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EDITORIAL NOTE

_Scholia_ 13 (2004) features three long articles on Plutarch, Livy and Ovid along with a couple of shorter contributions. Although the editor prefers to publish shorter articles, as suggested by the usual word length in the ‘Notes to Contributors’, he will publish longer articles when they are of considerable merit. _Scholia_ accepts submissions from scholars in all areas of classical studies, including the classical tradition. The editor continues to offer contributors competent and prompt refereeing by leading scholars internationally (for articles), immediate responses to the receipt of contributions, a short time between submission and acceptance (2-3 months), regular communication at all intervals of the refereeing and editorial process, and free offprints of articles. While the Editorial Committee undertakes to publish submissions accepted as soon as possible, it reserves the right to hold over any contribution to the next volume. This means that a small number of articles will be published one year later than the reserve dates indicated in the formal letters of acceptance.

Although _Scholia_ was conceived as a print journal and plans to continue publishing in this format, the editor believes that a strong web presence is important for its profile and to ensure maximum exposure of its contents. Accordingly it lays great stress on this aspect of publication, as can seen not only from its professional web site at http://www.otago.ac.nz/classics/scholia but also numerous links to its web pages on other websites of classical organisations and scholarly journals. The _Scholia_ website has a link to the electronic journal _Scholia Reviews_ hosted on the University of KwaZulu-Natal web site at http://www.classics.und.ac.za/reviews. _Scholia Reviews_ was only the second web journal of reviews launched within the international classical community and it continues to assume an important electronic role in the discipline. John Hilton, the _Scholia Reviews_ editor, selects a number of reviews for print publication in each volume of _Scholia_.

Two important sections of _Scholia_ that serve the New Zealand university community are In the Museum and J. A. Barsby Essay. In the Museum contains news about classical museums in New Zealand and articles on classical artefacts in these collections. This volume contains a report on the Classics Museum at Victoria University of Wellington and information about four additions to the Museum’s collection. Museum curators are invited to send news about their collections to the In the Museum editor by 1 October.

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2 See pp. 184-86.

3 See pp. 169-74.
This volume also includes the 2004 J. A. Barsby Essay, which is the paper judged to be the best student essay in New Zealand submitted to *Scholia* by 1 October 2004. The competition, which is organised annually by Jon Hall (Otago), is open to first-, second-, third- and fourth-year students. The winning essay has been composed by Jonathan Cweorth (Otago) and is entitled ‘Catullan *Urbanitas* and Social Exclusion’. Second place was awarded to Joe Sheppard (Victoria, Wellington) for his essay ‘Sympathy for the Devil: How Caesar Tricked the World in *De Bello Civili*’ and third place to Victoria Calver (Victoria, Wellington) for her essay entitled ‘The Origins of the First Punic War’.

*Scholia* expresses its appreciation to the Classical Association of Otago for sponsoring the first prize in the J. A. Barsby Essay competitions in 2002, 2003 and 2004. The University of Otago sponsored the second and third prizes of $50 in 2004. Nineteen entries were received from students at the universities of Auckland, Canterbury, Massey, Otago and Victoria of Wellington for the 2004 competition. The essays were assessed by Dougal Blyth (Auckland), Matthew Trundle (Victoria, Wellington), Robin Bond and Alison Griffith (Canterbury). The editors thank the adjudicators, lecturers and contributors for their enthusiastic support of the J. A. Barsby Essay competition. In 2005 the competition will be sponsored by the Australasian Society for Classical Studies and will feature a winning prize of $150. Submissions should not exceed 3000 words and should be sent to Jon Hall, the competition organiser, by 1 October.

William J. Dominik
Editor, *Scholia*

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*See pp. 175-82.*
"THE BIRTH OF THE READER":
PLUTARCH AS A LITERARY CRITIC

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Abstract. Plutarch, in his essay, How a Youth Should Listen to Poems, advocates a method of reading designed to render morally safe works of literature that are inevitably tainted by ill-considered, wicked, and passion-driven actions and opinions. In the process, Plutarch transfers authority over the meaning of the text to the reader in ways that remarkably anticipate certain strategies of postmodern literary theory.

It is well known that Plato harbored deep suspicions of poetry and poets, arriving at the conclusion, at the end of the Republic, that Homer and his like would not be welcome in the ideal state he envisioned. Plato was fully aware that poetry has a powerful effect on its listeners; that was precisely his concern. The wrong kind of poetry could corrupt, and Plato thought that banishing traditional forms such as epic and drama, which communicated all kinds of wrong ideas, was a price worth paying to secure the moral health of his citizens.

It is all too easy to criticize Plato for advocating censorship of literature, while overlooking the ways in which many—I venture to say most—people today favor at least some limitations on the dissemination of art. Our society is more obsessed with sex than Plato’s was, and consequently many think it reasonable to prohibit sexually explicit scenes in movies. Let us not allege that movies are a more powerful medium than literature. Plato was not worried about literature; he was worried about tragedy, comedy, and epic: dramatic genres that were every bit as vivid as the cinema. The proper comparandum is television, which reaches roughly the same proportion of the public today as the theater did in Plato’s time. Plato’s concerns were serious.¹

Plato begins his attack on poetry in the second book of the Republic, observing that Hesiod “told the greatest falsehood about the greatest matters, nor did he falsify properly in saying that Uranus accomplished what Hesiod says he did, and that Cronus in turn took vengeance on him” (τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεῦδος ὁ εἶπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο ὡς Οὐρανός τε

What does Plato’s Socrates mean by saying that Hesiod “did not falsify properly” (οὐ καλῶς ἔγενεν Ἀθηναίοι)? It is possible, maybe even likely, that the expression is a litotes for “his falsifications were very harmful indeed.” But conceivably Plato means that there is indeed a proper kind of falsification, but Hesiod’s fictions are not of this sort. Socrates began by observing that “there are two kinds of speech [λόγοι], one true, the other false,” and adds: “We must instruct by means of both, but first by means of falsehoods.” His point is that “we first tell children stories [μύθου], and this is a falsehood, speaking generally, but there are also true things in them” (λόγον δὲ διττὸν εἰδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς, ψευδὸς δὲ ἔτερον; ... Παραστάτης δὲ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δὲ ἐν τοῖς ψευδασίν; ... πρῶτον τοῖς παῖσιν μύθοις λέγομεν; τούτῳ δὲ ποὺ ὡς τὸ ὄλον εἰπεῖν ψευδὸς, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ, 376e11-377a4). 3 Whatever the case may be with the expression, “he did not falsify properly,” it is clear that for Plato myths or stories contain certain truths which are necessary for the instruction of the young; taken as a whole, however, such myths are nevertheless false. But tales such as Hesiod’s should not be recited to the young at all, even if they were true (378a2f., 378b2f.), though in fact they are not (378c1); for the young are incapable of appreciating the implicit meaning (ὅπονοια) in such stories (378d7-9)—should there be one.

Plato does not make entirely clear in what way myths contain truths, save for the suggestion that it may be by way of allegory or hidden significance. Plutarch, as befits a follower of the Academy, appears to take a similar line to Plato’s at the beginning of his essay, How a Youth should Listen to Poems:

οτί δὲ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λεγομένων οἱ σφόδρα νέοι τοὺς μὴ δοκοῦσι φιλοσόφους μὴ ἀπὸ σπουδὴς λέγεισθαι χαίροντες μᾶλλον καὶ παρεξεύχοντες ὑπηκόοις ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χειροθέηες, δῆλον ἐστιν ἡμῖν.

(Plut. Quomodo Adul. 14e)

For what is discussed in philosophy, it is obvious to us that the very young enjoy more and are more attentive and manageable in regard to things that do not seem to be said philosophically or in earnest.

But Plutarch too is aware that such stories may have a deleterious effect on the young:

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2 Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
"The Birth of the Reader": Plutarch as a Literary Critic, D. Konstan

For in poetry there is much that is pleasurable and nourishing to the soul of a youth, but no less that which is perturbing and misleading, unless listening finds correct instruction.

What is more, clever students are more at risk than dull ones, since they take everything they hear more to heart and understand it better. Unlike Plato, however, Plutarch is not writing a manual for education in a utopian state, but rather for real life:

Why should it not be beneficial? Plutarch compares such a strategy to stopping up the ears of students as they sail, like Odysseus’ men bypassing the Sirens, on the skiff of Epicurus (15d). The Epicureans had gained a reputation for disdaining traditional culture or παιδεία, and as the school most opposed to Platonism, it behooved Plutarch to maintain his distance from them in this domain. He insists, accordingly, that poetry is not simply harmful, but contains much that is useful (τὸ χρήσιμον, 15e); one has simply to trim away the mythological and dramatic element in it (τὸ μυθόδες . . . καὶ θεατρικὸν, 15f), mixing into the residue a suitable dose of philosophical content. Plutarch concludes:

Thus those who are going to engage in philosophy must not avoid poems but must rather pre-philosophize in poetry, having been trained to seek and welcome what is useful within the pleasurable.

All very well, but if Plutarch does not plan to banish poetry, what method does he propose to avoid the dangers inherent in it? His first recommendation is that the young be thoroughly steeped in the idea that “poets tell many falsehoods” (πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί), some intentionally, others not (16a,
quoting Arist. *Metaph.* 1.983a4). Those who do so deliberately aim to provide 
pleasure and delight (χάρις), since “truth is dryer than falsehood”
(αὐτής προτέραν . . . τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ ψεῦδους, 16b); with fiction (τὸ πλαττόμενον) one can invent a happy ending, if need be. I am reminded of
Miss Prism’s view of novels in Oscar Wilde’s *The Importance of Being Earnest* (act 2): “The good ended happily, and the bad unhappily. That is what Fiction
means.”4 In fact, Plutarch says, there is nothing in poetry—not meter, diction, 
or any other quality—equal in delight to a well-designed plot (διάθεσις μυθολογίας, 16b). This, Plutarch adds, is why Socrates, instructed in a dream 
to try his hand at poetry, elected to render Aesop’s fables in verse, since he
knew that “that is not poetry that has no falsehood in it” (ποίησις οὐκ οὖσαν ἢ ἴδιας μη πρόσεπτε, 16c), and Socrates, as a “battler for the truth,” did not
believe he had the talent to invent fictions. And Plutarch, who follows Aristotle 
in distinguishing between ποίησις (“poetry”) and didactic or wisdom literature 
that happens to be composed in meter (Arist. *Poet.* 1447b17-20), insists: “We
do not know of poetry that is without myth or falsehood” (οὐκ ἔσμεν δ’ ἀμφόθεν οὐδ’ ἢψευδή ποίησιν, 16c). Plutarch seems to imply that there is
something in the nature of narrative that obliges the poet to deviate from the 
true and good, though he does not yet explain why this should be so (he, and 
we, will return to this question later). In any case, the student who is aware not
to accept such specious matter concerning the gods or virtue as true, but rather
remembers constantly poetry’s enchantment in regard to falsehood, “will suffer
nothing terrible nor be persuaded of anything base” (οὔδὲν πείσεται δεινὸν ὀδὴ πιστεῦσει φαῦλον, 16e), for example that death is an evil or that
divinities are unjust.

We can already see what Plutarch’s strategy will be to combat the 
harmful consequences of the falsehood that is inherent in the very nature of
poetry. The young student must approach poetry guardedly, ever alert to the lies
it inevitably conveys. In the expression coined by the modern theological critic
Paul Ricoeur, the youth must practice a “hermeneutics of suspicion,”5
confronting the text, or reading against the grain, as Jack Winkler put it.
Winkler writes: “... the larger methodological issue is whether readers should
simply be trying to reproduce the author’s meaning (if he had one—that is, if he
had one) as the goal.”6 Winkler is adamant that they should not. The

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“ambiguities and contradictions” within a literary work “afford us an opportunity to become resisting readers.” For all the apparent modernity of this approach to a work of literature, the principle is fully present in Plutarch’s essay. Plutarch is committed to the notion of the resisting listener.

Plutarch goes on to observe that the greater and more prevalent danger derives from those poets who in fact believe the falsehoods they narrate (16f), ignorantly taking as true not obvious tall tales such as the fiery rivers of hell but rather plausible but pernicious doctrines such as that the gods are responsible for evil and that death is a misfortune. Persuaded themselves, the poets the more readily stuff us with their puny anxieties (17d). Here too, the remedy is to remind oneself that poetry has no concern for the truth, and what is more that the truth about such things is difficult to achieve even for those who dedicate themselves to a knowledge of reality. Plutarch cites Empedocles and Xenophanes on the obscurity of matters relating to the gods, and recalls that Socrates himself, according to Plato, denied that he possessed such wisdom (17e). The Academy that Plutarch knew endorsed skepticism with regard to ultimate truths, and ascribed this view, with some plausibility, to Socrates as well. Plutarch exploits the doubts of professional philosophers in order to reduce the student’s confidence in the insight of poets, who have even less claim to arcane intelligence.

This is Plutarch’s first line of attack. Poetry is not a vehicle of wisdom but a bundle of falsehoods tailored to give pleasure rather than to edify. In this, he is in agreement with the Socrates of the Republic, though at odds with Socrates’ belief, as expressed in the Apology and Ion, that poetry is divinely inspired. Plutarch’s response to this state of affairs, however, differs radically from Plato’s. Whereas Plato felt obliged to ban narrative poetry, assigning to

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8 I prefer the notion of the resisting reader to that of “self-censorship” on the part of the reader, which, according to S. Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems (Princeton 2002) 297, replaces the political censorship envisioned by Plato.

9 Although scholars have doubted the compatibility of skepticism with Plutarch’s religious commitments: J. Opsomer, “Divination and Academic ‘Scepticism’ according to Plutarch,” in L. Van der Stockt (ed.), Plutarchea Lovaniensia: A Miscellany of Essays on Plutarch (Louvain 1996) 177 rightly affirms that “Plutarch was convinced that his brand of Platonic philosophy was fundamentally in accordance with the Platonic and Academic tradition. . . . He repeatedly, throughout his whole oeuvre, advocated caution or suspension of judgment on the level of sensory perception and the natural sciences.” Opsomer provides a copious bibliography on the issue.
his philosopher kings the responsibility for recognizing what was harmful in poetry and what safe, Plutarch places his confidence in the astuteness of the audience or reader, indeed the young reader. Accountability for the meaning or message of the text is thus shifted from the poet to the audience. This is, I shall argue, the radical and remarkably modern approach to literature that Plutarch inaugurates in this essay.

To illustrate the connection between Plutarch's method and that of certain modern or rather postmodern critics, let me pause for a moment to cite the final paragraph of Roland Barthes' famous essay, "The Death of the Author," a passage whose import the essay's own title has caused to be unduly neglected:

Classic criticism has never paid any attention to the reader; for it, the writer is the only person in literature. We are now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer by the arrogant antiphrastical recriminations of good society in favour of the very thing it sets aside, ignores, smothers, or destroys; we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.¹⁰

That the reader is essential to the construction of the text is already there in Plutarch's treatise; where Plutarch will differ from Barthes is in his assumptions about what kinds of meanings it is appropriate to draw from, or rather ascribe to, a poem.¹¹ Modern critics, or at least some of them, are more disposed than Plutarch to be pluralistic in what they consider to be admissible readings. Robert Scholes observes that readers "are constituted differently and different readers perceive different features of the same texts."¹² Or in the words (as I recall them) of T. S. Eliot: "An author is entitled to all the meanings his readers find in him."¹³ Even here, however, the distance between Plutarch and postmodern literary theory is less than one may suppose.


¹¹ G. M. Ledbetter, Poetics Before Plato: Interpretation and Authority in Early Greek Theories of Poetry (Princeton 2003) 6 suggests that Socrates, as represented in Plato's Ion, Apology, and Protagoras, already anticipates Barthes' view, but does not go so far as to lodge entire responsibility for a text's meaning in the reader; she compares the Socratic approach rather with the New Criticism, which grants the text a determinate meaning "in isolation from its author and historical factors."


¹³ Cf. F. Dupont (tr. J. Lloyd), The Invention of Literature: From Greek Intoxication to the Latin Book (Baltimore 1999) 8: "What literary writing in effect does is indicate to the
In order further to inoculate the young student against the harmful properties of poetry, Plutarch goes on to argue that it shares with painting the quality of being mimetic in nature; therefore, the pleasure and amazement that poetry provides are due not to the fineness or beauty of the object represented but rather to the fidelity of the representation (18a). What is ugly cannot be fine (καλὸν), but mimesis succeeds when it achieves a likeness: contrariwise, it fails if it offers a handsome image of something ugly. The young must be taught that when people praise a work of art or poetry they are admiring the skill and propriety of the imitation, not the action imitated (18b; cf. Arist. Poet. 1448b4-17). This is why we take delight in imitations of sounds that are naturally disagreeable, such as the squeal of a pig, a squeaky wheel, the rustle of the wind or the beating of the sea (18c)—I cite the latter two examples from Plutarch to indicate once more the difference of taste in antiquity and today. As Plutarch elegantly sums it up: “Imitating something beautiful is not the same as doing it beautifully” (οὐ γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα τὸ καλὸν καὶ καλῶς τι μιμεῖσθαι, 18d).14

In practice, this means that youngsters learn to take account of character and context. If they realize that writers do not mean to praise a tyrant like Eteocles when they put in his mouth a defense of injustice in the service of power (Eur. Phoen. 524f.), “they cannot be harmed by the opinion of poets” (οὐκ ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς δόξης βλάπτοιντο τῶν ποιητῶν, 18f), but rather the reverse, because they recognize that the action and the agent are base. But how are they to know that a given deed or sentiment is in fact wrong? In this, one can often trust the poets themselves, who signal their view of the case to the listener or

reader what paths to follow in his own hermeneutics, since he alone can produce meaningful discourse from whatever is stated in writing. But there are many paths to choose from and it is up to the reader to decide on one for himself”; P. Brooks, “The Idea of a Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism,” in S. Rimmon-Kenan (ed.), Discourse in Psychoanalysis and Literature (London 1987) 1-18, esp. 13f. asserts that meaning resides “in the dialogic struggle and collaboration” between the text and the reader”; M. A. Júnior, “Ancient Rhetoric, Hermeneutics and New Rhetorical Criticism,” Logo: Rivista de Retórica y Teoría de la Comunicación 2 (2002) 53-63, esp. 56 attempts an integrative hermeneutic that “pays equal attention to author, text and reader,” where the latter requires that one value “the meaning of the text in terms of significance and relevant appropriation.” More radical is the formulation by S. Fish, Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, Mass. 1980) 327: “Interpreters do not decode poems; they make them”; for a critique of Fish’s relativism, see R. W. Dasenbrock, “Do We Write the Text We Read?”, in D. H. Richter (ed.), Falling into Theory: Conflicting Views on Reading Literature (Boston 2000) 278-89.

reader, though of course, given their desire to please and the fallibility of their judgment, they will not always either wish or be able to do so. Plutarch offers the example of Paris returning to battle in the sixth book of the Iliad: since Homer "described no other man sleeping with his wife during the day," he clearly wished to condemn the licentiousness of this adulterer (οὐδένα γὰρ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων ἡμέρας συγκομόμενον γυναῖκι ποιήσας, 18f).

The technique by which poets flash their own opinion of the personalities and events described in their compositions Plutarch labels ἐμφάσις (19a; cf. 35a), and it is to this that the young must pay special attention. It was a recognized procedure in antiquity. Quintilian defines it as "affording a deeper sense [intellectus] than that which the words by themselves reveal" (altiorem praebens intellectum quam quem uerba per se ipsa declarant, Inst. 8.3.83). He adds that "there are two types of emphasis, one of which signifies more than it says, the other precisely that which it does not say" (eius duae sunt species: altera quae plus significat quam dicit, altera quae etiam id quod non dicit, 8.3.83). The former is found in Homer and Virgil, and is fairly innocuous: by reporting that the Cyclops sprawled across his cave, Homer indicates without explicitly saying so that the monster is huge. The second type is more fraught, since by means of it the author "is silent about what we nevertheless comprehend" (tacuit enim illud, quod nihil minus accipimus, 8.3.85). Later, Quintilian returns to this figure, which he defines as occurring when "something hidden is elicited from something that has been said" (cum ex aliquo dicto latens aliquid eruitur, 9.2.64). These days the device is common, Quintilian says, though not the kind in which the opposite of what is said is intended—this is more like ἐπισταντέω—but rather where "something lies concealed and must be as it were discovered by the listener" (aliud latens et auditori quasi inueniendum, 9.2.65). It is employed when it is unsafe or unseemly to speak openly, or again to provide charm to the narrative. Plutarch appropriates the figure to his own ethical purposes, and regards Homer as the past master of the technique. Thus, when Agamemnon is on the point of berating Chryses, the priest of Apollo, Homer is careful to alert the audience in advance that "he dismissed him badly [κακῶς]" (ἄλλα κακῶς ἄφει, Hom. II. 1.24), that is, Plutarch explains, "roughly, arrogantly, and contrary to what is right" (τουτέστιν ἀγρίως καὶ αὐθάδας καὶ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον, 19b), and likewise in the case of Achilles' abusive speech to Agamemnon. In other cases, Homer appends his judgment afterwards, as when he comments concerning Pandarus' violation of the truce at Athena's prompting: "So spoke Athena, and she persuaded the witless fool [literally, 'foolish in his wits']" (ἄς φάτ᾽ Ἀθηναίη, τῷ δὲ φρένας ἄφρονι πείθεν, 19d = Hom. II. 4.104). The clever
listener should realize, I imagine, both that Pandarus’ action was wrong and that Athena herself is exempt from blame.

Now, we may be inclined to pick holes in Plutarch’s interpretations. To say that Agamemnon sent Chryses packing “badly” (κακῶς) may just mean that he treated him roughly, without carrying a moral evaluation. That Pandarus was a fool does not entirely exonerate Athena for planting in his head the idea of firing an arrow at Menelaus. But whether or not Plutarch is convincing in one or another exegesis, the method he employs is alive and well in criticism today. Let me offer a couple of examples. In a carefully reasoned article on “Greek Polytheism,” J. Gordon Howie explains that Homer’s gods “are willing to heed prayers not only for help but also for vengeance.”15 If they are not always able to save their favorites, this is because they are overridden by fate, but at least they take care that the bodies of reverent heroes “are preserved for burial.”16 Howie goes on to observe that

Priam sums up the question of divine obligations in his response to the news that Hector’s body has been preserved: “So it is worth giving proper gifts to the gods; for they have remembered their gratitude to my son even in his fate of death” (Iliad 24.425ff.). These words are addressed by a grateful mortal to a god (Hermes) in disguise in the final book of the Iliad; and it is reasonable to suspect that they have some wider, exemplary, significance.17

Howie concludes that cult is efficacious in Homer, and that “the traditional forms of prayer and hymnic predication, which are related to those in the Bible, can be said to be illustrated and validated in principle in Greek mythical narrative.”18 I would call attention particularly to Howie’s use of Priam’s words as a kind of meta-commentary on the action of the Iliad, very much in the Plutarchan manner, it seems to me. I need hardly state that Howie’s confidence that the gods honor those mortals who duly sacrifice to them is not uncontroversial; as David Kovacs puts it, “Greek polytheism . . . was not wedded to the doctrine of divine moral perfection . . . , and when one of the good met with undeserved disaster, they did not feel obliged to say, as a monotheist might, that this was divine beneficence heavily disguised.”19

So too, in his recent book, *Restraining Anger*, William Harris observes that, in the *Iliad*, Homer “was attempting to teach his audience general lessons about anger, the central theme of the epic.”\(^{20}\) Part of the evidence for this proposition is that “Zeus is emphatically said to get angry . . . at those mortals who make crooked judgements in the agora and drive out justice.”\(^{21}\)

Indeed, Wolfgang Iser, in his essay “Indeterminacy and the Reader’s Response in Prose Fiction,” provides something like a theoretical account of the issues involved in this style of interpretation:

> We all notice in reading novels that the narrative is often interspersed with the author’s comments on the events. These comments are frequently in the nature of an evaluation of what has happened . . . The author himself tells the reader how his tale is to be understood. At best, the reader can only contradict the author’s conception, if he thinks that he can extract different impressions from the work.\(^{22}\)

Iser notes that not all such incidental comments are intended to constrain the reader’s understanding of the text; rather, they may “strike one as mere hypotheses, and they seem to imply other possibilities of evaluation than those that arise directly from the events described.”\(^{23}\) Iser poses the question: “Are we, then, to trust the author when he makes his comments? Or are we not, rather, to test what he says for ourselves?\(^{24}\) Plutarch would be entirely comfortable, I think, with the kind of reading strategy that Iser adumbrates, and the idea that such authorial evaluations “provoke the faculty of judgment.”

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\(^{21}\) Harris [20] 137 citing Hom. *Iliad* 386-88. Today, Homer is believed to have been exceptionally discreet in regard to signaling openly his own evaluation of the events he narrates: “There are very few epics—or even novels—where the narrator’s explicit evaluation is heard so little. But this is not by any means to say that the *Iliad* is without ethical colouring or amoral. . . . The poem is full of implicit evaluation” (O. Taplin, *Homeric Soundings: The Shaping of the Iliad* [Oxford 1992] 6; cited in R. Nünlist “Some Clarifying Remarks on ‘Focalization,’” in F. Montanari and P. Ascheri [edd.], *Omero Tremila Anni Dopo: Atti del congresso di Genova, 6-8 luglio 2000* [Rome 2000] 431, who argues that explicit evaluations are better explained “as being focalized by the characters”).


Nor is it the case that Plutarch’s own exegeses are simply arbitrary, lacking in normative guidelines and regard for plausibility. He argues rather that his method, as opposed to that of the allegorists, offers

... ἀναθεωρησιν ὀφέλιμον ἐπὶ τῶν διαβεβλημένων μάλιστα μύθων, οὓς τοὺς πάλαι μὲν ὑπονοοιας ἀλληγορίας δὲ νῦν λεγομέναις παραβιαζόμενοι καὶ διαστρέφοντες ἐνιοὶ μοιχευμένην φασίν Ἀφροδίτην ὑπὸ Ἀρεος μηνύον Πλινον, ὅτι τῷ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀφτερῷ συνελθὼν ὅ του Ἀρεος μοιχικάς ἀποτελεῖ γενέσεις, Ἡλίου δὲ ἐπαναφερομένου καὶ καταλαμβάνοντος οὐ λανθάνουσιν, τὸν δὲ τῆς Ἡρας καλλιτεχνῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Δία καὶ τὰς περὶ τῶν κεστὸν γοητείας ἀέρος τινὰ κάθαρσιν εἶναι βούλονται τῷ πυρῷ δίπλησι Πλευσίαστος, ὡσπερ οὖν αὐτὸς τὰς λύσεις τοῦ ποιητοῦ διδόντος. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης διδάσκει τοὺς προσέχοντας, ὅτι μουσικὴ φαύλη καὶ άσιμα ποινήπα καὶ λόγου μοχθηρῶς ὑποθέσεις λαμβάνοντος ἀκόλουθα ποιοῦσιν ἡς καὶ βίους ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀνθρώπους τρυφῆν καὶ μαλακίαν καὶ γυναικοκρασίαν ἀγαπῶντας

εἰμιτὰ τ’ ἐξημομαὶ λοετρά τε θερμά καὶ εὐνάς. διὸ καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα τὸ κιθαρῳδόν προστάττοντα πεποιηκεν ἀλλ’ ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι καὶ ἱπποῦ κόσμον δείσον, καλὸς ὑφηγοῦμεν τὸ παρὰ τῶν φρονίμων καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων χρῆναι λαμβάνον τοὺς μοιχικοὺς καὶ ποιητικοὺς τὰς ὑποθέσεις. ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τῆς Ἡρας ἀρίστα τὴν ἀπὸ φαρμάκων καὶ γοητείας καὶ μετὰ δόλου πρὸς τοὺς ἀνδραὶς ἀμύλλεαι καὶ χάριν έδειξεν οὐ μόνον ἐφίμερον καὶ ἀνίκηρον καὶ ἀβέβαιου οὖσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεταβάλλουσαν εἰς ἔχθραν καὶ ὀργήν, ὅταν τὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἁπομαρανθῆ, τοιαύτα γὰρ ὦ Ζεὺς ἀπείλει καὶ λέγει πρὸς αὐτήν

ὁφρα τίς ἦν τοὶ χραίσιμη φιλότητες καὶ καὶ εὐνήν, ἦν ἐμίγης ἔλθουσα θεὸν ἀπὸ καὶ μ’ ἀπάτησας.

ἡ γὰρ τῶν φαύλων διάθεσις ἔργων καὶ μίμησις ἀν προσαποδῷ τὴν συμβαίνουσαν αἰσχύνη καὶ βλαβην τοῖς ἐργασιαμένοις, ὀφέλησεν οὖκ ἐβλαψε τὸν ἀκροδόμον.

(Plut. Quomodo Adul. 19e-20b)

... a useful approach to the most maligned myths, which some people force and twist with what used to be called connotations [ὑπονοοια] but are now called allegories. These people say that Helios reveals the adultery of Aphrodite with Ares [in the Odyssey], because when Ares’ star joins that of Aphrodite it predicts adulterous births, but they do not remain concealed when the Sun is ascendant and descendant. In turn, Hera’s beautification for Zeus and her trick with [Aphrodite’s] girdle signify, they say, the purification of the air as it nears the fiery element—as though the poet himself did not provide the solutions [λύσεις]. For in the verses concerning Aphrodite he teaches those who pay attention that cheap music, sordid songs, and stories with adulterous plots produce licentious characters, unmanly lifestyles, and people receptive to wantonness, effeminacy, a womanish temperament, “changes of clothes, hot baths, and soft beds” [Od. 8.249].

That is why Homer made Odysseus bid the singer, “come now, switch over and sing about the fashioning of the [Trojan] horse” [Od. 8.492].
nicely indicating that one should adopt one's musical and poetic plots from people who are discerning and have good sense. In the verses concerning Hera, Homer excellently demonstrated that sex and gratification deriving from potions and magic and accompanied by deception are not only transient, quick to surfeit, and precarious, but also mutate into enmity and anger when the pleasurable part abates. For Zeus himself threatens this and says to Hera, “so you may see whether sex and the bed help you, which you enjoyed when you came to me apart from the gods and deceived me” [Il. 14.32f.] For if writing about and representing ignoble deeds also delivers in the end shame and harm resulting to those who execute them, then they benefit rather than harm the audience.

Plutarch concludes that just as philosophers make use of examples, poets teach by fashioning the events in their narratives.

We have seen that Plutarch was not committed, as some neo-Platonists and other thinkers were, to the notion that poets necessarily purvey wisdom, albeit in a disguised form. He is thus perfectly happy to acknowledge that the poets contradict themselves, and this too can be profitable to the student (20c). If the contrary ideas are juxtaposed, as in stichomythic dialogue, the solution (λυσίς) is evident: one guides the judgment of the young toward the better view (20d). Otherwise, one must seek a conflicting and superior view expressed elsewhere in the work. Thus, against the image of gods fighting and wounding each other it is possible to cite Homer’s own statement that “the blessed gods are glad all their days” (Hom. Od. 6.46), which is the healthier and the truer view (20f). If Sophocles (or a character in a Sophoclean play) asserts, “profit is pleasant, even if it comes from falsehoods” (τὸ κέρδος ἡδόν, κἂν ἀπὸ ψευδών ἤ, Soph. fr. 749), Plutarch does not hesitate to reproach him as it were to his face: “But in fact we heard you say that ‘false statements never bear fruit’” (καὶ μὴν σοῦ γ’ ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς ὦκ ἐξάγουσι καρπὸν οἱ ψευδεῖς λόγοι, 21a). Plutarch does not suppose that the better view is that of the poet himself, whose inconsistencies are evidence of his confusion. The exercise of comparison is designed rather to subvert the auditor’s confidence in the authority of the poem by exposing its internal incoherence.25

In this, Plutarch’s approach is not so very far removed from that of modern deconstructionist critics. Paul de Man writes, for example:

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25 In this respect, Plutarch differs from Philodemus’ strategy in On the Good King according to Homer, where despite Philodemus’ awareness that the Homeric epics are scarcely a fountainhead of philosophical wisdom, the emphasis is entirely on the positive values to be extracted from the text; I owe this observation to Jeff Fish.
As long as [a narrative] treats a theme . . . it will always lead to the confrontation of incompatible meanings between which it is necessary but impossible to decide in terms of truth and error. If one of the readings is declared true, it will always be possible to undo it by means of the other; if it is decreed false, it will always be possible to demonstrate that it states the truth of its aberration. 26

What is more, according to de Man, allegories “are always ethical, the term ethical designating the structural interference of two distinct value systems.” 27 De Man, of course, withholds judgment concerning the superiority of one value system over another, whereas Plutarch, while recognizing the tensions in the text, prefers to tilt the student toward what he regards as the better or truer principles. But Plutarch too, as a skeptic, had doubts about the knowability of ultimate truths, and his ethical preferences may be seen as heuristic or pedagogical in character. Hence he asserts that exhibiting inconsistencies within a poem has one of two consequences: “Either it will lead [the student] to the better or it will eliminate trust in the worse” (ἡ παράξειν πρᾶξιν τὸ βέλτιον ἡ καὶ τὸ χείρον ἀποστήσει τὴν πίστιν, 21c-d). For de Man, the absence of a unified voice in the text means that a “reading has to check itself at all points, in quest of cues that puncture the surface of the discourse and reveal the holes and the traps concealed underneath. Reading now requires a vigilance that can no longer simply trust what it hears.” 28 So too for Plutarch, listening is always a

26 P. de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven 1979) 76.
28 de Man [26] 212. Although de Man, as a practitioner of deconstruction, maintained a position of ethical relativism, the contrast with Plutarch’s practical ethics is again not so radical as it may seem. In practice, the disciples of de Man held him to a standard of morality that was severely threatened by disclosures of his ostensible sympathies for the Nazi regime, expressed in two newspaper articles written when de Man was a young man in Belgium. The very furor that these notices aroused indicates that deconstruction is not incompatible with a belief in ethical norms, which are communicated by example as well as precept; see W. Hamacher et al. (edd.), Wartime Journalism: 1939-1943 (Lincoln 1988); P. de Man (edd. W. Hamacher et al.), Responses: On Paul de Man’s Wartime Journalism (Lincoln 1989). So too, W. Iser, The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary Anthropology (Baltimore 1993) 228 observes: “Because the literary text invokes conventional signs to establish itself as a ‘staged discourse’ that places the textual world under the sign of the ‘as-if’, readers know that they must bracket all their natural attitudes toward what they are reading. But this does not and cannot mean forgetting or transcending those natural attitudes, which cannot be abandoned. Instead, they figure as the virtualized background, which as a latent instance of comparison, or at least as a testing ground, is essential if the textual world is to be digested. Thus the bracketing-off process splits the reader’s attitude into one that is simultaneously
re-listening to familiar poems which the student is prepared to quote against themselves.

Where a given work does not provide a satisfactory solution to disapproved views, Plutarch cheerfully goes beyond it and throws other authorities into the scales. Thus, against the comic poet Alexis’ claim that eating, drinking, and having sex are the three things that complete a life (fr. 271 Kock), Plutarch cites Socrates to the effect that good people do not live to eat but eat to live (21d-e), and he records various jests by Diogenes and others aimed at inappropriate sayings by the poets. Once again, we will understand Plutarch’s strategy of reading better, I believe, if we set aside an exclusive preoccupation with his overt moralizing and enter into the game he is encouraging young people to play with the poets they read in school. The task is to find a counterweight to philosophically unsuitable views. If you find one, shout it out, as Diogenes did in the theater and as Plutarch himself does, more circumspectly, in this very essay when he castigates Sophocles and others for inconsistency. When you get into the spirit of the thing, you will have become a Plutarchan reader, ever ready to pounce on the work before you and reveal its confusion. In so doing, you will be immune to the baneful effects of poetry.

Plutarch offers next a set of techniques for manipulating meaning at the level of the sentence and the word. 29 For example, close attention to modifiers natural and artificial.” There is a similar doubleness to the style of reading enjoined by Plutarch, in which the reader brings to bear criteria of moral evaluation while recognizing that the text itself, as a work of fiction, need not and indeed cannot consistently authorize such values. L. Huffer, “‘There is no Gemorrah’: Narrative Ethics in Feminist and Queer Theory,” Differences 12 (2001) 19 acknowledges that “structuralism and post-structuralism tell us that we only have access to the world through a grid of language,” but she argues that the idea of “narrative performance . . . offers a way of thinking about human communication in the world where signs do refer, although contingently, through their use among a community of users. They refer, not transcendently or in the infinite specularity of self-repetition, but because they occur in a context of evaluation and judgment by others.” S. Fish, “Condemnation Without Absolutes,” The New York Times (New England edition: Monday, 15 October 2001) A23, writing in defense of postmodernism in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, argues that postmodernism “maintains only that there can be no independent standard for determining which of many rival interpretations of an event is the true one . . . ; we can and should invoke the particular lived values that unite us and inform the institutions we cherish and wish to defend”; cf. the fuller statement of this position in S. Fish, “Postmodern Warfare: The Ignorance of Our Warrior Intellectuals,” Harper’s Magazine (July 2002) 33-40.

29 In the shift from citing poets against themselves to citing authorities such as Socrates and Diogenes against the poets, Plutarch would seem to have abandoned an internal criticism of poetry, which presumes the soundness of the poet’s own judgment, for an external criticism, in which the object is to counteract the dangerous sayings of poets with better
in a sentence can alter its sense. Thus, when Homer says, “thus did the gods weave fate for wretched mortals, to live in agony” (ὥς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι, ζώειν ἀχνυμένοις, II. 24.525), Plutarch explains that Homer does not mean that all human beings are doomed to a painful life but only “wretched” ones, that is, those who are foolish (22b), taking “wretched” (δειλοῖσι) as a limiting rather than a predicative adjective. Again, Plutarch recommends training students to recognize literary usages, which he considers far more important than the so-called “glosses” or learned derivations of rare terms (22c). Such etymologizing is not unpleasant (ὁηδές), Plutarch says, but an understanding of usage is both useful and necessary as a prophylactic against the harm that poetry can do. For instance, it is important to know that the noun “living” (βιοτος) can mean “life” but also “livelihood,” depending on the context (22e). What is more, such verbal exegeses, Plutarch says, are χαρυτεν (“charming,” 22f) in their own right—they provide, we may say, an alternative pleasure to that of narrative.30 While Plutarch does not dwell on this point, it is an important one. Not only has Plutarch assigned to the listener or reader of poetry a decisive role in constituting its meaning or moral significance; he has also invested the reader’s activity with its own kind of pleasure, which competes with the pleasure inherent in fiction. This is a new kind of “pleasure of the text,” in Roland Barthes’ phrase. It is the joy of exegesis, the pleasure of the erudite commentator as opposed to that of the naïve reader who submits to the fascination of the story.31

views, irrespective of their source. Yet Plutarch does not recognize a change of approach, and returns without comment to techniques for showing that the poets themselves may mean something different from what they appear to be saying.

30 Plato Resp. 602d indicates that the means by which we may correct false impressions such as optical illusions include measuring, counting, and weighing, and he observes that these aids (βοηθεια) are χαρυστατα in this regard (πρὸς αύτα). F. M. Cornford (tr.), The Republic of Plato (Oxford 1941) translates “most satisfactory,” but the idea is probably more like “elegant” or “graceful” (cf. H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford 1940) 1978 s.v. χαρτες, def. 2.2, citing this passage among others). I wonder whether Plutarch’ s use of χαρτε here might not be an echo of the Platonic passage.

31 This kind of pleasure, insofar as it competes with that afforded by the plot, may seem to threaten one’s enjoyment of literature. I recall the anxiety of a young woman devoted to Harlequin romances who feared that she might cease to take pleasure in them after a course in the theory of the novel. Dupont [13] 98 asserts that Alexandrian literature “has nothing to do with our modern kind of literature, for it implied a kind of reading that separated the form from the content and that produced neither pleasure nor oblivion of the surrounding world. This Alexandrian literature was addressed solely to book professionals, men who were also commentators, philologists, professors, poets, librarians, and editors, all rolled into one.”
A knowledge of usage is particularly salient in respect to names of deities and other abstract concepts. When Homer uttered the name of Hephaestus, for example, he might mean the god himself, but he might also mean that which the god symbolizes, in this case fire (23a-b). The ethical significance of observing this distinction is apparent in a phrase such as “blind Ares” (τυφλός . . . Ἄρης, Soph. fr. 754): applied to the god, the adjective is blasphemous, but in fact the reference is to war. So too, one must understand whether Zeus is the deity himself or stands for fate or chance. The ancient poets resorted to this imagery, Plutarch says, because they did not yet have a special term for the concept of accident or τόχη (24a), though they knew that events occur randomly. Whenever we find ascribed to Zeus malice or some other quality incompatible with his rational nature, we may know that the poet is speaking metaphorically (cf. 24b). The same is true, Plutarch adds, of the term ἀρετή, which means both “virtue” and, by catachresis, the products of virtue, such as wealth or reputation (24c-e; this holds for vice as well, 24e-f); such usages will do no harm to the student who is alert to them.

But the problem with poetry, Plutarch is aware, goes deeper than what scholarship can sort out. The charm (χαρά) of poetry lies in excitement and surprise (τὸ γὰρ ἐμπαθές καὶ παράλογον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον, 25d), and this requires dramatic changes of fortune and variety of events; “what is simple lacks passion and narrative movement” (τὸ δ’ ἀπλοῦν ἀπαθές καὶ ἀμουσιον). This is why good people, and even gods when they involve themselves in human affairs, are not consistently successful and free of fault, since this would yield a tale without the shock of danger and struggle (ἀκίνδυνον καὶ ἀναγόμοντον). Here, I think, Plutarch goes to the heart of the problem with narrative fiction, which he had only adumbrated at the beginning of the treatise. For there to be a plot, there must be a conflict of wills among characters: they cannot all be in agreement on the nature of the situation. It is not obligatory that one or more characters be bad; as Aristotle had argued, it suffices that a leading figure be mistaken concerning the facts or the intentions of others. But a narrative cannot be made of characters who are perfectly good and wise, since

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Professors and librarians, however, can take pleasure in reading, even if it is sometimes the pleasure associated with professional criticism.

32 E. Valgiglio (ed.), Plutarco de Audiendis Poetis: Introduzione, testo, commento, traduzione (Turin 1973) xxxvi remarks: “Qui l’interpretazione di Plutarco si fa aliquanto arbitaria,” and adds that, by ascribing his own view of the gods to the archaic poets, Plutarch reveals his own “insensibilità storica ed estetica.” But Plutarch’s focus is on how to read, not on the poet’s intention.
nothing new or unanticipated could happen to them.\textsuperscript{33} Passion, error, uncertainty are the stuff of drama, suitably varied and combined with virtue and foresight, which is what makes literature interesting and furnishes nuggets of wisdom to listeners trained to detect them.\textsuperscript{34}

Plutarch next recommends that the young be disabused of their high regard for heroes like Achilles and Agamemnon. Rather, they must be prepared to find fault with them as they listen to what they have said and done (25e). For poetry is precisely the representation not of perfect people but of beings entangled in emotions and false opinions (26a). So long as the young maintain a critical distance toward these figures, praising what is good and blaming what is base and not letting their judgment be enslaved by great names, they can hear poetry without damage to themselves (26a-b). One must approach poetry not in a spirit of superstitious awe but rather be prepared to holler out “wrong!” and “inapt!” when the scene requires, as well as the opposite. These responses are finely tuned to short units of narrative. In the course of Achilles’ confrontation with Agamemnon in the first book of the \textit{Iliad}, Plutarch finds occasion to laud Achilles’ behavior, censure it, and extol it again (26c-d) in the space of two hundred lines. Plutarch cites some lines ascribed to Phoenix in book 9 (\textit{Il}. 9.458-61) that so offended the Alexandrian critic Aristarchus that he excised them, but Plutarch defends them on the grounds that they suit the situation (\textit{ἐχει δὲ πρὸς τὸν καλρόν ὀρθῶς}, 26f). It is a good thing that Plutarch was so astute a reader, since the lines, which are missing from all Homeric manuscripts, would otherwise have been lost to us.

Sometimes, Plutarch recognizes, there is room for doubt about the interpretation of a scene. When Nausicaa, upon meeting Odysseus, lets on to her handmaidens that she would be content to have a husband like him (Hom. \textit{Od}. 6.244f.), some critics found her too forward, but Plutarch suggests that she may have been admiring him for his mind (27b); so too Odysseus’ delight in Penelope’s cleverness at extracting gifts from the suitors (Hom. \textit{Od}. 18.282) is reprehensible if it expresses no more than greed, but appropriate if he was

\textsuperscript{33} Perhaps Aristotle was darkly adumbrating something like this when he declared in the \textit{Poetics} (1452b34-36) that a plot in which decent men (\textit{ἐπειξεῖς ἄνδρας}) go from good fortune to bad is neither frightening nor pitiable, but rather disgusting (\textit{μισρὸν}).

\textsuperscript{34} Halliwell [8] 300 sees a tension between Plutarch’s view of the mimetic function of literature, which attempts to “construct an ‘aestheticized’ domain of fiction whose standards are essentially technical and internal,” and his “remoralization” of mimesis “in such a way as to allow ethical questions to move back toward the center of his perspective on poetry.” I am rather inclined to understand Plutarch’s emphasis on mimesis as one of a series of devices for arming the reader against the seductive pleasures of narrative, and hence consistent with his overall approach to reading.
pleased at the way she kept the suitors off guard (27c). Some critics thought it blameworthy that Odysseus should have remained asleep while he was being deposited on Ithaca by the Phaeacians, and there was even an Etruscan version of the story according to which Odysseus had a tendency to narcolepsy. But one can argue that Odysseus was ashamed to quit himself of the Phaeacians without conferring gifts on them, and he feigned sleep to evade this predicament (27d-e).

It is important to note that Plutarch does not insist that one interpretation of Odysseus’ or Nausicaa’s behavior is more correct than the other. He is perfectly happy to leave the moral valence of these episodes indeterminate. Plutarch is not concerned to educe the authentic meaning of a text or the original intention of the poet. Poetry for him is rather an occasion for listeners, or at least noble-minded listeners (cf. 30d), to exercise and sharpen their interpretive skills. To be sure, students are expected to evaluate any given episode according to a set of high-minded ethical criteria, to which Plutarch himself no doubt subscribed. But the moral standard serves in practice as a stimulus to ingenuity. As Plutarch observes in On How to Listen to Lectures:

\[\text{(Plut. De Recta Ratione Audiendi 40c)}\]

Just as Xenophon says that householders profit both from their friends and from their enemies, so too those who speak benefit those who are alert and attentive not only when they succeed but even when they fail.

Plutarch’s real object is to liberate the young from the tyranny of tradition so that they may interrogate poetry frankly and fearlessly. The crucial thing is always to demand a reason for what is said, Plutarch avers (Quomodo Adul. 28a-d), “opposing and resisting” the text (ἀπαντῶν καὶ ἀντερείδων, 28d). The way to make poetry safe is to create a sophisticated and questioning audience for it.

I have been arguing that Plutarch’s method of purging poetry of its dangers is to create a certain kind of reader who by achieving a critical distance from the text is immune to the seductions of narrative. This strategy of locating the responsibility for the text in the recipient is, I have said, a new one—in fact, Plutarch is the earliest classical commentator, I believe, to present it fully and cogently. Of course, earlier theorists had sought to defend poetry against the strictures of Plato, who opted for suppressing narrative fiction entirely, at least in the Republic. Aristotle, for example, argued in the Poetics that the pleasure
provided by poetry consists in a kind of knowledge, namely that by which we recognize the connection between the representation and the object represented: that “this is that,” as Aristotle puts it (οἶνον ὅτι οὗτος ἔχεινος, Arist. Poet. 1448b12-17); thus the audience in a tragedy is partaking of a philosophical kind of pleasure. Theophrastus seems to have gone further in arguing that a speech is more persuasive if it skips over some things, leaving it to the hearer to grasp or figure out the missing bits; “for by catching on to what has been omitted by you he becomes not just part of your audience [ἀκροατής] but also a witness [μάρτυς] on your side” (συνεῖς γὰρ τὸ ἔλλειψθὲν ὑπὸ σοῦ οὐκ ἀκροατής μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ μάρτυς σου γίνεται, Theophr. fr. 696 Fortenbaugh). Recent work on Philodemus’ treatises concerning poetry has brought to light an important stage in ancient literary theory that had hitherto been all but invisible. While the papyrus fragments are often immensely difficult to read and interpret, and the problem of recovering the argument is complicated by Philodemus’ habit of quoting or summarizing the views of others, it is now possible to identify several different approaches to the problem of the pleasure poetry provides. Some critics called “euphonists” limited poetry’s delight to sounds and rhythmic effects, irrespective of content. As Richard Janko explains in the introduction to his edition of book 1 of Philodemus’ On Poems, Crates of Mallus, the second-century BC critic who was Philodemus’ “intermediate source,” advocated a method of literary judgement . . . in which sound is the sole criterion for excellence in verse. This is the natural excellence of a poem, inherent in the verse and recognized intuitively by the ear. . . . [T]he critic is aware of the content without judging it in itself.37

35 Since the object of tragic mimesis is not human beings but rather a praxis or action, Aristotle does not mean that one can simply point to the object that tragedy represents; this has rather to be the kind of sequence of events that constitutes a plot, which tragedy reduces to its essential lineaments. The playwright Michael Frayn, author of “Copenhagen,” seems to me to capture Aristotle’s meaning well when he writes that the purpose of fictional representation “is surely to make explicit the ideas and feelings that never quite get expressed in the confusing onrush of life, and to bring out the underlying structure of events” (M. Frayn, “‘Copenhagen’ Revisited,” New York Review of Books 49.5 [28 March 2002] 23).

36 I am grateful to René Nünlist for bringing this passage to my attention, and also for other helpful suggestions.

This position is not so exotic as one might suppose. Seamus Heaney has observed:

It is not only a poem’s explicit political concerns and paraphraseable content that need attending to. A précis of the content, for example, takes no account of the literary echoes and allusions which can be fundamental to its poetic energy. In a poem, words, phrases, cadences and images are linked in to systems of affect and signification which elude the précis maker. These underear activities, as they might be termed, may well constitute the most important business which the poem is up to and are more a matter of the erotics of language than the politics and polemics of the moment. 38

Philodemus’ main target, according to Janko, was Pausimachus of Miletus, who held that neither poetry nor prose need be “in accord with the truth”—“a uniquely radical position,” as Janko observes, though some had argued that poetry, as opposed to prose, need only delight and not instruct. 39 According to Janko, this view has its origin in Pythagoreanism and Democritean atomism, and was transmitted to the Stoics by Xenocrates and Heracleides Ponticus. 40

Other critics attacked by Philodemus in book 5 of On Poems “demanded that a poem be morally useful,” 41 while acknowledging that it must also be pleasant; these include Heraclides of Pontus and Neoptolemus of Parium, who had so great an influence on Horace’s Ars Poetica. The Stoics too, or at least those criticized by Philodemus, insisted that the content of poetry be useful. Philodemus will have none of this. He himself held that the combination of sound and content was crucial to poetry, but he denied that casting an argument in poetic form contributed in any way to enhancing its persuasiveness; poetry as such—that is, what poetic form adds to the force of an argument—is morally neutral and hence harmless. In the fourth book of On Music, Philodemus went so far as to argue that musical form “weakens the force of the thoughts” expressed in poetry, 42 precisely to the extent that it induces pleasure in the


39 Janko [37] 168; cf. 188 on Pausimachus as “the most radical of the euphonists.”

40 Janko [37] 173.


42 Asmis [41] 155.
listener, among other things. This is not to say that the thoughts contained in a poem are irrelevant to its artistic quality. As Elizabeth Asmis puts it, “the goodness of a poem consists in the thoughts and diction as fashioned by the poet.”\(^{43}\) These thoughts, moreover, can indeed harm the unwary, but not insofar as they take the form of poetry. In any case, “an Epicurean who is fortified with the correct beliefs would be able to withstand the harm that a poem might do, and so derive nothing but pleasure from a poem’s beauty.”\(^{44}\) Poems as such, then, neither benefit nor harm the reader or audience. All the critics enumerated by Philodemus, as far as one can judge, focused their attention on the quality of the poem or the poet.\(^{45}\) None seems, like Plutarch, to have transferred to the reader or auditor the principal responsibility for the effect of literature.

Plutarch goes on to indicate other means of educing morally positive lessons from poetry, such as attending to whether the words or behavior in question are those of a noble individual and a Greek or rather a base person or barbarian (28e-30c), and taking account of implicit signs that certain behaviors are good or bad; a little later (35a-c), Plutarch quite sensibly recommends that the reader note the kinds of qualities that characters single out when they praise or abuse others. He also proposes some additional interpretive strategies for eking what is useful from even the most intractable poetic text (32e), insisting, however, that such exegeses must be not only edifying but also plausible (πιθανόν, 31f), unlike the word games favored by the Stoics. Still, Plutarch does not stop short of approving the rewriting or “correction” (ἐπανόρθωσις, 34b) of offensive lines, as when Zeno (33d) altered the second verse of Sophocles’ “Whoever journeys to a tyrant / is his slave, even if he arrives free” (ὅστις δὲ πρὸς τύραννον ἐμπορεύεται, / κεῖνον ἵστι δοῦλος, κἂν ἐλεύθερος μόλις, fr. 789) to “is not a slave, if he arrives free” (οὐκ ἐστι δοῦλος, ἂν ἐλεύθερος μόλις, SVF 1.562), or again of applying sententious verses more broadly than they explicitly warrant (ἐπὶ πλέον, 34b) for didactic purposes. Finally, Plutarch suggests that the student be made aware of how statements in the poets coincide with those of philosophers such as Plato and Epicurus (35e-37b), since this will provide confirmation of the poets’ better sentiments (35e-f), thereby elevating poems above the mythic (36d), and will also provide a preliminary training in philosophy itself, accustoming the student to the often startling ideas that philosophers espouse, such as that

\(^{43}\) Asmis [41] 166.
\(^{44}\) Asmis [41] 166.
“death is nothing to us” (ο θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, 37a = Epicurus Ep. Men. 125.5).

Drawing moral lessons from poetry is surely as old as poetry itself, and the kind of constructive exegesis that Plutarch advocates goes back to the fifth century BC and doubtless beyond that. Xenophon offers a good illustration of the practice:

"Εφη δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ ποιητάτα καὶ τοῦτος μαρτυριοὶς χρόμενον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας κακούργους τε εἶναι καὶ τυραννικοὺς. Ἡσιόδου μὲν τὸ Ἐργον δ' οὐδὲν ὑνείδος, ἀεργίᾳ δὲ τ' ὑνειδός.

τούτῳ δὲ λέγειν αὐτὸν, ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς κελεύει μὴνδεόν ἔργον μὴν ἀδίκου μὴν αἰσχροῦ ἀπέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ κέρδει. Σωκράτης δὲ ἔπει διομολογήσασθι τὸ μὲν ἐργάτην εἶναι ὑφέλίμων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐργὸν βλαβερὸν τοις κακοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐργάζεσθαι ἀγαθών, τὸ δ' ἀργεῖν κακὸν, τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ποιοῦντας ἐργάζεσθαι τῇ ἐφῆ καὶ ἐργάτας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ κυβερνητας ἦ τι ἄλλο πονηρὸν καὶ ἐπιζήμιον ποιοῦντας ἁργοὺς ἀπεκάλει. ἔκ τοῦτον ὀρθῶς ἢ ἐξοί τὸ Ἐργον δ' οὐδὲν ὑνείδος, ἀεργίᾳ δὲ τ' ὑνείδος.

(Xen. Mem. 1.2.56f.)

[Socrates’] accuser said that he would select the worst bits of the most reputable poets, and using these as testimony would teach those who associated with him to be criminals and tyrannical; for example, that Socrates would cite the line of Hesiod [Op. 311],

“No work [ἔργον] is a reproach, it is idleness that is a reproach,”
as though the poet were bidding us to refrain from no deed [ἔργον], whether unjust or shameful, but rather to do these things for the sake of profit. But since Socrates fully agreed that a worker [ἐργατής] is good and useful to mankind, whereas an idle person is harmful and a bane, and that to work is good, but to be inactive is bad, he used to say that those who produced something good actually worked and were good workers, whereas those who played at dice or did any other wicked and punishable thing he used to call idle. On this basis it would be correct that

“No work [ἔργον] is a reproach, it is idleness that is a reproach.”

Xenophon goes on to cite another instance involving the Odyssey. People might, then, be held responsible for the use they made of poetic tags. But interpretations like that of Socrates or his accuser are a far cry from Plutarch’s concept of the wary listener, who is protected against the dangers inherent in narrative by the continual exercise of critical vigilance. I do not deny that there is in Plutarch a tendency to make poetry a storehouse of proper opinions concerning virtue and religion. But because he knows that poems must always confound good models with bad, listening or reading is safe only if one is
permanently on guard against the baser insinuations of the work itself. Creating such a disposition in the young is the proper object of education.

John Frow writes: "There are no codes of reading to which there will not correspond (at least potentially) a set of codes of writing." I would like to conclude this paper by considering the possibility that poets beginning at least as early as the Hellenistic period and on down through the Roman Empire composed their poems for just the kind of reader that Plutarch sought to produce. By way of illustration (it is impossible to demonstrate such a proposition, at least on the present occasion), I take as an example a well known controversy in the interpretation of Latin poetry. I refer to the conclusion to Virgil's *Aeneid*, over which the argument shows no signs of abating even though parties on both sides have declared themselves bored with it and have entreated their opponents to surrender once and for all. The issue, of course, is whether Aeneas is justified in taking the life of Turnus, who has publicly admitted defeat and adopted the posture of a suppliant.

As we know, Aeneas slays Turnus in a fit of anger or fury (*ira, furiae, Verg. Aen. 12.946*) inspired by the sight of Pallas' belt, although he was initially inclined to respond to Turnus' plea for pity and spare his life. Is Aeneas being just and practical here, eliminating the leader round whom the enemy might rally and punishing Turnus for the violation of the truce between the Trojans and Latins? Or is he a victim of unreasoning passion, which moves him to take the life of a helpless suppliant? The view that critics have taken of Virgil's own attitude toward Augustus and his regime has often hung on the answer to this question.

A reader of Plutarch will not be surprised at the ethical ambiguity of this passage. For the *Aeneid* to have a plot at all, that is to say, for it be a narrative, it is necessary that its heroes, and indeed its gods too insofar as they involve

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48 It is worth remarking that he does not refuse to return Turnus' corpse to his father (*Verg. Aen. 12.933-36*), as Achilles had done during his duel with Hector (*Hom. Il. 22.337-54*).
themselves in human affairs, both err and be moved by passion. Whatever Aeneas had done in the finale, he would have been acting on emotion, whether anger or pity. The wary reader will know not to take Aeneas as a model, bedazzled by the hero’s great name. Trained to critical evaluation by Plutarch, we will challenge the text, probe it for philosophically acceptable sentiments and actions, which are by no means lacking in the Aeneid, reprove Virgil where he slips, as indeed he must, and debate whether his hero’s motives are good or bad—like Nausicaa’s connubial aspirations—without worrying too much if the text remains indeterminate on this score. Our purpose will not be to fix the meaning of a work or passage, but to exercise our wits and judgment. Knowing this, Virgil would have left clues and cues to a morally positive as well as a negative interpretation, a Galinsky approach no less than a Putnam approach. The ambiguity of the conclusion to the Aeneid, on this view, has less to do with Virgil’s pro- or anti-Augustan sentiments, or even with what Adam Parry called “the two voices of the Aeneid,” than with the fact that Virgil was writing for the kind of critical reader he himself had been trained to be. Virgil did not mean his text simply to transport or bewitch with the charm of the story. He wrote for what we may call an alienated audience, which maintained its distance and took in the narrative through squinting eyes. It was an audience that would talk back to the text just as we do to statements made in real life, citing contrary views and quoting our opponents against themselves. Plutarch’s

50 M. H. Wenglinsky, “Responses to Philosophical Criticism of the Portrayal of the Gods: The Posthomerica of Quintus of Smyrna,” AncPhil 19 (1999) 77-86 argues that Quintus of Smyrna altered traditional stories so as to adapt his account to what the philosophers stipulated as morally correct (cf. especially the narrative of the death of Achilles, 3.26-138). But not even Quintus can have been immune to the intrusion of passionate motives and behavior in human action.


52 Iser [28] 26f. suggests that in the song contests that characterize Virgil’s eclogues, the role of the arbiter is a model for the role of the reader in judging the value or quality of literature.

53 Cf. R. R. Nauta, Poetry for Patrons: Literary Communication in the Age of Domitian (Leiden 2002) 2 n. 3, who remarks of Juvenal’s decision to refer only to deceased people in his satires: “This is not to say that the past is merely an allegory for the present. By making the correspondences neither complete nor exact, Juvenal leaves the responsibility for constructing criticisms of the present with the reader.” Also S. Goldhill, The Poet’s Voice: Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature (Cambridge 1991) 268 on the sense of the word ἐλαφρός (“light in weight”) at Theoc. Id. 2.124: “. . . each reader of this word elaphros makes choices and evaluations according to feelings about what is proper, natural, probable, inherent in the language, the fictions of desire. Each reader tells a story.”
essay is not only a manual but a paradigm of how to read: the student is to learn
to do what Plutarch does, play the game as he plays it and as the sophisticated
discussants in the table-talk compilations of Athenaeus, Aulus Gellius, or
Macrobius—or indeed Plato’s and Xenophon’s symposia (cf. the exegesis of
Simonides in Plato’s Protagoras)—played it as well. To be educated is to know
how to listen actively and critically. For the moral value of a poem lies
ultimately not with the author but with the reader, who with this essay of
Plutarch comes, perhaps for the first time, fully into his own.

54 Note that Macrobius dedicated his book to his son; cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ On
the Order of Words, dedicated to the son of a friend on the occasion of his birthday; so too,
Cornutus begins his treatise with the words, ὁ παῖς ὑμῶν ("O child,” Cornutus Theol. Graec.
1.1). Plutarch too may have intended his treatise to be read not only by the addressee, Marcus
Sedatus, but also by his and Marcus’ sons; cf. D. M. Schenkeveld, “The Structure of
DE INTEGRO CONDERE:
REDISCOVERING NUMA IN LIVY’S ROME

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Abstract. In his history Livy highlights Numa’s religious reforms and his role as a bringer of peace, but he also draws attention to Numa’s use of subterfuge in his reform program. Later he has the praetor Petillius using a religious pretext to justify destroying the contents of Numa’s tomb. Livy constructs both these episodes to invite comparison with Augustus’ reform program and his manipulation of history for ideological and political ends.

Under Augustus Rome reinvented itself. The regime oversaw and fostered a resurgence of interest in the legendary origins and history of Rome as it sought to establish itself not as a radical break with the mos maiorum but as its true instantiation. It was the time to rewrite Rome, the principal rewriter being Augustus himself. He rewrote the Roman constitution, despite assiduous denials in the Res Gestae of doing any such thing, and radically redefined the

1 This paper began life as part of the keynote address given to the 1999 meeting of the Pacific Rim Roman Literature Seminar at the University of Tasmania, Hobart. It was considerably reworked during a period of leave in Cambridge in the second half of 2001. I would like to express my thanks to Keith Hopkins, Vice-Provost of King’s College, for the College’s generous hospitality, to the Faculty of Classics for the use of their excellent library facilities, and to John Henderson for his as always insightful comments on an earlier draft.

2 The statues of Roman heroes in the porticoes of Augustus’ own forum by the temple of Mars Ultor, honouring ‘those who had made the power of the Roman people greatest instead of least’ (qui imperium populi Romani ex minimo maximum redidissent, Suet. Aug. 31.5), constitute a prime example. On the nature of this Roman ‘Hall of Fame’ and the idiosyncratic nature of the elogia that accompanied these statues (themselves index of a propensity on the part of Augustus to rewrite history), see T. J. Luce, ‘Livy, Augustus, and the Forum Augustum’, in K. A. Raaflaub and M. Toher (edd.), Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and His Principate (Berkeley 1990) 123-38 esp. 134: ‘Most striking . . . are the many disagreements not only with Livy but with all other extant sources concerning the achievements of the summi uiri’.

3 On his refusal of dictatorship and perpetual consulship: nullum magistratum contra morem maiorum delatum recepi (‘I accepted no magistracy the holding of which would have contravened the custom of our ancestors’, RG 6; cf. 5). The clincher comes in the comment per consensum uniuersorum potitus rerum omnium (‘by universal consent in control of everything’, RG 6)—carefully avoiding self-contradiction in one sense (this was not a magistracy) but falling right into it in another (this was no constitutional or traditional
concept of *princeps*. He changed the face of the city, via a massive building program sententiously itemised at *Res Gestae* 19-21 and encapsulated in the intendedly memorable *bon mot* ‘I found Rome a city of brick and left it a city of marble’ (*marmoream se relinquere, quam latericiam accepsisset*, Suet. *Aug.* 28.3). And by a systematic use of patronage he created a literary milieu which saw a rewriting of Roman history and the creation of a new national epic embodying a new mythology, the work of a ‘real’ new Roman Homer who was to complete the demolition work begun by Lucretius on the previous claimant to this title. Ennius’ was a poem without end; as Roman history kept unfolding, he would add another book. But now there was an identifiable office)—*rem publicam ex mea potestate in senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli* (‘I transferred the *res publica* out of my domain into the authority of SPQR’, *RG* 6): an oxymoron of staggering proportions (if *publica* then not in Caesar’s control; if in Caesar’s control, then not *publica*: note Scipio’s definition of *res publica*: *est . . . res publica res populi* (*res publica* means something belonging to the people*, Cic. *Rep.* 1.39). The ironic echo of Lucretius’ *ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri* (‘[striving] to come out on top of the pile and gain control of things’, 2.13) only serves to heighten the feeling of disjunction between representation and reality; was Augustus showing himself to be the Epicurean sage, giving up a ‘power’ he really did not want in order to pursue a life of *otium*? What Augustus represents here as the great event of his sixth and seventh consulships is rewritten by Tacitus as *sexto demum consulatu Caesar Augustus, potentiae securus . . . dedit . . . iura quis pace et principe uteremur* (‘finally in his sixth consulship Caesar Augustus, secure in his power [potentiae securus; cf. Augustus’ *ex mea potestate*], gave laws for us to use now that we have peace and *princeps*’, *Ann.* 3.28).

4 For a discussion of ways in which Octavian sought to project himself as Ciceronian *princeps* as a means of diverting attention from the unconstitutional reality, see J. L. Penwill, *Two Essays on Virgil: Intertextual Issues in Aeneid 6 and Georgics 4* (Bendigo 1995) 34-47, n. 19.


6 M. Beard *et al.*, *Religions of Rome 1: A History* (Cambridge 1998) 5: ‘. . . the myths of Aeneas and Romulus were used to define the position of the first emperor Augustus (and were themselves re-told in the process)’. It is the contention of this paper that the ‘myth’ of Numa was similarly rewritten.

7 See esp. *Luecr. 1.112-26*, where Ennius’ dream of Homeric inspiration is adduced as an example of ignorance (the proof will come in books 3 and 4). Lucretius’ epic is of course totally antithetical to Ennius’ celebration of *res gestae*.

culminating point: Vulcan’s propagandistic rewriting of Rome’s history described in the last 100 lines of *Aeneid* 8 begins with the traditional Roman icon of Romulus and Remus suckled by the she-wolf and closes with the new one, Caesar Augustus enthroned above a subject world. The wheel had now come full circle; Rome had a new founder, one who had at one stage contemplated taking the name of the first (Suet. *Aug.* 7.2; Dio 53.16.7) but rewrote himself instead as the emblem of Roman imperial expansion. Romulus, ‘little Rome’, was too small for the number one man in the vast augmentation that had occurred in the seven centuries *ab urbe condita*.

It is not coincidental that the concept ‘new founder’ also features prominently in contemporary rewriting of Roman history. At the beginning of book 2 Livy says that all the kings apart from the last could be regarded as *conditores partium certe urbis* (‘founders of at least parts of the City’, 2.1.2), while Brutus is described as *conditorem Romanae libertatis* (‘founder of Roman freedom’, 8.34.3). Camillus is hailed by his troops as *Romulus ac parens patriae conditorque alter urbis* (‘Romulus, father of his country, second founder of the city’, 5.49.7), terms which the narrator describes as *haud uanis laudibus* (‘by no means meaningless praises’) and repeats in Camillus’ obituary.

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9 On the link between *augustus* and *augeo* (‘grow’), adumbrated in Suetonius (*Aug.* 7.2; cf. Ov. *Fast.* 1.612f.), see P. Hardie, ‘Questions of Authority: The Invention of Tradition in Ovid *Metamorphoses* 15’, in T. Habinek and A. Schiesaro (edd.), *The Roman Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge 1997) 193f. As Hardie (and Suetonius) point out, this is Augustus’ second rewriting of himself; the (relatively) humble C. Octavius C. f. is first rewritten as ‘son of Julius Caesar’ and then as the one whose power has ‘grown’ beyond all previously known limits (to commemorate, as he says [RG 34.2], the fact that he had given it back). Coins of course will show many more rewritings of Octavius in the period between the Ides of March and his taking the Augustus title: *triumvir rei publicae constituendae* (‘triumvir for the settlement of the republic’), *imperator Caesar dii Iuli filius* (‘Caesar son of the divine Julius, proclaimed imperator’), *libertatis populi Romani uindex* (‘champion of the liberty of the Roman people’), *Caesar cos VII ciuibus seruatis* (‘Caesar in his seventh consulship for saving the lives of citizens’). See W. H. Gross, ‘Ways and Roundabout Ways in the Propaganda of an Unpopular Ideology’, in R. Winkes (ed.), *The Age of Augustus* (Providence 1985) 30-36, 46.

10 Plancus, the mover of the senatorial decree conferring the Augustus title, defends it against ‘Romulus’ on the grounds that it is both ‘new’ (*nouo*) and ‘of wider signification’ (*ampliore*): see Suet. *Aug.* 7.2. For those who might feel uncomfortable with the ‘new’ part of this argument, a line from *Ennius noster* is supplied: *augusto augurio postquam inclusa condita Roma est* (‘after by augury august [now read “Augustan”] illustrious Rome was founded’, Enn. *Ann.* fr. 155 [O. Skutsch (ed.), *The Annals of Quintus Ennius* (Oxford 1985)]). The title for this second founder of Rome is already there in the (not yet superseded) national epic. On ‘Augustus’ versus ‘Romulus’ as the renaming of choice, see Beard *et al.* [6] 182-84.
at 7.1.10.\textsuperscript{11} As far as Camillus is concerned, Catharine Edwards rightly connects this accolade with his persuading the Romans not to abandon the city after its near destruction by the Gauls, and relates it to Octavian’s defence of the site of Rome against the rumoured plans of Julius Caesar and Mark Antony to move the capital elsewhere.\textsuperscript{12} But there is another ‘second founder’ that Edwards does not mention. This is Numa Pompilius, second king of Rome, whose objective on his succession is summarised by Livy thus:

\begin{quote}
qui regno ita potitus urbem nouam, conditam ui et armis, iure eam legibusque ac moribus de integro condere parat.
\end{quote}

(Liv. 1.19.1)

In this way he [Numa] got control of the kingship. The new city, founded by force of arms, he prepares to found all over again, this time by justice, laws and traditions.

Numa’s change of direction is certainly part of the tradition. When Scipio gives his historical survey of early Rome in book 2 of Cicero’s \textit{De Re Publica},\textsuperscript{13} he too draws attention to it:

\begin{quote}
... hominesque Romanos instituto Romuli bellicis studiis ut uident incensos, existimauit eos paulum ab illa consuetudine esse reuocandos.
\end{quote}

(Cic. Rep. 2.13.25)

... and as he perceived that the Roman people had been fired up for warlike pursuits by the way of life Romulus had followed, he considered that they should be brought back a little from that particular habit.

But there is a profound difference between Cicero’s \textit{paulum} ... \textit{reuocandos} (‘be brought back a little’) and Livy’s \textit{de integro condere} (‘to found all over

\textsuperscript{11} Cf. the list of other \textit{conditores} given by G. Miles, ‘\textit{Maiores, Conditores} and Livy’s Perspective on the Past’, \textit{TAPhA} 118 (1988) 194f.


again’). The former implies that the Romans had perhaps gone too far in the direction of bellicosity and needed to be reined in a little; the latter that we are starting again from the beginning. There is likewise a profound difference in the approach of the two Numas to the problem of how to deal with these hyped-up warriors. Cicero’s Numa directs his people’s attention to the practice of farming, giving each citizen an allotment of the land conquered under Romulus; and so a clear continuity is set up between the two reigns. Only then does he turn his mind to the religious matters on which the Augustan writers were to lay such heavy emphasis (Cic. Rep. 2.14.26f.). Livy’s Numa on the other hand begins by inaugurating the temple of Janus in order immediately to shut it. He then puts the fear of God into the people (deorum metum iniciendum ratus est, 1.19.4). In order to gain credibility for his religious reforms, he invents the special relationship with Egeria (with whom he pretends to have nocturnos congressus, ‘night-time encounters’, 1.19.5). Livy then goes on to detail Numa’s calendrical and religious reforms; of the land distribution we find in Cicero’s account (backed up by Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.62.4, 2.74, 2.76) there is no mention. One gets the impression that for the whole of Numa’s reign the people were doing nothing but worshipping the gods.

Livy concludes his account of Romulus and Numa as follows:

ita duo deinceps reges, alius alia uia, ille bello, hic pace, ciuitatem auxerunt.14 Romulus septem et triginta regnauit annos, Numa tres et quadraginta. cum ualida turn temperata et belli et pacis artibus erat ciuitas.

(Liv. 1.21.5)

Thus the two kings in succession, each in his own way, the one by war, the other by peace, contributed to the growth of the state. Romulus reigned for thirty-seven years, Numa for forty-three. The state was well-fortified and well-regulated in the arts of both war and peace.

It is clear that we are meant to look on Romulus and Numa not only as a contrasting pair but also as twin founders of the state. In the case of all the other kings their regnal years are given at or near the end of their reigns; in Romulus’ case alone are they postponed to the end of the reign following. This also contrasts with Cicero’s narrative, where the regnal years are given in the normal place. In Cicero each king has his contribution to make in putting Rome on the road to becoming the perfecta res publica: Romulus provided auspicia et senatus (‘auspices and the senate’, Rep. 2.10.17), Numa religio ac clementia (‘religious observance and gentility’, Rep. 2.14.27) and is generally seen as having had a civilising influence. Instead of Cicero’s steady progression from

14 And so by implication were themselves augusti; cf. [9] above.
one king to the next, Livy presents us with a kind of Hegelian antithetical pair, 'Romulus' n' Numa, out of which the synthesis is a Rome well-versed in the arts of both war and peace. Instead of one founder of Rome we are given two.  

On one level Livy's rewriting of the republican account reflects that ideology of entering a new phase of Roman history to which I have already alluded. There is a sense of 'starting over', of making a new beginning, of being in the presence of a 'second founder of Rome'. Augustus contains within himself elements of both Romulus and Numa; his early career was characterised by war and violence (the five bella civilia listed by Suetonius at Aug. 9.1 and the two externa bella in Dalmatia and Spain at Aug. 20.1), and his later career (as he himself draws attention to at RG 13) by peace. As a gesture to this aspect of Augustus' self-imaging, Livy further rewrites the traditional narrative by bringing in a reference to Augustus as, like Numa, a bringer of peace:  

... mitigandum ferocem populum armorum desuetudine ratus, Ianum ad infimum Argiletum indicem pacis bellicae fecit, apertus ut in armis esse ciuitatem, clausus pacatos circa omnes populos significaret. bis deinde post Numae regnum clausus fuit, semel T. Manlio consule post Punicum primum perfectum bellum, iterum, quod nostrae aetati di dederunt ut uideremus, post bellum Actiacum ab imperatore Caesare Augusto pace terra marique parta.  

(Liv. 1.19.2)  


16 Other links between Numa and Augustus are summarised in L. de Blois and J. A. E. Bons, 'Platonic Philosophy and Isocratean Virtues in Plutarch's Numa', AncSoc 23 (1992) 163f., who cite (in addition to the closing of Janus) the fact that 'Numa accepted power only after an initial reclusatio imperii . . . just like Octavian had in 27 BC' (although to term Augustus' 'transfer of power' as a reclusatio seems something of a misnomer). Better is their observation that both Numa and Augustus were 'commonly accepted' as absolute rulers; universally accepted, in fact: Livy's ad unum omnes Numae Pompilio regnum deferendum decernunt ('they all without exception voted that the kingship should be handed over to Numa', 1.18.5) has clear affinities with Augustus' per consensum universorum potitus rerum omnium ('by universal consent in control of everything', RG 34). They also claim a link between Numa's dividing the Roman territory into pagi ('districts') ruled by archontes (magistrates) and Augustus dividing the city into uici ('quarters') ruled by uicomagistri ('regional magistrates'); but this derives from Dionysius (2.76.1), not Livy, and so falls outside the scope of this paper, which is concerned with Livy's rewriting of Numa.
... thinking that the ferocity of the people had to be softened by losing the habit of arms, he made the Janus at the foot of the Argiletum an index of peace and war, so that open it should signify that the state was in arms, shut that all the surrounding peoples had been pacified. Twice since Numa's reign has it been closed, once in the consulship of Titus Manlius after the conclusion of the First Punic War, the second time—and the gods have granted to our age that we should see it—by the victorious general Caesar Augustus after the Actian War, when he had achieved peace by land and sea.

As far as the Janus custom is concerned Livy here follows Varro, in a tradition going back to L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi (cos. 133 BC):

*tertia [sc. porta] est Ianualis, dicta ab Iano, et ideo ibi positum Iani signum et ius institutum a Pompilio, ut scribit in Annalibus Piso, ut sit aperta semper, nisi cum bellum sit nusquam. traditum est memoriae Pompilio rege fuisse opertam et post Tito Manlio consule bello Carthaginiensi primo confecto, et eodem anno apertam.*

(Varro *Ling.* 5.165)
The third [gate] is the Janual, named from Janus, and for that reason the statue of Janus was placed there and the practice instituted by [Numa] Pompilius (as Piso writes in the *Annals*), that it should always be open, except when there was no war anywhere. Tradition has it that it was closed while Numa was king, and afterwards in the consulship of Titus Manlius after the conclusion of the first Carthaginian war, and opened again the same year.

Now it has happened a third time. Augustus ascribes the ritual of closing the temple of Janus to *maiores nostri* (RG 13), while Vergil represents it as being an already existing Latin rite even before the arrival of the Trojans (*Aen.* 7.601-22): a way of saying that its origins are lost in the mists of time. Livy here allocates to Numa a counterbalance to Romulus' establishment of the temple of Jupiter Feretrius as a repository for the *spolia opima* (1.10.5-7) as part of his 'Romulus/War, Numa/Peace' antithesis; this is made yet neater by the fact that the *spolia opima*, arms won in single combat from an enemy commander, had only been won on two subsequent occasions just as the temple of Janus has (now) only been closed twice since Numa's time. But the real function of this episode is to set up the entry of Augustus into Livy's narrative. As the iconic she-wolf suckling Romulus and Remus begins the series of vignettes that culminates in the triumph of Caesar Augustus over the whole world in the version of Roman history that we read on Vulcan's shield, so here a practice is established by Numa in order to be taken up by the same Caesar

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17 The neatness was of course ensured by Octavian's refusal of M. Licinius Crassus' request for the right to dedicate *spolia opima* in 29 BC; discussed below.
Augustus in his role as peacemaker. Augustus-as-Romulus celebrates the triple triumph, recreating Romulus' dedication of the Caenian king's arms to Jupiter Feretrius, the first triumph celebrated in Rome according to Dionysius (2.34); Augustus-as-Numa closes the doors of Janus, recreating Numa's way of putting the genie of war back in the bottle.\footnote{Cf. R. Gordon, 'From Republic to Principate: Priesthood, Religion and Ideology', in M. Beard and J. North (edd.), \textit{Pagan Priests: Religion and Power in the Ancient World} (London 1990) 183f., where Augustus' revival of traditional Roman religious practices is linked to the foundational activities of Numa. Gordon concludes by describing Augustus as 'a neat blend \ldots of Romulus and Numa' (184); Buchheit [13] 95 n. 123; de Blois & Bons [17] 163f.}

The image has important resonances with the one that forms the climax of Jupiter's prophecy to Venus in \textit{Aeneid} 1:

\begin{quote}
aspera turn positis mitescent saecula bellis;
cana Fides et Vesta, Remo cum fratre Quirinus
iura dabunt; dirae ferro et compagibus artis
claudentur belli portae; Furor impius intus
saeva sedens super arma et centum uinctus aenis
post tergum nodis fremet horridus ore cruento.
\end{quote}

\textit{(Verg. Aen. 1.291-96)}

Wars laid aside, the harsh ages will grow gentle; white-haired Faith and Vesta, Quirinus with his brother Remus will give laws; the grim gates of war will be locked with well-fitted iron bolts; inside sacrilegious Violence, seated above his savage weaponry and bound by a hundred bronze fetters, will roar horribly with bloodstained mouth.

Vergil's \textit{mitescent} echoes Livy's \textit{mitigandum};\footnote{From the fact that at 1.19.2 Livy mentions only the post-Actium closing of the temple, and so seemingly is unaware of the next closure which occurred after the suppression of the Cantabrians and the pacification of Spain, it would appear that book 1 at least must have been completed before 25 BC. So Ogilvie [16] 94, 564; R. Syme, 'Livy and Augustus', \textit{HSPh} 64 (1959) 42. Even this is too late a date for some editors: see, e.g., J. Bayet, \textit{Tite-Live histoire romaine} 1 (Paris 1940) xvii-xviii, who argues for an initial publication of book 1 prior to 31 and a revised edition published between 27 and 25; T. J. Luce, 'The Dating of Livy's First Decade', \textit{TAPhA} 96 (1965) 209-40. It is therefore possible (despite the scepticism of Ogilvie [16]) that Vergil may have read Livy's account of the regal period and be alluding to it in this passage. Hence 'echoes', but it is not necessary to read too much into this; echoes are not always conscious ones.} and there is a strong sense here as in Livy's account of not simply making a formal gesture to indicate that the world is at peace, but rather of locking up that impulse towards violence that is the root cause of war. That is what Livy's Numa does by instituting the practice.\footnote{Cf. Plutarch, \textit{Comp. Lyc. Num.} 4.6: \ldots τὸν ἁμφιθυρον οἴκον, δὲν κεκλεισμένον αὐτὸς συνεῖχεν, ὃσπερ ὄντας ἐν αὐτῷ τιθασεύων καθειργμένον τὸν πόλεμον (\ldots the...
Romulus' reign and the first to Numa's: the cults of Vesta and Fides were also Numa's creation. As a final point, we might observe that in Anchises' review of notable Romans waiting to be born, it is Numa, the one of whom it is said *legibus urbem fundabit* ('he will set up the city with laws', *Aen.* 6.810), who is juxta posed to Augustus.

This brings us back to Livy's *iure . . . legibusque ac moribus de integro condere parat* ('he [Numa] prepares to found [it] all over again, this time by justice, laws and observances', 1.19.1). The second king prefigures Augustus in rewriting the city over which he had taken control. He rewrote the calendar, inventing the months of January and February (Ov. *Fast.* 1.43f.; Plut. *Num.* 18.3f.), so changing Romulus' tenfold division of the year with March as the first month into one based on the lunar cycle plus the requisite intercalations (further details at Liv. 1.19.6). This also had the effect of removing the month dedicated to Mars, god of war, from the primary position which it enjoyed in Romulus' reign and replacing it with the one dedicated to Janus; and so the rewriting of the calendar itself becomes an outward and visible sign of his reorientation of Roman *mores*: Numa's Janus replaces Romulus' Mars.

Augustus too rewrote the calendar, which had according to Suetonius become *neglegentia conturbatum atque confusum* ('confused and disordered due to negligence', *Aug.* 31.2) after the Julian reforms, and renamed what Numa had rendered no longer the sixth month after himself. And Livy also credits Numa with using writing to codify his religious innovations, thus literally 'rewriting' Roman religious practices and the duties and functions of those who were to conduct them:

double-doored temple, which he himself had kept closed, as if he had in fact tamed War by shutting him up in there').

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22 See E. Norden (ed.), *P. Vergilius Maro Aeneis Buch VI* (Berlin 1916) 326f.: ' . . . der Kaiser war eben nicht bloß ein *alter Romulus*, sondern auch ein *alter Numa*. Seneca has his *Divus Augustus* arrogate this statement to himself (*legibus urbem fundaui*, 'I set up the city with laws'), as well as Livy's *pace terra marique parta* ('peace having been achieved by land and sea', 1.19.3) in *terra marique pacem peperi* ('I achieved peace by land and sea', Sen. *Apoc.* 10.2).

23 This is certainly the interpretation placed on Numa's reform at Plut. *Num.* 19.5.

24 Cf. Dionysius, *Ant. Rom.* 2.63.4: . . . περιλαμβάνον δὲ ἄκασαν τὴν περὶ τὰ θεῖα νομοθεσίαν γραφαῖς διείλεν [sc. ὁ Νόμας] εἰς ὅκτω μοίρας, ὡσαί τῶν ἱερῶν ἤσαν αἱ συμμορίαι ('... having committed his entire legislation regarding religious matters to writing, he [Numa] divided it into eight sections, as many as there were classes of ritual observances').
pontificem deinde Numam Marcium Marci filium ex patribus legit eique sacra omnia exscripta exsignataque attribuit, quibus hostiis, quibus diebus, ad quae templae sacra fierent atque unde in eos sumptus pecunia erogaretur.

(Liv. 1.20.5)

Next from the senators he chose as pontifex Numa Marcius, son of Marcus, and put him in charge of all religious rites, written out and certified as authentic, showing with what victims, on what days, and at which temples the rites were to take place, as well as the source from which money was to be disbursed to meet the expenses involved.

Rome’s relationship with the divine realm and the principles on which this was to be conducted and preserved were an integral part of her identity. To rewrite these is truly to rewrite Rome.

This is not the last Livy has to tell about Numa’s writings. Included in his account of the year 181 BC is the story of the discovery of Numa’s burial place on the Janiculum (40.29), a story which goes back to L. Cassius Hemina, Piso and C. Sempronius Tuditanus (cos. 129), all writing within fifty or sixty years of the event. In Livy’s version, workmen on the estate of a scriba publicus named Lucius Petillius dug up two stone coffins, each with an inscription in Latin and Greek: one declared that it contained Numa’s body, the other his books. The one purporting to contain the body was completely empty, sine uestigioullo corporis humani autulliusrei (‘with no trace of a human body or anything else’, 40.29.5); in the other were two bundles of books, seven in Latin and seven in Greek, non integrosmodo sed recentissimaspécie (‘not only undamaged but looking like new’, 40.29.6). The seven Latin books were on the subject of the law relating to pontifices, exactly what one might expect of the Numa we met in book 1. The seven Greek ones are said to be de disciplina sapientiae quae illius aetatis esse potuit (‘on a system of philosophy which could have belonged to that period’, 40.29.7), and Livy goes on to quote (with appropriate disclaimer) Valerius of Antium’s assertion that they were

25 This was the principle underpinning Varro’s great work, the forty-one-book Antiquitates Rerum Humanarum ac Divinarum, the virtue of which in Cicero’s words was ‘to enable us to recognise who we are and where we fit’ (ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere, Acad. 1.3.9). Varro equated his achievement with that of ur-Founder Aeneas saving the household gods in the sack of Troy (Ant. Div. fr. 2a [B. Cardauns (ed.), M. Terentius Varro, Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum 1: Fragmenta (Mainz 1976)]; cf. Beard et al. [6] 118).

26 Their accounts are preserved at Plin. HN 13.27.84-87. Pliny’s interest is in the fact that writing on papyrus (chartis) could have lasted so long in such conditions, something he regards as ‘miraculous’ (maioreetiamnummiraculo, 13.27.85).
Pythagorean. The books were passed around and read by various people, eventually coming to the attention of the praetor urbanus, Q. Petillius Spurinus. His view was that much of their content was likely to undermine religious beliefs (dissoluendarum religionum esse, 4.29.11); the matter was put to the Senate, with the praetor declaring that he was prepared to swear an oath that the books ought not to be read or preserved. The Senate ordered them to be publicly burned, which they duly were.

Once again we find that Livy has rewritten the traditional account. In the version of Cassius Hemina as recorded by Pliny the Elder (HN 13.27.86), the scribe’s name is Cn. Terentius, there is only one coffin for both body and books, and the books contain scripta philosophiae Pythagoricae. Varro’s version as reproduced by Augustine is as follows:

Terentius quidam cum haberet ad Ianiculum fundum et bubulcus eius iuxta sepulcrum Numae Pompilii traiciens aratrum eruisset ex terra libros eius, ubi sacrorum institutorum scriptae erant causae, in urbem pertulit ad praetorem. at ille cum inspexisset principia, rem tantam detulit ad senatum. ubi cum primores quasdam causas legisset, cur quidque in sacris fuerit institutum, Numae mortuo senatus adsensus est, eosque libros tamquam religiosi patres conscripti, praetor ut combureret, censuerunt.

(August. De Civ. D. 7.34)

A certain Terentius had a farm near the Janiculum. A labourer of his was driving a plough next to the tomb of Numa Pompilius and unearthed his books, where the principles upon which he had set up his religious rituals had been written down. Terentius took these to the praetor in Rome. After looking at the headings, the praetor referred the matter to the Senate as being of great importance. When the leading senators had read some of the principles that lay behind the formulation of these rituals and their content, the senate moved to support the dead Numa and decreed, as if they really were devout conscript fathers, that the praetor should burn the books.

The name of the farm’s owner is the least of Livy’s changes. In his account there are two coffins instead of one. On the other hand he retains the detail that the finder of the books is a scribe, that is to say a person peculiarly

27 adicit Antias Valerius Pythagoricos fuisse, uulgatae opinioni qua creditur Pythagorae auditorem fuisse Numam, mendacio probabiliter accommodata fide (‘Valerius of Antium adds that they were Pythagorean, thus by a plausible fiction adapting his account to the popular view that Numa had been a disciple of Pythagoras’, 40.29.8). Valerius is thus ‘outed’ as an adherent of this ‘popular view’ (probably originating with Aristoxenus of Tarentum: see discussion in E. Gabba, ‘Considerazioni sulla tradizione letteraria sulle origini della Reppublica’ in E. Gjerstad (ed.), Les Origines de la république romaine [Genève 1966] 154-65, and E. Gruen, Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policy [Leiden 1990] 158-61) that writers of the late republic and early empire were at pains to discredit. See further below.
suited to deciphering and comprehending their content. They achieve considerable circulation before the praetor gets hold of them; and in contrast to Varro's assertion that the discoverer takes them to the praetor, in Livy the praetor has to ask the discoverer if he can borrow them. In Livy it is the praetor who decides they should be burned even before the Senate becomes involved; the Senate takes the praetor's word for it without reading the contents. Petillius insists on this course of action despite the discoverer's objections, motivated by his belief that the books 'are likely to undermine religious belief'.

What are we to make of this? Livy's account has a sense of the mystical about it: neither the total emptiness of the coffin purporting to contain Numa's body (even after five centuries one would still expect skeletal remains in a sealed stone container) nor the marvellous condition of the books ('looking like new') conforms to what one would normally expect. It is as if to emphasise that the man has gone but his ideas are still here, fresh and as new as when they were first conceived, for anyone bold enough to take up the challenge of engaging with them. And some clearly do—until the dead hand of censorship descends upon them. The number of books is also significant; seven of each in Livy's version. The number seven has intimate associations both with Rome (seven hills, seven kings, from which derives the significance attached to it in the new national epic), and with Pythagorean ritual (Apul. Met. 11.1; Macro. In Somn. 6.45ff.), thus implying that very link between the second founder of Rome and one of the more mystical Greek philosophical systems which Livy's earlier narrative was at pains to deny (1.18.24). Seven Latin books on Roman religious practices, seven Greek ones on philosophical doctrines 'that could have been held at the time'; the equal number is also both mysterious and significant. One of the inferences we are surely invited to draw is that for every Latin rite there is a Greek philosophical underpinning; in other words, Numa's Roman religion is not Roman at all but Greek. In a year of yet another praetorial inquiry into the Bacchanalia cult suppressed five years before, itself

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28 The tradition of seven books each in Greek and Latin goes back to Piso. Hemina has only three books in total (although III sitos is Mayhoff's conjecture for the manuscript's insitos), Tuditanus an unspecified number of 'Decrees of Numa', and Valerius of Antium twelve Latin books on pontifical matters and twelve Greek praecepta philosophiae continentes ('containing philosophical doctrines').

29 Seven ships surviving omni ex numero and seven stags killed by Aeneas: Aen. 1.170-93; seven years wandering since the fall of Troy: Aen. 1.755f. and 5.626; seven coils for the serpent-omen: Aen. 5.85; seven heifers and seven sheep to be sacrificed as a preliminary to entering the underworld: Aen. 6.37-39.

30 See F. E. Robbins, 'The Tradition of Greek Arithmology', CPh 16 (1921) 100-02.

31 See further below.
index of ongoing cultural anxiety, there were now books circulating which purported to prove that the rituals by which the authorities set such store were themselves foreign imports, that Numa's rewriting of Rome was based not on native understanding of the nature of divinity derived from communion with a Latin nymph and Latin Muses as Livy has him suggest but rather on a Greek philosophical system, one which 'could have belonged to that period'. Figures from the past invested with mythic significance as 'founders' have too important a place in the national consciousness for the ruling elite to allow some chance archaeological find to foster doubts about the role in which

32 For the cult and its suppression, see Liv. 39.8-19; for this latest inquiry, 40.19.9f. One might also see a link back to Cato's complaint that the ornamenta plundered from Athens and Corinth are diverting attention away from traditional Roman terracotta cult objects; there is a danger that these native gods, so far propitious, will cease to be so if we allow them to be supplanted by foreign ones: 34.4.4; on which cf. Feldherr [5] 42f.

33 That the Bacchanalia case accounts for the senate's decision to burn the books discovered in Numa's tomb is argued by K. R. Prowse, 'Numa and the Pythagoreans: A Curious Incident', G&R 11 (1964) 36-42. Prowse also argues that the 'discovery' was a hoax staged by adherents of Pythagoras to prove the authenticity of their beliefs. Gruen [28] 163-70) argues that the whole affair was orchestrated by Petillius and his scribe with the connivance of the Senate in order to assert Rome's cultural independence from Greece; the public ritual was an elaborate device intended to exorcise Numa's Hellenism and reclaim him as Roman. The details in Livy's account can certainly be accommodated to a hoax—the empty coffin, the 'as new' condition of the papyrus (cf. A. Willi, 'Numa's Dangerous Books: The Exegetic History of a Roman Forgery', MH 55 [1998] 149)—but the tone of the narrative does not suggest that this is the way Livy is leading us. A plausible reason is offered for the empty coffin (per tabem tot annorum omnibus absumptis, 'everything having been eaten up by decay over so great a number of years', 40.29.5), and the philosophy contained in the Greek books is consistent with the era in which they were allegedly composed (disciplina sapientiae quae illius aetatis esse potuit, 'on a system of philosophy which could have belonged to that period', Liv. 40.29.7). I cannot therefore agree with Walsh's comment on recentissima specie ('looking like new') that '... here Livy registers scepticism about the origin and authenticity of the documents' (P. G. Walsh, Livy Book XL [Warminster 1996] 150); nor is there any justification for Ogilvie's [16] 90 assertion that they were 'judged spurious'. In fact, as Willi [above, this note] 146, 149 also observes, not only did the Senate at the time (at least on the face of it) accept that the documents were genuine but later writers also do not avail themselves of the hoax theory to explain this incident. Does the empty coffin suggest that Numa, like his predecessor, has been translated into another realm? (This possibility clearly occurred to Lactantius, so his version of the story [Gai. Inst. 1.22.5-8] has the king's body firmly in the coffin; there can only be one empty tomb for the Christian writer.) At all events, concomitant with Numa's self-projection as a companion of Egeria and the Camenae (which Livy certainly does regard with suspicion) an aura of mystery hangs over the tomb of the second king of Rome.
tradition has cast them. So with Numa; the Senate accepts the praetor's evaluation and condemns the founder's words to public book-burning. For Livy it is another link in a chain of deception that has been associated with Numa right from the start. In order to get his reforms accepted, Numa pretended to have a relationship with a goddess; his posthumous attempt to set the record straight is stymied by a conservative praetor in the name of that very national integrity which Numa's reforms were designed to underwrite.

There are teasing ambiguities in Livy's narrative. The writings of Numa whose importance to Rome's foundation he emphasised back in book 1 now fall victim to the politics of cultural identity. The burning was carried out by the uictimarii, religious officials whose normal role was to perform the actual killing of sacrificial animals. The only other record of a uictimarius' action in Livy occurs in the account of the unfavourable omens associated with the allocation of consular provinces in 176, the consuls in question being Cn. Cornelius and none other than Q. Petillius. This uictimarius testified that a liver 'disappeared' (iocur defluxisse, 41.15.1); Cornelius on going to see for himself reports that it was 'consumed by unnarratability' (inenarrabilitate

34 The response of the Roman authorities to the discovery of Numa's books is analogous to that of the Catholic Church to the Turin Shroud. The fact that the Shroud contains an imprint of Jesus' body should make it the most revered Christian relic; but because it could also be used to argue that Jesus did not die on the cross but was taken down alive and revived, it was in 1988 declared to be a forgery. (That at least is the conspiracy theory: see H. Kersten and E. R. Gruber, The Jesus Conspiracy [Shaftesbury 1994]. Conspiracy theories abound about the incident we are discussing, too; see previous note.)

35 As the consul Sp. Postumius Albinus reminds the people in his speech on the Bacchanalia 'conspiracy', book-burning is one of the tasks 'assigned to the magistrates' (magistratibus datum) to counter un-Roman religious activities (Liv. 39.16.8). Willi [34] 146f. sees in this particular example an attempt at ritualistic expulsion of evil in which the whole community participates in order to maintain national identity, but given that we are dealing here with a text a narratological interpretation seems more appropriate. It might be tempting to associate Petillius' action with Augustus' clean-out of . . . quidquid fatidicorum librorum Graeci Latinique generis nullis uel parum idoneis auctoribus uulgo ferebatur ('. . . whatever anonymous or dubiously authored prophetic books of Greek and Latin origin that were circulating among the public', Suet. Aug. 31.1), undertaken after he became pontifex maximus in 13 BC, which involved the burning of over 2000 such volumes. But as Suetonius' narrative makes clear, this was done to ensure that the Sibylline Books should retain their primacy as the repositories of Rome's fate; the others are rejected because of their questionable authenticity. No such allegation is made about the documents Petillius had burned; no matter what kind of reconstruction we put on this event, the problem as Livy represents it is that they were too authentic.

36 On the role and function of uictimarii, see Beard et al. [6] 362f.

37 So manuscript V; some editors opt for difluxisse ('dissolved').
absumptum, 41.15.2).\(^{38}\) Is this ‘liver consumed by unnarratability’ the gods’ response to the consul who as praetor rendered the founder of Roman religion unreadable? Is it perhaps also the historian’s response to this ideologically motivated destruction of written records from the distant past, the paucity of which he complains of in the preface to book 6?\(^{39}\) And as we read on we find that Q. Petillius was later this same year killed in an action against the Ligurians after ignoring the unfavourable auspices displayed by the sacred chickens (41.18.11-14).\(^{40}\) Petillius’ behaviour here would not appear to be that of a man whose earlier defence of traditional religious practice was motivated by personal belief. Was this because his own religio had been dissoluta by reading those Greek papyrus rolls?

Numa’s religious reforms as Livy writes them are, like Petillius burning his record of them, calculated policy. He invents the ritual associated with the temple of Janus (even if he does not build it himself). His decision to put the fear of god into the people is designed, as Duncan Kennedy observes,\(^{41}\) as a measure of social control; its efficacy is secured by deception:

\[
\ldots\text{positis externorum periculorum curis ne luxuriarent oti animi, quos metus hostium disciplinaque militaris continuerat, omnium primum, rem ad multitudinem imperitam et illis saeculis rudem efficacissimam, deorum metum iniendum ratus est. qui cum descendere ad animos sine aliquo commento miraculi non posset, simulat sibi cum dea Egeria congressus noctunos esse} \ldots
\]

(Liv. 1.19.4f.)

... so that their spirits, which fear of the enemy and military training had kept in check, might not run riot in the relaxed atmosphere created by the removal of external threats, he decided that his first objective must be to instil the fear of the gods into them. This was the most effective measure for dealing with

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\(^{38}\) Again this is the reading of V, for which editors adopt Kreyssig’s less interesting inenarrabili tabe, ‘in putrefaction too horrible to relate’. If the text must be emended (and as will be obvious I am not convinced that this is the case), Frobenius’ inenarrabiliter (‘in a way that made it unreadable’) would make better sense.

\(^{39}\) ... quod paruae et rarae per eadem tempora litterae fuere (... ‘because written records during this same period were insignificant and scanty’, 6.1.2). The action of the Roman authorities as Livy relates it might be compared to those of the Taliban in Afghanistan, whose destruction in March 2001 of the ancient Buddha statues marking the silk route caused such outrage in the West.

\(^{40}\) One of the positions that Petillius was attempting to force was called Letum. His declaration that ‘hodie ego Letum utique capiam’ (‘today I shall get Letum’) was of course also seen as ominous, and became famous enough to feature at Val. Max. 1.5.9.

the ignorant and in those days uncouth masses. Since he would not be able to get down to their level without feigning something miraculous, he pretended he was having nightly assignations with the goddess Egeria . . .

And later Livy describes a grove with a stream flowing through it to which Numa withdraws _uelut ad congressum deae_ (‘as if for a meeting/assignation with the goddess’, 1.21.3). Egeria was entrenched in the tradition:

_ollī respondit suauis sonus Egeriāi . . ._

_(Enn. Ann. fr. 113)_

To him the sweet sound of Egeria replied . . .

Ennius’ terminology suggests a disembodied voice, as if Numa is discerning meaningful sounds in the tinkling brook that Egeria actually was. Varro gives a more rationalist account, accentuating the visual as opposed to the aural; for him, Numa is engaged in hydromancy, a form of divination in which one stares into water to see and learn from the images of the gods discernible therein. By a typically Varronian piece of etymologising, he derives her name from the verb _egerere_, meaning ‘to draw off’; for the purpose of his divination Numa ‘drew off’ some water from the spring which thereby got its name, and from this arose the legend of Numa’s relationship with the goddess Egeria. But to rationalise is not the same as to propose that Numa’s system and the means he used to persuade the people to accept it was nothing more than an exercise in social manipulation, imposed on a gullible populace by a ruler whose true beliefs were quite other than the ones he promulgated. Varro may explain ‘Egeria’ as

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42 Further trickery employed by Numa to deceive the upper classes as well is recorded by Dionysius (Ant. Rom. 2.60.4-7) and Plutarch (Num. 15.2): he summoned the leading citizens to his home and showed them how sparsely furnished it was and unsuited for any kind of lavish entertainment, and then invited them all to dinner that evening; when they turned up, they were presented with a banquet such that in Dionysius’ words _οδός ἐν ἑκ πολλοὶ πάντες _χρόνον παρασκευάσσον τινὶ τῶν τότε ἀνθρώπων ῥάδιον ἕν (‘it would not have been easy for anyone in those days to have prepared even if given a long time to do it’, Ant. Rom. 2.60.7). Numa clearly had access to a first-rate group of caterers; his guests depart convinced that he must have had divine assistance.

43 Skutsch [10].

44 For Varro’s account of Egeria, see August. De Civ. D. 7.35 (citing De Cultu Deorum). Augustine, in his own rewriting of Rome and Numa’s role in Rome’s religious history, reports that what Numa saw was not a prophet of God or a holy angel but _ludificationes daemonum_ (‘the trickery of demons’); and that this was what he wrote down in the books that he ordered to be buried, his motive for so ordering being the fear of what he had discovered.
hydromancy, but this does not suggest that what is revealed to Numa by this means is untrue, only that the means were misunderstood. Likewise Cicero in framing his own legislation in the *Laws* begins with laws regulating religious beliefs and practices, to the extent that Quintus remarks *non multum discrepat ista constitutio religionum a legibus Numae nostrisque moribus* (‘your religious system does not differ much from the laws of Numa and our own customs’ *Leg.* 2.10.23); but in introducing them Cicero maintains that the purpose is to guide the citizens’ minds towards the truth. This indeed is ‘useful’ for maintaining a respect for law and order in general (see 2.7.16 and 2.10-11.26, this latter passage citing Pythagoras in support), but it is not ‘false’.45 It is the Augustan writers, Livy and Dionysius, who rewrite Numa as a cynical manipulator of a gullible populace. Numa has to ‘descend to their level’ (*descendere ad animos*, Liv. 1.19.5) and ‘fabricate something miraculous’ (*commento miraculi*, Liv. 1.19.5); then they will believe anything.46 That for Livy is the source of the Egeria myth.

But Livy (in book 1 at any rate) is equally dismissive of the alternative theory, that Numa’s theological expertise derived not from Egeria but from Pythagoras. In this he agrees with Cicero who in *Republic* 2 is most emphatic on that point, having Manilius pose the question whether what he has heard from his elders as received tradition, that Numa was a pupil of Pythagoras, is in
fact true. Scipio replies that it is absolutely false, using a chronological argument to show that Pythagoras came to Italy some 140 years after Numa's death. Manilius rejoices that a long-held error has finally been corrected: we can now rest assured that Roman culture is truly Roman (Cic. Rep. 2.28f.; cf. Tusc. 4.1.2f., De Orat. 2.37.154). Livy is similarly insistent: even if the chronology were correct (which it isn't), how could the Greek Pythagoras have communicated with the Sabine Numa over so great a distance and so radical a language barrier (Liv. 1.18.2f.)? Dionysius likewise notes that 'many writers' report that Numa studied philosophy under Pythagoras at Croton but refutes this on the grounds not only that Numa lived a long time before Pythagoras but also that Croton itself was not founded until the fourth year of Numa's reign (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.59). It is clear that in the late republic and early empire the tradition of Greek philosophical influence on the establishment of Roman religion was not just being rewritten but written out—destroyed like the disturbing Greek manuscripts from Numa's tomb, which Cassius Hemina, Piso and Valerius of Antium all unite in designating Pythagorean. Roman institutions are to be Roman: *mos maiorum*, the custom of our (Latin) ancestors. For Livy Numa's learning is derived neither from Egeria nor Pythagoras, but from the 'grim and severe learning of the ancient Sabines, at one stage the least corruptible of any people around' (*disciplina tetrica ac tristi ueterum Sabinorum, quo genere nullum quondam incorruptius fuit*, 1.18.4). The Sabine people had been integrated into the Roman state through the deal done between Romulus and Titus Tatius after the rape of the Sabine women; Rome is now to incorporate Sabine religious lore as well. This is what it is to be Quirites.

Given the firm stance Livy takes on this issue at the beginning of the first pentad, it is odd to find him undermining his position at the close of the eighth. That we are meant to remember his earlier account of Numa when the coffins and their contents are unearthed is suggested by a verbal echo: in book 1 Numa is described as *consultissimus uir ut in illa quisquam esse aetate poterat omnis diuini atque humani iuris* ('a man as deeply versed in all human and divine law as anyone of that time possibly could be', 1.18.1); the Greek rolls found in the second coffin are *de disciplina sapientiae quae illius aetatis esse potuit* ('on a system of philosophy which could have belonged to that period', 40.29.7). More than a century before Thales this presumably would have consisted in the

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47 Plutarch, for whom Numa is very much a Platonic philosopher ruler, would dearly love the story to be true, and at the outset of his biography draws attention both to a certain Clodius' assertion that all Roman dating prior to Camillus is suspect because the records were completely destroyed when the Gauls sacked the city and to the unreliability of Hippias' records of Olympic victors on which the chronological arguments are based (Plut. Num. 1).
kind of theological/cosmological ideas associated with the names of Hesiod, Musaeus and Orpheus, which would exactly correspond with the interests tradition ascribes to Numa. But the implication of Livy's narrative (as opposed to modern reconstructions of 'what really happened in 181 BC') is that there must have been a clear indication in these documents that (a) Numa derived much of his knowledge from Greek rather than native Sabine sources; and (b), he did not himself believe in the religious system that he imposed upon his subjects. The ideology of cultural identity might be sufficient to account for the public burning; but the subsequent behaviour of Petillius suggests that he did not believe in the religious system he was so ostentatiously upholding any more than Numa had in the first place.

What then is the force of the Numa exemplum in Livy's 'exemplary history'?  

hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod uites.

(Liv. praef. 10)

This is what is especially healthy and fruitful in coming to an understanding of events, that you get to look at all kinds of examples you can learn from, set out and highlighted on a monument; there you may garner for yourself and your res publica things to imitate, there too find and so avoid what is foul from beginning to end.

Here the 'address to the reader' switches from third (quisque . . . intendat animum, 'let each give attention to', praef. 9) to second person, the only occasion in the whole preface where the direct form of address is used. Is this

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48 For some examples of such reconstructions see [34] above.

49 This phrase is of course borrowed from Jane D. Chaplin, Livy's Exemplary History (Oxford 2000); Chaplin introduces her work with the prefatorial quotation that follows (as does Feldherr [5]).

50 The switch to second person is noted by J. Moles, 'Livy's Preface', PCPhS 39 (1993) 152; but Moles sees it as 'a direct personal appeal to the individual . . . so framed as to overturn the distinction between self-interest and national interest'. Cizek perceives a 'crescendo' from the plural legentium ('readers', praef. 4) through quisque ('each one', 9) to te . . . tibi tuaeque ('you . . . for yourself and your', 10) (E. Cizek, 'À propos de la poétique de l’histoire chez Tite-Live', Latomus 51 [1992] 356: 'Nous y décelerions volontiers un crescendo, un climax, car Tite-Live part de “chacun” pour aboutir à toi, le lecteur et à tua res publica, “ton État”.'). Moles [above, this note] 158f. later notes the further switch to the first person plural in the concluding section 13, suggesting that it sets up a relationship between writer and audience: I who am about to write, you who are about to read, both of us are undertaking a great task. But if the reader in question is the imperial one, then the phrase nobis
the ‘imaginary reader, and so the public’ as Edwards suggests?\textsuperscript{51} Or is it a particular person imagined as reading, one for whom learning the lessons of history would be more salubre ac frugiferum (‘healthy and fruitful’) than for any other? When we read tibi tuaeque rei publicae (‘for yourself and your res publica’) surely we must think of one who was himself later to write that the res publica was so much in his possession that he was able to give it back (rem publicam ex mea potestate in senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli, RG 34).\textsuperscript{52} And so the preface—this part of the preface—is quite capable of being read as addressed to the new founder, the deeds of whose avatars at the original foundation are about to be presented to him on a monumentum inlustre. But imitation or avoidance is hardly the issue. Augustus’ deeds are already themselves history; what the historian is constructing here is a model not as paradigm but as image. Like Vergil’s Aeneas, Livy’s Numa is there to show us his rewriter telling Augustus something about himself.

There is of course a positive side. Augustus inherited an empire whose militarism had turned in upon itself; violence was to give way to peace, as Jupiter’s prophecy in Aeneid 1 spells out. The moral decline to which Cicero and Sallust among others lugubriously draw attention will be arrested by a revival of the values that made Rome great; in particular, a religious revival, as the temples that had fallen into disrepair are restored and the old cults falling into disuse revived (legibus nous me auctore latis multa exempla maiorum exolescentia iam ex nostro saeculo reduxi, ‘by new legislation which I sponsored I brought back many exemplary practices of the ancestors which were dying out in our time’, RG 8.5). But as with Numa, the authority of Augustus is founded on deception. Numa invented nightly assignations with Egeria, setting up for the purpose that pleasant grove with her stream flowing through it. Augustus invents a similarly cosy relationship with Apollo, constructing a temple of this god next to his house on the Palatine complete with connecting ramp.\textsuperscript{53} This is the new new founder’s commentum miraculi, to

\textit{... oris tantum operis} (‘for us who have embarked upon so great a task’) takes on a new dimension: both of us are in our own way rewriting Rome. On parallels between Livy’s historiographic undertaking and the activities of Augustus, see Feldherr [33] 35-37.


\textsuperscript{52} For translation and commentary refer back to [3] above. The phrase \textit{rei publicae tuae} (‘your res publica’) recurs at Sen. Clem. 1.5.1, where the \textit{tu} is Nero.

\textsuperscript{53} Zanker [5] 51; cf. 44-53 for a good account of Augustus’ manipulation of this and other links with the divine.
be celebrated (after a fashion) in Propertius 4.6 and on Aeneas’ shield at Aeneid 8.704f. and to become an integral part of the regime’s public ideology. The portrait of Numa constitutes the historian’s wry comment on the mendacity of this claim. The closing of Janus’ temple which brought Augustus into the narrative at 1.19.2 carries its own irony: we thank the gods (which Numa devised for us) that we have seen the third celebration of this ritual (which Numa invented). But this expression of newly discovered pietas fails to counterbalance the pessimism of a preface whose survey of Roman history ends not with Vergilian Vulcan’s image of Augustus triumphant but with Rome in a state of utter moral bankruptcy:

... deinde ut magis magisque lapsi sint [sc. mores], tum ire coeperint praecipites, donec ad haec tempora quibus nec uitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus peruentum est.

(Liv. praef. 9)

[Then let the reader attend to]... how our morals have collapsed further and further, and then begun to fall headlong, until we reach our own time where we can endure neither our vices nor their remedies.

The great renovator is powerless to halt the collapse of this edifice, no matter how often or loudly he may claim to be doing so. Neither moral legislation nor temple reconstruction will achieve their objectives, because the so-called vices have become ingrained in the upper-class lifestyle and the people at whom they are aimed are no longer the dullards of Numa’s time but wealthy, urban and sophisticated.54 The old Sabine incorruptibility is way out of fashion:

forsitan immundae Tatioregnante Sabinae
noluerint habiles pluribus esse uiris;
nunc Mars externis animos exercet in armis,
at Venus Aeneae regnat in urbe sui.

(Ov. Am. 1.8.39-42)

Could be in Tatius’ reign those unkempt Sabines
balked at being easy for a plurality of men;
but now Mars expends his spirit in overseas campaigns,
while Venus reigns in the city of her Aeneas.

Likewise:

54 On Livy’s pessimism with regard to the moral revival that the regime claimed to have effected, see E. Gabba, ‘The Historians and Augustus’, in F. Millar and E. Segal (edd.), Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects (Oxford 1990) 79f.
at nunc, exaequet tetricas licet illa Sabinas,
    imperat ut captae, qui dare multa potest.

(Ov. *Am.* 3.8.61ff.)

Nowadays she can ape the ‘grim Sabinesses’ all she likes;
    the big spender will catch her, she’ll do what he tells her.

Horace *Odes* 3.6 and Ovid’s *Ars Amatoria* will reinforce the point, as will the
behaviour of the two Julias, Augustus’ daughter and granddaughter. As much
as Octavian might claim that he is inspired by the austere and cerebral cult of
Apollo\(^{55}\) as opposed to the debauched Bacchus of his civil war opponent, and
as much as he might lay claim to the traditional Roman virtues of *virtus,*
*clementia,* *iustitia* and *pietas* (*RG* 34.2), any attempt to reimpose the values of
old King Numa on a Rome that is now the capital of the Mediterranean world is
doomed to failure. Nobody believes in the gods any more, anyway (*Liv.*
3.20.5).

The reappearance of Numa in book 40 also has its message for our
imperial reader. As the story is told in Livy, what survived for posterity were
two coffins, one mysteriously empty and the other containing equal numbers of
books in Greek and Latin. First we have the *exemplum* of Petillius, for whom
the prospect of the all-too-legible documents discovered in the coffins being
disseminated in the community and so undermining faith in the religious system
that underwrote its values and beliefs was so threatening that he ordered them
to be destroyed. Augustus too had problems with the past, particularly his
actions in the period following the Ides of March (the massacre at Perusia, the
proscriptions, the destruction of the ‘liberators’ at Philippi). As Ahl aptly puts
it, Augustus’ solution was to make the perpetrator of these acts disappear:

If Brutus and Cassius could successfully claim to have restored the republic by
murdering the victorious Caesar, perhaps he could achieve precisely the same
rhetorical point by destroying himself, or rather his identity. His best ploy
might be to suggest that nothing at Rome was changed as the result of his
victory [at Actium], and that the agent of victory, Octavian, no longer really

\(^{55}\) ‘The Temple of Apollo . . . was an indication of the rationality and rigour of the Roman
nation, which had made Rome great, and counteracted the irrationality of the East’ (W. Eder,
‘Augustus and the Power of Tradition: The Augustan Principate as Binding Link between
Republic and Empire’, in Raaflaub and Toher [2] 119). Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* will add its
own twist to this Apollonian ideology as Augustus’ god in a frenzy of *amor* pursues Daphne
from Parnassus to Thessaly, in the end forcing her metamorphosis into the bay leaves with
which a grateful senate wreathes the doorposts of the house next door to his temple on the
Palatine (*Met.* 1.562-65; cf. *RG* 34.2). Cupid is not to be suppressed; this is his revenge on
those who attempt to write up Apollo’s (Actian) bow as more powerful than his (*Met.* 1.452-73).
existed. So, his victory assured, and Rome securely under his control, Octavian simply vanished. In his place appeared Augustus, a kind of divinely spiritual adjective.\textsuperscript{56}

Octavian’s is the empty coffin; the documentary evidence contained in the other certainly existed (there were thirteen books \textit{de uita sua} which covered the period down to 26 BC: Suet. \textit{Aug.} 85.1),\textsuperscript{57} but disappears in a ‘bonfire’ of spin and propaganda (his illegal raising of an army and march on Rome in 44 was ‘liberating the republic from the tyranny of a faction’, \textit{RG} 1; Philippi was ‘avenging the murder of my father’, \textit{RG} 2)—or oblivion: as Eder and others have noted, the period between Philippi and Actium is virtually ignored in the \textit{Res Gestae}.\textsuperscript{58}

There is another example of Augustus rewriting history of which Livy purposefully makes us aware. In 437 BC a military tribune, A. Cornelius Cossus, became the second person to win the right to dedicate \textit{spolia opima} in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius after killing the Veian king Tolumnius. In 29 BC the proconsul of Macedonia claimed the same right after killing the Bastarnian king, Deldo; this was denied by Octavian on the grounds that he was not, in Dio’s words, \textit{αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός} (‘general with supreme command’, 51.24.4)—that is, he was not head of state, the \textit{dux} under whose auspices the war was being waged (Liv. 4.20.6). The political reasons for this refusal are clear enough; Octavian did not want his triple triumph so significantly upstaged by his consular colleague of the previous year (triumphs were common enough, but \textit{spolia opima} had only been won three times \textit{ab urbe condita}, and on the first occasion by the \textit{conditor} himself; it would not do to have someone else muscling in on ‘second founder’ status). In order to provide grounds for the rejection, Octavian had to eliminate the precedent whereby they had apparently been won by a mere tribune. After narrating the exploits of \textit{tribune} Cossus in 4.19 and his dedication of the spoils at 4.20.1-4, Livy adds a long footnote


\textsuperscript{57} Fragments are collected in H. Peter, \textit{Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae} 2 (Leipzig 1906) 54-64. Gabba [54] 62 argues that the \textit{Life of Augustus} by Nicolaus of Damascus, generally assumed to have been published between 25-20 BC, ‘... was a free paraphrase of Augustus’ work [sc. the \textit{de uita sua}], adapted to the point of view of the eastern part of the empire’. Another example of ‘equal number of books in Greek and Latin’? And then there were the ‘Greek and Latin’ sections of the library attached to the Temple of Apollo on the Palatine (Suet. \textit{Aug.} 29.3; further on this below).

\textsuperscript{58} Eder [55] 72.
(4.20.5-11) to the effect that despite unanimity among his sources\(^59\) that this is the correct version of these events and despite the fact that ancient records place Cossus’ consulship seven years later in a time of plague when no wars at all were fought, there is evidence from another source which proves them all wrong:

\[\ldots\] titulus ipse spoliis inscriptus illos meque arguit consulem ea Cossum cepisse. hoc ego cum Augustum Caesarem, templorum omnium conditorem aut restitutorem, ingressum aedem Feretriouis, quam uetustate dilapsam refecit, se ipsum in thorace linteo scriptum legisse audissem, prope sacrilegium ratus sum Cosso spoliorum suorum Caesarem, ipsius templi auctorem, subtrahere testem.

(Liv. 4.20.6f.)

\ldots the notice written on the spoils itself proves against them [sc. all other writers] and me that it was as consul that Cossus won them. Since I heard this from Augustus Caesar, founder or restorer of all our temples, who said that he himself had gone into the temple of Jupiter Feretrius (which he repaired as it was falling into ruin with age) and read what was written on the linen breastplate, I thought it verging on sacrilege to deprive Cossus of such a witness to his spoils as Caesar, the builder of that very temple.

Livy leaves no doubt in the reader’s mind that he has been ‘leaned on’ to insert this retraction.\(^60\) He has signally failed to rewrite the surrounding

\[^{59}\text{Ogilvie [16] 563 claims that this is not strictly true, since other sources must have placed this incident in 426 when Cossus was military tribune with consular power—the version given at Val. Max. 3.2.4 and Serv. A. 6.841. However this sounds not like information derived from a separate tradition but a revisionist attempt to bring the divergent accounts of Livy and Augustus together: Livy says Cossus was military tribune, Augustus says he was consul, we know there was another major war with Veii in the year Cossus was military tribune with consular power, so this must have been the war in which Cossus killed Tolumnius. As 4.32 shows, Livy will have none of this. (It wouldn’t have helped Augustus’ case anyway, because in 426 Cossus was not fighting as quasi-consul but as Master of the Horse.)}\]

\[^{60}\text{Luce [20] 211-17, in a long discussion of this passage, argues that it was a later insertion, implying that this is sufficient to account for the inconsistencies. But whether later insertion or not the inconsistencies have been left glaringly conspicuous, and this can scarcely be unintentional. If Augustus is right then this whole period of history needs to be rewritten, as Cossus’ victory over Tolumnius could not have taken place in the year or the circumstances in which all Livy’s ‘regular’ sources say that they were. Cf. P. G. Walsh, ‘Livy and Augustus’, Proceedings of the African Classical Association 4 (1961) 30: ‘The reader is left with the clear realisation that the literary sources are united against Augustus’ “evidence”.’ Miles [16] 40-47 in his discussion of this passage suggests that Livy (and we as readers) is (are) confronted with two versions between which it is impossible to decide. But Livy does ‘decide’; his narrative continues to rely on the sources on which he has based his}\]
narrative to conform to this new version, and at 4.32.4 pointedly repeats the assertion that it was as military tribune that Cossus won these spoils. In playing the part of a second Numa, founding and restoring temples, Augustus is already engaged in ‘rewriting’; in this passage he is actually described as auctor (ipsius templi auctorem). Was he also auctor of the inscription he alleges he read? Did the historian go and check for himself—or would that be another kind of sacrilegium? Who is it really who is running the risk of lying in the presence of Jupiter and Romulus, those haud spernendos falsi tituli testes (‘witnesses of false inscription not to be despised’, 4.20.11)? Which do we believe—what Augustus claims he read on the ‘linen breastplate’ in the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius, or what Licinius Macer read on the ‘linen annals and lists of magistrates’ in the Temple of Juno Moneta (4.20.8)? Despite the lip service that Livy pays to the correctness of this revised version (all coniectura is now uana, 4.20.11), the tone of the passage invites scepticism. And ‘exemplary history’ plays its part here too: the triumph narrated at 4.20.1-4 is meant to be that of the dictator whose name we have almost forgotten (Mamercus Aemilius from 4.17.9), but all eyes are on Cossus and his dedication of spolia opima; the soldiers in their songs ‘eqautes eum Romulo, 4.20.2). Octavian certainly wasn’t going to have his party ‘spoiled’ in the same way, and history is rewritten in order to prevent it.

Secondly there are the Greek and Latin books, with their now never-to-be-read message that seemingly called into question the Romanness of Numa’s religious innovations. Livy’s account of Numa in book 1, as we have seen, vigorously attacks the tradition that the first refounder was a pupil of Pythagoras, and so aligns himself with Octavian’s Romano-centric ideology. But even as Livy continued to compose his ab urbe condita Roman story, another rewriting of ancient history was taking place. Dionysius was in Rome construction of Roman history throughout. Miles’ [16] 39f. own implied linking of this to the Ascanius/Iulus ‘controversy’ at 1.3.2, which casts doubt on the Julian family’s claim to be descended from Aeneas, suggests that what we have here is not an aporetic outcome.

61 Given the context in which it occurs, it is hard not to read sacrilegium as ironic. However, E. Mensching, ‘Livius, Cossus und Augustus’, MH 24 (1967) 24-29 takes it as signifying Livy’s ‘große Verehrung des Princeps’ (25) and expressly rejects the idea that it is in any way ‘ironisch’ or ‘spöttisch’ (29).

62 Miles [16] 43 observes the repetition of ‘linen’ as pointing up the contrast between these conflicting accounts. On Moneta’s connection with the Greek Μνημοσύνη as repository of the collective ‘memory’ of Rome’s past, see A. Meadows and J. Williams, ‘Moneta and the Monuments: Coinage and Politics in Republican Rome’, JRS 91 (2001) 33-37.

63 That this was Augustus’ motive in making his ‘discovery’ known is argued by Ogilvie [16] 563f. and Syme [20] 44f.
writing his prequel to Polybius, playing Halicarnassian Herodotus to Polybius’ ‘scientific’ Thucydides, filling the gap that his predecessor had put in the ‘too hard’ basket:

Debe Integro Condere: Rediscovering Numa in Livy’s Rome, J. L. Penwill

This tilt at Polybius’ much-vaunted πραγματεία (‘analysis’) points up the fact that the earlier Greek historian of Rome failed to apply his historical acumen to the most important part of Roman history of all: the origin of the nation, knowledge of which allows one to understand what it really is about the Romans that has enabled them to achieve so much. It is in fact their Greekness, but not in the sense of ‘influence’, a makeover of Graecia capta ferum uictorem cepit et artis / intulit agresti Latio (‘captured Greece took captive her fierce conqueror and brought the arts to rustic Latium’, Hor. Ep. 2.1.156f.). Dionysius like Livy rejects the Pythagoras-Numa relationship; he too will have none of these chronological impossibilities. He does not need Pythagoras, because his analysis of Roman antiquities proves (to his satisfaction) that Romans are descended from Greeks anyway (1.60.3): their culture is already Greek as their language is a dialect of Greek (1.90.1); they have lived like Greeks ab urbe condita (ἐκ παντὸς οὗ συνοπτισθησαν χρόνου βίον Ἑλλήνα ζώντες, 1.90.1); and in particular close examination of their religious practices will show their Greek origin (7.70-73). Even the word aborigines that Cato used to denote their earliest inhabitants (Cato Orig. fr. 5 Peter), which to a Latin speaker would clearly derive from ab origine (‘from the beginning’) and imply autochthony, is actually derived from the Greek ἀπ’ ὀρέων (‘from the mountains’) and reflects the fact that they came from the mountains of Arcadia (1.13.3); autochthony is dismissed as an erroneous view put forward by some unnamed writers (1.10.1).
So the Augustan period like Numa’s will produce both a Greek and a Latin story, one from either end of the Palatine library. Dionysius gave his work the same title as his Greek rendering of Varro’s Antiquitates, "Ἀρχαιολογία" (1.14.1); and like Varro prefaced his work with a book that, in Augustine’s words, communiter prius de omnibus loqueretur (‘was to give a general overview about everything first’, De Civ. D. 6.3). Book 1 is the key to Dionysius’ reconfiguring of Varro’s road-map. The Latin/Augustan ideology of separate cultures with separate racial identities (see, e.g., Verg. Aen. 1.282-85, 6.847-53; Hor. Ep. 2.1.156ff.) is rejected; the assimilation of Trojans and Latins does not create a new Italian master race (as envisaged in the deal done between Juno and Jupiter at Aen. 12.819-42) because both Latins and Trojans are of Greek origin (1.60ff.). Numa is a Sabine; the Sabines are as they are not because of native character but because of an admixture of Spartan blood (2.49.4ff.). It is from the Spartans that they acquire τὸ λιτόδικατον καὶ παρὰ πάντα τοῦ βίου σκληρόν (‘plain living and austerity in all aspects of life’, 2.49.5), Dionysius’ version of Livy’s disciplina tetrica ac tristis (‘grim and severe learning’, Liv. 1.18.4). There are ways in which Dionysius’ Numa images Augustus just as Livy’s does: for example he is careful to preserve all the religious practices instituted by Romulus (1.63.2), his innovations being additions to rather than replacements of established ritual (the combination of conservatism and innovation claimed at RG 8.5); and among the first of these innovations is the deification of his predecessor (1.63.3ff.). But in the larger picture the Greek version of ab urbe condita is diametrically opposed to Livy’s Latin account of moral decline; it is rather the story of a people—a Greek people—come into its own, fulfilling the potential that was there at the beginning (1.90.1).67 Praetor Petillius may have tried to destroy the evidence in the case of Numa; but Livy, by the time he was writing book 40, was clearly aware that another story was being written parallel to his own in which the message of those suppressed Greek scrolls is openly argued, despite its continuing divergence from official ethnic orthodoxy. Augustus, if descended from Aeneas, is Greek too.

67 For fuller discussion of the ideology that underpins Dionysius’ history, see Gabba [66] 190-216. As Gabba [66] 211f. notes, Dionysius does not ignore the issue of moral decline, particularly in the last century of the republic (see, e.g., the remarks on C. Gracchus at 2.11.3 and the general disruption caused by the activities of tribunes at 10.35.2); but his pointed reference to Augustus’ καταλυθήσαν τὸν ἐμφύλιον πόλεμον (‘putting an end to civil war’, 1.7.2) as the time of his arrival in Rome suggests that all this is now behind us, the tribunician power is now properly exercised, and Rome’s domination is both deserved (1.5) and exercised by those whose natural tendency is πρὸς φιλίαν ζῆν (‘to live in a civilised manner’, 1.90.1).
Finally there is also a message for the future. One of Augustus’ major building projects, largely completed by 28 BC (Suet. Aug. 100.4), was the Mausoleum, a bid by the emperor to recreate in Rome one of the seven wonders of the world as part of his declaration that as far as he was concerned this was to remain the world’s capital.\(^{68}\) What Augustus would leave behind was an empty tomb (since as Suetonius and Dio both record, the body was cremated) and an inscription setting out his achievements, the contents composed by himself (Suet. Aug. 101.4), which was carved in bronze and set up at the entrance to the Mausoleum. The Res Gestae did not suffer the indignity of book-burning, but their version of what Augustus thought were his greatest achievements were in a later age to be skilfully twisted by another historian with his own ideological axe to grind.\(^{69}\) Here perhaps we do have an exemplum that constitutes a warning: whatever remains in your tomb (and you will no doubt see to it that it looks as though you too have been magically transported to another realm)\(^{70}\) will be unable to speak, and whatever you choose to say about yourself in the writings you leave behind will be subject to manipulation by future generations who will seek to distort or destroy them for their own ideological purposes. Inenarrabilitas awaits you too.

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\(^{68}\) On the significance of the Augustan Mausoleum, see Boyle [5] 37.


\(^{70}\) nec defuit uir praetorius, qui se effigiem cremati euntem in caelum vidisse iuraret (‘nor was their lacking a former praetor who swore that he had seen the image of the cremated one going up into the sky’, Suet. Aug. 100.4). Script as written by Livy for Proculus Julius, whose role in certifying the death and translation of Romulus is narrated at 1.16.5-8 with the concluding remark mirum quantum illi viro nuntianti haec fides fuerit (‘Amazing how much credence was given him when he told this tale’). See H. Petersen, ‘Livy and Augustus’, TAPhA 92 (1961) 443.
'EITHER WITH US OR AGAINST US':
THE PARThIANS IN AUGUSTAN IDEOLOGY

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Abstract. Parthians loomed large in the Julio-Claudian mind. Since revenge against the Parthians is such a powerful symbol of the Augustan regime, we can expect reaction to the idea in the literature of the time. When it comes to literature, we can gauge the degree of co-operation of an author by his tone in mentioning the Parthians and the proposed campaigns against them.

The necessity and virtue of war against the Parthians was a basic tenet of belief for the Julians and their supporters. Both Julius Caesar and his heir, Augustus, repeatedly planned expeditions against the Parthians. Julius, in fact, was planning such an expedition, on which Octavian would join him, at the time of his death in 44 BC, as Suetonius reports: de tuendo ampliandoque imperio plura ac maiora in dies destinabat . . . mox Parthis inferre bellum per Armeniam minorem (‘for the protection and expansion of the empire, he planned more and greater things every day . . . soon [he planned] to wage war against the Parthians through lower Armenia’, Suet. Iul. 44.3). Suetonius repeats the statement in his life of Augustus: Caesare . . . expeditionem in Dacos et inde Parthos destinante (‘with Caesar planning an expedition against the Dacians and thence against the Parthians’, Aug. 8.2).

The motive most often expressed for these plans was revenge against the Parthians for the death and humiliation of Crassus and the taking of the standards which he carried. This was certainly the perceived goal of Augustus’ pursuit of the Parthians: Parthi quoque et Armeniam uindicanti facile cesserunt et signa militaria, quae M. Crasso et M. Antonio ademerant, reposcenti reddiderunt (‘The Parthians easily yielded to him when he claimed Armenia, and they gave back the standards that they had taken from Marcus Crassus and Marcus Antonius when he asked’, Suet. Aug. 21.3). Revenge for his former colleague in the First Triumvirate was obviously important to Julius Caesar, and when he died Octavian took over the plans as part of his pietas (‘duty’) regarding his adopted father. Augustus emphasised in his Res Gestae the importance of his conquest of the Parthians, especially as revenge for previous Roman humiliations at their hands: Parthos trium exercitum Romanorum spolia et signa reddere mihi supplices amicitiam populi Romani petere coegi (‘I forced the Parthians to return the spoils and standards of three Roman armies and to seek the friendship of the Roman people as suppliants’, RG 29.2). The return of
the standards is shown on the cuirass of the Prima Porta Augustus, and was obviously important to Augustus and all the Romans, but the humiliation of the Parthians in effecting the return of the standards became part of the Augustan mythology and iconography. It is also depicted on three different denarii minted by Augustus in 19 BC, showing a kneeling Phraates offering up the standards, and is recalled by Horace: *ius imperiumque Phraates Caesaris accepit genibus minor* (‘Phraates accepted the law and command of Caesar, humbly on his knees’, Hor. Epist. 1.12.27f.). Earlier, Horace was even more emphatic in showing the humiliation of the Parthians, and implied that Augustus actually stripped the spoils from the Parthian temples himself, in order to return them to their proper place in Rome: *signa nostro restituit Ioui derepta Parthorum superbis postibus* (‘he restored the standards, having been stripped from the arrogant doorposts of the Parthians, to our Jove’, Hor. Carm. 4.15.6-8).

Augustus’ motives of pietas and revenge are especially demonstrated in the fact that spoils from the Parthians, and the returned standards themselves, were on public display in Augustus’ forum. The importance of revenge, especially, is clear from the fact that the standards and spoils were housed in the temple of Mars the Avenger: *(ea autem signa in penetrali quod est in templo Martis Ultoris reposui* ‘Those standards I deposited in the inner shrine of the Temple of Mars the Avenger’, RG 29.2). The same is reported by Cassius Dio: *ἀμέλει καὶ θυσίας ἐπ’ αὔτοις καὶ νεών Ἀρεως Τιμωρὸν ἐν τῷ Καπιτωλίῳ . . . πρὸς τὴν τῶν σημείων ἀνάθεσιν . . .* (‘he ordered sacrifices because of them [the standards], and ordered a temple of Mars the Avenger in the Capitoline . . . in which the standards were to be placed’, 54.8.3). Dio makes it seem as if the temple of Mars Ultor existed solely for the housing of the Parthian standards, emphasising that vengeance upon the Parthians had been a major motivation in Augustus’ actions. The revenge theme in the Parthian triumph is also reinforced by the numismatic evidence, as various coins minted.

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1 One of these coins is pictured in G. K. Galinsky, *Augustan Culture: An Introductory Interpretation* (Princeton 1996) 156 fig. 72. All three are included in the catalogue compiled by J. P. A. van der Vin, ‘The Return of the Roman Ensigns from Parthia’, BABesch 56 (1981) 122.

soon after the return of the standards depict Mars holding the standards in a temple that is labelled as that of Mars Ultor.\(^3\)

But even after the Parthians had returned the standards, the family of the Caesars apparently still considered it necessary to punish the Parthians, as in 1 BC Augustus sent his grandson Gaius off on yet another Parthian campaign. This campaign is discussed by Cassius Dio (55.10.18) and commemorated in a propempticon by Antipater of Thessalonica (Anth. Pal. 9.297). Ovid (Ars Am. 1.177-228) presents the expedition and expected triumphant return of young Gaius as an occasion to be celebrated, and one that will provide a holiday for all Rome.

Wars against the Parthians were obviously of great importance to the Julian family, and came to be identified as one of the priorities of the regime. Since revenge against the Parthians is such a powerful symbol of the Augustan regime, we can safely expect reaction to the idea in the literature of the time. When it comes to creative literature, we can actually gauge the degree of cooperation of a particular poet by his tone in mentioning the Parthians and the proposed campaigns against them. For those who supported the Caesars and their plans tended to agree that the Parthians were frightening and dangerous, and that they must be stopped. Perhaps those who accepted the justice and necessity of the Parthian expedition adopted this tone from Julius Caesar himself, who believed that the Parthians were to be approached with caution: *nec nisi ante expertos adgredi proelio* (‘nor were they to proceed to battle until they had reconnoitred well’, Suet. Iul. 44.3). Julius Caesar’s political supporters also approved the idea of the Parthian campaign: *Lucium Cottam quindecimuirum sententiam dicturum, ut, quoniam fatalibus libris contineretur, Parthos nisi a rege non posse uinci, Caesar rex appellaretur* (‘Lucius Cotta was going to pronounce the opinion of the quindecimvirs, that, since it was contained in the sacred books that the Parthians could not be conquered except by a king, Caesar should be called king’, Suet. Iul. 79.3). There is more here than simple flattery of Caesar: there is an expression of belief that defeating the Parthians is right and necessary, and a task worth changing the Republic for.

Those who wished to flatter and please Augustus certainly joined in treating the defeat of the Parthians as a great feat and a worthy cause: . . . καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ περί τῶν Πάρθων γράμματα ἠλθεν, ἦς τε τοὺς ὅμοιος αὐτὸν ἔξ ἱσου τοῖς θεοῖς ἐσχάρασθαι (‘. . . when the letter came about the Parthians, they included him in the hymns equally with the gods’, Cass. Dio 51.20.1). And Rich sees in Dio’s record of official response to the bloodless

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\(^3\) Rich [2] 71-128 discusses these coins, minted in Spain and Pergamum, in the context of his discussion of the Mars Ultor temple, and includes illustrations. They are found also at Van der Vin [1] 122 nos 7 and 8 (= RIC nos 281-85, 288).
victory over the Parthians yet more evidence of senatorial sycophancy. For in recording the decree of the temple of Mars Ultor, Dio notes that the temple was to be like that of Jupiter Feretrius (κατὰ τὸ τὸ θείος τὸ τοῦ Φερετρίου ζήλωμα, in imitation of that of Jupiter Feretrius', Cass Dio 54.8.3). Rich believes that this was decreed by the Senate, rather than by Augustus himself, as was reported by Dio, and that this senatorial decree was meant to identify Augustus with Romulus, who had dedicated the temple of Jupiter Feretrius to receive the spolia opima, which he himself had taken from a conquered foe. By decreeing such a temple in that place and on that pattern, the senate would seem to agree with Augustus' long sought association with Romulus, and agree that retrieving the Parthian standards was a feat that made Augustus truly a Roman hero.

Since the priests and politicians have fallen into line so nicely with the official opinion about Parthians, it is no wonder that among the poets, too, the Caesarian clan has its supporters in this 'crusade'. Thus Horace, a staunch supporter of Augustus and Augustanism, firmly believes in the importance of Parthian wars, describing the Parthians as a very imminent threat, looming over Latium itself, and he, like the priests mentioned by Dio, writes that a triumph over the Parthians merits deification:

\[
\text{gentis humanae pater atque custos,} \\
\text{orte Saturno, tibi cura magni} \\
\text{Caesaris fatis data: tu secundo} \\
\text{Caesare regnes.} \\
\text{ille seu Parthos Latio imminentes} \\
\text{egerit iusto domitos triumpho . . .} \\
\text{(Hor. Carm. 1.12.49-54)}
\]

Father and guardian of the human race, seed of Saturn, to you is given by fate the care of great Caesar: may you rule with Caesar as your vice-regent, Whether he leads in just triumph conquered Parthians, threatening Latium . . .

It is highly unlikely that the Parthians could ever threaten Latium, or that they even thought of it, but Augustus' reputation as the saviour of Rome seems to

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have demanded that the Parthian threat loom over Rome.\footnote{Cf. R. G. M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, \textit{A Commentary on Horace: Odes 1} (Oxford 1970) 166 \textit{ad} Hor. \textit{Carm.} 1.12.53: \textit{... autocratic governments commonly seek popular support by exaggerating the dangers of foreign enemies}. Nisbet and Hubbard also indicate the incursions by the Parthians into Roman territory (the invasions of Syria after Carrhae in 53 BC, and again in 41-40 BC), which could, by some stretch of the imagination, be interpreted as threats against Rome and Latium. S. Mattern, \textit{Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate} (Berkeley 1999) 187 suggests instead that the threat to Latium lay \textit{... in the loss of face and the appearance of weakness suffered by Rome [sc. as a result of the defeats and incursions by the Parthians]}.} The harm that the Parthians obviously mean to Rome is reiterated in \textit{Epode} 7, Horace’s condemnation of civil war: \textit{... ut secundum uota Parthorum sua urbs haec periret dextra} (‘... in accordance with the prayers of the Parthians this city may destroy itself with its own right hand’, Hor. \textit{Epod.} 7.9f.). A similar sentiment appeared earlier in the first book of the \textit{Odes}, where Horace lamented the self-destruction of the Romans, when they had enough enemies elsewhere:

\begin{quote}
\begin{verbatim}
audiet ciuis acuisses ferrum,
quo graues Persae melius perirent,
audiet pugnas uitio parentum
rara iuuentus.
\end{verbatim}
\end{quote}

(Hor. \textit{Carm.} 1.2.21-24)

Scarce youth will hear that the citizens have sharpened their swords, the sword with which dangerous Parthians should better have perished, he will hear of quarrels from the sin of his parents.

Repeatedly in Horace’s lyric poetry we find a supporter of Augustus emphasising not only what a great feat conquest of the Parthians would be, but also what a just and necessary deed. In a later book of \textit{Odes}, Horace again presents the Parthians as an enemy greatly to be feared, were it not for the saving presence of Augustus: \textit{quis Parthum paueat \ldots incolumi Caesare?} (‘who would fear the Parthian \ldots if Caesar is safe?’, 4.5.25.27). In the second book of \textit{Odes} Horace includes the Parthians among the things to be most feared in the world (after, of course, malicious trees that fall on unsuspecting landowners): \textit{[timet] miles sagittas et celerem fugam Parthi} (‘The soldier fears the arrows and the swift flight of the Parthians’, 2.13.17f.). He later presents pestering the Parthians as one of the most noble deeds a young Roman can accomplish:

\begin{quote}
\begin{verbatim}
Angustam amice pauperiem pati
robustus acri militia puer
\end{verbatim}
\end{quote}
"Either with Us or Against Us:" The Parthians in Augustan Ideology, C. U. Merriam

condiscat et Parthos feroces
uexet eques metuendus hasta ...

(Hor. Carm. 3.2.1-4)

Let the boy, strong from harsh service, learn
to calmly suffer hardship.
Let him, as a fearsome horseman,
learn to harass the fierce Parthians with his spear ...

Vergil also considered defeating the threatening forces of the East to be one of the best things Augustus could accomplish. In the prayer which ends Georgics 1, Caesar is asked to bestir himself on behalf of the Romans because both east and north are threatening: hinc mouet Euphrates, illinc Germania bellum ('from here the East moves war, from there Germany', 1.509). Vergil repeatedly presents the Parthians as dangerous and frightening, comparing the sudden and shocking flight of the newly generated bees to the swarming of Parthians in battle:

... donec ut aestiuis effusus nubibus imber
erupere, aut ut neruo pulsante sagittae,
primae leues ineunt si quando proelia Parthi.

(Verg. Georg. 4.312-14)

... they burst out like a storm poured forth from summer clouds,
or like the light arrows from the twanging string
when the Parthians first go into battle.

Vergil repeats the image, making it even more dire, in the Aeneid, where the descent of one of the Dirae is compared to the arrows of the Parthians:

... illa uolat celerique ad terram turbine fertur.
Non secus ac neruo per nubem impulsa sagitta,
armatum saeui Parthus quam felle ueneni,
Parthus siue Cydon, telum immedicabile, torsit,
stridens et celeris incognita transiliit umbras ...

(Verg. Aen. 12.855-59)

... she flies, and is carried to earth on a swift whirlwind,
like an arrow sent through the cloud from its string,
which a Parthian has sent, armed with the gall of harsh poison,
(a Parthian or a Cydonian), an incurable missile,
hissing and swift, it passes unseen through the shadows ...

The Parthians are themselves made to seem more fierce and frightening with this image, as they are made the standard by which the dire and frightful Child of Night is judged. And Vergil has already provided us with a description of the terrible nature of these Dirae, which is frightening enough in itself:
dicuntur geminae pestes cognomine Dirae,
quas et Tartaream Nox intempesta Megaeraem
uno codemque tulit partu, paribusque reuinxit
serpentum spiris uentosaeque addidit alas.
hae loius ad solium saeuique in limine regis
apparent acuantqve metum mortalibus aegris,
si quando letum horrificum morbosque deum rex
molitur, meritas aut bello territat urbes.

(Verg. Aen. 12.845-52)

They say there are two monsters by the name of Dirae,
which deadly Night bore at one birthing with Tartarean Megara,
and surrounded them all with similar coils of snakes,
and added wind-driven wings.
These appear at the seat of savage Jove and on the doorstep of the king
and they hone the terror of sickly mortals,
if ever the king of the gods sets in motion horrible death or diseases,
or war against deserving cities.

These descriptions of the comparanda, and of the Parthians themselves,
take on more significance when we recall that Vergil has already mentioned war
against the Parthians, and given it a measure of importance, in Aenied 7. For the
gates of the temple of Janus are to be opened when the Romans are setting off to
war, particularly for some good reason, for example, Parthos reposcere signa
(to reclaim the standards from the Parthians', Aen. 7.606). War against the
Parthians, especially for the purpose of reclaiming the standards, is implicitly
 contrasted with the unjustified war which Latinus is forced to declare in Aeneid
7, immediately following the description of the gates of Janus. By contrast to
this war so terrible that Latinus cannot bring himself to open the gates (abstinuit

tactu pater auersusque refugit / foeda ministeria, et caecis se condidit umbris,
' the father refrained from the touch, and, turning away, fled, and hid himself
from such a foul deed in the blind shadows', 7.618f.), those Vergil mentions as
justification for opening the gates are obviously just and right. Clearly, moving
against the Parthians is a worthy endeavour. For this reason Vergil included
triumphs over the Parthians among the subjects for the proposed monument in
Georgics 3. The monument itself will be a celebration of Caesar and his greatest
accomplishments (in medio mihi Caesar erit templumque tenebit, 'In the midst I
will have Caesar, he shall hold the shrine', 3.15), and will thus include his most
memorable triumphs. The defeat of Parthians will be chief among these:

addam urbes Asiae domitas pulsumque Niphaten
fidentemque fuga Parthum uersisque sagittis;
et duo rapta manu diuerso ex hoste tropaea
bisque triumphatas utroque ab litore gentis.

(Verg. Georg. 3.30-33)
I shall include conquered cities of Asia, and the beaten Niphates, and the Parthian trusting in flight and the backward arrow; and two trophies torn from the hand, with the foe being scattered and peoples granting twin triumphs from two shores.

This view of the Parthian expedition is common among the Augustan poets. For, in general, as far as Horace is concerned, defeating the Parthian ‘threat’ is one of the greatest of Augustus’ accomplishments:

*quaeque uos bobus ueneratur albis*
*clarus Anchisae Venerisque sanguis,*
impetret, bellante prior, iacentem
*lenis in hostem.*
*iam mari terraque manus potentes*
*Medus Albanas timet securis,*
*iam Scythae responsa petunt, superbi
*nuper et Indi.*

(Hor. *Carm. Saec.* 49-56)

And grant whatever the descendant of Anchises and Venus entreats, with white oxen, triumphant over those who war but lenient to the fallen foe. Now the Parthian fears the band, mighty on land and sea, and the Alban axes, now the Scythians and Indians, recently proud, seek a response.

Horace goes on in the hymn to identify these victories as responsible for the regeneration of all that is good at Rome:

*iam Fides et Pax et Honor Pudorque*
*priscus et neglecta redire Virtus*
audet apparetque beata pleno
*copia cornu.*

(Hor. *Carm. Saec.* 57-60)

Now faith and peace and honour and old-fashioned purity and neglected virtue dare to return, and blessed plenty appears with full horn.

The defeat of the Parthians, and the other barbarians with whom they are associated, is, in Horace’s mind, one of the greatest civilizing deeds of his time, and indeed the chief source of Augustus’ well-deserved fame: . . . *praesens diuus habebitur / Augustus adiectis Britannis / imperio grauibusque Persis* (‘Augustus will be considered a god among us because of the Britons and the
formidable Persians added to our empire’, *Carm.* 3.5.2-4), and that fame will extend throughout the earth:

... non qui profundum Danuuium bibunt
edicta rumpent Iulia, non Getae,
non Seres infidie Persae,
Non Tanain prope flumen orti...

(Hor. *Carm.* 4.15.21-24)

... those who drink from the deep Danube
will not break the Julian law, nor the Getae,
nor the Seres, nor the faithless Persians
nor those raised beside the Tanais...

The law brought to the world by Caesar, that is, by Augustus, brings peace and subdues all the threats to Roman peace and happiness. Defeating the Parthians, besides removing the immediate threat that loomed over Latium, was an important part of civilizing the whole world.

An important issue is raised by Horace’s repeated reference to the Parthians as either *Medi* or *Persae*. Nisbet and Hubbard identify *Persae* as simply a grandiose expression for the Parthians, ‘... whose empire included the territory of the Persians’. Garrison has suggested that Augustan authors call the Parthians ‘Medes’ and ‘Persians’ in order to dramatize the struggle of the Romans against these eastern enemies. Garrison’s suggestion seems sensible. Extrapolating from it, we can suggest that, in effect, the authors who refer to Parthians in this way seek to equate their battle with the great battles of the unified Greeks against the Persian invaders. Thus the glory attendant upon the history of the Greek wars with the Persians, and the fame accorded the battles by Aeschylus and Herodotus, would be transferred to the Roman struggles against eastern forces as well. In addition, the actual threat which the Greeks faced in the invasion by the Persians would now colour the Roman perceptions of the distant Parthians. In short, portraying the Parthians as the equivalent to Rome of the Greeks’ Persian enemy glorifies those Romans who fight against the Parthians, and the man who leads the struggle. The coincidence that Gaius’ expedition to the east in 2 BC took place in the same year as a mock naval battle representing the Greek defeat of the Persians, as described by Ovid in the *Ars Amatoria* (modo cum belli navalis imagine Caesar / Persidas induxit Cecropiasque rates: ‘when recently Caesar introduced the Persian and Athenian ships in the representation of a naval battle’, 1.171f.) may indicate that

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Augustus himself wanted to promote the same heroic connection. In this case, it is interesting that Horace calls the Parthians Persians and Medes, but Propertius never does.

For the love elegists, noted for their resistance to Augustus and, especially, his moral ideas, view the ‘Parthian threat’ very differently.¹⁰ Propertius treats the Parthian wars as emblematic of war in general, and the greed that prompts wars. In elegy 2.7, for example, in which Propertius rejoices so openly at the defeat of one of Augustus’ moral initiatives, a triumph over the Parthians is presented as the unworthy reason for an unworthy piece of legislation: unde mihi Parthis natos praebere triumphis? (‘wherefore should I provide sons for Parthian triumphs?’, Prop. 2.7.13). The line condemns the proposed Parthian campaign, and indeed any Parthian war, still more strongly in its deliberate ambiguity.¹¹ For Parthis triumphis could imply ‘triumphs by the Parthians’, rather than ‘over them’, and be a grim reminder of Roman failures against the Parthians, especially that of Crassus. The ambiguity is removed in elegy 3.4, in which Propertius openly mentions Crassus’ defeat and the humiliation of a Roman army at the hands of the Parthians: Crassos clademque piate (‘expiate the Crassii and the slaughter’, Prop. 3.4.9). Propertius is also very clear in his values and terminology in elegy 2.14, in which he claims that his amatory conquest of Cynthia is a greater cause for triumph than a Roman general could achieve for conquering the Parthians: haec mihi deuictis potior uictoria Parthis . . . (‘This is a more powerful victory for me than conquered Parthians . . .’, Prop. 2.14.23). The statement is a clear challenge to Augustan values, as not only the Parthian campaign, but also the triumph itself, a sacred rite much valued by Augustus,¹² is being denigrated and subordinated to Propertius’ amatory adventures. Parthian campaigns are again subordinated to love in elegy 3.12, in which Propertius chides Postumus for choosing war over love: tantine ulla fuit spoliati gloria Parthi, / ne faceres Galla multa rogante tua (‘was any glory of a conquered Parthian worth so much, when Galla was asking you so often that you not do this?’, Prop. 3.12.3f.).

Propertius does seem, occasionally, to approve and praise the princeps’ efforts against the Parthians, as in elegy 2.10: iam negat Euphrates equitem post terga tueri / Parthorum et Crassos se tenuisse dolet (‘now the Euphrates

¹⁰ Mattern [7] 186 takes the opposite view: ‘. . . in the twenties BC, Horace and Propertius look forward to victories in Parthia that will restore Rome to its pristine state of virtue’.


¹² To the extent that he eventually limited its celebration to members of his own family, as noted by F. D. Harvey, ‘Cognati Caesaris: Ovid Amores 1.2.51-52’, WS 17 (1983) 89f.; G. K. Galinsky, ‘The Triumph Theme in Augustan Elegy’, WS 3 (1969) 77.
declines to guard the horseman shooting over the backs of the Parthians, and grieves that it holds the Crassi', Prop. 2.10.13f.). This apparent praise of Augustus’ martial accomplishments loses its force, however, when the poem in which it appears is examined as a whole. For elegy 2.10 is essentially a recusatio: although Propertius begins by agreeing that it is time to praise Caesar and his victories, in the end he decides that his talents are simply not suited to the topic:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{at caput in magnis ubi non est tangere signis,} & \\
\text{ponitur haec imos ante corona pedes;} & \\
\text{sic nos nunc, inopes laudis conscendere carmen,} & \\
\text{pauperibus sacris uilia tura damus.} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Prop. 2.10.21-24)

But where it is not allowed to touch the head of great statues, this crown is placed at the foot; so I now, unable to mount a song of praise, give cheap incense as a pauper’s sacrifice.

The epic, like the victories, is entirely hypothetical, and their mention cannot be regarded as demonstrating serious approval of the hypothetical victor.

The same issue arises in elegy 4.6, in which Propertius seems to applaud Caesar’s Parthian initiatives, along with other military adventures of the princeps:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ingenium potis irritat Musa poetis:} & \\
\text{Bacche, soles Phoebô fertilis esse tuo.} & \\
\text{ille paludosos memoret seruire Sygambros,} & \\
\text{Cepheam hic Merôên fuscaque regna canat,} & \\
\text{hic referat sero confessum foedere Parthum:} & \\
\text{reddat signa Remi, mox dabit ipse sua . . .} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Prop. 4.6.75-80)

The Muse stirs up the talent of drunken poets: Bacchus, you are accustomed to be the inspiration for your brother Apollo. That one could recall the conquest of the swampy Sygambri, this one sing the dark kingdoms of Cephean Meroë, and this one will recall the Parthian, confessed by a late treaty: let him return the standards of Remus; soon he will give up his own . . .

But there are many problems with accepting this as a straightforward endorsement of Parthian campaigns. The poem itself is the greatest problem: elegy 4.6 is one of the Propertian poems which has generated the most scholarly activity, especially because it seems as if Propertius has changed his tone and actually accepts and praises Augustus and his initiatives, after a creative lifetime
of denigrating them. But in the end it becomes difficult to accept that the praise of Augustus and Actium which forms the main part of elegy 4.6 is sincerely meant, which in turn makes it difficult to accept the praise of the Parthian success as serious. The sincerity of this passage is further cast into doubt by the fact that the poets, and the gods, are obviously all drunk when they sing of these successes. As well, the statement about the Parthians implies that, after the Parthian surrenders the Roman standards, he will be compelled, through war, to surrender his own. We know this was not the case, as Suetonius tells us that the Parthians freely handed over the Roman standards when Augustus asked: Parthi quoque et Armeniam uindicanti facile cesserunt et signa militaria, quae M. Crasso et M. Antonio ademerant, reposcenti reddiderunt . . . ('The Parthians easily yielded to him when he claimed Armenia, and they gave back the standards that they had taken from Marcus Crassus and Marcus Antonius when he asked . . .', Suet. Aug. 21.3). And Augustus himself states that, when the children and grandchildren of Phraates, king of the Parthians, were sent to Rome, it was out of friendship, rather than as a result of conquest: ad me rex Parthorum Phrates Orodis filius filios suos nepotesque omnes misit in Italiam non bello superatus, sed amicitiam nostram per liberorum suorum pignora petens ('Phrates, son of Orodus, the king of the Parthians, sent all of his sons and grandchildren to me in Italy, not because he had been conquered in war, but because he was seeking our friendship by the pledge of his children', RG 32.2). The Parthian victory which Propertius' drunken poets will celebrate is fictional, and tells us nothing about the real events of any interaction between Caesar and the Parthians. It may also denigrate Augustus' efforts in that area.

13 Elegy 4.6 is the most problematic for anyone interested in examining Propertius' attitude towards Augustus. The bibliography of the poem is vast, and presents a matching variety of opinion. P. J. Connor, 'The Actian Miracle', Ramus 7 (1978) 1-10 summarised the opposing sides in the debate about the poem up to 1978. Those who considered 4.6 a straightforward patriotic panegyric of Augustus included P. Grimal, Les intentions de Proce et la composition du livre IV des Elégies (Brussels 1952); R. Pichon, 'La bataille d'Actium et les témoignages contemporains', Mélanges Boissier (Paris 1903) 397-400; H. E. Pillinger, 'Some Callimachean influences on Propertius, Book 4', HSCP 73 (1969) 171-99; W. R. Nethercut, 'Notes on the Structure of Propertius, Book IV', AJPh 89 (1968); Little [11] 304: ' . . . 4.6 is undiluted Augustan propaganda: the official version of the battle of Actium, with Propertius' blessing on the Parthian war for good measure'. F. Cairns, 'Propertius and the Battle of Actium', in A. Woodman and D. West (edd.), Poetry and Politics in the Age of Augustus (Cambridge 1984) 129-68 is the most adamant that 4.6 is a straightforward pronouncement from a converted Propertius, now a supporter and spokesman for the Augustan regime. Many other authors, including Connor himself, see some resistance to the regime in this poem. Galinsky [12] 75-107 takes the entire poem as an elaborate recusatio; J. Hallett, Book IV: Propertius' Recusatio to Augustus and Augustan Ideals (Diss. Harvard 1971) has the same view of all of book 4; so too J. P. Sullivan, 'The Politics of Elegy', Arethusa 5 (1972) 17-34.
The clearest seal of Propertian disapproval, and disinclination to laud such victories (even if they did exist), is the identification of the Roman standards as belonging to Remus.

In the same camp as Propertius we find Ovid, at best ambivalent about Augustus and his entire regime, and refusing to treat any Parthian threat as serious at all. For Ovid presents Augustus’ achievements against the Parthians with a sort of comic-book heroism. Augustus is shown in the Fasti as personally going through the Parthian lands, hunting down the standards, and retrieving them for Rome: *persequitur Parthi signa retenta manu* (‘He follows the standards held in the hand of the Parthian’, 5.580). Ovid does show Augustus, in this poem, as finally settling the Parthians and eliminating the threat they pose to Rome:

... *isque pudor mansisset adhuc, nisi fortibus armis Caesaris Ausonieae protegerentur opes.*
Ille notas ueteres et longi dedecus aeui sustulit: agnorunt signa recepta suos.

(Ov. Fast. 5.587-90)

... the shame would have remained until now, unless the wealth of Ausonia were protected by the strong arms of Caesar.
He ended the old shame, held by long generations,
and the recovered standards know their rightful owners again.

But the finality of this loses some of its force when we recall the later expeditions that the family mounted against the Parthians. Ovid certainly recalled them, and made much of the planned punishment of the Parthians by young Gaius Caesar:

*ecce, parat Caesar, domito quod defuit orbi addere: nunc, Oriens ultime, noster eris.*
Parthe, dabis poenas; Crassi gaudete sepulti signaque barbaricas non bene passa manus.

(Ov. Ars. Am. 1.177-80)

Behold, Caesar prepares to add the part of the world that was lacking to our dominion: now, furthest Orient, you will be ours.
Parthian, pay the penalty; rejoice, graves of the Crassi,
and standards that have not borne well the barbarian hands.

But we need not mention that the rescue of the standards and the avenging of the Crassi have both already been accomplished! For, to Ovid, the purpose of the expedition is unimportant. To Ovid, Gaius Caesar’s vaunted Parthian campaign will, in the end, serve only to provide one more venue for picking up girls (*Ars Am. 1.177-228*).
This same attitude is expressed by Propertius through elegy 3.4. This poem seems to begin with enthusiastic praise for the planned Parthian expedition:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Arma deus Caesar dites meditatur ad Indos,} \\
\text{et freta gemmiferi findere classe maris.} \\
\text{magna, uiri, merces: parat ultima terra triumphos;} \\
\text{Tigris et Euphrates sub noua iura fluent;} \\
\text{sera, sed Ausoniis ueniet prouincia uirgis;} \\
\text{assuescent Latio Partha tropaea Ioui.}
\end{align*}
\]

(Prop. 3.4.1-6)

Divine Caesar is planning war against the rich Indians,
and to split the straits of the jewelled sea with his fleet.
The prizes are great, men: the furthest land prepares triumphs.
The Tigris and Euphrates will flow under new laws.
Late anew province will come under Ausonian rule;
Parthian trophies will be tamed by Latin Jove.

But Propertius soon makes it clear that the war itself is not the source of his enthusiasm. Rather, he looks forward to the triumph which will come at the end of the much-vaunted Parthian campaign, not for its military importance or its contribution to patriotic pride, but as a holiday to be spent with his favourite girl of the moment:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{... qua uideam spoliis oneratos Caesaris axis,} \\
\text{ad uulgi plausus saepe resistere equos,} \\
\text{inque sinu carae nixus spectare puellae} \\
\text{incipiam et titulis oppida capta legam,} \\
\text{tela fugacis equi et bracati militis arcus,} \\
\text{et subter captos arma sedere duces}
\end{align*}
\]

(Prop. 3.4.13-18)

... [the day] on which I will see the chariots of Caesar burdened with spoils,
and the horses hesitate frequently at the mob’s applause,
and I, wrapped in the embrace of a beloved girl will begin to watch,
and I shall read the captured towns from the banners,
the weapons of the swift horse and the bow of the soldier in pants,
and the captured leaders seated under their weapons.

Both Ovid and Propertius make their priorities very clear: love and love affairs are important; holidays and pleasure are important. Parthians are insignificant, and the most that the ambitions of the Caesars can do is to provide a background for the really important things in life.

If the apologists and supporters of the Julian clan are to be believed, the Parthians were a constant threat to Rome, which Augustus and his entire family took very seriously. Many Romans also accepted that Parthians were villains,
and that unleashing the power of the Roman military upon this small eastern nation was not only acceptable, but necessary. Some Romans, however, particularly the love elegists, refused to accept this party line. While the very fact of their writing of love in a dangerous time demonstrates their rejection of the regime and its demands, the repeated references which the elegists make to the Parthians, and the light manner in which they regard the threat, show clearly the attitudes of the elegists to the Julians and their plans and values. Caesars may make plans; Caesars may arrange the affairs of the world to please themselves and satisfy their own ambitions. But the lovers and poets need not take them seriously.
MUTATIS MUTANDIS: THE POETRY AND POETICS OF ISOLATION IN OVID AND BREYTENBACH

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Abstract. There are similarities of emotion between the Roman Ovid and the South African Breyten Breytenbach in their poetry. Breytenbach’s explicit statements of poetics may be extrapolated to give the reader a clearer understanding of the poetics that motivated Ovid’s poetry when he was relegated by the emperor Augustus to Tomis on the Black Sea.

Introduction

The South African author Breyten Breytenbach on several occasions proposed that a ‘monument to the unknown poet’ should be erected in Rotterdam (a city he had found congenial after his release from a South African prison) explaining:

The body/corpse of a poet is his/her poetry... a poem is a black skeleton of the poet... Poets form no ideological group... we try to make... [even] ‘poetry of poetry’... The poet is just a human without his skin.¹

The project would comprise a sepulchre for the Unknown Poet, ‘anonymous... somewhere on the windblown polders like that of an Ovid’. This monument would reflect as its mirror image an atomic reactor, and the ‘eternal flame [would be] periodically rekindled to burn or sublimate poems’. It would be inscribed: ‘Here lies a body / Eaten by words / From such earth / Springs poetry!’ Poets ‘known and unknown’ would contribute to this body and ‘all died happily ever after’.²

This startling proposal points to the possibility of a fruitful comparison, mutatis mutandis, between the works and motives of Breytenbach and his Roman predecessor Ovid. The paper will concentrate on each author’s

¹ The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation of South Africa toward this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed in this paper and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the National Research Foundation. Thanks also to Maridien Schneider for assistance in countless ways.

awareness of the value of literary creativity in isolation for the preservation of his individuality and sanity.

His *carmen* ('poetry'), the reason for Ovid's exile, was also his salvation, bridging the gap from Tomis to Rome. It enabled him to politicise his 'unpoliticality', answering in verse to obscure accusations of malfeasance levelled against him by the emperor (his *error*). Yet one may question the degree of Ovid's own awareness of what he was doing, not only politically, but generically (the nature of his poetics). Such poetics must be culled from his poetry—he is seldom explicit. I contend that comparison with modern South African literature will help to clarify certain Ovidian issues. Many South African authors experienced isolation, either imprisonment or exile, during the years of political struggle before 1994.

As basis for comparison, the writings of authors imprisoned or exiled for reasons political (e.g., Dennis Brutus, Keorapetse Kgogitsile, C. J. Driver, Jeremy Cronin, Bessie Head, and Breyten Breytenbach) most nearly reflect the total isolation that Ovid portrays himself as experiencing at Tomis. South African prose writers (journalists like Ruth First, Hugh Lewin, and Joyce Sikakane) are particularly useful as they soberly narrate their emotions during imprisonment and subsequent exile. I have chosen to concentrate on Breyten Breytenbach, who moved from youthful, self-imposed traveller (exploring the unknown delights of Europe) to banished writer (for having transgressed his

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3 For references and discussion, see J. M. Claassen, *Displaced Persons: The Literature of Exile from Cicero to Boethius* (London 1999a) passim.

4 D. Brutus was banned from writing (or publishing) poetry, so his writings were published as 'letters' in *The Letters to Martha and Other Poems from a South African Prison* (London 1968). The writings of Brutus, Keorapetse Kgogitsile and Driver feature along with I. Choonara, Dollar Brand (now Dullah Ebrahim), Timothy Holmes and Arthur Cronje in C. Pieterse (ed.), *Seven South African Poets* (London 1971).

5 J. Cronin, *Inside* (London 1987) back cover, terms imprisonment 'exile in one's own country'.

6 H. Ibrahim, *Bessie Head: Subversive Identities in Exile* (London 1996) 171-199 shows how Head uses the trope of exile to explore both her alienation as expatriate and as a woman in a gendered society.

country’s strange marriage laws), to political activist (imprisoned as a ‘terrorist’), to expatriate (sent out of South Africa on a one-way exit visa), to naturalised French citizen, to occasional visitor to the New South Africa and long-distance loyal critic of its new regime.

Breytenbach’s oeuvre is as varied and complex as Ovid’s own, ranging from dense (and ‘subversive’) lyrical poetry in Afrikaans, to sometimes obscure ‘magically realistic’—often savage—prose in various post-modern writings embodying his prison life and exilic experiences, to his own translations into English of the two former genres (or similar original productions in English), to extremely lucid prose or compelling interviews reported by others, spelling out his poetics and his views on ‘life, the universe and everything’, all tempered by an avowed adherence to Zen Buddhism and an overwhelming love-hate relationship with his native country.

Breytenbach’s prison works can be better understood by comparison with the factual narratives of the journalists referred to above. First, Lewin and Sikakane all report on feelings of despair and isolation, yet the dawn of a feeling of camaraderie when they became aware of fellow prisoners. Although some were imprisoned up to a decade before Breytenbach, their reportage of the reasons for their arrest, the circumstances, methods, even the names of some of their tormentors, coincide to such a degree that a strong factual background for Breytenbach’s elliptic evocations of scenes and sounds may be read from them.

I further contend that Ovid’s unconscious poetics (those aspects of his writing about writing which appear instinctive rather than cerebral) can be more

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8 The list of Breytenbach’s publications is long and varied. The following list is confined to works I have consulted for this study: Lyrical poetry: *Die Ysterkoei Moet Sweet* (Johannesburg 1964); *Die Huis van die Dove* (Cape Town 1967); *Voetskrif* (Johannesburg 1976); *Ekrips: Die Derde Bundel van Die Ongedanste Dans* (Emmarentia 1983a); (‘yk’) (Emmarentia 1983); *Die Vierde Bundel van Die Ongedanste Dans* (Emmarentia 1983b); *Judas Eye and Self-portrait/Deathwatch* (London 1988); *Papierblom: 72 Gedigte uit ’n Swerfjoerntaal* (Cape Town 1998). Prose (either post-modern novels or quasi-autobiography, recounting his views on poetics, life and art): Breytenbach [2 (1984a)]; Breytenbach [2 (1986)]; ‘n Seisoen in die Paradys (Johannesburg 1976); *The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist* (Johannesburg 1984b); *All One Horse: Fictions and Images* (Johannesburg 1989a); *Memory of Snow and of Dust* (Johannesburg 1989b); *The Memory of Birds in Times of Revolution* (Cape Town 1996). See F. Galloway, *Breyten Breytenbach as Openbare Figuur* (Pretoria 1990) 340-47 for a full bibliography of the works deriving from the prison era and immediately thereafter and a listing of critical writings on individual works.

clearly delineated by comparison with Breytenbach’s poetics. Both poets suffered isolation at the hands of a repressive intervention by the state into private morality, and both articulated their suffering in extensive metaphors (isolation as death or sickness, the value of the imagination to transcend time and space, isolation as the most cruel metamorphosis). Both seemed to acknowledge the ‘truth’ of the accusations against them while articulating a higher morality in their verse, and using writing to keep themselves alive and in contact with others.

**Biographies and Autobiographies**

The public details of Ovid’s life are well known. Born of an aristocratic family in 43 BC, he grew up in the turbulent times that followed the death of Julius Caesar, but spent his adult years in the comparative stability of the Augustan era. He could afford to ignore the exigencies of a state-oriented career and devote himself to *otium* (‘peace and quiet’). His *Amores* did not fit in with the serious Augustan call upon Roman *littérateurs* to write patriotic poetry, but it was only with the publication of his *Ars Amatoria* that his stance as an independently minded Master of Love could turn his jaunty and irreverent attitude to love and marriage (in Rome not automatic harness-mates) into an act of social sabotage. Such social sabotage was duly reported to Augustus at some time during the next ten years, and by AD 8—when the third generation Julia Minor seemed to have imbued too much from these racy precepts and was banished from Rome, along with her lovers—Ovid, too, was banished to the Black Sea area. In his case a second, rather mysterious, accusation—perhaps political—his *error*, accompanied the first, the accusation of subversion of public morality through his *carmen*, construed as ‘immoral poetry’. The poet tells us that his *error* was not illegal: *nee quicquam, quod lege uetor committere, feci* (‘nor did I commit anything which is forbidden by law to do’, *Pont.* 2.9.71). He vehemently defends his poetry against charges of subversion. The major part of *Tristia* 2.1 is devoted to showing up the hollowness of such a charge. Why an exile would have resorted to the very medium and even metric form that caused his downfall is a question that should always be considered when looking at the nature of Ovid’s exilic poems.  

10 Speculation on the matter is endless and pointless. Most recently, the novelist D. Wishart, *Ovid* (London 1996) ingeniously links Ovid with prior knowledge of the Varian disaster (as an event manipulated by the empress Livia for her own political ends). It need not be taken seriously.

Ovid’s laments from Tomis, the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*, together with his famous farrago of curses, the *Ibis*, constitute the exilic poetry that has undergone strong scrutiny in the last forty years. Opinion is still divided on who his intended audience was, whether he was serious in the recantation of all that he stood for before, and whether his ostensibly subservient appeals to the emperor should be taken at face value or whether there is a subversive subtext. The major issue is his level of consciousness: was he politically aware or a total *naïf*, was he serious in his protestations of loyalty to Augustus and disparagement of his own works, and, above all, was he poetically aware of what he was doing? Did Ovid realise that he was simultaneously sending Roman elegy into a new direction and ringing its death-knell? This paper will concentrate on his poetic awareness, as set against Breytenbach’s.

Modern criticism often questions authorial intention as a concept, stressing the role of the reader in re-forming the text and in deconstructing its verbal exterior and semiotic interior. Yet research into an author’s poetics, when it assumes that the author was aware of what he was doing, essentially assumes that the author had a particular idea that he wanted to express, and a particular purpose in expressing it. Occasionally Ovid does refer to the healing power of composition, as in his famous hymn to his Muse: *gratia, Musa tibi: nam tu solacia praebes, / tu curae requies, tu medicina uenis . . .* (‘my thanks to you, my Muse: for you offer comfort / you give rest from care, you come as a healing drug . . . ’, *Tr.* 4.10.117-20). This is the type of consolation always advocated in the philosophical tradition of comfort to the bereaved or to those in exile, but he does not acknowledge this explicitly. At the same time he berates his Muse for bringing about his downfall, the stone against which he is again stubbing his toe, the Telegonus or Oedipus that killed its own progenitor. In the end his poetry triumphs and gives the desolate Roman that immortality which he also endlessly offered his wife and friends, if only they would have helped to facilitate his return.

Breyten Breytenbach’s history offers on the superficial level almost uncanny parallels with the Roman poet’s life story. As a young man he

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14 Claassen [3 (1999a)] esp. 23f.; 85f.; 229; 277 n. 84.

abandoned university studies in favour of oversea travel. His first anthology of poems, *Die Ysterkoei Moet Sweet* (‘The Iron Cow Must Sweat’) burst upon the Afrikaans literary scene in 1964, astonishing and impressing the Afrikaner establishment with its poetic verve but often subversive stance, which questioned and sometimes ridiculed accepted values in dense and brilliant exhibitions of word-play, imagery and innuendo. Its often daring eroticism was for his critics tempered by the brilliance of his verbal dexterity. Galloway explains that it was considered stylistically like but ideologically unlike the works of the so-called ‘sestigers’ (Afrikaans poetic movement of the sixties) in its equation of the act of writing with all other bodily functions. Its anti-establishment implications could be swallowed by the Afrikaans literary establishment only by recourse to the, for them, newly fashionable ‘New Criticism’ (already almost passé in English literary circles) which firmly separates an author from his works. However, the personal intensity of the poetry as mouthpiece for the man (proclaiming the unity of poem and poet) made this approach difficult to maintain.

In Paris Breytenbach had met and married a young Vietnamese woman, who would not have been allowed to share his home, or bed, had they been in the bizarre atmosphere of South African extreme social engineering, which, just like Augustus’ marriage laws, brought public sanction to bear upon the regulation of marriage, that most private of social institutions. Their marriage contravened the South African Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 and article 16 of the Immorality Act of 1957. When in 1965 he sought to bring his bride to meet his family, she was refused a visa. Exclusion of the wife turned the husband as voluntary wanderer into an enforced exile. For the poet this was a sobering and radicalising event. The literary establishment was now faced with an uncomfortable dichotomy; the genius of the young poet was unmistakable and he was virtually canonised as author, but his deviant role as persistent and loquacious critic of the government was increasingly decried.

As attitudes and political stresses waxed and waned, in time the couple were allowed a one-day visit to Cape Town on their way back to Paris from Swaziland, just across the South African border, and later, in December 1972,

18 Articles 1.1 and 1.2 of the Mixed Marriages Act prohibited the interracial marriage of South Africans, even when living overseas, and article 16 of the later act declared normal marital concourse within South Africa of parties whose marriages were not acknowledged here, as ‘illegal miscegenation’.
19 Galloway [8] 63. Breytenbach himself [8 (1996)] 160 commented much later: ‘My severance was a jump into a free-fall away from the structures of my tribe’.
came even an *ex gratia* concession for them to visit the country together.\(^{20}\) Breytenbach’s fame as poet was growing and battles within the Afrikaans literary establishment were furiously waged over his place within the canon. The continued safety of New Criticism enabled conservative critics to praise the poetry while condemning the poet as ‘not a rebel but a revolutionary’. Yet his politics were viewed as an aberration that ‘did not truly touch his poetic soul’.\(^{21}\) By the early seventies reason would have dictated that he be given the highest Afrikaans literary award, the ‘Herzog Prize’, but the influential Afrikaans Academy awarded it in 1971 to another expatriate author, Elizabeth Eybers, living in Holland in self-imposed cultural exile. This clearly political move tore the Afrikaans literary world into two camps. Conservative critics either denied Breytenbach’s importance as poet or the importance of his political stance, a move which put him in a double bind, making of him the representative of the kind of Afrikaans culture with which he could not associate.\(^{22}\)

Such stresses and strains further estranged the poet from the Afrikaans establishment. He by now was firmly associating himself with the struggle of South African blacks for political recognition. Much more than Ovid, who apparently fell into a political situation almost by chance, Breytenbach in time became firmly committed to action, slipping into the country in disguise in order to establish a branch of Okhela, a ‘literary resistance wing’ for the broader struggle.\(^{23}\) His arrest and trial in 1975 were the sensation of the day, *literati* once again ranging themselves for and against the now apparently abjectly

\(^{20}\) A prose account of the visit (Breytenbach [8 (1976)]) was published in partly censored format in South Africa in 1976, when the author was already incarcerated. He says that he was allowed once to page through it, but not to read it, while in prison (Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 139). F. Galloway, ‘Sensuur’, *Literator Supplement: Survey Articles on SA Literature in 1985* (1993) 227-30, points out the irony of such internal censoring while uncensored English and Dutch versions were available. The narrative exhibits the characteristics of magic realism. See the Afrikaans author André P. Brink in his foreword to the Dutch version of Breytenbach [8 (1976)], *Een Seizoen in het Paradys* (Amsterdam 1977 [published under the *nom-de-plume* ‘B. B. Lazarus’]) 5-13 on the poet’s philosophy of life and death and the tragic paradoxes of good and evil in his native land, a ‘hellish paradise’, à la Rimbaud’s *Saison en Enfer*.

\(^{21}\) So Coetzee [16] 30. When in 1984, after his release from prison, he was at last offered the Herzog Prize, he inevitably turned it down, Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 148.


\(^{23}\) For factual reportage, see Galloway [8] 168-80. Breytenbach explains the motives and currents of emotion that precipitated his personal involvement in active political resistance in Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 73-101: he was ‘the exile who had never accepted the finality of his exile’. In this ironically titled prose work, fact, thoughts, fantasy and realism merge, collapse and coalesce kaleidoscopically.
contrite young Afrikaner, who seemed ready to confess his sins and return to the fold, after due punishment had been exacted.

Breytenbach was convicted and sent to gaol for seven years. Two years later he was on trial again, this time for 'plotting from within the prison'. It now emerged that he had been promised leniency and a minimum sentence on condition that he recanted—hence his abject attitude at the first trial, and his subsequent dedication of a volume of prison-writings to his captor.\(^{24}\) Of the promised leniency nothing had come, and he had, it emerged, been subjected to two years of solitary confinement, while a warder as agent provocateur spurred him on to plot an escape.\(^{25}\) The conditions of his incarceration improved after this, but he was not released before 1982, when he left South Africa and took on French citizenship, at first spurning his mother tongue to publish in English and French, but gradually publishing (in South Africa) his Afrikaans-language\(^{26}\) prison effusions, which had been serially confiscated as they were produced, but returned upon his release.

Four anthologies of prison poems together comprise Die Ongedanste Dans ('The Undanced Dance'),\(^{27}\) an indication of the cessation of life within his prison walls. Excerpts from these were translated by the poet himself, and published, together with an explicit statement of his view of his craft, in a collection entitled Judas Eye and Selfportrait/Deathwatch.\(^{28}\) Then followed, in English, the novel-length post-modern-style True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist. It blends fact and fantasy, stark reality and tender longing in an evocative volume that conveys the horror of isolation as graphically as does Ovid's fantasies from Tomis or the sober journalistic narratives of the other South African political prisoners mentioned above or the prose-and-verse production of his fellow-poet Jeremy Cronin. Breytenbach's lucid expose of his methods and aims in his collections of English-language essays in End Papers,

\(^{24}\) Breytenbach [8 (1976)]. The title means 'Footnote' or, better, 'Postscript'; its publishers were most closely associated with the Nationalist government, and it bore a solemn dedication 'For my wife YB, and with thanks to Colonel Broodryk J.C.' (my translation). Unless otherwise specified, all translations below are my own.


\(^{26}\) Breytenbach's original revulsion against Afrikaans seems to have evaporated over time as he became more aware of his 'Africanness'. Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 27 reports on a visit to Botswana: 'You felt at home!'. Breytenbach [8 (1988)] 128: 'Europe made me aware of my Africanness'; Breytenbach [8 (1996)] 124 writes of 'Africa on my mind'. Recently, Breytenbach [8 (1998)] bears the name 'Jan Afrika' as ostensible author (copyright asserted by Breytenbach).

\(^{27}\) This is reminiscent of Ovid's assertion that writing poetry that has no audience is like dancing in the dark at Pont. 4.2.33-4. See below.

\(^{28}\) Breytenbach [8 (1988)].
the latter half of *Judas Eye* and *The Memory of Birds in Times of Revolution* reads in stark contrast to his poems and to other post prison publications such as the surreal sequences in *Mouroir: Mirrornotes of a Novel* (a pun evocative of the French words for *death* and *mirror*) and the novel *Memory of Snow and of Dust*. Of these, the latter rewrites Breytenbach’s attempts at political subversion and his prison life as a powerful post-modern novel, whereas *Mouroir*, composed piece-meal in prison, draws on the sickened imagination of a wounded and battered soul to portray the horror of imprisonment as a nightmare without end, logic or sense, with virtually no contact with the world outside. The mood of the work is evocative of troubled dreams, those endless searches for something or somebody that dissolves or evaporates, to be supplanted by new faces and new horrors, a waking dream as vivid as any reality.

Significantly, *Mouroir* ends with a morbid third person narrative of the fates of various characters that had appeared and disappeared in the novel. The author is another of these evanescent characters: ‘Breytenbach came to a sticky

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29 Mirrors run like a *Leitmotiv* throughout Breytenbach [2 (1984a)] from the literary-critical statement ‘The reader is a mirror of the writer’ (62), to the idea of the mirror as permanent, its image evanescent (91), to a factual statement that no mirrors are allowed in the Maximum Security prison (110), to a dream sequence where an hotel room has many mirrors ‘which retained his image’ (156f.), various other edifices with mirrors (171, 246, 253) and the wings of moths reminiscent of mirror-fetishes in the Congo (180). He deliberately transgresses the distance between author and subject by deliberating on themes he has not explored in rapid *praeteritio*, stating that the ‘possibility offered by the title of the story must be exploited’ (245). His use of this constant is best explained by himself in Breytenbach [8 (1989a)] 12: ‘The mirror creates the image. The image creates the mirror. Imagine Imago: Imagine I!'; cf. the uses of the word *imago* by Ovid in J. M. Claassen, ‘The Vocabulary of Exile in Ovid’s *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*, *Glotta* 75 (1999b) 159f.

end’; ‘In due time Braytenbach [a deliberate pun] died the death, in the end claiming and maybe believing that he had been a poet, and innocent, his death words *sic* “Not guilty, your Honour”...’. This character was by then in Panama, where he had befriended a woman he called ‘Mooityd’ (‘Beautiful Time’), who subsequently corresponded with the authorities in ‘Niemandsland’ (Breytenbach’s term, together with its English equivalent Nomansland, for South Africa). She was sent information on a ‘Bre(a)thenbach’ who ‘was eventually obliterated while still serving his time, by general debility, and the rot of said time’. It does not do for us here to try to sort out fact and fiction. As in Ovid’s fantastic depiction of Tomis as perpetually snow-bound (Tr. 3.2.8, 3.10 9-50) and of himself as both ashes and a living corpse (Pont. 4.16.47-52), the emotional state of the author is the true reality that his words convey.

*A Basis for Comparison*

Any critic attempting to draw comparisons between two authors whose circumstances were only superficially alike, but whose poetry exhibits vast differences—of genre, type, tone, apparent intent, as well as prosodic and metrical differences in the languages that shaped their art—must hedge herself very carefully. Ovid and Breytenbach share some literary characteristics, even granting that the former was composing in a strict metrical form and in a language that conveys grammatical relationships through invariable inflection, the only freedom allowed being etymological play, whereas the latter writes in any form that suits his purpose. Yet overriding the salient differences between the two poets is a psychological similarity that is related not only to the circumstances of his isolation, but also the personalities which informed the art of each in happier times. Both poets may be described as having an ironic attitude to the accepted wisdom of his time, yet in each a certain romanticism tempers his cynicism.

Both poets are masters at word play and *double entendre*. Ovid is perhaps the more subtle. The nature of the Latin language and its linguistic conventions lend themselves to paronomasia, punning or etymological play, where the linguistic integrity of individual words is maintained. Breytenbach plays more

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32 Braytenbach [2 (1984a)] 255. For Ovid, time ceases to function on the Pontic shore, destroying all things except the unfortunate poet: Pont. 4.10.7. See Claassen [12] 169 for extensive references.
freely, the genius of the Afrikaans language being such that coining of neologisms is an accepted poetic practice adding to the richness of his verse. Many of these (also in his English writings) consist of the conflation of two known words that together create a portmanteau word carrying overtones of both, such as the title of the poem ‘Autobiotherapy’, reminiscent of ‘autobiography’ and ‘atrophy’. 35 The title ‘Moanologue’ reflects ‘moan’ and ‘monologue’. 36 ‘The Wormwomb Land of Poetry’ indicates both the bitterness of the poet’s lot and the comforting power of poetry, but also warns of its imminent decay. 37 Breytenbach can vary prose and verse and subvert the meanings of words through acoustic play, slight semantic shifts, neologisms and the exploitation of a characteristic that Afrikaans shares with Greek (but not Latin), that allows change of the function of words—from infinitive verbs into nouns, and vice versa—by the mere addition or removal of an article. Often such play contributes to the poet’s ironical stance. 38 Ovid’s ‘irony’ is sometimes questioned, but the general trend is to read a divergence, or slippage, between what he says and what he means in much of his exilic poetry.

In Breytenbach, degrees of irony are more easily discerned because the counterpoint of his prose writings sets in perspective his most abject protestations of admiration for his persecutors. Much of his poetry is overtly politically subversive and it does not need elucidation by the author for us to read disgust with the South African political system, and yet sympathy for its perpetrators as fellow-victims, from verses such as the last stanza of ‘Die toelig van metafore’ (‘Illustrating Metaphors’):

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35 Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 349. This neologism works equally well in English and Afrikaans. The poet deals with his longing for his wife, fantasising about a messenger that fords streams to deliver his missive in a cleft stick: ‘my letter is full of words / turning to water’ (tr. Denis Hirson, one of several in this volume not translated by the author).

36 Breytenbach [2 (1984a)] 158.

37 Breytenbach [8 (1988)] 15. Three words are here conflated: wormwood (absinthe), womb and worm. One of the dream sequence-essays in Breytenbach [8 (1989b)] 114 refers to a prisoner as ‘the man Wormfood’ or ‘Bird-dream’.

38 A random example from the poem ‘Mahala’ in Breytenbach [8 (1983b)] 8 describes the process of writing poetry in prison: ‘die hand / aan die arm op die papier / wat woordmaak frase / kluise gedig gedagte beeld skuifel / in die papier skuifel’ (literally, ‘the hand / attached to the arm on the paper, / that word-tame makes a word phrase / safe-chaste poem thought image shuffle’), which is so dense in both mental and visual images, and both grammatical and semantic shifts, that it is almost impossible to render into intelligible English. For example, kluise is the plural noun ‘safes’, ‘vaults’ but in context it evokes the sound, and thus the thought, of kluise, the adjective ‘chaste’, while the consonants of gedig, ‘poem’, are repeated and amplified in gedagte, ‘thought’, leading naturally into the idea that a ‘thought’ evokes an ‘image’, beeld.
Kyk het ek gekyk in die Bees se gelyk—
sy ole [for 'oë'] was ondergronds agter 'n sonbril,
Sy porsieleingryns getooi deur die staatsmoestas
en hy is ook maar Mens

Slegs ek en slegs jy

Look I have looked on the equal [or 'corpse'] of the Beast
his (l)eyes [= 'lies'] were underground under dark glasses
his porcelain-grin garnished with a State moustache
and he too is only Human

Only I and only you

Metamorphosis looms large in both poets' consciousness. It was the topic of Ovid's major work, now generally taken to have been completed in exile. His relegation to Tomis is for Ovid the ultimate, obscene metamorphosis; its horror has made any other improbability now only too possible. Metamorphosis also lies central to Breytenbach's awareness of his own art. The chameleon is an important image, and the need for being like a chameleon recurs in several poems. It is also a frequent motif in Breytenbach's drawings and paintings.

The chameleon implies a willingness to change, but only in order to blend in with the background, becoming part of the whole, and resisting individuality where individuality can work to harm the imprisoned poet. Yet its watchfulness must be emulated: 'It is not necessarily shameful to be living at the table of the political lord or the patron of the arts ... but one should do so as the chameleon ... rotating the eyes in different directions simultaneously'.

Much of Breytenbach's poetry is very difficult, highly allusive and elliptic. Here, perhaps, beside the more obvious aspects of generic and circumstantial differences, is a major contrast to the clarity and apparently guileless exposition of both Ovid's elegiacs and his epic narrative. Yet Ovid is

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39 Breytenbach [8 (1983b)] 47.
40 In Tr. 1.7.11-14 Ovid claims that these poems of change exactly depict his lot; in the introductory poem, Tr. 1.1.117-22, he claims to have undergone a metamorphosis worthy of poetic treatment.
41 At Breytenbach [8 1989a] 53, a chameleon is pictured clutching the three letters of the Afrikaans word for a moth, 'mot'. The centrality of the chameleon in Breytenbach's thinking may be read from his repeated use of the charming parable of the chameleon being sent to deliver a divine message: 'When people are old they will die but be resuscitated'. Only half of the message is delivered, and the chameleon is thereafter earthbound, but receives the colours of the rainbow as compensation; cf. Breytenbach [8 (1976)] 95; [8 1989a] 299f.
equally elusive, as critics find who try to discuss the endless array of emotional shifts toward, for instance, Augustus, that the poet reflects in his exilic works. Much of Ovid’s pre-exilic work, in particular the narratives of fluid change that make up the bulk of the Metamorphoses, convey the impression of a dream-world in which unreality is the greater reality. In sum, the almost postmodern fluidity of Ovid’s narrative style in the Metamorphoses is approached by the urgently surreal, dreamlike (rather, nightmarish) fluidity of Breytenbach’s prose works.

**Art and Life**

The central difference between our two poets always must be respected in examining their attitudes to art and life, that is the difference between first-century versus twentieth-century concepts of self, with Breytenbach complicated by his adherence to Zen-Buddhism, where the self is seen both to disappear into and to manifest itself in all around it. This ensures a basic difference in the manner in which each poet associates his life with his art. Yet at the deeper, instinctual level, we may still explore similarities in our poets’ awareness of the role of art to sustain troubled life.

Ovid protests in Tristia 2.1.354 that his poetry, as reason for his banishment, was the mere product of his art. His life had been pure, although his Muse had been wanton (an excusable fault, so Tr.1.9.59-64). Yet throughout his exilic poetry he stresses that his poetry is ‘bad’ because his circumstances are ‘bad’ (as in the final elegy of Tristia 3, and the opening and twelfth elegies

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44 In an interview reported by I. Dimitriu, ‘Translations of the Self: Interview with Breyten Breytenbach’, *Current Writing* 8 (1996) 90f., Breytenbach calls writing and reading poetry ‘the oldest forms of imaginative creativity . . . formal dreaming . . . creating yourself’ and acknowledges the re-creative role of the reader in reception of poetry, the ‘creation of self in love . . . an expression of the need to transform yourself’. To him, ‘prophecy is not important’ but what is important, is that ‘it came out as poetry’. This seems both to negate and confirm the vatic principle, but above all it affirms the need for the self to express itself extra-rationally. It is difficult to imagine the cerebral Ovid consciously subscribing to this thesis, yet his fierce defence of his art essentially subsumes these principles; cf. Claassen [12 (1988)]. Ovid’s poetic creativity is *his real self*; what he *says* is often play.
of book 5). 45 The central paradox to Ovid’s exilic poetry as a statement of his 
*bona fides* is that if one accepts what he says about the former separation of his 
life and art, one must assume that this separation still holds, undercutting 
whatever he says in exile about himself and his attitude to the emperor. 46 Like 
Breytenbach at his first trial, Ovid is unstinted in his apparently abject 
submission to the authority of his tormentor. In Ovid’s exile the emperor looms 
as the supreme, just god of the Roman pantheon. On him Ovid unquestioningly 
lavishes fearful worship. We know from later events that Breytenbach’s initial 
submissiveness was meant merely to gain mitigation of sentence. With Ovid, 
we can only surmise that this, too, was the case, while we read subversive irony 
between the adulatory lines. 47 Yet the Roman poet’s submissiveness was 
equally unsuccessful in achieving his recall. 48 Augustus was not taken in by 
Ovid’s protestations in the way that the Afrikaner literary establishment was 
from 1975 until 1977 prepared to accept Breytenbach’s apparent recantation, 
until the second trial showed up both his ‘repentance’ and the authorities who 
cynically manipulated him into submission without carrying out their half of the 
bargain. 49

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45 E.g., *non haec ingenio, non haec componimus arte / materia est propriis ingeniosa 
malis* (*I didn’t compose this from inspiration, nor with my art, but the material has sprung 
and Poetics: Poetry as Enemy and Friend*’, in C. Deroux (ed.) *Studies in Latin Literature and 
Roman History* 5 (Brussels 1989b) 252-66 on Ovid’s exilic poetry and poetics; cf. also 
Claassen [12 (1988)] 158-69, on the poet’s paradoxical statements about his life and art, pre-
and post-relegation.

46 Cf. U. Müller, ‘*Lügende Dichter*’, in H. Kreuzer (ed.), *Gestaltungsgeschichte und 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (Stuttgart 1965) 32-50.

47 On enforced compliance, Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 139 says: ‘It is possible to falsify for 
some time the thrust of one’s words by inserting them in an environment controlled by the 
enemy . . . but eventually . . . it will become evident and be rectified (even if it is true only in 
its absence of truth)’.

48 See extensive discussion in Claassen [3 (1999a)] esp. 145-53; 210f.; 226-28; Claassen 

49 Coetzee [16] 29 speaks of a ‘deliberately unheroic attitude’. B. F. Doherty, ‘*Paradise 
232 sees Breytenbach’s attitude at his first trial as a sign of his ‘disintegration’ under duress. 
Galloway [8] 197 explains it (in the light of the second trial) as a deliberate ploy to protect 
the poet’s friends and family, but also because he had been led to expect a sentence of only a 
year’s imprisonment, as had even the prosecutor. Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 49 says ‘I was 
umbed. All I wanted was to please. And in my cell I was alone in the house of dying.’ He 
explains (51) that he had been tricked into de-politicising the trial, to prevent his becoming a 
political rallying point, but the State then set out to smear even those innocently associated 
with him. No prominent literary figure would testify on his behalf. He admits—‘to my
One should not, *mutatis mutandis*, assume that similar manipulations and betrayals were in force in Ovid’s case, but the Breytenbach experience does illuminate the forces that play upon a poet when politics (even in Rome, where politicians regularly committed poetic *nugae* ['trifles'] to their writing tablets in moments of relaxation) lead him out of his depth. It can safely be said, I submit, of both Ovid and Breytenbach, that the poet remained true to his Muse, both regarding the exterior trappings of his poetry, his stylistics, and the interior impetus that fuelled it—his attitude to life and art. With Breytenbach we have explicit statements after his release; with Ovid we must reconstruct his interior attitude from the exterior evidence of his poetry. Comparison with the younger poet may serve as further elucidation.

The last poem of Ovid’s exilic collections, seemingly a cry to mordant envy to let go of his nearly extinct carcass, actually celebrates the fame the poet knows that he has earned while alive:

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ergo submotum patria proscindere, Liuor,
desine neu cineres sparge, cruente, meos!
onnia perdidimus, tantummodo uita relictâ est,
praebeat ut sensum materiamque mali.
quid iuuat extinctos ferrum demittere in artus?
non habet in nobis iam noua plaga locum.
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*Ov. Pont. 4.16.47-52*

So, Malice, sheathe your bloody claws, spare this poor exile, don’t scatter my ashes after death! I have lost all: only bare life remains to quicken the awareness and substance of my pain. What pleasure do you get from stabbing this dead body? There is no space in me now for another wound.

This cry ends a long poem listing Ovid’s poetic contemporaries (many otherwise unknown), asserting his own pre-eminence in this company. Writing thus once more separates art and life—the ‘extinct carcass’ belongs to a poet still very much alive and aware of his own worth. The inverse conceit occurs in *Memory of Snow and of Dust* (257). Breytenbach’s fictionalised *alter ego* states ‘It is quite possible to die while nominally still alive’.

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50 In the mid-1980s it was still necessary to assert the sustained quality of his art, in spite of E. J. Kenney’s seminal article of two decades earlier, ‘The Poetry of Ovid’s Exile’, *PCPhS* 191 (1965) 37-49. By now the exilic poems have largely come into their own as mature and subtle works.


52 Breytenbach [8 (1989b)] 257; at 217-20 the name of the protagonist Mano alternates with ‘Noma’ and ‘Anom’. All three ring the changes on *anonymity*, the state brought about
Multiple Personalities

One of Ovid’s autobiographical effusions from Tomis (Pont. 1.2.33,34) speaks in terms reminiscent of the perhaps spurious opening lines of the Aeneid, ille ego sum . . . (‘I am that he who . . . ’; cf. Serv. ad Verg. Aen. praef. 30). In spite of its lugubrious tone and sad contents, bewailing the dreary circumstances that limit his exercise of his own talent, this poem yet presents Ovid (as does his more explicit autobiography, Tr. 4.10) as a confident poet, divinely chosen for his craft, both victim and major exponent of his creative Muse. In his self-revelations the poet deliberately creates a whole series of personae, from poet who is an exile to exile that can compose poetry, from greatest living poet to dead body, from victim to avenger, from deserted friend to implacable enemy, from erstwhile desultor amorum (‘serial lover’) to devoted husband. 53 Behind these multiple personalities stands a sure creator-poet that knows his craft and knows what he is doing when he exercises it.

Ovid’s poetry is both his comfort and his bane, the cause of his banishment and his only solace, his inspirational goddess and his Nemesis, both the creative force that sustains him and the product of his genius—his child, but an Oedipus or Telegonus that caused his death. Yet he can no longer write, he complains in poem after fruitful poem; his talent is gone and all that remains is a mere husk of his formerly prolific self. Breytenbach’s love-hate relationship with his art lies within the sphere of the language itself. He is equally driven, the victim of a remorseless ananké. Afrikaans is his heart’s tongue, but his Afrikaans background rejected him and his before he rejected it. He intends to write in English or French only, but his heart’s tongue will speak, and it speaks in Afrikaans. 54 For Breytenbach, release from prison did not end his isolation, for, living in Paris, not as an exile, ‘[but] . . . an émigré . . . the only Afrikaans-writing French poet’, he was cut off from ‘intimate communication by incarceration, and even oblivion, if Mano may be equated with ‘No man’. The allusion is made explicit at 259 when the character is given the well-known Afrikaans surname ‘Niemand’ (Nobody). Ironically, at 265 the judge trying Mano for murder is ‘Breytenbach’.


54 In Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 102 he dispassionately disavows being an Afrikaner, but emphasises that Afrikaans does not belong to one group exclusively, lauding it as an instrument of ‘expression of astonishing beauty’. Later he questions whether he still is a South African, yet refusing to ‘founder in the miserabilism [sic] of being a refugee’ (121). By 1996 he tells Dimitriu [44] 95-97 that he must ‘write in Afrikaans’, explaining that ‘poetry goes down into the areas of unspoken experience, or the unspeakable, the pre-verbal [which] can only happen in your mother-tongue’, yet for him ‘there is no distinction between translating and writing’.
with his own people’, finding it ‘terrible for a wordsmith to be deprived of language enrichment’.\(^{55}\) This must be taken as emotionally, not factually, true, for the poet’s richness of expression continues unabated. Ovid at Tomis similarly protested, in mellifluous Latin verse, the loss of his Latin.\(^{56}\)

Breytenbach’s verbal play is endlessly ingenious. In spite of his Zen awareness of being part of the great Nothingness, he creates multiple names for himself: both he and his persecutor are ‘Mr I’,\(^{57}\) the *ego-persona*, but he has half a dozen or more other names for himself: play on his initials produces Buffalo Bill and B. Bird (a pun on ‘jailbird’), also Burnt Bird, Bangai Bird, and Juan T. Bird. Elsewhere we have Breathenbach, and Braytenbach, Beda Breyten and Barnum, even Billiard Ball (after shaving his head). Some names are playful, others reflect his bitterness.\(^{58}\) His most persistent *alter ego* is his mirror image, Don Espeglio (‘Mr Mirror’), the face of the ‘thin man in the green sweater’ that he sees before him.\(^{59}\) Nothing is fixed, but in true Zen-fashion, everything becomes part of everything else, and so he is part of what he writes. In prison Breytenbach *is* what he writes. His being, as he sets it down on paper, is his true reality, and that is daily taken away from him by the authorities as he completes each page. He explains that he needed to write in order to survive, but that it was a bizarre, one-way exercise, the ‘enemy reading over [his] shoulder [while he was] laying bare [his] most personal and intimate nerves’. Worst was not being able to edit or revise: ‘You cannot remember what you wrote before and whether you are writing in circles’.\(^{60}\)

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\(^{55}\) Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 207-11.

\(^{56}\) Discussed, with references, by Claassen [45 (1989b)] 252-66 esp. 256.

\(^{57}\) In turn ‘Mr. Interrogator’, ‘Mr. I’, ‘Mr. Eye’, ‘Mr Intestigator’, and ‘The Investigator’. The title of Breytenbach [8 (1988)] puns on the viewing slot in a prison door versus the poet as a betrayer—of self or of country.


\(^{59}\) Much later he explains, ‘Every mirror is a self-portrait’, yet wonders ‘What is the relationship between the intelligent hero I imagined and the cowardly fool peering at me from the mirror?’ Breytenbach [8 (1996)] 61, 156.

\(^{60}\) Breytenbach [8 (1984)] 140. A collection of earlier prose writings published during his incarceration with the bizarre title *Die miernes swel op, ja die fox-terrier kry ’n weekend en
So, too, Ovid condenses all his personae into one: his poetry as the true reflection of himself, his true imago, more 'real' than his pain-wracked body: sed carmina maior imago / sunt mea, quae mando qualiacumque ('but my songs are a greater image of me, and I entrust them to you to read, whatever they may be like', Tr. 1.7.11f.). Although his portrayal of desolate and frozen external reality is most often now taken as a portrayal of his inner desolation, Ovid paradoxically depicts his inner resilience as vanquishing external hardship. His imagination sustains him, travelling at will to Rome where he sees in his mind's eye the life he can no longer share.

Love, Isolation and Death

A major metaphor in Ovid's exilic poetry is the concept of 'having died' when he was banished. Van der Horst identifies the central themes in Breytenbach's prison oeuvre: his wife, a cage, and krenge—a rotten carcass or a bad man. As verb, krenge means 'to tilt a ship or cause it to list for the sake of repairs', but as word play, it also implies kring, a 'ring', in the sense of 'ring composition'. The fourth theme is death. The themes of love and death are interwoven in both poets. First, on love: a flouting of the sexual mores of his time features in the works of both poets, yet each, when in dire straits, exhibits a single-minded affection for his spouse. Where the roots of Breytenbach's troubles with the State sprang from a non-State-sanctioned marriage, we can expect that longing for his wife should be central to his prison poetry. Love for his wife shines through as a clear beam in the murk of his sequestered life and the gloom of his
writings. Everything else is questioned. The third stanza of a poem translated by
the poet himself and entitled ‘Oh My Love, My Darling, I Hunger . . .’
(reminiscent of title of the popular fifties love song, which continues ‘for your
touch’), runs thus:

for too long have I forgotten
the deft tips of fondling
the flower fingering of dalliance
woven in arabesque in hiprock and tapis.

This, although tone and temper are entirely different, may be compared with
Ovid’s evocation of a reunion with the ‘old and grey’ Penelope-like figure of
his wife, who will be emaciated through care, but still desirable, and vulnerable:

te quoque, quam iuuenem discedens urbe reliqui,
credibile est nostris insenuisse malis.
o! ego—di faciant!—talem te cernere possim,
caraque mutatis oscula ferre comis
amplectique meis corpus non pingue lacertis
et ‘Gracile hoc fecit’ dicere ‘cura mei’ . . .

(Ov. Pont. 1.4.47-52)

You too, whom I left as a young woman when I left the city, perhaps you have
grown old through my ills. Oh, may the gods grant that I might see you again
and enjoy kissing your silvering locks, and hug your slender body in my arms
and say, ‘It’s my worries that made you so thin!’ . . .

Ovid uses the concept of exile as death as a consistent metaphor from
Tristia 1.2.65 onward; but play is inconsistent, death alternately featuring as
final threat or final release for the suffering exile. That these tropes are mutually
exclusive is acknowledged in Tristia 1.4 with the rider si modo, qui perit ille
perire potest (‘That is, of course, if someone who has died can die’, Tr.
1.4.28). Tristia 3.3 features an imaginary deathbed scene, where the poet
‘watches’ the ‘dying’ exile. The separation of personae is clearly evident. An
‘epitaph’ follows, vindicating him as love poet, who died at his own hand, or
rather, through his own art:

HIC EGO QVI IACEO TENERORVM LVSOR AMORVM
INGENIO PERII NASOR POETA MEO

(Ov. Tr. 3.3.73f.)

65 Breytenbach [8 (1988)] 89.
66 See J. M. Claassen, ‘Exile, Death and Immortality: Voices from the Grave’, Latomus
55 (1996) 576-81 for further examples. Ovid is, incidentally, rewriting the metaphorical use
of ‘dying’ in the erotic sense so common in Roman elegy (later also common in the English
metaphysical poets).
I WHO LIE HERE, NASO THE POET, TENDER LOVE’S PLAYBOY, PERISHED THROUGH MY OWN GENIUS.

Yet even within the poet’s words the game continues. The exile’s ‘death’ acts as a metaphor for his isolation, both as poet and as Roman citizen. Against this Breytenbach’s similar claim of having died sounds a grimmer note, as in the first lines of the Afrikaans original of the poem from which I quote above:

mon amour
    hierdie ek is dood
met die groen van brommers om oë en mond
maar uit die hara van hierdie stil plek
deur gegrondelde poorte en getraliede vensters

sien ek jou
praat ek jou
mon amour

mon amour
    this ‘I’ is dead
with green of blowflies at eyes and mouth
but from the hara of this silent tumulus
through bolted gates and barred apertures

I see you
I talk you
mon amour

The irony of a ‘dead’ husband with sightless eyes and silent tongue both ‘seeing’ and ‘talking’ his wife into existence is close to the Ovidian trope of simultaneous death and sentient, suffering life (cf., e.g., Pont. 4.16.47-52, quoted above). Breytenbach’s poem ends on a reaffirmation of his continued existence, yet an awareness of how prison has changed him:

the man you’re waiting for
will no longer be this I
but older, like winter snow in the cracks
old like a wounded wind from the interior
and he will carry me back with him

67 Breytenbach’s own translation [8 (1988)] 94 of his own poem in Breytenbach [8 (1976)] 8. By pure chance the poem goes on to reminisce about his wife in ‘the golden city of Rome / in that gilded cemetery’, referring no doubt to Rome’s Christian architectural legacy, but this cannot be taken as the poet’s acknowledgement of a spiritual affinity with his Roman predecessor.
Ovid, as we see, like Breytenbach, admits that time and isolation have changed him, and fantasises about ultimate return as an ‘old and grey’ Odysseus-figure, reunited with an equally ancient wife (*Pont. 1.4.1f.*). In an earlier poem Ovid complains because, although his essence has altered, he can in no way lose sentence: *ille ego sum, lignum qui non admittar in ullum: ille ego sum, frustra qui lapis esse uelim* (‘I am that man who am not allowed to turn into wood: I am that he who wishes in vain to be a stone’, *Pont. 1.2.33f.*). Here, too, repetition of the key phrase *ille ego sum* (‘I am that man’) ties the poet to the possibly spurious *incipit* of the *Aeneid*, but not as a statement of poetic autonomy and the promise of future excellence, but a sad palinode of all that he has ever vaunted himself to be. In this poem he both calls for death and fears it: *saepe precor mortem, mortem quoque deprecor idem, ne mea Sarmaticum contegat ossa solum* (‘I frequently pray for death, and also pray that death may stay away, lest Sarmatian soil should cover my bones’, *Pont. 1.2.57f.*).

One of the psychological spin-offs of isolation is a fluctuation in both poets between awareness of having ‘died’ and awareness that isolation has not killed them off, but irrevocably changed them. Isolation and non-communication equal ‘non-being’. Death in all its facets typifies the bleak existence of each. Even after Breytenbach’s release, death remains the central metaphor for his horrific experience. One of his retrospective collections of prison poems is aptly entitled *Lewendood* (‘Living Death’). In *True Confessions* he tells of being ‘aware of being buried’, adding:

That you entertain the fancy of still being alive is of no consequence. There is no death. You are buried to what you know as normal life outside. . . . This death-world is filled with sounds you never imagined.

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68 Breytenbach [8 (1988)] 95.

69 The illusion of being dead seems central to the consciousness of most prisoners, as witnessed, for instance, by the title of Soyinko’s prison book *The Man Died*, or Oscar Wilde’s famous aphorism ‘all sentences are sentences of death’ (quoted with references in Claassen [3 (1999a)] 253). R Degl’Innocenti Pierini “‘La Cenere dei Vivi’: Topoi Epigrafici e Motivi Sepolcrali applicati all’ Esule’, *InvLuc* 21 (1999) 133-47 quotes Shakespeare’s *Romeo and Juliet* act 2, scene 3: ‘And say’st thou yet that exile is not death?’.

70 Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 108.
Yet in prison the urge to communicate with the outside world persisted. He needed ‘to shout “I’m here! I’m dead but I’m here—be sure not to forget it!”’.\textsuperscript{71} On suicide by prisoners he says ‘You kill yourself because they are killing you’.\textsuperscript{72} His own thoughts of suicide had been exorcised by his inner life, an ‘intimate questioning’ of his persecutors.\textsuperscript{73} The last passage in this work is a poem entitled ‘13 TO LIVE IS TO BURN (Andrei Voznesenski)’. Its last couplet reads: ‘Burn, burn with me love—to hell with decay / To live is to live, and while alive to die anyway!’\textsuperscript{74} Both Ovid the love poet and Ovid the lonely exile could \textit{mutatis mutandis} have expressed a similar sentiment.

When he is asked how he survived, twice Breytenbach answers ‘I did not survive’.\textsuperscript{75} Twelve pages after the second denial he says in an (unsent) letter to his wife:

\begin{quote}
You gave me your strength and I survived. I died and you were there waiting. I was in my grave, and you wrote to me. . . . The husk of hurt and alienation will be shucked.\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}

Earlier he had explained the effects of isolation: ‘Parts of you are destroyed . . . all objectivity is taken away from you . . . you watch yourself changing . . . without ever being able to ascertain the extent of these deviations’.\textsuperscript{77} In \textit{Mouroir} Breytenbach is even more explicit: ‘The difference between life and death is that there is no difference’.\textsuperscript{78} Elsewhere he explains what imprisonment does: ‘Absence and distance kills the soul’;\textsuperscript{79} later he expatiates upon exile in similar terms:

\begin{quote}
Exile—isolation (exile is too melodramatic) is a method of maiming. It implies that you are turned in upon yourself . . . without finding a natural outlet in a shared culture of language for your worries and your reflections. . . . Isolation is arrested growth . . . the I can only develop as a living part of the us.\textsuperscript{80}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{71} Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 239.  
\textsuperscript{72} Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 208.  
\textsuperscript{73} Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 235.  
\textsuperscript{74} Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 356.  
\textsuperscript{75} Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 356.  
\textsuperscript{76} Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 234, 280.  
\textsuperscript{77} Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 292.  
\textsuperscript{78} Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 113.  
\textsuperscript{79} Breytenbach [2 (1984a)] 90.  
\textsuperscript{80} Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 75.
Here Breytenbach refers to 'maiming'. 'Wounding' and 'illness' as precursors to dying are closely linked to the metaphor of isolation as death in both poets.\(^81\) In Ovid 'wounds' are of two kinds: those inflicted upon him by the emperor, and the emperor's 'wound'. Ovid calls attention to his mysterious error with frequent refusals to lacerate the emperor's 'wound' afresh (at, e.g., *Tr.* 2.1.209, 4.4.41f. and *Pont.* 2.2.57). His own miseries as 'wounds' recur frequently from *Tristia* 1.1.99 onward. The aid of family and friends is 'healing'. His melancholia is so graphically portrayed that several articles have appeared discussing Ovid's poetry as symptomatic of severe depression.\(^82\) Breytenbach recounts bouts of depression in similar terms: 'I was sick of myself and sick of others through isolation'.\(^83\)

*Singing Death*

The South African writer of ironic short stories, Herman Charles Bosman, was in his youth (during the late 1930s) condemned to death for murder, long before the wholesale imprisonment of South African political activists. This sentence was later commuted to a prison term. In *Cold Stone Jug* he relates his prison experiences, telling of his envy of those prisoners that were treated with contempt and hardship by unsympathetic wardens, for that was an acknowledgement that they were alive.\(^84\) In contrast, those in the condemned cells were treated almost kindly, with grudging respect, as if already dead. Laughter and joking helped him and a fellow inmate of the condemned cells to assert their continued existence as living men, but every day was heavily imbued with the foreboding of an announcement of his imminent execution.

Laughter became, then, Bosman's means of clinging on to life. Later, political prisoners Ruth First, Hugh Lewin, Jeremy Cronin and Joyce Sikakane all relate soberly what Breytenbach portrays luridly in *True Confessions*.\(^85\) The last night that condemned black prisoners, political or otherwise, would spend on earth, was whiled away by the singing of their fellow 'condemns' (common prison slange for those in the condemned cell). A black man, they tell, was *carried to his death by a wave of song* that the white prisoners in their separate quarters could share only vicariously. Our various authors all tell of fear and pity filling the whole prison with gloom. Lewin refers to Bosman's narrative and comments that in forty years 'little had changed' and tells that the rest of

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\(^{81}\) Breytenbach [8 (1989b)] 104 refers to 'exiles with unhealed wounds in their minds'.

\(^{82}\) See discussion and extensive references in Claassen [66 (1996)] 581f., esp. nn. 40f.

\(^{83}\) Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 113.

\(^{84}\) Bosman [9] 17.

\(^{85}\) Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 194f.
the prisoners were kept sleepless on the night before hangings were to take place. Hence song also worked to break through the isolation of single cells. Breytenbach also speaks of interruption of sleep. Sikakane found that the ‘long, never-ending hymns’ of the condemned prisoners accentuated the loneliness and emptiness of her isolated state. Breytenbach, too, speaks of being ‘alone in the house of dying’ and of ‘the defiance of those singing their death, . . . raising their voices in a rhythm of life and of sorrow so intimately intertwined that it could only be a dislocation of the very notion of the body of God’. In one instance song brought new solidarity. Cronin, in the prose elucidations that intersperse his poems, explains how the unbroken forty-eight-hour vigil on one occasion changed its tone as three condemned ANC guerrillas imported defiance into their song.

Elsewhere Breytenbach refers to the unison, rhythmic singing of prisoners polishing the corridor floors, song setting a common pace for the sweep of their brushes. H. Bruce Franklin in his discussion of the ‘prisoner as victim’ in the gaols of America, discusses the value of prison poetry and the prison chain gang song as a ‘necessity for survival’, serving to sustain the spirits of those incarcerated or subjected to long periods of back-breaking and unrewarding enforced labour. Nearly two millennia earlier, Ovid had expressed the selfsame sentiments. In his isolation, he says, he does no more than the fossor (‘ditch-digger’) ‘chained to his fellow’: both sing to relieve their

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87 Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 115.
89 Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 49, 108, 194. He speaks of awakening in the dark and writing a poem while listening to a ‘lone voice singing . . . this week only one is due for hanging’ (115). Elsewhere he tells of how all others in the prison join the ‘Unwhites’ in singing: ‘Every flight of the prospective voyagers’ voices is supported and sustained by those of the others . . . the sound of the voices is like that of cattle at the abattoir . . . [whereas] the Uncoloureds . . . don’t sing easily’ (Breytenbach [2 (1984a)] 52f.). His poem ‘For the Singers’ (Breytenbach [8 (1988)] 45) also refers to ‘cattle at the slaughtering places’, stating that ‘in the singing is the endlessness / of dying’.
92 Franklin [9] 78-110. The work-song also helps to sustain workers for long periods, keeping anyone from being victimised for slowness, and [to] ‘co-opt . . . what they are forced to do, making it theirs’ (111).
pain (Tr. 4.1.5). The idea recurs in a later poem. By implication relief of pain through song brings hope, the ‘only goddess’ that still keeps the fossor alive: 

\[ \text{haec facit ut uiuat fossor quoque compede uinctus / liberaque a ferro crura futura putet} \]  

([Hope] ... causes the chain-gang-navvy to go on living / and he thinks that his legs will still be freed from the irons’, *Pont.* 1.6.31).

For Ovid, the writing of poetry in exile is a manifestation of the same desire to relieve his loneliness and the accompanying tedium that is the greatest hardship he has to bear. At the same time, he complains about writing poetry without having someone to hear it: 

\[ \text{siue quod in tenebris numerosus ponere gestus / quodque legas scribere carmen idem est} \]  

(‘or [I’m unhappy] because it’s just like dancing in the dark / to write poetry that you must read [i.e., not *sing*]’, *Pont.* 4.2.33f.): 93 Breytenbach expresses an almost similar sentiment in *True Confessions*, but in his case his description of *writing in the dark* is literally factual: ‘I used to be a night-bird; now only a jailbird . . . ’. Writing in the dark was ‘like launching a black ship on a dark sea’. He was doing his ‘black writing with . . . no-colour gloves and . . . dark glasses on’, trying to feel the letters he could not see. Furthermore,

It makes for a very specific kind of wording . . . the splashing of darkness, the twirled sense. Since one cannot re-read what you’ve written a certain continuity is imposed on you. You have to let go. You must follow. You allow yourself to be carried forward by the pulsation of the words as they surface on the paper. You are the paper. 94

He makes explicit the value but also the pain of writing poetry: ‘You write on in an attempt to erase’—to erase the dark, to erase the loneliness. Later he defines poetry as ‘a secret way of capturing lost time’. 95 One may read into this Ovid’s equal need to write himself into the minds and hearts of those in Rome.

About the lack of an appreciative audience, Breytenbach says: ‘Writing took on its own pure shape, since it had no echo, no feedback, no evaluation, and perhaps ultimately no existence’. 96 This is a prime example of the proverbial lone tree falling unheard in the silent woods. 97 Ovid expresses similar frustration at writing to Rome but never receiving a reply, clearly poetic

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95 Breytenbach [8 (1989a)] 72.
96 Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 142.
97 Breytenbach [8 (1988)] 62 evokes the ‘life cycle’ of a poem, from tree, to paper, to poem, to beauty in words, in the evocative ‘White Lines’: ‘Then boat, house, paper, word— / and somewhere a moon mounts / whitely from the verse’.
hyperbole, an expression of a feeling of dumb hopelessness, aimed at evoking sympathy, not literal fact.  

Submission Versus Subversion

For the incarcerated Breytenbach, allowed to compose, but not to keep his effusions, the act of creation was a function of life, painful but necessary, its products like excreta, which are flushed away. A poem in Voetskrif entitled ‘(mitemosaiek)’, that is, ‘mosaic of myths’, evokes the process of defecation, concluding that ‘the labyrinth gives birth to a naked pyramid’. The volume that appeared in the early years, Voetskrif (‘Footnote’) was dedicated to his police captor and interrogator, Colonel Broodryk, in ostensible submission. This was the only way in which the poet could get his products to the literary market place. The police interrogator features largely in Breytenbach’s post-prison writings as variant play on the initial of ‘investigate’, ‘Mr Eye’ or merely ‘Mr I’. With this last appellation Breytenbach is showing the degree to which the victim actually associates himself with his persecutor. The one needs the other to feed his being into existence. After being returned to the maximum security facility from a short stay in less secure surroundings, he commented, in ironical apostrophe of his captor, ‘[I was] ... saved ... to confess to you, my dead P.’ This implies that his captor is no longer a living human being, is brought to sentience by his victim’s address, but also, that his captor is essentially himself. Similarly, Ovid’s poetry brings to life, and ties himself in with, the looming figure of the all-powerful man-god who removed him from Rome. Most of his poems assume the divinity of the emperor. Tristia 2.1 is explicitly addressed to Augustus. In many others the argument shifts subtly from an ostensible addressee to the persecuting figure of a vengeful god.

98 On the rhetoric of silence see Claassen [3 (1999a)] 129f.
99 See Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 140.
100 This phenomenon is well documented by M. Hepworth and B. S. Turner, Confession: Studies in Deviance and Religion (London 1982) esp. 66-78, 131-40, 145, 171-75 on confession as a phenomenon in both the ecclesiastical and judicial spheres in England in the last two centuries. They point out that the law prefers that the condemned confess, thereby relieving the state, or even the executioner himself, of some of the onus of taking a life. Conversely, the prisoner needs to confess in order to assert his common humanity with his punisher.
101 Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 231, my emphasis. The reader’s eye is beguiled by the initial ‘my dea-’ into expecting ‘my dear’, so that ‘my dead’ comes as an almost sickening blow. This is typical of Breytenbach’s word play.
Almost every poem assumes the presence of the poet’s imagined major reader, the figure of the emperor as powerful censor and arbiter of his lot.

The picture is not flattering, placing in a questionable light the most exemplary achievements that Augustus vaunts in his Res Gestae. The pater patriae appears as a cruel and unnatural father, whose adopted son reflects his father’s visage, but only in its cruel and vindictive expression. The religion that Augustus tried to restore has been superseded by the lone figure of a harsh man-god, his humanity displayed only in an obsession with gaming and wenching, his divinity arbitrary and repressive. The moral life of Rome that Augustus tried to restore through fostering the creative power of poetry is shown as degraded, hypocrisy its major vice. In all this, there is an overlay of ostensible submission and admiration. We have noted that Ovid’s possible irony is still debated, but recent criticism seems to subscribe more and more fully to the anti-Augustan stance in Ovid’s exilic poetry that I have been postulating since 1987 and before.\textsuperscript{103}

Poetry Made Visible

Breytenbach is a celebrated painter as well as a poet, and his lucid discussion of the process of choices inherent in painting a picture—deciding where limits should be set, reducing the options open to the artist—could as easily have served as a description of the process whereby a wordsmith chooses the words that make up a poem, polishing the product until all alternatives are eliminated:

\begin{quote}
Painting . . . is always a process of never-ending decisions. . . . ‘Completing’ a work is simply a matter, step by step, of reducing the choices. . . . The final form, if successful, is arrived at by eliminating the has-beens and the progeny.\textsuperscript{104}
\end{quote}

Breytenbach the painter and Breytenbach the poet work in the same way. What they describe would work equally well for Ovid the wordsmith.

It is a commonplace of Ovidian criticism that Ovid wrote ‘visually’. Many of the ekphraseis in his love poetry and graphic descriptions of creeping change in the Metamorphoses seem to depict verbally some or other lost painting. In general the poet’s words convey a visual impact. In one of the strangest of his poems, Epistula ex Ponto 4.1, the poet explicitly requests the great Sextus Pompeius, his latest patron, to consider him, Ovid, as one of his, Pompeius’, possessions, comparable to a series of famous art works, a sculpted

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[103]{Cf., e.g., the double-edged praise in Tr. 2.1.470-84, 509-14; for thorough discussion: Claassen \citea{11 (1987)} and Claassen \citea{3 (1999a)} 147-53.}
\footnotetext[104]{Breytenbach \citea{2 (1986)} 140.}
\end{footnotes}
heifer by the great Myron, Apelles’ Aphrodite of Anadyomene and the two statues of Athena on the Acropolis. Green’s translation gives the feel of the verses of the remarkable (and unique) coda:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ut} & \quad \text{Venus artificis labor est et gloria Coi,} \\
& \quad \text{aequoreo madidas quae premit imbre comas,} \\
& \quad \text{arcis ut Actaeae uel eburna uel aerea custos} \\
& \quad \text{bellica Phidiasca stat dea facta manu,} \\
& \quad \text{uindicat ut Calamis laudem quos fecit equorum,} \\
& \quad \text{ut similis uerae uacca Myronis opus,} \\
& \quad \text{sic ego sum rerum non ultima, Sexte, tuarum} \\
& \quad \text{tutelaeque feror munus opusque tuae.}
\end{align*}
\]

(Ov. Pont. 4.1.29-36)

Just as Venus forms Apelles’ labour, and glory, squeezing out her sea-wet hair, as the warrior-goddess guarding the Acropolis, Athena stands in bronze or ivory, Pheidias’ work, as Calamis claims renown for his sculptures of horses, as the truly lifelike cow reveals Myron’s hand, so I, Sextus, am not the meanest of your possessions: my safeguard, you: your gift, your creation, I.

The poet is expressing gratitude for aid. It is a word-craftsman’s attempt to resort, through his words, to a more visual medium and to lose his personality within a product of the plastic arts.

With Breytenbach the relationship between the literary and plastic arts is even more explicit. A picture in a book of essays, published six years after his release, shows the grim scene of a man hanging in a prison cell, pen and paintbrush in hand, wearing a bib, as if about to take a meal. This graphically epitomises the lot of the isolated poet. The covers of his books carry illustrations by the poet himself, strange and enigmatic paintings that convey the central imagery of the poems: a chameleon, a man with a horse’s head, birds, butterflies and strange unclothed figures whose exposed genitalia offer a metaphor for the exposure of self that the poet conveys in words. The cover of Judas Eye features the naked figure astride a big bird within the confines of a small cell with a strong hinge and two key-holes. The figure looks defensively at a large eye, more reminiscent of the architectural feature on the gable of a Cape Dutch house (the omniscient ‘eye of God’) than of the small spy-hole of a

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105 The translation is that of Green [51]. At Pont. 4.5.39-44 the exile vows that he will remain the consul’s res mancipi (a fossilised archaic legal term for certain types of possessions relating to agriculture: cf. Gaius Inst. 2.14-17).

prison door. Light shows under the door, and the back of the figure appears illuminated, as if by light from an invisible window.

The eyes of the bald, skull-like head and face on the cover of ('yk') are covered by a white moth, and the title appears branded in red on his forehead. On the back cover a naturalistic self-portrait of the author has a large orange butterfly covering its eyes. On the cover of *True Confessions* a grey, naked figure clutches—in fingerless hands—a big, brightly coloured bird. The figure is kneeling, again in a small cell, here with windows on either side, from which twelve hands (brown, white and pink) reach out behind him, fingers bent, as if signalling in the language of the deaf. Bandages cover the top of the figure’s head, hiding the eyes. On the back cover the same figure is flesh-coloured, or pink, except for the unbandaged, bald white top of its head, the eye sockets smeared shut with whitewash or paste. The lower part of its face is flecked white and crimson, as if carrying fresh bruises. This figure has fingers, stained a deep rose pink. Here the bird is bandaged, all except its head and beak and gleaming black eye. The whole powerfully portrays the frustrations of imprisonment, alleviated only by the comforting presence of the multi-coloured bird, perhaps representing the poet’s writings, also trammelled by the prison experience.

Mirror-imaging appears as the overriding metaphor of the cover of *Eklips*. It visually depicts the Afrikaans pun inherent in the title (both ‘an eclipse’ and ‘I, lips’). An eyeless face has the labyrinthine white letters of the title, outlined in black, on its forehead, with the letters of the author’s name jostling each other between red, grinning lips. The back cover has the mirror image of the title in black letters. From its closed, turned-down mouth the mirror image letters of the name dribble out, hanging over the lower lip like half-chewed spaghetti. This is again a sightless, wordless writer that comes into being by speaking his own name, his speech clogged and muted.

*Breytenbach’s Explicit Poetics*

So writing is the only way in which an isolated poet can make himself believe in his own continued existence. Ovid stresses, time and again, that his pain is

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107 Butterflies and moths feature in Breytenbach [2 (1984a)] (the prose equivalent of his prison meanderings) at, e.g., 142, 179f., where the narrator enters a room full of moths and water; and at 202, describing a city filled with ‘signs of decay and rats’, where ‘white butterflies’ are ‘clean as unwritten and unthought thoughts’. For Breytenbach, both moths and butterflies are important signifiers of metamorphosis, the changes that he himself underwent, from carefree traveller, to exile, to prisoner, to haunted political refugee who had lost his South African citizenship, to French citizen. He coins the verb ‘butterflying’ to depict this process (Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 20).
alleviated by writing poetry (e.g., *praebet mihi littera linguam*, ‘literature provides me with a tongue’, *Pont.* 2.6.3). Hugh Lewin describes writing between the lines of a Bible, the only paper he had to hand.\(^{108}\) Writing confirms his own existence to a solitary author, whether at Tomis or in Pretoria Central Prison.

In prison Breytenbach can travel in his mind’s eye, as in his description of his visit to his mother’s deathbed, where he, like the dying woman, can see their common forebears surrounding the bier:

\[
\ldots \text{glinsterend geel} \\
\text{het ’n son die arkadiese toneel bestreel} \\
\text{gespeel oor die halfkring gesigte van ou} \\
\text{uitgesorwe ooms en voorvaders wat rustig} \\
\text{aan pype sit suig om rook te kweel.}
\]

\[
\ldots \text{glistening gold} \\
a \text{sun soft-stroked the arcadian scene} \\
\text{played over a halfcircle of faces of old} \\
\text{long-dead uncles and forefathers, peacefully} \\
\text{sucking pipe stems, lips smoke-enfolded.}\(^{109}\)
\]

We know from his prose writings that the poet was not allowed to leave his place of incarceration even to attend his mother’s funeral, but his poems work to give vicarious closure.\(^{110}\) Similarly, his longing for his wife achieves a degree of sublimation by the celebration of their love, as in the examples quoted above, but also in a poem recounting the value of memory and mind-travel at dead of night: ‘\ldots\ this unforeseen shameless joy / that my thoughts can be with you despite all my fears / \ldots\ in the immense clustering and death of consciousness / oh my wife’.\(^{111}\) Ovid does much the same in various poems to his wife, but also to friends (e.g., *Tr.* 4.1.57).\(^{112}\)

For Breytenbach, reality outside his prison has become vague, but as poet he thinks it into new existence. That is the *raison d’être* of his composition.\(^{113}\)

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\(^{108}\) Lewin [7] 61 and 81 relates the extended uses to which the Bible could be put in a cell with no other paper available.

\(^{109}\) Breytenbach [8 (1983a)] 57.

\(^{110}\) Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 270-73. A cycle of four poems, to his father, mother and an imaginary attendance of her wake, in Breytenbach [8 (1988)] 77–82 continues this process. Much later (Breytenbach [8 (1989a)] 101), he fantasises about his dead mother’s return.

\(^{111}\) ‘In the Middle of the Night’, Breytenbach [8 (1988)] 44.

\(^{112}\) See discussion by Claassen [3 (1999)] 121f., 177, 283 nn. 75, 78, 311 n. 85.

\(^{113}\) ‘The Commitment’, Breytenbach [8 (1988)] 22f. In Breytenbach [8 (1989a)] 31 he explains that ‘when writing comes into its own \ldots\ the missing is transformed into a delicious
He speaks time and again of his urgent need to write. In *Mouroir* he typifies words as ‘holes in which you must stick death’, and writing as ‘an “anti-reality” that causes reality to exist’; he affirms his creative autonomy: ‘I am the writer. I can do what I want!’ \(^{114}\) The composition of a poem can serve as surrogate for all the usual trappings of a birthday celebration:

\[\text{a man sat down and made up a poem} \]
\[\text{for his birthday on the sixteenth of the ninth month} \]
\[\text{The man scrimmaged and scraped and even aped} \]
\[\text{trying to gum together the scrapings and scribblings} \]
\[\text{with his own breath} - \]
\[\text{in the desert too the tongue casts a shade.} \(^{115}\) \]

The prisoner goes on to relate that he ‘wrapped up the poem in paper against making a fair copy that evening’, but when he next looked at it ‘the damned paper had gobbled up the verse’, leaving him with nothing to show for his birthday. \(^{116}\) Ovid on occasion berates his birthday for following him to Tomis (e.g., Tr. 3.13). Later he uses a poem as surrogate greeting on his wife’s birthday, drawing comfort from putting the familiar ritual into words (Tr. 5.5). Elsewhere he designates poetry as *solacia frigida* (‘cold solace’, Pont. 4.2.45). It would appear that Breytenbach, like Ovid, experiences the futility of versification as a substitute for human contact. A poem that discusses the poetics of isolation puts it powerfully: ‘... ’tis easier for the camel word with no oil to its sound / to slither through the needle’s mouth / than for the heart / to escape through that judas!’ \(^{117}\) Equally bitter is the anguished sound play

\[^{114}\text{Breytenbach [2 (1984a)] 53, 62.}\]
\[^{115}\text{Breytenbach [8 (1976)] 27.}\]
\[^{116}\text{Breytenbach [8 (1976)] 27.}\]
\[^{117}\text{Breytenbach [8 (1988)] 15; cf. ‘It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven’ (Matthew 19.24).}\]

\[\text{mixture of ache and ecstasy ... until the very absence becomes a presence’}.\text{Certain conceits recur in Breytenbach’s writings. The ‘present absence’ recurs almost unaltered in} \]

\[\text{Breytenbach [8 (1989b)] 82.}\]
Yet poetry seems to be the one thing that sustained both poets in their isolation. With Breytenbach, his lucid post-prison writings about his craft give us a view of what transpires in the creative process, but also of the value that the solitary artist attached to the practice of his craft. He spells out the value that writing had for him in sustaining his personality against the erosions of solitary confinement and of the onslaughts of the conventional, while admitting that to write was dangerous: ‘If you are a writer, watch out for the words: they are traitors’. His circumstances were such that he could say ‘I doubted if poetry was going to save my neck; it might well have become the very noose’. Notwithstanding this, Breytenbach continued writing, driven by an inner need to compose. Often he would write at night, in the dark. The apparent formlessness of his poetry, its lack of punctuation, is explained by this. As he could not reread what he had written, he felt ‘a certain continuity ... imposed’ on him by the dark, a smaller version of the blindness of one-way composition without revision imposed by his captors. Yet writing became for him

... a means ... a way of survival. ... Writing is an extension of my senses ... but becomes an externalisation of my imprisonment ... writing ... constitutes the walls of my confinement. ... [It is unbalancing something very deeply embedded in yourself when you in reality construct ... your own mirror ... you write ... your own face, and you don’t like what you see.'

Breytenbach was rediscovering the personal value that poetry has for the poet, even if only to disturb. Long before, he had composed an Arse poetica, a kind of political manifesto for a poet, an emotional upwelling of his frustration at his inability to change the South African political situation through his poetry: ‘Ek weet net dat daar van soveel braaksel ontslae geraak moet word. ... Ek wil sê dat die gedig nutteloos is. Ek moet die gedig kan rig (‘I only know there is so much vomit to be voided. ... I want to say that poetry is useless. I must be able to address it’). Ovid could probably have told him that it is not

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118 Cf. Breytenbach [8 (1976)] 70: ‘For writing pad is butcher’s block, page is bloodbath / word is murder—or becoming, and is that / not the same?’


120 Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 219.

121 Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 136. In his fictionalisation of his prison experiences Breytenbach’s [8 (1989b)] 65 protagonist, Mano, exclaims: ‘I need ... to exist in the reader’s mind ... through my writing I create myself’.

122 Breytenbach [60 (1980)] 114-16.
the task of a poet to interfere directly in politics, but both would agree that the
inverse was equally true.

After his release, continued writing serves as a catharsis, cleansing the
festering sore of his memory of suffering: ‘There is no composition like
decomposition . . . recollecting all the hurts will allow me to put them out of my
mind for ever’. 123 Publishing his prison writings was a triumph of mind over
hurt: ‘The word dreamt in the anonymity of prison has become sap and fibre’. 124
Writing True Confessions was to him like the effect of a strong emetic: ‘It is all
coming back in bits and pieces . . . I am vomiting words’. 125 Its final pages are
entitled ‘Notes from the Journal of Bangai Bird’. The first of six notes begins:

I realise now the preceding document is in itself for me an interstice of
freedom. I had to write it. I had to purge myself . . . I am not a hero; I am not
even a revolutionary . . . I don’t believe in trying to change the past, except to
the extent that a forever changing future continually throws another light on
that past.126

He tells of an obsessive, urgent need to talk on tape, to tell the things he had to
hold back during his wife’s visits to him in prison, which she now ‘typed and
retyped’. His intention had been to produce a political text: ‘. . . if it turned out
to be more “literary” than expected it can only be because I couldn’t help it. It is
. . . the seductiveness and the life of the word. But . . . prison accounts as a genre
. . . are pretty much the same the world over.’ 127 He became aware of the need
to transcribe his experiences for the sake of all those incarcerated everywhere,
and even for the sake of their oppressors, as a form of recognition of their
essential brotherhood. For him, a tool for survival in prison had been ‘to remain
aware of the humanity of the other’. 128

Application to Ovid

Breytenbach’s attitude to the power-structures that interfered so drastically with
his life, and the way he eluded censure for his continued subversive writings,

123 Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 133.
125 Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 268.
126 Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 307. He is aware that what he has written often remains to
haunt an author, even though he has moved on in his thinking: ‘Writing is a messy way
of committing suicide’, so ‘Writing the Darkening Mirror’ (1994), published in Breytenbach
[8 (1996)] 2.
128 Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 255.
can help us to understand what Ovid was doing in his isolation. I am sure that Ovid knew what he was doing when he ostensibly praised Augustus and the imperial family, while in fact denigrating the despot that punished his *carmen* for an inadvertent error. Ovid’s pre-exilic writing had not been cast into the required Augustan mould. Exile did not change that. Breytenbach spells out the need for resistance against totalitarian control of the arts: ‘Art is ambivalent. If it were otherwise, we’d be spouting propaganda . . . even mediocre work may be made important by proscribing it.’\(^{129}\) And again: ‘Poetry can transmit or be used by power . . . [it has] the slow but sure power to break down separators.’\(^{130}\) He will not ‘knuckle down to oversimplification [for] . . . writing [is] the expression of revolt, not the sublimation of it.’\(^{131}\)

Like Ovid, Breytenbach appears both to love and to hate his art, which, to him, is himself. In one of the almost lyrical, but bitter, prose passages that intersperse the narrative of *True Confessions*, he asserts:

I write about South Africa—which is the quintessential No Man’s Land. . . .
I write to no one, inventing an I who may mouth words that I can neither swallow nor spew out—they are the stones of the labyrinth, with the mortar of silences.\(^{132}\)

His essential being has been silenced, but he has created a persona through whom to protest. Elsewhere Breytenbach admits frankly that what he writes is ‘corrupt[ed by his] suffering’, adding ‘one man’s penpoint of view [is] obviously formed and deformed by personal experiences’.\(^{133}\) What is written must be taken as a distortion of reality (whatever that reality may be). In *Self-portrait/Deathwatch* he discusses the role of the author as creator of a projected self, explaining that the process of writing objectifies the self. This is very much what I have for a long time asserted about Ovid in exile.\(^{134}\)

Breytenbach continues on the next page of the passage from *True Confessions*: ‘You must go on, even if you lose yourself along the way’.\(^{135}\) His intimate relationship with his tormentors is continued in this work:

\(^{129}\) Breytenbach [2 (1984b)] 143f.
\(^{130}\) Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 153f.
\(^{131}\) Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 194.
\(^{132}\) Breytenbach [8 (1984)] 216.
\(^{133}\) Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 265.
\(^{134}\) Breytenbach [8 (1988)] 123. For discussion: e.g., Claassen [3 (1999a)] esp. 229-31 and earlier in Claassen [12 (1988)].
\(^{135}\) Breytenbach [8 (1984b)] 217.
always... I've kept up my intimate questioning of you, Investigator... I have seen you as the minotaur, which is the I, which does not exist since it is a myth... I see you now as my dark mirror-brother. We need to talk, brother I... I must warn you that the system... will grind us down, me and you.  

Ovid's continued address of the emperor, directly or indirectly, may be seen in a similar light. Sometimes the 'Other' is simply an aspect of the 'I', as in Breytenbach's frequent addresses to 'Don Espeglio', 'Mr Mirror'. A poem in Judas Eye bears the apt title 'mirror-fresh reflection'. It addresses in turn a warder, the poet himself, and then Death. Here his poetry is termed 'the sorrow that I squirrelled away word for word'.

An introduction—punningly termed 'Pretext'—to End Papers explains:

Part of the how [of writing in isolation] was using the I as prism... as some sort of prototype of South African sensibility... not just any old I, but... the ever-changing 'historical' bonhomme...

leading to poetry:

I know there will always be, when least expected, an eruption of the irrational, the poetic... We all have inside of us a subterranean and bottomless pit of ink which wells up... strained through the brain... emerging in weak squirts called words.

This underlying impulse to compose leads to the creation of verse. Elsewhere he acknowledges the value of poetry, as a 'do-it-yourself survival method... a mechanism... a verbally transmitted passion of words resulting in silence'; it is 'language taking a risk', even 'crippled prose'. This conceit is verbally reminiscent of Ovid's play on the uneven length the verses in an elegiac couplet, but such chance similarity is negligible. Of importance are the ideas that composition is the means of survival of a poet in extremis and that it can convey emotion.

Although Breytenbach's poetry and prose are unconventional in form, the poet remains aware of the disciplined patterning required by verse composition.

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137 Breytenbach [8 (1988)] 40f.
139 Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 156; cf. 146 about his painting: 'Art is the matter of survival'.
140 Cf., e.g., Tr. 3.1.11f.: the poem itself 'limps' as the result of its long journey from Tomis.
141 On Ovid's emotion in the exilic poetry see Claassen [12 (1989a)].
The meandering, dream-like sequences of *Mouroir* in some cases include distinct poetics, such as: ‘I wrap up my story in words and try to present it in patterns’. Elsewhere in the same work he interrupts the narrative to launch into an excursus on poetics and the nature of his tale. Even here the artist with words cannot resist word-play:

> Of course I could introduce a juggling of beauty here and yonder just for the juice of it—some lacustrine [*sic*] colours perhaps, and a breath of sentiment not too lachrymose. Nothing lacerating however, no—none of that turning inside out or bringing dark mumblings to light.

Toward the end of the book he muses about the ‘possibility offered by the title of the story’. He is honest about the obscurity of his writing: ‘As reader you will just have to read a little harder to interpret the signals’. *End Papers* spells out the reader’s role: ‘The poem, to exist, needs a listener, a reader, a participant’. Ovid is less explicit, leaving much to his readers’ intelligence to decipher, yet his writing constitutes a similar consistent attempt to write himself into existence within readers’ perceptions.

Breytenbach defines the function of the plastic arts as ‘the coming to grips with a feel of reality by way of illusion’. His writing does the same. *Mouroir*, the prose evocation of the horrors of incarceration, even more than his prison poetry, exhibits characteristics of fantasy similar to those of Ovid’s stylised picture of Tomis. It conveys a fantastic picture of Breytenbach’s place of incarceration, as a large double-storied hut, with empty cells and only two guards, ‘Sergeant Roog’ (inversion of the Afrikaans word for ‘gross’) and ‘Warder Softly-Softly’. The place is inhabited by the prisoner and his wife ‘Meisie’ (‘Girl’):

> Sometimes I even thought that the prison must be a holiday camp for warders and that we were there . . . just to justify the presence of the guardians . . . . Warders will be warders . . . . Often we got drunk together . . . .

This is not to be taken literally. Breytenbach is exhibiting in prison the same kind of durability of spirit that prompted Ovid in exile to conjure up a

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144 Breytenbach [2 (1984a)] 245. The ‘possibility’ encompasses play on the French for the words *death* and *mirror*; cf. above, n. 29.
146 Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 146.
magnificent shrine at which he daily worshipped silver images of Augustus, Livia and Tiberius, sending reports of his paroxysms of reverence, to (one would hope) a skeptical Rome (Pont. 2.8). 148

Conclusion

A cynical poem in Judas Eye is entitled ‘What Counts’. It contrasts other (dead) poets with a still-live Breytenbach and concludes that life is worth more than an ability to weave words: ‘They were perhaps wise in the ways of the word / but knew sweet bloody nothing about keeping alive’. 149 This need not be taken as his final word on poetry. The body of works emanating from Breytenbach’s incarceration and subsequent exile offer, like works from Ovid’s banishment, immortal proof of the value of writing poetry to keep the human spirit alive. For both poets, poetry was power. Long before his incarceration Breytenbach had written that ‘art independent of politics does not in reality exist’, and, three years later, ‘The tribe expects the Poet to be an exponent of its tribal values, not a dissenter’. 150 Neither Ovid not Breytenbach could subscribe to this. Such an inability led to their downfall. After his release, Breytenbach wrote ‘A poem is an expressive structure and an instrument of freedom. . . . Word is act.’ 151 Six years later came: ‘Writing is like plaiting a rope. And the rope is the present linking past to future.’ 152 The fact that a comparison such as this present paper can be made between two authors separated by two thousand years is proof of the durability of this multi-stranded rope. Finally, an address to ‘My Dear Unlikely Reader’ spells out Breytenbach’s view of the function of poetry in a political environment: ‘The simplest way to combat totalitarianism . . . is to disturb the silence’. 153 Is this not what Ovid, too, was doing, when he penned ten books of poems and sent them back to Rome from Tomis on the Black Sea?

150 Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 45, 57.
151 Breytenbach [2 (1986)] 93.
THE EUNUCHS OF EARLY BYZANTIUM

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Abstract. Eunuchs played an important role at Rome and early Byzantium because of their intimate contact with the imperial family. Cubicularii serving under weak emperors notoriously abused their positions for personal gain, but Eutherius distinguished himself through selfless service to two emperors and others like him bequeathed riches to the church or gave alms to the poor. Narses played an extraordinary role as advisor, administrator and military commander under Justinian I.

Human castration was officially abhorred in ancient Rome. Eunuchs were despised and emperors like Domitian, Nerva and Hadrian decreed ruthless penalties for perpetrators of castration. However, in due course the number of eunuchs (usually imported as slaves from Armenia, Persia and Caucasian nations) increased progressively and after the second century they become quite essential components of high-class Roman households, including the imperial court. Emperors had their favourite eunuchs and they became part of the licentious behaviour of Nero and the like. Juvenal (6.360-79) wrote of Roman ladies who preferred eunuchs as sexual partners because of their beardless kisses and absence of the risk of pregnancy.

During the fourth century, Rome’s expansion to the East led to Constantine’s decision to build a new capitol at Byzantium, inaugurated as Constantinople in 330 AD. In 395 the empire finally split into independent western and eastern components. With this movement towards the Orient, eunuchs in the eastern empire in particular also acquired more status and influence, some even achieving greater power than the emperors. This extraordinary development during the fourth to sixth centuries largely coincided with the creation of an influential imperial court organisation run almost exclusively by eunuchs, called the institution of the ‘sacred bedchamber’. In this paper the role played by the most eminent of these eunuchs is reviewed.

1 RE Suppl. 3.449-52; M. Horstmanshoff, ‘Who is the True Eunuch?’, in S. Kottek and M. Horstmanshoff (edd.), From Athens to Jerusalem (Rotterdam 2000) 101-17.
2 All dates throughout this article are AD.
Cubicularii, or staff of the ‘sacred bedchamber’ (*cubiculum*) of the emperor and empress, were first appointed towards the end of the fourth century during the rule of Constantine’s sons. With the exception of two (an elderly man of free birth and a person accidentally castrated), all *cubicularii* known to us were eunuch slaves, mostly of Persarmenian origin. The organisation of the *cubiculum* varied from time to time, either as a single establishment or as separate bedchambers for the emperor and empress or other ladies of the imperial family. The imperial ladies were sometimes served by *cubiculariae* (‘women of the bedchamber’), also of servile origin. Court eunuchs wore a distinctive uniform and minor adornments, especially earrings.

The *cubicularii* were ranked according to importance. The most junior included the *comites sacrae vestis* (‘keepers of the wardrobe’), while the *comites domorum* were responsible for supplying the income for the bedchamber. The *spatharius* (‘captain of the bodyguard’) and *sacellarius* (‘keeper of the privy purse’) were more senior, with the *castrensis* (‘majordomo of the palace’) above them. Under the majordomo served two *tabularii* (accountants who managed the expenses of the emperor and empress), an *adiutor* (‘assistant’) and a *chartularius* (‘secretary’) with clerks. Above the *castrensis* ranked the *primicerius sacri cubiculi* (‘senior eunuch’) and above him the *praepositus sacri cubiculi* (‘grand chamberlain’). The latter was selected by the emperor (or empress) and served during his (or her) pleasure. The *spatharius* and *sacellarius* often enjoyed similar terms of employment, but these lower posts went by seniority and were held for a fixed term (for example, for two years in Justinian’s reign).

Owing to the secluded state in which the emperor lived, these eunuchs, who alone had regular and familiar contact with him, controlled all personal access by outsiders and thus enjoyed considerable influence. In the case of weak emperors, a strong *praepositus* in particular could become all-powerful. They were often used as ambassadors and imperial representatives on important missions. Their privileged positions could bring great wealth, as it became customary to receive gifts for arranging audiences with the imperial family. A powerful *praepositus* could virtually sell the great offices of state by auction. They also had unrivalled opportunities to petition for confiscated estates, and such confiscations often followed on their scheming influence with the emperor. In the fifth century Theodosius II exempted the estates of senior *cubicularii* from *sordida munera* (degrading services such as grinding corn and baking bread for the troops) and from billeting. The law requiring that successful petitioners for estranged estates should transfer half their income to the state, and tax regulations were relaxed for *cubicularii*. As a result, the populace
understandably greatly disliked these ‘barbaric’ slaves promoted to power, who possessed riches unachievable by the ordinary citizen.

Gradually the official ranking of cubicularii was raised. In 422 the rank of the praepositus gained parity with that of the praetorian and urban prefects and the magistri militum (‘supreme commanders’): in the Notitia he became illustris (‘illustrious’). The primicerius and castrensis ranked as spectabilis (‘noteworthy’), a dignity later extended to lower officers including the chartularii. By the fifth century senior officers thus ranked as senators on retirement. Initially the aristocracy greatly objected to this, as they considered cubicularii unscrupulous impostors, an opinion that was justified in a large number of cases. When the praepositus Eutropius managed to have himself declared consul in 399, this caused so much indignation that he was the first and last eunuch ever to attain this position. Virtuous cubicularii were indeed in a minority but by the sixth century, when senior eunuchs regularly achieved senatorial rank, popular prejudice seemed to wane and occasional eunuchs like Narses with proven ability excited no adverse comment.

The Fourth Century

After the death of Constantine the Great in 337, his three mediocre sons co-ruled initially but soon became involved in civil war. Constantine II (the eldest) died in battle in 340; Constans ruled in the West until his assassination in 350; Constantius II ruled in the East from 337-361. The subsequent emperor, the pagan but efficient Julian the Apostate, was killed in battle after a brief reign (361-363) and was followed by Jovian (363-364). The energetic Valentinian I co-ruled with his brother Valens from 364-375 and was succeeded in the West by his son Valentinian II for the period 375-392. The latter was temporarily deposed by the usurper, Maximus (383-387), but was re-instated by Theodosius I (379-395) and ruled with Gratian in the East. At the death of Theodosius (who had taken a strong pro-Christian stance) there was finally a division into a western empire under Honorius (395-423) and an eastern (Byzantine) empire under the weak ruler Arcadius (395-408), who was married to the Frankish princess Eudoxia.

During this period a number of cubicularii came to prominence. Among the less prominent eunuchs of Constantius II was Hilarius. In 355 he was dispatched to Alexandria to eject Athanasius and install George as bishop. When in 357 Pope Liberius assented to condemn Athanasius, the powerful anti-Arian bishop of Alexandria, he sent copies of his recantation to Hilarius, ‘the faithful eunuch of the emperor’. Earlier, in 341, when Athanasius was

temporarily deposed, the emperor sent his cubicularius, Arsacius, to assist Philagrius, the Prefect of Egypt, in installing the Cappadocian Gregory as Bishop of Alexandria during anti-Arian church squabbles. When Pope Julian convinced the emperor to arrange a definitive church council to settle the Arian issue in 342/343, the meeting proved a fiasco when the western delegation supported Athanasius and the eastern one opposed them. At this gathering the eastern delegation of bishops was controlled by two commissioners, one of whom was the emperor’s castrensis, Hesychius.

Perhaps the most infamous cubicularius of the period was Eusebius, praepositus of Constantius II, who had immense influence over the weak emperor and amassed enormous riches (Amm. Marc. 14.10.5, 15.3.2, 17.4.2-7, 18.5.4f., 21.16.16, 22.3.12). In 354 he was sent to Callibonum with large bribes to quell a mutiny of the army. He then lead the persecution of Gallus Caesar (half brother of the subsequent emperor Julian), had him executed and cruelly prosecuted his friends and followers. He propagated the Arian case with Constantius II and arranged for the appointment of Eudoxios as bishop of Antioch. In 355 he endeavoured unsuccessfully to turn Pope Liberius against Athanasius by means of threats and elaborate bribes and schemed extensively in favour of the Arians at the Synods of Ariminum and Seleucia in 359. His plot to assassinate Ursicinus, the magister militum, in order to acquire his estate, failed. When Constantius II died in 361 he schemed to maintain his privileged position but was promptly executed by the next emperor, Julian the Apostate.

Eutherius, in the service of both Constans and Julian, is one of the few cubicularii to emerge from history with an unsullied record. Born a freeman in Armenia, he was captured and castrated by enemies who sold him as a slave to the palace of Constantine I. He educated himself and gained a reputation for loyalty, good judgement and wise decisions. As primicerius to Constans, he tried in vain to keep the young ruler on the right track. Promoted to praepositus by Julian, he had a healthy, sobering influence on the energetic emperor but as ambassador to Constantius II in 355 he unsuccessfully strove to reconcile the two. He was not a Christian. He eventually retired to Rome where, as Ammianus tells us, he lived a long and respected life, liked by all ranks of society in contrast to most cubicularii, who retired into obscurity with their ill-gotten gains (Amm. Marc. 16.7.2-8).

Little but the name is known of Euzonius (Euzoicus), praepositus to emperor Jovian (363-364). Gallicanus, praepositus to the usurper Maximus, is

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7 RE 1.1725, 3.2483-86.
8 RE 1.1725, 3.2485f.
remembered for aborting the reconciliatory mission of Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, on behalf of Valentinian II, by denying the bishop a private interview with Maximus (384).

Eutropius, an ambitious and unscrupulous eunuch, served as praepositus under Theodosius I and Arcadius, and became the most influential man in Byzantium between 395-399. After the death of Theodosius I, Eutropius plotted the rapid succession of the young Arcadius and immediately involved himself in national politics in order to eliminate Rufinus, the powerful praetorian prefect. With the assistance of Stilicho, magister militum in the West, and the general Gainas, Rufinus was assassinated and Arcadius was pressured to legitimise the action in 395. Rufinus’ extensive estate went largely to Eutropius, who now became virtual ruler of the East. He appointed a minion as military prefect, exiled two senior commanders and decentralised the army so as to have direct control over the military. This resulted in a weakening of the empire’s defences and forced Eutropius to continue his relations with Stilicho until he felt secure enough to go into direct alliance with Alaric the Visigoth and oppose Stilicho. The latter then plotted to overthrow Eutropius but the attempt failed and the senate declared him enemy of the eastern empire and his properties in Byzantium were confiscated (much of it went to Eutropius).

Eutropius manipulated the judicial system in his own favour. Petitionary gifts to the emperor were forbidden but by devious means he continued to accept such presents in person. He interfered in ecclesiastical matters, arranged the assassination of Gainas (an Arian leader) and launched the persecution of non-Christians, whose properties were then confiscated. He passed a law to interfere with the Church’s property rights and acquired certain church estates for himself. Religious leaders like John Chrysostom and Theophilus of Alexandria were pressured to accept his candidates for prestigious positions like that of the post of Bishop of Constantinople. When Porphyrius, Bishop of Gaza, wanted the pagan temples in his region closed he went to Eutropius, who spoke to the emperor, and the request was granted within a week. However, the rich pagans of Gaza then succeeded in bribing the official sent to close the temples and the main temple (the Mameum) was spared.

When Eutropius had himself appointed consul in 399 (the first and last eunuch to attain this distinction), public indignation reached a climax. At the time Constantinople experienced earthquakes, floods and fire, and the bishop declared that the end of the world was near. In spite of a moderately successful military operation against the Huns (led by Eutropius), Gainas used a revolt of

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the army to discredit Eutropius. His many enemies rose against him and he was disgraced and exiled to Cyprus.

*The Fifth Century*

The western empire came to an end after Alaric sacked Rome in 410 and the last emperor, Romulus Augustulus, was deposed in 476. In the eastern (Byzantine) empire, Arcadius was succeeded by his son, Theodosius II, who reigned rather than ruled from 408 until his death in 450. His pious elder sister, Pulcheria, and wife, Eudocia, influenced him strongly up to 440 when they fell from favour and the imperial eunuch, Chrysaphius, rose to power.¹¹ Marcian (450-457), Leo I (457-474) and Zeno (474-491) were indifferent rulers in a time characterised by religious confrontations and constant warfare against Persians, Huns, Goths and other barbarian tribes. Anastasius I become emperor in 491.¹²

In 400 John Chrysostom was petitioned by the bishop of Gaza to close the surviving pagan temple, the Marneum. He arranged an interview with the sympathetic empress, Eudoxia, through her *castrensis*, Amantius.¹³ In spite of obstinate resistance from her husband, Arcadius, the Marneum was soon closed. Amantius continued to exercise a sinister influence under Theodosius II.

During the rule of Theodosius II it was recorded that two *praepositi*, Antiochus and Calepodus, who had acquired considerable wealth, left their entire estates to the Church of Constantinople.¹⁴ Religious leaders like Cyril, Bishop of Alexandria, ensured healthy relations with the imperial court by spending vast sums of money on winning the support of eunuchs and ladies in the bedchambers of the emperor and his influential sister Pulcheria.¹⁵ We know the names of three *praepositi* in this era: Chryseros,¹⁶ Paul and Musellius;¹⁷ these last two were granted remission of arrears owed to the ‘sacred house’ in 414.

The best known *cubicularius* of this era was the powerful and unscrupulous Chrysaphius.¹⁸ As *spatharius* and later *primicerius* under Theodosius II he gradually acquired influence and through careful plotting and

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¹³ RE 3.1725.
manipulation eliminated his enemies. Malalas states that he was the emperor's lover.\textsuperscript{19} By 440 he had succeeded in alienating Theodosius from Pulcheria, the empress Eudocia and the very influential Egyptian born Cyrus (imperial adviser, praetorian prefect, prefect of Constantinople, and consul). When Cyrus was deposed in 441 (and made Bishop of Cotyaeum), Crysaphius became virtual ruler of Byzantium in association with one Nomus (consul and master of offices). After arranging the assassination of John, \textit{magister militum}, he also took over the imperial military reins. After the death of Cyril, Bishop of Alexandria, in 444 he increasingly interfered in church matters. When his friend Eutyches, Bishop of Constantinople, was convicted of heresy and deposed, he took up his cause and persuaded Theodosius to call the 'Robber Synod' of Ephesus in 449, where Eutyches was cleared and reinstated as bishop. However, the tide was turning against Crysaphius. His plot to assassinate Attila in 448 went sour and he barely escaped the Hun's wrath. At home his enemies increased steadily and on Theodosius' death in 450 the new emperor, Marcian, was elected with the support of Pulcheria and senators in opposition to Crysaphius' foreign, domestic and ecclesiastical policies. He was promptly executed by the new emperor, who had married Pulcheria.

\textit{The Sixth Century}

Anastasius I (491-518) ruled wisely, interfered minimally in ecclesiastical matters, consolidated the empire militarily and brought financial stability.\textsuperscript{20} He was succeeded by the commander of his bodyguard, Justin I (518-527), and after him followed his nephew, Justinian I (527-565), the greatest of all Byzantine emperors. He married the able Theodora (who started life as a courtesan), surrounded himself with good administrators and proceeded to restore the Roman empire almost to its ancient boundaries. His \textit{Corpus Juris Civilis} codified existing Roman law and remained influential in European countries down to modern times. The magnificent Hagia Sophia church was built in his time. His largely successful military campaigns can be ascribed to two extraordinary commanders: the Slav, Belisarius, and the Persarmenian eunuch, Narses.\textsuperscript{21} Justinian's successors, Justin II (565-578), Tiberius I (578-582) and Maurice (582-602) were unimportant emperors.

At the death of Anastasius I, his praepositus, Amantius,\textsuperscript{22} contrived a coup to have a certain Theocritus elected emperor. For this purpose he entrusted the commander of the bodyguard, Justin, with a large sum of money with which he was to bribe the troops to support his candidate Theocritus. However, Justin used the money to bribe the troops in his own interest and they proclaimed him emperor. He then executed Amantius (and Theocritus) on charges of conspiracy against the emperor as well as the patriarch of Constantinople on the charge of being a secret Manichaean.

John of Ephesus recorded the history of Theodore,\textsuperscript{23} one of the few truly virtuous cubicularii of this era. He was castrensis in Justinian's court and a pious man who retired prematurely because of ill health. He was then so lavish in donating charitable gifts to the poor that he dissipated his entire fortune in gold in one year. In the next year he disposed of his silver plate and clothes and freed all his slaves. Thus reduced to beggary, the emperor heard of his plight and allocated him a yearly pension equivalent to the salary of a provincial governor.

Narses, born approximately 490, must rank as one of the most extraordinary eunuchs of all times.\textsuperscript{24} Brought to Byzantium as a Persarmenian slave, he was approaching forty years of age when Justinian I became emperor. His administrative ability led to his appointment as Justinian's sacellarius ('keeper of the privy purse') and in the Nika riots of 532 he impressed with his efficient contribution to quelling the rebellion by a combination of judicious bribing and firm force when needed. In 535, when the empress' candidate for bishop of Alexandria was deposed by extremists, Narses, at the head of 6 000 men, reinstated him. In 537 Justinian gave Narses (who had no previous military experience) command of an army to support Belisarius, who was at this time leading Justinian's efforts to liberate North Africa and Italy from barbarian invaders. Belisarius fought an excellent campaign with the help of one Solomon, an Armenian eunuch, whom he had as chief of staff and who later commanded his own army with distinction but died in battle in 544.\textsuperscript{25} Narses showed remarkable military ability in this campaign but because of disunity among the generals (which included inappropriate independent action by Narses), Milan fell to the Goths with enormous loss of life and Justinian recalled Narses.

In 549 Belisarius left Italy and was made magister militum of the East. This led to renewed barbarian invasions. In 550 Totila the Goth captured Rome.

\textsuperscript{22} RE 1.1725; Gibbon [18] 5.56.
\textsuperscript{23} Jones [3] 569.
\textsuperscript{24} PLRE 3.912-28; Gibbon [18] 5.226-35, 310, 311; RE 12.870-89.
\textsuperscript{25} Jones [3] 227, 293.
and a new army under Germanus was raised. When Germanus died suddenly Justinian appointed Narses, now promoted to praepositus, as commander. Although he was probably sixty-one years old at this stage, there are historians who believe that he might have been at least ten years older.\textsuperscript{26} He lived up to Justinian's expectations, handled his motley army with great efficiency and, in a brilliant campaign lasting two years, re-conquered the whole of Italy, destroying Totila's Goths, the Franks and the Alaman armies. Although Italy was once again (briefly, as it turned out) in Roman hands, the country was devastated. Narses stayed on with the power of military commander and civil governor and from 554 to 567 ruled efficiently and with wisdom. When Justinian died in 565, his mentally unstable successor, Justin II, listening to accusations from enemies and probably edged on by empress Sophia who despised the eunuch general, recalled Narses. Almost immediately the Lombards and other tribes reoccupied Italy. Narses retired in bad grace: he never returned to Constantinople and probably died in Naples or in Rome in 574 at the age of eighty-four years (or older).

According to Procopius and other historians, he was an honourable man and one of the few officials who managed to remain in the good books of both Justinian and Theodora. As military commander-in-chief at sixty-one with minimal previous military experience, he proved himself an outstanding strategist. He was popular with his army and merciful to his enemies. As governor of Italy he showed endless energy in restructuring the land while maintaining good relations with the Pope and church (although he was probably a monophysite).\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{Conclusion}

Eunuchism represents a despicable chapter in the story of mankind. Not only were innocent victims castrated against their will, but society then turned its back on these unfortunate people and considered them outcasts while the perpetrators of the horror wallowed in their ill-gotten gains. The popular generalisation that eunuchs were unscrupulous and scheming individuals is certainly based on some historical truth, but it is probably to be expected that, out of bitterness towards a society which had maimed them for life, many eunuchs would react by avenging themselves indiscriminately.\textsuperscript{28} In this review of a specific group of eunuchs in late antiquity who found themselves in

\textsuperscript{27} RE Suppl. 12.888f.
\textsuperscript{28} RE 3.451-54.
positions of relative power in the imperial sacred bedchamber, it is clear that certain behavioural tendencies, but no uniform picture emerges. Of those influential eunuchs recorded for posterity (of course we know nothing of the vast majority), a significant percentage were indeed unprincipled, greedy and cruel. These men, like Eusebius, Eutropius, Crysaphius and both Amantiuses, also counted among the most powerful eunuchs and best recorded cases. There were also cubicularii whose names we know as obviously important personalities but who played a neutral role in recorded history, like Arsacius, Hesychius, Euzonius and Hilarius. Of Urbicius, we know only that his wise advice at an imperial selection forum led to the appointment of a good emperor, while Gallicanus' refusal to grant Ambrose a private audience with a usurping emperor probably prolonged the latter's reign. Nares and Eutherius clearly were talented, wise and honourable men. Solomon was an excellent soldier. Theodore was a virtual saint, while Antiochus and Caledopus did accumulate significant treasures as cubicularii but bequeathed it all to the Church. What we cannot tell from this study is whether this pattern of varying avarice, ambition and probity differed significantly from non-eunuch Roman citizens of the time exposed to similar opportunities and responsibilities.
VARIETIES OF NARRATIVE IN ANTIQUITY

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This collection of essays, which is dedicated to Bryan Reardon in recognition of the important contribution he has made to the study of the ancient novel, is a selection of thirty out of approximately one hundred papers read at the International Conference on the Ancient Novel (ICAN) held at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands in July 2000.¹ The present book is neatly divided into three parts each consisting of ten often quite closely-paired chapters: the first part goes by the title ‘The Ancient Novel in Context’, the second ‘The Ancient Novel in Focus’, and the third ‘Beyond the Ancient Novel’. In terms of the novels themselves, the emphasis falls mainly on Apuleius, who features in six chapters (this was perhaps to be expected from the hosts of the conference and the current popularity of this author). Petronius is the focus of two chapters, while Longus, Achilles Tatius, Chariton and Heliodorus are each discussed in one. There are nine general accounts of ancient fiction, two on the Alexander Romance, three on the Byzantine novel, and one each on the Ahiqar Romance, Plato, Lucian and Apollonius of Tyre. The current neglect of Heliodorus and Xenophon of Ephesus is shown by the fact that, according to the index to the volume, each of these authors is mentioned only three times (apart from the chapter about the influence of Heliodorus on Madame de Scudéry and Umberto Eco). In general, however (again with the notable exception of Apuleius), the contextualisation of the ancient novels, their reception in later literature, and discussion of other narrative genres are far more prominent in this bulky work than in-depth studies of the novels themselves. The editors suggest, in fact, that the next ICAN will not be an international conference on the ancient novel but rather on ancient narrative (p. xix).

¹ It is virtually impossible for one person to review this large collection of disparate pieces adequately. I therefore forego in this review discussion of a number of chapters in the collection.
Ellen Finkelpearl’s chapter, ‘Lucius and Aesop Gain a Voice: Apuleius Met. 11.1-2 and Vita Aesopi 7’ (pp. 37-51), is largely devoted to the relationship between Isis’ role in releasing Lucius from his embodiment as an ass in the novel and the part played by the same goddess in granting Aesop the power of speech in the biography of the fabulist. In giving speech both to Lucius in his asinine form and to Aesop, the mute slave, Isis endows the novel and fable with ‘legitimacy’ as genres (p. 40). This is an interesting metatextual perspective on the by now well-established link between the shorter and longer forms of narrative fiction in antiquity that provides some quite fascinating perspectives on Apuleius’ use of Egyptian hieroglyphic writing (Met. 1.1, 11.22), Egyptian religion (the Isis episode), and animal fables. Finkelpearl’s second point—that there is a tension between ‘two levels of language’ (p. 42) the ‘Apollonian’, represented by Xanthus and formal Greek philosophy, and the ‘Isiac’ discourse, which ‘does not disdain to be associated with donkeys and slaves’ (p. 43), in both the Metamorphoses and the Vita—is more questionable. The discussion is of interest in view of work currently being done on the need to bring philosophy closer to literature—a proximity that the Metamorphoses could in many ways be thought to exemplify. However, Finkelpearl does not establish clearly what she means by ‘Apollonian’ and ‘Isiac’ discourse. She assumes that Aesop wrote ‘populist fable-language’ (p. 50) and that Apuleius was ‘raising subliterary forms to the status of literature’ (p. 50), but fables were as much the favourite literary form of the philosophical and social elite as they were of the socially dispossessed throughout antiquity (cf. Pl. Phd. 61c; Aesch. Ag. 716-36; Archil. frs. 172-81 [West]). Their application in the rhetorical practice of the second sophistic is clear from Hermogenes’ On Types 406f., to take an example roughly contemporary with Apuleius. Fables are to be found in early wisdom literature (cf. Judges 9.8-15, for example) as well as in other traditions and it may be more helpful to consider them in origin alien to Greek culture, rather than as ‘subliterary’. If that is the case then Finkelpearl’s argument needs to be drastically restated.

That fables were foreign to Greek culture is suggested by the connection between the Vita Aesopi and Middle Eastern literature. This is the subject of Marko Marincic’s contribution, ‘The Grand Vizier, the Prophet, and the Satirist’ (pp. 53-70). Marincic argues that the Life of Aesop, like the apocryphal Tobit, sets out ‘to reduce the austere figure of the aristocratic Grand Vizier [Ahiqar] to an alternative type of a sage’ (p. 55). Thus Isis’ gift of speech to Aesop in the Vita, for example, is modelled on the conversion of Ahiqar in the oriental romance (p. 64) but with a very different outcome: unlike Lucius, Aesop remains a slave and may indulge his lust for his master’s wife after his transformation (p. 68). It is this contrast that is supposed to explain the sudden change of fortune of Aesop, who hubristically rises to the status of a sage in the Babylon-Memphis episodes only to end his life ignominiously at the hands of the people of Delphi.

The relationship between philosophy and fiction is investigated by Kathryn Morgan, ‘Plato’s Dream: Philosophy and Fiction in the Theaetetus’ (pp. 101-13), and Andrew Laird, ‘Fiction as a Discourse of Philosophy in Lucian’s Verae Historiae’
Morgan begins with the ‘troubling gap between Plato’s practice [sc. of writing fiction] and any explicit theorizing of it’ (p. 101) and proceeds to argue that dreaming in the *Theaetetus* should be taken as an ‘analogue for the experience of fiction’ (p. 102). The discussion centres on the long-standing problem of the relationship between dreams and reality in Greek (and indeed human) thought, complicated by the Platonic view that our ‘reality’ is itself unreal. This is a large and complex issue and Morgan evidently could not cover it all in her chapter, but some discussion of *Timaeus* 70e might have introduced consideration of Plato’s idea of *phantasia* and fiction. There is no doubt that the use of framing narratives and fictional characters in Plato’s dialogues do raise the important questions about the authority of the ideas contained with them. Laird’s contribution on the other hand investigates the obverse of the relationship between philosophy and literature: the extent to which Plato’s *Republic* constituted the ‘principle [sic] foundation’ (p. 123) of Lucian’s *Verae Historiae*. Evidence for the connection is sought in the educational value of *anesis* in the prologue (*Ver. Hist.* 1.1), the link between Plato’s allegory of the cave and the wall built between the sun and moon (*Ver. Hist.* 1.19, 1.31, 1.39f.), the mention of Socrates and Plato (*Ver. Hist.* 2.17), the connection between fiction and lying (*Ver. Hist.* 1.4), the problematisation of author-narrator transitions (*Ver. Hist.* 2.28), and the slippage between authors and characters in the work. These intertexts are typical of the writers of the second sophistic, but this does not mean that Lucian’s satirical squib is philosophical discourse.

Two contributions deal with narrative structure. Stephen Harrison, ‘Epic Extremities: The Openings and Closures of Books in Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses*’ (pp. 239-54), investigates how the novel ‘uses many epic patterns and themes but . . . presents them in a way appropriate for its own . . . genre of Roman prose fiction’ (p. 239). This study shows that Apuleius’ literary openings and closures frequently and deliberately include epic time references, that they are more common in the first half of the work, and that they are sometimes significantly structurally-related (the transition between books 4 and 5 parallels that between books 5 and 11). Stephen Nimis, ‘In Mediis Rebus: Beginning Again in the Middle of the Ancient Novel’ (pp. 255-69), likens the construction of fictional texts to building a wall from bricks (‘thematic elements’, p. 268) and mortar (‘text-economic elements’ such as references to composition, allusions to other genres, proleptic statements and summaries, p. 264). During the process, the author may alter the line of the plot and these ‘mortar moments’ (p. 256) are the subject of Nimis’ investigation. In his conclusion, Nimis swaps this metaphor for the familiar one of weaving in which each thread is ‘part of the design that is represented, but also exerts a force that holds the whole rug together’ (p. 268). One such element occurs at the beginning of book 3 of Longus: here the narrative moves from war to peace, winter to spring, and metaphorically from death to resurrection in order to bring about narrative closure. The title of this paper promises too much, however, and the model needs to be exhaustively tested against all of the ancient novels to determine the extent to which there is such fully-articulated and comprehensive ‘design’ in these narratives.
Donald Lateiner’s contribution, ‘Tlepolemus the Spectral Spouse’ (pp. 219-38), examines ‘the mythical and literary . . . antecedents of the spectral return of the anxious, dead spouse, Tlepolemus’ (p. 219) and how it ‘provides breakneck anti-romance that once again reveals Apuleius consciously subverting, when not inverting, his Greek “models”’ (p. 238). Lateiner documents some cases of ghostly spouses from epic and tragedy (but does not consider the more contemporary story of Phlegon of Tralles made famous by Goethe in his poem ‘Die Braut von Korinth’, for example, though this of course concerns a female revenant). He then argues that Charite has ‘thoughts and rituals of sexual union or marriage with six partners or pursuers’ (p. 234) and argues that Apuleius ‘consistently figures marriage negatively’ (p. 235) and that ‘the Charite-frame forces us to question the meaning and relevance of the inset Psyche-canvas’ (p. 236). However, this argument distorts Charite’s evident commitment as uniuira (a woman who has had only one husband) to her husband, Tlepolemus (noted on p. 230) and their romance, while it fails tragically, is not therefore necessarily ‘unideal’ (p. 237). Ultimately Lateiner fails to resolve the paradoxical dichotomy between complex but nevertheless idealistic romances, such as those of Psyche and Charite, and the adulterous liaisons of Pamphile and others in the novel.

Two contributions analyze literary elements included in the ancient novels. Françoise Létoublon, ‘La lettre dans le roman grec ou les liaisons dangereuses’ (pp. 271-88) broadly categorises the letters in the novels as official letters and love letters (letters of seduction and letters between hero and heroine) and discusses their functions of conveying information and dramatising the action. Much has already been written on epistolary novels and letters in ancient fiction and, while this study contains many insights, it often touches on points treated more fully elsewhere. By contrast there have only been a very few discussions of inscriptions in the ancient novels, and Erkki Sironen produces a refreshingly new perspective in her chapter, ‘The Role of Inscriptions in Greco-Roman Novels’ (pp. 289-300). After a glance at the use of inscriptions in the historians and other prose narratives, Sironen shows that these fictional notices are plausible, if archaic and literary; that they play an important part only in Xenophon and Apollonius of Tyre; and that they serve to identify and reunite characters in the novels (p. 290). On the negative side, the ταινία (‘headband’, not a ‘waistband’ [1], p. 295) of Persinna, is somewhat more than an inscription (it is in fact ἐστιγμένη, ‘embroidered’, 4.8.1), and Sironen does not include reference to the

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2 D. Ogden, Greek and Roman Necromancy (Princeton 2001) was evidently too late to be included in the discussion.

public notice of Venus offering a reward for the return of her runaway slave, Psyche (Met. 6.7), which takes the form of an official edict (edicere).

The intrusion of official documents into the novels is a form of authentication and this is the subject of the chapter by William Hansen, ‘Strategies of Authentication in Ancient Popular Fiction’ (pp. 301-14). Techniques such as superabundance of detail have been researched before, as has the pseudo-documentation in Photius’ account of Antonius Diogenes’ Wonders Beyond Thule and Dictys’ Trojan war diary, but Hansen takes this aspect of ancient narrative further by identifying a number of devices used by these authors: the relaying of information, the establishment of a pedigree for the narrative, and the association of celebrity names with the work (pp. 306f.). He also differentiates between light pseudo-documentation (the inscriptions in Xenophon and Apollonius of Tyre) and heavy pseudo-documentation (divine revelation of the doctrine in Thessalos of Tralles’ On the Virtues of Plants) and shows how the authors of ancient narratives differ in the degree of earnestness with which they authenticate their narratives.

Niall W. Slater, ‘Spectators and Spectacle in Apuleius’ (pp. 85-100), explores the ‘instability’ (p. 86) of the spectator in the Metamorphoses, and how spectators may become spectacles. The analysis focuses on the festival of laughter in book 3, but includes also the story of the robber Thrasyleon, which ‘functions as a warning against ambitious role-playing’ (p. 96), the attempted escape of Charite, and the performances of Lucius himself as ass in triclinium and amphitheatre. The novel therefore tells how Lucius ‘begins as an eager spectator and ends as spectacle’ (p. 100). This is a revealing study, although I was not persuaded that Lucius’ progression to being an object of public scrutiny is necessarily ‘more terrifying than comforting’ (p. 100) in Apuleian terms in view of the fact that ancient society was rather more communal than that of the United States in the twenty-first century. The importance of the gaze is also the subject of Froma Zeitlin’s contribution, ‘Living Portraits and Sculpted Bodies in Chariton’s Theater of Romance’ (pp. 71-83). Visual elements in the romance are classified as epiphanies (for example, the epiphany of Kallirhoe’s divine beauty, 4.1) and apparitions (the appearance of Chaereas at the trial of Mithridates, 5.7), sculptural representations (the golden statue of Kallirhoe, 3.6) and dream images (Dionysius’ dream of his wife, 2.1). These representations ‘serve as organizing elements that sustain the work’s technique of doubling’ or ‘as imaginative signposts that clarify its structure and deepen its emotional valence’ (pp. 82f.).

Violence in ancient narrative fiction is the subject of Kathryn Chew’s contribution, ‘The Representation of Violence in the Greek Novels and Martyr Accounts’ (pp. 129-41) and that of Stelios Panayotakis, ‘Three Death Scenes in Apollonius of Tyre’ (pp. 143-57). Chew discusses the reasons for violence against

women in the novels and martyrlogies and seeks her answer in sociology and a theory of sexuality, specifically the ideas of Durkheim and Butler, whose thoughts Chew paraphrases respectively as ‘violence indicates social disorder’ and ‘women are the phalluses which men have and which they constantly fear losing control or possession of’ (p. 135).\(^5\) The subject is vast and controversial and the importation of these recent, post-industrial revolution theories does not help the clarity or cogency of Chew’s analysis. Panayotakis, on the other hand, has a much narrower focus. He simply argues that ‘three passages from the anonymous romance of Apollonius share the rhetoric of violence with well known death scenes from Biblical and hagiographical texts’ (p. 157).

Three papers deal with generic links. Giuseppe Zanetto, ‘Archaic Iambos and Greek Novel: A Possible Connection’ (pp. 317-28), finds that ‘the novelists [particularly Achilles Tatius] had a direct knowledge of most of archaic iambography’ (p. 327) and that ‘the Greek novels . . . are cultivated texts in which hidden quotations, allusions, and veiled reminiscences play an important part’ (p. 328). Judith P. Hallett, ‘Resistant (and Enabling) Reading: Petronius’ Satyricon and Latin Love Elegy’ (pp. 328-43), sees Satyricon 16-26 as a ‘resistant reading’ (p. 330) of Propertius 4.8 and concludes that ‘Petronius is here reinforcing traditional, conservative, patriarchal (and some might even say misogynistic) assumptions about female, and male, sexual conduct’ (p. 343). Danielle van Mal-Maeder, ‘La mise en scene declamatoire chez les romanciers latins’ (pp. 345-55), states that Petronius and Apuleius make use of rhetoric to create intertextual, sensational, and fantastic effects within the context of the fictive universe of their novels. Gareth Schmeling’s chapter, ‘Myths of Person and Place: The Search for a Model for the Ancient Greek Novel’ (pp. 425-42), can perhaps be added to these three studies of genre. Schmeling seeks ‘another group of novels, quite unrelated to the Greek novels, which shows, however, a number of literary similarities to the Greek novels and also similarities in social institutions which help to give rise to its popularity’ (p. 426). This group is found in the novels about the American South, whose female protagonists are known as Southern Belles. I found this an extremely interesting and original comparative study.

The epic character of Charite’s story is demonstrated by Luca Graverini, ‘The Winged Ass’ (pp. 207-18), who connects the tears of Charite in her dream (Met. 4.27) with those of Odysseus (Hom. Od. 8.521-31), Medea in Apollonius Rhodius (3.656-64), and Dido (Verg. Aen. 4.465-68). The main interest of Graverini’s contribution, however, lies in his discussion of the narrators in the novel. Graverini links the narration of the story of Cupid and Psyche by the old woman to the tales told by Aeneas in the Aeneid and by Demodocus in the Odyssey and also discusses the stories told by Diophanes (Met. 2.14) and Socrates (Met. 1.7). He concludes that there are more ‘I-narrators’ than heterodiegetic, omniscient narrators in the Metamorphoses and that, although Apuleius exploits epic intertexts, ‘the physical and spiritual virtues

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typically shown by the epic hero are replaced by more bourgeois and everyday features’ (p. 218).

Wytske Keulen, ‘Swordplay-Wordplay: Phraseology of Fiction in Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses*’ (pp. 161-70), interprets Lucius’ description of a sword-swallow and contortionist (*Met. 1.4*) as ‘the *Metamorphoses* in miniature’ or ‘the novel in a nutshell’ (p. 170). This claim is based on the context of the anecdote regarding belief and disbelief in magic at the beginning of the novel (with possible intertexts with Empedocles via Plutarch) and on the metaphor of words as swords enforcing persuasion (with intertexts in Apuleius and Plutarch). Neither argument appears strong enough for Keulen to go on to describe the incident as ‘a visual comment on the genre of prose fiction’ (p. 168), especially as the reader of this chapter is expected on these grounds to swallow the theory that Apuleius ‘seems to make the reader his sceptical accomplice in observing Lucius as a ridiculous pseudo-philosopher’ but he, the author, ‘turns out to be the accomplice not of the reader, but of the narrator, whom he makes the mouthpiece of his deceptive literary strategy’ (p. 170).

The ‘polyphony of narrating voices’ (p. 171) is more fully and more convincingly expounded in J. R. Morgan’s chapter, ‘Nymphs, Neighbours and Narrators: A Narratological Approach to Longus’ (pp. 171-89), a study based on his regretfully still unpublished commentary on Longus.* Morgan argues that the author of *Daphnis and Chloe* is to be distinguished from the narrator, whom the prologue reveals to be urban, superficial, lacking in understanding and conventional. Thus the novel has a Chomskyan ‘surface “narrators text” and a deeper “author’s text”’ (p. 178). Morgan suggests that this ‘textual duplicity’ (p. 178) can be seen in the narrator’s (as opposed to the author’s) belief that cows may lose their hooves in water (1.30); in his failure to connect the images dedicated by Daphnis and Chloe at the conclusion of the novel (4.39) with the painting described in the prologue; in his restrained description of how Chloe rescues Daphnis from a pit by means of her breast-band (1.11); in his sarcastic reference to Lykainion’s education of Daphnis in love (3.18); in his ignorance of the significance of the nymphs (Pitys, Syrinx and Echo) in the novel; and in his prim treatment of the cicada episode (1.26). The hidden author makes his presence felt through inclusion of details whose significance is lost on the narrator, and by ‘structural symmetries and symbolisms’ (p. 187). Morgan himself provides a caveat (p. 189): the author’s presence may be so recessive and elusive as to become invisible.

The identity and limitations of the narrator are also the subjects of Tim Whitmarsh’s ‘Reading for Pleasure: Narrative, Irony, and Erotics in Achilles Tatius’ (pp. 191-205), a paper that follows his recent translation of the text.* Like Morgan (p. 172), Whitmarsh also draws inspiration from Conte’s work on Petronius (p. 192),

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* G. B. Conte (tr. E. Fantham), *The Hidden Author: An Interpretation of Petronius’ Satyricon* (Berkeley 1996).
but Whitmarsh focuses more on the relationship between reader and narrator than on that between author and narrator. Clitophon is a complex figure: he is at once experienced (1.2) and naive, especially in comparison with his pederastic cousin, Clinias (1.7), but the reader is 'never quite sure how much he [sc. Clitophon] knows' (p. 196). Clitophon shows himself at times to be not as naive as he seems, particularly in his use of erotic metaphor (1.16) and in respect of his own not inconsiderable sexual experience (2.37). Likewise, Clinias’ behaviour is not always mature and self-controlled (1.12-14). Both Clitophon and Clinias are in fact often remarkably of a kind: for example, Clitophon discourses on the physical impact of beauty on the soul (1.4); this passage should be read together with Clinias’ very similar pronouncement (1.9). Thus both Clitophon and Clinias are ironised and Achilles creates considerable space for the novelised reader to enjoy the act of reading ‘this wonderful, narratologically opulent, and self-consciously readerly text’ (p. 205). To me, this chapter is the highlight of the collection.

This is a very large collection of articles on the ancient novel; there are some brilliant and inspirational chapters and new reputations have clearly been made. The pairing of contributions (noted in this review) gives the book an intriguing, dialectical character. Taken as a whole, this volume demonstrates that scholarship on the ancient narrative is strongly debated and continues to grow in new and fascinating directions.

ON THE DIVINITY OF THE ROMAN EMPEROR ONCE MORE

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The long-awaited appearance of Gradel’s DPhil thesis in published form provides an excellent opportunity to discuss the phenomenon of ruler cult in the early Roman empire and the controversial theses that Gradel advances.¹ The study of Greco-

¹ The thesis was passed in 1995 and the transformation into a book was essentially completed by early 1998, although the preface dates from April 2002 and publication followed later in the year. Although Gradel says he has taken account of later scholarship, only one item appears in the bibliography: G. Camodeca, Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum: Edizione critica dell’ archivio puteolano dei Sulpicii (Rome 1999). He fails therefore to take account of M. Bergmann, Die Strahlen der Herrscher: Theomorphes Herrscherbild und politische Symbolik im Hellenismus und in der römischen Kaiserzeit (Mainz 1998), M. Clauss, Kaiser und Gott: Herrscherkult im römischen Reich (Stuttgart 1998) and D. Feeney, Literature and Religion at Rome: Cultures, Contexts, and Beliefs (Cambridge 1998) of the major monographs published in 1998. There are also hints that Gradel has not
Roman religion has come a long way in the past twenty years, but the specific area of ruler cult, despite enormously valuable detailed studies by the likes of Duncan Fishwick,\(^2\) has struggled to free itself from long treasured, but now outdated, paradigms. Gradel offers a highly provocative interpretation of what may be the most distinctive innovation of the Roman empire.

Gradel’s introductory chapter (pp. 1-26) is crucial for the development of his ideas. He begins by confronting the problem of defining ‘religion’ in general and especially in the Roman context: he prefers a concept of religion ‘defined by action of dialogue—sacrifice, prayer or other forms of establishing and constructing dialogue—between humans and what they perceive as “another world”, opposed to and different from the everyday sphere in which men function’ (p. 5), while at the same time arguing that for the Roman the divine world should not be separated from the other world. In addition, he builds on the important discussion by Simon Price on the need to remove overt or submerged Christianising assumptions from any discussion of Roman religion.\(^3\) Gradel believes he can do this by using ancient, contemporary terminology (that is, rejecting the modern category of ‘ruler cult’), differentiating worshippers by status groups, and public from private rites on the basis of whether they received state (or municipal) funding or not (cf. Festus 284 L\(^4\)). Building on the distinction best enunciated by John Scheid, that Roman religion was centred on


\(^2\) See, for example, D. Fishwick, *The Imperial Cult in the Latin West. Studies in the Ruler Cult of the Western Provinces of the Roman Empire: Provincial Cult, Institution and Evolution* (Leiden 2002).


\(^4\) All references to the text of Festus (L) in this review are to the page numbers in the edition of W. M. Lindsay (ed.), *Sexti Pompei Festi: De Verborum Significatu Quae Supersunt cum Pauli Epitome* (Leipzig 1913).
orthopraxy, Gradel concentrates on sacrifice as the best vehicle through which to examine Roman worship. Using the records of the Arval Brethren, he establishes the hierarchy of sacrificial victims—bull, steer, cow/heifer—that will assist later in his categorisation of emperor worship. He concludes his introduction with the assertion that, although the Roman sacrificial rites established boundaries between gods and men, these (and all other trappings of cult, such as temples or priests) ‘differed in degree, not in kind, from lower, terrestrial or—as we would say—secular honours’ (p. 26), so that ‘the man-god divide . . . could also be taken to reflect a distinction in status between the respective beings, rather than a distinction between their respective natures or “species”’ (p. 26). Divinity, then, (or rather, divine status) emerges as a relative category. No doubt this is perfectly true in terms of a modern sociological analysis of Roman religion or religion in general, but does it do full justice to the distinctions drawn by the ancients themselves? Authors such as Suetonius could distinguish between human and divine honours (e.g., ampliora etiam humano fastigio, ‘honours surpassing human limits’, Jul. 76) and behaviour (e.g., neque patrio neque ciuili ac ne virili guidem ac denique humano, ‘neither traditional nor current, nor masculine nor even human conventions’, Cal. 52), employing largely consistent distinctions in such a way as to suggest that, while things may be relative, there were ‘absolute’ distinctives (cf. Gradel’s later discussion of Seneca’s Apocolocyntosis in chapter 12).

Chapter 2, ‘Before the Caesars’ (pp. 27-53), begins by expanding on the idea that Rome’s gods were not worshipped because they were gods, but for their services to the Roman state; to worship X expressed that the status gap between the worshipped and the worshipper was very great, ‘it merely granted divine status to the honorand in relation to the worshippers’ (p. 29). So, Gradel argues, ‘there is no fundamental difference between worship of an emperor and of Jupiter’ (p. 30), ‘power was in fact the only common determinant for according divine worship to anyone, celestials or terrestrials’ (p. 32). The absence of a sufficiently large power gap alone explains why no-one under the republic was accorded divine status at the state level; however, within the Roman household, worship of the genius of the paterfamilias was an appropriate response to the unlimited power of the latter over his slaves and freedmen (and to a lesser degree over wife and children), which could be terminated only by his death. Gradel is here laying the foundation for his later, highly controversial, argument that worship of the imperial genius was avoided by elite Romans as servile, that it was not a less extreme form of cult designed to accommodate them and that its importance in imperial cult has been much overstated. The way in which ordinary free Romans, as individuals or communally, could respond to an extraordinary benefaction without the connotations of servility or clientship was to honour the benefactor as an earthly

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5 Cf., e.g., ‘... it is difficult for us to grasp a religious system with almost exclusive emphasis on ritual action to the almost complete detriment of theology or speculation’ (p. 24).

6 See below, pp. 131f.
Jupiter (e.g., the famous popular response to Marius at Val. Max. 8.15.7; and Cicero’s public praise of P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther at Red. Pop. 11).

Chapter 3, ‘Caesar’s Divine Honours’ (pp. 54-72), cuts through the mass of secondary scholarship to concentrate on the primary sources and accepts rightly that the senate decreed Caesar a state divinity, with attendant priests and temple, shortly before his death. These and the other honours voted to him are best viewed as the senate’s attempt to formulate an appropriate response to the unique position Caesar had won for himself by his victories. Gradel calls the attempt ‘inconsistent’, but, if we can assume that Dio provides an accurate chronological framework for the honours, there emerges a clear progression in the ‘divine honours’ voted him. Granted the senate does at each stage bundle together disparate honours, but to disregard Suetonius’ distinction (quoted above) as ‘feeble and imprecise’ and ‘founded . . . on moral (and anachronistic) criteria determined by the behaviour of good vs. bad emperors from Augustus till Suetonius’ own day’ (pp. 60f. n. 15) assumes that the Senate was wholly ignorant of the hierarchy of honours long since formulated in the east. Many of its members had served there and therefore it is most unlikely that all Caesar’s honours were invented en nihilo.

The progression is destroyed if we follow Gradel’s suggestion and interpret the inscription on the statue of Caesar on top of the world, Dio’s ἄµιθος (‘demigod’, 43.21.2), as translating diuus and also understand that as the Latin term for gods of the highest, eternal state. Gradel’s argument on diuus does not take into account the archaic nature of the word in mid-first century Rome and its particular appropriateness to a legal context. Again, if Caesar was honoured in 46 BC as diuus, the highest category of elevation, would it make sense for him to be honoured only as an ‘invincible god’ (deus invictus; cf. ἀνίκεφλος θεός, Cass. Dio. 43.45.3) in 45 after Munda? Gradel accepts in essence the chronology of Dio’s account and proposes a solution to the problematic discrepancy between Dio and Cicero on the cult title formally voted to Caesar in 44: he was offered the title ‘Jupiter Julius’, but either rejected it or it was withdrawn, and the vaguer diuus was substituted.

Chapter 4, ‘Beyond Rome: “By Municipal Deification”’ (pp. 73-108), presents the general thesis that direct worship of the reigning emperor at the municipal level in Italy was the norm; worship of the imperial genius by contrast was rare at this level. The starting point is a rereading of Dio 51.20.6-8, ‘in the capital itself and in the rest of Italy’ no emperor dared to set up a precinct to himself: Gradel posits that, for his provincial audience, Dio wishes to emphasise that no emperor treated Italy as a province (p. 76). This and the argument developed thereafter involves rejecting the predominant view that Augustus was worshipped across Italy at the municipal level in the guise of his Genius, which was based on a flawed interpretation of much

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7 See, e.g., Fishwick [2].
archaeological information, especially that from Pompeii. Gradel reprises his earlier argument that the Mamia inscription should be restored as a dedication GENIOcolo[niae] (‘to the guardian deity of the colony’), and thereby excludes it from the discussion of imperial cult, thus leaving no insurmountable evidence against the view that municipal temples from Augustus’ lifetime were dedicated to him directly. Municipalities may have devised cults that could pass seamlessly from one emperor to the next by addressing them to Caesar Augustus (cf. CIL 4.1180), titles held by all emperors, although other evidence points to specific cults surviving up to a generation after the emperor’s demise. As an example of iconographic evidence of municipal sacrifice to the emperor Gradel makes use of an altar from Abellinum (pp. 94f.), but the presence of two statues around the altar and sacrificing priest is a complicating factor, with which Gradel refuses to grapple. Even so, his main thesis that worship to Augustus’ genius at the municipal level was avoided because of the social humiliation implied by open acknowledgement of client status survives, and is wonderfully illustrated by the contrast between Romans and client kings (pp. 100ff.).

Chapter 5, ‘The Augustan Settlement’ (pp. 109-39), pursues the line of argument further: Augustus accepted no state cult to himself during his lifetime, either directly to himself or to his genius, even though his choice of name on its most obvious interpretation denoted superhuman status (cf. Florus 2.34.66). Gradel concentrates on the worship of Augustus’ genius in the Compital cults of Rome, as it was reorganised from 7 BC onwards as part of the emperor’s administrative reforms of the city: the Lares compitales were renamed Lares Augusti and were joined by the genius Augusti; their worship was supervised and probably paid for by elected magistri of the 265 uici (‘quarters’), although the state certainly paid for the restoration of Compital shrines from the late first century AD. It is clear that this level of cult was principally directed at and run by freedmen, and was shunned by freeborn Romans as involving a degrading cliental relationship, hence Gradel’s justifiable insistence that it was not a state cult. While Gradel’s argument has been questioned on the grounds that uicomagistri were state officials, it is clear that the cult was not a state cult: although Laralia were a sacrum popularium (‘public rite’, Festus 357 L, preserving a definition of the Augustan period that probably reflects the reforms of Augustus; if so, Gradel is wrong to categorise them as sacra privata [p. 129]) they were not a sacrum publicum (cf. publica sacra, quae publico sumptu pro populo fiunt, ‘public rites, which happen on behalf of the people at public express’, Festus 284 L), a cult on the level of, say, that of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitol.

Chapter 6, ‘The Augustan Heritage and Mad Emperors’ (pp. 140-61), concentrates on the developments attributed to Caligula by our literary sources. Under Tiberius there was a fossilising of the Augustan status quo, but the accession of

9 The view has its most familiar expression in L. R. Taylor’s The Divinity of the Roman Emperor (Middletown 1931).

Caligula led to new challenges. Initial restraint, for example an imperial veto of a proposal ordering sacrifices to Caligula’s genius (Cass. Dio 59.4.4), soon gave way to extravagant and provocative behaviour. I conjecture that the refusal was made before Caligula accepted the title pater patriae on 21 September 37, and as such took note of the sensibilities of the Roman and Italian elite. Gradel’s most important contribution here is to argue that the cult of Caligula, which both Suetonius and Dio describe as being initiated in Rome, was not a state cult; if the senate did offer Caligula a state temple, he refused it and ‘instead built another temple, with flamingo cult and all, at his own expense and on his own land, indeed in his own palace’ (p. 152)—hence the cult was private.\footnote{Despite its moments of Egyptomania F. Gury, ‘Caligula entre les Castores’, in N. Blanc and A. Buisson (edd.), Imago Antiquitatis: Religions et iconographie du monde romain (Paris 1999) 265-80, is worth citing. The author thinks (well, he would!) that his Suetonius’ Life of Caligula: A Commentary (Brussels 1994) offers a more nuanced treatment of chapter 22 than that of D. W. Hurley.} This reconstruction, although it has a degree of plausibility, involves a highly selective treatment of Dio 59.28.5, rejecting the contents of a μέν clause and privileging the δὲ, and, to my mind, places too much emphasis on the silence of Suetonius.

Chapter 7, ‘The Emperor’s Genius in State Cult’ (pp. 162-97), argues that Claudius’ reign saw a crucial development in imperial cult. To avoid the unfortunate connection between formal state deification and death, a state cult of the emperor’s genius was introduced in January 42, when Claudius also engineered the deification of Livia. Gradel offers a detailed reinterpretation of the so-called ‘Frieze of the Vicomagistri’ (pp. 165-78), which he argues does not relate to the Comitral cult of the imperial genius but to a sacrifice to two dīni, namely Augustus and Livia, at the latter’s consecration; the frieze, he argues, probably formed the base to the statues of Augustus and Livia in the temple of Divus Augustus. The appearance of a bull first among the sacrificial victims leads Gradel to conclude that the genius of the living emperor was being honoured as well. This is all ingenious, but other problems of iconographical interpretation emerge: can we have the emperor present at a sacrifice to his own genius?\footnote{Stevenson [10] also highlights potential problems in the identifications posited by Gradel and the absence of comparative iconographical material from the discussion.} So in January 42 Claudius introduced worship of the genius Augusti as a state cult, one integrally connected with his assumption of the title pater patriae; as father of the state, his genius was entitled to worship just as that of any paterfamilias within his house. Gradel underlines his theory that this cult was problematic for elite worshippers by tracing its disappearance under Vespasian and Titus, who were distancing themselves from later Julio-Claudian excess, its rapid reappearance under the absolutist Domitian, and further disappearance from Trajan to Antoninus Pius.
Chapter 8, “In Every House?” The Emperor in the Roman Household’ (pp. 198-212), rightly criticises Bickerman’s arguments for the absence of imperial worship in the domestic context, collecting archaeological and literary evidence of imperial portrait busts in ordinary and elite houses and showing that possession of an image of the reigning emperor was normal. The imperial presence goes back to a senatorial decree of 30 BC, which laid down that a libation be poured to the then Caesar at every meal both public and private (Cass. Dio 51.19.7). Gradel has to impute a veto against public libation (as he does for Caligula’s cult; cf. p. 152), but why would such an example of civilitas be suppressed, when Dio a few lines later can record selectivity and restraint on the part of Caesar (51.20.4)? More convincing is Gradel’s ‘fundamentalist’ reading of the literary evidence to the conclusion that the libation was in practice poured to the emperor and not to his genius.

Chapter 9, ‘Corporate Worship’ (pp. 213-33), deals with the associations of cultures, who worshipped the emperor and his Lares both in the domestic context and outside it, attested primarily by inscriptive evidence across Italy. Even in Rome these associations had temples (CIL 6.253, 958), an important corrective to the frequently proclaimed view that there was no cult of the living emperor in Rome (p. 223). As before, Gradel argues that they did not worship the imperial genius, but rather the emperor directly or the domus divina (‘divine house’). On the seuiri Augustales (the college of priests devoted to Augustus) Gradel emphasises that cult was only a part of their function as an ordo (‘order’). Overall his assertion that private worship of the emperor was rife is an important corrective to over-rational and elite-centred studies of imperial cult: ‘the extraordinary circumstances behind the few instances where emperors took a stand against private worship of themselves indicate that the phenomenon was as common as it was permanent’ (p. 233).

Chapter 10, ‘Numen Augustum’ (pp. 234-50), has more ‘ghost-busting’: Gradel presents a re-reading of the Fasti Praenestini that eliminates the altar to the numen (‘godhead’) of Augustus putatively set up in AD 6; and his study of the altar in Narbo removes that as a public cult: it is not the copy of a state altar in Rome, but is better illustrated by comparison with a private cult from Forum Clodii in Etruria. Gradel’s detailed discussion of this neglected inscription (CIL 11.3303) concludes that the numen Augustum, on whose altar the genii of Augustus and Tiberius are invited to feast, was the living emperor, in turn here Augustus and Tiberius. Chapter 11, ‘A Parallel: C. Manlius, Caeretan “Caesar”’ (pp. 251-60), is a pendant to the first part of the book and discusses an altar dedicated to C. Manlius who was celebrated as perpetual censor by his clients. Scholars had often connected the monument with imperial cult, but Gradel argues that the cult was devoted to Manlius (rather than by Manlius), in recognition of his exalted position within Caeretan society.

Chapter 12, “Heavenly Honours Decreed by the Senate”: From Emperor to Divus’ (pp. 261-371) is by far the lengthiest of the book and is devoted to the official state cult of the emperor. In stark contrast to what Gradel has demonstrated for the private and non-official areas, the formal and official position as set out in senatorial decrees is that the living emperor was not a god. He brings to bear on this question the
same line of argument pursued earlier, that once dead an emperor had no power and
that to confer divine honours on him did not involve humiliation of the worshipper.
Discussion of the funeral and consecration of Augustus, in particular, is excellent and
yields several insights: the difference of emphasis and purpose in the accounts of Dio
and Suetonius, the historicity of the eagle released from the funeral pyre, Augustus’
desire to be declared a state god posthumously and the *Res Gestae* as his manifesto,
the superfluous nature of eye-witnesses to the imperial ascension. Constructing the
meaning of consecration, as opposed to determining the minutiae of the proceedings,
is more difficult. Gradel rejects the usual notion of canonisation as inherently
Christianising; rather the Senate actively created a deity. And in so doing ‘further
cemented the link between death and divinity in the Roman state, making divine
honours to the living emperor in this context an even more dangerous notion’ (p. 295).

In his discussion of Seneca’s *Apocolocyntosis*, I am confused by the notion of
absolute deity that Gradel imports: Claudius received relative divinity from the earthly
rituals and senatorial decree but is denied ‘divinity in the absolute sense’ (p. 329). His
work has emphasised throughout that, for the Romans, divinity is a construction of a
power-relationship, being a god implies no different nature. Then, when dealing with
texts that use the language of belief in connection with *diuī*, ostensibly more
appropriate to absolute divinities (in a Christianising sense or not), he presents a
paradox worthy of *Alice in Wonderland*: such language actually demonstrates the
doubt that could be felt about the claim of absolute divinity for *diuī* (p. 324). Gradel
posits a crisis of belief, because the relationship between the worshipper and
worshipped was not (and could not be) reciprocal in the case of *diuī*, as a cause of the
cult of individual *diuī* not surviving the immediate political situation that led to their
institution. Even Tiberius’ active support for the worship of Augustus at the municipal
level achieved nothing long-lasting and cities across the empire had to be bullied into
erecting temples (Cass. Dio 56.46.3); only one of the sixteen known temples to *Diuus
Augustus* in Italy is definitely posthumous. ‘People cared little for their emperors once
they had left this world; and even when they did, the main, if indirect, target of their
worship was usually the living emperor’ (p. 339). Even so, Gradel shows from the
*Feriale Duranum* that worship of the *diuī* was imposed from Rome and maintained
among the army until at least the mid-third century AD and from the prominent
archaeological remains of Rome that the official state cults of some of the *diuī* were
continued long after their death. A financial crisis during the reign of Maximinus
between 236 and 238 led to their suppression at Rome and thereafter, whenever the
title *diuus* was voted, it was little more than honorific.

Gradel’s book is essential reading for anyone interested in the religious life of
the Roman empire, particularly for those who deal with ruler cult. His style and
conclusions are provocative and, even where they do not convince, they force a serious
re-reading of the evidence.
REAPPRAISING THE ROMAN HOUSE

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In 1975 McKay's *Houses, Villas, and Palaces in the Roman World* was the most comprehensive introductory work on Roman housing.¹ This geographically organised survey focused on housing in Italy and treated provincial evidence separately in two final chapters. McKay was concerned with structure and its origins, and his handbook was typological in nature.² The study of Roman housing has now been so utterly transformed that a new general treatment is long overdue. In the interim, the houses of elite Romans have been rigorously scrutinised and are now regarded as methodically and deliberately created environments in which a range of activities took place, most important among them the display of their owners’ status.³ Whether architectural and decorative innovation should be ascribed to individuals or to societal changes is, Ellis suggests, a fundamental question that has prevented anyone from writing a new general book on the subject of Roman housing until now (p. 4).

The aims of the book astonish. Ellis intends not just to provide 'the first empire-wide, overall introduction to Roman housing, covering all provinces and all social classes, from the origins of Rome to the sixth century AD' to the student and general reader but also 'a wealth of comparative evidence' to specialists (p. 1). Adding to these Herculean tasks, he further promises that the Roman house 'will be taken apart and pieced back together in a way never attempted before' (p. 4). The seven chapter headings are focused topically: 'Introduction' (pp. 1-21), 'Houses of

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² In addition to the chapter McKay devotes to origins, an iteration of the argument can be found in A. Boethius and J. B. Ward-Perkins, *Etruscan and Roman Architecture* (Harmondsworth 1970) and in subsequent editions: A. Boethius, *Etruscan and Early Roman Architecture* (Harmondsworth 1978) and F. Sear, *Roman Architecture* (Ithaca 1982).

³ S. Hales, *The Roman House and Social Identity* (Cambridge 2003) was released just as this manuscript was submitted and has not been read in full by the author. Hales accepts this view of the relationship of house and status, but argues further that decor and architecture, or the ‘art of impression’, in provincial urban housing also convey the Roman identity (*Romanitas*) of the owner.
Pretension’ (pp. 22-72), ‘Town and Country’ (pp. 73-113), ‘Decoration’ (pp. 114-44), ‘Furniture’ (pp. 145-65), ‘The House and Family’ (pp. 167-87), and ‘Conclusions’ (pp. 188-91). Numerous subdivisions in each chapter guide the reader and assist in revisiting particular topics. Ellis’ personal interest in ‘reception rooms’ and other aspects of elite housing provides thematic coherence and is also used to signal, evaluate and demonstrate the implications of recent research concerning Roman houses. What the chapter headings conceal is a much-welcome integration of detailed but succinctly related comparative material—from Britain, the European and North African provinces and the East—to the main thread of the discussion, whatever the topic might be. In short, Ellis acquaints his readers with the state of the field as articulated recently by work in Pompeii and Italy, but applies its conclusions more broadly in geographic terms than any other standard works currently do. To his survey he brings expertise in town planning and his wide knowledge of Roman Carthage, North Africa and late-antique housing.

Ellis’ ‘holistic approach’ to the Roman house, which assumes the inter-relationship between structure, decor, furnishings, and allocation and use of space, is the culmination of the work of many scholars over several decades. Of central concern to work on Roman housing is the way in which Romans used the space they inhabited and the extent to which archaeological and textual evidence increases understanding of the Roman domestic environment. Current discussion also assumes that the home is a deliberate construct, at least for wealthy or aristocratic Romans. The roots of this...
conclusion, arguably, began with a desire to move beyond August Mau's 'four Pompeian styles' and the subsequent search for meaning in Roman wall paintings, which quickly yielded attempts to contextualise them culturally, and to view them with Roman eyes. We now talk about 'decorative ensembles' within a room or 'sight-lines' between rooms and throughout the house. We regard Roman houses as venues for personal expression representing, in part, their owners' perception of status and social standing. We accept that a well-appointed Roman house must be 'read', its decor 'decoded' and the 'underlying grammar and vocabulary' of its 'language' understood if we are to learn anything about its owner. The linguistic metaphor has been applied to Trimalchio, who 'parodies the language of Roman luxury rather than communicating in it'. Similarly, says Ellis of both Trimalchio and the Vettii, 'Any shortcoming in their [cultural] knowledge was not through want of reading but more from their inability to restructure what they had learnt' (p. 11). In point of fact, trends of cultural expression were so pervasive that it can be nearly impossible to distinguish the social status of an owner on the strength of archaeological evidence alone. That is partly because we can never know for certain which interested parties—owner, architect, painter, mosaicist—exerted the most influence in the overall design and presentation of a Roman house, as Ellis admits (pp. 6-9). Moreover, Ellis rightly points out, Roman houses were 'heavily constrained by conventions of the local community and society at large' (p. 9) so that it is also difficult to discern whether social behaviours preceded and therefore influenced the design of elite houses or whether adoption of form inspired a consequential behavioural change.

Most important in the last decade is the complete turnabout in our thinking about how Roman houses were used. Recent research has emphasised repeatedly and variously that Roman homes, elite and otherwise, were a venue for 'business' in the broadest sense. Shops, the smallest formal residential unit, had a bed or attached living quarters (pp. 78-80). Further, Ellis is keen to dispel the notion that a higher degree of artisanal or commercial activity at a habitation site necessarily indicates a poorer dwelling (pp. 88f., 107f.). The contents of houses must also be considered, and studies that assess the actual provenience of artefacts are a potent reminder that Roman usage of space does not always conform to modern expectations.

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10 P. Allison, 'Artefact Distribution and Spatial Function in Pompeian Houses', in B. Rawson and P. Weaver (edd.), *The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space* (Oxford 1997) 321-54; P. Allison, 'How Do We Identify the Use of Space in Roman Housing?', in E. M. Moormann (ed.), *Functional and Spatial Analysis of Wall Painting:*
location of artefacts in the eleven-room house of M. Epidius Primus at Pompeii (I.8.17), for example, indicated in the atrium a horse's harness, the remains of an iron-wheeled cart, and tools there and throughout the house. Further up the social scale elite Romans of the Republic used their homes for the morning salutatio and invited special guests and clients to dine in the triclinium at the close of the day. Augustus' choice to reside in his own Palatine domus effectively redefined the role of the house in an imperial context, such that the business of ruling took place in the Palatine residence of subsequent emperors and influenced the incorporation of domestic elements into palatial architecture (pp. 54, 72).

Interest in the origins of the two major urban types of 'houses of pretension'—the atrium house during the Republic and the peristyle house during the empire—continues, but the focus now includes the houses at such sites as Olynthus, Delos, Megara, Hyblaea, Pergamon and Priene as well as Italian antecedents. The possible influence of Etruscan chamber tombs on the Roman atrium house is now discounted in light of our rudimentary understanding of Etruscan housing and settlement sites generally. By contrast the role of the peristyle in palatial residences of Hellenistic kings and in other structures such as the gymnasium, and its influence on the Roman peristyle house, have been the subject of considerable discussion. Even the use of columns has been re-evaluated. These are not just structural elements; rather, their use or reproduction in stucco and paint represents intentional association with public architecture. Ellis rightly cautions that apparent structural similarities in plan tell us nothing about patterns of usage, which for him remain paramount (pp. 24, 35). A loss of function in the atrium/tablinum must necessarily precede its absence from Roman houses (p. 36), although little evidence sustains the notion that the waning power of the aristocracy in the early principate led to a decline in the importance of the atrium and tablinum in their houses in favour of more general-purpose reception rooms such as the oecus and triclinium (p. 69). So also, Ellis argues, the appearance of specialised audience halls in late antiquity certainly suggests that these filled a new spatial need for a reception area.

Ellis traces the diffusion of the atrium house or local translations of the type, but because its heyday paralleled the growth of the empire provincial examples are restricted to Spain and southern France. In his survey of these Ellis treats the evidence

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conservatively in light of the absence of a *tablinum* in most cases. By contrast, clear examples of provincial aristocratic housing including a peristyle abound, particularly in the second to fourth centuries. Ellis defines the ‘ideal’ (not a ‘norm’) as a central peristyle completely surrounded by ‘ranges of rooms’, with the main reception room directly opposite the entrance from the street (p. 41). Local and individual expression of the type varies considerably, as Ellis shows, such that reception rooms can sometimes only be identified after careful consideration. The preference for a peristyle can be seen in villas both in Italy and the provinces where there was ‘one major reception room located on the central axis of the house off the inner peristyle or yard’ (pp. 68f.). This room, Ellis further suggests, fulfilled all the functions of a *triclinium*, *tablinum* and *oecus*. Ellis concludes that the omnipresence of the peristyle house type, or at least of local interpretations of the form, indicates ‘a single, empire-wide aristocratic culture’ (p. 108; cf. pp. 69, 97).

Recent excavation and re-investigation in Pompeii indicates that the Roman house did not so much consist of spaces dedicated to particular activities, although this was certainly true to some extent, but to different sorts of spaces devoted primarily to display in a social context. The house ‘did not merely reflect but generated status’ of the *dominus*; thus Ellis’ houses of pretension are defined by the very rooms whose function, in part, related to ostentatious display by the owner: the *tablinum*/atrium/alae trio and later the *oecus*/peristyle. This much we conclude from the physical remains, but beyond that the archaeological record compels us to abandon modern notions of space compartmentalised according to sex, status, age or activity. We know of no nurseries or γυναικεία (women’s apartments). It is difficult to identify slave-quarters securely from the archaeological record, although the array of functions that household slaves performed indicates their presence throughout wealthy Roman houses. We are now encouraged to recognise how fluid were the lines that might otherwise seem to divide the house. As Ellis and others caution, houses were for business and pleasure, with a time but not necessarily an independent space for each.

The now much-studied use of Roman domestic space and the concomitant notion that it was constructed have received increasingly theoretical treatment. Wallace-Hadrill proposed two intersecting axes of space in a Roman house defined


15 M. George, ‘*Seruus* and *Domus*: The Slave in the Roman House’, in Laurence and Wallace-Hadrill [4] 15-24 for a discussion of previous methodology and its problems. Ellis takes exception to Carrandini’s assertion that status demarcations were clear (p. 166f. and n. 1).

according to access to the male head of the household through a main entrance: the private-public axis and the grand-humble axis. In this model architecture and decor regulate circulation within the house.\textsuperscript{17} With the application of Hillier and Hanson’s access analysis theory\textsuperscript{18} Grahame introduced an extra dimension of privacy—that of separating members of the same household—to the basic public-private distinction.\textsuperscript{19} For Ellis, these issues boil down to ‘circulation patterns’ (pp. 166-70). He faults Wallace-Hadrill’s theory as too reliant on the old model of assigning functions to particular rooms and too little cognizant that the duty of a servant might require sleeping in the bedroom of the master or mistress. Hillier and Hanson’s theory is praised for its elucidation of spatial organisation but ultimately dismissed as ‘mechanistic’ and unable to take into account that which does not appear in plan (e.g., decor and furnishings). The Roman house, Ellis suggests, had relatively ‘open’ circulation in that rooms were often grouped around a central court, so that passage from one room to another required crossing this court, which maximised the potential of encountering another member of the household. Still, he notes, there exist multiple circulation routes to particular parts of Roman houses, for example, dining rooms, so that the proper route for a visitor necessarily differed from that of a servant.

Despite his ‘holistic’ approach to the house Ellis devotes chapter 4 to decoration (pp. 114-44) and here treats wall painting and mosaic in relative isolation. The discussion on painting provides a useful synopsis of recent work,\textsuperscript{20} and moves outside Italy and beyond AD 79 to the late-antique period. The debt to other scholars is also acknowledged in the sections devoted to mosaics. Ellis examines them contextually as floor coverings, noting carefully their placement within a room, their intended viewpoint(s) and interaction with furniture. Also included is a brief nod to sculptural decoration, water features, and the relative improbability that we can understand pervasive mythological allusion in decor as evidence for domestic cults. The final sections of the chapter reunite various forms of decor in order to evaluate scholarship on its impact, relationship to room function and contribution to ambience. Here Ellis argues that symbolic interpretations should not be over-emphasised, but that meaningful associations can reveal ‘Romans’ conception of their domestic life’ (p. 141). Furniture forms the subject of chapter 5 (pp. 145-65) and despite its mobility is regarded as integral to the decor of the room in which it was located; a range of furnishings indicates flexibility of room function. A clear distinction is made between items for storage and those for other use and the term is used broadly and includes partitions, wall coverings and lighting.

\textsuperscript{17} Wallace-Hadrill [9] 11, 38-61.
\textsuperscript{18} B. Hillier and J. Hanson, \textit{The Social Logic of Space} (Cambridge 1984).
\textsuperscript{20} R. Ling, \textit{Roman Painting} (Cambridge 1991) and Clarke [7].
Two main premises link diverse material in chapter 3, 'Town and Country' (pp. 73-113): that Romans of lesser means could imitate Roman (aristocratic) behaviour through conscious selection of specific elements pertaining to Roman culture, and that the rural/urban dichotomy in terms of the function and activities in Roman houses is false. Ellis also makes a good case for a vernacular tradition of 'housing [that is] Roman by date but not apparently Roman by culture' (p. 87), arguing that adoption of Roman forms only in part, or not at all, does not necessarily indicate resistance to Roman culture (p. 112). In terms of the depth of research and sheer range of topics this chapter might be the richest, although for reasons of space it serves more as an introduction to the considerable body of evidence now available. The sixteen sub-sections include urban housing, shops and taverns, towns, villages, trade and industry, factories, farms, homesteads and fortified farms in Italy, Britain and in the European, African and eastern provinces where excavation has yielded sufficient data. Using apparently anomalous cases such as the *medianum* 'houses' of Ostia, the House of the Prince of Naples in Pompeii (6.15.7.8), Lot 11 at Utica and the House of the Brick Walls at Djemila, Ellis examines urban houses of modest but respectable means not of the 'ideal' peristyle type but containing (arguably) identifiable reception rooms. The central sections of the chapter address the range of provincial responses to habitation in villages, towns and small cities where lesser habitation density sometimes allowed a considerable degree of agricultural, artisanal or industrial activity in a residential context. Included in the discussion are so-called strip housing of the northwest provinces, and variations on apartments and peristyle houses evident in Syrian villages and cities and at Karanis and Alexandria in Egypt. The final sections on individual farms and homesteads of Britain and Gaul and factories and fortified farms of North Africa provide a concise but useful introduction to the excavations of the last twenty years. Here, as in previous sections, Ellis questions the extent to which a clear distinction between residential and agricultural activity in particular buildings can be made, while at the same time identifying the sometimes surprising mixture of non-Roman and Roman traits.

*Roman Housing* lives up to its promises in almost every respect, but certain aspects of this introductory text may be seen by some as limitations. For example, Ellis concentrates on elite housing (p. viii), and although textual evidence is frequently and appropriately taken into consideration, this survey is largely archaeological. Further, the book is aimed at a wide audience, but those with background in Roman culture and history will undoubtedly benefit more than the general reader. The book is technically well produced and has few errors, but illustration is sometimes sparse for a book purporting to be an introduction to the subject, and the lack of plans is sometimes keenly felt where such would be most welcome. The omission of a bibliography is regrettable. These are minor oversights. *Roman Housing*—a book twenty years in the making according to its author (p. vii)—is an extremely well-researched, readable and easily comprehensible survey that will stand as a point of departure for the next generation of students and specialists.
REVIEWS

Scholia publishes solicited and unsolicited short reviews. Short reviews to be considered for publication should be directed to the Reviews Editor, Scholia.


Graham Anderson of the University of Kent has voyaged into darkest fairyland to snap the Little Red Riding Hood, the Snow White and the Bluebeard. This intrepid reader of obscure classical texts and explorer in the wider world of oral tales from lands far away and times long ago, wherever the Finnish comparative geographical-historical method has cast its wide net, has brought us back a provocative study. Each case must be judged on its merits and there are fifteen or so to weigh. Some arguments are fuller and more persuasive than others. Anderson’s thesis is that many ancient narratives and so-called ‘modern’ (that is, post-medieval) ‘fairytales’ spring from the same Aarne and Thompson tale-type. Anderson might have wisely curried readers’ favour by explaining at some length the problems, methods and results achieved by the Finn Antti Aarne (1867-1925) and his continuator, the American student of both European and native American tales, Stith Thompson (1885-1976). Classicists can benefit, as rather few unfortunately have, by close study of traditional tales from within the Indo-European community, from Sanskrit India to Spain and Norway. The Grimm brothers, trained in Greek and Latin, were more alive to the connections than most contemporaries today. Anderson hopes to lead more classicists back to this common ocean of story, tearing away seven or more veils that make it hard to see Chione as a version of Snow White despite her name. For this he is to be commended.

Supernatural tiny people play little role in the elite literature of the classical ages. They might have been more active around the farmer’s fireside and perhaps there was an ancient Greek ‘tooth fairy’ (apparently, America’s indigenous contribution). Anderson, however, has employed the term that the public unselfconsciously uses despite the fact that most such tales have no fairies. Fairytale seems to be ceding place in popular cinematic (Disneyfied) culture to wizened or green creatures from outer space or inner earth. Since Anderson’s learned study of the traditional tale in antiquity more often analyses large monsters, slandered ‘ordinary’ (if ultra-attractive) girls and other Indo-European tale-types, the problem is not simply a small semantic one. Only students of oral and written literature grounded in the formidable indexes will be able to read comfortably this distillation of much labour or control its speculative motif and hunting of tale-types. Anderson pairs ancient folktales (often elaborated in epic poetry, Attic dramatic structures and the ancient

\[1\] A. Aarne and S. Thompson, The Motif-Index of Folk Literature 1-6 (Bloomington 1955-58); The Types of the Folktale (Bloomington 1961) (hereafter ‘AT’).
novels) with the ethnic European collections of Basile, Perrault, Grimm and Afanas’ev. He seeks his fortune far beyond those in time and space with non-European traditions, for instance, the nearly prehistoric myths of Mesopotamian Inanna and the twelve medieval prose legends of the Turkish Dede Korkut, an insufficiently known Turkoman Iliad. Neophytes can easily become lost in the woods while tracking down a type, as I was, for instance when examining ‘the grateful dead’ (Motif E341-79, AT Types 505-08).\(^2\) I was grateful to have William F. Hansen assure me that even more serious folktales scholars have trouble navigating their waters.\(^3\)

Anderson believes that some stories have travelled widely with a continuous existence, despite the passage of centuries, kept alive on a sub-literary or (better) oral level. One can follow this reasonably clearly, for instance, in the transmission of Teutonic and Scottish tales to the ‘white’ USA Appalachian ‘Jack Tales’, through what is probably a combination of printed versions (the Grimms’ first edition appeared in 1812) and oral Hicks-Harmon family traditions in the vicinity of Beech Mountain, North Carolina. The Grimms’ tales (nos 71, 134) of ‘The Six Servants’ and ‘Six who Made their Way through the World’ have striking similarities with the parochial ‘oikotype’, ‘Hardy Hard Ass’.\(^4\) It seems less likely that Native American tales are related to Old World and Samosatian Lucianic plots (pp. 190f.).

The introduction usefully collects ancient quotations, passages usually dismissive, in which narrators refer to children’s tales, assuming that there were children in Socrates’ Attica and Trimalchio’s Capua. Ancient condescension, when not condemnation, largely explains the obscurity of these narratives in our already lacunose record of ancient narrative. The repertoire of denigrated story-tellers often features old women, weavers whiling time away (Ov. Met. 4.39), cooks and nurses, such as we meet telling and framing Apuleius’ inset ‘Cupid and Psyche’. Their scorned tales are to be noticed in texts of Aristophanes, Plato, Sotades (the Maronean?), Quintilian, Persius, Lucian, Tertullian, Lactantius and John Chrysostom. This last figure, a Christian educator, advises parents about how to inspire enthusiasm for Bible stories rather than for frivolous pagan fare. The harvest may be meagre, but that does not justify the profession’s ignoring useful, if porous, tale categories such as myth, legend and wondertale (further divided into household tale, animal fable, jocular anecdote, tall-tale and so on).

The verbal slapstick of Wasps 1174-196 certainly points to something that we would have suspected in any case: floating sub-literary anecdotes and short narratives. This reader comes to worry that for Anderson every ancient plot grew out of folktales.

\(^2\) See, e.g., D. Felton, Haunted Greece and Rome (Austin 1999) 77-88; A. Stramaglia, Res Inauditae, Incredulae: Storie di fantasmi nel mondo greco-latino (Bari 1999). Anderson’s ninth chapter, ‘Between Living and Dead’ (pp. 112-22), hustles too quickly through a variety of relevant tales of ghosts, separated lovers and Alcestis.

\(^3\) William F. Hansen is the author of the invaluable ancient folktales resource Ariadne’s Thread (Ithaca 2002), which unfortunately was not yet available to Anderson.

While Anderson never claims so boldly and while the sea of folktale is truly capacious, one waits impatiently for any razor sharpened by some principle of falsification. ‘When is a parallel not a parallel?’ (p. 17) is a good question. Anderson asserts that the genuine folktale ‘will maintain most of its structure, intrinsic logic and basic identity’ (p. 19) in various instantiations. The concept is a rational touchstone, but the criteria are too slippery to be reassuring. Anderson ingeniously and seriously (but self-destructively) proposes that we see Diotima in Plato’s *Symposium* as a purveyor of (inspired) old wives’ tales, claiming that she and her Eros provide parallels to the *anula* (‘little old woman’) and her outcast child in Apuleius’ long inset (p. 11).

Anderson correctly laments contemporary classicists’ ignorance of folklore scholarship (p. 12), although I do not agree that still they think folktale ‘a kind of degenerate mythology’. The names of Basile (1634-36), Perrault (1697) and Mme d’Aulnoy (1698) are nearly unknown or unmentioned, although this ignorance is not so general for the more academic and simultaneously more popular Gebrüder Grimm. Enthusiasm for issues of gender, race and class has outrun the more tedious comparative task of unearthing disguised parallels and ‘deformed’ variants. Anderson, building on the work of the Germanist Jack Zipes and others such as Maria Tatar,5 nicely shows how modern academic categories can dovetail with interest in ancient narrative. Detlev Fehling’s discouraging, if logically possible, idea6 that even apparent folktales may be only pseudo-folktale (faketale?—if we coin a word following Richard Dorson’s ‘fakelore’) and, in fact, only precious Romantic literary invention of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, which has then entered the popular repertoire, has retarded classical research. The most extensive ancient example is Apuleius’ inset tale (if the term can be stretched so far), a version of the Monster-Bridegroom (AT 425a; cf. 425c: ‘Beauty and the Beast’) known best to classicists as ‘Cupid and Psyche’.

Anderson treats Cinderella (Herodotus’ Rhodopis, Hebrew Asenath, Sumerian Inanna), Snow White (Chione, Pygmalion’s ivory statue, Xenophon’s Anthia), Little Red Riding Hood, Bluebeard (Minos, Apuleius’ Charite) and the ‘obstacle flight’ in various chapters. He examines for this last tale early and late analogues to the ‘vulgate’ of the Argonaut voyage, stories featuring the heroes’ special helpers and magical objects. The persecuted and only intermittently competent protagonist (only by courtesy to be called a ‘hero’) needs helpers. *Inanna and Enki* in earlier Sumerian myth and the Islamic, tenth-century medieval *Dede Korkut* in medieval Oghuz Turkish preserve many motifs in the same order, a basic requirement for finding a tale-type. Anderson sees rather human Medea anticipated in Inanna, a fertility goddess. True, there are no hero’s tasks (or hero) in the former, and true, there is no magic ship in the latter but, like the Scottish (recorded 1954) ‘Green Man o’ Knowledge’, a good-for-nothing wins all the prizes by wit and unearned miracles. ‘Six Go through


the World' (AT 513A) is the Grimms' version of this tale-type in which a league of underdogs need and utilise special expertise—magic as the great equalizer. Hardy Hard-Ass, formerly known to a more squeamish publishing industry and public as 'Hardy Hard-Head', has one more and different helpers. Here a voice-commanded 'land and air ship' replaces the Argo, a 'land and water ship' (AT 513B), and a charmingly obscene hard set of buttocks replaces a man who can frost any fire (Grimm's no. 71). Anderson notes a neat (if common before eyeglasses) analogue between Apollonius' Lynceus and Hicks' 'See Well', also the Grimms' hawkeyed Huntsman.

'The Ogre Blinded' motif (AT type 1137)—here chapter 10, 'Two Homeric Tales' (pp. 123-32)—starts with Polyphemus but is extended to recent times with stories as far away as Finland. Anderson notes that any concatenated voyage could easily accommodate a monster-blinding and a wily hero with a trick-name. When Anderson lists eight or so parallels between Gilgamesh's struggle with Humbaba and Odysseus' Cyclopes' spelunking (p. 127), one might expect a systematic attempt to trace the later (detailed) narrative to the earlier tale, but his breathless method moves on immediately to another ball of wax, Bellerophon's magical horse. For Ares and Aphrodite's escapade he finds an Egyptian tale at least eight centuries older, but a genetic connection is only hinted, not asserted or argued. Anderson conceives one Hittite Telepinus tale with a character named Zukki to be a lineal ancestor, in sound of name as well as function, for the Apuleian Psyche (p. 64). Are the meanings then of Psyche's 'meaningful' name entirely fortuitous? Not all will be persuaded.

Chapter 12, 'Fairytale into Romance' (pp. 146-57), contends that popular 'fairytale' became Greek romance. Longus and Heliodorus' heroines are patterned after Aschenputtel, a.k.a. Cinderella. Chloe's recognitions of Longus are 'part of a Cinderella mechanism' (p. 146) and Calasiris 'plays the part of the fairy god-person'. I am not sure that Anderson draws any line between suggestive parallels in narrative devices and claims for strict genetic connection. Xenophon, Achilles Tatius and the author of Apollonius of Tyre then provide examples of 'a part Snow White' (AT 709). Given the parallel predicaments of nearly all ancient (and many modern) novel heroines, Anderson seems to carry his reductionism too far when he argues for the ancient novels' origins coming always from the embellishment of traditional tales. Chapter 13, 'Folktale and Sorcery: Some Reflections on Ancient Evidence' (pp. 158-66), examines the nature of such folkplots' popularity, exploring psychology, especially the view that they exist to cushion the crises and problems of vulnerable adolescent girls. Bruno Bettelheim is chastised for 'ultra-speculative methods' on the basis of Jack Zipes' more sociological and historically based analysis. Anderson regards the application of Freudianism to fairytales as no more useful than applying Christian allegory to Ovidian metamorphoses, a view I endorse without his having yet argued it.

Anderson opens by cogently arguing that brittle sequences of motifs are likely to be borrowed (diffusion), not separately reinvented (polygenesis). We are unlikely
ever to have ‘the original [Ur-]version’ (itself a contested concept in folklore) but, more often than others think, Anderson argues that our classical texts gave rise to or share a common—more ancient—source with the surviving tales of early modern Europe, an ‘increasingly incestuous fairytale community’ (p. 170). Thus he argues that some common (Anatolian?) plot is the source of both Ovid’s Baucis and Philemon ‘myth’ and a Yorkshire wondertale (pp. 16f.)—genre variants. ‘If a story is a genuine folktale or fairytale it will maintain most of its structure, intrinsic logic and basic identity for centuries or millennia on end’ (p. 19). He acknowledges that some of his reconstructions require him ‘awkwardly [to] unscramble’ (p. 142) the texts that we have. Yet ‘much of the standard modern canon of fairytales existed in antiquity’ (p. 169). In sum, I think Anderson will achieve more when he aims his mind at less. 8

Donald Lateiner


Jon Mikalson has written on Greek religion in other contexts.1 The present book addresses Herodotus’ account of the Persian Wars from the Ionian Revolt to the battle of Plataea. The aims are to present Greek religious practices in a historical context for better understanding of the importance of the interplay of religion and history and to argue against those who play down the role of religious explanation in history. Unfortunately, as Mikalson explains in his first note (p. 197), Thomas Harrison’s book on Herodotus’ religion2 came out just as Mikalson was on the point of submitting his and Harrison also argues against the sceptics—from those who see religious reference as mere entertainment for the audience to those who see it as characteristic of Herodotus as the traditional story-teller rather than the historian. This overlap meant that Mikalson had to jettison large questions including, as he explains, ‘the relationship of religion to the study of ancient history, the nature of the “miraculous” and the “divine” and whether Herodotus “believed” in what he described’ (p. 197).

Mikalson’s first chapter of almost 100 pages presents religious incidents from the Persian Wars in chronological order. Extensive translations from Herodotus are

8 The notes are copious (sometimes fifteen on a page) and helpful, although the publisher unhelpfully places them, despite the wonders of technology, at the back. There is a good index of subjects and of tale-types and a bibliography that one can spend a lifetime absorbing. The proofreading has faltered in chapter eleven where words have been run together and an ancient critic named ‘Dio of Halicarnassus’ makes his unwelcome debut.


complemented with evidence from later authors and inscriptions and a short commentary on each incident. The chronological presentation means that incidents are treated more or less in isolation from others even when they exhibit similar religious phenomena. In some places the natural pressure to make comparisons leads to explicit digressions (e.g., ‘we close this digression on Herodotus’ oracles’, p. 57), but this is not the general rule. The incident in which the Persians were divinely repelled from Delphi (pp. 69ff.) is a good example of the limitations of this presentation and of the style of the commentary. The point is made first that Herodotus prefers not to present gods on his battlefields, only heroes. This is followed by a translation of the inscription commemorating the incident in Diodorus Siculus (11.14.4), which gave the credit to the Delphians themselves as human agents. Mikalson notes that modern scholars emend this inscription and thus transfer the credit back to the gods, but that many inscriptions do regularly give the credit to people rather than gods or heroes. He then raises an interesting question: how did the Greeks think that gods contributed to their victories if they took the credit themselves in their inscriptions? But he does not explore this question of the relative responsibility of human and divine forces further; nor does he explain why Herodotus’ narrative gives the credit to the divine. Other examples of the interplay of divine and human agency could have been brought to bear to produce a much richer and more stimulating discussion, such as the role that the priestess Timo played in the fated downfall of Miltiades (6.135; cf. pp. 36ff.).

In another example (pp. 72-74, the capture of the Athenian Acropolis), Mikalson highlights the concept of ‘what was bound to occur’ by including in his translation a transliteration of the Greek phrase that describes the capture of Attica as ‘necessary’ according to the oracle (ἐδει, 8.53). This leads us to expect a discussion of the religious implications of the phrase not only because of the transliteration but also because John Gould understands such indications of necessity as mere narrative motifs that points the reader toward story closure. Yet there is none forthcoming and even in the later discussion of such phrases under the heading of the influence of the poetic tradition this particular incident is not discussed (pp. 148ff.). Harrison makes more penetrating remarks about such phrases. Mikalson also passes over Xerxes’ motives for offering sacrifice after the capture (both of them with religious implications: a motivating dream or a religious concern about the burning of the shrine on the Acropolis; Herodotus 8.54 leaves the alternatives unresolved); in fact, we hear much more about another motive that Herodotus does not mention—that Xerxes should have been more worried about the murder of suppliants in the temple. But double unresolved motivation has become an issue in studies of Herodotean narrative so that Xerxes’ stated motives are interesting enough in their own right. Why was Herodotus unable to decide in this case and not in others? How do the motives relate to each other in the divine scheme of things? The book gives no clear picture of Herodotus’ methods and narrative habits. Even in the introduction the statement that ‘Herodotus thought them (religious phenomena) important, included them and

integrated them into his account’ (p. 7) seems to contradict the subsequent comment that he was describing what was remembered, which puts the responsibility for what he says onto his sources.

Chapter 2, ‘Greek Gods, Heroes, and the Divine in the Persian Invasions’ (pp. 111-35), surveys the contributions of the individual gods in their various cultic guises. Two pages on Zeus Eleutherios are followed by one on the cults of Poseidon; there are eight on the contributions of Apollo. The point is also made that Herodotus attributes events to the vague force of ‘the divine’ rather than to a specific god not because he is sceptical but because he is unsure and taking the normal Greek precaution against naming the wrong deity (pp. 131-35). The reason why the gods support the Greeks in the war is not their general concern for justice but protection of their own shrines and constituencies (pp. 142f.).

A final chapter, ‘Some Religious Beliefs and Attitudes of Herodotus’ (pp. 136-66), treats questions such as: What kinds of gods exist? What affairs of men do they attend to? What sort of reciprocity exists with men? The reader is directed to the appendix on the origins of Greek religion for the first and to earlier discussions for some of the rest. Herodotus’ explicit statements about the activities of gods are then described; instances too where he thought it ‘reasonable’ to believe that something was caused by a god (because he believed that gods do cause things to happen when they are protecting their own shrines); oracles, omens, dreams and prophecies come next, then reciprocal relations between gods and men. It would have been good to integrate Herodotus’ religious beliefs into his general belief system. A treatment of his reserve about some divine matters does produce the comment that he avoided narrating the deeds of the gods because ‘they were unverifiable by the historical methods he used’, but these methods are not explained (p. 145). There is no systematic explanation either of why he rejects some reports of divine causation outright. In spite of the assertion that he is not expressing scepticism when he attributes a divine story to a source or puts it into reported speech, there is also no reason given why some miracles are reported and some are not, nor why Herodotus does not express a preference for one of the three divine reasons for the storm abating off Artemisium but does choose one among the three religious causes for the death of Cleomenes. The book ends with the presentation of the Hellenised religious beliefs of non-Greeks in Herodotus (as opposed largely to their practices, which are often alien).

This survey has some interesting insights, but its attempt to defend the importance of religion in history and in history writing could have profited from more engagement with the scholarship on Herodotus’ general belief system (for belief in religious phenomena should bear some relation to belief in others). So too on his methods, particularly the modes in which the storyteller presents divine phenomena (for to see these as part of his storytelling is not to say that he or his sources disbelieved them but could better explain the patterns of their appearance and their functions).

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Diana Spencer is a lecturer in Classics at the University of Birmingham and this is a by-product of her doctoral thesis, *The Roman Alexander: Studies in Curtius Rufus*, which she presented to Cambridge University in 1997. This book is both a monograph on the use and development of the Alexander myth in the Roman world of the late republic and early empire and a sourcebook of key literary passages relevant to the theme. The sources range from Cicero to poets of the Domitianic era (for whatever reason, Valerius Maximus is not included) and in each case a full translation is offered together with the Latin text. While the book has an obvious chronological focus and concentrates on Latin authors, Spencer’s study includes the origins of Latin literature, follows the tradition way beyond the first century CE, and concludes with comments on modern treatments of Alexander.

Her aims in this book appear to be encapsulated in the sentence, ‘Ultimately, we will be able to read a story of the development of a textualised Alexander and his impact on Roman political evolution, whilst also gaining a sense of the semiotics of Alexander in the modern world’ (p. xiv). She claims that what we know of Alexander from the classical sources is essentially a Roman story (p. xiv) since even the writers who might be labelled Hellenistic or Second Sophistic operated in a world that was dominated by Rome. I would be less inclined to reduce the significance of those labels in this way and would rather think of three overlapping phases in the (multi-stranded) development of the myth. Spencer is rightly concerned with contextualising the texts in this collection and, as she says, in distinguishing between the voice of the narrator and that of the author (p. xvii).

After a lengthy and useful introduction, the chapters are organised thematically, the first, ‘History into Story’ (pp. 1-38), providing an historical introduction with the focus on the period down to the foundation of the principate. The chapter opens with an interesting section under the title ‘What’s in a Name?’, which covers the associations of the name Alexander starting with the Trojan Paris, the connotations of the label Macedonian, and the implications of adding or leaving out the title ‘the Great’. This theme is developed at various points in the book, for instance, when Spencer refers to Lucan’s ‘destructive deployment of the adjective *Pellaeus*’ (p. 114), and when she notes that in a society where *cognomina* mattered Metellus’ appropriation of the *cognomen Macedonicus* meant that he ‘integrates Alexander inextricably into the fabric of Roman public space’ (p. 185). I missed a reference to the episode in 59 BCE when the audience in the theatre showed their feelings about Pompey by their reaction to the line, *nostra miseria tu es magnus* (‘to our misfortune you are great’, Cic. *Att.* 2.19.3). The section on names ends with the suggestion that Rome emerged as a sort of successor kingdom (p. 5). Chapter 2 ends with a section on ‘History and Identity’ (pp. 31-38), which covers the shifting significance of the east for Romans and gives prominence to Greek writers about Rome.
Chapter 2, ‘Readings—Alexander Rex’ (pp. 39-82), sets off from the closural problem: Alexander turned back from the east, did not progress from conquest to a management phase, and died before he could test the western half of the Mediterranean world. Hence the speculation illustrated by the first reading, Livy 9.18.1-7: what if Alexander had lived long enough to invade Italy and where would his worsening alcoholism, savage anger and adoption of oriental practices lead? This second array of questions leads into issues relating to kingship in the following readings, which bear upon the relationship between ruler and ruled and at the higher level between ruler and his advisers.

Chapter 3, ‘Readings—Living Fast, Dying Young’ (pp. 83-118), covers nine passages, most of them by Seneca, and shifts the focus from institutional factors to issues of personality. Spencer sees Caligula’s professed admiration for Alexander as damaging to the continued use of Alexander as a positive comparative for Roman emperors (p. 93). Hence Curtius’ treatment of the corruption of Alexander, which provoked numerous plots against him and increasing paranoia on his part. Curtius may be engaging in programmatic moralising, but his handling of Alexander’s attacks on those whom he disliked or distrusted seem rather to reflect experience of trials for maiestas (‘treason’) even before Caligula came on the scene. Furthermore, Tiberius was perhaps not the only one to be worried about Germanicus’ emulation of Alexander. Spencer has a good section on Seneca and Lucan on Alexander’s bloodlust, though to complete the picture one might draw in reference to Seneca’s tragedies and take a less flattering view of his nobility of purpose.

Chapter 4, ‘Readings—Imaging Alexander’ (pp. 119-63), deals with the realisations in antiquity that the hero needed a eulogist of matching stature and equally that the great writer needed a subject worthy of his talent. Who better to cite than Cicero? He provides the first two readings: Pro Archia 24 and Ad Familiares 5.12. There is a good treatment of Curtius’ presentation of the final clash between Alexander and the court historian Callisthenes (esp. pp. 136f. on Curt. 8.5-8). There is then an easy glide into the genre of the Suasoria, with the elder Seneca Suasoria 1.9 and 14 illustrating rhetorical exercises counselling a limit on imperialist ambition; then from rhetorical exercise to satire with Juvenal, Satires 10.133-73, where Alexander is associated with Hannibal and written down as the Pellaeus iuvenis (‘Pellean youth’).

Chapter 5, ‘Autocracy—The Roman Alexander Complex’ (pp. 165-203), has no readings and deals with a range of issues under the main headings ‘Style of command’ and ‘Eastward Ambitions: the Politics of Victory’. Themes covered include clementia (‘clemency’), divinity and felicitas (‘fortune’). Spencer takes a strong line on the emergence of Alexander as ‘a normative model for Roman leadership’ (p. 165) and refers to ‘the centrality of Alexander to Cicero’s engagement with Caesar’ (p. 165). And yet it can be argued that, if Alexander was central to political debate about leadership in Rome, it made little impression on Diodorus and perhaps even Timagenes. Spencer’s subject is not imitatio Alexandri (‘emulation of Alexander’), but rather the use made of the Alexander myth in discussion of power relationships involving Roman figures. Spencer notes the difficulties of determining in
any case whether conscious imitatio Alexandri inspired contemporary writers to develop that association or comparisons made by contemporaries encouraged Roman political figures to emulate Alexander openly (p. 168). Spencer would leave open the possibility that Scipio Africanus fostered comparison of himself with Alexander, though most would probably follow Badian’s view that Pompey was probably the first to encourage such an association. Spencer goes on to suggest that with Pompey dead Caesar ‘could take tentative steps towards manifesting himself as the true heir of Alexander’ (p. 170). On this count me among the doubters.

Chapter 6, ‘Alexander after Alexander’ (pp. 205-18), is a brief but valuable survey of the Nachleben of the Alexander myth. It includes a commentary on various Renaissance representations of Alexander, which are included in the book’s illustrations. Spencer finds Mary Renault rather bitchy about Curtius, Brian Walden rather Luddite about audio-visual technology for his television series Walden on Heroes, and Michael Wood rather amusing In the Footsteps of Alexander the Great (BBC 1997). There is an informative paragraph on various plans for a movie on Alexander (pp. 211f.) and a useful appendix on modern Alexanders, which includes a list of web sites.

The early pages are laced with social science and literary criticism jargon needed to satisfy the academic, bean-counting quality controllers, but for the rest the style is more attractive and at times positively jaunty, with vocabulary that includes ‘pin-up’ (p. 6), ‘sexy’ (p. 19) and ‘morph’ (p. 158). But throughout Spencer is making subtle points and drawing fine distinctions, and consequently some formulations do not read easily such as ‘The unrest that Alexander’s death sparked off implicates all his generals in the fragile hold he had on unity towards the end of his life’ (p. 171) and ‘These cavils [by Tacitus] and the Alexandrian edict made by Germanicus . . . lead inevitably . . . to the Tacitean eulogy of comparison with Alexander’ (p. 191). Obviously more might be written about the authors, genres and political contexts of the readings provided by this book and it may be that Spencer has perhaps magnified the impact that these passages may have made, but her purpose is an exegesis of the key passages and an historical account of the development of political themes associated with Alexander. In this she has admirably succeeded and has made a useful contribution not only to the study of the Alexander myth but also to the study of political discourse in the late republic and early principate.¹

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¹ Typographical errors are few: the only serious case is the scrambling of the Greek word in Seneca, De Ira 3.23.8 (p. 106). Although it is not germane to the issues of this book, I do not believe it correct to show Alexander as returning from Siwah to Memphis via the Qattara Depression (map 2).

Tylawsky’s book traces the Greek literary and social ancestry of the Plautine parasite of her title. In agreement with some judgements by Athenaeus (6.236c, not directly quoted by Tylawsky and referring to Hector’s companion Podes), she draws in a wide field of ‘ancestors’ throughout Greek literary history from the *Odyssey* and archaic poetry through Old and Middle Comedy to Menander and his contemporaries. Her main argument is that Roman comedy still shows many particularly Greek elements in the character of the flatterer. Tylawsky is especially interested in the social realities of the parasitical lifestyle and primarily tries to trace historical sources (and literary sources as an indication of their contemporary society) for the stage character and points out the similarities between some literary characters from the earliest Greek texts and the characterisation of the Plautine parasite.

In chapter 1, ‘Ragged Opportunism in Early Greek Poetry and Society’ (pp. 7-16), she analyses Odysseus in disguise as a beggar as a precursor of the parasite since he is, like the parasite, on society’s margins attempting to be admitted to the table of the suitors and thus to society. The hangers-on of the suitors, Iros the beggar, Phemios the bard and Medon the herald, she argues, are ‘protoparasites’ in the sense that they are in their different ways dependent on the suitors, but excluded from their proper society, and their various elements would later develop into the distinctive role of the comic parasite. A stranger without close connections to one household and unable to forge those with another soon becomes reliant on people to provide him with food and comforts in return for his entertaining them. This figure can take the form of a beggar, herald, rhapsode, companion or φίλος (‘friend’) depending on the circumstances. Similar characterisations are also found in the poetry of Asios of Samos (who is credited with the first evidence for the description of the flatterer as κόλαξ or κυνοκόλαξ) and Epicharmos’ *Wealth*; all these flatterers are willing to undergo humiliations in order to procure food and comforts for themselves.

Chapter 2, ‘Beggarly Interlopers and the Democracy: Aristophanes’ *Acharnians, Knights, and Wasps*’ (pp. 17-28), and chapter 3, ‘Fashionable Philosophizing: *Clouds* and Contemporary Society’ (pp. 29-42), are dedicated to the portrayal in the plays mentioned and in Eupolis of disreputable characters who have similar characteristics as hungry opportunists, namely good entertainment skills and tolerance of abuse or ridicule. These plays, she argues, show different ways in which flattery could be used by playwrights in the 420s, ranging from demonstrating the art of flattering in *Knights* to putting flatterers on stage in *Kolakes* (perhaps the first instance of a κόλαξ on stage). In *Acharnians*, the earliest of these plays, Dikaiopolis borrows the beggar’s outfit of Telephos from Euripides in order to make himself look more miserable. In *Knights*, Paphlagon-Cleon (an outsider to the household of Demos, as his slave-name indicates) flatters Demos with his clever tongue and, despite being low-born himself, becomes a successful opportunist. Both he and the Sausage-Seller have the gift of the gab and both use it to flatter Demos. Thus Cleon and his political
companions are exposed as flatterers by Aristophanes, a relationship further explored in the *Wasps*; both Cleonymus and Theorus, Cleon's aides, are κόλακες, flatterers of the people and opportunists, willing to undergo humiliations in order to achieve their goals. In *Clouds*, Aristophanes derides Socrates and the sophists as flatterers imposing on a credulous public (p. 34). Socrates is an ironic version of the sophist and Chaerephon, his friend and admirer, becomes his flatterer, while Socrates himself manages to obtain food and clothes (primarily cloaks) from the fashionable youths of Athens.

Chapter 4, ‘The Forging of a Stereotype: Society in the 420’s and Eupolis’ *Flatterers*’ (pp. 43-58), discusses Eupolis’ play (421 BC), which portrays Callias and his circle of sophists and flatterers. Tylawsky carefully reconstructs the play (including some possible dress of the chorus of flatterers) with its cooks called in to provide a feast for the flatterers (possibly including the sophist Protagoras as Callias’ main guest or, as Eupolis mischievously indicated, his main flatterer), an incident that is in many ways reminiscent of Middle and New Comedy plots and thus perhaps closer to what a parasite (until now, the character is a κόλαξ rather than a parasite) should be like. The chorus of flatterers in an extant fragment claims that nothing and no one would prevent them from getting their dinner, a similar notion to those found in Plautine parasite monologues.

Chapter 5, ‘Athenaeus, the Flatterer, and Middle Comedy’ (pp. 59-78), offers the full-blown study of the development of the flatterer into a stock character in Middle Comedy and our main source for it, Athenaeus. He attempts a definition as well as a historical sketch of κόλαξ and ‘parasite’. Tylawsky in general follows and illustrates Athenaeus’ discussion of the characters’ development (6.234-62) and argues that παράσειτος ‘designated the person, kolakeia the activity’ (p. 62). She argues that the word κόλαξ is used at first for both flatterers and parasites, until in Middle Comedy the word παράσειτος was adapted for this particular branch of hanger-on restricted to comedy. The parasite developed his particular characteristics fully in this period, for example, being beaten up at dinner parties for the sake of good food and having a nickname, which integrates the parasite into the in-crowd. Some named parasites and their historical origins are discussed. Chaerephon, mentioned by name by several comic writers, the archetypal anecdotal parasite, she argues, is based on the comic portrait of Socrates’ follower Chaerephon in Old Comedy, as in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, turning the philosopher into a stereotyped ancestor of the stock character. Philoxenos the dithyrambist underwent a similar fate and became another stereotypical comic parasite.

Chapter 6, ‘The Flatterer and Contemporary Themes’ (pp. 79-92), deals with situations in which the parasite functioned as the butt for criticism of contemporary party life. Themes ridiculed were contemporary philosophy, fashionable young men, their rowdy party behaviour, and love for drink and prostitutes, all by association with the typical character traits of stage parasites: gluttony, entertaining talk, and ability to bear insults if necessary to procure a meal. Chapter 7, ‘Flatterers and New Comedy’ (pp. 93-106), illustrates how characters became more and more realistic and the parasite became much quieter and less noticeable (p. 94), but Menander provided him
with more variety in the role: Chaereas in the *Dyscolus* is a foil to the more sensitive Sostratos in handling love affairs, and the several flatterers pandering to Menander’s soldiers show other aspects in which Menander varied the stock character by giving its role more diverse functions depending on the necessities of the play.

Chapter 8, ‘Saturio’s Inheritance’ (pp. 107-24), turns to Roman *palliata*. In the course of his development, the flatterer had acquired some props, bathing equipment and a sack for provisions. Tylawsky discusses in detail the various connotations of these props and concludes (among other things) that the subdued clothes of the parasite and the λῆκυθος (‘oil flask’) are the signs of ‘the career idler’ and associate the bearer with a Greek lifestyle. The parasite, she argues convincingly, is still recognisably Greek (and thus suspicious to the Roman audience) in his appearance and attitude to life. She associates especially the parasite and Cynic philosophers since both share the same impoverished life-style. This special reference to the Cynic philosopher as a source for the stock character of the parasite indeed matches well with the characterisation of Saturio, who mentions the Cynics in his speeches, but Tylawsky struggles to extrapolate this particular philosophical attitude in Plautus’ other parasites. Plautus continued to let his parasites have long speeches in which they brag and describe their professional eating skills with added Plautine exuberance. Like Menander’s characters, Plautus’ are adaptable to the situation and needs of the play. Their task is to be funny (*ridiculus*): if they are not, they are thrown out. Saturio’s monologue in many respects is the true heir to the speeches of Greek comedy. There is, she argues, no true parallel to the parasite in Roman society (thus standing in direct opposition to the thesis of Damon,¹ who argues the Roman client system is reflected in the relationship between the parasite and his rex). After such a wide-ranging introduction to the development of the character, this last chapter with its concentration on the props appears a bit narrow. Other Plautine incarnations of the stock character other than Saturio disappear into the background and the stress on the possible philosophical origin of the parasite’s props as derision of the Cynics and the continued perception of ‘Greekness’ of the character is perhaps too limited, an attempt to draw a straight line from Chaerephon to Saturio. The discussion does not allow enough space to the typically Plautine exuberance of characterisation or the often metaetheatrical elements in the speeches of Plautus’ parasites.

Overall this study, however, offers a good history of the long ancestry of this character, which did not all spring newly formed from Plautus’ pen but stands at the end of a long development and derives from many and various sources. The book is a valuable study of the development of the parasite’s Greek into the Roman stage personality and the continuity of some persistent features in this stock character from the Greek beginnings of comedy into Plautus.

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In this book, Hubbard collects ‘in as complete a form as is possible’ (p. xv) translated excerpts from the literary and documentary evidence concerning ‘homosexuality’ in Greece and Rome from the archaic Greek to the Greco-Roman periods, excluding texts written under Christian influence. Introductions to each section aimed at the general reader, extensive footnotes, and thorough bibliographical surveys for each period make this volume an accessible and invaluable resource that should be in every university library. Having said this, it is a volume that has to be used with caution (as is the case with many collections of translated texts). Hubbard’s ‘curious reader not immersed in the cultural history of Greece and Rome’ (p. xv) may well find her-/himself bewildered; ‘the more experienced students of antiquity’ will probably find themselves (as I did) returning frequently to the original Greek and Latin sources to check on the words translated as ‘fag’, ‘queer’, ‘faggotry’, ‘homosexual inclinations’, ‘pervert’, ‘boy’, ‘youth’, ‘slutting around’, ‘mixed grill of boys’, ‘inborn qualities’, ‘sex-drive’, ‘males beyond nature’, ‘boy-toy’, ‘hairy-arsed queens’, ‘over-aged male hustlers’ and ‘wanton lesbianism’.

From the outset Hubbard makes it clear that he has collected these texts from a particular ideological perspective on gender, sex and sexuality, which shapes his interpretation of same-sex relations in antiquity. In his preface, he refers to ‘same-gender relations’ or ‘same-gender eroticism’ (p. xv); later he uses the terms ‘same-sex relations or same-sex behaviour’ (p. 447). Clearly, Hubbard does not endorse the careful distinction made between sex and gender in much feminist and gender theory, emanating from scholars, who would adopt the constructionist rather than the essentialist perspective on human sexuality. However, Hubbard does not adopt the term ‘homosexuality’ because he believes that sexual identity is transhistorical, but ‘as a convenient shorthand linking together a range of different phenomena involving same-gender love and/or sexual activity’ (p. 1). In addition, he strongly believes that analysis of a range of ancient texts suggests that ‘some forms of sexual preference were, in fact, considered a distinguishing characteristic of individuals’ (p. 2).

Hubbard, believing that Greek and Roman sexual behaviour cannot be reduced to any single paradigm, rejects the ‘age-differential’ model of male same-sex relationships and the active-passive polarity inherent in it because, he maintains, there is enough textual evidence of ‘age-equal activity’ to subvert any interpretation rooted in ‘victim categories’ (p. 11). Although Hubbard never clarifies what fundamental premises of Dover, Boswell, Foucault and Halperin he disagrees with (p. xvi), he presumably refers to the ‘older-younger’/‘active-passive’ model that underpins these scholars’ well-known interpretations of Greek male same-sex relations. However, the evidence collected for ‘age-equal relationships’ is so rare (and problematic) that much of it is not evidence at all and one is left suspecting that the exception simply proves the ‘age-differential’ rule (for which the evidence in Hubbard’s collection is
overwhelming). For example, in one of Theognis’ poems (excerpt 1.65, p. 44), the editor believes that the fact that other boys find Cymus sexually attractive ‘makes it clear that youths were attracted to and slept with other youths of the same age’ (p. 5). However, the Greek (unlike the English translation) clearly distinguishes between the παῖς (Cymus), all the other youths (vēōt) and the ‘man’ (ἀνήρ), the fictive speaker whose desire is presumably unreciprocated. I fail to see what this poem has to do with age-equal relationships; what is at issue is lack of mutuality in an age-unequal relationship (a familiar topos).

There are other examples of pushing flimsy evidence too far. The entrance of the glamorous Charmides into the palaestra attracts the admiring gazes of the younger boys (5.4, p. 172) but lustfully admiring gazes from one’s contemporaries do not make for ‘intimate male attachments, even among age-equals’ (p. 163). Similarly, I cannot see how Meleager’s poem about the delicate Diodorus, who casts a ‘flame upon his young age-mates’ (6.40, pp. 294f.), appears to explore an age-equal relationship ‘in which roles become readily reversible’ (p. 271). The Strato poem, about a threesome, to which the editor also refers (p. 271), has no reference to age at all (6.76, p. 303); the other Strato poem cited (6.84, pp. 304f.) is indeed about reciprocal sexual role-playing amongst youths, but it is about brute sex (hence the imagery), not ‘age-equal relationships’. ‘Youth obviously delights youth’ (5.9, pp. 234f.), but I suspect that when it comes to male same-sex relationships in classical antiquity Plato’s comment on this proverb is more apt: ‘you can even have too much of people your own age’ (p. 235).

With regard to awareness of sexual preferences and characterising people on the basis of this, I cannot believe that this begins with Archilochus (p. 2), especially since ‘man’s nature is not the same’ (1.1, p. 25) is largely editorial conjecture. A nascent awareness of innate preferences certainly seems to underlie Aristophanes’ famous myth in Plato’s Symposium (p. 3), but there is no real evidence to suggest that this was a ‘widespread perception’ (amongst whom precisely?). In fact, the very use of ‘sexual preferences’ and ‘characterizing individuals’ conjures up the thorny issue of identity and its relationship to sexuality (or rather, the discourse around sexuality), a post-modern rather than pre-modern concern.

Even in the later Roman period, I am not sure that there could have been a ‘homosexual subculture’ with its specific fashions, speech and cruising spots: as Williams has perceptively shown, sub-cultures of this kind flourish only in environments where the dominant form of masculinity is overtly hostile to penetrative sex between men (which hegemonic Roman masculinity never was). Effeminate cinaedi (‘pathics’) are indeed the butt of savage satire in Juvenal, Martial, Petronius and Apuleius (all included in Hubbard’s sourcebook), but these are men who publicly parade their enjoyment of passivity in such a way that it undermines the prevailing code of masculine values. One can presumably engage in active and passive sex with

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men without ever being labelled a cinaedus or ever identifying oneself as one (as do the gaggle of made-up queens in Apuleius).

If a collection of source material in translation is to work effectively, the editor has to be very careful about the translations used. Hubbard notes that he and his team of translators attempted to ‘strike the delicate balance between fidelity to the original and felicity of English expression, further complicated by my demands for uniformity within the volume on certain semantic issues’ (p. xvii). These ‘semantic issues’ are never clarified, but presumably one such issue is the translation of cinaedus, for which Hubbard reluctantly adopts ‘pervert’ in many passages since he believes that the range of the word’s uses ‘seems potentially to include anyone who is perceived as sexually excessive or deviant’ (p. 7). Yet how is a Latinless reader, interested in understanding Roman attitudes to sexuality rather than the attitudes of various translators, to cope with the fact that cinaedus is also translated in this collection as ‘faggot’ (7.40, p. 327), ‘fag’ (9.25, p. 425; 9.28, p. 426), ‘fairy’ (9.38, p. 431), ‘queer’ (9.39, p. 438) and ‘queen’ (10.15, p. 475)? Hubbard usually indicates (and this is essential) when cinaedus is translated as ‘pervert’, but there should be explanatory comments on all of these.

Some of the translations do not quite attain Hubbard’s ‘delicate balance’ (for example, Daryl Hine’s version of Theocritus, Idyll 23 (pp. 285-87) and the editor’s translation of Statius, Silvae 2.6.21-57 (pp. 427f.), but the majority are largely accurate and lively. The editor often indicates (in footnotes) the Greek (transliterated) and Latin for important concepts, for example, the Greek for ‘friendship, desire and erotic desire’ (p. 254 n. 148), but this practice should have been used more consistently, especially if the sourcebook is to be used for any meaningful analysis of love, desire and same-sex relationships in antiquity.²

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Mayer’s book is one of three works published in 2002 as part of a new (and very reasonably priced) series, Duckworth Companions to Greek and Roman Tragedy, edited by Thomas Harrison of the University of St Andrews. The professed aim of the

² For the general reader the notes are on the whole exceptionally helpful. A few are not: the Kerameikos is a little more than the northwest part of Athens (p. 61 n. 7; cf. p. 471 n. 65); in Rufinus’ poem (Hubbard 6.52, p. 297), in which the poet-lover claims that he is no longer boy-crazy but is now mad for women and his discus is now a rattle (clearly a sexual reference), rattle (κρόταλον) is glossed with the following: ‘the sistrum was a musical instrument used in the worship of the goddess Isis’ (n. 71)! I cannot understand p. 65 n. 23. There are very few misprints: I noticed Lambert and Szesnat (1984), where the date should be 1994; Euripid (p. 71 n. 34); and Praetorius (p. 377 n. 79).
series is to provide 'accessible introductions to ancient tragedies'. To this end all Greek or Latin quoted by the authors is translated and technical terms are elucidated. There is a select guide for further reading in addition to a full bibliography, a chronology of events referred to in the books, and a clearly laid-out index. The series has been thoughtfully conceived and succeeds to a large extent (no mean feat) in balancing the needs of the reader with no or little background in ancient drama or in classics with those of classics undergraduates. In the case of Mayer's book, the detailed notes and extensive bibliography may prove a fruitful resource even for students beyond this level.

There are nine chapters in Mayer's book. Chapter 1, 'Seneca and Roman Tragedy' (pp. 9-19), provides a succinct account of the key events in Seneca's life in addition to an outline of the main tenets of Stoicism, the influence of declamation, and a brief survey of the history of Roman tragedy. In this chapter Mayer discusses the issue of stage performance versus recitation and makes it clear that he favours the latter. Chapter 2, 'The Action of the Play' (pp. 19-36), includes a summary of the action of *Phaedra*, a commentary on its development, and discussion of Senecan tragic practice in general. Mayer handles topics such as the dramatic function of the prologue, the contemporary resonances of Phaedra's willingness to take the erotic initiative with Hippolytus, and problems of staging. The chapter closes with a three-page section on the role of the chorus in Senecan drama in general and in this play in particular. Chapter 3, 'The Major Themes of the Play' (pp. 37-50), considers the *topoi* of nature, family values, *furor* ('insanity') versus *ratio* ('reason'), and the moral world of the play. Chapter 4, 'Characterisation' (pp. 51-64), explores the individual characters in the play as well as dealing with the issue of tragic character more generally, contrasting Seneca's tragic sensibility with that of Euripides and pointing out the influence of the mythical tradition, Roman social *mores* and rhetoric. Chapter 5, 'Literary Texture' (pp. 65-74), deals with the blending of sources generally in Roman literature before proceeding to consider Seneca's relationship with his main models, the two plays of Euripides on the same theme and Ovid. The final section is concerned with style: the influence of rhetoric and declamation, brevity, allusiveness and epigrams. Chapter 6, 'Reception and Later Influence' (pp. 75-88), considers the popularity of Seneca's plays in his own lifetime and the limited influence of *Phaedra* to the end of the classical period before tracing the revival of interest in Senecan tragedy in the fourteenth century and through the Renaissance. Mayer lingers over Seneca's influence on Racine's *Phèdre*, moves on through Swinburne in the nineteenth century, and closes with an account of the work of two contemporary dramatists, Claus and Kane. Chapter 7, 'Interpretation' (pp. 89-96), opens with a brief historical outline of the interpretation of Senecan tragedy from Trebet to Regenbogen. A survey of those scholars who interpret the tragedies in Stoic terms follows. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to a critique of Charles Segal's *Language and Desire in Seneca's Phaedra*. Chapter 8, 'Performance History' (pp. 97-104), gives an account of what recitation would have entailed in Seneca's day before moving on to discuss stage performances of the *Phaedra* from the fifteenth to the twentieth century. Chapter 9,
‘Translations’ (pp. 105-10), is a brief critique of (mostly contemporary) translations of the tragedies.

The book supplies a good introduction to Seneca’s *Phaedra*. It is neatly packaged into its various chapters and sub-sections. The fragmentation of a short work into so many chapters, however, does create a problem with regard to repetition since some matters are relevant to more than one chapter. It also prevents the integration of topics that might usefully have been discussed together: for instance, the sections in chapter 2 in which Mayer provides a commentary on the action of the play might have been enriched by discussion of some of the themes discussed in chapter 3 and the consideration of Seneca’s use of his sources in chapter 4. This said, it is certainly the case that Mayer’s arrangement makes the contents of his book more accessible and less intimidating to the non-specialist reader than would a denser and more integrated approach.

The quality of the books is somewhat uneven. Chapters 1 to 5 are excellent. In them Mayer distils a great deal of scholarly learning into a very few pages, simplifying without being patronising, and drawing attention to problems without getting bogged down in them. He is strong on staging issues and pp. 52f., which deal with the impact of staging on character, are especially good. Mayer largely succeeds in the difficult task of elucidating the play while simultaneously making the reader aware of the general characteristics of Senecan tragedy, of the political and social milieu in which Seneca worked, and of the literary background to his plays. The only point in these chapters at which Mayer’s sense of direction appears to falter somewhat is in chapter 4, where he becomes very specific, devoting nearly two pages (pp. 56-58) to an essay by Hanna M. Roisman,¹ which is out of keeping with his (appropriately) general approach.

Chapter 6 is solid, though I wonder whether a chapter on ‘Reception’ is necessary in an introductory book. In a world of page constraints, I would willingly have sacrificed this chapter in order to gain more pages for chapters 7 and 9. These chapters, in my opinion, are somewhat sketchy. Chapter 7 is six and one-half pages long—long enough perhaps to provide a brisk critical outline of the major contributors to the interpretation of the play. Some of these contributors are present: Trevet, Widal and Regenbogen are mentioned. Mayer then refutes the views of those who interpret *Phaedra* as a Stoic text. After this Mayer introduces Segal’s study of *Phaedra*,² which he guardedly describes as ‘the most individual interpretation of our play’ (p. 92; the ‘our’, like the ‘we’ in chapter 2, cosily draws the reader close). At this point he becomes stuck. For the remaining three and one-half pages, he engages in a critique of Segal’s book. Such a close treatment of a single text (compare his critique of Roisman’s essay in chapter 4), especially of one that does not ultimately find much favour in Mayer’s eyes, throws the chapter out of balance and apparently leaves

Mayer with no space for a more general survey of modern scholarly interpretations of the play to guide the novice reader.

The final chapter on translations is disappointing. True, Mayer does here what he does not in chapter 7: he presents an overview of modern contributions. However, his assessment of them is superficial. The last two pages (pp. 109-11) of the chapter are the most interesting. Mayer considers the nature of Seneca’s poetic diction, drawing attention to the ‘constant echoic buzz of earlier verse’ and pointing to the difficulties involved in translating his plays into English. If this section has been placed at the beginning of the chapter, it would have provided a framework for a more focused discussion of the translations.

Chapter 1 does not read smoothly, but thereafter matters improve, although I am not sure that the attempts at chatty informality that crop up from time to time work very well. The frequency of Mayer’s inclusion of parenthetic material can be annoying (see, e.g., the last lines on p. 28 and the first few lines of p. 29). There is some awkwardness of expression, particularly in chapter 1, e.g., ‘But whatever man gets up to for good or ill, overall is the benevolent will of god, which takes the form of providence’ (p. 11). On the positive side there are delightful flashes of dry wit, especially in the later chapters, such as on p. 86, where Mayer, recounting the story of Kane’s play, Phaedra’s Love, refers to Hippolytus blowing his nose into one sock and then ‘with nice discrimination’ masturbating into its companion. I found very few typographical errors: the verb is missing in the last sentence of the first paragraph on p. 94; ‘to’ is omitted before ‘talk’ in the second-last sentence on p. 110; and there is the misspelling of ‘Presss’ on p. 112 (n. 9). Mayer’s book is a useful introduction to Seneca’s Phaedra and to Senecan drama in general. It fills a real gap in the area. If one might have wished for more in the latter chapters, it is in part because the earlier ones set such a high standard.

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Why should twenty-first century classicists be interested in a short essay (twenty-six pages in this edition) on the Iliad published in French in 1941 and written by a woman who was not a professional scholar? The reason quite simply is that this brief essay is a work of deep and startling originality, one of those rare pieces of criticism that makes one look with fresh eyes at the work it treats. Its author, Simone Weil (1909-43), was an extraordinary individual, revered by some as a saint, regarded by others as an extremist of doubtful sanity. At the least one would have to say that
Weil was a paradoxical person. Born of non-observant Jewish parents, she became a fervent Christian without joining any church or believing that God existed in any conventional sense. In her youth, Weil embraced Marxism, but later turned away from it. After graduating brilliantly from France's elite École Normale Supérieure, Weil taught in a high school, spent several long spells as a factory worker, joined the anarchists in the Spanish Civil War, and ended her short life as a clerical worker for the Free French in London during the Second World War. Having forced herself to live only on the rations allowed to people in occupied France, Weil 'died of heart failure caused by pulmonary tuberculosis and self-starvation' (p. 3); the coroner indicated that she had committed suicide 'whilst the balance of her mind was disturbed' (p. 12 n. 13).

Weil’s reading of the Iliad seems at first sight simple and straightforward; yet as it proceeds one realises that she is saying things about the poem that have never been put in this way, many of which are profoundly true. She is above all concerned with the manifestations of 'force' in the poem. Weil uses this word in a number of ways, meaning by it 'violence', such as we see in the many battle scenes of the Iliad; 'oppression and humiliation', as of Thersites by Odysseus in Iliad 2.266-70; 'power', such as the strong always wield over the weak, as Agamemnon exerts over Achilles in Iliad 1, and as the gods exercise over humans; 'force of Nature', as exemplified by the lions, wild boars, raging fires and hurricanes of the Iliad’s similes; and 'inescapable constraint', the kind of force that fate and death represent for all mortals.

Since Weil’s essay is so brief and condensed and her style so lapidary, extended citation is perhaps the easiest way to give a sense of the work. Much of the essay consists of powerful generalisation, which is then illustrated by quotation from the text of the Iliad. 'The true hero, the true subject matter, the centre of the Iliad is force. The force that men wield, the force that subdues men, in the face of which human flesh shrinks back' (p. 45). 'From the power to change a human being into a thing by making him die there comes another power, in its way more momentous, that of making a still living human being into a thing. He is living, he has a soul; he is nonetheless a thing' (p. 46). 'As pitilessly as force annihilates, equally without pity it intoxicates those who possess or believe they possess it. In reality, no one possesses it' (p. 51). 'Though all are destined from birth to endure violence, the realm of circumstances closes their minds to this truth. The strong is never perfectly strong nor the weak perfectly weak, but neither knows this' (p. 53). 'Thus violence overpowers those it touches. In the end, it seems as external to the one who wields it as to the one who endures it. Here is born the notion of a destiny under which executioners and their victims are similarly innocent; conquerors and conquered are brothers in the same misery' (p. 57). 'Thus war expunges every concept of a goal, even the goals of war. It expunges the idea of an end of war. The possibility of a situation so violent is unthinkable outside that situation; an end to it unthinkable within it' (p. 59). 'When the beaten man begs to be allowed to see another day, what response can this meek

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1 See the critical but fair assessment of G. Steiner, 'Sainte Simone, the Jewish Bases of Simone Weil's Via Negativa to the Philosophic Peaks', TLS June 4 (1993) 3f.
wish for life find . . . ? The very possession of arms on one side and their lack on the other divest the imperiled life of nearly all its significance' (p. 60).

But, particularly in the latter part of the essay, Weil also discusses the nature of the Iliad more specifically. 'Battles are not determined among men who calculate, devise, take resolutions and act on them but among men stripped of these abilities, transformed, fallen to the level either of purely passive inert matter or of the blind forces of sheer impetus. This is the ultimate secret of war, which the Iliad expresses in its similes' (p. 61). 'This is what makes the Iliad unique, this bitterness emerging from tenderness and enveloping all men equally. . . . The tone always is imbued with bitterness but never descends to lamentation. . . . Nothing of value, whether doomed to die or not, is slighted; the misery of all is revealed without dissimulation or condescension; no man is set above or below the common human condition; all that is destroyed is regretted. Victors and victims are equally close to us, and thereby akin to both poet and listener' (p. 64). 'The exceptional impartiality that pervades the Iliad may have parallels unknown to us, but it has had no imitators. It is difficult to detect that the poet is Greek and not Trojan' (p. 66). 'No thing the peoples of Europe have produced matches their first known poem. They will perhaps rediscover epic genius when they learn to believe nothing is protected from fate, learn never to admire force, not to hate the enemy nor to scorn the unfortunate. It is doubtful whether this will soon occur' (p. 69).

No one, not even a genius, can state the whole truth about the Iliad in the space of twenty-six pages. And not everyone is convinced by Weil's reading of the poem. George Steiner, for example, writes of her 'deeply felt but bizarre interpretation of the Iliad as a poem of suffering—a reading almost blind to the wild joy and ferocity of archaic warfare which makes the epic blaze'. 2 (On this point, though, I think Weil is more right than Steiner.) But what, I believe, lends Weil's writing on the Iliad such power is the stringent underlying moral sense of which one is constantly aware. Although she writes about the Iliad often at a high level of abstraction and generality, it is this moral sense that creates a bridge to the wider contemporary world. As one reads one constantly feels moving behind her words the conflicts and tragedies of the last one hundred years: Nazi aggression, the death camps, World War 2 (and indeed the war in Iraq and all other wars), the struggles between capital and labour, between the powerful and the powerless.

Although Weil's essay on the Iliad has been translated into English before, it has not been easily accessible. Holoka deserves our gratitude for having provided this exemplary edition, which supplies all the help necessary for the non-classical reader to understand and appreciate the essay, but which also contains much that is of interest to the classicist. The edition consists of four parts. Part 1, 'Introduction' (pp. 1-17), provides a brief but balanced and fair account of Weil's life and of the essay and how it reflects Weil's views on ethics, Christianity and the classics. Part 2, 'L'Iliade ou le poème de la force' (pp. 19-44), supplies the French text 'based on the definitive 1989 Oeuvres complètes' (p. ix) and part 3 (pp. 45-69) a lucid, accurate translation into

English. Part 4 (pp. 71-105) provides a paragraph-by-paragraph commentary on the entire essay summarising its argument and illustrating Weil's points by frequent quotation from more recent Homeric scholarship, from other writings by Weil, and from war literature. An appendix helpfully gives in full the Greek text of all Weil's quotations from the *Iliad* (she quotes only in French). All scholars interested in Homer and all libraries of universities where literature is taught should buy this book.³

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This collection of ten papers records a conference held in Oslo in 2000, itself the end product of a three-year research project. It is hard to discern much of a common theme among the individual contributions other than scholarly attention focused primarily, though not exclusively, on the *Poetics*. The title of the collection is accurately modest. Sense is indeed made of the work, as the volume's sub-title promises. That was bound to be the case because these writers are scholars of proven competence. In most cases they have already made significant contributions to the commentary on Aristotle's work and here they address themselves with clarity and circumspection to discrete topics that can be handled in the space of a brief essay. Some pieces concentrate on the Aristotelian treatment of an issue, even where there is caution as to whether the Aristotelian approach is actually Aristotle's. Others cast their literary net wider, using Aristotle as a touchstone for a more comparative approach. Both approaches can help illuminate Aristotle's *Poetics*.

The topics related to the *Poetics* that readers should seek to quarry from this collection are the role of aesthetic pleasure in the good life (Heath, pp. 7-23), the timescale of tragic material and experience (Belfiori, pp. 25-49), the significance of universals in the theory of *mimesis* (Halliwell, pp. 87-107), and the ethical significance of the same key concept (Fossheim, pp. 73-86). Moving further afield but still within the compass of Aristotle, there are discussions of his almost vanished work on comedy (Janko, pp. 51-71). Some of the essays seek to illuminate Aristotle's work by considering its influence on subsequent theorists and artists. Here we have a discussion of Aristotle's influence on early Roman tragedy (Feltham, pp. 109-25), his reception in the theories of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century poets, particularly Giraldi and Shakespeare (Javitch, pp. 127-44; Minsaas, pp. 145-71), reflections of Aristotle in the theories of Rapin and Brecht (Silk, pp. 173-95), and likewise of Goethe (Cave, pp. 197-214). The last essay helpfully constructs a hermeneutic map of the different

³ I found the following minor misprints: for ‘Sons’ (p. 25 sec. 24) read ‘Sous’; for ‘tremblement’ (p. 30 sec. 44) read ‘tremblement’; for ‘out’ (p. 34 sec. 54) read ‘ont’; for ‘wretch’ (p. 51 sec. 24) read ‘Wretch’; for ‘covered’ (p. 55 sec. 39) read ‘covered’ (?); for Greek ‘τε’ (p. 117 sec. 77) read ‘τ’.
approaches to the *Poetics* that are adopted by the co-contributors in the volume. The book ranges interestingly over a great deal of the Aristotelian text and also the numerous literary traditions that look back to Aristotle. In what follows I shall concentrate on the essays of Halliwell and Heath, which bear directly on central themes in the *Poetics*. In my view both these pieces and the volume generally might have been usefully supplemented by awareness not only of how Aristotle's influence reaches forward into later tradition but also of how he himself looks back dialectically to the sources of his own problems.

Stephen Halliwell works together two themes: the importance of *mimesis* in Aristotle's account of human nature and the claims about the philosophical character of tragedy in *Poetics* 9. In the latter text Aristotle famously categorises tragedy (here generically called 'poetry') as more philosophical than history on the ground that it is concerned with the universal while the history sticks with the particular. Tragedy shows the sorts of things that might get done while history recounts actual individual events, and that makes the former more philosophical and 'worthy' than the latter. Halliwell rightly probes the terms of Aristotle's contrast between the two genres. If history tells us what Alcibiades did at Syracuse, is not a tragedy similarly specific in its depiction of people and events? It certainly does not present universals in the manner that a scientific treatise, conceived after the prescriptions of the *Posterior Analytics*, might do. Halliwell presses the point that tragedy is mimetic; it operates through comparisons—and recognitions of comparisons—between individuals. The intellectual benefits of tragedy are expressed in terms of such comparisons. So how do universals play the role that they must do if this judgment about the philosophical character of tragedy is to be supported? His answer is to remind us that in Aristotle's general philosophy universals are not separate entities but instead should be understood as immanent in the individuals whom they serve to connect. This is how art is able to function as a valuable bridge in human intellectual progression from perception and experience to scientific knowledge and wisdom, as that process is outlined in *Metaphysics* A and *Nicomachean Ethics* Z. There is a certain kind of insight that can portray the universal through—because in—the individual and that is how art in its mimetic manner contributes to human knowledge.

Halliwell's sound analysis of Aristotle's epistemology enables him to avoid a number of pitfalls in his reading of *Poetics* 9. But a richer reading is available if we bear in mind the Platonic background against which Aristotle is working. One of Plato's main criticisms of art (including tragedy) as an aid to human rationality concerned the ontological deficiency of the material that it handles. Copies of copies are feeble guides to the true nature of reality. There is therefore considerable piquancy in Aristotle's commentary on these ideas here in the *Poetics*. Not only is the subject matter of poetry at least as real as is that of history, but it also contains greater reference to precisely that element in things—the universal—that supplied understanding for Plato. Just as with his revision of Plato's ontology, so in aesthetic theory too Aristotle explicitly corrects the judgments of his predecessor.

Malcolm Heath is interested in the peculiar character of the pleasure that Aristotle attributes to the spectacle of tragedy. He is scrupulous in identifying his
problem. The events of tragedy about which pleasure might plausibly be felt are certainly not apt to excite that feeling in a context other than the aesthetic. Moreover, the greater emphasis we place on the role played by mimesis in the experience of tragedy, the more likely we are to delineate too broad a range of experience for the purpose in hand. The focus of aesthetic reaction must be on the plot, not on other features—like words or spectacle—that might arouse pleasure.

Heath reviews the life of leisured excellence, in particular as described in Politics Θ, and on this basis he argues that when an audience that views a tragedy contains such members their moral excellence makes their response of pity and fear to the tragic events an appropriately pleasurable response. So their pleasure is justified precisely by the focus of their attention on the pitiable actions of the plot. Heath himself finds this account of the pleasure in tragedy implausible and he is doubtful that it can truly be attributed to Aristotle. I agree on both counts. A better line, I suggest, is to construe pleasure in tragedy as the kind of ‘mixed case’ involving elements of pain as well as pleasure. Aristotle wrestled with the legacy of the thoughts of Eudoxus and Plato on this topic and in Nicomachean Ethics K2-4 he shows how anti-hedonism is not entailed by a refusal to assign pleasure the highest value. The way through the dialectical minefield lies in recognising how the mixed cases do not simply combine good and bad elements. The pleasure of tragedy supplies an excellent example of this phenomenon.

My point in both these examples is that there would be interpretative gain in paying more attention to the dialectical background to Aristotle’s own discussion, as he himself in many contexts—although often in the Poetics—enjoins us to do. This line of thought is notably missing from the otherwise comprehensive discussions in the volume. There is much more in the collection than I have been able to discuss in any detail. The editors, who contribute an introduction (pp. 1-5), a bibliography (pp. 215-17), an index locorum (pp. 219-23) and a general index (pp. 225-30), are to be congratulated on a well-turned enterprise. Read it with profit.

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Books for review should be sent to the Reviews Editor, Scholia.


Books Received


IN THE MUSEUM

*Scholia* publishes news about classical museums in New Zealand and articles on classical artefacts in museums. Information about classical exhibitions and artefacts is welcome and should reach the In the Museum Editor by 1 September.

CLASSICS MUSEUM
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON

J. K. Deuling, Curator
Classics Museum, Victoria University of Wellington
Wellington, New Zealand

In February 2003, the Classics Programme and the Classics Museum relocated into new facilities in Level 5 of the Old Kirk Building at the Kelburn Campus. After rapid unpacking and refitting, the Museum opened late March, hosting the first meeting of the Wellington Classical Association in 2003 in the new combined museum and tutorial room. The internal room is physically twice as large as previous facilities with atmosphere and lighting controlled for teaching purposes as well as preservation of antiquities. An open atmosphere is maintained, however, by the glass walls and sliding doors on two sides that open onto the foyer and the Classics Library beyond. Mobile slide projection and power point presentation facilities are readily available. As a result all tutorials for Classics art courses, honours and research seminars are held in this room.

Initial exhibition space for the main collection has consisted of the former display and storage cases reconfigured in the new space side by side. Additional storage and viewing for coins and sherd sets is provided by a set of five individually locked museum drawers a metre wide that can be pulled out and fixed into position for close examination of material. From 2005 we will expand the display around the room and into the foyer with new vitrines as the collection grows and with special thematic exhibitions. Most importantly, we have been able to acknowledge our combined Pacific and classical heritage with strong colours and by lining the cases with woven grass matting. School groups and schools’ careers advisors are frequent visitors on open days and throughout the academic year. The new Classics Museum space creates a centralised venue for the Classics programme and the community to celebrate study and research in our discipline at the Victoria University of Wellington.

In 2003 and 2004 four additions have been made to the Classics Museum.¹ All are sculptural and from the eastern and central Mediterranean region. The first is an

¹ Photographs by D. H. Burton, Classics, Victoria University of Wellington.
Etruscan antefix dating from the late sixth to the early fifth century BC (ca. 515-485). The fragment shows the head of a grinning, bearded gorgon with a broad, flattened nose fired with creamy white, red and black pigmentation. The face is nearly complete, while only a quarter of the tongue-patterned aureole fan remains. The gorgon’s locks of hair are represented by two archaic beaded black ropes that would be mirrored across the face if it were complete. Additionally, the face is framed with a series of moulded black s-curved locks forming the fringe or bangs, which are echoed below by a series of sinuous, stylised curls alternating in red and black representing the snakes usually associated with a gorgoneion. The archaic almond-shaped eyes are outlined in black and framed above three-dimensionally by the brows, also drawn in black. The remaining ear, outlined in red, folds out at the corner of the figure’s left eye. The head itself is framed by a series of adjacent tongues outlined in alternating red and black that follow the twisted red and black stripes of the terracotta crescent framing the medallion that the gorgoneion constitutes. The whole mask appears to float above a rectangular plinth decorated in a meander pattern in black, white and red. The back of the antefix shows broken elements that indicate it was attached to the edge of a shrine or temple roof. It likely fell to the ground since there is some rubbing and grazing around the edges. The antefix is quite similar to an example from Satricum.

The Roman female portrait head is said to be from the eastern Mediterranean, although the finely grained marble may have been imported to that area from Attica. The style of the portrait is generally Antonine, dating to the mid-second century AD or more probably into the mid-third century. The woman’s face is shaped roughly like an inverted pear with a rounded chin. Her hair is parted centrally and frames the upper part of her face in gently waving folds. A long plait rises from the back of her neck to the crown. The eyes are carefully rendered with heavy lids, incised irises, drilled pupils. The tear ducts are clearly defined with fine drillwork and undercutting. As a

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2 Figure 1: VUW Classics 2003.1; height 25.5 cm. The clay is reddish yellow, Munsell 5YR 7/6-8. The grey core indicates imperfect firing, Munsell 5YR 7/1-6/1. The coarse clay has inclusions with small pits and holes, along with flecks of mica; the piece was formerly in a Dutch collection. Charles Ede Limited, Ancient Terracotta Sculpture 17 (2002) no. 47.

3 G. Q. Giglioli, L’arte etrusca (Milan 1935) tav. 177.5. This example is from Conca, Satricum and located in the Museo di Villa Giulia in Rome. It may have come from a previous use of the same mould as that of the VUW antefix or perhaps from a mould made by the same mould-maker or workshop.

4 Figure 2: VUW Classics 2003.2; height 23.3 cm., from a nineteenth-century English collection. Charles Ede Limited, Antiquities 173 (2003) no. 11. Charles Ede Limited suggests the general provenience and an Antonine date, but a probable restoration of the hair indicates a style popular from the mid-second century AD and worn well into the third. For a similar but more elaborate hairstyle see S. Wood, Roman Portrait Sculpture 217-260 A.D. (Leiden 1986) pl. 43 (fig. 57a-b) Tranquillina, married to Gordian III in AD 241 (London, British Museum). Pupils tend to be cardioid (heart-shaped) and more deeply cut in the third century than in the second, but heavily lidded eyes with shallowly cut crescent-shaped pupils do persist.
result, the figure gazes upwards to her right. The v-shaped mouth is similarly undercut with a drilled line separating thin lips. Between her right eye and nose is a mole, an unusual individualising feature. The face is nearly complete, although the end of the nose and left nostril are broken. Additionally, both ears are damaged, with some grazing and root patination overall. The braid shows a lateral crack and the back of the head is hollowed out at either side of the braid with rough chisel marks. The coiffure likely was pieced together and carved with odd bits of marble used at the back and sides, where the portrait would not be viewed closely.

The third item, a Hellenistic (ca. 150-50 BC) model of a theatrical mask, is complete and intact. The mask depicts the head of a young man with eyes pierced in the pupils and an open mouth typical of the type. The brow is furrowed slightly and creased at the bridge of the nose, although the eyebrows are fairly straight and smooth. The sausage-like nose is perhaps slightly hooked to the figure’s right and the thick upper lip is raised a bit on the left. As a result, the figure appears to frown slightly or to appear quite earnest. The face is framed by a tight roll of straight hair rising centrally above the nose with clusters of three to four corkscrew curls falling below the ears from behind. Reddish brown pigmentation remains prominently throughout the hair. Traces of red can be seen on the lips, and the cheeks are ruddy. Two small holes have been pierced in the centre back circa 1.5 cm. from the bottom edge. The mask has been cleaned, although some encrustation remains. Additionally there is some grazing around the back edges. The mask can be described as that of a ‘serious youth’ or in Pollux’ typology the category πάγχης τος νεανικός, ‘the admirable young man’, as translated by J. R. Green and A. Seeberg. Compare to examples from Agrigento and Southern Italy. A similar provenience is likely for the VUW mask.

A Mycenaean phi-figurine, the final acquisition for 2004, takes us back to the Late Bronze Age Greek mainland (LH IIIA2, 1350-1300 BC). The female figure has applied pellet eyes, a pinched ridge nose and modelled breasts. Her facial, hair and dress details are defined by strokes of applied slip ranging from strong brown to black

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5 For a similarly shaped mouth, see Wood [4] pl. 17 (fig. 25) Julia Mammaea, her Type 2, possibly dateable ca. 230 (Rome, Museo Capitolino, inv. 457).

6 Figure 3: VUW Classics 2004.1; height ca. 15.5 cm., diameter at base 15.7 cm. The clay is pink, Munsell 7.5YR 7/4 to reddish yellow, Munsell 7.5YR 7/6; the piece comes from an Australian collection.

7 M. Bieber, The History of the Greek and Roman Theatre (Princeton 1939) 94, fig. 339. Bieber refers to ‘the serious youth’ and illustrates a similar mask from Agrigento. J. R. Green and A. Seeberg apply Pollux’ typology as noted and provide an example from South Italy in T. B. L. Webster, Monuments Illustrating New Comedy 1 (London 1995) pl. 32, 3NT2a.

8 Figures 4a-b: VUW Classics 2004.2; height 13.7 cm., maximum diameter at base 4.7 cm. The fine terracotta is pink, Munsell 7.5YR 7/4 to reddish yellow, Munsell 7.5YR 7/6, with strong brown to black slip, Munsell 7.5YR 4/6 –N2/0, and fired; the figurine is complete and has been cleaned although some encrustation remains. It was formerly in the Trampisch Collection, thence that of Sir Peter Holmes. Charles Ede Limited, Greek Antiquities (2004) no. 9.
depending on thickness and firing. Broad bands encircle her neck and low waist. Her arms are not modelled beyond the flat disc that constitutes the shoulders, arms and torso of the figure. The folds of her garment are indicated with broad, wavy linear bands of slip on the torso and skirt, both in front and back, that form a swirl as the skirt flares at the base. A double applied plait or braid falls from the back of the head midway down the back. Each strand is marked by short horizontal bands that have been worn at the ridges of the braids and now resemble double rows of dots. This phi-figurine appears to be a variation of Elizabeth French's Phi Type A, which has modelled eyes and breasts. Normally Type A does not have a braid. Yet examples with plaits in a variety of decorative markings do exist, although a double plait is unusual. Compare particularly, however, the example from Voula with a double braid.9 Because of the modelled eyes and breasts, the figure is more likely French's Type A than her Type B or a transitional piece.

![Figure 1. VUW Classics 2003.1. Etruscan Antefix.](image-url)

Figure 2. VUW Classics 2003.2. Roman female portrait head.

Figure 3. VUW Classics 2004.1. Hellenistic model of New Comedy theatrical mask.
Figure 4a. VUW Classics 2004.2. Mycenaean phi-figurine (front).

Figure 4b. VUW Classics 2004.2. Mycenaean phi-figurine (back).
The paper judged to be the best student essay in New Zealand submitted to Scholia by 1 September for the preceding year is published annually as the J. A. Barsby Essay. The competition was sponsored from 2002 to 2004 by the Classical Association of Otago. From 2005 the Australasian Society for Classical Studies will sponsor the competition. The Essay is in honour of New Zealand classicist J. A. Barsby.

FUGIT TE, INEPTE: CATULLAN URBANITAS AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

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In this essay I will sketch a broad outline of the concept of urbanitas and discuss how Catullus uses this concept to mark social differences among his contemporaries. I will also draw upon a reconsideration of satire from a study of eighteenth-century English literature as a way of understanding the complexity of Catullus' position. I will argue that Catullan urbanitas constitutes a highly unstable and ambivalent set of criteria for distinguishing insiders from outsiders in Roman society.

In the first century BC Roman civilisation was becoming more self-conscious.1 This period was marked 'by careful analysis and precise definition of important concepts'2 and 'conscious attempts [were] . . . being made to explain, interpret, and even define Roman urbanity'.3 However, as William Fitzgerald points out, the meaning of urbanitas was in flux at this time and it remained a 'somewhat experimental' concept.4 Cicero himself resorted to such vagaries as odor urbanitatis ('the fragrance of urbanity',5 De Orat. 3.161) when he tried to describe it and 'all but admits defeat when he attempts to delineate and define . . . urbanity',6 while Quintilian, writing somewhat later, defines urbanitas in largely negative terms: nihil absonum, nihil agreste, nihil inconditum, nihil peregrinum ('nothing dissonant,
nothing rustic, nothing artless, nothing foreign'). Some critics argue that there is no single discoverable essence of urbanitas: it is ‘an ideal with many facets’, 8 ‘a complex concept made up of a number of qualities, characteristics [and] attitudes’, 9 a ‘performance’, 10 or a ‘social game’. 11 They point to ‘the indefinability of Catullan urbanity’ 12 and acknowledge that ‘an adequate translation of urbanitas is impossible’. 13

If we cannot adequately define urbanitas, however, we can at least identify some of the qualities associated with it. In the writings of Cicero, Quintilian and others, urbanitas is seen as innately Roman, a quality conspicuously lacking in the foreigners making their way to Rome in increasing numbers. 14 It is consistently and sharply contrasted with rusticitas (‘country ways’) and associated with literature and learning, 15 with a sophisticated sense of humour, 16 and with style and good taste. 17 There was also a ‘general feeling’ that the homo urbanus ‘should avoid becoming excited or harried for any reason at all’. 18 Furthermore, we can isolate a distinctive vocabulary associated with urbanitas. Though the word urbanus appears only four times in Catullus (22.2, 9; 39.8; 57.4), critics have identified an array of words belonging to ‘the vocabulary of urbane Rome’, 19 including bellus (‘charming’), delicatus (‘wanton, elegant’), dicax (‘well-spoken’), elegans (‘refined’), expolitum (‘polished’), facetiae (‘wit’), ineptiae (‘follies’), lepos (‘grace’), sal (‘piquancy’) and venustus (‘attractive’). 20 In any discussion of Catullan urbanity these words are essential clues that issues of urbanitas are at stake. While bearing the terms and attributes above in mind, it is also important to note that urbanitas is a concept ‘whose purpose is as much to exclude as to define’. 21 It should be considered ‘functionally

19 D. O. Ross, Style and Tradition in Catullus (Massachusetts 1969) 105.
21 Fitzgerald [1] 89.
rather than as a bundle of qualities" and I shall therefore examine how Catullus uses urbanitas to mark social divisions.

Perhaps the most vulnerable candidate for exclusion from Roman society was the foreigner. In poem 39 Catullus attacks the Spaniard Egnatius, who uses urine to whiten his teeth and consequently grins incessantly regardless of the circumstances:

\[ Si \text{ ad rei ventum est} \]
\[ \text{subsellium, cum orator excitat fletum,} \]
\[ \text{renidet ille; si ad pii rogum fili} \]
\[ \text{lugetur, orba cum flet unicum mater,} \]
\[ \text{renidet ille.} \]

(Catull. 39.2-6)

If someone has gone to the defendant's bench,
when the barrister arouses tears, he grins; if there
is mourning at the funeral pyre of a dutiful son,
where the bereaved mother is weeping for her only
child, he grins.

Catullus uses very specific language to condemn Egnatius, whose monomaniacal behaviour is *neque elegantem, ut arbitror, neque urbanum* ('neither refined nor urbane, in my opinion', 8). The poet uses a metaphor of illness (*hunc habet morbum* 'he has this disease', 7) along with graphically described physical symptoms (*russam . . . gingivam*, 'red-raw gums', 19) to reinforce Egnatius' social unacceptability. A socially inclusive catalogue of Italian peoples, in which Catullus' Transpadanians are excused the insulting epithets bestowed on the Umbrians, Etruscans and Lanuvians (11-13), shows just how far beyond the pale Celtiberians like Egnatius really are. In the ideal conditional clause marked by *si . . . esses* ('if you were'), which contains the key word *urbanus* (10), Catullus suggests that even if Egnatius were to come from the right places his behaviour would be inappropriate. As it is, his Celtiberian origins and disgusting habits definitively exclude him from polite society; all his attempts to appear more polished (*expolitior*, 20), ironically echoing the *novum libellum . . . expolitum* or 'polished verses' of 1.1f., only damn him further. In poem 39 Catullus uses the language of urbanitas to tell his contemporaries that 'this is the kind of person that Rome can do without'.

In poem 84 Catullus targets Arrius, 'an ambitious hick who doesn't know where to put his aitches'. Though Catullus mentions Arrius' *liber avunculus* ('free-born uncle') in passing (5), thereby hinting at other servile relations, poem 84 is

\[ \text{22 Fitzgerald [1] 90.} \]
\[ \text{23 The edition used throughout this essay is that of D. Garrison (ed.), The Students' Catullus (Oklahoma 1995).} \]
\[ \text{24 Ramage [2] 74.} \]
\[ \text{25 Garrison [23] 155.} \]
mostly a witty parody of Arrius’ doomed attempts to compensate for his lower-class background through speech:

Chommoda dicebat, si quando commoda vellet
dicere, et insidias Arrius hinsidias . . .

(Catull. 84.1f.)

Arrius used to say ‘hadadvantages’ whenever he
wanted to say ‘advantages’, and ‘hambushes’
instead of ‘ambushes’ . . .

Arrius is naively proud of his foolish locutions (mirifices sperabat se esse locutum, ‘he hoped he had spoken amazingly well’, 3) and the point is hammered home by the first and last words of the poem: Chommoda . . . Hionios (‘Hadadvantages . . . Hionian’, 1-12). Catullus’ sophisticated audience would instantly have recognised this mangling of educated speech: Cicero and other authors regarded the correct use of the aspirate as an essential part of urbanitas.26 Ramage suggests that leniter et leviter (‘gently and lightly’, 8) hint at the correct intonation required of the urbane man, which social climbers like Arrius struggled to acquire.27 Arrius’ departure from the city for Syria may be politically advantageous, but it also marks his exclusion from urbane society; everyone is relieved to see him go (7-9).

In poem 6 Catullus focuses on someone who has excluded himself from sophisticated company. Flavius’ reluctance to talk about his new lover immediately points to a more serious breach of urbanitas; the girl is illepidae atque inelegantes (‘graceless and inelegant’, 2), an unfortunate combination of qualities that is emphasised by the double elision.28 She is further described as a febriculosi scorti (‘feverish whore’, 4f.), and the adjective suggests both disease and a lack of self-restraint. Clearly, ‘she is not the cool and fashionable type one would introduce socially’.29 While Flavius tries to conceal his trysts, the very bed betrays him by shouting and squeaking (clamat . . . lecti argutatio, 7, 10f.), and his exhausted body bears all the signs of ineptiarum (‘acts of foolishness’, 14). Catullus neatly distinguishes himself from Flavius and his unfashionable lover by promising to celebrate their sordid affair in charming poetry:

Volo te ac tuos amores
ad caelum lepido vocare versu.

(Catull. 6.16f.)

I want to immortalize you and your girlfriend
in witty verse.

The contrast between the panting, weary lovers and the elegant poet of the closing lines is a particularly deft piece of social boundary marking.

Poem 12 is also an interesting illustration of how *urbanitas* can be used exclusively and inclusively at the same time. Catullus condemns Asinius’ tasteless theft in familiar terms: *non belle uteris* (‘you were up to no good’, 2); *hoc salsum esse putas? Fugit te, inepte* (‘Did you think this was witty? You’re out of it, idiot’, 4); *quamvis sordida res et invenusta est* (‘It was a shabby business and as gauche as could be’, 5). Catullus begins the poem with Asinius’ *cognomen Marrucine* (1), reminding his audience of Asinius’ provincial origins, and contrasts Asinius’ petty greed with his own disregard for money (*non me movet aestimatione*, ‘I am not concerned about the cost’, 12) and the intrinsic worth of Pollio (*leporum differtus puer ac facetiarum*, ‘a young man crammed with charm and cleverness’, 8f.). Catullus’ *urbanitas* is evident here not only in the ease with which he transforms invective against Asinius into praise of Pollio and in the elegant affirmation of his friendship with Veranius and Fabullus (14-17), but also in the technical facility with which he uses crude colloquialisms such as *differtus* (9) alongside the *hapax legomenon mnemosynum* (‘keepsake’, 13).

These literary expressions of *urbanitas* have a wider function in the Catullan corpus. The poet’s clever adaptations of Greek poetic modes (4, 6, 51), his mythological and literary references (2.11-13, 60.2, 22.21), and his Hellenistic displays of botanical and geographical knowledge (7.4f., 11.2-12) simultaneously declare his own urbane learning and divide his listeners: some, like the witty poet Licinius Calvus of poem 50, can be expected to understand every arcane allusion, but others, like the gormless ‘Mentula’ of poem 105, will always miss the point. While modern students of Catullus who benefit from the careful work of editors like Garrison gain a kind of artificial entry into Roman polite society, those readers who approach Catullus with little or no outside help might get a taste of what it was like to be excluded from the rarified world of *urbanitas*.

Thus in the poems discussed above, Catullus seems to use *urbanitas* in a relatively unambiguous way, marking clear social distinctions between insiders and outsiders in Roman city life. On closer inspection, however, *urbanitas* becomes a much more problematic concept. In a recent re-examination of eighteenth-century Augustan satire, Fredric Bogel notes that satiric texts are seen traditionally as attacking an external target: ‘The originating moment of satire is the satirist’s perception of an object that exists anterior to the satiric attack’. Norms of judgment ‘are assumed to be relatively clear and unambiguous . . . [and] the satirist is set in

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opposition to the satiric object’. However, Bogel argues that ‘referentiality and factuality’ are satiric conventions that readers should question: the crucial fact about satire ‘is not that satirists find folly or wickedness in the world and then wish to expose that alien something. Instead, satirists identify in the world something or someone that is both unattractive and curiously or dangerously like them, or like the culture or subculture they represent . . . [something] that is not alien enough’. In this context satire is ‘a rhetorical means to the production of difference in the face of a potentially compromising similarity, not the articulation of differences already in place’. As a mode that simultaneously denies existing similarities and produces artificial differences, satire is ‘intrinsically and inescapably a double structure’.

Although Bogel is writing about satire in Augustan England nearly two thousand years after Catullus, there are critical precedents for applying cultural and literary models anachronistically. William Fitzgerald, for instance, begins his discussion of Roman urbanitas with Terry Eagleton’s analysis of the Earl of Shaftesbury’s aesthetics. And while Catullus is not formally classed among Roman satirists, much of his verse corresponds closely to the standard definition of satire in the Oxford Companion to Classical Literature as ‘a commentary from a personal viewpoint, good-humoured, biting, or moralizing, on current topics, social life, literature, and the faults of individuals’. If we accept Bogel’s understanding of the essential doubleness of satire and apply his formulations to Catullus’ satiric use of urbanitas, we should find at least some poems in which the categories of insider and outsider blur or break down altogether, revealing disturbing similarities between the satiric poet and the despised satiric object.

In poem 44 Catullus ostensibly ridicules a bad orator in terms that recall the disease imagery of poems 39 and 6. Sestius’ speech is plenam veneni et pestilentiae (‘poisonous and pestilential’, 44.12), and it gives Catullus a severe cold (malamque pectore . . . tussim, 7). However, the real butt of the joke turns out to be Catullus himself: the verbs appeto (‘I seek’, 9) and volo (‘I want’, 10) betray Catullus’ longing to be invited to dinner, regardless of the aesthetic compromises involved and he openly admits that he brought his illness on himself (non inmerenti, ‘I deserved it’, 8). In poem 44 the ‘rich well-connected aristocratic orator showed his bad taste in his

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34 Bogel [33] 2f.
35 Bogel [33] 41.
36 Bogel [33] 42.
37 Bogel [33] 4.
style, Catullus in his desperate desire to be included in Sestius’ company, and that desire demonstrates that Catullus can be as much an outsider as those he mocks. In this light it is highly significant that the geographical boundaries of urbanitas also blur and shift. Whereas in poem 39 both the Sabine and Tiburtine regions are within the limits of social acceptability, finer distinctions are drawn in poem 44 in which the Tiburtine area is regarded as fashionable but the Sabine is not. Catullus, like Cicero, was from a provincial background and worked hard to assimilate into aristocratic Roman society. His concern to locate his villa in the Tiburtine region (verius Tiburs, ‘more truly, Tiburtine’, 5) suggests that the poet may have sympathised more closely with outsiders like Egnatius and Arrius than he is willing to admit.

In poem 10, as in poem 6, Catullus confronts a scortillum (‘bimbo’, 10.3) but with very different results. In contrast to Flavius’ hapless lover, the girl of poem 10 is non sane ilepidum neque invenustum (‘decidedly not ungraceful or unattractive’, 4), and despite the grudging privatives, she is more than a match for Catullus, easily calling his bluff about the litter-bearers (24-27). The graceless syntax of 10.30 (Cinna est Gaius ‘Cinna—that is, Gaius Cinna’) mirrors the poet’s fumbling excuses, and the phrase fugit me ratio (‘it slipped my mind’, 10.29) recalls a similar phrase in poem 12 (Fugit te, inepte, 12.4). Catullus admits his foolish motives for lying to the girl (ut . . . unum me facerem beatiorem, ‘in order to make myself (seem) particularly rich’, 10.16f.), and his closing condemnation of her as insulsa (‘witless’) is clearly mere spite (33). The poem ends with Catullus’ carelessness in the emphatic final position (neglegentem, 34) and shows that the arbiter of urbanitas may himself be judged and found wanting.

Indeed, many of the poems portray Catullus losing his poise in terms that recall the scorti of poem 6. In poem 50, even after a day of urbane play with Calvus, Catullus is incensus (‘aflame’, 8) and semimortua (‘half-dead’, 15); in 51, his passion for Lesbia renders him dumb, feverish and deaf (lingua sed torpet, tenuis sub artus/flamma demanat, sonitu suopte/tintinant aures, ‘my tongue is paralysed; liquid fire runs through my limbs; my ears ring with their own sound’, 9-11); and he is vesano (‘frenzied’) at 7.10 and on fire with love in poem 72 (etsi impensius uror, ‘I am burning more fiercely’, 5). The picture that emerges from these poems is a long way from the cool, unflustered homo urbanus described by Cicero.

But perhaps the most interesting illustration of the double structure of Catullan urbanitas occurs in 22. In this poem Catullus confronts the disturbing spectacle of Suffenus, a man of exemplary urbanity (homo ... venustus et dicax et urbanus, ‘an attractive, well-spoken and cosmopolitan man’, 2; bellus ille et urbanus, ‘he is charming and sophisticated’, 9) whose abysmal poetry reveals all the finesse of a caprimulgus aut fossor (‘a goatmilk or ditchdigger’, 10) and sinks him below the level of the most boorish rustic (idem infaceto est in factior rure, 14). Even the lavish trappings of expensive bookbinding (cartae regiae, novi libri, novi umbilici . . . ,

41 George [40] 250.
‘large sheets, new rolls, new winding-sticks . . .’, 22.6f.) cannot conceal Suffenus’ true lack of sophistication, and Catullus is forced to conclude that if someone as outwardly perfect as Suffenus is not really urbanus, no one is:

\[
\text{Nimirum idem omnes fallimur, neque est quisquam quem non in aliqua re videre Suffenum possis.} \\
\text{(Catull. 22.18-20)}
\]

Doubtless we all err in the same way, and there is no-one whom you cannot see as a Suffenus in some area.

These poems demonstrate that the variable terms of urbanitas can potentially exclude anyone, even Catullus himself. The poet is left in the interesting position of fiercely defending a standard to which he cannot measure up, a paradoxical stance echoed somewhat later by Groucho Marx: ‘Please accept my resignation. I don’t want to belong to any club that will accept me as a member’.43 In the poetry of Catullus, urbanitas is an ambiguous and unstable concept. The vein of irony running through both Roman urbanity and the satiric mode44 allows Catullus to attack vanity, foolishness and insincerity. Yet it simultaneously undermines his efforts to construct a despised ‘other’: the terms of urbanitas turn back on those who wield them, the lines between insider and outsider blur, and unstated sympathies between satirist and satiric object gradually emerge. As a tool of social exclusion and inclusion, urbanitas is too double-edged to be truly effective. It does, however, prompt the poet to mock his own pretensions as often as he mocks those of others, and ultimately these qualities of humble irony, wry self-deprecation and rueful self-knowledge are arguably the most attractive features of Catullan urbanitas.

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