this way, see Paoletti [3] nos 71, 73-74, 78, 83.

5 On the complex question of the attribution of the vase, see Jackson [3] 71-74.
On side A a maenad appears flanked by two satyrs. The first satyr, wearing a leopard skin over his left shoulder, is shown striding inwards balancing a large *skyphos* on the fingertips of his left hand. In the centre, the maenad, wearing a *chiton* and with a leopard skin draped over her left forearm, stands looking right; her hands are raised in front of her as if to ward off the approaching ithyphallic satyr. The latter is shown with his right hand raised and his left outstretched in a suggestive fashion. Side B shows a variation on the stock scene of three draped youths. Here the figures appear with more animation than usual, the one on the left moving right, his right hand raised as if in greeting. The central figure, striding left, holds a wine skin in his right hand; he turns back to face the final youth who, though walking away, faces left, a walking stick in his right hand. A double ivy pattern decorates the lip of the vase; the figural scenes are bordered at the top by tongues and at the sides by double ivy bands.

It may be that the scene that adorns side A of this *krater* was influenced by the popularisation of satyr plays in Athens at the end of the sixth century BC. Traditionally the main role of satyrs and maenads was to accompany Dionysus as his entourage. Here, however, the god is absent, but his followers still partake in the familiar Dionysiac activities of drinking and revelry. Also typical are the scene’s sexual connotations, with at least one satyr engaged in the lustful pursuit of the maenad. A reason for the popularity of satyrs may be that they embodied the wilder side of human nature. To this end, the two sides of the vessel appear interrelated, with the youths on side B mimicking the drunken behaviour of their mythical counterparts. Both scenes would have been well suited to the sympotic context of the *krater*. On both sides characteristics of the Syracuse Painter are evident. These include large sturdy bodies with awkwardly drawn hands and feet, and coarse drapery. (Reiana Onekawa)

---


7 On satyrs and maenads as the companions of Dionysus in earlier black-figure vases, see T. H. Carpenter, *Dionysian Imagery in Archaic Greek Art* (Oxford 1986) 76-97.


Apulian Red-figure Skyphos (Type A), Ca. 375-350 BC. Inv. No. VKL 6/03; Apulian Red-figure Skyphos (Type A), Ca. 375-350 BC. Inv. No. VKL 7/03.

The elegant shape of the first cup (figure 3), which sharply tapers to a spreading foot, is more in keeping with a type B skyphos, but this example has two horizontal handles. The specific type of decoration identifies this cup as an owl-skyphos. Both sides feature an owl in profile to left with frontal head flanked by two sprigs of olive. Figure 4 is a more robust cup than the previous example, with a slight taper to the foot. It is decorated as above, but with one owl to left and one to right.

Previously thought to be Attic, in fact these skyphoi can be placed in the Farwell (Apulian) Group, as identified by F. Johnson. This group features owls with an angular beak, a circle of dots on the face and lacking solid eyebrows. More generally, these skyphoi can be identified as Apulian because of a number of factors. Of particular note is the positioning of the owls: on figure 3 they face left, a feature that is very seldom seen on Attic parallels, and on figure 4 they face in opposite directions, a thorough misinterpretation of Attic models by the Apulian artist. The remnants of a red wash on figure 4 would suggest the vase was painted in an attempt to imitate the richer colour of Attic pottery; the paler colour of the original Apulian clay is revealed in chips under the handles. In addition to exhibiting characteristics of the Farwell (Apulian) Group, both skyphoi can perhaps be assigned to individual hands based on comparanda. Figure 3 is very close to Worcester: 1899.13, while figure 4 shares a similar shape and features with Bologna: Palagi 346, 347, but is a better specimen despite being roughly drawn by comparison with figure 3. The purpose of the owl-skyphos is largely unexplained in modern scholarship. The presence of owls and olive branches suggests some use particular to either Athens or Athena, but this would not readily explain the popularity of these cups in south Italy.

(Siobhan O’Rourke)

---

10 Figure 3. Height: 77 mm.; diameter including handles: 144 mm.; diameter: 89 mm. Previously unpublished.

11 Figures 4a-b. Height: 73 mm.; diameter including handles: 139 mm.; diameter: 90 mm. Previously unpublished.


This vase, whose large scale and narrow stem are atypical of most trefoil oinochoai, is decorated with two figural registers depicting youths and women engaged in conversation. Each of the youths is either nude or semi-draped, while each of the women wears a chiton and has her hair tied in a top-knot. The upper register from the left consists of a seated woman holding a wreath and a phiale that is extended towards a standing youth shown with drapery over his left arm and carrying a stick; a seated woman gesturing to a winged Eros who is putting incense in a thymiaterion; a seated youth with a stick and a phiale, the latter extended towards a standing woman; a seated youth gesturing to a standing woman; and a seated woman holding a mirror and a wreath. In the lower register appear a standing woman with a fillet and a phiale; a seated youth holding a stick; a seated woman with a mirror; a youth leaning on a stick and holding a fillet with a bird perched on his outstretched right hand; a seated woman with a phiale turning towards a standing woman who reaches out to touch her shoulder and holds a phiale; a seated youth holding a wreath; a seated woman with a phiale; and a seated youth with a kantharos and stick. In the field between figures appear rosettes, fillets, a box, xylophone, kantharos, ribboned ball, berried laurel sprig and oinochoe. A rosette and phiale band separates the scenes; the lower register rests on a meander with quartered and dotted squares. An impressed egg and dart band decorates the rim, while on the neck are rays in added white and another egg and dart band. Bead and reel separates the neck from the shoulder; the latter is painted with a lotus and palmette chain and an egg and dart band. On the reverse of the vase are elaborate double- and fan-palmettes.

Stylistically this oinochoe is typical of the Varrese Painter and the ornate style he employs when decorating large vases. The ornament, in particular the distinctive meander, is typically Apulian, and the precision with which it is executed represents the Varrese Painter at his best. Characteristic elements include the figures' stern expressions, long straight noses, high foreheads and downward-curving mouths. Also apparent is the artist's tendency to use stock figures, for example, the seated women at each end of the upper register. The depiction of mythological scenes is not unknown in the Varrese Painter's oeuvre, but there is little here to suggest a specific mythic context. The presence of Eros surely relates to the courting couples, though the thymiaterion and numerous phialai could suggest either a sanctuary or a ceremonial

---


18 See A. D. Trendall, Red Figure Vases of South Italy and Sicily (London 1989) 81.

19 For the stylistic characteristics of the Varrese Painter, see Trendall [18] 83.
Certainly the youth shown holding a *kantharos* in the lower register is similar in appearance to contemporary representations of Dionysus, although his peripheral position and the lack of other Dionysiac attributes tell against his identification as the god.  

 Emma Rogers

*Apulian Red-figure Lekythos, Mid-fourth Century BC, Attributed to the Painter of Louvre MNB 1148 (A. D. Trendall). Inv. no. VKL 4/03.*

This is an unusually large *lekythos* with a ribbed handle and a narrow stem that buckled during firing—hence the pronounced lean of the vase. The body of the vase is decorated in two registers. The upper consists of an Amazonomachy in which two Amazons, dressed in oriental belted tunics and trousers, are depicted on rearing horses. The Amazon on the left carries two spears and *pelta* in her outstretched left hand; that on the right is shown under attack from two Greek warriors wearing *chlamydes*, one of whom who wears a Corinthian helmet and the other a *pilos*. The first warrior, shown with sword drawn, pulls the Amazon from her horse by her cap; at the far right the second steps up on a rock and, thrusting his spear upwards, prompts the horse to rear. A Phrygian cap, an axe and a *pelta* lie on the ground among plants, while rosettes appear in the field between the figures. In the lower register four women appear in a landscape, each wearing a *peplos* and with their hair tied in *kekryphaloi*. Two women are positioned in the centre sitting on opposite sides of the same rock. The woman on the left turns to place her hand on the shoulder of the woman on the right; the former has an open casket in her lap, while her companion holds a *phiale*. On each side of them, bending forwards and facing inwards, stand the remaining two women. The one on the left carries an *alabastron* and a *tymanum*, that on the right an *oinochoe* and a *situ/a*. A fillet, rosettes and ivy leaves decorate the field. The registers are divided by a band of swastika meanders notable for its three-dimensional appearance. Other ornament consists of a band of berried laurel on the flaring lip and alternating black and white serrated diamonds, bead and reel, rosette and ray bands on the neck. On the shoulder above the *ovolo* a female head in added white is surrounded by three-

---


21 A comparable figure in a similar scene is nevertheless tentatively identified as Apollo in A. D. Trendall and A. Cambitoglou, *Second Supplement to the Red-figured Vases of Apulia* 1 (London 1991) 88 no. 30c, pl. 15.4.

dimensional florals; multiple palmette-fans fill the back below the handle and a meander encircles the lower body.

With an oeuvre consisting largely of libation and naiskos scenes, here the Painter of Louvre MNB 1148 provides one of the infrequent depictions of the Amazonomachy in Apulian vase painting. Its choice creates an interesting juxtaposition between contemporary perceptions of the contrasting nature of women: on the one hand, wild and un governable; on the other, domesticated and cultured. Despite originally being thought of as a minor follower of the Varrese Painter, the Painter of Louvre MNB 1148 has been recently re-evaluated as a result of the attribution of several large loutrophoroi to his hand.\(^\text{23}\) His close association with the Varrese Painter (see figure 5) can be seen in his rendering of drapery, while more individual characteristics include the painter's treatment of women's breasts, shown in profile with one pointing upwards; prominent noses; the downward curve of the mouth; and the bunching of drapery under the knees of seated figures. (Megan Andrews and Greta Broadfoot)

_Canosan Red-figure Fish Plate, Ca. 350 BC, Attributed to the Black and White Stripe Painter (I. McPhee). Inv. No. VKL 5/03\(^\text{24}\)_

This plate appears to have been recomposed from fragments with large areas of over-painting, particularly on the central boss, which is decorated with an 'ice cream cone' rosette, and on the wave pattern that adorns the overhanging rim. Previously thought to belong to the Group of Karlsruhe 66/140, the plate has recently been re-attributed to the Canosan Black and White Stripe Painter.\(^\text{25}\) The latter was an associate of the Baltimore Painter and his workshop was in the middle of the fourth century BC, a time when fish plates were being manufactured in quantity.\(^\text{26}\)

The top of the plate is decorated with two fish swimming counter-clockwise, with a _cephalopod_ (‘cuttlefish’) moving in the opposite direction. The fish are most probably striped perch, a species that was valued in antiquity not only as a food but also as a cancer treatment when the head was salted and burnt, then crushed and mixed


\(^{24}\) Figures 7a-b. Height: 75 mm.; diameter: 240 mm.; foot diameter: 840 mm.; boss diameter: 580 mm. Previously unpublished.

\(^{25}\) E-mail correspondence with Ian McPhee, 17 September 2003. Ian McPhee’s assistance is acknowledged with gratitude. On the Black and White Stripe Painter, see I. McPhee and A. D. Trendall, _Greek Red-figured Fish-Plates_ (Basel 1987) 137f., pl. 58c-f and their Addenda in _Antike Kunst_ 33 (1990) 43, pl. 11.5.

\(^{26}\) For the use of similar fish by the Baltimore Painter, see A. D. Trendall and A. Cambitoglou, _The Red-figured Vases of Apulia_ 2 (Oxford 1982) 869 no. 47, pl. 329.4. For the Painter of Berlin F3383 and Arpi Painter (followers of the Baltimore Painter), who use friezes of fish, cephalopods and molluscs to separate registers on their _amphorai_, see Trendall and Cambitoglou [above, this note] 918 no. 60, pl. 354.2-4; 924 no. 88, pl. 359.
with honey. Each fish displays a different treatment of the ventral and pelvic fins. That at the head of the cuttlefish has fins highlighted in white that are presented as diagonal strokes, which diminish in size as they descend down the body; the pelvic fin is split into two, again with diagonal white stripes. In contrast, the fin rakes of the fish to the rear appear as an open fan with white strokes conjoined. Any differences may be due to the artist having observed and represented various stages in the decomposition of the creatures. The latter fish is also shown with barbell curls from the mouth and dorsal fins that are treated with alternating black and white stripes. These features, along with the frequent absence of pectoral fins, are characteristics of the Black and White Stripe Painter. Also typical is the portrayal of the cuttlefish, which not only has a human-like face with two large eyes and oval mouth but also white string-like tentacles alternating between six arms with white dotted suckers. The cuttlefish, which was prized in antiquity for its stimulating qualities and food value, frequently appears on Apulian, Canosan and Paestan fish-plates. (Penny Minchin-Garvin)

Figure 1a. VKL 2/03. Attic black-figure neck-amphora. Side A.

---

28 Conversation with Jon Harding, School of Biological Sciences, University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
Figure 1b. VKL 2/03. Attic black-figure neck-amphora. Side B.

Figure 2a. VKL 1/03. Attic red-figure column krater. Side A.
Figure 2b. VKL 1/03. Attic red-figure column krater. Side B.

Figure 3. VKL 6/03. Apulian red-figure skyphos (type A). Side A.
Figure 4a. VKL 7/03. Apulian red-figure skyphos (type A). Side A.

Figure 4b. VKL 7/03. Apulian red-figure skyphos (type A). Side B.
Figure 5a. VKL3/03. Apulian red-figure trefoil oinochoe (shape 1). Left side.

Figure 5b. VKL3/03. Apulian red-figure trefoil oinochoe (shape 1). Front.
Figure 5c. VKL3/03. Apulian red-figure trefoil *oinochoe* (shape 1). Right side.

Figure 5d. VKL3/03. Apulian red-figure trefoil *oinochoe* (shape 1). Back.
Figure 6a. VKL 4/03 Apulian red-figure lekythos. Front.

Figure 6b. VKL 4/03 Apulian red-figure lekythos. Upper register.
Figure 6c. VKL 4/03 Apulian red-figure lekythos. Lower register.

Figure 6d. VKL 4/03 Apulian red-figure lekythos. Right side.
Figure 7a. VKL 5/03. Canosan red-figure fish plate. Top.

Figure 7b. VKL 5/03. Canosan red-figure fish plate. Side.
J. A. BARSBY ESSAY

The paper judged to be the best student essay in New Zealand submitted to Scholia by 1 September for the preceding year is published annually as the J. A. Barsby Essay. The competition, which is currently sponsored by the Classical Association of Otago, is open to undergraduate students every year and entries from fourth-year students are invited in even-numbered years. There is a prize of NZD100. The essay is in honour of New Zealand classicist J. A. Barsby.

CYRUS THE GREAT: WAS HE A THREAT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREECE?

Graham Day
3rd-year Ancient History major
University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Cyrus’ overthrow of Croesus’ Lydian kingdom in 547 BC brought the eastern Persians into contact with Greeks for the first time. It can be said that all Greeks, free or subjected, felt the effect of the Persian empire. Future Greek international relations, politics and economies would be massively influenced by Persians and attitudes toward them.¹ The official policy of Sparta is depicted by Herodotus throughout his narrative as anti-Persian. Eastern powers such as Lydia and Egypt had long depended on Greek hoplite mercenaries probably recruited from religious centers such as Delphi and Branchidai.² Yet the increasing threat of Cyrus and his Persians led both of these kingdoms to seek to establish more formal links with Sparta, which at this time had the pre-eminent army in Greece (Hdt. 1.65-68).³ Gifts exchanged between Sparta and Lydia symbolised this new alliance (1.69).⁴ It is quite possible that Sparta had no idea of the implications of these actions. Indeed, Dandamaev believes that when this original alliance was made, Sparta in all likelihood had not even heard of Persia except

¹ A. T. Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire (Chicago 1948) 41.
³ Croesus had been told by the oracles to ‘find out which was the most powerful Greek state and ally himself with it’ (R. Waterfield [tr.], Herodotus, The Histories [Oxford 1998] 23). After looking into the societies he chose Sparta for this role (Hdt. 1.53).
⁴ Evidence also suggests ties between Sparta and Scythian lords, a possible reaction to Darius’ move into Europe in 513 BC and the desire by the Spartans to unite the enemies of Persia.
from the ambassadors themselves. Whatever the case, Sparta was now firmly set in its foreign policy and was part of the old grand alliance against Persia, which also included Egypt, Babylon and Lydia. Yet until Xerxes’ invasion in 480, Sparta was not involved in Persian matters at all. When Croesus marched into Cappadocia, for example, which at this time was part of Cyrus’ territory, he did not take his allies with him, with the possible exception of some Egyptian Greek mercenaries. Herodotus tells us the main reasons for the invasion: Croesus’ desire for land, his belief that the oracle was favorable, and his wish to punish Cyrus over Astyages. But he does not state why Croesus did not invite his allies to join him (cf. 1.73). Perhaps the king thought that if he were to launch a solo campaign he would not have to share the conquered land; yet it is unlikely that he would have rejected sizable assistance if it had been offered. It is more likely that Sparta had other reasons for not going.

Argos had always been a major factor in Spartan decision-making and Herodotus implies that Argos and the ongoing domestic wars between the two states is the reason why they did not go (Hdt. 1.82). The other major Spartan domestic concern was always the fact that the helots could rebel if given the chance. H. W. Parke suggests another possible factor. He points out that Herodotus mentions a gold lion statue, dedicated by Croesus to Apollo at Delphi, which fell over and was partly melted when the temple burned down (Hdt. 1.50). Parke notes that this must have looked like a bad omen to the pious Greeks, especially the Spartans, who often would not fight at the time of their religious festivals. Moreover, the Lion seems to have been a Lydian icon, as shown on Lydian coins from Croesus’ reign. We can assume that such events did affect the Spartans but, as Herodotus implies, domestic matters were probably of chief importance. Whatever the reason the allies were not present, Croesus did not defeat Cyrus and attributed this to his lack of troops (Hdt. 1.77). Croesus returned to Sardis, made plans to fight again in the spring, and sent word to his allies to assemble in four months (Hdt. 1.77). We do not hear the Spartan response to the first message, but we are told that when Croesus sent a second message to his

---

5 M. A Dandamaev (tr. W. J. Vogelsang), A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire (Leiden 1989) 23.

6 Herodotus says that the Spartans were engaged with Argos when the second message arrived asking them to come and that they had just defeated Argos at Thyreae (1.82). We can assume then that these events were occupying them when Croesus marched on Cyrus.

7 It is interesting to note here that Thucydides (1.118) says that Sparta had often been prevented from taking international action because of wars in their own territory, which we can assume included both Argos campaigns and helot risings.

8 H. W. Parke, ‘Croesus and Delphi’, Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 25 (1984) 216. This was the reason that Sparta could not march immediately to meet Darius’ threat at Marathon in 490 BC (Hdt. 6.106), and also why the Spartans did not march to meet Mardonius in Boeotia when to them ‘nothing was more important than catering to the god’s requirements’ (Hdt. 9.7).

allies to come immediately and remove the siege, Sparta began making preparations to provide help. Herodotus says this decision was taken despite the domestic problems with Argos (it was just after the battle of Thryae), but that halfway through preparations when their ships were ready another message came with the news that Sardis had fallen. Sparta, with ‘deep regret’, called off its preparations (Hdt. 1.83). Parke suggests that this version of events may have been circulated by the Spartans soon after the fact in order to uphold their international reputation, for Herodotus implies that Sparta were in fact unable to aid Croesus on the first offensive due to their border dispute with Argos.

The next event involving Spartans and Persians had virtually the same result. According to Herodotus, the Ionians sent ambassadors to Sparta asking for aid against Persia (1.152). The Spartans refused to help without explanation. It is possible that Sparta simply did not wish to fight for those with whom she previously had not made alliances, but it is more like that it just did not want to send its limited troops away from Greece. There were few Spartites and these were needed in Spartan territory to keep Argos out and more importantly to keep the helots from rebelling. This interpretation is supported by the story of the Spartan ambassador who instructed Cyrus to keep away from the Ionian Greeks. This incident shows that Sparta saw herself as protector of Greeks and just how far into this ‘fantasy’ she had entered. Sparta believed that its reputation as the ‘warrior race’ was enough for threats alone to intimidate the Persians.

It does seem, however, that Sparta was prepared to involve itself against Persian supported states if the situation was right. This is evident from Sparta’s failed campaign against Polycrates of Samos (Hdt. 3.44-56). This campaign was launched because Samian ‘dissenters’ had rebelled and sailed to Sparta seeking aid, obviously regarding Sparta as their protector. The Samians said they went to Sparta because Samos had aided Sparta against Messana, but it is more likely that they were aware of Sparta’s anti-Persian policies. So why did Sparta attack Samos, a state that was obviously pro-Persian, but keep away from Persia itself? Dandamaev suggests that the answer can be seen in the Ionian revolt, when Sparta again decided not to aid the Ionians. He believes the Spartites simply realised that they could not defeat the Persians in a prolonged campaign deep in Asia: they had seen Lydia, Babylon and Egypt crushed and realised that they were not in a position to mount an attack of that scale. This is quite possible. Indeed Herodotus claims that their main reason for not engaging

13 A good example of this Spartan mentality is shown by Thucydides: ‘You Spartans are the only people in Hellas who wait calmly on events, relying for your defence not on action but on making people think that you will act’ (Thuc. 1.69; tr. R. Warner, History of the Peloponnesian War [Harmondsworth 1972]) 75.
was that they did not want to march inland for the three months required to reach Susa (Hdt. 5.54). Yet it seems more likely that the Spartans were not so much afraid of Persia as of the effect that a prolonged campaign would have on domestic affairs. To send their main armies away from Greece for the year or more needed to actually mount a campaign such as this could have weakened their own position within Greece: Argos could invade; some of their allies could defect if things did not go totally to plan overseas; and, worst of all, the helots could revolt and break down the entire social system.

The immediate reaction of the Ionians when Cyrus conquered Croesus was to seek to make terms with him along the same lines as they had previously had with Croesus. After Croesus attacked and subdued the Asian Greeks, they paid him a moderate tribute, although we do not know exactly what this was (Hdt. 1.26f.). However, the Greeks did not feel oppressed under Croesus, chiefly because he did not involve himself in the internal affairs of the Greek states. They were free to pursue their own trade and governments. Because of this moderate rule Croesus is often portrayed by ancient authors such as Herodotus as being almost Greek. He was considered to be pious to the Greek gods and a lover of Greek culture. It was exactly this type of arrangement that the Ionians were trying to continue with Cyrus. Cyrus refused, however, because when Croesus had invaded Persian land Cyrus had sent messages to the Ionians hoping to persuade them to rebel against Croesus, but they had refused to listen (Hdt. 1.76). He now told them the story of the dancing fish and they knew they would have to fight him. They left Sardis to build their city walls and prepare their forces. By right of conquest, title to former Lydian subjects was passed directly to Cyrus, and to have made what Olmstead rightly sees as an ‘insolent demand’ on Cyrus to allow them to live on the same terms would have made them rebels in the eyes of the Persians. Diodorus says that the Persian general Harpagos, when he was given the job of subduing the Ionians, told the Greeks that they would now become Cyrus’ slaves because in the past they had not wanted to be his allies (Diod. Sic. 9.35.3). From this point there was a common cause among the Asian mainland Greeks, except Miletos, against Cyrus. They had to fight because there was no way out for them even though they were willing to be moderate tribute-paying states. Some states decided to flee when it was evident that they could not beat the Persian army. They did this rather than become Persian subjects, something they considered to be a form of slavery. The other states did not flee but submitted to Persian control when beaten (Hdt. 1.169).

15 Cyrus did, however, allow Miletos to continue the treaty she had previously held (Hdt. 1.141). There are various theories as to why he did so. Olmstead suggests [1] 41 that Miletos may have rebelled against Croesus when asked by Cyrus. This seems unlikely as surely Herodotus would not have left out information like this. It seems more likely that the reason was simply to cause divisions in the Ionian resistance and prevent a united resistance to him; see A. R. Burn, The Persian Wars (London 2002) 38.

16 Olmstead [1] 42.

17 Phocaea and Teos were the cities whose citizens fled (Hdt. 1.162).
In order to assess whether Cyrus and Persia would have been a threat to the prosperity of Greece as a whole, we must look at the example of the Ionians and other Asian Greeks, since this will show us Greeks before and after major Persian influence. Ionians had previously been the wealthiest of the Greeks because their location put them in the perfect area for multiple trade routes. They became the ‘middle men’ between the east and the west and dominated the trade of both the Aegean and the Black Seas, their influence spreading to Egypt and the west Mediterranean.\(^{18}\) With the arrival of Persia, however, this dominance stopped and in one generation the economic prosperity was effectively removed.\(^{19}\) Some scholars have suggested that Persia was not bad but rather good for the Ionian merchants, especially those of Miletos, because it allowed them to trade with the Near East, mainland Greece and the Black Sea coast freely within the empire.\(^{20}\) Conversely, Dandamaev maintains that the chief reason Ionian trade faltered was because large ports like Athens became more prominent trade centres.\(^{21}\) However, while it is apparent that Athens did grow more powerful via trade in this period, it is more likely that trade had been previously removed from the Ionians as a result of their loss of independence, whereupon Athens and other similar ports became the new focus of trade. There are many examples of how Asian Greeks were ruined by Persian western expansion. With the growth of the Black Sea trade, Ionic cities had previously been able to rely on imported slaves and grain from areas like the Propontis and Scythia.\(^{22}\) This state of affairs allowed them to focus more on commodities, specialist industries and production.\(^{23}\) However, with Persian western movements, such as the Scythian expedition in 513 BC, grain and other essentials became severely limited and the Greeks had to focus some of their attention on providing these for themselves. The Ionians knew they needed these western and northern trade routes if they were to survive, which is why Histiaeus of Miletos attempted to found Myrcinus on the Thrancian coast as a Milesian emporium.\(^{24}\) What speciality items were still made were now also much harder to trade, largely because by the time of Cambyses both the Egyptian and Lydian ‘royal markets’ had closed.\(^{25}\) Archaeological findings show, for example, that following the Egyptian conquest in 525 BC there seems to be a twenty-five year gap in the trade of pottery to Egypt.\(^{26}\) Another valuable source of revenue that was lost with Persian conquest was the Asian


\(^{23}\) Cook [9] 94.

\(^{24}\) Murray [2] 477. Of course, Histiaeus being a tyrant it is much more likely he did this for his own benefit rather than that of his people.


Greek mercenary trade. Previously mercenaries, especially those from small Ionian cities, had served in large numbers for Lydia and Egypt. Following the Persian conquest these troops became subjects. One major function of Persian subjects was to serve in the armies. When Cambyses led his forces against Amasis’ Egypt in 526 BC, he included some Ionian and Aeolian Greeks in his army (Hdt. 3.1). From Cyrus’ time, once Ionia was finally conquered, Greek hoplites formed part of the regular Persian armies, since they were the best infantry of the time.

Another loss in prosperity came from tribute. With Croesus, tribute had been most likely in the form of gifts to the king, and this practice probably continued with Cyrus and Cambyses. Darius, however, fixed a set tribute when he came to power in 521 BC as part of his policy to reorganise the satrapies. Herodotus tells us that the Ionians, Asian Magnesians, Aeolians, Carians, Lycians, Milyans and Pamphylians were counted as a single paying unit and paid revenue of four hundred talents of silver (Hdt. 3.90). While it is possible that for each city the amount ended up similar to that paid to Croesus or Cyrus, it is likely that this set sum created resentment among the Greeks, since it would have been enforced strongly without exceptions. With this tribute system in place the Greeks were facing an oriental bureaucracy at its strongest.27 This resentment of Persian control over economics can be seen as one of the major factors causing the Ionians to rebel in 499 BC28, a last effort of a merchant people to reclaim their past glory.

The economic systems of the Greeks and Persians were fundamentally different, something that caused major friction between the two peoples. This is shown in Cyrus’ speech to the Spartan ambassador after Sparta had warned Cyrus to stay away from the Ionians. Cyrus says he does not respect or fear men who ‘set aside a space in the middle of their own town where they can meet and make false promises to each other [that is, conduct business and trade]’ (Hdt. 1.153).29 This to Herodotus is ‘an attack on all Greeks’ because, while Greeks set aside a place in their towns to buy and sell goods, this market system was a concept unknown to the Persians (1.153).30 This sentiment, expressed to the Spartans, sums up the incompatibility of oriental imperialism and the still-developing Greek merchant culture.31 The Persian economic system was socially aristocratic, politically feudal and based on a food producing peasantry that would support the armies and aristocrats. Burn suggests that such an economy may have existed in Greece during the Homeric age, but by the sixth century

28 Shown by the fact that after the revolt itself the Persians undertook a review of the Asian Greek tribute system, although Herodotus tells us that there was not much change in the amount as a result of this review (Hdt. 6.43).
BC Greek civilisation, except Sparta to an extent, was dependant on trade to survive.\textsuperscript{32} If Greece had fallen to Persia, it is most likely that Persia would have tried to push Greece ‘back’ toward its own ideal type of economics probably by promoting tyrant figures and army service for those who were not farmers.\textsuperscript{33}

Herodotus generally views the Greek and Persian conflict as one of west versus east and freedom versus tyranny. Cyrus would have been a threat to political development because Persian rule as a whole seemed to promote non-change within society. When Persians conquered lands, they generally did not change local forms of government. During the late seventh and early sixth centuries tyranny seems to have been a ‘popular’ form of government in Greece, and in Asia Minor there were many tyrant-controlled cities. In the wake of his conquests, Cyrus generally did not change the political order and he supported these tyrants. Dandamaev believes the common view that Persia was simply anti-democratic and pro-tyrannical is false. He argues that Persia only supported tyrants out of tradition, that is, because tyranny was already an ‘accepted’ form of government in the area.\textsuperscript{34} We know that Cyrus was generally kind to subject peoples and as such was known to the Persians as a ‘father’ (\textit{Hdt.} 3.89);\textsuperscript{35} yet to say there was no political motive seems unrealistic. Bum offers a plausible alternative arguing that the Persians would identify a leader in each Greek city and make him its governor or tyrant. The obvious leaders were people already in positions of power such as aristocrats or tyrants. He says that while most cities would govern their own internal affairs in the empire through town meetings, the Persians wanted one strong central figure who would be responsible for the soldiers and for collecting the tribute.\textsuperscript{36} Cyrus seems to have had a remarkable tolerance of his subject peoples, which was probably based on respect for their religions, ethnic groups, cultures and previous kingdoms. However, the main reason seems to be because they paid their tributes to him, gave homage and served in his armies. Because of this, placing native rulers in positions of power seems to be something he was happy to do if it meant that the people would be more content. The occasional unfortunate event that could lead to instability in the empire, such as the rebellion of Pacytes after he was placed in charge of the Lydian treasury (\textit{Hdt.} 1.154.),\textsuperscript{37} did not seem to deter Cyrus from his policies.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{32} Burn [15] 39. It is rather amusing that this was said to the Spartans, who had an economic structure very similar to that of Persia: the ‘true’ citizens shunned economics and trade (generally the \textit{perioikoi} would assume these roles), while the helots farmed and produced food for the rest of the society, thus allowing the citizens to train for war. Cyrus would not have known this however when making his generalisations.

\textsuperscript{33} The fact that by Darius’ time the Persians were minting coins is irrelevant here in a discussion of Cyrus’ Persia; it simply shows one of the many changes Darius introduced.

\textsuperscript{34} Dandamaev [5] 156.


\textsuperscript{36} Burn [31] 295.

\textsuperscript{37} Cyrus may have been happy with the result of Pacytes’ rebellion since it showed that the island Ionian cities could be bribed easily and were happy to work with the Persians.
Such policies worked well in places that had long traditions of powerful autocrats and priesthoods such as Jerusalem. They were not as effective in the Greek states probably because the Greek systems were always changing, and tyranny, while familiar to them, was really only a short term form of government. It generally did not extend beyond the second generation since the heirs were not able to control the peoples as skilfully as the charismatic, ambitious original tyrants.

At this time forms of government which included wider citizen participation were beginning to grow in popularity. This process is shown best by Athens, whose democracy of 507 BC set their future policies in relation to Persia. Athens, which became afraid of Spartan involvement after the removal of the Peisistratids in 510 BC, sought Persian aid. However, the Persians at this time firmly supported Hippias and would not support the Athenian state unless it reinstated him (Hdt. 5.96). This Athens felt it could not do and therefore it supported Sparta’s anti-Persian policy. Pro-active Athens went further than Sparta, however, and actually sent aid to Asian Greeks in the form of the twenty ships of 499 BC to aid in the Ionian revolt (5.97). This trend of states developing political ideals away from tyranny is also shown by the fact that the Ionian tyrants themselves knew they were eventually only able to stay in power because of Persian backing and were in effect ‘puppet’ tyrants (4.137). The Ionian revolt itself, though a failed event for the Greeks, showed how naive Cyrus’ policies were when imposed on Greek culture. After the revolt Darius’ general Mardonius removed all the remaining tyrannies and installed democracies in the Ionian cities (6.43). While democracy prevailed in the end, it was only achieved via coercion. It therefore seems clear that Persian control would not have helped to develop Greek political ideals.

Using Ionia and the other Asian Greek states as an example, we are able to see what mainland Greece might have become under Persian control. We can see how imposed governments and economic ideals virtually ruined the Ionian cities, turning them from wealthy, powerful states to subject people who really do not feature in Greek history again. To prevent this from happening on mainland Greece itself, firm anti-Persian positions were needed by the leading Greek states. Sparta was at the time the most powerful state and played a vital role in this period. The fact that it did not actually engage the Persians or aid those fighting the Persians is important, mainly because such non-engagement could be seen as a partial reason for Cyrus’ success in Lydia and Asia Minor. Yet Sparta’s national anti-Persian stance, its immediate reaction to Cyrus, is more important, for it allowed other Greek states to stand behind it, safe in the knowledge that Sparta would always stand against western Persian expansion and would eventually act, especially if its own interests were at stake.

---


39 Herodotus says that Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians were up in arms against the Athenians because Cleomenes had tried to force the expulsion of Cleisthenes and his supporters, which allowed Isagras to rule very briefly in Athens as an oligarchy (Hdt. 5.72).
EXCHANGES WITH SCHOLIA

Scholia is currently exchanged with journals and monograph series not subscribed to by the University of Otago, New Zealand or the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The list below includes journals and monograph series currently received in exchange for Scholia.

Aevum (Milan, Italy)
Ancient History: Resources for Teachers (Sydney, Australia)
Ancient History Bulletin (Calgary, Canada)
Ancient Philosophy (Pittsburgh, USA)
Apeiron (Alberta, Canada)
Arethusa (Buffalo, USA)
Arion (Boston, USA)
AUMLA: Journal of the Australasian Universities Language and Literature Association (Christchurch, New Zealand)
The Classical Bulletin (Wauconda, USA)
The Classical Journal (Charlottesville, USA)
Classics Ireland (Dublin, Ireland)
Classicum (Sydney, Australia)
Dionysius (Halifax, Canada)
Drama (Stuttgart, Germany)
Emerita (Madrid, Spain)
Euphrosyne (Lisbon, Portugal)
Florilegium (Ottawa, Canada)
Hermathena (Dublin, Ireland)
Illinois Classical Studies (Urbana, USA)
Iris (Melbourne, Australia)
Journal of Ancient Civilizations (Changchun, China)
Les Études Classiques (Brussels, Belgium)
Maia (Genova, Italy)
Mouseion (Calgary, Canada)
Philologus (Berlin, Germany)
Scripta Classica Israelica (Jerusalem, Israel)
Syllecta Classica (Iowa City, USA)
NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

1. Submissions are invited in every area of Classical Studies. The preferred language is English, but other languages such as French, German, Italian and Spanish are acceptable.

2. (a) Contributors should address two copies of the submission to the Editor, Scholia, Department of Classics, University of Otago, P. O. Box 56, University of Otago, Dunedin 9015, New Zealand. Electronic submissions are welcome and should be e-mailed to the Editor as attached files with all Greek fonts embedded. Printed submissions not accepted for publication are normally returned at the journal’s expense, but potential contributors should, in any case, retain copies of their manuscripts.

(b) Submissions are acknowledged forthwith and every effort is made to inform contributors of the Editors’ decision concerning publication as promptly as possible.

(c) All contributions accepted for publication are edited to conform to the Scholia style.

(d) First (and occasionally second) proofs of articles are sent to contributors whose submissions are accepted for publication. Proofreading is then the responsibility of the author.

(e) While the Scholia Editorial Committee undertakes to publish submissions accepted as soon as possible, it reserves the right to hold over any contribution to another volume. The vast majority of articles and reviews are published in the volume of the journal specified in the formal letters of acceptance sent to contributors; however, some articles and reviews may not appear until the publication of the subsequent volume, owing to limits of space and printing deadlines.

3. (a) Articles should be submitted in clear type and be double-spaced throughout on A4 (21 cm. x 29.7 cm.) or Letter (8.5 in. x 11 in.) paper.

(b) Articles should not ordinarily exceed 7000 words in length. The maximum length of review articles is 2500 words, reviews 1500 words, and notices of reprints 500 words.

(c) A submission need not be accompanied by a copy on a computer diskette in computer-readable form; if a submission is accepted, the contributor should then post a hard copy of the final draft with accompanying copy on a diskette, indicating clearly the word-processing program used in writing the article. (To avoid damage to the diskette during mailing, please post in a diskette mailer.) Final manuscripts not accompanied by a copy on a computer diskette are accepted in some cases.
4. (a) The title of the article or review, author’s full name and title, affiliation, position, full address (also e-mail address and fax number, if available), and a 40-70 word summary in English suitable for publication (for critical and pedagogical articles only) should be typed on a separate page; the title and summary alone should appear on the first page of the manuscript.

(b) References to the author’s own work should be made in the third person. Any acknowledgements are to be included only after the submission has been accepted.

5. (a) Paragraphs should be indented five spaces, except the first paragraphs after subheadings, which should not be indented.

(b) Inverted commas (quotation marks) should be single, not double, unless they are placed within single inverted commas.

(c) Spelling and punctuation should be consistent. American spelling and punctuation are acceptable from American authors; otherwise, spellings should conform to the most recent edition of The Concise Oxford English Dictionary.

(d) Numbers below 10 000 should not contain any spaces or commas (e.g., 1 000); numbers above this figure should contain spaces instead of commas.

6. (a) Greek script should be used for quotations from Classical Greek. Short Greek quotations may be inserted by hand, but special care should be taken with breathings, accents and iotas subscript. Passages longer than a few words should be typed or photocopied.

(b) Greek names in the text should either be fully transliterated or fully Latinised (e.g., Klutaimestra or Clytemnestra) throughout.

7. (a) Translations, preferably those of the author, should be provided for all Greek and Latin text.

(b) Greek and Latin text should be provided for all translations.

(c) Citations of ancient works should appear in brackets (parentheses) in the body of the text wherever possible.

(d) In the case of an indented passage, the translation should appear unbracketed (without parentheses) immediately below the quotation; the citation of the work in brackets (parentheses) should follow rather than precede the indented quotation.

(e) In the case of a short citation in the body of the text, the following convention should be followed: *cupido dominandi cunctis affectibus flagrantior est* (‘the desire for power burns more fiercely than all the passions’, Tac. Ann. 15.53).

8. (a) Notes should appear at the foot of pages.

(b) Citations of modern works should be given in the notes rather than in the body of the text.

(c) Do not use the Harvard (author-date) system of parenthetical documentation or the number system.

(d) Authors should be cited by initials and surname only.
(e) Titles of books, periodicals, and Greek and Latin technical terms should be italicised.

(f) Titles of articles should be enclosed in single inverted commas.

(g) Volume numbers of periodicals should be given in Arabic rather than Roman numerals.

(h) Page and line references generally should be given as follows: ‘f.’ (e.g., ‘174f.’) ought to be used, but ‘ff.’ should be avoided wherever possible (e.g., ‘174-76’ is preferable to ‘174ff.’).

(i) When citing a book or periodical in the notes for the first time, details should be given as follows:


All subsequent citations should contain the author’s name, footnote number of the first citation of the work in square brackets, and relevant page numbers. The following forms should be used:


(j) The author is responsible for ensuring the accuracy and completeness of all references to primary and secondary materials. Incorrect citations of ancient authors and works and citations of modern works that do not include complete details such as the author’s initials and date and place of publication may be deleted from the article unless the Editor can easily locate the missing information.

(k) Cross-references should be marked clearly in the left-hand margin of the manuscript.

9. (a) Periodicals cited in the notes should use the abbreviations in *L'Année Philologique*; the names of periodicals not listed in the most recent volume should appear in full.

(b) Abbreviations of ancient authors and works should be those listed in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*3 (1996) or in *The Oxford Latin Dictionary* (1968-82) and Liddell-Scott-Jones’ *A Greek-English Lexicon* (1968).

(c) Titles of standard reference works (e.g., *RE, FGrH*) should be abbreviated according to *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*3 (1996); the titles of reference works not listed in *OCD*3 should appear in full.

(d) Titles of periodicals and classical works should be italicised.

(e) In citation of classical works and standard reference works, Arabic rather than Roman numerals should be used.

10. Contributors of articles and review articles receive twenty and ten covered offprints respectively; contributors of reviews receive six covered offprints. Additional covered offprints may be purchased from the Business Manager.

11. *Scholia* retains copyright in content and format. Contributors should obtain written permission from the Editor before using material in another publication.
FORTHCOMING IN SCHOLIA 13 (2004)

ARTICLES

‘The Birth of the Reader’: Plutarch as a Literary Critic
David Konstan  Brown, USA

‘Either with Us or Against Us’: The Parthians in Augustan Ideology
Carol U. Merriam  Brock, Canada

Sabinus in Ovid’s Exile-Poetry
Martin Helze  Case Western Reserve, USA

Mutatis Mutandis: The Poetry and Poetics of Isolation in Ovid and Breytenbach
Jo-Marie Claassen  Stellenbosch, South Africa

Note sulla tradizione annalistica relativa al teatro ‘a Lupercali in Palatium versus’
Luigi Pedroni  Innsbruck, Austria

An Altar of Alexander Now Standing Near Delhi
Ranajit Pal  Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, India

REVIEWS

Jon D. Mikalson, Herodotus and Religion in the Persian Wars (Vivienne Gray)

Diana Spencer, The Roman Alexander: Reading a Cultural Myth (John Atkinson)

Graham Anderson, Fairytales in the Ancient World (Donald Lateiner)

Elizabeth Ivory Tylawsky, Saturio’s Inheritance: The Greek Ancestry of the Roman Comic Parasite (Regine May)

Ittai Gradel, Emperor Worship and Roman Religion (David Wardle)
SCHOLIA
Studies in Classical Antiquity
ISSN 1018-9017

To subscribe, please photocopy and fill in this form.

Subscription Form

Title and Name: ____________________________________________________________

Postal Address: ____________________________________________________________

E-mail Address: ____________________________________________________________

Rates (2004): Individuals: North America, Europe and Asia USD25/NZD50; Australasia and
South America NZD40; Africa NZD20. Libraries and institutions: North America, Europe
and Asia USD40/NZD80; Australasia and South America NZD60; Africa NZD30. Institutional
and personal cheques should be made out to ‘Scholia/University of Otago’. Credit card
payments are preferred; please use the credit card authorisation below. Foreign
subscriptions cover air mail postage and bank charges on institutional and personal cheques.
Payments from Africa, however, must be made with an international bank draft or by credit
card in New Zealand currency because of foreign exchange regulations in many countries.
After initial payment, a subscription to the journal will be entered. Back numbers are
available at a reduced price and may be ordered from the Business Manager.

Credit Card Authorisation

Card type (please delete one): Mastercard Visa

Credit Card Number: ______ / ______ / ______ / ______

Expiry Date: ______ / ______

Amount to be Debited: NZD ______

Your Signature: ____________________________________________________________

Mail subscriptions with cheque or the credit card authorisation form to:
Business Manager, Scholia, Department of Classics, University of Otago,
P. O. Box 56, Dunedin 9015, New Zealand
**THE SMELL OF SWEAT**
**GREEK ATHLETICS AND GREEK CULTURE**

Wm. Blake Tyrrell

A survey of Greek athletics from Homeric times through the fourth century B.C.E. From the games of the *Iliad*, to the foundation of the Olympic games, to the poetry of Pindar and the Olympic Festival, this book covers all aspects of Greek athletics.

The introduction examines the nineteenth-century bias that created the myth of Greek amateurism. An extensive bibliography aids the reader in pursuing further study.

This Volume Features
- Introduction discusses the bias in earlier treatments of Greek athletics and the “myth of Greek amateurism”
- Six Chapters examine evidence from Homeric times to the Golden Age of Athens
- 29 Illustrations plus 2 maps and 2 tables
- Extensive bibliography for further reading
- Companion CD-ROM of Sources, translated into English.

---

**CIVIS ROMANUS**
**A READER FOR THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF LATIN**

Cobban & Colebourn

The wonderful, memorable stories that grew from the civilization of ancient Rome are the basis of this unique reader. Sixty graded passages of Latin let your students read about actual people and events while they hone their Latin grammatical and syntactical skills and increase their Latin vocabulary.

Features:
- a new introduction by Marianthe Colakis
- 60 passages of graded Latin readings of graduated length
- a special Latin-to-English vocabulary list for each reading
- a general Latin-to-English glossary
- a list of grammar assumed for each reading