# SCHOLIA

*Studies in Classical Antiquity*

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Editor: W. J. Dominik

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## REVIEW ARTICLES

# EDITORIAL NOTE

One of the distinguishing features of *Scholia* since it commenced publication in 1991 has been its publication of contributions by scholars from numerous countries around the world. *Scholia* 14 (2005) contains contributions by scholars at universities in New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Canada, USA, France and Greece. The research articles cover a wide range of subjects and authors such as tool use in animals, the use of the term *barbarus*, a stone theatre in Rome, one of the *Homeric Hymns*, Xenophon, Plautus, Ovid, Lucan and Seneca.[1] In the feature article of this volume the assertions of ancient writers such as Pliny, Plutarch and Aelian that some animals are capable of using tools are shown to be corroborated by modern scientific research, which suggests that the mental activity of animals is conscious and therefore should encourage humans to reconsider their treatment of them.[2]

While the *Scholia* Editorial Committee undertakes to publish submissions accepted as soon as possible, it reserves the right to hold over any contribution to another volume. The vast majority of articles and reviews are published in the volume of the journal specified in the formal letters of acceptance sent to contributors; however, some articles and reviews may not appear until the publication of a subsequent volume for various reasons. Due to circumstances beyond the control of the editor, some of the articles scheduled for publication in this volume have had to be postponed and therefore are listed again as forthcoming but this time in *Scholia* 15 (2006).[3] The editor regrets the delay in publication and apologises to the contributors of these articles.

*Scholia* is predominantly a print journal, but its professional website has been upgraded so that all articles and other contributions appear in pdf format. This development reflects the editor's belief in the importance of a strong web presence to enhance the journal's profile and to ensure maximum exposure of its contents. In addition, *Scholia* is archived in ProQuest and LOCKSS, indexed and abstracted in *L'Année Philologique*, indexed in *Gnomon* and TOCS-IN, and listed in *Ulrich's International Periodicals Directory*. *Scholia* is listed in the Australian Department of Education, Science and Training *Register of Refereed Journals* and is recognised by the South African Department of Education for research output subsidy.

The In the Museum section, which contains news about classical artefacts in New Zealand museums, features an article in this volume by Robert Hannah on Greek and Roman lamps in the Otago Museum in Dunedin.[4] This volume also includes the 2005 J. A. Barsby Essay, which is the paper judged to be the best student essay in

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[1] See 'Articles', pp. v-vi.

[2] S. Newmyer, 'Tool Use in Animals: Ancient and Modern Insights and Moral Consequences', pp. 3-17.

[3] See p. 188.

[4] See pp. 171-76.

New Zealand submitted to *Scholia* during 2005. First place was awarded to Elizabeth Lockhead (Canterbury), for her essay entitled 'The Relationship Between Books and Slaves: Horace Epistles 1.20'.[5] The winner's prize of NZD150 was sponsored by the Australasian Society for Classical Studies. Joint second place was awarded to Maree Newson and to Olivia Holborow (Victoria, Wellington); the runner-up prizes were sponsored by the Australasian Society for Classical Studies and the Department of Classics at the University of Otago. The competition was adjudicated by Paul McKechnie (Auckland), Matthew Trundle (Wellington) and Robin Bond (Canterbury).

William J. Dominik
Editor, *Scholia*

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[5] See pp. 175-81.

# TOOL USE IN ANIMALS: ANCIENT AND MODERN INSIGHTS AND MORAL CONSEQUENCES

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**Abstract.** Research conducted in recent decades by zoologists and specialists in animal behavioral psychology have corroborated ancient assertions, found in the elder Pliny, Plutarch, and Aelian, that some animals are capable of using tools to enhance their lives. Modern scientists agree with these ancient writers that this capacity may indicate the presence in animals of some conscious mental activity and that this may compel humans to rethink their treatment of animals.

One of the most fascinating aspects of the modern animal rights movement remains relatively unknown even to activists who have some sense of the history of the movement. Animal rightists are generally unaware of the extent to which issues central to the current debate on the moral status of animals are anticipated in ancient discussions of man's relationship with non-human species that are found both in serious zoological and philosophical treatises and in naïve compilations of animal wonders. A question that in the past several decades has achieved a certain degree of notoriety in scientific literature is that of whether animals have the intellectual capacities needed to use or even to produce tools. This question, like all questions that relate to the potential mental faculties of animals, is important to animal rights advocates because of the implications it has for human conduct toward non-human animals. If it can be proven that animals can solve such problems as securing food and attaining freedom by manipulating and altering the components of their physical environment, humans might feel morally obligated to rethink their treatment of them if such behavior is indicative of a correlation between tool use and higher intelligence in animals. The question of the "technological skill" of animals is taken up in ancient literature in a manner that at times parallels current scientific observations to a remarkable degree. Arguments in support of the hypothesis that animals can use tools, and examples of the sorts of tools that animals use, are surprisingly similar in ancient and modern literature. This study examines the issue of tool use in animals as it is addressed in Greek and Roman scientific and philosophical literature and in its modern counterpart.

Roger French observes that Aristotle held two views on the nature of animalkind: that each animal's nature expresses itself as well as possible and does nothing that does not contribute to the welfare and survival of that animal's

species, and that each species can be compared against other species favorably or unfavorably.[1] In Aristotle's zoology, animal species are judged to be naturally perfect or imperfect when viewed against other species. Man occupies the high point in this system, and all other species represent to a greater or lesser degree a falling away from man. From this vision Aristotle developed his biological doctrine of συνέχεια ("continuity," "gradualism," Arist. *Hist. An.* 588b5, *Part. An.* 681a12-15), whereby nature advances by degrees toward humankind, a doctrine that contributed substantially to the concept that came in later ages to be known as the *scala naturae*, or Great Chain of Being.[2] This chain does not reach seamlessly from the lowliest animal species to man, but admits of a break between other species and man in the matter of mental capacity. As philosopher of mind Richard Sorabji has characterized Aristotle's position, "Even Aristotle's gradualism in biology is carefully qualified so that it allows for a sharp intellectual distinction between animals and man."[3] In this doctrine man stands at the pinnacle of creation thanks to his possession of reason, which Aristotle denied to animals. He allows animals τῆς περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν συνέσεως ὁμοιότητες ("resemblances of intelligent understanding," *Hist. An.* 588a23f.), but he reserves reason for man: μόνος γὰρ ἔχει λόγον ("for he alone possesses reason," *Pol.* 1332b5f.).[4] Aristotle reiterates and elaborated his denial of reason to animals elsewhere in the course of his zoological treatises. He claims, for example, that only man has a deliberative faculty: βουλευτικὸν δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τῶν ζῴων ("Man alone among animals is a deliberative creature," *Hist. An.* 488b24f.). Moreover, while other species may be capable of movement, only man is capable of thought: ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἡ φορὰ καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις τῶν ζῴων, διάνοια δ᾽ οὐδενί ("Locomotion is present in other animals as well, but thought [is] in no other one," *Part. An.* 641b8f.).

The notion that man differs from other animals most especially in his capacity for intellectual activity that is denied to other species because of their inferior mental endowments became, according to Robert Renehan, a commonplace so widely accepted in western thought that its Greek origin has been forgotten, although the dichotomy between humans and other animal species that arises from the concept has, as Renehan expresses it, "scarcely any

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[1] R. French, *Ancient Natural History: Histories of Nature* (London 1994) 59.

[2] The classic study of the idea of the *scala naturae* remains that of A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, Mass. 1939). On Aristotle's contribution, see pp. 55-59.

[3] R. Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate* (Ithaca 1993) 13.

[4] Aristotle reiterates this claim at *Eth. Nic.* 1098a3f.; *Eth. Eud.* 1224a26f.; and *Metaph.* 980b28.

rival as a characteristically Greek concept."[5] The claim that man alone of animals is rational is in fact only one of a number of claims of man's unique status, which are so numerous is ancient literature that Renehan speaks of a "man alone of animals *topos*."[6]

     A powerful advantage that the unique possession of reason accorded humans, in the thinking of Aristotle and other ancient authorities, was the ability it gave them to manipulate and alter their physical environment to some degree through the use of what Aristotle and others termed τέχνη ("technological skill"). Aristotle articulates this position in *Historia Animalium*: ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τέχνη καὶ σοφία καὶ σύνεσις ("In humans [are] technological skill, wisdom and intelligence," 588a29f.). Animals, in contrast, have only τις ἑτέρα τοιαύτη φυσικὴ δύναμις ("some other similar sort of natural capacity," 588a30f.). The philosopher elaborates his conception of human technology in the opening chapters of his *Metaphysics*, where he argues that human beings, who by nature seek knowledge, are capable of profiting from their life experiences, whereas animals live solely by ταῖς φαντασίαις καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις ("impressions and memories," 980b26f.). Human beings, on the other hand, live at the same time by skill and reason: ζῇ . . . τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνη καὶ λογισμοῖς ("But the race of human beings lives by technical skill and reason," 980b26-28). Xenophon's Socrates remarks that, in addition to their gift of reason, the gods gave man hands: ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ χεῖρας προσέθεσαν, αἳ τὰ πλεῖστα οἷς εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἐκείνων ἐσμὲν ἐξεργάζονται ("And they gave man hands as well, that fashion most of those things by means of which we are more blessed than they," *Mem.* 1.4.11). By giving man the two greatest gifts, reason and hands, the gods have, Xenophon continues, shown their special concern for human beings (1. 4.14).

     Although the zoological treatises of Aristotle, supplemented to some degree by his political and ethical works, are by far the most prolific source of assertions of man's unique status in the scheme of creation to be found in ancient literature, it is important to note that Aristotle made his contributions to the "man alone of animals *topos*" primarily in his role as a scientist rather than as a moralist. Sorabji is certainly correct in his observation concerning Aristotle's denial of reason to animals: "Aristotle, I believe, was driven almost

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     [5] R. Renehan, "The Greek Anthropocentric View of Man," *HSPh* 85 (1981) 240.

     [6] Renehan [5] 252. Exhaustive lists of ancient claims of man's uniqueness can be found in Renehan [5] 248-52 and Sorabji [3] 89-93. At the end of his discussion, Sorabji [3] 93 makes the sage observation: "My own impression on attempts to draw a boundary between humans and animals is that it is very easy to find things well beyond the compass of animals, like advanced mathematics, but very difficult to find the supposed border itself."

entirely by scientific interest in reaching his decision that animals lack reason."[7] Aristotle's doctrine of συνέχεια embodied his judgment on biological advancement of species and was not intended as a judgment on the relative moral worth of those species. It was left largely to the Stoics of the following generation to impart a distinctly moral dimension to Aristotle's zoology and to conclude that, because only humans can reason, other animal species are so fundamentally alien to humans that they have nothing in common with them. In Stoic theory the relationship termed justice, upon which human society is built, is specifically ruled out between humans and other animals. Diogenes Laertius states the Stoic position on this issue in his life of Zeno, the founder of the school: Ἔτι ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς μηδὲν εἶναι ἡμῖν δίκαιον πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα, διὰ τὴν ἀνομοιότητα ("It is their belief that justice does not exist for us toward other animals because of their unlikeness," 7.129).[8]

According to Stoic teaching, the origin of the unlikeness that separates humans from other animals and leads to an uncrossable gulf between the species lies in the nature of the soul. The doxographer Aetius, citing the influential Stoic Chrysippus as his source, reports that the Stoics held that the soul, both of humans and of other animals, consisted of eight parts: the senses, the faculty of utterance, the reproductive faculty, and a mysterious eighth part that they called the ἡγεμονικόν, or "governing principle" (Aet. *Placita* 4.14.4 = *SVF* 2. 827). At birth the soul of the animal does not differ appreciably from that of the human child, but in time the ἡγεμονικόν in the human soul goes on to attain rationality, whereas that of other animals remains forever irrational, resulting in a permanent moral alienation between the species. Although the human and animal souls might seem similar enough at birth to require humans to include animals in the purview of their moral universe, the Stoics maintained that animals are excluded already at birth by the fact that the human soul has at birth at least the *potential* to become rational, whereas the animal soul does not. Seneca comments on this propensity of the human soul toward rationality: *dociles natura nos edidit et rationem dedit imperfectam, sed quae perfici posset* ("Nature made us teachable and gave us an imperfect reason, but one that could be perfected," *Ep.* 49. 11).[9]

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[7] Sorabji [3] 2.

[8] On ancient attitudes toward according justice to animals, see U. Dierauer, *Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik* (Amsterdam 1977) 14-16 and 125-28; S. T. Newmyer, "Plutarch on Justice toward Animals: Ancient Insights on a Modern Debate," *Scholia* 1 (1992) 38-54; and F. Becchi, "Biopsicologia e Giustizia verso gli Animali," *Prometheus* 27 (2000) 119-35.

[9] There was no universal agreement among Stoics as to the age at which a child attained to rationality. Aetius (*SVF* 2. 83) reports that Chrysippus taught that rationality was reached

The permanent imperfection of the souls of animals prevented them in Stoic thinking from participating with human beings in that relationship which the Stoics termed οἰκειότης, a concept that combined the ideas of belonging, kinship and relationship.[10] Human beings participate in this relationship with other humans, as do animals with other animals, but humans can never share this relationship with animals because of the irrationality of the animal soul that denies animals the gift of meaningful language by means of which humans assert their claim to have their rights respected by other humans and acknowledge their obligation to respect the rights of other humans. Consequently humans can owe nothing to creatures that are so alien to themselves that they cannot understand and verbalize a conception of morality. It is precisely on these grounds that Cicero in *De Officiis* states that the relationship called justice cannot exist between humans and animals: *in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam, aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes* ("In the case of horses or lions, we do not speak of justice, equity or goodness, for they are devoid of reason and language," 1.50).

Such disparaging attitudes toward the intellectual endowments of animals vis-à-vis their human counterparts, with the negative consequences they entail for animals seeking entry into the sphere of human moral concern, have since antiquity not gone unchallenged. At times, the same evidence adduced by opponents of animals was used by others to argue that animals do indeed display traces of rationality that earn them a more exalted place than that accorded them in Stoic ethics. Some ancient writers who place the attainments of animals in a favorable light, including the elder Pliny and Aelian, are frequently dismissed as mere retailers of animal *mirabilia*, especially when their works are set against the magisterial zoology treatises of Aristotle.[11] In his dialogue *De Sollertia Animalium* ('On the Cleverness of Animals'), Plutarch

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at the age of seven, whereas Diogenes Laertius (7.55) says that the Stoic Zeno placed this occurrence at the age of fourteen.

[10] G. Striker, "The Role of Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics," *OSAPh* 1 (1983) 145-67, has argued convincingly that the term οἰκειότης was used by the Stoics to indicate the actual relationship of belonging in the sense of being a member of the same household, while the term οἰκείωσις denoted the process of welcoming perceived kindred individuals in to the household or community. On οἰκείωσις see also the informative study of S. Pembroke, "Oikeiôsis," in A. A. Long (ed.), *Problems in Stoicism* (London 1971) 114-49.

[11] G. E. R. Lloyd, *Science, Folklore and Ideology: Studies in the Life Sciences in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge 1983) 56f., illustrates this attitude perfectly: "Most of the extant Greek and Latin texts that tackle aspects of the subject of animals after him revert to the anecdotal—a trend especially pronounced in such writers as Pliny and Aelian. . . . They often preferred to devote more attention to the strange and the marvelous than to emulate Aristotle's careful and detailed investigations of 'noble' and 'ignoble' creatures alike."

combines anecdotal material in the manner of Pliny and Aelian with a carefully argued proof for the rationality of animals in an effort to refute the Stoic position against animals. At the outset of the dialogue, one of the interlocutors reminds his listeners that this thesis had been advanced the day before: ἀποφηνάμενοι γὰρ ἐχθές, ὡς οἶσθα, μετέχειν ἀμωσγέπως πάντα τὰ ζῷα διανοίας καὶ λογισμοῦ ("For, as you know, we yesterday showed that all animals in one way or another partake of understanding and reason," 960A). The interlocutor Aristobulus argues that the Stoics are absurd to expect that animals will demonstrate perfection of reason, which depends upon factors that lie outside the experience of animals: λόγος μὲν γὰρ ἐγγίγνεται φύσει, σπουδαῖος δὲ λόγος καὶ τέλειος ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ διδασκαλίας ("For reason is inborn by nature, but superb and complete reason arises from care and education," 962C). Nevertheless other philosophers too have demonstrated, according to Plutarch (966B), that animals have those capabilities that argue for rationality in a being: a sense of purpose, preparedness, memory, emotions, and care for their offspring. The conclusion that philosophers draw from these capabilities is self-evident: δι᾽ ὧν οἱ φιλόσοφοι δεικνύουσι τὸ μετέχειν λόγου τὰ ζῷα ("Through these philosophers demonstrate that animals have a share of reason," 966B).

The latter chapters of *De Sollertia Animalium* are devoted to a comparative examination of the "cleverness" of land- and sea-dwelling animals. Neither lifestyle is ultimately judged superior, since Plutarch's intention all along had been to demonstrate that all animals partake to some degree of reason, as the final sentence of the dialogue makes clear wherein both sides are enjoined to defend the rationality of all animals: καλῶς ἀγωνιεῖσθε κοινῇ πρὸς τοὺς τὰ ζῷα λόγου καὶ συνέσεως ἀποστεροῦντας ("Together you will fight nobly against those who deprive animals of reason and understanding," 985C). One argument that figures prominently in Plutarch's comparative chapters is that the remarkable skill that animals exhibit in building their homes, securing food, and coping with their surroundings proves that they are endowed with reason; that is, he adds to his denial of the claim that man alone of animals is rational a refutation of the position that man alone possesses technological skill (τέχνη). Many of the examples of such skill that Plutarch cites would in some modern scientific circles be considered merely instinctual behaviors. Activities like nest building by birds, the construction of elaborate webs by spiders, and the production of carefully defended dwellings by ants are cited by Plutarch, as well as by Pliny and Aelian, as instances of technological skill supported by some intellectual activity.[12] Far more remarkable, because of the comparative scarcity

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[12] The interrelation of ancient works that treat the subject of animal intellect is studied in S. O. Dickerman, "Some Stock Illustrations of Animal Intelligence in Greek Psychology,"

of such discussions in ancient literature, is the claim by these writers that animals are capable of using what is termed in modern scientific parlance "tools," that is, objects external to the animals themselves, to solve problems with which they could not otherwise successfully contend.[13]

Ancient detractors of animal accomplishments, like Cicero, dismiss apparent instances of skilled behavior in animals as entirely attributable to the workings of φύσις ("nature") that are accomplished without purposeful intellectual activity, but Plutarch argues that nature and reason (λόγος) operate in tandem in motivating some animal behaviors and should in fact be regarded as equivalent. In his dialogue *Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti* ("That Beasts Are Rational"), a parody of *Odyssey* 10 in which Odysseus is lectured by one of Circe's pig-converts who argues that the animal estate is superior to the human, the erstwhile human, Gryllus ("Oinker") assures Odysseus that for animals nature is the supreme motivating factor in their behavior: τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον ἡ φύσις ("Nature [is] everything," 990D). It is this nature that teaches animals all their skills: τούτων διδάσκαλον εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ("Nature is their teacher," 991F). This φύσις in animals is itself rational, as is made clear in Gryllus' challenge to Odysseus: ἣν εἰ μὴ λόγον οἴεσθε δεῖν μηδὲ φρόνησιν καλεῖν, ὥρα σκοπεῖν ὄνομα κάλλιον αὐτῇ καὶ τιμιώτερον ("Unless you think we must call this [nature] reason or intellect, you must look for a better and more worthy name for it," 991F). If their nature did not contain at least some component of rational action, animals could not be expected to recall what is important to their self-preservation once the immediate perception of prey or predator had passed beyond their attention. Yet animals obviously do recall their prey and predators and, as Plutarch argues in *De Sollertia Animalium* 961C, animals could not devise lairs for evading those predators or traps for catching that prey if they did not possess some modicum of rationality.

Some of Plutarch's examples of rational action in animal behavior will strike the modern reader as farfetched and grotesque as, for example, his tale of the elephant who, on being slow at learning the steps and maneuvers he was to perform with his fellow-elephants in the Roman arena and after being repeatedly scolded by his trainer, stayed up at night to practice his steps,

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*TAPhA* 42 (1911) 123-30. Dickerman provides references to ancient discussions of the skills of ants, bees, swallows, and other creatures celebrated for their technological prowess, and he concludes that all such anecdotal material may ultimately be derived from the work of Alcmaeon of Croton.

[13] Neurobiologist L. J. Rogers, *Minds of Their Own: Thinking and Awareness in Animals* (Sydney 1997) 82, provides a useful definition of "tool use" in animals: "The strict definition of tool using requires use of a separate object, not part of the user's body (i.e. not a beak or claw) to make an alteration in another object."

behavior that Plutarch declares to be a clear illustration of τοῦ νοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἐν μεγίστοις σώμασι ("the nature of mind in the largest bodies," *De Soll. An.* 968B). Even more impressive, in Plutarch's estimation, is the action of the fox who, when crossing a frozen river, placed its ear to the ice to judge its depth and crossed only when satisfied that the ice would bear its weight because no sound of moving water could be detected underneath. Plutarch concludes from this example that foxes demonstrate both powers of reasoning and the capacity for logical deduction: καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λέγωμεν αἰσθήσεως ἄλογον ἀκρίβειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ αἰσθήσεως συλλογισμὸν ("But let us not declare this an irrational sharpness of perception, but rather a syllogistic deduction arising from perception," *De Soll. An.* 969A).

However noteworthy Plutarch judges these apparent instances of animal rationality to be, no animals impress him as so capable of successfully manipulating their environment through technological skill (τέχνη) as birds, among which the corvids, the family of birds that includes crows, ravens and jays, are singled out as particularly adept at using tools. This same family of birds draws the amazed attention of other ancient cataloguers of animal wonders and figures prominently in modern zoological literature as tool users and even manufacturers. The elder Pliny, Plutarch's older contemporary, relates an anecdote that became with variations a standard feature in these ancient catalogues of animal *mirabilia.* Once during a drought, Pliny reports, relying on unnamed sources, a raven (*corvus*) dropped stones into an urn in which had accumulated some rain water, too little to allow the bird to reach it unaided. This stratagem caused the water to rise so that the bird could drink it: *ita descendere paventem expressisse tali congerie quantum poturo sufficeret* ("Thus, [they report,] the bird, being afraid to go into the urn, forced up enough for it to drink by use of such a pile," *HN* 7. 125). Pliny makes no comment on the intellectual skills demonstrated by this operation. In Plutarch's more complex version of the anecdote, however, specific mention is made of the mental prowess evidenced by the employment of stones as he compares the use of tools by birds and a dog. In Plutarch's retelling of the incident, Libyan crows (κόρακες) cast stones into a pot when thirsty to raise the water to a level at which they could reach it, an action that Plutarch's interlocutor says he would be hesitant to believe if he had not seen a dog on board a ship carry out precisely the same action, dropping stones into a jar to raise the level of its contents. He admits his astonishment at the degree of intelligence involved in the dog's behavior: ἐθαύμασα πῶς νοεῖ καὶ συνίησι τὴν γιγνομένην ἔκθλιψιν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρυτέρων τοῖς κουφοτέροις ὑφισταμένων ("I was amazed at how it understands and comprehends the forcing up action that

occurs, as the heavier substances are placed beneath the lighter," *De Soll. An.* 967A).

This anecdote reappears in a particularly enthusiastic form a century after Plutarch in Aelian's *De Natura Animalium*, where we learn that when the Libyans fear a lack of rain, they place storage jars of water on their house roofs. Crows insert their beaks into these jars as far as they will reach, but when the water level drops too low, they gather pebbles in their beaks and claws and drop them into the jars. This action inspires in Aelian an outburst of admiration for the mechanical skill that birds have by nature: καὶ πίνουσιν εὖ μάλα εὐμηχάνως οἱ κόρακες, εἰδότες φύσει τινὶ ἀπορρήτῳ δύο σώματα μίαν χώραν μὴ δέχεσθαι ("The crows drink, most inventively, knowing by some mysterious natural capacity that one space cannot hold two bodies," *NA* 2. 48). The enterprising corvid made one final appearance in ancient literature a century after Aelian, in a fable of Avianus, in which it is also identified as a crow (*cornix*). Unable to topple a water jar, Avianus' crow applies her wits to the problem: *admovet omnes / indignata nova calliditate dolos* ("In anger, she applied all her wiles, with strange cleverness," *Fabulae* 27.5f.). By dropping stones into the jar, she easily solved her problem: *potandi facilem praebuit unda viam* ("The water provided an easy way to drink," 27.8). The fabulist's moral is in keeping with conclusions drawn in earlier versions of the anecdote: *viribus haec docuit quam sit prudentia maior* ("This shows how much superior wisdom is to strength," 27. 9).

Our sources report another use by birds of stones as tools, their interpretation of which, if the anecdote is after all factual, is somewhat bizarre. Pliny records that cranes (*grues*), during periods of rest in long migrations, post sentries who hold stones in their claws to force them to stay awake: *excubias habent nocturnis temporibus lapillum pede sustinentes, qui laxatus somno et decidens indiligentiam coarguat* ("They have sentries at night holding a stone in their claws, which if let slip because of their sleepiness and falling down convicts them of carelessness," *HN* 10. 59). These same cranes, he continues, swallow sand and carry pebbles while flying over the Black Sea to provide them with ballast. On landing they vomit up the sand and let go of the pebbles. Plutarch's version of the tool-using cranes does not differ in detail from that of Pliny and the clever stratagem is said to have the same effect: ἐκπεσὼν ὁ λίθος ταχὺ διήγειρε τὴν προεμένην ("The stone, by falling, quickly arouses the one who dropped it," *De Soll. An.* 967C), but he adds that Heracles imitated the birds in carrying his bow under his arm to alert him should be doze off while holding it. Not surprisingly, Aelian's retelling of the anecdote trumps his predecessors. Now each crane in the flock holds a stone while standing on one leg, providing a sort of double insurance of safety to which every individual

contributes (*NA* 5. 13). Both Plutarch and Aelian catalogue instances of this use of stones as ballast on the part of bees. According to Plutarch, the insects carry little stones when they cross windy plains to keep them from being carried off course (*De Soll. An.* 967A), while Aelian adds the further detail that the bees take stones into their feet when they suspect that the wind will pick up and possibly carry them away (*NA* 5. 13). Along these same lines, Plutarch reports that geese, in order not to attract the attention of predatory eagles, place stones in their mouths when flying near Mt Taurus to curb their customary loquaciousness (χαλινοῦντες τὸ φιλόφωνον καὶ λάλον, *De Soll. An.* 967B).

The admiration expressed by Pliny, Plutarch, Aelian and Avianus at the use of tools by animals, as well as at such other examples of technological skill in animals as nest building and web spinning, is a manifestation of an attitude toward animals occasionally encountered in ancient literature that George Boas has aptly termed "theriophily," or love of beasts.[14] Theriophily, as Boas defines it, is characterized by what he calls "admiring glances below man,"[15] which cause humans to feel that animals offer true models for correct behavior, whether because of their industriousness, or their prudence, or their fidelity to their mates. Animals are seen in theriophilic literature as behaving more in accord with nature and as being therefore less prone to vices and passions. Boas sees the origin of theriophilic thought in a rejection of Aristotle's denial of reason to animals, but he expresses doubt as to whether theriophilic pronouncements are seriously intended.[16] What is left unsaid in Boas' analysis is the extent to which theriophilic thought is ironically anthropocentric in inspiration: animals are viewed as useful to humans as lessons in good conduct. In her study of the elder Pliny, Mary Beagon makes this point with regard to his comparisons of human and animal capacities: "The very fact of comparison suggests that the original stimulus was an interest in defining and explaining man. . . . Rather than a belief in the superiority of the beasts, it could be argued that Pliny is really expressing a purely human ideal of attainment."[17] The case of Plutarch, however, is more subtle. For him the conclusion to be drawn from a study of tool use in animals, as well as from other instances of τέχνη in animals, was obvious. The argument that man alone of animals possesses reason

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[14] G. Boas, *The Happy Beast in French Thought of the Seventeenth Century* (Baltimore 1966). Boas elaborated his ideas in his article "Theriophily," in P. Wiener (ed.), *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* 4 (New York 1973) 384-89. Boas' insights are developed further in J. E. Gill, "Theriophily in Antiquity: A Supplementary Account," *JHI* 30 (1969) 401-12 and in G. Chapoutier, "Le Courant Zoophile dans la Pensée Antique," *RQS* 161 (1990) 261-87.

[15] Boas [14 (1966)] 1.

[16] Boas [14 (1973)] 386.

[17] M. Beagon, *Roman Nature: The Thought of Pliny the Elder* (Oxford 1992) 138.

and in consequence that man alone of animals possesses technological skill cannot stand, and the Stoic denial to animals of a place in the sphere of human moral concern that depends upon this denial of reason to animals is indefensible. Animals after all evince that οἰκειότης ("kinship") with humans that allows them entry into the moral arena. It is in their nature (φύσις) to share in rationality and their behavior, in Plutarch's estimation, is not mere "instinct." When a crow drops stones into a jar to raise the water level, it has exercised some kind of choice and has made some kind of decision, neither of which can operate without rationality.

In recent years the issue of tool use in animals has resurfaced in scientific and philosophic literature, aided now by discoveries in neurobiology made both in the context of controlled laboratory conditions and in observation of animal behavior in the wild. The results of such research are applied to the question of the mental capacities of animals, central to which is the issue of whether animals act according to pre-programmed, "hard-wired" patterns that scientists term "instinct" or offer evidence of conscious choice and deliberation. Animal rights advocate Matthew Scully poses this question in a manner remarkably similar to Plutarch's articulation of the issue when he observes: "The broad 'instinct' argument doesn't hold because, like us, animals have different and at times conflicting instincts. . . . *Something* has to choose, to mediate, to organize, which is why identical animals will often react differently to identical circumstances. And whatever that something is, it cannot itself be instinct. It must logically stand above instinct, presiding and selecting as it does in us. In our case we call it consciousness. What could it be in their case but a humbler version of the same thing?"[18]

Research into the consciousness of non-human animals is a central occupation of zoologists who specialize in the branch of their discipline called cognitive ethology, which examines animal behavior in natural conditions unfettered by the artificial conditions that prevail in the laboratory.[19] Many of these scientists are convinced that the discovery of conscious mental experiences in non-human animals will have profound moral implications for human conduct toward other species in such areas as food choices, treatment of

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[18] M. Scully, *Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy* (New York 2002) 227f.

[19] A helpful definition of the term "ethology" is offered by primatologist and ethologist Frans deWaal, *Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals* (Cambridge, Mass. 1996) 34f.: "In the 1940s a special label became necessary to distinguish the study of animal behavior in nature from the laboratory experiments of behaviorists on white rats and other domesticated animals. The chosen name was *ethology. . . .*"

animals in laboratories, and use of animals in the context of entertainment. Prominent ethologist Donald Griffin eloquently expresses the role that his discipline can play in enabling humans to make enlightened moral choices: "I do not feel that scientists have any special right to advocate moral judgments in such difficult matters, but cognitive ethology does hold out the prospect of providing helpful information and understanding that can lead to better informed decisions."[20] One of the indicators of potential consciousness in animals that figures in scientific literature with increasing frequency is that of tool use and, in some instances, of tool manufacture in animals.[21] Although Griffin himself admits that documented instances of tool use and manufacture in animal species have been "relatively rare,"[22] he nevertheless considers the study of tool behavior important on the grounds that it would seem to indicate at least "simple thinking about something the animal is trying to accomplish."[23] Not all ethologists or laboratory scientists are convinced, however, that tool behavior in animals provides any substantive evidence of rationality or even of mental versatility in them. Neurobiologist Marc Hauser, for example, discounts the vast majority of examples of such tools as mere instances of what he terms "gifts from nature," that is, things that animals find and employ without modification.[24] Hauser would demand evidence of "design" on the part of animal tool users and manufacturers before he would be willing to grant them conscious mental activity. The animal must in his view evaluate a tool that it intends to use or produce for relevant and irrelevant features. Only a few species appear to do this. He notes that capuchin monkeys have been observed to insert one twig after another to push food from a tube if they see that some of the available twigs are not individually long enough.[25]

Hauser's strictures are inspired by a desire to avoid the trap of anthropomorphism that might lead the investigator astray into concluding that random or purposeless behaviors in animals that resemble purposeful tool use in humans are after all evidence of conscious tool use in animals. Such fears have colored the definition of "tool use" itself to the point that some scientists will

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[20] D. R. Griffin, *Animal Minds* (Chicago 1992) 251.

[21] I have not been able to locate any discussions of tool manufacture by animals in ancient sources.

[22] Griffin [20] 102. The fact that animals seldom resort to tool use and manufacture should not be taken as evidence of a lack of intelligence on their part. A. F. Skutch, *The Minds of Birds* (College Station 1996) xv, argues that birds are so well equipped by nature for the requirements of their lives that they only infrequently have need for artificial aids.

[23] Griffin [20] 102.

[24] Marc D. Hauser, *Animal Minds: What Animals Really Think* (New York 2000) 35.

[25] Hauser [24] 37.

accept only the most precise and detailed definition of the phenomenon. Biologist Benjamin Beck well illustrates this striving for precision in his definition that "tool use is the external employment of an unattached environmental object to alter more efficiently the form, position, or condition of another object, another organism, or the user itself when the user holds or carries the tool during or just prior to use and is responsible for the proper and effective orientation of the tool."[26] Tool manufacture is for Beck an easier phenomenon to define: "Tool manufacture is simply any modification of an object by the user or a conspecific so that the object serves more effectively as a tool."[27] Despite the difficulties inherent in the study of tool behavior in animals, many ethologists consider it a fruitful avenue of investigation not only for the insights it may provide on the subject of animal consciousness but also for the light it may throw on human evolutionary development if it emerges, for example, that tool use was practiced by some common ancestor of birds and human beings.[28] It is not surprising, then, that virtually every family of animals has been studied for evidence of tool use and manufacture, albeit with varying results.

Beck has sought to catalogue all cases of tool usage by nonhuman animals reported to date and to analyze them for the information they provided on the cognitive skills of the species involved. Ants were found to be sophisticated tool users, employing bits of leaves and wood to transport fruit and even the body fluids of vanquished prey, procedures that enabled the insects to increase their food supplies ten-fold.[29] In contrast, he found no recorded instances of tool use by amphibians or reptiles. Mice have been observed to prop sticks up against the walls of aquariums to help them to ascend and escape. Elephants are frequent tool users, rubbing parts of their bodies that they could not reach unaided with sticks and at time dislodging leeches with such sticks. Not surprisingly, monkeys have been studied with particular frequency because of their closeness to human beings. Many species of monkeys throw stones or drop objects to deter predators, while baboons throw sand in the eyes of predators and humans. Gorillas use sticks to reach into tight places and dip objects including boxes into water to serve as drinking cups. A primate activity noted especially often is what scientists call "ant-dipping," in which wild chimpanzees use sticks, blades of grass and other objects to extract insects from

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[26] B. B. Beck, *Animal Tool Behavior: The Use and Manufacture of Tools by Animals* (New York 1980) 10.

[27] Beck [26] 11f.

[28] This possibility is discussed in Rogers [13] 88.

[29] Beck [26] 16.

wood.[30] Instances of tool manufacture are somewhat less often encountered, but even insects are capable of this activity. Ants detach small grains of sand from larger lumps of dirt and place them in honey to absorb the liquid that they then convey to their nests.[31] Elephants pull up clumps of grass to wipe wounds clean and polar bears have been observed to detach chunks of ice to throw at sleeping seals and walruses.[32]

However versatile and ingenious these animal species appear to be in their tool use and manufacture, it is birds that have inspired the greatest admiration in laboratory scientists and field ethologists alike, and some of the behaviors catalogued offer remarkable parallels to the examples of tool use mentioned in ancient sources. As in antiquity, it is the family of corvids whose tool use and problem solving capacities are observed to outstrip those of other avians. Ornithologist Tony Angell writes of corvid intellect: "To the degree that corvids do these things they are set apart from other avian families and it appears that no other birds approach their breadth of intelligence."[33] Angell records instances in which jays have been seen to cut pieces of newspaper into strips to enable them to drag food pellets into their cages that they could not reach unaided and he offers scientific corroboration to the anecdotes of Pliny, Plutarch and Aelian in his account of how jays secure water: "Another captive jay raised the water level of its drinking dish by placing solid objects in the container. The water was thus raised to where the jay could reach it. . . ."[34] In a behavior that again recalls our ancient sources, ornithologist James Reid notes that rooks, a type of corvid closely related to the crow, have been seen to use objects to plug up drains below their cages to enable them to collect and drink rain water accumulating beneath the floor of the cages.[35]

Although some ethologists downplay the significance of tool use and manufacture in birds as stereotypic and largely limited to operations that maximize opportunities to secure food, others argue that this attitude misjudges the potential intellectual activity involved in animal tool use. Ornithologist Gavin Hunt notes that crows appear to be able to specialize their tool production in a manner that suggests "definite imposition of form in tool shaping."[36] He

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[30] Beck [26] 90.

[31] Beck [26] 105.

[32] Beck [26] 107.

[33] T. Angell, *Ravens, Crows, Magpies, and Jays* (Seattle 1978) 'Preface', n. pag.

[34] Angell [33] 78.

[35] J. B. Reid, "Tool-use by a Rook (*Corvus Frugilegus*) and Its Causation," *Animal Behavior* 30 (1982) 1213.

[36] G. Hunt, "Manufacture and Use of Hook-tools by New Caledonian Crows," *Nature* 379 (1996) 249.

observed four crows over a period of three years manufacturing hooked tools by stripping the leaves from branches that had a naturally occurring hooked shape after they noted that they could not remove bits of food from inside trees with unhooked branches. The crows carried their hooked tools from branch to branch and would fly back to retrieve the tools if they left them behind on a branch that they had deserted. This recognition of the efficacy of hooked structure suggests to Hunt that crows have "an appreciation of tool functionality."[37] Neurobiologist Lesley Rogers goes a step further in her estimation of the significance of selection of straight or hooked tools by crows, depending upon the task involved, when she writes: "These two behaviors would require some forward planning, which is considered to be an aspect of consciousness. . . ."[38]

For some ethologists, the phenomenon of tool use and manufacture in animals entails aspects of conscious mental activity like planning, decision making and deliberate choice that compel human beings to confront the possibility that animal intelligence is part of an evolutionary continuum that reaches from the lowliest species to man without a break, a view that rejects the assumption underlying Aristotle's biological doctrine of συνέχεια or gradualism, which posits a break between humankind and other species. At the conclusion of his discussion of tool use in birds, ethologist Donald Griffin asserts that it is reasonable to infer that a bird "thinks about its behavior and the probable results."[39] Neuroscience is moving in the direction of corroborating Plutarch's belief that animals share that kinship and that relationship with humans that the Stoic doctrine of οἰκειότης denied them. If evidence of conscious mental activity is the criterion that humans demand of other species for entrance into the sphere of human moral concern, as they have since the time of Aristotle, perhaps Plutarch was after all correct in maintaining that some claims in the "man alone of animals *topos*" are invalid and that humans must rethink their behavior toward other species. Plutarch would agree with the conclusion of Griffin that mentality and morality are intimately linked: "Whatever we can learn about the subjective mental experiences of animals has significant potential relevance to ethics of animal utilization by our species."[40]

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[37] Hunt [36] 250f.

[38] Rogers [13] 86.

[39] Griffin [20] 218.

[40] Griffin [20] 252.

# THE MYSTERY FLEET OF
# XENOPHON, *HELLENICA* 4.6.14

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**Abstract.** The Athenian fleet that hindered the withdrawal of the Spartan king Agesilaus from Acarnania in 389 may have arrived during the campaign. The fleet was commanded perhaps by Chabrias, appointed recently to a command at Corinth, but it faced no serious challenge in view of the Spartan failure to invade. When the Acarnanians made peace in 388, the fleet could be used to supply aid to Evagoras of Cyprus.

In an account of the Corinthian War, Robin Seager makes the following observation about an Athenian fleet: 'Xenophon's sudden surprising mention of this squadron is a reminder of how scrappy our information is, even on so vital a strategic matter as control of the Corinthian Gulf . . .'.[1] What is surprising about the mention is its unheralded appearance in an explanation of Spartan behaviour at the end of a campaign, in the context of an invasion of Acarnania led by the Spartan king Agesilaus at the request of the Achaeans, probably in 389 BC.[2] Xenophon simply comments on the navy's effect on Agesilaus and the soldiers under his command. In spite of the fact that this is the first indication of an Athenian naval presence in the situation, we are told nothing about the fleet apart from the fact that it was based at Oeniadae in Acarnania. Xenophon informs us that Agesilaus was unable to return to the Peloponnese by sea from Calydon, which was held by the Achaeans, because the Athenian fleet based at Oeniadae was blocking the way. The Spartans had to march further east until they were opposite Rhium and embark there. For this route they required the goodwill of the Aetolians, through whose territory they passed (*Hell.* 4.6.14).

As there is no hint of a problem facing Agesilaus when he crossed from the Peloponnese to Calydon at the beginning of the invasion, it looks as though the Athenian fleet was not in the vicinity at this stage. If it was, it posed no immediate threat. There is a possibility that it had simply failed to arrive from Oeniadae in time to interfere with the original crossing, but there should have

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[1] R. Seager, 'The Corinthian War', in D. M. Lewis *et al.* (edd.), *Cambridge Ancient History*[2] 6 (Cambridge 1994) 112.

[2] This is the date that is generally accepted, although 390 and 388 BC have also been suggested. I. L. Merker, 'The Achaians in Naupaktos and Kalydon in the Fourth Century', *Hesperia* 58 (1989) 303 n. 4 has a discussion of the proposed dates; he opts for 389 BC on the basis of Xenophon's order of events.

been plenty of time for any ships that were already at Oeniadae to arrive ahead of Agesilaus. Another possibility is that the fleet might not have been big enough to act as an effective deterrent, so that the Athenians would have had to allow Agesilaus to devastate Acarnania and hope that they could make life awkward for him when reinforcements arrived; for it is also possible that ships were sent out from Athens in the course of the campaign, perhaps to reinforce an existing fleet. Earlier in his account Xenophon mentions that some Athenians and Boeotians were in Acarnania helping the Acarnanians, and the presence of at least a small fleet from the outset would be in keeping with this circumstance.

Although the commander of the Athenian fleet, or of its reinforcements, is not named by Xenophon, there is some circumstantial evidence that makes Chabrias an attractive possibility, at least for a commander of reinforcements. He sailed out to Aegina and Cyprus in the Athenian archon year 388/7, apparently from an earlier naval command, with 800 peltasts. While the peltasts may well have been acquired from the post he held at Corinth after the resignation of the Athenian commander of mercenaries, Iphicrates, there is no evidence for an Athenian naval presence there. In any case, in spring 389 Spartan attention to Acarnania would have made that region a higher priority than Corinth for the Athenians, who may, therefore, have decided to transfer Chabrias. Peace arrangements between the Spartans, Acarnanians and Achaeans[3] in spring or summer 388 would then have freed up Chabrias and his ships for a new commission.

This reconstruction carries certain chronological implications, provided the Athenian year 389/8 for Agesilaus' expedition to Acarnania is correct. Events taking place from 392 to 387 are notoriously difficult to date and there are several competing schemes;[4] however, the early date proposed by George Cawkwell[5] for a certain naval expedition associated in the ancient sources with Thrasybulus of Stiria (391/0, with departure from Athens in late 391), along

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[3] And possibly the Aetolians and Amphilochian Argives (Xen. *Ages*. 2.20), though they are not mentioned in this connection in the *Hellenica*.

[4] There have been attempts to use Spartan navarchs to provide a chronological framework, but the only ones on whom there is agreement are Hierax for 389/8 and Antalcidas for 388/7. There are other possibilities. For instance, Ecdicus is identified as a navarch by Xenophon (*Hell*. 4.8.20), but some regard him as navarch for 391/0, while others think he was navarch in the following year. Teleutias, the half-brother of Agesilaus, presents a special problem, since he served continuously in a naval command from 392/1 to 390/89, and then again in either 388/7 or 387/6. As Xenophon states that a man could be navarch only once (*Hell*. 2.1.7), there has been much speculation about when Teleutias held the navarchy, and whether the rule was broken or not. An examination of the Corinthian War navarchs can be found in R. Sealey, 'Die Spartanische Nauarchie', *Klio* 58 (1976) 335-58, 352-55.

[5] G. L. Cawkwell, 'The Imperialism of Thrasybulus', *CQ* 26 (1976) 270-77.

with a date in the following archon year (390/89) for the death of Thrasybulus,[6] is compatible with the proposal presented here. The proposal would also work with a sailing for Thrasybulus in spring 390, provided that all his activities on this occasion and his death are placed in one campaigning season, though in two Athenian archon years (still 391/0 and 390/89).[7] This dating also involves an early departure of Iphicrates for the Hellespont, where he probably arrived not long after the death of Thrasybulus,[8] and an early posting of Chabrias to Corinth. It allows Chabrias time to serve at Corinth in succession to Iphicrates, as indicated by Diodorus (14.92.2), and to be sent afterwards to Acarnania.

The first thing to note in considering Athenian input into the Acarnanian situation is that, although the Athenian fleet in Acarnania is mentioned only at

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[6] These dates are treated as early because some scholars prefer 390/89, or even 389/8, for the start of Thrasybulus' voyage, and 389/8, or 388/7, for his death. Another issue is the time of year when Thrasybulus set sail from Athens: Cawkwell [5] 273 suggested winter, but others prefer the following spring, in the same archon year. Disagreement over the time of year is to some extent connected with uncertainty about when Spartan navarchs took office. While some scholars think that it was at the beginning of the Spartan year, in late summer or early autumn, others think that it was not until the next spring. As well as the article by Sealey [4], there are various other discussions, including those in T. J. Figueira, 'Aigina and the Naval Strategy of the Late Fifth and Early Fourth Centuries', *RhM* 133 (1990) 15-51, 32 and in P. J. Stylianou, 'How Many Naval Squadrons did Athens Send to Evagoras?', *Historia* 37 (1988) 463-71, 467. The reason for the importance of Spartan navarchs in this context is that Thrasybulus' expedition was close in time to the arrival of Teleutias in the Aegean and his taking over of the fleet from the navarch Ecdicus, so that Teleutias' arrival date has often been seen as a key factor. It cannot be assumed, however, that the movements of Spartan admirals can be predicted exactly according to official dates, even if we know these. Another area of dispute concerns the likelihood of winter voyages in this particular situation. Here Cawkwell and Figueira, for instance, differ in their opinions, Cawkwell [5] 273 seeing Thrasybulus' decision not to challenge Teleutias as an indication that it was winter, but Figueira [6] 34 regarding it as unlikely that Teleutias would have been sent in the first place if it had been winter.

[7] Although a winter in the region is usually assumed there is no mention of it in the sources. Diodorus has three archon years, but divides all the information between the first and last of these (392/1 and 390/89), most of it appearing under the first, and perhaps belonging in 391/0.

[8] In Xenophon's account the Spartans react to the news of Thrasybulus' arrangements in the Hellespont by sending out Anaxibius, who starts to undo some of the damage, and when the Athenians realize what is going on they send Iphicrates to the rescue (*Hell.* 4.8.31-34). As Thrasybulus had engaged in later activities than the ones the Spartans reacted to at this point, Anaxibius should have arrived close to the time of Thrasybulus' death, as suggested by Xenophon's placement of the information, and he would have been followed before long by Iphicrates. The replacement naval commander for Thrasybulus was not Iphicrates, but Agyrrhius, who was sent out as soon as the Athenians learned of the death of Thrasybulus (*Hell.* 4.8.31).

the end of Xenophon's account of the campaign, an Athenian presence in the area is indicated at the beginning (*Hell*. 4.6.1). Xenophon tells us that some Athenians and Boeotians were helping the Acarnanians with their expedition against Calydon, which was currently held by the Achaeans. The Athenians and Boeotians appear again in *Hellenica* 4.6.2. Xenophon does not comment on how they came to be in Acarnania, though he does explain that their states were allied with the Acarnanians, but that is all. One obvious explanation for the presence of an Athenian fleet in Acarnania is that it had come with the Athenians and Boeotians when they first arrived. It could be claimed that this is the key to Xenophon's failure to account for its arrival. He might have taken it for granted that if there were Athenians helping the Acarnanians, there would also be an Athenian fleet present; however, the fact that Agesilaus does not seem to have been inconvenienced by an enemy fleet on his way to Acarnania does require explanation. Xenophon just tells us: διέβη ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ('Agesilaus crossed over', *Hell*. 4.6.4). Either the Athenian fleet was not yet in the area, or there were not enough ships to prevent Agesilaus from reaching Acarnania and ravaging the land until reinforcements arrived, or the ships had not managed to travel from their base at Oeniadae in time to hinder the crossing. Unless the Athenians were taken by surprise, the third of these seems unlikely: Agesilaus had a much longer distance to travel than a fleet based at Oeniadae. It is also difficult to believe that the Spartans could have kept their march through the Peloponnese secret, especially once the Achaeans joined with all their forces, as Xenophon indicates they did (*Hell*. 4.6.3). At the beginning of the campaigning season of 388, the Acarnanians capitulated simply on hearing that Agesilaus had called up an army. He did not need to take it anywhere for the message to reach them, though it is possible that the Spartans may have taken steps at this time to ensure that the Acarnanians did hear about the projected invasion, since the Spartan wish appears to have been for a quick solution with regard to the Achaeans and Acarnanians so that Agesipolis could be free to invade Argos.[9] Nevertheless, this was just a projected invasion, whereas the earlier one had been real. It might be argued that the Athenians could have been unaware of the destination of the Spartan army until it had reached Achaea; however, the Achaean embassy to Sparta to ask for assistance and the Achaeans' own preparations might have been noted. Once the Achaeans were joined by the Spartans there would have been no misapprehension.

Perhaps an Athenian fleet arrived in time to witness Agesilaus' arrival, but did nothing as yet. A small fleet might have let Agesilaus past in the meantime, contenting itself with the prospect of making his return difficult as,

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[9] Once the peace with Acarnania was settled, an expedition against Argos was launched (*Hell*. 4.7.2).

in fact, happened. Given the threat to the Acarnanians, however, it seems unlikely that the Athenians would elect to wait until the action was over before attempting their blocking tactics, if they had any option. If the same number of ships was involved at the end as at the beginning, the Athenians could have forced the Spartans to cross over to a point further to the east than Calydon at the start of the invasion. In fact, John Buckler thinks that this is what happened. He suggests that the Spartans crossed over from the Peloponnese to Naupactus to avoid the Athenians and to outflank the Acarnanians at Calydon.[10] This was, in his view, made possible by an earlier Achaean takeover of Naupactus from the Ozolian Locrians; however, this is not how Xenophon's account reads. It is difficult to understand why Xenophon should remark on the obstacle presented by the Athenians at the end of the campaign, if the identical problem had already been faced, and dealt with in similar fashion, by the Spartans at the beginning. Naupactus is even further east than Antirrhium, the crossing place on the return journey. Moreover, although some scholars believe that Naupactus was held by the Achaeans at this time and was therefore friendly to Sparta, others are not so sure. There is no direct ancient testimony on the matter. A statement by Diodorus (15.75.2) indicates that the Achaeans occupied Naupactus in 367/6, but does not show when they acquired it. Xenophon says that the Aetolians hoped Agesilaus would help them to obtain it, but the current holders are not mentioned (*Hell*. 4.6.14). Pritchett thinks the Aetolian expectation more credible if the Achaeans were already there[11], but Merker draws the opposite conclusion, seeing it as unlikely that Agesilaus would rob one ally to pay another.[12]

One problem with accepting the implications of Xenophon's account concerns the whereabouts of the Peloponnesian ships at the end of the campaign if they had originally crossed over to a point near Calydon. Since Agesilaus had to march through Aetolian territory before embarking to go home, presumably the ships were not available to transport the forces by sea in an eastward direction. This raises the question of where they had gone. A simple solution may be proposed, however: if a new Athenian fleet had arrived and taken up position during Agesilaus' campaign, the Peloponnesian fleet might have moved on already to avoid attack. This brings up the other suggested explanation for the presence of the Athenian fleet at the end of the invasion: that

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[10] J. Buckler, *Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century BC* (Leiden 2003) 123f.

[11] W. K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography* 7 (Amsterdam 1991) 99.

[12] Merker [2] 305 reviews the scanty evidence on the matter, and concludes that the Achaeans were not yet in control of Naupactus, but that the Ozolian Locrians held it. The Locrians fought against the Spartans in the Corinthian War, so they would not have welcomed a landing at Naupactus.

a fleet, perhaps reinforcing an existing one, was sent out from Athens in response to the Spartan invasion of allied territory. Xenophon's account shows that once Agesilaus arrived, his pace was leisurely, as he systematically laid waste the countryside: . . . κόπτων συνεχῶς τὴν χώραν οὐ προῄει πλέον τῆς ἡμέρας ἢ δέκα ἢ δώδεκα σταδίων ('. . . he progressed no more than ten or twelve stades a day, steadily laying waste the land as he went', *Hell.* 4.6.5). Encounters with the locals were followed by more devastation. Autumn was already approaching when he left (4.6.12). Unfortunately, Xenophon does not say when he arrived, but departure from Sparta would presumably have been in spring, as near to the start of the standard campaigning season as possible. Therefore, the Athenians would have had time to sail around the Peloponnese to the base at Oeniadae, and then on to take up the position mentioned. Going through the Corinthian Gulf may not have been feasible, as the Spartans controlled the Corinthian port at Lechaeum (*Hell.* 4.5.14, 17-19).

It is not absolutely certain that there was already an Athenian fleet at Acarnania at the start of the Spartan invasion, though it is necessary to consider how the original force of Athenians and Boeotians had reached its destination. Transport could, conceivably, have been provided by the Boeotians. Boeotia had access to the Corinthian Gulf, so Lechaeum was perhaps not an insuperable problem for Boeotian ships. In fact, one matter that Agesilaus had been concerned about when campaigning in the vicinity of Corinth in 391/0 was Boeotian use of Creusis, a port on the Gulf of Corinth, as a base from which to help Corinth (Xen. *Ages.* 2.18). All the same, Salmon regards the sea route from Creusis as 'almost impossible', given Spartan control of Lechaeum.[13] In any case, Sparta controlled Rhium, at the other end of the Gulf, which would have been a further deterrent. In effect, the Spartans could monitor all ships travelling through the Gulf, as is indicated by Xenophon's description of Teleutias' command there as being around Achaea and Lechaeum (*Hell.* 4.8.23).

A theoretical possibility is an overland march, such as was contemplated by the Athenian general Demosthenes during the Peloponnesian War, according to Thucydides (3.95). Demosthenes' idea had been to go through Ozolian Locris to Doris, from there to Phocis, and finally to Boeotia. Of course, in the present instance, the order of the march would have been reversed; however, favourable political circumstances were needed for such a route to be feasible.[14] For the Boeotians of the Corinthian War period, an obvious drawback would have been the need to pass through the territory of the hostile Phocians.

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[13] J. B. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford 1984) 365.

[14] A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 2 (Oxford 1956) 402f., examines routes that could be taken, if political circumstances suited. Demosthenes experienced so many problems in Aetolia that his march went no further than that region.

Altogether, transport to Acarnania by an Athenian fleet is probable. An original Athenian fleet based at Oeniadae, however, might have been too small to hinder Agesilaus and could have been reinforced in the course of the summer, in time for the action at the end of the campaign. If Spartan intervention had not been anticipated, a small fleet might have seemed adequate initially. In fact, the first fleet of ships sent out could even have been made up predominantly of transports,[15] if little naval involvement had been expected. We do not know, for that matter, how many Athenians and Boeotians made up the τινες ('some') of *Hellenica* 4.6.1. Unless a large army was involved, the ships would have been few. With Athenian interest now centred mainly on the Aegean, a large Athenian contingent in Acarnania seems unlikely. Since the Athenian fleet based at Oeniadae had failed to hinder Agesilaus' invasion of Acarnania, and yet was able to inconvenience him on the return journey, it may well be that additional ships were sent in the course of the campaign.

At the end of the campaign, Agesilaus marched through Aetolian territory as far as Antirrhium and crossed over to the Peloponnese from there. He then returned safely back to Sparta for the winter of 389/8. As soon as the winter was over, Agesilaus prepared for renewed invasion but, as indicated above, the Acarnanians surrendered, making invasion unnecessary (*Hell.* 4.7.1). Since the Acarnanians agreed to become allies of Sparta, the Athenian fleet was now not needed at Oeniadae and would be available for service elsewhere. A return home in the first half of the Athenian archon year 388/7 would fit the changed circumstances.

In the same archon year, but not at the beginning,[16] we find the Athenian Chabrias on his way to Cyprus with ten ships and some peltasts (*Hell.* 5.1.10). Before going to Cyprus, he stopped at Aegina to deal with the Spartans there. At Athens he had arranged for additional ships and for hoplites to follow him to the island of Aegina the morning after his night landing there. Meanwhile, his own forces had positioned themselves for an ambush, into which the Spartans walked when the hoplites landed and made themselves visible. The trick was a success, unlike the attempts of his two predecessors (Pamphilus and Eunomus) to deal with the Spartans on Aegina. The Spartans had been using the island as a

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[15] The use of triremes as transports is included in discussion in J. S. Morrison, J. F. Coates and N. B. Rankov, *The Athenian Trireme*[2] (Cambridge 2000) 150-57.

[16] A little earlier than Chabrias' expedition to Aegina and Cyprus, Eunomus was sent out from Athens to Aegina, but he was defeated by the Spartan harmost, Gorgopas. This defeat took place after the arrival of the Spartan navarch for 388/7, Antalcidas (*Hell.* 5.1.6f.), and so in the Athenian year 388/7, which would have started before the new Spartan year.

base from which to raid the coast of Attica and to interfere with shipping. For the time being, these activities ceased (*Hell.* 5.1.10, 13).[17]

The way in which Xenophon words his opening statement about Chabrias' intervention on Aegina has generally been interpreted as showing that Chabrias called into Athens with his ten ships on his way back from a prior naval appointment. The sentence reads: Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Χαβρίας ἐξέπλει εἰς Κύπρον βοηθῶν Εὐαγόρᾳ, πελταστάς τ' ἔχων ὀκτακοσίους καὶ δέκα τριήρεις, προσλαβὼν δὲ καὶ Ἀθήνηθεν ἄλλας τε ναῦς καὶ ὁπλίτας ('After this Chabrias was sailing out to Cyprus to help Evagoras, with 800 peltasts and ten triremes. He also obtained additional ships and hoplites from Athens', *Hell.* 5.1.10). Where was the prior naval posting? Given the timing, it is tempting to wonder if Chabrias had been to Acarnania. This is not the normal explanation, as it is generally accepted that Chabrias had taken over command of the light-armed mercenary soldiers at Corinth as a replacement for Iphicrates, as stated by Diodorus (14.92.2),[18] probably either late in 390 or early in 389,[19] and he is usually seen as having gone straight from the Corinthian command to the one that was aimed at bringing help to Evagoras of Salamis on the island of Cyprus. In fact, the peltasts on board his ships could well have been some of those who had been serving in Corinth;[20] however, an Athenian fleet does not seem to have been part of the original arrangement at Corinth, and this situation is unlikely to have changed.

In the Corinthian Gulf we hear of a Corinthian fleet funded by Persian money, at least in the early part of the war (*Hell.* 4.8.10). There is also evidence for a Boeotian base at Creusis (4.5.10) which, as has already been noted, was a port; however, there is no mention of Athenian naval activity in the area until the time of the expedition of Agesilaus against Acarnania. Certain considerations suggest that this is not just a reflection of the limited amount of

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[17] Though for how long is uncertain. Teleutias, a successful Spartan naval commander, was at some stage recalled to restore the Spartan position on Aegina.

[18] This is also seen by most as the implication of *FGrH* 324 F 48 and 328 F 150 (Harpocration citing Androtion and Philochorus).

[19] The date is summer 388 by some chronological schemes, but this could be too late even without the expedition to Acarnania, depending on the precise timing of the Peace of Antalcidas of 387/6. After his service at Corinth and his intervention on the island of Aegina, Chabrias arrived in Cyprus in time to win victories on behalf of Evagoras of Salamis on Cyprus (Dem. 20.76; Nep. *Cha.* 2), before his activity was cut short by the signing of the Peace. If peace was concluded in 387, and not in 386, departure from Athens for Aegina and Cyprus in 388 might be needed to allow time for Chabrias' victories. An earlier date than 388 for arrival at Corinth is also in line with the indications provided by Diodorus Siculus (to be discussed).

[20] Figueira [6] 38 assumes that they were.

information that has survived. For a start, at the beginning of the Corinthian War Athens had very few warships. This is deduced not only from the surrender of all but twelve at the end of the Peloponnesian War (2.2.20), but also from the fact that the only early challenge to Sparta on the Aegean came from the Persians. It was a Persian fleet led by the Athenian Conon and the Persian satrap Pharnabazus that defeated the Spartans at Cnidus in 394 (4.3.11f.)[21] and was then used to dismantle the Spartan naval empire, and it was the same fleet that Conon later borrowed to take back home (4.8.1-10, 12). Diodorus (15.35.2) describes the fleet used at Cnidus as the King's. It is true that a few years after after Cnidus the situation had changed to some extent, as shown by two events, since we hear of two Athenian fleets sent in different directions in one year. Ten ships, commanded by Philocrates, the son of Ephialtes, were sent to help Evagoras of Salamis in Cyprus, but were intercepted by the Spartan Teleutias (*Hell.* 4.8.24), and Thrasybulus of Stiria led out a fleet of forty ships evidently intended for Rhodes, though it went elsewhere initially (4.8.25-30). It may be wondered, however, if the Athenians had had the time or resources to build more ships than those required by Thrasybulus and possibly those required by Philocrates.[22]

One difficulty with the idea of an Athenian naval presence at Corinth is the fact that the Spartans continued to hold the Corinthian port of Lechaeum, even after the defeat of a Spartan *mora* and the recovery of several positions by Iphicrates in 390. Soldiers belonging to the *mora* were rescued by vessels setting out from Lechaeum (*Hell.* 4.5.17), so clearly the Spartans still held the port at the time of the incident. Xenophon also states that the Corinthian exiles, who were on Sparta's side, ceased using the land route after the defeat of the *mora* and travelled by sea to Lechaeum in order to conduct raids (4.5.19). There is no mention of a fleet based at Cenchreae, the other Corinthian port. Therefore, it is not likely that Chabrias obtained his ships from his Corinthian command, so we need to consider what circumstances could have led to his command of a fleet before he was sent out to Aegina and Cyprus. We can

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[21] Xenophon does state, in the passage cited, that Conon led a Greek contingent in the battle, but Pharnabazus held the overall command, and was responsible for raising the ships. The Oxyrhynchus Historian (London fragment) mentions the earlier supply of equipment (7.1) in the context of an unofficial attempt to sneak a trireme to Conon from the Piraeus (6.1), but does not comment on any earlier attempt to send ships. As noted by I. A. F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia'* (Cambridge 1967) 54, the political situation makes it unlikely that there had been any sent. The state of panic produced by the discovery of the attempt that was made is revealing, too.

[22] It is not known whether the ships that Philocrates took were from the twelve allowed by the Spartans at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, as suggested by Cawkwell [5] 275 n. 20, or whether they were new, as claimed by Stylianou [6] 466.

probably safely conclude that he was not involved in the earlier campaigns on Aegina, which were both failures, and there is no indication that he was in the Hellespontine region after the death of Thrasybulus. This leaves open the possibility suggested here—that he had been recalled from Corinth in the summer of 389 and had been sent to help the Acarnanians during Agesilaus' invasion. While Agesilaus was concentrating on Acarnania, the fact that there was no Spartan invasion of the Corinthiad must have reduced the pressure on armed forces in that area. In fact, it is commonly believed that the main focus of the war had now shifted to the Aegean, perhaps already causing a scaling down of the Athenian presence in Corinth at the time when Chabrias took up his position there.[23]

Given that there was no Spartan invasion of the Corinthiad to contend with in 389, and given that peltasts from Corinth would be the ideal force for fighting in Acarnania, where mobile, light-armed troops were generally more effective than hoplites alone, it might have seemed a good idea to shift Chabrias to a place where there was likely to be more action. On this hypothesis, he would have arrived in time to provide an obstacle to Agesilaus' retreat, but he would not have been part of the orginal contingent sent to Acarnania. Meanwhile, fewer men and a replacement commander could keep an eye on Corinth. It is commonly (but not universally) thought that Chabrias was replaced at Corinth by Diotimus, who seems to have had some sort of involvement there during the Corinthian War.[24] At any rate, Chabrias must have been replaced by someone in 388/7, if not before, in order to go to Aegina and Cyprus. Perhaps the mysterious Polystratus, named by Demosthenes as a leader of the mercenaries (4.24), belongs here.

For the idea that Chabrias left Corinth in 389 rather than 388 to be feasible chronologically, it is necessary to assume that Iphicrates had stepped down from his position at Corinth late in 390 or early in 389, to allow time for Chabrias to take over the post before heading west. Some achievements for Chabrias at Corinth seem to be indicated by the ancient sources, though the information is vague. The matter is complicated by Thompson's contention that Chabrias served twice at Corinth during the Corinthian War: once as general in charge of the hoplites serving alongside Iphicrates, as in the known case of

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[23] It has been suggested by W. E. Thompson, 'Chabrias at Corinth' *GRBS* 26 (1985) 51-57, that after the withdrawal of Iphicrates from Corinth, the Athenians ceased to maintain a force of hoplites alongside the peltasts and, accordingly, reduced the number of commanding officers operating there (p. 55 n. 23).

[24] Thompson [23] 55-57, however, regards Diotimus as a general in command of hoplites, serving at an earlier date with Iphicrates, rather than as a commander of the mercenaries serving later.

Callias in 391/0; and the other time as leader of the peltasts.[25] The first period of service would pre-date that of Callias, as a campaign associated with Chabrias by the scholiast on Aristides' *Panathenaecus* (172.3, 4)[26] preceded the destruction of the Spartan *mora* with which Callias was involved, as commander of the Athenian hoplites. If Thompson is right in suggesting two periods at Corinth for Chabrias, it is difficult to assign episodes to a particular year; however, some allowance must be made for the fact that people remembered Chabrias as one of the leaders of the mercenary force. Demosthenes, in the *First Philippic*, speaks of the mercenary force maintained by Athens at Corinth, and lists three of its leaders as Polystratus, Iphicrates and Chabrias (Dem. 4.24). Therefore, Chabrias is not likely to have been moved on immediately after taking up the position as leader of the mercenaries.

Although there is a tendency to treat Iphicrates' move from Corinth to Athens and then to the Hellespont as occurring in the campaigning season after that of the defeat of the *mora* (so that the departure date for the Hellespont is during the campaigning season beginning in spring 389), there is no necessity for this. Iphicrates' successes in the area around Corinth can be fitted into the summer of 390, and his scheme to take Corinth for Athens does not constitute a problem either. He does not seem to have progressed very far with the move before being forced to resign, if a takeover was, in fact, his intention. Buckler treats the idea as a senseless rumour.[27] A possible chronological indication in Xenophon's *Hellenica* may support the sending of Iphicrates to the Hellespont earlier than is often thought. At the beginning of *Hellenica* 5.1, Xenophon seems to link in time the activities of the Spartan Eteonicus on Aegina with the events of 4.8 just related. These events end with the death of the Spartan governor of Abydus, Anaxibius, who had been ambushed by Iphicrates' men. Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ Ἑλλήσποντον Ἀθηναίοις τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις τοιαῦτα ἦν. ὢν δὲ πάλιν ὁ Ἐτεόνικος ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ . . . ('So then, these were the events involving the Athenians and Spartans that took place in the area of

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[25] Thompson [23] 55. Whether Chabrias was a general or not when he commanded the mercenaries is debated, though most seem to think he was, as stated in Diod. Sic. 14.92.2. Discussion of the matter tends to include the controversial issue of the status of Iphicrates and whether this changed during his time at Corinth, perhaps after the defeat of the Spartan *mora*. The reasoning behind the inclusion of Iphicrates in the reckoning is the assumption that two men doing the same job ought to hold the same rank. It is seen, for instance, in L. A. Tritle, *Phocion the Good* (London 1988) 65.

[26] W. Dindorf (ed.), *Aristides ex Recensione Guilielemi Dindorfii* 1-3 (Leipzig 1829), as quoted and corrected by Thompson [23] 51f. On the other hand, Seager [1] 111 sees the victories at Phlius and Mantinea attributed by the scholiast to Chabrias as additional to and later than those won by Iphicrates in the same locations.

[27] J. Buckler [10] 122.

the Hellespont. Meanwhile, Eteonicus was again on Aegina . . .', *Hell.* 5.1.1). The Spartan Eteonicus, Xenophon informs us, had been encouraging raids on Attica so successfully that the Athenians decided to send out some hoplites under the command of Pamphilus to deal with the situation. Pamphilus made moves towards a blockade of the city by land and sea, before his ships were unexpectedly driven away by the Spartan Teleutias, leaving the land forces stranded.

Pamphilus' command on Aegina is generally agreed to belong to the year 389, as the sequel was a trial that appears to be alluded to by Aristophanes in *Plutus* 174 early in 388. This places the activities of Eteonicus earlier in 389, since Pamphilus was attempting to counter the Spartan's actions: in fact, Figueira suggests 390 for the coming of Eteonicus to Aegina.[28] That Pamphilus was sent out in 389 is supported also by the arrival of a new Spartan navarch, Hierax, after Pamphilus had lost his fleet. As Antalcidas was the navarch for the Spartan year 388/7, Hierax, who preceded him, must have been the navarch for 389/8. On the basis of Xenophon's wording in *Hellenica* 5.1 (quoted above), a date in 389 may be suggested for Iphicrates' final encounter in the region of the Hellespont with the Spartan Anaxibius. Iphicrates had been in the area for some time before this.

A corollary of this position is an early dating of the death of Thrasybulus of Stiria, which took place shortly before Iphicrates' arrival at the Hellespont. In spite of work by Seager and others, some still assume that Thrasybulus died in 388. Seager pointed out in 1967 that the main item of evidence used in support of this position at the time when he was writing was invalid, and proposed 390 for departure and 389 for Thrasybulus' death.[29] In this he returned to the dates supplied by Kirchner.[30] Cawkwell later suggested raising the dates a further year, so that 391 was the departure date, with Thrasybulus' death occurring in 390.[31] For what it is worth, this is in accord with the date of death supplied by Diodorus, who places it under the archon Demostratus of 390/89 (Diod. Sic. 14.99.4). While it is clear that sometimes Diodorus stuggled to identify the right years for events, at other times he had access to accurate chronological

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[28] Figueira [6] 36.

[29] R. Seager, 'Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism', *JHS* 87 (1967) 95-115, 109 n. 27. He discussed a reference in Aristophanes' *Plutus* that had been regarded as showing that Thrasybulus was alive in 388. His conclusion was that Aristophanes had been wrongly interpreted, and his argument has been generally accepted.

[30] *PA* 7310, 478f. Note, too, that Chabrias is recorded by Kirchner as general for the year 390/89, on the basis of his participation in Thrasybulus' expedition (*PA* 15086, 404). This entry is reflected in Davies, *APF*, 560.

[31] Cawkwell [5] 273f.

information. For instance, after ignoring the last two years of the Corinthian
War, he correctly dates the Peace of Antalcidas to the archonship of Theodotus,
in 387/6. In places, his problem seems to lie in determining where to insert a
new archon year, though other factors can throw him, too. The fact that the
archons for 393/2 and 390/89 were both called Demostratus seems to have
confused him, so that certain items that appear under one would make more
sense under the other. His handling of Iphicrates is of interest. The destruction
of the Spartan *mora* and various other actions, including his resignation from
the post at Corinth, are all placed under the archon of 393/2. If they are moved
to 390/89, the account makes sense. The defeat of the *mora* is usually assigned
to 391/0, but it perhaps took place close to the change of year, so that the error,
if there is one, may not be serious.[32]

In dating the start of Thrasybulus' expedition to 391, Cawkwell is
followed cautiously by Buck,[33] who, however, has Thrasybulus die in summer
389. Buck's view seems to prolong the campaign unduly. Although it has been
suggested that a lengthy stay is necessary to account for the deterioration in
Thrasybulus' ships mentioned in Lysias 28.2, 4,[34] the speaker of that speech
may be referring in a misleading way to storm damage, rather than to the effects
of old age. Diodorus (14.94.3) has Thrasybulus lose 23 of his 40 ships in a
storm. In spite of advocating a long gap between Thrasybulus' setting out from
Athens and his death, Buck does not appear to subscribe to the aging triremes
theory, judging from his comments on Diodorus at this point: 'For Thrasybulus
to continue with half his fleet gone seems highly unlikely, and so the story of
the storm and of the severe losses is generally rejected. Heavy damage from a

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[32] The normal problem with Diodorus' dates can be illustrated by his dating of the naval
battle fought off Cnidus and its aftermath. Diodorus places both the battle and a number of
later events in the archonship of Diophantus in 395/4. The battle is dated to early August 394
by an eclipse of the sun noted by Xenophon (*Hell*. 4.3.10). Although W. K. Pritchett pointed
out in *The Greek State at War* 2 (Berkeley 1974) 120 n. 21 that the change of year at Athens
could sometimes occur as late as August, the speaker of Lysias 19 indicates the archonship of
Eubulides in 394/3 as the date for the battle (28). Even if the speaker of Lysias 19 is wrong,
the later events mentioned by Diodorus as taking place in 395/4 cannot be crammed into the
rest of August. Xenophon, in fact, mentions winter and spring in the course of his account of
the same events (*Hell*. 4.8.7). As it happens, the speaker of Lysias 19 is probably not wrong.
An Athenian cavalryman who died at the battle of Nemea, which preceded the battle at
Cnidus, is declared by his funeral monument to have died in the archonship of Eubulides
(*IG* 2$^2$ 6217).

[33] R. J. Buck, *Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy: The Life of an Athenian
Statesman* (Stuttgart 1998) 112. He refers to the appointment of Thrasybulus as commander
as taking place 'probably in very late 391, or possibly early in 390.'

[34] Stylianou [6] 471 n. 34.

storm to half of the ships, however, might well end up in Diodorus as their destruction. Such damage could give rise to charges that he was letting the fleet deteriorate.'[35] Rather, he appears to be trying to accommodate the evidence of Diodorus, who spreads the expedition of Thrasybulus over a period of three archon years; however, the archon years supplied by Diodorus are 392/1, 391/0 and 390/89, as noted by Figueira, whereas Buck offers 391/0, 390/89 and 389/8.[36] Figueira suggests 392/1 as the year of the voting of the expedition and the preparations for it.[37] The archon year 391/0 then becomes the year of setting sail (though Figueira considers early 390/89 as possible) and 390/89 the year of Thrasybulus' death.

Thrasybulus' departure from Athens is linked to Spartan movements in the aftermath of the failed peace negotiations of 392. Perhaps in winter 392/1, or earlier, as suggested by DeVoto, a new, pro-Athenian satrap called Struthas arrived to replace the pro-Spartan Tiribazus,[38] and the Spartan reaction was to send Thibron to campaign in Asia (*Hell*. 4.8.17). Before long, according to most (although this is queried by Tuplin),[39] Thibron had lost his life and was replaced by Diphridas, who travelled out at the same time as Ecdicus, the latter sent out with eight ships in response to an appeal from Rhodian exiles (4.8.18-22). All of these events could belong to 391, as could the replacement of the inactive Ecdicus by Teleutias (4.8.23), who had just enjoyed a successful naval campaign in conjunction with the 391 land campaign of his half-brother Agesilaus at Corinth. He turned up in the Aegean with the twelve ships he had had in the Corinthian Gulf (4.4.19)—described as περί ('about') twelve in this passage—and augmented his fleet in various ways (4.8.23f.). The immediate aftermath of his success around Corinth would be a good psychological time for the Spartans to decide to transfer him.

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[35] Buck [33] 116.

[36] Buck [33] 115. Diodorus first mentions the expedition under the archon Philocles (392/1) and resumes his narrative of it under Demostratus (390/89).

[37] Figueira [6] 34.

[38] J. DeVoto, 'Agesilaus, Antalcidas and the Failed Peace of 392/1 BC', *CPh* 81 (1986) 191-202. His proposal is made on 194. He refers to a suggestion made by D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden 1977) 145 n. 61, linking initial peace negotiations with the Persian and allied seizure of Cythera in 393. This is seen as sufficient to alarm the Spartans to the extent of inducing them to attempt to gain peace. Peace negotiations then start earlier than is usually thought, with a corresponding earlier arrival of the satrap Tiribazus in Susa and an earlier sending of Struthas to replace him.

[39] C. J. Tuplin, 'Lysias XIX, the Cypriot War and Thrasyboulos' Naval Expedition', *Philologus* 127 (1983) 170-86, 184 and n. 91. This is mentioned also in Tuplin's *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.11-7.5.27* (Stuttgart 1993) 77.

In Xenophon Thrasybulus is sent out as a result of this Spartan activity (*Hell*. 4.8.25), presumably in 391 or early 390. Cawkwell thinks he is more likely to have left just before Teleutias' arrival than after it, and to have reacted to the discovery of that arrival by avoiding Rhodes in the meantime. Otherwise, according to Cawkwell, it is difficult to understand why he did not go there in the first place. This ought to place his departure in 391,[40] and his death, on this view, is likely to have taken place in 390. The early career of Chabrias, even leaving Acarnania out of account, may indicate, at least, that 388 is too late for Thrasybulus' death. There is inscriptional evidence that shows Chabrias' presence on Thrasybulus' expedition (*IG* 2$^2$.21),[41] and there is also a garbled mention of Chabrias in the same connection by the scholiast on Aristides' *Panathenaecus* (Schol. *ad* Aristid. *Pan.* 172.7). Chabrias then replaced Iphicrates at Corinth, as indicated by Diodorus (14.92.2) and probably also by Harpocration, whose use of the words ὕστερον καὶ between the names Iphicrates and Chabrias has usually been interpreted as indicating that he thought Chabrias served in Corinth in succession to Iphicrates. Next, if there was no intervening post, Chabrias set sail for Aegina and Cyprus. All these events should have taken place in 388 if Thrasybulus died in that year, unless one follows a late dating, and places the last item in the first half of 387. While it is theoretically possible for Chabrias to have sailed to Aegina in spring 387, this date may not leave enough time for the victories in Cyprus mentioned by Nepos (*Cha.* 2.2) and implied by Demosthenes in his mention of trophies set up there by Chabrias (20.76). It is also necessary to allow time for the Athenians to enjoy the results of Chabrias' success on Aegina, as reported by Xenophon (*Hell*. 5.1.13).[42]

The congestion arising from having a large amount of activity crammed into a short period of time was noted by Elisabetta Bianco, who proposed changing Diodorus' order of events to give Chabrias some breathing space. She also saw merit in placing the naval campaign of Thrasybulus immediately before that of Chabrias to Aegina and Cyprus, so that Chabrias would sail directly from one to the other. Both would follow his time at Corinth.[43] She refers to the article by Thompson, accepting his first period for Chabrias at Corinth, but tacitly rejecting the second. Her solution not only changes the Diodoran order of events, but also ignores indications in the sources that Chabrias was remembered as a commander of the light-armed mercenaries, which ought to involve a

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[40] Cawkwell [5] 273.

[41] The inscription names Chabrias in relation to an alliance with the Thracian king Seuthes attributed by both Xenophon (*Hell*. 4.8.26) and Diodorus (14.94.2) to Thrasybulus.

[42] This is noted by P. Funke, *Homónoia und Arché* (Wiesbaden 1980) 99 n. 99.

[43] E. Bianco, 'Chabrias Atheniensis', *RSA* 30 (2000) 47-72, 49 n. 9, 50.

period of service after that of Iphicrates. Iphicrates was the commander from the time the force was set up until shortly before his departure for the Hellespont. In fact, if earlier dates for Thrasybulus' expedition and death, and for Iphicrates' transfer to the Aegean, are accepted, there is no need to interfere with the normally accepted order of events. The chronological indications provided by Diodorus for the death of Thrasybulus and the departure of Iphicrates can stand, once an adjustment is made to correct the assigning of Iphicrates' resignation of his Corinthian command to the archonship of the wrong Demostratus. Diodorus has Thrasybulus die in 390/89 and, after the adjustment, his account has Iphicrates resigning from his post at Corinth in the same year.

In view of what is known of Chabrias' activities both immediately before and immediately after the Spartan invasion of Acarnania, it is worth considering him as a possibility for the position of commander of the fleet based at Oeniadae, or for that of the commander of the reinforcements, if Athenian ships had taken the Athenians and Boeotians there in the first place. He served at Corinth as commander of the peltasts in succession to Iphicrates, who could have left the area as early as late 390. When the Spartans failed to send an army to Corinth in spring 389, Chabrias could have been released from his duties there to serve in a place where the Spartans did send an army. Similarly, the coming of peace to Acarnania in 388 removed the need for the Athenian fleet, so making possible its deployment elsewhere. A suggested sequence of events is as follows. Partway through 390/89 Chabrias took over the leadership of the Athenian mercenaries at Corinth. Later in the same Athenian archon year Agesilaus of Sparta invaded Acarnania. This took the pressure off those stationed around Corinth and transferred it further west. The Athenians, who already had some men in Acarnania, decided to send reinforcements with Chabrias. A fleet was assembled and some of the mercenaries from Corinth were put on board. By the time the fleet arrived at Oeniadae, a new archon year had started and Agesilaus was well into his campaign. All Chabrias could do at this stage was move into position to hinder the retreat. Once Agesilaus and his army had gone, everyone settled down for the winter, expecting action in the spring. But the action turned out to be of a diplomatic nature. The Acarnanians made peace with the Achaeans and an alliance with the Spartans, so they no longer needed defenders. By the time the negotiations were complete and the Athenians had returned to Athens, part of the year 388/7 had already passed. As for Chabrias, since his ships and men were now available for a new commission, the Athenians decided to send them to Cyprus, to help their friend, Evagoras of Salamis. Before Chabrias had time to leave for Cyprus, Eunomus had been defeated by the Spartans occupying Aegina, so Chabrias was asked to make a detour on his way out to Cyprus.

# OFFERING A SEAT TO A GRIEVING GODDESS

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**Abstract.** In the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, Demeter assumes the guise of an old woman partly as a consequence of grief. The goddess, as old woman, refuses a seat offered to her by Metaneira but accepts one offered by Iambe. This is because Iambe's habit of care enables her to acknowledge and indulge Demeter's grief. The seat she offers is a seat for two, which makes room for Demeter's lost daughter.

Two separate but related points will be made here about Demeter's experience as recounted in the *Homeric Hymn* sung in her honour.[1] The first is that Demeter takes on the appearance of an old woman partly as a consequence of grief and partly as a deliberate attempt to conceal her true identity. The second is that the goddess accepts the seat placed before her by Iambe because Iambe's gesture reveals at once a welcome recognition of Demeter's grief and a desire to fulfil the particular needs of a woman in mourning.

Demeter, when she hears Persephone's cries, begins to suffer a very human grief. At that moment, 'sharp pain seized her in her heart' (ὀξὺ δέ μιν κραδίην ἄχος ἔλλαβεν, *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 40). As she searches land and sea for her daughter, the goddess is afflicted with physical and emotional symptoms of loss as described by psychologists: she loses her appetite (49f.), feels restless and cannot sleep (47f.), neglects her grooming (50).[2] Once she learns from Helios that Hades has abducted Persephone, her grief becomes 'more terrible and more shameless' (αἰνότερον καὶ κύντερον, 90)[3] and manifests itself

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[1] I first studied this poem with Catherine Matchett, whose love of Demeter inspired my own. I also wish to thank C. J. Leon, whose love inspired me.

[2] B. Deits, *Life After Loss* (Cambridge 2000) 49, lists lack of appetite, inability to sleep, and lack of concern with personal hygiene among the effects of grief. Demeter's first response to her distress is tearing and throwing off her veil (*Hom. Hymn Dem.* 40-42), for which we may compare Andromache's response to news of Hector's death (*Il.* 22.468-70).

[3] N. J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford 1974) 177, surveys Homeric usage of the term κύντερον and finds that it refers to things shameful and by extension hard to endure. Richardson emphasizes the objective response to what is κύντερον. So also M. Crudden, *The Homeric Hymns* (Oxford 2001) 7, who translates κύντερον as 'more grim'. H. Foley (ed.), *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter: Translation, Commentary, and Interpretive Essays* (Princeton 1994) 6, brings out Demeter's subjective experience of grief in her translation 'more . . . brutal'. My translation attempts to do the same. Cf. LSJ *s.v.* κύντερον.

primarily as anger at Zeus (χωσαμένη . . . Κρονίωνι, 91).[4] Her anger is such that Demeter forsakes Olympus (νοσφισθεῖσα . . . Ὄλυμπον, 92). The goddess' disillusionment with home is one aspect of her experience that sets it apart from other instances of divine grief. Zeus honours his doomed son Sarpedon with a rain of blood, but does not himself leave heaven (*Il.* 16.459f.). Thetis, as she anticipates Achilles' death, sits sorrowing in an undersea cave, but this is her accustomed home, and she remains surrounded by her divine friends (*Il.* 24.83-86). Demeter's grief, on the other hand, takes her to the 'cities and rich fields of men' (ἀνθρώπων πόλιας καὶ πίονα ἔργα, *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 93) to live among mortals while she grieves (τετιημένη, 98).[5] Hers is a human experience that leads to a self-imposed exile on earth, the proper place for pain.

For a time, Demeter assumes the form of an ancient lady, removed from childbirth, someone like a nursemaid or housekeeper (γρηὶ παλαιγενέι ἐναλίγκιος, ἥτε τόκοιο εἴργεται . . . οἷαί τε τροφοί εἰσι . . . καὶ ταμίαι, *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 101-04). Her disguise is clearly prompted by her desire to gain access to and immortalize Demophoon, son of Keleos.[6] For the disguise is discarded the very instant her role as nursemaid in Keleos' home is brought to an end (248-81). It is also possible, however, to see Demeter's alteration of her divine aspect as motivated in part by grief, as an attempt to give her unwontedly human condition physical expression.[7] She 'softens' (ἀμαλδύνουσα, 94) her

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[4] Helios knows that, even before she knew exactly what had befallen Persephone, Demeter's lamentation (γόον, *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 82) was coupled with 'unapproachable anger' (ἄπλητον . . . χόλον, 83), both of which he urges her to put aside (*Hom. Hymn Dem.* 82). Her anger is to be understood as a feature of her grief. Contemporary psychology recognizes that grief and anger go hand in hand (Deits [2] 49).

[5] Disillusionment with home is a typical component of human grief (Deits [2] 49). My argument is compatible with Arthur's compelling idea that Demeter chooses earth because, in fact, she has a natural and effective superiority there and can manipulate events, whereas others on Olympus hold sway over her (M. Arthur, 'Politics and Pomegranates: An Interpretation of the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*', in Foley [3] 224f.).

[6] J. S. Clay, *The Politics of Olympus* (Princeton 1989) 227; L. Pratt, 'The Old Women of Ancient Greece and the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*', *TAPhA* 130 (2000) 46. Foley notes plausibly that Demeter's likeness to a barren old woman 'resonates with the famine she will soon inflict on mortals' ('Commentary on the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*', in Foley [3] 41).

[7] The word 'attempt' is used advisedly, for the transformation is incomplete. Demeter retains a goddess' slender feet, height, and radiance (*Hom. Hymn Dem.* 183, 188f.). Somewhat ill-concealed divinity gives away the true nature of the disguised Aphrodite (to Helen in *Il.* 3.396-98, to Anchises in *H. Ven.* 5.92-99) and Poseidon (to the smaller Ajax in *Il.* 13.68-72). But in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, Metaneira, though she responds to Demeter's appearance as to a divine epiphany (Richardson [3] 207), fails to see the goddess as a goddess. One of the points of the story told here is that human blindness, as exemplified by Metaneira (*Hom. Hymn Dem.* 256-62), blocks people from experiencing the ageless and

form. But this softening is of a startlingly violent nature. The verb ἀμαλδύνω in epic has the sense of 'crushing'.[8] It is used, for example, of Poseidon and Apollo's destruction of the Trojan city-wall (*Il.* 12.18). In the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, instead of the harder, chiselled, youthful beauty of a goddess, we are invited to see a crumpled, slack-skinned, fragile old lady.[9] But more may be inferred from the poet's use of ἀμαλδύνω. When Aphrodite appears to Helen disguised as an ancient wool-comber (*Il.* 3.386f.), she is said simply to be 'like' an old woman (εἰκυῖα, 3.386). The verb ἀμαλδύνω is remarkable in the context of a personal transformation; it evokes precisely the sort of collapse we would expect of a woman in Demeter's situation. Without her Persephone, Demeter feels crushed by the weight of grief.

Though it quite literally informs her, Demeter's grief is missed by her hostess at Eleusis; Metaneira detects something uncanny about the stranger on her doorstep (*Hom. Hymn Dem.* 190), but this is not her suffering.  Metaneira offers her guest a seat on the 'shining chair' (κλισμοῖο φαεινοῦ, 193) on which she herself had been seated. Shortly afterwards, we learn that Metaneira has taken Demeter to be a noblewoman, albeit one reduced to working for hire (213-15). The offer of the κλισμός fit for the queenly lady of the house seems meant to honour the visitor.[10] Yet the offer is refused. A certain Iambe then offers a different kind of seat, a δίφρος (218). Her offer is accepted.

Iambe's role within Keleos' household is unclear, but an expression used twice to describe her, 'knowing careful things' (κέδν᾽ εἰδυῖα, *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 195, 202), may imply that she is a servant.[11] Whatever her role, Iambe's 'knowing careful things' suggests a habit of care for others.[12] This habit is invoked both when Iambe sets the δίφρος before the goddess and when she brings a smile to Demeter's grief-stricken face. The poet seems, in fact, to

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deathless immortality of the gods, such as Demeter tries to bestow upon Demophoon, and necessitates Demeter's substitution of another gift to mankind, namely her Eleusinian rites.

[8] L.S.J. and B. Snell *et al.* (edd.), *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* (Göttingen 1955) *s.v.* ἀμαλδύνω.

[9] The aged Hecuba, depicted on the so-called Polyxena sarcophagus (*ca.* 520-500 BC) is characterized by loose, wrinkled skin around the eyes and crooked posture (Pratt [6] 61).

[10] Cf. C. G. Brown, 'Iambos', D. E. Gerber (ed.), *A Companion to the Greek Lyric Poets* (Leiden, New York, Koln 1997) 17: 'Implicit in Metaneira's offer is the recognition of the goddess' superior status'.

[11] κέδν᾽ εἰδυῖα is used elsewhere in epic only of Penelope and Eurycleia (Pratt [6] 48). Brown notes: 'In the later tradition she [Iambe] is regularly described as θεραπαίνη or θεραπίς. Such a description may reflect a well-established tradition or it may merely be an inference based on the language of the *Hymn*' ([10] 18).

[12] Snell [8] *s.v.* κέδνος.

suggest that Iambe's habit of care lies behind her successes with Demeter. Certainly, there is no suggestion that Iambe sees through Demeter's decrepitude to her divinity, and so performs actions pleasing to a goddess.[13]

Iambe seems to take the measure of the situation, where Metaneira blundered. Iambe offers the right seat. The goddess' preference for one kind of seat over another is a notable device,[14] all the more so because mourners usually choose to sit on the ground rather than on any kind of chair.[15] The word δίφρος contains the roots 'two' (δί) and 'carry' (φέρω). It is used early on of chariots, where the sense 'carrying two' is appropriate. The force of the δί is thought to be lost by the time δίφρος is used of a type of seat.[16] But sometimes in epic the word is used pointedly of a seat that can encourage intimacy. A δίφρος is the seat Aphrodite sets out for an encounter between Helen and Paris (*Il.* 3.424). Helen invites Hector to join her on a δίφρος while she hints at her desire for him over his brother (6.354). In the *Hymn*, Demeter's choice is easier to understand if we allow the word δίφρος its full etymological force; she accepts the seat for two *because* it is made for two. On her loveseat, she sits 'wasting away with desire for her deep-zoned daughter' (πόθῳ μινύθουσα βαθυζώνοιο θυγατρός, *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 201). The δίφρος makes space for Demeter's missing child.[17] The shattered goddess, having made her grief palpable, now has it indulged, thanks to Iambe's sympathetic ways. Divine as she is, Demeter becomes in our poet's hands a potent image of human grief, alone on a seat for two.

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[13] Iambe is thus unlike the perspicacious helmsman in the *Hymn to Dionysus* who, as S. Murnaghan, *Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey* (Princeton 1987) 71 says, 'distinguishes himself from the other pirates by his awareness, when their captive resists binding, that he must be one of the gods'. The helmsman is aware of the immanence of the divine in the world of men.

[14] Clay [6] 235 believes the δίφρος in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* is a parodic version of a birthing chair, and that Iambe's jokes point up the incongruity of an old lady about to give birth, much to Demeter's delight. I find this view unpalatable. The δίφρος is elsewhere plausibly said to be the lowlier of the two seats offered, appealing to the goddess in humbled, human form (H. G. Evelyn-White, *Hesiod the Homeric Hymns and Homerica* [Cambridge, Mass. 1914] 303). The δίφρος scene also has ritual significance for the initiate of the Mysteries; the scene is shaped by and prescribes a part of the initiate's purification wherein he sits silently on a fleece-draped stool (Richardson [3] 211f.).

[15] Clay [6] 235.

[16] R. J. Cunliffe, *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect* (London, Glasgow, Bombay 1924), Snell [8] *s.v.* δίφρος.

[17] Perhaps we are to imagine that Demeter fantasizes, as a bereaved mother would (Deits [2] 49), that her lost daughter sits beside her.

# PLAUTUS' *MILES GLORIOSUS* ACT 3, SCENE 2:
# A SECOND DELAYED PROLOGUE?

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**Abstract.** The position of act 3, scene 2 underscores the condition of Sceledrus as a result of Palaestrio's first intrigue and anticipates the fate awaiting the soldier as a victim of the slave's second ruse. This scene may act as a kind of delayed prologue and may form a structural parallel with the postponed prologue in act 2, scene 1, which anticipates the outcome of Palaestrio's first intrigue against Sceledrus.

The Lucrio scene in Plautus' *Miles Gloriosus* act 3, scene 2 involves an exchange between the trickster slave Palaestrio and the drunken slave Lucrio.[1] Several scholars have discussed this scene from the perspective of the play's sources.[2] Others have shed light on the excellent humour of the scene, arguing that it stems from drunkenness.[3] Still others have claimed that it fails to advance the play's action.[4] Yet in my view the key to understanding act 3, scene 2 lies in a holistic approach, which takes the overall structure of the play and techniques employed earlier in *Miles Gloriosus* into account. Seen in this light, the scene not only moves the play's plot forward but also anticipates the triumph of the deception planned by the trickster slave Palaestrio against his new master, the soldier Pyrgopolynices. Even if is delayed, act 3, scene 2 therefore appears to be fully integrated into the plot and therefore may well

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[1] I wish to express my thanks to John Tzifopoulos for his welcome suggestions in reading a draft of this paper and to the anonymous reader of *Scholia* for his insightful comments.

[2] E. Fraenkel, 'Zur Interpretation des Plautinischen *Miles*', *Hermes* 64 (1929) 339-75; G. Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment* (Princeton 1971) 20, 201; G. Williams, 'Evidence for Plautus' Workmanship in the *Miles Gloriosus*', *Hermes* 86 (1958) 96-98. For a survey of the different views expressed see R. M. Haywood, 'On the Unity of the *Miles Gloriosus*', *AJP* 65 (1944) 382. For a comprehensive review of previous scholarship addressing this and many other issues not directly related to our discussion, see L. Schaaf, *Der* Miles Gloriosus *des Plautus und sein griechisches Original* (Munich 1977) 97-119.

[3] P. Stadter, 'Special Effects in Plautine Dialogue: *Miles Gloriosus*, III.ii', *CP* 63 (1968) 147.

[4] See Schaaf [2] 104 for a summary of previous scholarship.

belong to the original Plautine text.[5] In what follows I explain the function of act 3, scene 2, which is placed in a delayed position after the completion of Palaestrio's ruse against his fellow slave Sceledrus.

In act 3, scene 2 Palaestrio delivers a short address to the audience in which he states his belief that his second scheme against the soldier Pyrgopolynices will triumph if his fellow actors perform their roles well.[6] Palaestrio then seeks Sceledrus, a character who played a part in the first scheme, in all likelihood so as to find out about his condition[7] in the aftermath of the twin-sister ruse, which is produced as a play within the play.[8] Instead of Sceledrus, however, the under-butler Lucrio appears on stage and explains that Sceledrus is unable to come. The humour of this highly entertaining scene depends on Lucrio's vain attempts to conceal the truth about Sceledrus' falling asleep from drunkenness, largely because Lucrio himself is also drunk.[9] Sceledrus' state directs attention to his difficult condition after the performance

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[5] Since the purpose of this paper is to argue that there is a commonsense function for the scene at the point where it occurs, I shall not engage in detailed discussion of those elements, whether linguistic or other, which have been put forward as evidence that act 3, scene 2 cannot have been written in its entirety by Plautus (e.g., O. Zwierlein, *Zur Kritik und Exegese des Plautus II: Miles Gloriosus* (Stuttgart 1991). The holistic spirit of my thesis rests on the assumption that the original playwright intended to include act 3, scene 2 at this particular juncture regardless of the sources on which he may have drawn.

[6] In act 2, scene 2 Pyrgopolynices' servant Sceledrus has seen Philocomasium, his master's new concubine, embracing and kissing her lover Pleusicles, who came from Athens on instructions of Palaestrio, his original slave. In this difficult situation, Palaestrio devises a scheme to fool the slow-witted Sceledrus that he has not seen the soldier's mistress embracing and kissing her lover but rather her fictional twin sister, who came to Ephesus with her lover and stays in the house of Periplectomenus next door. This deception is represented as a play within the play. The performance of this scheme is so successful that Sceledrus expresses belief in Palaestrio's fiction; he then withdraws from the stage for a few days and saves himself from his master's punishment when he returns home (583f.). For a metatheatrical analysis of this scheme see T. J. Moore, *The Theater of Plautus: Playing to the Audience* (Austin 1998) 74f. and S. Frangoulidis, 'Palaestrio as Playwright: Plautus, *Miles Gloriosus* 209-212', in C. Deroux (ed.), *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History VII* (Brussels 1994) 80-85. On metatheatre in Plautus see F. Muecke, 'Plautus and the Theatre of Disguise', *CA* 5 (1986) 216-29 and N. W. Slater, *Plautus in Performance: The Theater of the Mind* (Princeton 1985).

[7] See Schaaf [2] 109 for an alternative explanation: Palaestrio's wish to ensure that Sceledrus (and by extension Lucrio) do not put his scheme at risk.

[8] For an analysis of this scheme from a metatheatrical perspective see Moore [6] 73f. and Frangoulidis [6] 75-80.

[9] An excellent discussion of the humour of the scene from the perspective of Lucrio's difficulties to control his tongue because of his drunkenness appears in Stadter [3] 146f.

of Palaestrio's ruse against him. In the context of the sleeping Sceledrus, the earlier performance of the scheme of the twin sisters can be interpreted as a dream, thus indicating its illusory nature. In act 3, scene 2 Palaestrio and the play's spectators find out where Sceledrus has withdrawn for a few days after his encounter with Periplectomenus in order to save himself from severe punishment when his master returns home (583f.).[10] When Palaestrio seeks to find out whether the slaves have emptied the wine caskets in the cellar, Lucrio lays the fault on the wine pots slipping and emptying rather than on human intervention. At this point Palaestrio orders Lucrio to go inside and informs him that he will go to the forum to fetch the master home (857f.). Palaestrio goes to the market to bring the master for the performance of the ruse against him. Lucrio, however, thinks that Palaestrio intends to bring the master so as to punish him and Sceledrus for emptying the wine cellar. He thus decides to withdraw in order to postpone punishment for a day: *fugiam hercle aliquo atque hoc in diem extollam malum* ('I'll run away somewhere, by . . . gad, and postpone . . . my punishment for a while', 861). His flight creates a verbal and structural parallel with Sceledrus, who likewise withdraws from the stage following his encounter with Periplectomenus and thus avoids torture for some days when his master returns home from the market place: *nam iam aliquo aufugiam et me occultabo aliquot dies, / dum haec consilescunt turbae atque irae lenient* ('I will flit somewhere now and lie low for a few days / while this storm dies down and their wrath subsides', 583f.).[11]

    We are now in a position to understand the reasons for the delayed position of act 3, scene 2 after Palaestrio's exposition of his deception against the soldier. Sceledrus' drunkenness and ensuing falling into deep sleep in order to forget his troubles reveals the triumph of Palaestrio's ruse against him. Wine could be considered as the symbolic equivalent of theatre/Dionysus and therefore for Palaestrio's scheme, which is represented as a play within the

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[10] References to the text are to the edition of Plautus by W. M. Lindsay (ed.), *T. Macci Plauti Comoediae* (Oxford 1963), while all English translations of Latin are quoted from P. Nixon, *Plautus 5: The Merchant, The Braggart Warrior, The Haunted House, the Persian* (Cambridge, Mass. 1980).

[11] The slave appears in a most difficult situation in act 2, scene 6 when old Periplectomenus comes on stage and in a kind of a mock trial scene makes a catalogue of Sceledrus' offences within the play and vows deserved punishment (501-12). In his plea Sceledrus admits that he is still in confusion, but Periplectomenus invites him to go inside the soldier's houses to see for himself if Philocomasium is there and then go to his own house. Once again Philocomasium successfully acts out the role of the soldier's devoted mistress and that of her twin sister as she passes from one house to the next and fools Sceledrus. At this stage Sceledrus begs for forgiveness, which Periplectomenus in his role as a lenient judge grants after receiving assurances for his better conduct in the future (568f.).

play. This notion also emerges from Lucrio's remark that Sceledrus has never drunk before: *numquam edepol vidi promere* ('I never saw . . . him draw any wine, upon my word', 848). The remarkable success of Palaestrio's deception against Sceledrus anticipates the even greater misfortune that awaits the master Pyrgopolynices as target of the ruse already explained in act 3, scene 1, the preceding scene. This notion is reinforced by the fact that both the slave and master are portrayed as foolish: in the deception against the soldier, Palaestrio exploits Pyrgopolynices' foolish belief that all women are in love with him, just as in his earlier ruse of the twin sister he takes advantage of Sceledrus' slow wits. Furthermore, the entire exchange between Palaestrio and Lucrio provides the necessary intermission between the performances of the two deceptions represented as plays within the play. Finally, the scene offers Palaestrio the perfect motivation to go to the forum and bring the master home in order to perform the scheme against him, while it leaves Lucrio with the false belief that his exit is associated with reporting the drinking binge. From this perspective the first scheme appears to be interconnected with the second one and prefigures its outcome.

In terms of structure, the delayed position of act 3, scene 2 after Palaestrio's description of his deception against the soldier may find its analogue in the play's opening. Act 1 begins with a highly entertaining exchange between the soldier and his parasite in which praise is poured on Pyrgopolynices for his alleged virtues both as a soldier and as a lover, praise designed to ensure the parasite free food.[12] The opening of the play with a highly comic scene is intended to capture the audience's attention.[13] Once this goal is achieved, Palaestrio in his role as prologue speaker delivers the play's prologue, which is postponed to act 2, scene 1 of the play. In the delayed prologue Palaestrio explains to the spectators not only the play's past events but also foreshadows the outcome of his deception against his fellow slave Sceledrus. Similarly, in act 3, scene 1 Palaestrio reveals his ruse against the soldier to Periplectomenus and Pleusicles and then orders Periplectomenus to fetch a courtesan and her maid for the performance of the second ruse against the soldier. The notion of act 3, scene 2 as a kind of a delayed prologue is in agreement with Slater's remarks about the function of prologues and epilogues in Plautus:

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[12] For a full discussion of the scene see C. Damon, *The Mask of the Parasite: A Pathology of Roman Patronage* (Ann Arbor 1997) 40-44.

[13] R. L. Hunter, *The New Comedy of Greece and Rome* (Cambridge 1985) 27 and Williams [2] 101.

> The prologue and epilogue in Plautus, then, seem to function not as conventions designed to transmit as briefly as possible the information necessary to understand the play but rather as transitions between non-theatrical and theatrical modes of perception (that is, a play within a play)— and of course as opportunities for games—playing in and of themselves. The jokes and banter that seem so irrelevant to a reader actually perform a vital function in alerting the audience to its role in the play and in the workings of the theater.[14]

The position of act 3, scene 2, therefore, after the exposition of the slave's second scheme against the soldier, underlines the fate befalling Sceledrus as target of Palaestrio's first intrigue. At the same time it foreshadows the end awaiting the soldier as victim of the slave's second ruse against him. Despite numerous claims to the opposite, the scene can be seen to advance the plot. In plain terms act 3, scene 2 may be viewed as a kind of prologue to the second half of the play but placed in a delayed position and forming a structural parallel with the play's earlier postponed prologue in act 2, which also anticipates the fate that awaits the slave Sceledrus in the play's first half.

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[14] Slater [6] 154.

# SABINUS IN OVID'S EXILE POETRY

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**Abstract.** Ovid's exile poetry has been promoted as largely fiction, but it does contain fragments of reality. His unfaithful friend, for example, is here identified as Sabinus from the *Amores*. If this identification holds, some passages aquire a distinct poignancy. Ovid's Sabinus came from a poor family, achieved equestrian status late, and reportedly wrote prose *Fasti*. His father, a poor contemporary of Ovid, switched allegiance once Ovid became *persona non grata*.

After a century or more of focussing on Ovid's exile poetry as a source of information on Black Sea meteorology and Tiberian prosopography, scholarship in its inexorable dialectic has recently thrown out the baby with the bath-water and deliberately ignored any historical details contained in Ovid's poems[1] to the point where the reality of his exile is seriously called into question.[2] Largely unnoticed has been Burkhard Chwalek's approach,[3] based on Wolfgang Iser's theory of fiction,[4] of reading the exile poetry as being created by what Iser calls 'Akte des Fingierens' which means that it contains a mixture of both imaginary and real elements, what Iser calls 'Realitätsfragmente'. Relying on this theory of the creative act as producing works that are at the same time imaginary and real, I want to deal with some of these 'fragments of reality' that went into the exile poetry, namely the friends from the poet's pre-exilic life that are mentioned in the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*.

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[1] See, e.g., G. D. Williams, *Banished Voices: Readings in Ovid's Exile Poetry* (Cambridge 1994); G. D. Williams and A. Walker (edd.), *Ovid and Exile* (Bendigo 1997); J. M. Claassen, *Displaced Persons: The Literature of Exile from Cicero to Boethius* (London 1999) 190-204.

[2] A. D. Fitton-Brown, 'The Unreality of Ovid's Tomitan Exile', *LCM* 10 (1985) 19-22; H. Hofmann, 'The Unreality of Ovid's Tomitan Exile Once Again', *LCM* 12 (1987) 23; H. Hofmann, 'Ovid im Exil?', *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Altphilologenverbandes, Landesverband Baden-Württemberg* 29 (2001) 8-19.

[3] B. Chwalek, *Die Verwandlung des Exils in die elegische Welt: Studien zu den Tristia und Epistulae ex Ponto Ovids* (Frankfurt 1996) 87-89.

[4] W. Iser, 'Akte des Fingierens oder Was ist das Fiktive im fiktionalen Text?', in D. Henrich and W. Iser (edd.), *Funktionen des Fiktiven: Poetik und Hermeneutik* 10 (München 1983) 121-51.

Ovid mentions four of his friends in the *Amores*. There is Atticus, the addressee of *Amores* 1.9,[5] C. Pomponius Graecinus in the prominent central position of the second book of the *Amores* (2.10) and Macer (2.18).[6] In the poem addressed to the latter, we also hear of his poet and friend (*meus* 'my friend', *Am.* 2.18.17) Sabinus, who wrote letters that answer each of Ovid's *Heroides* and may have given our poet the idea for writing the double epistles.[7] The identity of the latter remains shrouded in mystery. Paul Brandt remarks in his note: 'Freund des Ovid (*meus*), vielleicht derselbe, der Hor. ep. I 5,27 genannt wird, wird von Ovid noch ex Pont. IV 16,13 erwähnt als Verfasser eines nicht sicher zu bestimmenden Epos'.[8] Neither the Horatian epistle nor the passage from the *Epistulae ex Ponto* adds anything to our knowledge of Sabinus' identity other than that he was dead by the late teens AD.

The present paper tries to argue that Sabinus, as one of the four *sodales* ('poet-friends'), that are mentioned by name in Ovid's *Amores*, may be the unfaithful friend who is mentioned in *Tristia* 1.8, 5.8, *Epistula ex Ponto* 4.3, and possibly *Tristia* 3.11.[9] Were it not for the fact that the legal scholar and amateur

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[5] On his identity: R. Syme, *History in Ovid* (Oxford 1978) 72; J. C. McKeown (ed.), *Ovid, Amores: Text, Prolegomena and Commentary* 1-4 (Leeds 1989) 2.260; M. Helzle (ed.), *P. Ovidii Nasonis Epistularum ex Ponto Liber IV: A Commentary on Poems 1-7 and 16* (Hildesheim 1989) 29 showed that Ovid's relationship with Tiberius was probably less than perfect. I would rule out Curtius Atticus and opt either for the rhetorician Antonius Atticus (Sen. *Suas.* 2.6) or Iulius Atticus, a provincial governor in Gaul (*CIL* 12.1854) and/or a writer on viticulture (Columella, *Rust.* 1.1.14). The latter seems to me to be the most appropriate addressee for a poem on the paradox of the lover being a soldier.

[6] *Amores* 2.10 is either at the very centre of the book (assuming it contains nineteen poems) or—if one divides poem 9 into two pieces—it is the tenth poem of a twenty-poem collection. Syme [5] 73f. accepts the traditional identification of Ovid's Macer as Pompeius Macer (cf. *RE* 21.2276.15-2277.56), the son of Theophanes of Mytilene, a famous friend of Pompey the Great. This identification has recently been seriously challenged by P. Green, ''Pomepius Macer' and Ovid', *CQ* 42 (1992) 210-18. McKeown [5] 382f. *ad* Ov. *Am.* 2.18 argues convincingly in favour of identifying Ovid's Macer with the eponymous addressee of Tibullus 2.6; see also E. N. O'Neil, 'Tibullus 2.6: A New Interpretation', *CPh* 42 (1967) 163-67; D. F. Bright, *Haec Mihi Fingebam: Tibullus and his World* (Leiden 1978) 217f.; P. Murgatroyd (ed.), *Tibullus: Elegies* 2 (Oxford 1994) 239f. is skeptical. For the purposes of the present paper it is immaterial if the two are the same or if they are identical with Pompeius Macer; what matters here is the fact that, in any case, Macer is a man of letters.

[7] E. J. Kenney, in A. D. Melville (tr.), *Ovid, The Love Poems* (Oxford 1990) 200.

[8] P. Brandt (ed.), *P. Ovidi Nasonis Amorum Libri Tres* (Leipzig 1911) 134 *ad Am.* 2.8.17.

[9] The tone of the *Ibis* and of *Tristia* 4.9 is substantially more aggressive than that found in the other letters to the faithless friend. It therefore seems likely that the enemy who is Ovid's target there is different from the former friend of *Tristia* 1.8, 3.11, 5.8 and *Epistula ex Ponto* 4.3 (cf. Helzle [5] 84. G. D. Williams, *The Curse of Exile: A Study of Ovid's Ibis* (Cambridge

writer Massurius Sabinus is reported as being still alive under Nero (Gai. *Inst.* 2.218),[10] he would make a suitable candidate for Ovid's Sabinus. I would therefore suggest that the poet's friend was a Massurius Sabinus, the father of the legal scholar, who left no trace other than in Ovid's poems.

The four friends mentioned in the *Amores* are all *sodales*, presumably because all of them are writers in their own right. C. Pomponius Graecinus (*cos. suff.* AD 16) also has an interest in literature:

> artibus ingenuis, quarum tibi maxima cura est,
>     pectora mollescunt asperitasque fugit . . .
> <div align="right">(Ov. <em>Pont.</em> 1.6.7f.)</div>
> The liberal arts, about which you care greatly,
>     soothe the heart and dispel harshness . . .

Atticus, the other *uetus sodalis* ('old friend', *Pont.* 2.4.33), had been consulted by Ovid as a critic (*Pont.* 2.4.13f.) while Macer apparently wrote *Posthomerica* which must be why he is dubbed *Iliacus* ('Iliadic') at *Epistula ex Ponto* 4.16.6:

> tu canis aeterno quidquid restabat Homero,
>     ne careant summa Troica bella manu.
> <div align="right">(Ov. <em>Pont.</em> 2.10.13f.)</div>
> You sing whatever was left by immortal Homer
>     to prevent the Trojan War from lacking its final touch.

His traditional identification as Pompeius Macer, the son of Theophanes of Mytilene, has recently been questioned.[11] This, however, does not alter the fact that he is a poet which is all that matters for the purposes of the present argument. Sabinus, finally, wrote some form of *Heroides* (*Am.* 2.18.27-34), *Fasti* (*Pont.* 1.16.15) and an epic whose subject hides behind a textually corrupt word (*trisomem* or *trisomen* in the *codices Monacenses*) but which is most likely to be Troezen.[12] All four *sodales* therefore have something to do with the writing or polishing of poetry. Two of them are addressed by name in the

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1996) 7-29 while reviewing the issue unfortunately adds only negative answers to the question of Ibis' identity.

[10] *RE* 1A.1600.38-1601.43; W. Kunkel, *Herkunft und soziale Stellung der römischen Juristen* (Weimar 1952) 119f.

[11] See Syme [5] 73f.

[12] Cf. Helzle [5] 186 *ad Pont.* 4.16.15, following Heinsius' emendation to *Troezena*. The poets named at *Pont.* 4.16 are clearly arranged in generic groups, starting with epic poets and working down the 'hierarchy of genres.' Sabinus appears at 4.16.16, firmly within the epic section which lasts until line 26. Since his other works are *Fasti* and *Heroides* in Ovid's manner, a work in epic hexameters is called for in order for him to qualify for this section.

*Epistulae ex Ponto*. Only Sabinus fades out of the picture until his death.[13] Why should he not be the recipient of a missive from Tomis? The most obvious answer is that he deserted his friend Ovid in which case he would make a suitable candidate for being the addressee of the letters to the unfaithful *sodalis*.

In *Tristia* 1.8, Ovid complains at length that the addressee, who has been his long-standing friend, has unexpectedly not supported him in his downfall:

> tantane te, fallax, cepere obliuia nostri,
>     adflictumque fuit tantus adire timor,
> ut neque respiceres nec solarere iacentem,
>     dure, neque exequias prosequerere meas?
> illud amicitiae sanctum et uenerabile nomen
>     re tibi pro uili sub pedibusque iacet?
> quid fuit ingenti prostratum mole sodalem
>     uisere et adloquii parte leuare tui . . .
>
> (Ov. *Tr.* 1.8.11-18)
>
> Do you have such amnesia about me, you fraud,
>     was your fear to approach me in my demise so great
> that you don't look back nor console downcast me,
>     heartless one, nor attend my funeral?
> Do you trample on the sacred and venerable term 'friendship'
>     as if it were something common?
> What was so difficult about visiting a comrade knocked down
>     by a huge punch and lifting him up with a bit of your encouragement . . .

And a little further on he points out their long-standing association:

> quid, nisi conuictu causisque ualentibus essem
>     temporis et longi iunctus amore tibi?
>
> (Ov. *Tr.* 1.8.29f.)
>
> What if I were not tied to you by strong bonds, our association,
>     and a long-standing friendship?[14]

If the addressee of this epistle is indeed Sabinus, then the intervening passage acquires some piquancy in that Ovid could be alluding to his friend's poetic production and his answering letters in particular:

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[13] Ovid does, of course, address him again in fulsome terms after his demise (*Pont.* 4.16.13-16), but, somewhat ironically, within a list of poetic nobodies.

[14] *Quid, nisi* cannot mean here 'what except' (a favourite Ovidian formula: F. Bömer, *P. Ovidius Naso Metamorphosen: Kommentar Buch XII-XIII* [Heidelberg 1982] 260 *ad Met.* 13.227; McKeown [5] 151f. *ad Am.* 2.7.15f.), analogous to *nil nisi* ('nothing except'). Instead, the context requires it to be the negative version of the standing phrase *quis si* ('what would be the case if'; *OLD*, *quis* 13a).

quid fuit . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

inque meos si non lacrimam demittere casus,
    pauca tamen ficto uerba dolore loqui,
idque quod ignoti, 'factum male' dicere saltem,
    et uocem populi publicaque ora sequi,
denique lugubres uultus numquamque uidendos
    cernere supremo dum licuitque die,
dicendumque semel toto non amplius aeuo
    accipere et parili reddere uoce 'uale'?

<div align="right">(Ov. <em>Tr.</em> 1.8.17-26)</div>

How difficult was it . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

even if you don't shed a tear over my fall,
    nonetheless to say a few words with feigned grief
and at least to say 'what a shame!', which is what strangers say,
    and to follow popular opinion and the word on the streets,
finally to see my sad face never to be seen again,
    while it was allowed on the last day,
and to hear and return with like voice the 'farewell'
    which was to said once and no more in my entire life?

After all, *ficto uerba dolore loqui* ('to say words with feigned grief', 1.8.20) is exactly what a poet has to do when he is writing epistles like the *Heroides*. Furthermore, considering the fact that Ovid repeatedly stresses Sabinus' answers to his *Heroides* (*rediit*, 'has returned', *Am.* 2.18.27; *rettulit*, 'brought back', 28, *rescripsit*, 'wrote back', 31; *rescribere*, 'to write back', *Pont.* 4.16.13), the phrase *parili rederre uoce* ('return with like voice', 26) could contain a veiled allusion to something that Sabinus had been known for doing.

Ovid also stresses his age-old friendship with the addressee of *Epistula ex Ponto* 4.3 who thought extremely highly of Ovid as a poet and with whom Ovid joked around and (on the analogy of Catullus 50[15]) exchanged occasional verse:

ille ego sum, quamquam non uis audire, uetusta
    paene puer puero iunctus amicitia,
ille ego, qui primus tua seria nosse solebam
    et tibi iucundis primus adesse iocis,
ille ego conuictor densoque domesticus usu,
    ille ego iudiciis unica Musa tuis . . .

<div align="right">(Ov. <em>Pont.</em> 4.3.11-16)</div>

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[15] Cf. esp. Catul. 50.4-6: *. . . scribens uersiculos uterque nostrum / ludebat numero modo hoc modo illoc, / reddens mutua per iocum atque uinum* ('. . . writing little verses, each of us / was playing, now in this metre, now in that / reciprocating verses amid laughter and wine'). On the poetics of this poem, see C. Segal, 'Catullan *Otiosi*: The Lover and the Poet', *G&R* 17 (1970) 25-31.

> I am the one who, although you do not want to hear it, has been tied
>     to you in friendship almost since we were boys,
> I am the one who first used to know your serious problems,
>     and the first to share your delightful jokes,
> I am your companion, your close friend,
>     I am a unique poet in your judgment . . .

The reason why there are parallels between this poem and *Epistula ex Ponto* 2.4[16] is not because Atticus is the addressee of *Epistula ex Ponto* 4.3, but because the addressee of 4.3 has one essential thing in common with Atticus, that is he is an old *sodalis*, mentioned in the *Amores*, with a keen interest in poetry. The only one who fits this description is Sabinus. This identification adds poignancy to Ovid's second couplet:

> nomine non utar, ne commendere querela
>     quaeraturque tibi carmine fama meo.
>
> <div align="right">(Ov. *Pont.* 4.3.3f.)</div>
>
> I shall not use your name to prevent you from being commended by my
>     complaint and from gaining fame through my poem.

At first sight the phrase *quaeraturque tibi carmine fama meo* is literally translated as '[lest] fame be sought by you in my poem'. Ovid refuses to name his faithless friend in order to condemn his memory. But if Sabinus is the addressee, *carmine meo* could also be an ablative of means: '[lest] fame be sought by you using my poems'. After all, Sabinus had used Ovid's idea of writing elegiac epistles from heroines to their husbands and lovers to his own advantage when he wrote his own sequel; today it would be called *Heroides* 2: *The Men's Story*. No doubt Sabinus' sequel was a poor rehash of the original, as seems to be invariably the case today, which is probably why none of his letters have survived.[17]

Yet there are two more interesting pieces of information we gain from this missive. First, Sabinus in what seems to be an attempt to ingratiate himself with the powers that be has taken up offending Ovid now that he is exiled.[18] Ovid, however, warns him that Lady Luck can desert him, too (*Pont.* 4.3.29-58).[19] One cannot help but get the impression that, whether it is Sabinus or not, the addressee is something of an opportunist who attached himself to

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[16] Cf. C. Ganzenmüller, 'Aus Ovids Werkstatt', *Philologus* 70 (1911) 274-311, 397-437.

[17] The letters that purport to be his are well-known later forgeries; cf. E. Martini, *Einleitung zu Ovid* (Leipzig 1933) 21f.

[18] For parallels in the other poems to the unnamed antagonist see Helzle [5] 84.

[19] Parallels for the *locus de Fortuna* ('commonplace concerning Lady Luck') in this group of exile poems and elsewhere are gathered at Helzle [5] 84, 98.

Ovid when he was successful but has changed his tune after the poet's disgrace in order to save his own skin. Ovid's threat that the present situation might change any time goes hand in hand with his hope for Germanicus' accession and a subsequent recall for himself.[20]

The motif that the opponent *casibus insultat* ('rejoices in my downfall'), is also mentioned at *Tristia* 5.8.4, which reads almost like an earlier version of *Epistula ex Ponto* 4.3. This poem develops the *locus de Fortuna* ('commonplace concerning Lady Luck') at length at 5.8.17f. and entertains the possibility of a recall as well as a reversal for the enemy at 23-38. Again, if Sabinus is the addressee, the phrase *restitui quondam me quoque posse puta* ('consider that I may, one day, also be brought back', *Tr.* 5.8.34) could be quite poignant: instead of Sabinus indulging in *rescribere* ('to write back'), Ovid could be blessed with *restitui* ('to be brought back'). Be that as it may, our poet obviously has a very low opinion of this individual since he opens his epistle by pointing out that he couldn't fall lower than his opponent:

> Non adeo cecidi, quamuis abiectus, ut infra
>     te quoque sim, inferius quo nihil esse potest.
> > (Ov. *Tr.* 5.8.1f.)
> I have not fallen so low, although I am dejected, that I am
>     lower than you, compared to whom nothing can be lower.

We sense all the disgust and disappointment when Ovid calls him the lowest of the low. This sentiment on my analysis is caused by Sabinus' opportunism: first he was one of Ovid's friends, but now he has jumped on his opponents' bandwagon.

*Tristia* 3.11 may very well be addressed to the same man. In spite of the repeated indefinite address (*quisquis es* 'whoever you are', 1, 54; *quicumque es* 'whoever you are', 63); the poem shares the motif of the mocking opponent (*insultes qui casibus . . . nostris*, 'you who rejoice in my downfall', 1) with the above mentioned missives to the faithless friend. It also mentions that he used to know Ovid (*me quoque, quem noras olim, non esse memento*, 'remember, too, that I, whom you used to know, no longer exist', 29). While these statements could be true of a whole class of people,[21] an apparently innocent passage like *ad te, quisquis is es, nostra querella redit* ('my complaint returns to you, whoever you are', 56) could contain an allusion to Sabinus' answering letters. First Sabinus answered the *Heroides*' letters, now Ovid's complaint literally comes back to him.

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[20] Helzle [5] 22-30.

[21] Helzle [5] 84, following H. Fränkel, *Ovid: A Poet Between Two Worlds* (Berkeley 1945) 246 n. 6.

Having collected the passages that suggest that the addressee of *Tristia* 1.8, 3.11, 5.8 and *Epistula ex Ponto* 4.3 is Ovid's former friend, critic and fellow-poet Sabinus, the question naturally arises who this particular Sabinus might have been. Syme laconically states that '. . . [t]he *cognomen* "Sabinus" is too common to lead anywhere'.[22] But is it? One good candidate emerges, namely Massurius Sabinus,[23] a renowned legal scholar who also had an interest in non-technical literature. In fact, Bremer's *Iurisprudentia Antehadriana* readily provides fragments of *Libri Memoralium*, *Libri Fastorum* and *Commentarii de Indigenis*, all in prose. The *Libri Fastorum* should make any Ovidian's ears prick up, for Ovid's Sabinus is reported to have left an *imperfectum . . . dierum / . . . opus* ('an unfinished work about the calendar', *Pont.* 4.16.15) upon his death. *Epistula ex Ponto* 4.16 contains a long list of contemporary Tiberian poets. All but Sabinus seem to be still alive and all seem to be complete nobodies.[24] The fact that Sabinus is reported as dead before Ovid's demise in AD 17 or 18[25] means that Massurius Sabinus[26] cannot be Ovid's former friend because he is on record as being still alive under Nero (Gai. *Inst*. 2.218). However, following one of Syme's favourite tricks,[27] one could posit that Ovid's Sabinus was his homonymous father who wrote a poetic *Fasti* like Ovid. That could explain the son's interest in literature and even in the Roman calendar.

A few remarks in Athenaeus' proem also point this way, since there he is characterised as a μόνος ποιητής ('unique poet') and also as one who τοιαύτη πολυμαθείᾳ ἐκ παίδων συνετράφη· ἰάμβων δὲ ἦν ποιητὴς οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, φησί, τῶν μετ᾽ Ἀρχίλοχον ποιητῶν ('was raised with such broad learning from childhood; they say that as an iambic poet he is second to none of the poets after Archilochus', Ath. 1 Kaibel para. 2.4-9). No word here about answering letters to Ovid's *Heroides* nor anything about any *Fasti*, which makes Sabinus the legal scholar an unlikely candidate for Ovid's friend. But his education as a polymath, which in this context means a man of letters rather

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[22] Syme [5] 75.

[23] *RE* 1A.1598-602.

[24] Helzle [5] 178-99.

[25] Mommsen is quoted by F. P. Bremer, *Iurisprudentiae Antehadrianae Quae Supersunt* (Leipzig 1896) 1.314 n. 2 (without an exact reference) as having rejected Gaius' remark that Sabinus lived until the reign of Nero as unbelievable. If that is so, then the Massurius Sabinus on record could be a candidate for Ovid's friend.

[26] *RE* 1A.1600.46-50 *s.v.* 'Sabinus'; see now also T. Giaro, 'Mas(s)urius Sabinus', in H. Cancik and H. Schneider (edd.), *Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike* (Stuttgart 2001) 10.1191f.

[27] Cf., e.g., Syme [5] 158: 'Between the consuls of 35 BC and AD 14 an intermediate generation should be allowed for . . .'.

than just of high legal training, fits my conjecture very well. Massurius Sabinus' interest in literature was fostered by his upbringing in a home where poetry was valued very highly. That would be the case if his father was indeed Ovid's Sabinus. The latter's lack of success could, on the other hand, explain why the son did not make this livelihood depend on creative writing but rather went for what fathers even today prefer, namely a 'Brotstudium.'

Further evidence recommends a hypothetical Massurius Sabinus, father of the legal scholar. The latter is said to have come from a poor background, reaching equestrian status only at the age of fifty.[28] Because we know nothing about his family we also do not know exactly how poor they were. Since they were not of equestrian status their estate was below the minimum of HS 400 000 required at the time. The equestrian minimum estate would yield an annual income of about HS 24 000.[29] If the family lacked this financial security it probably depended on patronage.[30] Since Ovid was an *eques* who even had the required minimum capital for entering the senate,[31] he clearly had the financial means to support Sabinus at least from time to time. Ovid may therefore have provided not just a poetic model for Sabinus, but also financial support and patronage.[32] Consequently, his relegation was a life-changing event for Sabinus as well, since he had to look for new patrons as well as tread carefully around any other supporters he may have had who did not want to be pulled into the vortex of Ovid's exile. Sabinus, being suddenly left without Ovid's support, probably needed to look for new sponsors whose sensitivities had to be celebrated. It seems, however, that this opportunism out of necessity did not serve him well at all since it took his son until he was fifty years of age to reach equestrian status.

On my analysis, then, Ovid's nameless unfaithful friend in *Tristia* 1.8, 3.11, 5.8 and *Epistula ex Ponto* 4.3 was a Massurius Sabinus, a second rate poet of Ovid's generation, who tried to get ahead in life by imitating Ovid while he was successful and at Rome, but who had to change his allegiance out of necessity once Ovid had been relegated. It should not surprise us that none of his poetry survives since we have hardly anything from the pens of the people mentioned in *Epistula ex Ponto* 4.16. Ovid never forgave Sabinus for his change of heart and condemned his memory by not naming him in his exile poetry.

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[28] *RE* 1A.1600.46-50; Giaro [26] 10.1191.

[29] P. White, *Promised Verse: Poets in the Society of Augustan Rome* (Cambridge, Mass. 1993) 6f.

[30] White [29] 16-18.

[31] W. Kraus, 'Ovidius Naso', in M. von Albrecht and E. Zinn (edd.), *Ovid*[2] (Darmstadt 1968) 69f.

[32] White [29] 46f.

# RIGHTING THE READER: CONFLAGRATION
# AND CIVIL WAR IN LUCAN'S *DE BELLO CIVILI*

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**Abstract.** Lucan's first simile compares Rome's descent into civil war with the stoic phenomenon of conflagration. This simile is here read against the tradition of classical literature treating conflagration. The implications of this heritage are weighed against the simile's context and the themes and narrative techniques appearing throughout the epic. The simile is programmatic of Lucan's tendency to extend ambiguous hermeneutic possibilities and in its declaration of a conspicuously defective equation between subject and simile.

An interpretive problem resides in the first simile of Lucan's *De Bello Civili* (1.72-80).[1] This article is devoted to outlining the nature of the problem and to exploring a few possible paths to resolving it in a satisfactory manner. Ultimately an approach is endorsed that is strongly reader-oriented and therefore potentially subjective, but no claim is made to an exclusively correct mode of interpreting this passage. The broader aim of the discussion is merely to highlight an otherwise undetected interpretive thread that exists along side others within the fabric of the poem; but at the same time, the dynamics of the response I suggest are important, in that they are relevant to the broader ideological inclinations advertised by the narrator of the poem. In order to help orientate the reader and illustrate the approach adopted in this article, a few analogies have been drawn together from the visual arts and from critical work on Latin and later epic, but to avoid confusion from the early consideration of some of this material, it should be noted at the outset that the main focus of the discussion is Lucan and that the overall space devoted to these illustrations will be minimal.

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*Analogy 1: Magritte's Pipe*

*La Trahison des Images* ('The Treason of Images', 1929) is among the most famous of all the paintings of the Belgian surrealist René Magritte. It requires little in the way of introductory explanation: a brown pipe sits, in the manner of a road sign, above a sentence that assures us, 'Ceci n'est pas une pipe' ('This is not a pipe'). More interesting than the execution of the painting itself has been the paradox it annunciates. Daniel Abadie offers a concise overview:

> The pipe in Magritte's painting is neither the reproduction of a physical object nor an idealised pipe. . . . First and foremost it is a painting and thus, in this sense [as it says], "this is not a pipe." Thanks to the neutrality of the painting technique and the clarity of the message, however, the painted image unmistakeably conveys a generic idea of [that] object.[2]

In broad terms, the viewer of the painting is provoked into trying to resolve a disparity existing between the ostensible representation of the object and the caption that denies any such correlation. Magritte himself (by no means the first or last to affirm the potentially tenuous bonds that tie signified and signifier) wrote to his patron and collector Edward James on 6 May 1937 and reduced his approach to the rules that any object may be replaced by its image, or by its name, or by any form, or by any word.[3] It is difficult to conceive of a more concise introduction to the linguistic notion of the breakdown or slippage between signifier and signified than Magritte's painting and it has often been invoked in the context of semiotic theory. For my purposes, though, Magritte's *La Trahison des Images* serves a more rudimentary and introductory function; the aspect of this painting which is useful to our impending discussion of Lucan is not its complication or dislocation of sign and signifier.[4] The key elements for us are (1) the overt nature in which the painting relies upon an interpretive response from its viewer for its effect and (2) the manner in which an image is promoted and negated by the same text. Daniel Chandler and Anthony Wilden have both discussed the effects of this provocation from a semiotic point of view. Chandler has drawn attention to the painting's central paradox; its frustration of a single, correct interpretation; its potential for highlighting modes

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[2] D. Abadie (ed.), *Magritte* (Paris 2003) 19.

[3] Cited by R. Hammacher, 'Edward James and René Magritte, Magicians of the Surreal', in Abadie [2] 251.

[4] This phenomenon has been treated in relation to *De Bello Civili* often; most recently in R. Sklenář, *The Taste for Nothingness: A Study of Virtus and Related Themes in Lucan's Bellum Ciuile* (Ann Arbor 2003).

or levels of correlation between text and image; and the importance of the centrality of the meaning of the pronoun 'ceci' in the attempt to resolve its conflicting messages.[5] Wilden's earlier study entertains some possible answers. He suggests that what may be negated by the text beneath the pipe could be the pipe itself,[6] the image of a pipe, the entire painting, the sentence with which the negation is made, the pronoun 'ceci', or the idea behind the pronoun.[7] It is this process, this search by the reader/viewer rather than the answers provided by Wilden that are of paramount interest to us. I have begun with Magritte's painting because it offers a broad tool of orientation to a process we will presently discuss and because it provides an extreme (and therefore easy to understand) example of a provocation that—while cruder than anything in Lucan and apparently apolitical—is analogous in its engagement with its audience to techniques deployed throughout *De Bello Civili*. Let us keep it in mind as we turn our attention to Lucan's epic poem.

### *Lucan and Teleology*

David Quint's formulation of the relationship between an epic plot's tendency towards teleological progression and the ideological impulses driving its narrative has exerted some influence over the manner in which Lucan's own plot has been perceived. His basic position is summarised below:

> Epic indicates its allegiance to the winning side through the shape of its own narrative. The victors' achievement is restaged by a narrative that steadily advances to reach the ending toward which it has been directed from the beginning. Just as the victors' ideology ascribes principles of confusion and disorder to the enemy so that victory over them may be described as a triumph of reason and meaning, the epic narrative projects episodes of suspension and indirection in order that it may overcome them and demonstrate its ultimately teleological form. When these episodes expand or multiply to disrupt narrative unity and closure, epic may be suspected of going over to the side of the perspective of the losers, as it does in the anti-Virgilian poems of Lucan and his successors. For if the teleological epic narrative is directed to answering the question "Who has won," the absence of an organizing teleology proposes the answer "Nobody wins," which might be seen as a deep truth (or cliché) about the absurdity of war and history. The losers console themselves that in the long run empire is a no-win affair and that its conquests are bound to

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[5] D. Chandler, *Semiotics: The Basics* (London 2002) 64-66.

[6] This answer is unlikely to please the pedant, since the pronoun 'ceci' and the noun 'pipe' have incompatible genders.

[7] A. Wilden, *The Rules Are No Game: The Strategy of Communication* (London 1987) 245.

> perish, and even the staunchly imperialist epic may concede this possibility. But it is precisely empire's long run through history that informs epic's sense of narrative coherence and completion.[8]

The implications and tenability of this statement are worth examining. In literary terms a teleological plot is one in which a causal sequence of events extends itself along a purposeful line leading to a significant and meaningful end.[9] David Macey's recent definition usefully underscores this last nuance of the concept: '. . . the teleological view of history holds that a sequence of historical events necessarily leads to a *telos* such as the rule of god on earth or the classless society'.[10] Clearly, both the *Aeneid* and *De Bello Civili* are possessed of teleological *stories*, because both progress along an historically sequential continuum towards, and thereby explain the origin of, a fixed point in Roman history. In the case of Vergil's epic, the rule of Augustus provides this *telos*, and likewise the narrator of the Lucan's epic is explicit at 1.33-45 that the fates brought about the civil war in order to pave the way for Nero's accession. Just as Augustus is the final cause and *telos* of the story of the *Aeneid*, Nero, for good or ill, fulfils the same function in Lucan's epic.

When one turns to the plot proper, our response to Quint's formulation and its applicability to Lucan's poem will depend partly upon whether we conceive of *De Bello Civili* as existing in a completed state or if we accept that the poem is unfinished. If we incline to the former view, the termination of the plot at Alexandria with Caesar, beset by enemies, and looking backwards towards Scaeva (10.534-46), is patently unsatisfactory as a *telos* for the plot. After all, no structural climax attends this scene, and no overall resolution is offered, since (to cite only the most obvious objection) Cato, a significant protagonist in opposition to Caesar's victory, is still alive near Leptis as he

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[8] D. Quint, *Epic and Empire: Politics and Generic Form from Virgil to Milton* (Princeton 1993) 46. Endorsing Quint's view are, e.g., C. Perkell, 'The Lament of Juturna: Pathos and Interpretation in the Aeneid', *TAPhA* 127 (1997) 267; and the same author's 'Editor's Introduction', in C. Perkell (ed.), *Reading Vergil's* Aeneid*: An Interpretive Guide* (Oklahoma 1999) 16: '. . . both Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and Lucan's *Bellum Ciuile* with, for example, their unteleological plots . . . can be read as challenges to an imperial Augustan *Aeneid*'; cf. also S. Bartsch, '*Ars* and the Man: The Politics of Art in Virgil's *Aeneid*', *CPh* 93 (1998) 33f.

[9] The *locus classicus* is Arist. *Poet.* 1450b21-1452b13. A modern formulation is that of E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (New York 1927) 130f.: '. . . a story [is] a narrative of events arranged in their time-sequence. A plot is also a narrative of events, the emphasis falling upon causality. "The king died and then the queen died", is a story. "The king died, and then the queen died of grief" is a plot. The time-sequence is preserved, but the sense of causality overshadows it.'

[10] D. Macey, *The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory* (London 2000) 376.

progresses westwards towards Utica. Jamie Masters, the last representative of the view that the poem is complete,[11] has made a virtue of this necessity, and argues that this unexpected terminus underscores the poem's insistence upon the endlessness of civil war.[12] If, on the other hand, we prefer the view that the plot of the poem is incomplete as we have it, then any of the terminal points suggested by scholarship—the suicide of Cato stands out as the most likely, but one might add the more remote contingencies of the assassination of Caesar, Philippi, or Actium[13]—would offer a *telos* that is structurally and thematically at least as satisfying as the death of Turnus. The distinction between the two poems from the point of view of teleology is in any case deceptive:

> Virgil made the τέλος of the epic poem a live issue; the astonishingly abrupt end of his *Aeneid* may, indeed, be squared with an Aristotelian idea of how epic should be constructed, but this is to elide the sense of unexpectedness which is surely its most striking feature. With no epilogue, with no funeral rites, no marriage and no resolution of differences between Trojans and Latins to follow it, the death of Turnus constitutes a classic 'surprise ending'.[14]

Beyond this response lie more basic reasons for treating Quint's formulation with care. Even in the passage quoted above he seems to acknowledge the potential of an individual epic poem to deconstruct the binary opposites, 'winner' and 'loser', with which he frames his approach to epic narrative. However, I would suggest that his argument does not acknowledge the extent to which epic poetry realises this potential: these terms are so corroded in classical epic as to be virtually useless as meaningful concepts. For who can be said to have 'won' the *Iliad*, or the *Aeneid*, or *De Bello Civili*? What is it that has been won in each case and at what price? In what useful sense can these plots be seen as promoting a winner at all? The nexus of defeat in victory articulated since the dawn of epic narrative as we have it is so ingrained that to suggest that the fundamental question of epic narrative is 'who has won?' effectively elides the central point of books such as *Iliad* 24, *Aeneid* 12, *De*

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[11] J. Masters, *Poetry and Civil War in Lucan's Bellum Civile* (Cambridge 1992) 216-69; earlier exponents of this view are summarised at 235f. n. 34.

[12] Masters [11] 247-59, esp. 259: 'A strange, unconventional end, to be sure, pointing as it does to its own inconclusiveness, avoiding as it does any kind of resolution, but one which in being so preserves the unconventional premises of its subject-matter: evil without alternative, contradiction without compromise, civil war without end'.

[13] The various viewpoints are surveyed by F. M. Ahl, *Lucan: An Introduction* (Cornell 1976) 319-26 and Masters [11] 234-47.

[14] Masters [11] 250f.; cf. S. Farron, 'The Abruptness of the End of the *Aeneid*', *AClass* 25 (1982) 136-41.

*Bello Civili* 7, *Thebaid* 11, or *Punica* 10. Much more pertinent a question, if we allow ourselves to be drawn into distilling epic narrative into these terms, would be 'is victory possible?' or 'how did we come to exist under certain ideological conditions?'. The terms employed by Quint have clear currency in Miltonic narrative (which he also treats), since *Paradise Lost* can be read as operating as a means of describing, as much as a weapon with which to fight, an all-or-nothing battle between salvation and perdition, but they are anachronistic and misleading in a pre-Christian context.

At a fundamental level, Lucan's narrative is demonstrably possessed of an organising teleology. At the very least, it is as teleological as the *Aeneid*. Both poems situate themselves in an historical continuum with a fixed resolution (Augustus, Nero) and both poems play off their reader/listener's knowledge of their respective outcomes. Both poems effectively challenge the notion of a civilising or civilised resolution to chaotic states. Finally, because of the historical processes at work in both poems, causality is the fundamental impetus of both stories. If the plot of *De Bello Civili* is innovative in any manner akin to those terms posited by Quint, it is not that it is unteleological *per se*, but that it pre-empts by nearly 1700 years Voltaire's *Candide* in debunking the myth that causality necessarily implies an *optimistic* end-point; and, of course, many readers of Vergil's epic could make this claim for the Augustan poem as well.

Like all epic poetry, *De Bello Civili* may be read as an attempt to explain the origin or aspects of the society that produced it. From its very beginning it advertises the contemporary consequences and thereby the relevance of its own subject matter to its original audience. This is borne out in the first apostrophe of the poem to Rome's citizens at 1.8-32. In this densely allusive passage, Lucan's narrator—drawing upon Horace's *Epodes* (7.1f.), as well as various indignant exclamations from Vergil's Laocoon (*Aen.* 2.42f.), Ascanius (*Aen.* 5.670-72), and Aeneas (*Aen.* 12.313f.)[15]—asks what madness it was that led a nation to civil war when foreign enemies yet remained (1.9-12, 21-23). The rewards of externalising her *furor* ('madness'), measured out by the expansion of her *imperium*, could have extended to all points of the compass (1.13-20). As it is, though, the punishment for internalising this love of warfare, the narrator demonstrates, is still being paid by Italy. He writes:

> at nunc semirutis pendent quod moenia tectis
> urbibus Italiae lapsisque ingentia muris
> saxa iacent nulloque domus custode tenentur

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[15] For the significance of some of these intertextual references, see D. Hershkowitz, *The Madness of Epic: Reading Insanity from Homer to Statius* (Oxford 1998) 198-200.

> rarus et antiquis habitator in urbibus errat,
> horrida quod dumis multosque inarata per annos
> Hesperia est desuntque manus poscentibus aruis.
> <div align="right">(Luc. 1.24-29)</div>
> But now walls crumble in half-destroyed houses in Italy's towns. Massive stones lie: the walls are razed and homes have none to guard them. A mere handful of people wander amid the ancient towns: Hesperia, unploughed so many years, is overgrown with weeds. The hands the fields cry out for are gone.

This passage can read as squarely engaging with its epic inheritance. Lucan here invokes Vergil's Anchises and bookends the old man's optimistic prophecy of Rome's ascendance, for in the underworld of *Aeneid* 6, Anchises had predicted the ascendancy of Roman Italy in the following words:

> qui iuuenes! quantas ostentant, aspice, uiris
> atque umbrata gerunt ciuili tempora quercu!
> hi tibi Nomentum et Gabios urbemque Fidenam,
> hi Collatinas imponent montibus arces,
> Pometios Castrumque Inui Bolamque Coramque;
> haec tum nomina erunt, nunc sunt sine nomine terrae.
> <div align="right">(Verg. *Aen*. 6.771-76)</div>
> What young men are these! What strength they show and, look, their brows shaded by the civic oak! For you these will found Nomentum, Gabii, and the city of Fidena; these will establish Collatia's towers in the mountains and Pometii, the Fort of Inuus, Bola, and Cora; *Then* these will be names, *Now* they're just nameless lands.

In this way, it was averred, Italy shall rise. The Italy of *De Bello Civili* at 1.24-29 (and at 7.391-408 when the theme is revisited in similar terms prior to Pharsalus) is by contrast a wasteland of anonymous, ruined ghost towns. The temporal point of view assumed by the narrator, who looks backwards to Rome's downfall, affords moral symmetry with the prediction of Anchises. In the *Aeneid*, the young men who will found these towns have all earned the *corona ciuica* for saving the lives of their fellow citizens in war. In Lucan's epic, through the self-destructive impulses of its protagonists, the cycle is complete. In effect, Lucan parodies Vergil to declare of the townships of Italy: *haec tum nomina erant, nunc sunt sine nomine terrae* ('these were *then* names, *now* they are lands without names', cf. Verg. *Aen*. 6.776).

The poem thus starts with disaster and works back to its cause. The reader is already implicated in the subject matter of the epic, since its terminal point will be *nunc* ('now', 1.24): contemporary, imperial, Neronian Italy. This *telos* is underscored further by the singer's invocation of his emperor. Civil war is not

just inadvertently responsible for the present state of decay throughout Italy, it was the necessary precursor to the imperial system: civil war was the way, the only way, the singer suggests, that fate could bring about Nero's accession (1.33-45). The poem masquerades as a verse treatment of the period 49-47 BC: by its proem, by its invocation, by its constant apostrophe to its reader, and by its obsessive lament for the prevailing ideology of its day, it advertises an aetiological aspect. It explains how the imperial system came to pass and how the Roman citizenry allowed this colossal metamorphosis to happen.[16]

### *The Conflagration Simile and the Problem*

Following immediately upon the invocation, the narrator enumerates the causes of the war. They are many (they occupy 1.67-182), and heralding the sequence is the first and longest simile of the poem. It describes the collapse of the Roman state into civil warfare in the following manner:

> sic, cum conpage soluta
> saecula tot mundi suprema coegerit hora
> antiquum repetens iterum chaos, [omnia mixtis
> sidera sideribus concurrent] ignea pontum
> astra petent, tellus extendere litora nolet
> excutietque fretum, fratri contraria Phoebe
> ibit et obliquum bigas agitare per orbem
> indignata diem poscet sibi, totaque discors
> machina diuolsi turbabit foedera mundi.
>
> (Luc. 1.72-80)

> Just as when the structure is dissolved and the final hour closes out the long ages of the universe and seeks again the ancient chaos, stars ablaze will plummet into the sea, and the earth will refuse to stretch out the shore and will shake off the ocean. Phoebe, disdaining to drive her two-horse chariot cross-ways across the sky, will go against her brother and demand the day for herself. The whole discordant machine will overturn the laws of a universe ripped apart.

It is a simile that has drawn some discussion, although a number of its philosophical, poetic and narratological implications remain unexamined.[17] In

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[16] On which, cf. R. Tarrant, 'Chaos in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*', *Arethusa* 35 (2002) 356, or S. Wheeler, 'Lucan's Reception of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*', *Arethusa* 35 (2002) 370 (with references at n. 27) on Luc. 1.67.

[17] R. J. Getty (ed.), *Lucan, De Bello Civili I* (Cambridge 1940) 141-43; J. Aymard, *Quelques séries de comparaisons chez Lucain* (Montpelier 1951) 100; W. D. Lebek, *Lucans Pharsalia: Dichtungsstruktur und Zeitbezug* (Göttingen 1976) 48-50; fundamental is M. Lapidge, 'Lucan's Imagery of Cosmic Dissolution', *Hermes* 107 (1979) 344-70; P. Hardie, *Virgil's* Aeneid*: Cosmos and Imperium* (Oxford 1986) 381; W. R. Johnson, *Momentary*

broad terms, the text draws a comparison between the inevitability of Rome sinking into civil war beneath the weight of her own good fortune (1.70-72) and the stoic concept of conflagration, or ekpyrosis, according to which at periodic intervals all of the corporeal matter in the universe is consumed by fire.[18] Michael Lapidge has well established how throughout the epic, and especially in this passage, Lucan employs language drawn from stoic terminology regarding the final conflagration, and this is evident in the similar language and imagery employed here and in other accounts of the stoic universe, its cohesion, and its dissolution such as, for example, in Seneca's *De Beneficiis*, *Epistles*, and *Dialogues* and the *Astronomica* of Manilius (cf., e.g., Sen. *Ben.* 6.22.1, *Ep.* 91, *Dial.* 6.26.6, 11.1.2; Man. 1.247-54, 2.60-66, 804-07).[19]

The general interpretive response to the simile is to declare that it escalates the catastrophic destruction of political strife to a cosmic scale (inverting as it does so Vergil's comparison of natural and political strife represented in the first simile of the *Aeneid* at 1.148-53), and this is a reading that finds ample support from the text and much to recommend it.[20] The consistent emphasis throughout the narrative upon the universal symbolism of civil war (revisited in similar terms at, e.g., 7.134-37), the descent into chaos (expressed, e.g., at 5.634-36), the contravention of natural boundaries and phenomena,[21] the repeated emphasis upon *discordia* (cf., e.g., 1.98, 2.272, 5.299, 6.780), and the use of language that underscores the dissolution of union (*resoluere*, 'to unbind'; *excutere*, 'to shake off';[22] *turbare foedus*, 'to disrupt law') all find parallels in the text's presentation of civil war.

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*Monsters: Lucan and his Heroes* (Ithaca 1987) 14-18; S. Hinds, 'Generalising about Ovid', *Ramus* 16 (1987): 28f.; D. Feeney, *The Gods in Epic: Poets and Critics of the Classical Tradition* (Oxford 1991) 278 n. 127; J. Masters [11] 63-65; M. Leigh, *Lucan: Spectacle and Engagement* (Oxford 1997) 45; Hershkowitz [15] 201f.; Sklenář [4] 3-10; E. Narducci, *Lucano: Un'epica contro l'impero* (Rome 2002) 42-50.

[18] The standard classical references to this concept can be found gathered together in A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley (edd.), *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1987) 1.274-79, 2.271-77; and B. Inwood and L. P. Gerson (edd.), *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings* (Indianapolis 1988) 96-127.

[19] Lapidge [17] 359-70.

[20] So, e.g., Hardie [17] 381; Feeney [17] 278 n. 127; Leigh [17] 45; Hershkowitz [15] 202.

[21] Explored in S. Bartsch, *Ideology in Cold Blood: A Reading of Lucan*'s Civil War (Harvard 1997) 10-47; cf. also J. Henderson, 'Lucan/The Word at War', *Ramus* 16 (1988) 124, 135, 155.

[22] We should accept *excutiet* over *excipiet*: A. Hudson-Williams, 'Lucan 1.76-77', *CR* 2 (1952) 68f. argues for an emendation to the latter; L. A. Mackay, 'Lucan 1.76-77', *CR* 3 (1953) 145 for the former.

This surface meaning, however, is made problematic upon consideration of the function of ekpyrosis within stoic thought and literature. For conflagration is not merely or even primarily destruction, but palingenesis, re-birth and reconstitution. It occurs in accordance with the fixed movements of the stars and, moreover, confirms the rational, benevolent, and virtuous causative principle governing the universe. Consider the account of Nemesius of Emesa, who, though a late source (fourth-fifth century AD), offers a succinct overview:

> οἱ δὲ Στωικοί φασιν ἀποκαθισταμένους τοὺς πλανήτας εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ σημεῖον κατά τε μῆκος καὶ πλάτος ἔνθα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἕκαστος ἦν ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ὁ κόσμος συνέστη, ἐν ῥηταῖς χρόνων περιόδοις ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ φθορὰν τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργάζεσθαι, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τὸν κόσμον ἀποκαθίστασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἀστέρων ὁμοίως πάλιν φερομένων ἕκαστα τῶν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ γενομένων ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι. ἔσεσθαι γὰρ πάλιν Σωκράτην καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων σὺν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πείσεσθαι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς συντεύξεσθαι καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μεταχειριεῖσθαι, καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν καὶ κώμην καὶ ἀγρὸν ὁμοίως ἀποκαθίστασθαι.
>
> (*SVF* 2.625)

The Stoics say that when the planets return to the same celestial sign, in length and breadth, where each was originally when the world was first formed, at set periods of time they cause conflagration and destruction of existing things. Once again the world returns anew to the same condition as before; and when the stars are moving again in the same way, each thing which occurred in the previous period will come to pass indiscernibly [from its previous occurrence]. For again there will be Socrates and Plato and each one of mankind with the same friends and fellow citizens; they will suffer the same things and they will encounter the same things, and put their hands to the same things, and every city and village and piece of land return in the same way.

Aristocles on the same phenomenon continues:

> ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ κατά τινας εἱμαρμένους χρόνους ἐκπυροῦσθαι τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον, εἶτ' αὖθις πάλιν διακοσμεῖσθαι. τὸ μέντοι πρῶτον πῦρ εἶναι καθαπερεί τι σπέρμα, τῶν ἁπάντων ἔχον τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων· τὴν δὲ τούτων ἐπιπλοκὴν καὶ ἀκολουθίαν εἱμαρμένην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ νόμον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων ἀδιάδραστόν τινα καὶ ἄφυκτον. ταύτῃ δὲ πάντα διοικεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον ὑπέρευ, καθάπερ ἐν εὐνομωτάτῃ τινὶ πολιτείᾳ.
>
> (*SVF* 1.98)

At certain fated times the entire world is subject to conflagration, and then is reconstituted afresh. But the primary fire is as it were a sperm which possesses the principles of all things and the causes of past, present, and future events. The nexus and succession of these is fate, knowledge, truth, and an inevitable

and inescapable law of what exists. In this way everything in the world is
excellently organised as in a perfectly ordered society.

Everlasting recurrence was not universally accepted among stoics, and some
(notably Diogenes of Babylon, Boethius of Sidon, and Panaetius) rejected the
whole scheme of destruction and rebirth in favour of the indestructibility of the
universe. Moreover the nature of the universe's rebirth was also debated with
particular reference to what, exactly, was meant by the notion of 'the recurrence
of the *same* things'.[23] But the centrality and refutability of the doctrine as a
whole, along with the fine print of everlasting recurrence are less important in
this context than the inseparability of conflagration and the providential
palingenesis that is its necessary sequel.

Conflagration is the moment when the universe unites with its
commanding faculty (*SVF* 2.605, 2.1052, 2.1065). The soul of god expands to
encompass and transform all matter in existence and god's own virtue rules in
the flames (*SVF* 2.1052). Anthony Long and David Sedley have reduced the
essential philosophical drive of conflagration to the following points:

> First, it provides a subtle answer to the frequently stated objection that a
> providential deity . . . would never destroy the excellent world he had
> created. . . . Secondly, the conflagration completely instantiates god's
> providence and so what brings the present world-order to an end is that state
> of the universe which, in its total goodness and wisdom will ensure the
> reconstitution of world-order in the best possible way.[24]

It is not the universe's death, it has been argued, but its most perfect expression
of life.[25]

Accordingly, when the concept is invoked in literature before Lucan,
destruction is often subordinated to renewal, and the context is often one of
consolation and reassurance. In Seneca's *De Consolatione ad Marciam*, the
ekpyrosis is invoked to give comfort to the grieving Marcia. All things pass, he
contends, the universe one day will end and, *cum deo uisum erit iterum ista
moliri* ('when it seems best to god to regenerate the universe'), all the living and
the dead will be added—a smaller part of a greater ruination—to be changed
again into their former elements (*Dial*. 6.26.7). Again, in the *De Consolatione*

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[23] Long and Sedley [18] 312.

[24] Long and Sedley [18] 278f.

[25] D. Furley, 'Cosmology', in K. Algra *et al*. (edd.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic
Philosophy* (Cambridge 1999) 439; cf. J. Mansfield, 'Protagoras on Epistemological
Obstacles and Persons', in G. B. Kerford (ed.), *The Sophists and their Legacy* (Wiesbaden
1981) 38-53.

*ad Polybium*, the addressee is comforted in a similar vein. The destruction of the universe once again illustrates an aspect of the benevolence of nature:

> . . . et ideo mihi uidetur rerum natura quod grauissimum fecerat commune fecisse, ut crudelitatem fati consolaretur aequalitas.
>
> <div align="right">(Sen. <em>Dial</em>. 11.1.4)</div>
>
> . . . it seems to me that nature has made communal what she had made hardest to bear, so that the commonality of our death would lessen the burden of its cruelty.

More tellingly, in *Epistle* 91, as Seneca reflects upon the burning of Lyon, he is moved to compare the destruction of the city to the ekpyrosis, and muses that perhaps it was destroyed in order to be reborn for a better fate (*Ep*. 91.12f.). It is this element of ordered regeneration that discomforts *De Bello Civili*'s reader. By explicitly locating the narrator in the Neronian present, by drawing attention to the fact of the principate in a number of prominent passages throughout the narrative, and by openly declaring that the imperial system was the consequence of civil war, Lucan's reader is invited to consider the corresponding consequence of conflagration to which civil war is compared. Does the simile therefore contain the suggestion that after the conflagration of civil war will come 'the reconstitution of world-order in the best possible way'?[26] Does the eternal loss of freedom represented in the principate and lamented explicitly in these terms throughout the poem (especially in book 7) square away with the contention that, in the regeneration brought about through ekpyrosis, 'everything in the world is excellently organised as in a perfectly ordered society' (*SVF* 1.98)? Plutarch makes the incongruity explicit:

> ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδὲ ὁτιοῦν ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δὲ ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν.
>
> <div align="right">(Plut. <em>Comm. Not.</em> 1067a)</div>
>
> Whenever they [the Stoics] subject the world to conflagration, no evil at all remains, but the whole is the prudent and wise.

How are we to interpret this Stoic notion that during conflagration nothing occurs except the fiery, providential activity of god (cf. Sen. *Ep*. 9.16; *SVF* 2.599)?[27] If Caesar can be read on any level as the causative principle in *De Bello Civili*'s narrative—if he is at least a principle cause of the kind of destruction the ekpyrotic simile describes and predicts for its epic—should we then equate this providential god with him?

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[26] Long and Sedley [18] 279.

[27] Long and Sedley [18] 310.

The text is clear that we should not: time and again Caesar is denounced along with the principate as the antithesis of the kind of settled order that is the outcome of ekpyrosis. To take just a few obvious examples, at the end of book 1, a frenzied matron foresees the continuing violence that awaits Caesar's final victory (1.690-95). He is cast squarely as the opponent of the moral higher ground in this famous *sententia*: *uictrix causa deis placuit sed uicta Catoni* ('the conquering cause was pleasing to the gods, but the conquered pleased Cato', 1.128). In the equally famous invective of book 7, he is cast as the enemy of freedom (7.432f., 695f.). Finally, any regenerative aspect to the destruction in which he delights (2.439-46) is explicitly denied him in the devastation of Italy at the opening of book 1 (1.24-32) and re-affirmed in book 7 (7.387-91) when the narrator openly declares that the destruction wrought at Pharsalus is irreprable for all time.

## *Approaching the Problem*

If the reader of *De Bello Civili* is to make sense of this discrepancy, if we see that as our role when we read, a number of immediate interpretive responses present themsleves. If we accept that the equation between civil war and its aftermath and conflagration does pose a problem, a reading that draws upon historical and political reconstructions of the author's life could clearly provide a solution. This reading would invoke the early friendship of the emperor and Lucan in order to account for a positive interpretation of principate or Nero or both, and could then explain the dissident polemic that informs the rest of the poem by his falling out with the emperor and his subsequent participation in the Pisonian conspiracy. It would contend that in the current simile there is no suggestion of subversion or irony to be found; just a pre-fallout relic that posits civil war as the storm before the Julio-Claudian calm in the same manner in which this kind of approach has been applied to the invocation of Nero at 1.33-66. This was, in fact, the approach adopted by Elaine Fantham to reconcile the panegyric of the emperor with the poem's later invective against the principate in her 1992 commentary on book 2:

> . . . [it] must have become a moral embarrassment to its author in later years. . . . But . . . in AD 60, the twenty-two-year-old Nero had not yet the marks of vice written on his features. No doubt Lucan was initially dazzled. . . . A free man could have made attempts to suppress the dedication when he grew disillusioned; but the ban on Lucan's poetry was also a ban on

revision in the form of a 'second edition'; and Lucan was not even free to disown his own praise.[28]

Our concern here is not with the debate surrounding the panegyric, but to highlight the basic outline of this response. Attendant upon this strategy is the evidence provided in the ancient biographies of Lucan, that three books (most naturally assume the first three) were published at an early stage by a young(er) Lucan (Vacca 43-47). This notion is then the basis for the assumption that books one to three contain material which is reflective of this enthusiasm for Nero (or the principate, or both). After his falling out with Nero, the argument proceeds, his position *vis-à-vis* the principate as reflected in *De Bello Civili* underwent a radical change, and books four to ten were written in a state of increasingly open hostility towards the imperial system.

The problem with adopting this approach to the simile, and indeed to the proem in general, is that a significant body of internal evidence that complicates a pro-imperial reading can be drawn from the first three books, those traditionally interpreted by readers informed by biographical reconstructions as being in favour of the ideology of the principate. We should consider a representative portion of this evidence, although scale dissuades an exhaustive catalogue. We have already considered the devastation of Italy that continues into the narrator's present, announced at 1.24-32: clearly, then, the system of the principate has not been endowed with the capacity to regenerate the youth of Italy (1.32). So far from endorsing the establishment of the imperial system, the first three books also insist on *in commune nefas* ('universal guilt', 1.6): this is borne out in the equally damning introduction of Pompey and Caesar (1.120-57);[29] it is also evident in the anonymous condemning of both sides in comparison with Marius and Sulla (2.227-32) and in the pronouncements of Cato on the moral vacuum of the war (2.284-325). Donato Gagliardi has usefully underscored the partisan implications of beginning the narrative of the poem with Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon in defiance of the image of *Patria* rather than with (for example) scenes from the senate that might paint the invasion as foisted upon Caesar, as *per* Caesar's own commentaries on the civil war.[30] Finally, in the characterisation of Caesar in books 1-3 there is nothing to suggest that the poem's mood changes radically from Ilerda onwards. Let us

[28] E. Fantham (ed.), *Lucan, De Bello Ciuili Book II* (Cambridge 1992) 13f. I quote Fantham here not to impeach the quality of her excellent commentary but for the clarity of her exposition of this approach.

[29] For which see, e.g., J. A. Rosner-Siegel, 'The Oak and the Lightning: Lucan, *Bellum Ciuile* 1.135-57', *Athenaeum* 61 (1983) 165-77; Johnson [17] 73-78; Sklenář [4] 101-06.

[30] D. Gagliardi (ed.), *M. Annaei Lucani Belli Ciuilis Liber Primus* (Naples 1989) 71f.

leave aside the bloodlust of his Italian Blitzkrieg (2.439-46); the suicidal *furor* of his introductory and leonine similes in book 1 (1.151-57, 205-12); the fratricidal, patricidal, infanticidal, almost Herculean self-destruction of the family unit espoused by his general Laelius (1.374-78). An obviously critical standpoint of the imperial system offers itself in Caesar's first entry into Rome in book 3: here, as in book 7, freedom is posited as the antithesis of Caesar (3.112-14, 137-40, 145-47); Caesar's presence makes a mockery of the republican organs of government and the narrator laments the self-degradation of the city (3.108-12); here his plundering of the Temple of Saturn results in the observation that *pauperiorque fuit tum primum Caesare Roma* ('then, for the first time, Rome was poorer than a Caesar', 3.168). There is clearly room, then, to argue for Lucan's consistency. Nothing in the early books reaches the same fever pitch of the narrator's invective against empire in book 7, but it is in the nature of a climactic scene, such as Pharsalus offers, that more emphatic statements of thematic pre-occupations come to the fore.

A second and more empirical response to the problematic aspects informing the conflagration simile might be to invoke authorial intent. In this approach one might argue that Lucan's manifest design was to call to mind the destructive aspects of conflagration, and nothing more; and that any nuances of palingenesis or the providential aspects of the stoic-cosmic cycle are a sort of unwelcome static crackling below the obvious meaning of the simile or, worse still, are a result of the poet's incompetence. In the present context, this approach would certainly iron-out any problems from the passage under consideration, and if we take this as our goal when we read, it provides an economical solution. But the reductive side-effects of this approach would seem to exact too high a toll on the interpretive potential of our poem. Consider, briefly, the summation of Roland Barthes:

> . . . to give a text an author is to impose a limit upon that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing. Such a conception suits criticism very well, the latter then allotting itself the important task of discovering the author beneath the work: when the author has been found the text is explained. Victory to the critic.[31]

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[31] R. Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', in S. Heath (tr. and ed.), *Image, Music, Text* (1968) 142-8. The full implications of the stance, encapsulated in Barthes' closing maxim, that 'the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author' (p. 148), were well encapsulated by S. Fish, 'What is Stylistics and Why are they Saying such Terrible Things About it?', in S. Chatman (ed.), *Approaches to Poetics* (New York 1973) 143: '. . . [any given text is already, i.e., before reading,] filled with significances and what the reader is required to do is get them out. In short, the reader's job is to extract meaning that formal patterns possess prior to, and independently of, his activities. . . . these same activities are

If it seems somehow gauche to quote Barthes here, it is well to remember that this approach to Lucan (and imperial epic, especially Silius and Statius) has been a common one until fairly recently and has been used in the history of *De Bello Civili*'s critical evaluation as a tool to temper enthusiasm for the poem or to denigrate it as the product of an immature soul. Without wanting to dwell upon an approach with equally obvious advantages and limitations, one might ask which of our constructions of Lucan it is that is being given the authority to guarantee where the meaning of the poem begins and ends: we may not feel comfortable entrusting to Rose's 'young and hot-headed Spaniard' what we entrust to Johnson's poet 'of enormous intelligence and feeling'.[32]

### *The Reader and the Conflagration Simile*

In another context, Denis Feeney provided a catalyst for a third approach by writing, 'In literary criticism you can often go a long way by saying, if someone brings up a problem, "Yes, that's the point."'[33] What can be gained, then, if we take the potentially contradictory notions of civil war followed by principate on the one hand and conflagration followed by palingenesis on the other as a meaningful dynamic at work within Lucan's poem? The reader is confronted in particular with the pairs of sequels to these two notions. A defective equation is offered between the work of providence represented in the orderly regeneration of the universe which in stoic cosmology is the necessary result of conflagration and in the system of the principate established as a consequence of civil war and which the narrator of *De Bello Civili* repeatedly, consistently, and insistently reminds us is a disastrous loss of freedom from which there is no recovery. Faced with these unsatisfying correlations, the reader is forced into rejecting the equivalence between the imperial system of government and the providential re-ordering of the universe after the storm of conflagration and, in the act of

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constitutive of a structure of concerns which is necessarily prior to any examination of meaningful patterns because it is itself the occasion of their coming into being.' For a thought-provoking piece on Plutarch's *How a Young Man Should Listen to Poetry* as a distant precursor to the work of Barthes, Fish and other modern and post-modern critical theorists, see D. Konstan, '"The Birth of the Reader": Plutarch as Literary Critic', *Scholia* 13 (2004) 3-28.

[32] Johnson [17] xii; cf. also Masters [11] xiii; K. F. C. Rose, 'Problems of Chronology in Lucan's Career', *TAPhA* 97 (1966) 381: 'Lucan's precocity as a major poet by the age of 25 is also without parallel, and it is somewhat gratuitous to assume that the young and hot-headed Spaniard wrote as carefully as Vergil and Horace'.

[33] D. Feeney, 'Epic Violence, Epic Order: Killings, Catalogues, and the Role of the Reader in *Aeneid* 10', in Perkell [8] 193.

rejection—in this moral repudiation of principate—Lucan's reader has already become politically implicated in the subject matter of the poem.

Whereas Magritte's painting requires its viewer to negotiate its denial of a correlation between its image and its text, Lucan's simile invites of its reader a response to the implications and appropriateness of the correspondence it advertises between civil war and its outcome and conflagration and its purpose. Both artefacts depend upon reader/viewer engagement for their effect: in Magritte the defective nature of the equation between text and image is explicitly stated, in Lucan the reader is made to realise this for his or herself.

In this act of rejection, it is important to differentiate my response from past scholarship on Lucan that has considered the providential aspect of conflagration. The most recent discussion is by Robert Sklenář, who has cast Lucan's use of conflagration in the following terms:

> Lucan has reversed the significance of ekpyrosis, transmuting it into a terrifying vision of the fire at the end of time. Nowhere does he suggest that this stage will be followed by a restoration of cosmic order: rather he supplants the Stoic model of a rational cycle with images of an irreversible descent into cosmic anarchy, thereby pressing his Stoic imagery into the service of an explicitly anti-Stoic position: that the universe is governed not by *logos*, but by *alogia*.[34]

I would certainly agree with Sklenář and those before him who have seen in much of *De Bello Civili* a complication of Stoic conceptions of the providential order of the universe. Where I am more cautious than Sklenář is in his assumption that conflagration can be completely cordoned off from its necessary sequel of palingenesis. Lucan, I would argue, does not *need* to 'suggest that this stage will be followed by a restoration of cosmic order' in order for the idea to make itself felt. The mind necessarily moves from one to the other, because conflagration has no other purpose *except* this restoration.

Offering potential support for Sklenář's contention are some of the arguments contained in Thomas Rosenmeyer's *Senecan Drama and Stoic Cosmology*. Of course, the tragedies of Seneca are also replete with ekpyrotic imagery and allusions to the destruction of the world and in these works the regenerative sequel to the end of the cosmic cycle is also at odds with the tragic outcome of their plots. Rosenmeyer explains the Senecan use of the imagery in this way:

> . . . [it] may be given its modern sense, and signal the total destruction of everything that makes life worth living. In Seneca's writings . . . catastrophe is

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[34] Sklenář [4] 6.

> a pervasive memory and fear, a thought that colours all thinking about the constitution of the cosmos. It is as if nature in all its functions had catastrophe embedded in it. A proper vision of that nature can only be an apocalyptic one. It casts its shadow over even the most sanguine homilies of consolation and encouragement. In drama, its imperatives are at the heart of the tragic mood.[35]

Rosenmeyer later assumes that a Stoic treatise has been lost in which conflagration is explained in purely materialistic (that is, non-redemptive terms) and that this lost discussion is what Seneca and Lucan drew upon for their uses of this imagery.[36] But it should be remembered that in this reasoning and in this assumption it is manifestly Rosenmeyer's (as well as Sklenář's) purpose to suppress the providential aspect of the phenomenon. To say that the apocalyptic aspect of conflagration casts a shadow over its consolatory aspect is, quite literally, to reverse the sequence of destruction and restoration. This does not necessarily make this last statement untrue, but we should pause to consider the rhetorical manipulation of the event when summarised in the manner presented by Rosenmeyer. Nor need we assume a lost treatise in order to tie up the interpretive loose ends adhering to the use of the imagery of conflagration; this is an assumption with no evidence whatsoever to support it, and it is difficult to imagine the terms in which a Stoic writer would frame the proposition that the universe could be destroyed without any element of rebirth.

In one fundamental respect, the fact that the same reader response to Lucan's use of conflagration imagery does not offer itself in the case of Seneca's does not undermine our present approach. This is because in Lucan's poem the principate is underscored as an explicit, obvious and direct political sequel to the narrative and this prompts us to find a meaningful corollary to the sequel of his ekpyrotic simile. Indeed there may well be room to explore the dynamics of the reader's rejection of this providential aspect of conflagration in Senecan drama, but this falls outside the scope of our present discussion.

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[35] T. G. Rosenmeyer, *Senecan Drama and Stoic Cosmology* (Los Angeles 1989) 149; cf. also Narducci [17] 48: 'Questo procedimento di proiezione degli eventi umani in una sfera cosmica ha un importante precedente letterario nelle tragedie di Seneca, dove l'autore dà spesso voce a sentimenti di radicale 'negatività', in spiccato contrasto (quale che ne sia la spegiazione) con le tendenze 'conciliatrici' che spesso attraversano la sua produzione filosofica. Uno dei tratti di maggiore singolarità di questa drammaturgia sta proprio nel fatto che in essa il *nefas* assume la dimensione di una vera e propria catastrofe universale. Ciò ci conferma come l'epica lucanèa sia percorsa da una vena profundamente tragica.'

[36] Rosenmeyer [35] 150.

*Conclusion/Analogy 2:*
*Reader Response in Lucan and Milton*

If we choose to draw meaning from the reader's rejection of conflagration's providential aspect, a further nuance emerges to the kind of reader-response dynamics explored in Lucan's poem by Matthew Leigh in his 1997 monograph *Lucan: Spectacle and Engagement*. In that work, Leigh examines how the poem 'aestheticizes' the civil war, and presents it as spectacle for his reader's viewing pleasure, in the manner of, and in language and imagery that evoke, the theatre and amphitheatre. The reader/viewer of this imagery, Leigh contends, is presented with the politically charged choice between dispassionate compliance with or emotional resistance to the outcome of the narrative and the coming of the principate.[37] The dynamic at work in our current response to Lucan's simile of conflagration is a more direct path to the same end. Here, if as readers we wish to 'iron out' the contradictory nuances in the comparison between conflagration and civil war, if (to put it bluntly) we are to make the simile 'fit', we are forced to reject or edit out the providential sequel to both events, a process that effectively makes republicans of all who read it.

A final analogy to this dynamic offers itself in the early work of Stanley Fish on Milton's *Paradise Lost*, particularly the reading promoted in *Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost*. In this book Fish explores the method in which the poem '[re-creates] in the mind of the reader the drama of the fall' in order to explain certain contradictions inherent in Milton's presentation of Satan.[38] Throughout *Paradise Lost*, the reader is enticed by the heroic rhetoric of the character of Satan only to be told by the narrator that he is not heroic at all. The prior critical responses to this anomaly had been to explain away either the heroic nature of Satan's speeches or to discount the narrator's disavowal of his character's heroism.[39] Fish insisted that the contradiction itself—this process of the reader's attraction and the narrator's reproof—was possessed of important meaning consistent with the poem's function of making its reader fall again in exactly the same way that Adam did. Jonathan Culler summarises:

> Fish is able, by an elementary dialectal move, to argue that the contradiction is
> crucial: we are supposed to be jolted by it, to see that as fallen men, we are

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[37] Leigh [17]; his thesis is summarised on pp. 3-5, 292-306.

[38] S. Fish, *Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost* (London 1967) 1.

[39] E.g., A. J. A. Waldock, *Paradise Lost and Its Critics* (Cambridge 1947) esp. 77f.

indeed prey to Satan's wiles, so that the contradiction becomes, at a higher level, the point of the poem.[40]

A similar dynamic is at work in Lucan's epic: the suggestion of a providential outcome to the civil war inherent in the conflagration simile jolts us. As we smooth out its levels of correspondence, negating the equation between the ordered regeneration of the universe and the violent re-organisation of the Roman republic into the principate and the sequence of Julio-Claudian emperors, we are in effect participating in, and in some respects anticipating, the denunciations of empire that intrude from Lucan's narrator early on in the narrative of his epic and which reach fever pitch at the battle of Pharsalus in book 7. The first simile of the epic, in its philosophical and logical implications, prompts its reader to declare of its sequel, the imperial system: 'This is not palingenesis', 'This is not regeneration', 'This is not providence'. In Fish's formulation, Lucan's narrative technique is 'not so much a teaching as an intangling'.[41]

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[40] J. Culler, 'Stanley Fish and the Righting of the Reader', *Diacritics* 5 (1975) 30; reprinted in J. Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction*[2] (London 2001) 142. For this strategy, cf. Milton's own formulation of the 'good temptation' (in F. A. Patterson *et. al.* (edd.), *The Works of John Milton* [New York 1933] 15.87-89): 'A good temptation is that whereby God tempts even the righteous for the purposes of proving them, not as though he were ignorant of the disposition of their hearts, but for the purpose of exercising or manifesting their faith or patience . . . [so that] they themselves may become wiser by experience'.

[41] Fish [38] 1; his final word is an archaic orthographic variant on 'entangling': *OED* 5.287 *s.v.* 'entangling'.

# WOMEN IN SENECAN TRAGEDY

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**Abstract.** A comparison of Seneca's and Euripides' characterization of Phaedra and Medea shows that Euripides accepts the character flaws inherent in these mythical women. He focuses on the means by which his heroines accomplish their terrible deeds. Seneca, less resigned to their flaws, explores the destructive power of passion and of rejected love turned to anger. His heroines fall prey to these emotions and end up destroying themselves and others.

In considering two monumental heroines of Senecan tragedy, Phaedra and Medea, I will compare them against the background of their Euripidean namesakes.[1] There is little doubt that both Seneca and his audience were familiar with Euripides' dramatic treatment of these powerful mythical figures.[2] Seneca almost certainly fashioned his characters with Euripides' plays in mind, though he was not necessarily influenced by them. In fact, he treats both these women very differently from his Athenian predecessor. This article will examine the differences. Scholars have, of course, already compared the Greek and Latin plays. My comparison differs in several respects. Its focus is on character, not plot, as has been the norm; it does not directly concern itself with the question of how innovative Seneca was—his innovations emerge clearly from my analysis; and it does not seek to compare the quality of the two playwrights—a practice which has worked against Seneca and which recent criticism has rightly condemned.[3] Rather it examines the motives, attitudes, and

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[1] A version of this article was delivered at the symposium "Re-Imagining Nero," which was held at Emory University, USA, in November 2002.

[2] See C. Garton, "The Background to Character Portrayal in Seneca," *CPh* 54 (1956) 6, who points out that Seneca's audience was more literary-minded than the Greek audience and was especially attuned to authorial variation on a theme, since they were highly familiar not only with the Greek forerunners but also with previous Roman treatments.

[3] R. Mayer, *Seneca: Phaedra* (London 2002) 51: "Comparing his [Seneca's] characterisation to that of Euripides is useful up to a point, but we must always bear in mind the different dramatic tradition in which he worked, and Seneca's own possible aims." See also M. Hadas, "The Roman Stamp of Seneca's Tragedies," *AJP* 60 (1939) 220-31. For the recent tendency to analyze Seneca's tragedies independently of their Greek precursors and the problem of the identity of Seneca the tragedian, see most recently T. D. Kohn, "Who Wrote Seneca's Plays?", *CW* 96 (2003) 271-80.

claims of the two playwrights' leading characters with the aim of elucidating Seneca's treatment of them.

Greek and Roman myths invariably feature very flawed characters, whose behaviors have deep roots in the human psyche but are totally unacceptable and beyond the pale in virtually all human societies. The mythical Phaedra lusts for her stepson Hippolytus in violation of both her marital bond and the universal strictures against incest and, when he rejects her, accuses him of rape. The mythical Medea avenges her husband's abandonment of her by giving his new bride a gift of a robe that ignites into flames and burns her to death, as well as by killing her own children. What differentiates one playwright from another is how he treats these essential flaws in the mythical women.

On the whole, Euripides seems to have accepted the flaws as part of human nature—of women's nature. He focuses on the means by which his heroines accomplish their terrible deeds and makes them clever and resourceful women with whom both the inner and outer audience of his plays can identify. Seneca seems to have been less resigned to these flaws. His focus is on exploring the destructive power of passion, specifically the destructive power of love turned to anger and hate when the love is rejected. His plays concentrate on showing how his heroines fall prey to these emotions and destroy themselves and others as they are carried away by them.

Now to the plays themselves. I will start with the *Phaedra*, which was probably the earlier of the two Senecan plays. In terms of characterization, the basic difference between the two Phaedras is that Seneca depicts an essentially good woman driven to do terrible things by her passions, whereas Euripides depicts a deceptive and manipulative woman who was of dubious virtue from the start. This reading of Euripides' Phaedra goes contrary to most, though not all, critical evaluations, which generally regard her as a virtuous woman who struggles hard to withstand the power of *eros*. The general claim is that Euripides' first version of the myth, which has been lost to us, presented Phaedra as a lustful and disloyal wife, but that he amended her portrait in his second version, which has come down to us. I tried to refute this claim and expounded my contrary thesis in my study of Euripides' *Hippolytus*.[4] It is impossible to reproduce that detailed and complex argument in this article, given the limits of space and its focus on Roman literature. One may, however, note that quite a few years after Euripides' second version was staged, Aristophanes has Aeschylus, whom he has turned into a character in his *Frogs*, produced in 405 BC, accuse Euripides of presenting both Phaedra and

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[4] H. M. Roisman, *Nothing Is as It Seems: The Tragedy of the Implicit in Euripides' Hippolytus* (Lanham 1999) with bibliography; see also G. J. Fitzgerald, "Misconception, Hypocrisy, and the Structure of Euripides' Hippolytus," *Ramus* 2 (1973) 20-40.

Stheneboea as πόρναι ("prostitutes") in line 1043.[5] So apparently Aristophanes must have interpreted the character in much the same way as I do.

This said, I will first discuss briefly Euripides' depiction of Phaedra and then show how Seneca creates a very different character.[6] In his play Euripides first introduces Phaedra in the opening scene, in which the goddess Aphrodite gives the audience the background against which the tragedy will unfold. Among the pieces of information Aphrodite provides is that Phaedra had already seen Hippolytus before she came to Troezen with Theseus and that she had been so enamored of him that she dedicated a temple to Cypris in view of Troezen, where she could look at it, and that even as she pines for Hippolytus, she breathes not a word of her passion to anyone. This "background information" establishes that Phaedra has been deeply in love with Hippolytus for the better part of her marriage; that, although not technically adulterous, she has actually lived a double life; and that she is a deceptive and secretive woman with the capacity to hide her feelings, deeds, and intentions even within the closeness of her home.

This information thus serves to caution the audience not to take Phaedra's subsequent acts and statements at face value. It casts doubt on the madness and helplessness that she displays for the Nurse and the Chorus when she makes her appearance on stage. It suggests that her long refusal to tell the Nurse what is bothering her does not stem, as it might seem, from shame or modesty, but is a calculated tease designed to draw the Nurse into her troubles. And it makes one wonder why she finally allows the Nurse to pry her secret out of her after she had been so intent on keeping it. The information also raises questions about the veracity of Phaedra's description to the Chorus of how she had tried to overcome her forbidden love before deciding that the only solution was to take her own life. The play suggests rather that these are all ruses designed to manipulate her unsuspecting Nurse, who loves her and fears losing her, into acting as her procurer. When the Nurse asks her what is her fear, Phaedra answers: μή μοί τι Θησέως τῶνδε μηνύσηις τόκωι ("Lest you *divulge* any of these to the offspring of Theseus," 520). There could hardly be a more effective way of making sure that the Nurse would do exactly that. In short, Euripides presents Phaedra as a lustful and scheming woman, determined to get her man,

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[5] See also on Euripides' *Bellerophon* in T. B. L. Webster, *The Tragedies of Euripides* (London 1967) 109-111; C. Collard, *Bellerophon* in *Euripides: Selected Fragmentary Plays* 1 (Warminster 1995) 98-101.

[6] See also H. M. Roisman, "A New Look at Seneca's *Phaedra*," in G. W. M. Harrison (ed.), *Seneca in Performance* (London 2000) 73-86 and bibliography.

and with the skill and control to manipulate her doting Nurse into telling him of her love.[7]

Seneca's Phaedra is both less complex and more dynamic. There is no glaring difference between inner and outer, between what his Phaedra feels and does and what she says.[8] Nor is she particularly resourceful or clever. At the same time, although she is consistently driven by her passion—and Seneca makes a point of highlighting this—she both struggles with herself and changes in the course of the play, while Euripides' character does neither.

Seneca's depiction of his Phaedra may be described as an arc, which starts in one place, goes to another, and returns to its starting point. In the opening scenes, Seneca draws Phaedra as an essentially good woman who would really have preferred to be a faithful wife but fails in the struggle against her desires. He introduces his Phaedra directly, without any preamble that would cue the audience to regard her as anything other than what she seems. He shows her speaking of her feelings half to herself, half to the Nurse, without any of the histrionic madness that her predecessor feigns and without any pretense of being unwilling to divulge her love.

Her speech opens with her inveighing against her husband's sexual exploits, among them the help he is currently giving his friend Peirithous in trying to kidnap and rape Persephone. In her angry cry, *haud illum timor / pudorque tenuit—stupra et illicitos toros Acheronte ab imo quaerit* ("Shame does not hold him back—in the depths of Acheron he seeks fornication and unlawful bed," 96-98), we hear the voice of a neglected wife affronted by her husband's constant philandering. Theseus' philandering may not justify her contemplated infidelity; but it gives her a motive, which Euripides' Phaedra had

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[7] See also Fitzgerald [4] 23-25, esp. 25: "That the revelation to Hippolytus is uppermost in her [Phaedra's] mind as the likely curative resort is surely confirmed by the nature of her overt apprehensions in regard to the nurse's cleverness (σοφή) captured in the rejoinder 'Do not disclose . . .', which now in the growing realisation of Phaedra's hypocrisy may fairly be construed as almost an incitement *to reveal* all to Hippoytus".

[8] O. Zwierlein, *Senecas Phaedra und ihre Vorbilder* (Stuttgart 1987) 8, believes that Seneca's Phaedra tricks the Nurse into helping her seduce Hippolytus. He supports this claim by pointing out that unlike Euripides' Phaedra, the Senecan heroine does not see herself as a bad woman, does not say that she is shameless, and so forth. As I see it, these behaviors indicate that Seneca's Phaedra is not the hypocrite that Euripides' Phaedra is. She abandons herself to her *furor* and admits that she cannot resist it. Moreover, Seneca's Phaedra does not employ the manipulations that Euripides' Phaedra uses to get the Nurse to tease a confession out of her.

not had.[9] In fact, Euripides studiously disallowed his Phaedra any cause for her illicit love, by having the Nurse in his play ask her whether Theseus had sinned against her and Phaedra answer emphatically in the negative (320f.). In highlighting Theseus' philandering, Seneca leads his audience to wonder whether she might have been less drawn to her misogynistic stepson if his father had been a more faithful husband.

Seneca then goes on to show his Phaedra as a wife who would prefer to occupy herself with the kinds of things with which women in her position usually kept themselves busy, but which she cannot bring herself to do in her passion. Her list begins with weaving—*Palladis telae vacant / et inter ipsas pensa labuntur manus* ("The loom of Athena is empty / and the wool slips between my very hands," 103f.)—an image that clearly recalls Homer's Penelope, the prototype of the faithful wife, which Phaedra would have liked to be. The rest of the list covers such wifely activities as adorning temples and participating in Athenian dances and in the secret rites of Demeter, showing how much she yearns to return to the stability and routine of her former life, from which her passion for Hippolytus has torn her.

At the end of this list, Seneca has her make a statement that encapsulates just how far he has taken her from her Euripidean namesake. One of the most emotive scenes in Euripides' *Hippolytus* is a sung exchange in which the heroine tells the Nurse of her desire to go into nature, which is demarcated as Hippolytus' realm. She exclaims that she would like to drink "from the dewy spring" (δροσερᾶς ἀπὸ κρηνῖδος, 208) and lie under the poplars in the "tufted meadow" (κομήτηι λειμῶνι, 210f.); that she will go to the mountains where the hunter's dogs chase their prey; that she longs to set the dogs on and to hold javelins and spears (215-22); and that she would like to ride horseback through the plains and break in Venetian colts (228-31). The lush and overtly sexual imagery conveys not only Phaedra's passion but the basic licentiousness of her nature.[10] Seneca condenses this entire evocative scene into two dispassionate lines: *iuvat excitatas consequi cursu feras / et rigida molli gaesa iaculari manu* ("I take pleasure in pursuing the startled beasts / and with my soft hand hurling stiff javelins," 110f.). All the sensuality of Euripides' character has been pared away.

Once Seneca establishes his Phaedra as a basically decent woman, he goes on to expose what her passion does to her. First, in the remainder of the scene with the Nurse, he shows her struggling with her passion. Superficially,

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[9] For the importance of fidelity to Seneca's Phaedra, see also J. M. Osho, "Variations on the Phaedra Theme in Euripides, Seneca and Racine," *Nigeria and the Classics* 12 (1970) 91f.

[10] See Roisman [4] 47-107.

this part of the play closely resembles Euripides'. Both heroines speak of their inner struggle; both reach the conclusion that death is the only way that they can save reputation and virtue; both are dissuaded from taking their lives by the Nurse, and both Nurses take the initiative in revealing their mistresses' love to Hippolytus. The difference is that while Euripides had shown Phaedra's struggle to be a sham and her talk of suicide a manipulation designed to get her Nurse to do what she herself wanted, Seneca shows his Phaedra struggling in earnest, losing the struggle, and being influenced by her Nurse.

The struggle he shows is between his heroine's anguished moral awareness and what he depicts as her "bestial" desires. In contrast to the Euripidean Phaedra, he shows his Phaedra to be fully aware of the depravity and destructiveness of her illicit love. He has her describe her love as *malum* ("evil," 101); concede her moral danger, declaring that "I recognize the deadly evil [that afflicted] my unhappy mother" (*fatale miserae matris agnosco malum*, 113); and accept in principle the Nurse's advice to "smother" her incestuous passion. At the same time, he shows her as overwhelmed by her desire.[11] In response to the Nurse's counsel of restraint, she declares with anguished self-awareness: *quae memoras scio / vera esse, nutrix; sed furor cogit sequi / peiora* ("I know, dear Nurse, that what you say is true; but *furor* forces me to take the worse path," 177-79). And immediately afterward: *quid ratio possit? vicit ac regnat furor / potensque tota mente dominatur deus* ("What can reason do? *Furor* has won and rules supreme, and a mighty god has control over all my soul," 184f.). In translating these statements, I have retained the Latin *furor*, which conveys both madness and raging passion—and Seneca's depiction of a woman swept away by emotions that she cannot control.[12]

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[11] C. Gill, "Passion as Madness in Roman Poetry," in S. M. Braund and C. Gill (edd.), *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (Cambridge 1997) 213-36, analyzes 'madness' in Seneca's Phaedra and Medea. He sees this 'madness' as a condition in which the character surrenders akratically (out of weakness of will) to emotional forces following inner conflict. Cf. Mayer [3] 42: "This madness is not the mental incapacity to conduct oneself normally in life, but rather any yielding to an irrational impulse, usually in tragedy to excess."

[12] See F. F. Merzlak, "*Furor* in Seneca's *Phaedra*, in C. Deroux (ed.) *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* 3 (Brussels 1983) 193-95, for the claim that *furor* in the *Phaedra* means "compulsion" with "the basic senses of ungovernability, of something out of control" (p. 194), almost an obsession, and for the view that "by juxtaposing the word *furor* so often with Phaedra's name and person, Seneca is making clear the fact that his heroine is a victim of *furor* in a special sense of the word, and that this victimization predestines her for death" (193). Cf. also Virgil's depiction of Dido's state of mind when in love in *Aeneid* 4.1-5, 66-73, 101, 300-03, 376, 391f., 529-32.

In showing her losing battle, Seneca highlights a feature of the mythical Phaedra that Euripides downplays. This is her bestial ancestry: her conception from a mother who at some point had intercourse with a bull. Euripides refers to this matter only once in his entire play (337f.). Seneca highlights it. Among other things, he has his Phaedra compare her passion for Hippolytus with the passion that drove her mother Pasiphae to mate with a bull; and he has the Nurse warn her to avoid her mother's *concubitus novos* ("irregular/unnconventional sexuality," 170) and its *monstra* ("monstrous issue," 174). Thematically, it was Seneca's way of dealing with the question that the play grapples with: how a good woman could come to do the terrible things that Phaedra does. It enables him to anchor the answer, at least in part, in the bestiality inherent in his heroine's mythical nature and in human nature in general. It is this bestiality, his depiction seems to say, that leads his heroine to lust for Hippolytus, to fail in her struggle to overcome her lust, and treacherously to accuse Hippolytus of rape after he rebuffs her.[13]

As part of his exposé, so to speak, Seneca shows Phaedra in a steady process of decline. First, he demonstrates that her passion has so clouded her reason that, despite her moral awareness, she rejects with spurious and unrealistic arguments all the Nurse's sensible advice to abjure her love: Love is uncontrollable, she says; she need not fear Theseus' vengeance, because he will never return from the Otherworld and, if he does, he will forgive her liaison with his son; her father, who has been wronged by Theseus, will condone her adultery; finally, she will be able to win over her virginal stepson and bring him to dishonor his father! With the exception of the first point, which is a commonplace that excuses nothing, the rest is merely the wishful thinking of a woman who is losing touch with reality.

At this point in her deterioration, Seneca still portrays her as a good woman. In response to the Nurse's personal plea that she consider the *has senectae . . . comas* ("white hair of an old woman," 246) who loved and nurtured her, he has her recall her "shame" and "conscience" and declare her decision to commit suicide (*non omnis animo cessit ingenuo pudor. / . . . morte praevertam nefas*, 250-54). Euripides' Phaedra, we recall, also stayed her hand after her Nurse's urging. But while Euripides had framed her threat as a ruse designed to prompt the Nurse to act as her procurer, Seneca presents it as the only alternative his heroine can envision to the satisfaction of her ruinous passion.

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[13] For the theme of heredity in the play, see lines 112-28, 142, 170, 176f., 242, 687-93, 698. Cf. Mayer [3] 40f.

The decline continues as Seneca shows how Phaedra's illicit passion turns her into a bad woman, or, more precisely, into a woman who behaves badly and wreaks destruction on herself and others. In the second act (358-834), he shows her as much more devoid of reason and lacking in control than Euripides' Phaedra had ever been. Early on in the act there is a "mad scene" which is somewhat reminiscent of the one that Euripides' Phaedra had feigned, in which, like Euripides, Seneca symbolizes his heroine's divesting herself of the inhibitions and restraint of a good woman through letting her hair down to flow loose on her shoulders (394-96). However, the madness of Seneca's heroine is real; and he has her act it out in ways that her predecessor had not done. Seneca shows his distraught heroine, having removed her royal robes, thinking of running disheveled into the woods and literally throwing herself at Hippolytus' feet. He shows her fainting and then, when she comes to, humiliating herself by offering to be Hippolytus' *famula* ("servant," 611, 617), offending Hippolytus by suggesting that he take his father's place as her lover, and demeaning herself by begging him to take her (609-23). Euripides' Phaedra had never so lost command of herself or lost touch with the social reality in which she lived. She left the seduction to the Nurse and never so exposed or demeaned herself. When the seduction failed, she promptly hung herself to avoid the repercussions that would ensue once her proposal was revealed to Theseus. Tying up matters neatly, she both cleared her name and avenged Hippolytus' rebuff by appending a tablet to her wrist, for Theseus to find after her death, accusing his son of having raped her.

Seneca, in contrast, draws out his heroine's ordeal, in a way that makes her both worse and better than Euripides' Phaedra. First, he has her make her accusation in person, to her husband's face, while she is still alive. In a vividly drawn scene, he brings Theseus back from the Otherworld, old and enfeebled after a three-year struggle to escape, and shows Phaedra manipulating him in his helplessness. He shows her worrying him sick with the Nurse's false depiction of her on the verge of suicide (which she has no intention of committing at this point); lying to him about Hippolytus' supposed rape; and watching and listening as, overcome by suffering, he curses his son and wishes his death—all without making any effort to retract, to mollify him, or interfere with the curse, even though the consequences are crystal clear. Putting all of this on stage emphasizes the depravity and viciousness to which Phaedra's passion has led her, and makes her conduct more horrific than her predecessor's posthumous slander; though that, of course, was horrible enough in its own way.

Then, at the end of the play, Seneca redeems his heroine, which Euripides had never done. Completing his elaboration of the destructive consequences of passion, he brings her on stage screaming and moaning at Hippolytus' death—

goaded by *furor* and wild with grief (1156), as Theseus describes it. The sight of her in such pain mitigates the earlier impression of viciousness and shows her to be a victim of her passion, as does her declaration, later in the scene, that she still loves Hippolytus. Along with this, Seneca shows her facing up to her actions as she takes responsibility for Hippolytus' death, admits her illicit love and deception to her wronged husband, and finally takes her own life—not so much because she feared what Theseus would do to her, which had been a key motive for Euripides' Phaedra, but as just self-punishment for her misdeeds. Moreover, throughout her confession (1159-98), she scrupulously avoids any mention of the Nurse's role in her deception and false accusation (725-35), being careful not to cause the Nurse any more damage or pain than that which she is bound to suffer by association and as a result of her mistress's suicide. In her last appearance on stage, Seneca thus shows us a courageous woman, who, though still driven by her passion, returns to her essential goodness and morality. In short, Seneca creates a Phaedra both better and worse than Euripides' heroine: more bestial and more obvious in the hurts she inflicts on her husband, but also basically a more decent woman and wife, more a victim of her passion, and more honest and courageous in the end.

With regard to the Medeas, a central theme for both Seneca's and Euripides' plays is a mother's murder of her own children, an act which, by any account, is far worse than a wife's lusting for her stepson, and so evil and unnatural that it is forbidden even in fantasy.[14] The evidence suggests that Euripides may have been the first artist to depict Medea as killing her children—that is, that this deed was not part of the original myth, and that Euripides had intentionally made his character commit an act far worse than that of her mythical prototype, whose vengeance had been restricted to her unfaithful husband and his wife.[15] Given this, the remarkable feature of

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[14] For the prominence of the theme of children in the drama, see L. Golden, "Children in the *Medea*," *CB* 48 (1971) 14; for the cultural value of children as representing the continuation of the descent line, see S. Des Bouvrie, *Women in Greek Tragedy: An Anthropological Approach* (Oslo 1990) 219-39; J. March, "Euripides the Misogynist?," in A. Powell (ed.), *Euripides, Women, and Sexuality* (London 1990) 36-38. I agree with S. A. Barlow, "Stereotype and Reversal in Euripides' *Medea*," *G&R* 36 (1989) 159, 166-68, that it is unacceptable to excuse Medea's murder of her children on the grounds that she is a foreigner, as does D. L. Page (ed.), *Medea* (Oxford 1938) xxi (cf. xix). For some disturbing facts about murder of children by parents in modern society and their meaning for Euripides' *Medea*, see P. E. Easterling, "The Infanticide in Euripides' *Medea*," in J. Mossman (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Euripides* (Oxford 2003) 195f.

[15] W. Allan, *Euripides: Medea* (London 2002) 22f. and bibliography. See also C. A. E. Luschnig, "Seeing the Real You at Last: Understanding Medea's Changing Roles," *Interdisciplinary Humanities* 16 (1999) 97-112; D. Boedeker, "Becoming Medea:

Euripides' characterization of his Medea is her humanness.[16] Just as he had downplayed Phaedra's bestial background, so too he downplays Medea's well-known magical, witchlike powers to present her as a very human persona.

Euripides fashions his heroine as a wronged and grieving woman with whom the viewer can identify and sympathize. Long before Medea appears on stage, in line 214, the Nurse has told of her love for Jason, the good she did him, both before and after their marriage, and of her great grief at his shabby treatment. The children's tutor has also brought the news of her banishment by Creon, and the Chorus have expressed their sympathy with this "miserable wife" (δύστανος . . . νύμφα, 149f.). In the same prologue, as it may be called, Euripides also introduces the wild and violent aspect of Medea. The Nurse relates her foreboding that her mistress, with her strange and violent nature, will take terrible revenge (36-49, 92f.; cf. 171f., 184-89). The Tutor and Chorus repeat her premonitions (61f., 176f., 181-83). Medea herself, speaking from within the house, cries out her hatred and rage, not only at Jason but also at their children, and her furious wish that the "the whole house go to ruin" (καὶ πᾶς δόμος ἔρροι, 114). But all of this violence is presented not as an aberration, but as the natural and understandable outcome of her grief. Both before and after we hear Medea screaming "may you perish" at her children (114; cf. 36, 117), we hear her bewailing her misery and wishing her own death—not that of others. It is not difficult to understand her anger against her children as a passing outburst, spoken in the intense grief of her abandonment—as the sort of thing that a mother might say without really meaning it, or meaning it for only a moment and no more.

By the time Euripides brings her on stage, the viewer is no less ready than the Chorus of Women, to whom Medea appeals, to take her side against her husband. Euripides makes the speech she delivers to them moving and persuasive, as he has her combine observations on the common hardships of women's lot (covering such matters as the difficulty of finding a good husband, the oppression of wives, and the pain of bearing and raising children) with a depiction of her special sorrow as a lonely woman, friendless and abandoned in a foreign land (214-66). Even as she murders her children, he shows Medea as a loving mother, who commits the act reluctantly: telling of her sadness that she will not see them grow up; kissing their hands, hugging them, reveling in the

Assimilation in Euripides," in J. J. Clauss and S. Iles (edd.), *Medea: Essays on Medea in Myth, Literature, Philosophy, and Art* (Princeton 1997) 127 and bibliography; March [14] 35f. D. J. Mastronarde, *Euripides: Medea* (Cambridge 2002) 52-57, doubts that this was Euripides' innovation but with no conclusive evidence.

[16] March [14] 38.

sweetness of their touch and breath; and, right before she goes off stage to do the terrible deed, declaring her sorrow and love for them (1019-80).

The feeling that Euripides arouses for his Medea is pity.[17] Not once does he have his chorus of women criticize her. On the contrary. When they learn of her plans to kill her children, they call her a "poor lost woman" (ὀλομέναν γυναῖκα, 1253); after the murders they note the precedent of Ino (1284) who killed her children when, under circumstances similar to Medea's, she was driven out of her home by Hera. The outer audience feels much the same. The only one who judges Medea as monstrous and evil is Jason, whom the play has consistently discredited as exploitative, shallow, and egotistical.

Five hundred years later, when Seneca wrote his play, Medea's murder of her children was a given, with which he had to deal. It seems from his play that he viewed the act as so terrible and unnatural, as so far outside the realm of what a human mother would, or could, do, that he fashioned the character of his Medea to answer the question, what kind of woman would commit an act of that nature. Judging from his characterization of Medea, the answer seems to have been a witch in whom a slew of reprehensible or unsympathetic human qualities—rage, savagery, innate vindictiveness, egoism, possessiveness, criminality, unnatural masculinity, and madness—combined with a magical and supernatural power for evil. Only such a woman would murder her children. No ordinary woman would.[18]

Seneca depicts an enraged and savage Medea, not a grieving one. Without preamble, he brings her on stage, working herself up into a frenzy as she prays to the gods, in their vicious and infernal aspects, to help her accomplish a vengeance of extraordinary evil and brutality. In contrast to the brief outburst that Euripides gives his Medea, Seneca has his heroine reveal her destructive rage in a lengthy monologue (1-55) before he shows its cause. It is only in the next scene, where he has the Chorus describe the wedding preparations and recount Jason's betrayal, that Seneca establishes his heroine as having been wronged and ill done by (56-115). This order of presentation reverses the

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[17] March [14] 47: "Euripides has made innovations to the myth which mean that she kills her own children, but has drawn his new Medea in such a way that even this dreadful deed must be viewed with compassion, not condemnation."

[18] The words of Page [14] xxi on Euripides' Medea thus seem more applicable to Seneca's treatment of the heroine: "Because she was a foreigner she could kill her children, because she was a witch she could escape in a magic chariot"—even though Seneca does not emphasize Medea's being a barbarian and not a Greek. For seeing Euripides' use of Medea's foreignness to emphasize her vulnerability and isolation, see Easterling [14] 189f. For seeing Seneca's Medea as "the Other," see C. Benton, "Bringing the Other to Center Stage: Seneca's *Medea* and the Anxieties of Imperialism," *Arethusa* 36 (2003) 271-84, esp. 272-82.

Euripidean exposition, which had ensured the audience's sympathy for and identification with Medea before her troubling plans for vengeance were revealed.

Euripides had presented Medea's murder of her children as the inexorable completion of her justified vengeance, carried out not only to injure her husband, but also to protect her children from the harshness of exile, to which they had been consigned along with her (74f., 793, 1060f.). Seneca has his Medea sent into exile without her children (144f., 540-49) and presents the murder as the product of her search for a punishment of sufficient horror and brutality to satisfy her lust for vengeance (25f.). He shows her coming up with the idea of killing her children when Jason's refusal to allow her to take them with her makes her realize how much he loves them and how much their death would pain him (544-50). He also portrays her as driven to the murder by two motives that Euripides' Medea never shows: namely, power-hunger and egotistical possessiveness. He shows the first as Medea speaks of the murder as a way of restoring the power for harm that she had lost with her marriage and as a demand for cataclysmic revenge (49, 423-28, 670-739, 909f., 983). The second is revealed in her statement, shortly before she draws the knife: *osculis pereant patris: / periere matris* ("Let them be lost to their father's kisses, for they are lost to their mother's,"[19] 950f.).[20] The egoism here is reminiscent of that implicit in the behavior of the false mother in the well-known Solomon story, who would rather see the baby cut in half than relinquish her claim to it.

Seneca highlights three attributes in the character of his Medea that are either downplayed or entirely absent in Euripides' heroine. These are masculinity, criminality, and madness coupled with bestiality. He depicts his Medea as an unnatural "man-woman" who variously primes herself to "drive out womanly fears" (*pelle femineos metus*, 42) and to show *virtus* (160; Nurse's line), which translates as "courage" but is linked etymologically to the word for "man"—*vir*. He has her repeatedly term her vengeful acts "crimes" (*scelere*, 55; *sceleribus*, 925; *scelus*, 923, 994) and revel in the criminal acts that she had committed to save Jason and the Argonauts (129-36).[21] Among her various

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[19] Translations of Seneca's *Medea* are by H. M. Hine (ed.), *Seneca: Medea* (Warminster 2000).

[20] Cf. also Dido's uncontrollable wish for vengeance (Virg. *Aen.* 4.590-629).

[21] C. Gill, "Two Monologues of Self-Division: Euripides, *Medea* 1021-80 and Seneca, *Medea* 893-977," in M. Whitby, P. Hardie, and M. Whitby (edd.), *Homo Viator: Classical Essays for John Bramble* (Bristol/Wauconda 1987) 32, notes: "The idea of infanticide as a means of punishing Jason is embraced, and with conviction (*placuit . . . meritoque placuit*) *because* it is recognized as the *ultimum scelus* and not in spite of it (922-5)." Cf. Gill [above, this note] 33.

statements to this effect is her observation that the "advantage" she gained from her earlier crimes was that now, when she is contemplating the murder of her children, she considers nothing a crime (*nullum scelus putare*, 564). Finally, not only does he have both the Nurse and the Chorus repeatedly describe her as mad, and bestial too (e.g., 385-87, 392, 849-52, 858-65); he also shows her as such. The depiction of her madness is found in her rages throughout the play, but it is particularly vivid at the end of act 4 after she has prepared the poisoned robe that will kill her husband's wife. We see her there in a bloody ritual in which she bares her chest, cuts into her flesh, and tells of the powers of evil and destruction given her by the gods (740-848).

Euripides, in contrast, firmly anchored his Medea in the natural world, comparing her to powerful elements of the natural world—to a lioness (187, 1342, 1407), a rock (28, 1279), a wave (28f.).[22] Furthermore, he emphasized her femininity, showing her appeal to the Chorus as a heartbroken and oppressed woman and identifying her situation with the common hardships shared by all members of her sex (230-51). He has her briefly acknowledge the criminality of her vengeance, but he goes on to have the Chorus reject her assessment. He even has her sound a note of regret for the criminal acts of her mythological prototype, among them her murder of her brother and dishonor of her father (166f.). And while there are several references in his play to Medea as "mad" in her anger (92, 520, 873), Euripides does not play up her derangement, as Seneca does.

In endowing his Medea with the attributes of masculinity, criminality, and madness coupled with bestiality, Seneca distances her from both her inner and outer audience. He enlarges the distance with one further attribute, which, more than any other, distinguishes his Medea from her Euripidean predecessor. This is her magical powers and witchcraft.[23] Euripides alludes to these powers in two agons, with Creon and Jason, as Medea reminds her interlocutors of the things she did to save Jason and the Argonauts (285, 298-306, 476-87). But it is not until the very close of the play, where Euripides shows her riding off in Helios' carriage and has her declare that Helios is her grandfather, that her supernatural origins and abilities are brought to the fore.

Seneca makes these attributes core qualities of his Medea. At the very beginning of the play, in lines 29-34, he has her declare her descent from Sol and ask him to let her "ride through the air on my ancestral chariot" (*da per auras curribus patriis uehi*, 32; cf. 207-10, 510-12, 570-72. In the second part

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[22] Seneca compares Medea only once to a tigress in lines 863f.; in line 392 her anger is compared to a breaking wave.

[23] See March [14] 38f. for a discussion of the pains Euripides took to adapt the myth to downplay her magical powers as much as possible.

of act 4, lines 740-842, he demonstrates her magical powers at length. In the first part of the act, he has the Nurse describe, in grisly detail, Medea preparing the poisonous potion in which she will dip the robe for Creusa, Jason's bride (670-739). Then he brings Medea herself on stage so that the audience can watch her doing it. He shows her summoning the gods of death and shades from the otherworld (740) and then calling upon her own special goddess, Hecate, who in Seneca's time was associated with magic and witchcraft (577, 833-42).

This emphasis on Medea's divine origins, magical powers, and witchcraft serves two functions. First, it enables Seneca to show the means by which Medea accomplishes her vengeance. Euripides had fashioned a "clever" Medea (σοφή, 285, 305, 385, 409, 539, 600)—that is the word that not only Creon and Jason use to describe her but Medea herself as well—who accomplished her vengeance through the power of her intelligence. He showed her forethought and planning at each stage—whether in getting the Chorus to promise not to reveal her plot for vengeance (822f.), in manipulating Aegeus to arrange a safe haven for her in exile (712f.), or pretending to Jason that she has come to terms with her exile and forgiven his treachery—so that she can complete her revenge (776, 869-905). Seneca's Medea uses her magical powers to this end.

The other function of Medea's "witchness" is that it is the quality that, above all others, epitomizes his heroine's superhuman evil. What Seneca seems to be saying is that a human mother would not kill her children. Only an evil witch would. It may also be noted, without straying too far afield into Augustan literature, that the theme of witchcraft was popular with the love elegists. Dark arts often formed an accusation against the calculating *lena* who stood between the lover and the girl, a position somewhat analogous to Medea's in respect to Jason and Creusa (e.g., Propert. 4.5.13-20).

Finally, in his presentation of the murder at the end of the play, Seneca pointedly rejects Euripides' presentation of Medea as a loving mother. Like Euripides, he has his heroine call her children to her, speak movingly about her loss of them with her impending exile, declare her love for them, and vacillate in her murderous intent. But the overall impression he creates is of sadistic ferocity, conveyed all the more strongly in his onstage presentation of the act, which, of course, we do not have in the Euripidean version. Historically, this onstage violence reflects the abandonment in Roman times of the Greek dramatic convention which prohibited such displays. But it also enables Seneca to make the murder that much more horrific—just as his Phaedra's live, onstage slander of Hippolytus makes her action seem more terrible. In his protracted presentation of the murders (1014-17), Seneca shows Medea drawing a knife and killing one child first (970f.), then, interrupted by the arrival of Jason and his men, contemplating her deed and conversing with Jason before killing the

second child (971-1019). We hear her triumphing in the return of her former power (982-87), acknowledging the pleasure she felt in the boy's murder (991f.), and, quite dreadfully, expressing the idea that the murder was somehow deficient in retributive power because Jason had not been there to see it with his own eyes (992-94)! The murder of her second child, carried out after a due pause and in full view of her horrified husband, thus becomes an act of extraordinary sadism, which Seneca yet tops by showing Medea glorying in her crime, as she urges herself to "relish a leisurely crime, anguish, don't hurry" (*perfruere lento scelere, ne propera, dolor*, 1016), before pulling the knife. The murder thus brings together her savagery, unrepentant criminality, lust for vengeance, and unremitting evil.

All in all, while Euripides had created a Medea with whom both the inner audience of Nurse and Chorus and the outer audience sympathize and are drawn to identify, Seneca created a Medea who is repeatedly condemned by the inner audience and with whom few, if any, in the outer audience could find grounds of commonality. Even if they could sympathize with her plight as a rejected wife and a mother whose children were to be torn away from her, the ferocity of her rage, her search for a particularly brutal vengeance, her criminality, madness, and unnaturalness all create a distance between her and the audiences, while her superhuman origins and witchcraft enlarge that distance to a gulf.

What can be concluded from the above discussions? On first thought, one might say that Seneca shows women in a worse light than Euripides. Seneca's two women rant and rave as they are carried away by their bestial or diabolical passions. Euripides' women are cool, collected, intelligent and resourceful. Seneca accentuates the hideousness of both his heroines' deeds. Euripides makes his heroines defend the justice of their deeds articulately and eloquently.[24] Seneca distances his audience from his heroines, particularly Medea, but also Phaedra. Euripides brings both the inner and outer audience to identify with them and sympathize with their plight.

Judging by Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousai* (411 BC), in which Euripides learns that women who are angry at his depictions of their characters and misdeeds are plotting to kill him, Euripides' contemporaries seem to have considered him something of a misogynist—or at least a playwright whom women had cause to believe viewed them unfavorably.[25] Because he has them

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[24] A. H. Sommerstein, *Greek Drama and Dramatists* (London 2002) 56, in an attempt to explain the ancient suspicion of misogyny on Euripides' part, says: ". . . these women [Phaedra, Stheneboea], like virtually all major characters in Euripides, were made eloquent *advocates* for the justice of their case."

[25] Although alternatively this could be Aristophanes' running joke based on Euripides' opposite reputation, of being overly *kind* to women, I do side with the view expressed by

speak so eloquently of their desires and sufferings, Euripides' view of women cannot be pinned down very well. Indeed, Jennifer March argues that his extant plays do not provide evidence of misogyny. Analyzing Euripides' *Hippolytus*, *Medea*, and *Bacchae*, she argues that Euripides adapted the mythical material at his disposal to make his female characters more sympathetic than they otherwise would have been. Among other things, she points out that he shows them suffering deeply for the wrongs they committed.[26]

Nonetheless, as much as one may be drawn in by the formidable rhetoric of his Phaedra and Medea and as much as one may identify with their suffering, at some point, perhaps during the play itself, maybe after one has gone home or finished reading the text, the inescapable horror of Phaedra's murderous slander of her virginal stepson and of Medea's murder of her children makes itself felt. By rendering these evil heroines so sympathetic, so convincing, and so human, Euripides conveys the idea—whether intentionally or not—that women are wily and deceptive creatures, that any and every woman is capable of the same evil that his heroines demonstrate, and moreover that women—as represented by the Chorus and those in the outer audience who fall for his heroines' arguments—lack the moral judgment that is essential to distinguishing between good and evil in the first place.

Seneca's Phaedra and Medea are not tainted by the "cleverness" that makes women so dangerous in Euripides' plays, and they are much more straightforward. Seneca's Phaedra is an essentially good woman with a solid moral awareness, who is driven to evil deeds by her passion. His Medea is evil to the core, as well as mad, but she also seems to have a moral compass that is largely missing in Euripides' heroine. She repeatedly defines her evil acts as "crimes," indicating a clear awareness of their nature, although she loves their

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J. B. Bury and R. Meiggs, *A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great*[4] (New York 1980) 287: "Comedy did not guide public opinion, but rather echoed it; comedy set up no exalted ideal or high standard of action. The best hits were those which tickled the man in the market-place and more or less responded to his thoughts ." Cf. also Bury and Meggs [above, this note] 297.

[26] March [14] 32, 38f. also claims that Euripides cut out the powers of creative magic that the myth attributed to Medea, and that while he mentions her murder of Pelias, he glides over the magic she employed in doing so. It is difficult, however, to imagine which version of her murder of her brother Apsyrtus would have been more abhorrent to the Athenian audience; the one in which she chopped him in pieces scattering these on the water to delay her father in the chase, or the one that appears in line 1334, that she murdered him παρέστιον ("at the hearth"), the most sacred symbol of any Greek home. Cf. M. Visser, "Medea: Daughter, Sister, Wife and Mother: Natal Family *Versus* Conjugal Family In Greek and Roman Myths About Women," in M. Cropp, E. Fantham, and S. E. Scully (edd.), *Greek Tragedy and Its Legacy*: *Essays Presented to D. J. Conacher* (Calgary 1986) 151.

criminality. Seneca's characterization of his heroines locates evil in the rule of passion, but not necessarily in the essence of women. Passion may make his heroines bestial and drive them to madness, but not all women are bestial or mad. Indeed, in distancing his heroines from both his inner and outer audience and denying them sympathy for their misdeeds, Seneca draws a clear line between them and ordinary women who, he implies, would not do the terrible deeds that his heroines do.[27]

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[27] Whether the distance that Seneca creates represents an evasion of the artist's responsibility to explore the human psyche is a question I will not venture to deal with here.

# *BARBARUS*, UNE DÉNOMINATION DE L'ENNEMI ÉTRANGER CHEZ CÉSAR

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**Abstract.** The occurrences of *barbarus* can be divided in two broad categories: the foreigner is characterized by his savagery (*feritas*) or by his inferiority (*uanitas*). When Caesar uses *barbarus* to designate his enemies, most occurrences fall into the latter category. This way he suggests the inadequacy of his foreign enemies and emphasizes his own ability as a Roman to defeat most of the barbarians.

L'histoire et la rhétorique sont, dans l'Antiquité, toutes deux régies par les mêmes lois de composition et de mise en forme. Au moment où César rédige le *De Bello Gallico* (de 58 à 51) et le *De Bello Ciuili* (45), Cicéron est en train de théoriser les fondements de l'historiographie dans ses divers traités.[1] L'historien doit faire preuve de qualités rhétoriques, garantes de vérité et d'exemplarité, et réfléchir à son 'discours', au sens linguistique du terme c'est-à-dire le langage mis en action, un énoncé assumé par un sujet d'énonciation. Nous nous proposons d'analyser ici un des aspects du 'discours' de César, à travers l'emploi volontaire et conscient qu'il fait des potentialités de la langue et plus particulièrement du lexique.

On s'accorde pour reconnaître l'objectif de propagande politique et d'apologie personnelle des oeuvres de César.[2] Dans ces conditions, quelle image donner des ennemis? Deux directions sont possibles: ou bien on souligne leur force et leur dangerosité pour accroître son propre mérite à les vaincre, ou bien on constate leur faiblesse et leur incompétence militaire, pour rendre leur défaite inévitable, logique et donc justifiée. Pour désigner ses ennemis, César utilise régulièrement les dénominations ethniques, les termes généraux (*gentes*, *nationes*, *milites*, *homines*) ou *hostes*. Nous avons choisi de nous intéresser à un autre vocable, *barbarus*, en général traduit par 'barbare', sans que le sens exact de ce terme soit clair. Notre objectif est d'essayer d'en préciser la signification. Outre le sens habituel d''étranger', *barbarus* signifie aussi 'ennemi (étranger)', qu'il soit adjectif qualificatif (*barbari homines*, *barbarae nationes*), ou employé

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[1] *De Inuentione*, *De Oratore*, *De Legibus* datent respectivement de 84, 55 et 52; le *Brutus* et l'*Orator* de 46.

[2] Et ce dès l'Antiquité, voir la récapitulation de P. M. Martin, *La Guerre des Gaules, La Guerre civile* (Paris 2000) 14-21.

seul substantivé. On ne rencontre jamais le syntagme *barbari hostes* chez César, puisque *barbarus* inclut déjà le sème /ennemi/. Mais s'y ajoutent deux autres valeurs, qui correspondent aux deux images possibles qu'on souhaite donner des ennemis.

### *Valeurs sémiques de barbarus*

Quelles sont les valeurs de *barbarus* au moment où César l'utilise? Qualifier des peuples de *barbari* renvoie à des nations extérieures au territoire des cités, autrement dit les 'barbares' (avec ou sans majuscule) sont les étrangers 'au sens grec du terme'.[3] Le mot, emprunté au grec *bárbaros*, est introduit sans doute assez tôt dans le vocabulaire latin, avec ses valeurs grecques, déjà péjoratives.[4] Cicéron va s'efforcer de transformer l'opposition binaire à deux termes, les Grecs *versus* les Barbares—dont font partie les Romains[5]—en une opposition binaire à trois termes: les Grecs et les Romains *versus* les Barbares.

Pour préciser les valeurs sémiques de *barbarus* nous nous appuyons sur la distinction établie par Y. A. Daugé.[6] L'auteur définit la 'conception romaine de la *barbari*e et de la civilisation', à partir d'une structure bipolaire organisée autour de deux notions: la *feritas* et la *uanitas*.[7] Le terme de *feritas* englobe toutes les manifestations de la sauvagerie, comprise comme un excès de force.

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[3] C'est ainsi que les traducteurs commentent souvent leur traduction de *barbarus*: le français n'a que le mot 'barbare' et ne connaît pas la distinction que fait l'anglais entre 'barbarian' et 'barbarous'.

[4] Voir E. Lévy, 'Naissance du concept de barbare', *Ktèma* 9 (1984) 5-14; *barbarus* servait à qualifier les étrangers autrement qu'avec les mots existant dans la langue, *aduena*, *alienigena*, *alienus*, *exter / externus*, *peregrinus*, *hostis*. Seul *barbarus* renvoie de manière négative à celui qui n'appartient pas au territoire romain.

[5] Caton se plaint que les Grecs appellent aussi 'barbares' les Romains, selon Plin. *HN* 29.14.

[6] Y. A. Daugé, *Le Barbare : Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation* (Bruxelles 1981) 379-676 (en particulier 413-66, et les tableaux 539, 668, 676). Contrairement à la plupart de ses prédécesseurs, il ne limite pas son analyse à une perspective historique mais envisage le rôle de ce terme dans l'idéologie romaine.

[7] Cette répartition clarifie les nuances sémantiques du terme mieux que les autres classifications: par exemple, T. J. Haarhoff, *The Stranger at the Gate* (Oxford 1948) 216-21, note bien, dans sa rapide récapitulation, que les Romains se placent sur un plan culturel et non racial, mais minimise la valeur dépréciative des emplois latins et ne délimite pas clairement le sens de *barbarus* ; H. Meusel, *Lexicon Caesarianum* (Berlin-Zürich 1958) 398-400, n'isole que le sens de *ferus* ; et O. Hiltbrunner, *Bibliographie zur lateinischen Wortforschung* 3 (Tubingen 1988) 96-101, bien qu'il souligne la valeur péjorative, ne dégage pas de lignes de force sémantiques.

Celui de *uanitas* englobe toutes les marques de l'inconsistance, c'est-à-dire ce qui signale un manque. On classera ainsi du côté de la *feritas*, la violence, la cruauté sous toutes leurs formes (*ferocia*). La conséquence de ce pôle est que le *barbarus* est synonyme de menace. On classera du côté de la *uanitas*, l'incapacité à se dominer (*impotens*, *demens*); le manque de loyauté et de constance (*infidus*); l'ignorance, l'inculture, la bêtise (*ignarus*, *indoctus*, *stultus*); l'impiété ou la superstition (*impius*); l'incapacité à observer une règle et à garder un ordre (*incautus*, *temerarius*, *discors*); l'incompétence, en particulier militaire. La conséquence de ce pôle est que le *barbarus* est synonyme de faiblesse. Les deux pôles, apparemment antithétiques, se combinent pour caractériser le *barbarus* par sa non-civilisation: la violence de la *feritas* le rejette vers la bestialité, mais la déficience due à la *uanitas* l'exclut également de la culture telle qu'elle est conçue par le Latins[8] et le rejette du côté de la non-humanité. La *feritas* est en fait la manifestation, la conséquence de la *uanitas* qui, elle, est la cause, l'essence du *barbarus*.[9]

Partant de l'hypothèse que les emplois de *barbarus* relèvent d'un choix de César,[10] notre travail consiste donc à vérifier de quel côté penche chaque occurrence dans un contexte donné, selon le propos de l'auteur: plutôt vers la *feritas* ou plutôt vers la *uanitas*. Pour rendre notre analyse plus sûre, nous utilisons les outils et la terminologie de l'analyse sémique.[11]

Le sémème, qui donne le sens du mot, est formé de plusieurs sèmes, unités minimales distinctives. La combinaison des sèmes (notés / . . . /) aboutit à plusieurs sémèmes, dont nous ne retiendrons que celui qui nous intéresse ici:[12]

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[8] La présence des préfixes privatifs ou négatifs *in-*, *de-* ou *dis-*, dans presque tous les termes relevant de la *uanitas*, le prouve. Les deux pôles de la romanité sont l'*humanitas* et la *constantia*, dont les principales dimensions sont: *sapientia*, *temperantia*, *firmitas*, *pietas*, *fides*, *iustitia*, *concordia*, *grauitas et prudentia* ( Daugé [6] 460sq.).

[9] Sans être d'accord avec toutes les conclusions de l'auteur, nous souscrivons à celle-ci: 'ainsi la *uanitas*, de même que la *feritas*, apparaît-elle comme un mal fondamental, qui interdit à l'homme d'être présent à lui-même, et l'enferme dans la prison de l'impuissance barbare' (Daugé [6] 434).

[10] L'importance de César pour l'élaboration du latin classique dans cette période, où les choix étaient encore ouverts pour ce qui est du vocabulaire comme du genre des *commentarii*, est soulignée avec pertinence par L. G. H. Hall, '*Ratio* and *Romanitas* in the *Bellum Gallicum*', dans K. Welch et A. Powell (edd.), *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter : The War Commentaries as Political Instruments* (London 1998) 13-17, 26.

[11] Pour les présupposés théoriques de cette approche des textes, voir F. Rastier, *Sémantique interprétative* (Paris 1987) ; C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni, *L'énonciation* (Paris 1999).

[12] Pour une étude complète, voir E. Ndiaye, *Un nom de l'étranger : 'Barbarus'. Étude lexico-sémantique, en latin, des origines à Juvénal* (Lille 2003).

'*barbarus*' = /animé/ /humain/[13] /étranger qui parle une langue qu'on ne comprend pas, qui n'est ni grec ni romain/ /non résident à Rome, sans statut institutionnel/ /ennemi/ + /caractérisé par la *feritas*/ ou /caractérisé par la *uanitas*/. Comme on appréhende toujours le vocable dans un contexte, les occurrences textuelles diffèrent selon l'actualisation, la virtualisation ou l'addition de tel ou tel trait sémique: c'est un des aspects de la polysémie du message. La notion d'isotopie permet de cerner les sèmes actualisés dans *barbarus* en assurant la cohésion d'un texte: l'homogénéité textuelle résulte de la récurrence de traits sémiques dans plusieurs mots. Ce sont donc les sèmes actualisés dans le contexte proche qui activent tel ou tel sème dans *barbarus*. On aura ainsi trois occurrences sémantiques possibles: pas de trait supplémentaire, addition du sème /caractérisé par la *feritas*/ ou addition du sème /caractérisé par la *uanitas*/.[14]

Nous proposons donc une analyse textuelle des différentes occurrences de *barbarus* dans le *De Bello Gallico* et le *De Bello Ciuili*, en utilisant les outils que nous venons de définir, pour cerner au plus près les valeurs sémantiques du mot[15] et vérifier quelle image donne César de ses différents ennemis barbares. Pour ne pas alourdir la démonstration, nous étudions quelques exemples représentatifs et nous résumons nos conclusions pour les autres.

### *Les occurrences de barbarus dans le* De Bello Gallico

Dans le *De Bello Gallico* se trouvent trente et un des quarante occurrences de *barbarus* chez César,[16] c'est-à-dire la majorité. L'adjectif sert à qualifier ou à désigner plusieurs ennemis étrangers, quel que soit leur peuple. M. Rambaud note à plusieurs reprises que César déprécie ses ennemis par l'emploi de *barbarus:* tantôt pour expliquer leur révolte ou résistance, présentée comme une manifestation de leur sauvagerie, tantôt pour souligner leur absence de technique militaire, face à celle des Romains.[17] La 'démonstration' de César

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[13] On adopte le principe que si l'adjectif qualifie un non-animé (comme *adrogantia*), il équivaut à un génitif de spécificité, *barbarorum*, 'caractéristique des barbares'.

[14] Nous convenons de traduire *barbarus* par 'barbare' et de noter entre crochets les sèmes actualisés.

[15] En ce qui concerne ces valeurs sémiques, aucune différence n'apparaît entre *barbarus* employé comme adjectif (treize occurrences) ou comme substantif (vingt-sept occurrences). Ainsi nous ne traduirons pas *homines* dans les occurrences où il est lié à *barbarus*, faisant de *barbari* un adjectif substantivé, ce qui ne modifie en rien ses valeurs sémiques.

[16] Nous laissons de côté le livre 8, rédigé par Hirtius, lieutenant de César.

visant à le faire apparaître, dans ses *Commentarii*, comme l'ami et le défenseur des Gaulois face à leurs agresseurs, les Germains, il convient de rendre les premiers moins barbares que les seconds.

Nous commencerons par les occurrences en rapport avec les peuples vaincus, c'est-à-dire les Gaulois et les Belges.

*Les Gaulois*

Les Gaulois sont qualifiés 8 fois de *barbari*.[18] Loin d'être associé à l'idée de sauvagerie, le terme est plutôt rapproché de la notion d'ignorance: c'est par inexpérience, ou impréparation, ou encore manque de jugement, que les différentes peuplades gauloises se font battre. Toutes ces occurrences se situent dans des contextes où, d'une manière ou d'une autre, c'est l'incapacité des Gaulois à gagner les batailles qui ressort, face aux subtiles tactiques guerrières romaines.

L'occurrence qui nous semble résumer toutes les autres de ce point de vue apparaît en 3.6.2, à la fin du combat faisant suite à l'attaque par les Sédunes et les Véragres du camp de Galba dans les Alpes; d'abord mis en difficulté, les Romains réussissent à riposter:

> Ita commutata fortuna eos qui in spem potiundorum castrorum uenerant undique circumuentos interficiunt et ex hominum milibus amplius XXX, quem numerum *barbarorum* ad castra uenisse constabat, plus tertia parte interfecta reliquos perterritos in fugam coniiciunt ac ne in locis quidem superioribus consistere patiuntur.
>
> (Caes. *BGall.* 3.6.2)
>
> La Fortune ayant ainsi changé, ceux qui s'étaient flattés de s'emparer du camp sont enveloppés de toutes parts et massacrés, et des trente mille hommes et plus, nombre *de barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//incapables-de-vaincre/] qu'on savait être venus à l'attaque du camp, plus du tiers fut tué, les autres, effrayés, sont poussés à la fuite et ne peuvent même pas rester sur les hauteurs.

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[17] E.g. M. Rambaud, *César, De Bello Gallico : Livre 4* (Paris 1965) 95 ou 107 ; M. Rambaud, *De Bello Gallico: Livre 5* (Paris 1966) 162. J. M. André, 'Ethnographie et sociologie 'barbare' chez César (1)', *VL* 161 (2001) 15-28, insiste aussi sur les scènes de *tumultus* et de *pauor* chez César.

[18] Dix ans avant la guerre des Gaules, Cicéron dans le *Pro Fonteio* donne à ce terme la valeur d'une insulte pour dénigrer les Gaulois. Voir M. Rambaud, 'Le *Pro Fonteio* et l'assimilation des Gaulois de la Transalpine', dans H. Le Bonniec and G. Vallet (edd.), *Mélanges de littérature et d'épigraphie latines, d'histoire ancienne et d'archéologie: Hommages à la mémoire de Pierre Wuilleumier* (Paris 1980) 301-18.

Presque tous les éléments de la *uanitas* sont concentrés dans cette phrase: prétention illusoire à l'emporter (*in spem potiundorum castrorum*), incompétence militaire (*undique circumuentos, interficiunt, interfecta* et toute la fin de la phrase), faiblesse morale (*perterritos*, avec le préfixe intensif *per-*), pour terminer par la déroute, *in fugam*.[19]

Dans trois occurrences, l'adjectif *imperitus* ('incompétent', 'sans expérience') est associé à *barbarus*. On peut hésiter sur la traduction de *barbarus* dans cette *iunctura:* est-il redondant par rapport à *imperitus*—dont il est alors un synonyme—ou, au contraire, apporte-t-il d'autres valeurs sémiques? Les deux adjectifs peuvent se renforcer, accentuant la *uanitas* de ces *barbari*. Mais ils peuvent aussi se compléter: *barbarus* insiste alors sur la sauvagerie, *imperitus* en donnant la cause, ils sont *barbari* parce qu'*imperiti*, 'sauvages parce qu'incapables'.

Les Morins font preuve d'humilité (réelle ou feinte) et s'excusent devant César de leur inconduite passée, c'est-à-dire l'attaque de soldats désarmés. Ils invoquent leur ignorance des habitudes guerrières des Romains, en se qualifiant ainsi: *homines* barbari *et nostrae consuetudinis imperiti* ('*barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers/brutes/] et ignorants de nos usages', *BGall*. 4.22.1).[20] On peut considérer qu'*imperitus* explique *barbarus*: 'barbares, c'est-à-dire ignorants . . .' et que la précision *nostrae consuetudinis* réactive le sème /étranger/.

César prévient le Germain Arioviste qu'une tactique qui a pu fonctionner contre les Gaulois, *homines* barbaros *atque imperitos* ('des *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//incompétents/] et sans expérience', *BGall*. 1.40.9) ne peut marcher avec les troupes romaines. En 1.44.9 c'est Arioviste lui-même qui renvoie à César ses propres paroles pour se démarquer des Gaulois incompétents:

> . . . non se tam *barbarum* neque tam imperitum esse rerum, ut non sciret neque bello Allobrogum proximo Haeduos Romanis auxilium tulisse neque ipsos . . . auxilio populi Romani usos esse.
>
> (Caes. *BGall*. 1.44.9)

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[19] En écho, la déroute des Andes de Dumnacus au livre 8.29.1-3 offre un tableau encore plus dramatique, évoquant la fuite éperdue des *barbari* terrorisés: tableau promis à un bel avenir (chez Quinte-Curce par exemple).

[20] Dans cette occurrence le terme est placé dans la bouche d'un étranger (en discours indirect), comme dans la suivante et celles de Diviciac (voir ci-dessous, note 26). Par ce procédé César souligne l'allégeance des Morins qui adoptent son point de vue, comme Diviciac qui se place délibérément de son côté contre les *barbari*; pour Arioviste, la reprise est plutôt ironique.

. . . il n'était pas *un barbare* [=/ennemi//étranger//si-incompétent/], ni si inexpérimenté pour ignorer qu'à la dernière guerre contre les Allobroges, les Éduens n'avaient pas aidé les Romains ni eux-mêmes . . . reçu l'aide du peuple romain.

On insistera sur l'exemple des Vénètes désignés trois fois par ce terme dans le livre 3. L'adjectif qualifie d'abord leurs navires, qui sont *a priori* un avantage car leurs poupes plus hautes dominent les vaisseaux romains, mais que les Romains réussissent à neutraliser:

> . . . turribus autem excitatis tamen has altitudo puppium ex *barbaris* nauibus superabat. . . . Vna erat magno usui res praeparata a nostris, falces praeacutae . . . ut omnis usus nauium uno tempore eriperetur.
> <div align="right">(Caes. <i>BGall</i>. 3.14.4-7)</div>
> . . . or si des tours étaient élevées, la hauteur des poupes du côté des navires des *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//qui-se-croient-menaçants/] les dominait cependant. . . . Une invention préparée par les nôtres fut d'un grand secours, des faux tranchantes à leur extrémité . . . de sorte que dans le même temps était ôtée toute efficacité à leurs navires.

La concession faite à la supériorité des navires vénètes (*altitudo . . . superabat*) est vite balayée et la reprise du terme *usus* accentue l'opposition *nostris versus Gallicis*.

Le deuxième emploi désigne directement le peuple au moment où, vaincu, il cherche le salut dans la fuite:

> Quod postquam *barbari* fieri animaduerterunt, expugnatis compluribus nauibus, cum ei rei nullum reperiretur auxilium, fuga salutem petere contenderunt.
> <div align="right">(Caes. <i>BGall</i>. 3.15.2)</div>
> Quand *les barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//incapables-de-vaincre/] se rendirent compte [de l'abordage de leurs navires], après la prise d'une grande partie de leurs navires, comme aucune riposte à cette situation ne fut trouvée, ils cherchèrent leur salut dans la fuite.

Face à une situation imprévue, alors que les Romains, eux, avaient su trouver la parade aux poupes de navires trop élevées, les Vénètes sont incapables d'improviser une nouvelle tactique, *nullum reperitur auxilium*: notons le passif, souligné par la disjonction, qui évite de nommer le sujet dans la mesure même où celui-ci est défaillant.

La troisième occurrence élargit l'appellation aux peuples étrangers, pour lesquels le châtiment infligé aux Vénètes[21] doit constituer un exemple: *quo diligentius in reliquum tempus a* barbaris *ius legatorum conseruaretur* ('pour que par là le droit des ambassadeurs soit, à l'avenir, mieux respecté par *les barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//destinés-à-être-vaincus/]', *BGall.* 3.16.4).

Ces trois occurrences proches dans le texte révèlent une progression dans la valeur sémique de *barbarus:* le trait *uanitas* devient de plus en plus actif, au fur et à mesure de la réalité de cette défaite, ce que nous rendons par /destiné à être vaincu/. Ainsi réapparaît l'opposition entre gens civilisés qui savent respecter le code guerrier et qui gagnent, et les autres: incultes et sauvages, non respectueux des propositions de César, et qui ne peuvent qu'être vaincus.

Les Vocates et les Tarusates d'Aquitaine sont des *barbari commoti* ('*barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//faciles-à-impressionner/] bouleversés', *BGall.* 3.23.2). L'image qui est donnée est celle de peuples versatiles, incapables d'être loyaux, car ils sont soumis aux influences extérieures.

Les huit occurrences concernant les Gaulois vont toutes du côté de la *uanitas*, donc cent pour cent. On ne peut être plus clair.[22]

*Les Belges*

Pour les Gaulois Belges, la répartition est identique. Dans une occurrence du livre 4 on trouve le syntagme *ferus atque barbarus*, parallèle à la *iunctura barbarus et imperitus*. Si *barbarus* reprend *ferus*, il amplifie le trait sémique /violent/ de *ferus*, en y ajoutant les sèmes /étranger/ et /ennemi/, et on peut inclure ces occurrences dans la catégorie *feritas*. Si les traits de *barbarus* sont autres que ceux de *ferus*, on peut considérer qu'ils relèvent plutôt de la *uanitas*, l'accent est mis sur l'absence de civilisation dont il résulte une certaine sauvagerie: le qualifié est *ferus* parce que *barbarus*, 'sauvage parce que non-civilisé'.

C'est le cas dans l'occurrence qui résume l'impression générale donnée par les peuplades habitant les îles de l'embouchure du Rhin, sans doute les Ménapes:

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[21] Ils avaient retenu les envoyés de César, pour demander en échange leurs otages (3.8sq.), et sont tous tués ou vendus (3.16.4).

[22] Doutant de la réalité de cette incompétence gauloise, L. Rawlings, 'Caesar's Portrayal of Gauls as Warriors', dans K. Welch et A. Powell (edd.), *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments* (London 1998) 182), souligne l'efficacité de leurs techniques guerrières et leurs probables victoires.

> . . . pars magna a feris *barbaris*que nationibus incolitur, ex quibus sunt qui piscibus atque ouis auium uiuere existimantur . . .
>
> (Caes. *BGall.* 4.10.4)
>
> . . . une grande part [sc. des îles] est habitée par des peuples sauvages et *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//non-civilisés/], au nombre desquels sont ces hommes qui vivent, croit-on, de poissons et d'oeufs d'oiseaux . . .

Même si ce passage, peut-être en référence à des géographes grecs, vise 'à créer une impression d'exotisme' à laquelle participe *barbarus*,[23] cette nourriture non carnée dévalorise ceux qui s'en contentent.

Au livre 5, au moment du massacre de l'armée romaine après l'abandon du camp par Cotta, les Éburons dominent sur le terrain par leur tactique: par opposition à la négligence de Titurius qui n'avait rien prévu (33.1), César souligne la résolution des ennemis, qui, pour une fois, font preuve de réflexion: *at* barbaris *consilium non defuit* ('mais *les barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers/ /habituellement-irréfléchis/] ne manquèrent pas de jugement', *BGall.* 5.34.1). *Barbarus* apparaît dans une alliance de mots en général antonymes, *barbaris / consilium*.[24]

Dans le livre 6, les mêmes Éburons sont qualifiés de *stripem hominum sceleratorum* ('race de brigands'). On cherche à les punir d'avoir, par la ruse, tué les deux légats Sabinus et Cotta avec leurs troupes (5.27-34): ils résistent mais c'est parce qu'ils sont favorisés par la nature des lieux plutôt que par leur savoir militaire, *locus ipse erat praesidio barbari*s ('la nature même des lieux protégeait *les barbares* [=ennemis-étrangers-incompétents]', *BGall.* 6.34.5). Plutôt que de se battre selon 'les règles établies' (*instituta ratio*) et 'les usages de l'armée romaine' (*consuetudo exercitus Romani*), ils font preuve de témérité dans des combats déloyaux, *neque ex occulto insidiandi . . . deerat audacia* ('et ils ne manquaient pas d'audace pour dresser de secrètes embuscades', *BGall.* 6.34.6). Ces Éburons seront finalement massacrés, massacre sanglant auquel échappera toutefois leur chef Ambiorix.

Les Trévires, quant à eux, sont *barbari* ('*barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers/ /influençables/]') car l'exemple des Sénons en révolte contre Cavarinus, roi imposé par César, les rend suspects en provoquant chez eux 'un si grand changement des intentions' (*tantam uoluntatum commutationem*, *BGall.* 5.54.4sq.).

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[23] M. Rambaud, *L'art de la déformation historique dans les 'Commentaires' de César* (Paris 1966) 69sq.

[24] Sur l'importance du *consilium*, voir M. Rambaud, 'L'idéal romain dans les Livres I et V de Tite-Live', dans *Mélanges offerts à L. S. Senghor* (Dakar 1977) 412sq.

Les quatre occurrences concernant les Gaulois Belges penchent vers la *uanitas:* comme pour les autres Gaulois, cette conquête est ainsi totalement justifiée.[25]

*Les Germains*

Face à ces peuples destinés à être vaincus, César oppose les Germains et les Bretons, *barbari* également mais menaçants. Sur les trente et un occurrences, treize concernent les Germains, six les Bretons.

Commençons par les Germains. L'Éduen Diviciac présente à César Arioviste, roi des Suèves, en ces termes: *hominem esse* barbarum*, iracundum, temerarium: non posse eius imperia sustinere* ('c'est un homme *barbare* [=/ennemi//étranger//violent/], emporté, irréfléchi, dont on ne pouvait supporter le despotisme', *BGall.* 1.31.13).

On peut considérer que *barbarus* est le terme le plus général, les deux autres adjectifs précisent comment se manifeste cette '*barbari*e', par des accès de colère (*iracundum*) et des décisions irréfléchies (*temerarium*). Mais les deux facettes ne sont pas sur le même plan: l'énumération dans laquelle s'inscrit *barbarus* a pour isotopie la violence et donc la *feritas* prime sur la *uanitas*.[26]

Deux autres occurrences de l'adjectif joint à *ferus* confirment cette valeur sémique. Se dessine alors l'image d'un Germain inculte, farouche, venant d'un pays rude, donc sauvage et de ce fait dangereux. C'est à nouveau dans la bouche de Diviciac que cette menace est évoquée:

> . . . postquam agros et cultum et copias Gallorum homines feri ac *barbari* adamassent, traductos plures . . .
>
> (Caes. *BGall*. 1.31.5)

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[25] Hall [10] 39 n. 172 rappelle que Cicéron (*Prov. Cons.* 32sq.) lui-même présente comme raisonnée la soumission de la Gaule, que les résultats justifient.

[26] Le pro-Romain Diviciac reprend à son compte la rhétorique de César (voir au-dessus, note 20). Ceci confirme les analyses de J. Barlow, 'Noble Gauls and their Other in Caesar's Propaganda', dans K. Welch et A. Powell (edd.), *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments* (London 1998) 144sq., sur les qualifications des Gaulois selon qu'ils sont alliés ou ennemis des Romains. Sur l'importance d'Arioviste et de sa représentation par César qui 'a, par sa peinture des Suèves également, confirmé, sinon créé, le caractère national prêté aux Germains', voir M. Rambaud, 'A propos d'Arioviste et des Germains', *REA* 61 (1959) 121-33.

> . . . après que ces hommes [les Germains] sauvages et *barbares* [=/ennemis/ /étrangers//non-civilisés/], eurent pris goût au pays, à la civilisation et aux richesses des Gaulois,[27] il en vint un plus grand nombre . . .

L'attrait de la civilisation sur ces peuplades les rend précisément menaçantes puisqu'il est précisé un peu plus loin qu'ils seraient 120 000.

L'autre occurrence de cette *iunctura*, quelques paragraphes plus loin, confirme cette *feritas*, du point de vue de César lui-même:

> . . . neque sibi homines feros ac *barbaros* temperaturos existimabat quin, cum omnem Galliam occupauissent, ut ante Cimbri Teutonique fecissent, in prouinciam exirent atque inde in Italiam contenderent . . .
>
> <div align="right">(Caes. <em>BGall.</em> 1.33.4)</div>
>
> . . . et il pensait que des hommes sauvages et *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers/ /violents/], une fois maîtres de toute la Gaule, ne se retiendraient pas de passer dans la Province, comme l'avaient fait auparavant les Cimbres et les Teutons, et de là de marcher sur l'Italie . . .

L'énumération des verbes *occupauissent*, *fecissent*, *exirent*, *contenderent*, qui développe *temptaturos* met l'accent sur la menace que constituent ces populations, menace concrétisée par le passé pour les Gaulois, peut-être à venir pour les Romains.[28]

Le danger que constituent les Usipètes et Tenctères, Suèves et Sugambres, réapparaît au livre 4. Quand César décide de jeter un pont sur le Rhin, il fait consolider l'ouvrage pour parer aux attaques ennemies *si arborum trunci siue naues deiciendi operis essent a* barbaris *missae*, ('si les *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//menaçants/] lançaient des troncs d'arbre ou des navires pour jeter à bas l'ouvrage', *BGall.* 4.17.10).

Dans le livre 6 deux occurrences semblent aller du côté de la *uanitas:* César qualifie les Suèves de *barbaros atque imperitos homines* ('*barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//incompétents/] et sans expérience', *BGall.* 6.10.2). Il compte les amener à livrer bataille dans des conditions défavorables par la crainte qu'ils ont de lui et qui les a conduits à se retirer dans la forêt de Bacénis.[29]

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[27] Sur la riche culture dite 'de La Tène', voir B. Sergent, *Les Indo-Européens: Histoire, Langues et mythes* (Paris 1995) 415sq.

[28] Les Cimbres et les Teutons avaient été arrêtés en -101 par Marius. Quelques paragraphes plus loin, pour désigner les mêmes Germains, César emploie *ferus* uniquement (1.47.3), que M. Rat, *César: La Guerre des Gaules* (Paris 1964) 41 traduit par 'barbares'.

[29] *sed ne omnino metum reditus sui* barbaris *tolleret* ('mais pour ne pas ôter aux *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//faciles-à-impressionner/] tout sujet de craindre son retour', *BGall.* 6.29.2).

Mais la suite du livre 6 (35-42) fournit la preuve que les Germains sont bien dangereux: cinq occurrences se situent dans le récit de leur attaque contre Atuatuque, place-forte des Éburons, et contre le camp de Quintus Cicéron. La première justifie l'agressivité des Sugambres, qui, comme tous les *cupidissimi barbari* ('les *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//menaçants/] très avides', *BGall.* 6.35.6) sont poussés par l'appât du gain.

Les quatre passages suivants insistent sur leurs attaques victorieuses: (1) *deleto exercitu atque imperatore uictores* barbaros *uenisse* ('les *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//menaçants/] sont venus en vainqueurs, après avoir détruit l'armée et tué son général', *BGall.* 6.37.7); (2) *confirmatur opinio* barbaris*, ut ex captiuo audierant, nullum esse intus praesidium; praerumpere nituntur* ('les *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//menaçants/] se confirment dans l'opinion, comme l'avait dit un prisonnier, que l'intérieur de la place-forte est vide; ils s'efforcent d'y faire irruption', *BGall.* 6.37.9sq.); (3) barbari . . . *despecta paucitate ex omnibus partibus impetum faciunt* ('les *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//menaçants/] . . . méprisant une si petite troupe, fondent sur elle de toutes parts', *BGall.* 6.39.4); (4) *militum pars . . . a* barbaris *circumuenta periit* ('une partie des soldats . . . périt, enveloppée par les *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//menaçants/]', *BGall.* 6.40.8).

Il est aisé de relever les termes qui, d'un passage à l'autre, installent une isotopie de l'attaque réussie: *potiuntur*, *deleto*, *uictores*, *praerumpere*, *despecta*, *impetum faciunt*, *circumuenta*. Pourtant la phrase suivante note que le camp n'est pas pris, en partie grâce à la bravoure de centurions qui le défendent au prix de leur vie (6.40). César donne une autre explication, avec une dernière occurrence de *barbarus* pour ce passage:

> . . . multum Fortunam in repentino hostium aduentu potuisse iudicauit, multo etiam amplius, quod paene ab ipso uallo portisque castrorum *barbaros* auertisset.
>
> (Caes. *BGall.* 6.42.1)
>
> . . . il estima que la Fortune avait beaucoup pesé dans l'arrivée soudaine des ennemis, encore bien plus en ce qu'elle avait écarté les *barbares* [=/ennemis/ /étrangers//qui-se-croient-menaçants/] presque du retranchement et des portes du camp.

Manière adroite de minimiser, *in fine*, la part personnelle des *barbari* dans leur réussite: aussi bien l'initiative de l'attaque que le déroulement des opérations dépendent d'un facteur extérieur, la Fortuna, bien souvent invoquée par César. On glisse ainsi insensiblement de la *feritas* à la *uanitas* de ces Germains, manipulés par le hasard.

Cette complémentarité entre la *feritas* et la *uanitas* se décelait déjà à la fin du livre 2, quand les Germains, impressionnés par la pacification de toute la Gaule, sont prêts à négocier avec César:

> His rebus gestis omni Gallia pacata tanta huius belli ad *barbaros* opinio perlata est, uti ab iis nationibus quae trans Rhenum incolerent mitterentur legati ad Caesarem, qui se obsides daturas, imperata facturas pollicerentur.
>
> (Caes. *BGall.* 2.35.1)
>
> Une fois toute la Gaule pacifiée[30] par ces campagnes, la renommée de cette guerre se répandit si largement auprès des *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//qui-se-veulent-menaçants/], que les peuples habitant au-delà du Rhin,[31] adressèrent des envoyés à César, pour lui promettre des livraisons d'otages et leur soumission à ses ordres.

On peut hésiter: s'agit-il du *barbarus* violent et menaçant, qui précisément ne l'est plus maintenant et emploie des moyens plus diplomatiques que guerriers, à cause de la puissance reconnue à César?[32] Ou bien du *barbarus* ignare qui s'incline devant plus fort que lui? La polysémie de *barbarus* peut impliquer les deux notions à la fois et quelle que soit la valeur sémique choisie, l'interprétation convient aux objectifs de l'auteur.

Sur les treize occurrences concernant les Germains, huit activent le sème *feritas*: ces *barbari* sont donc bien barbares.

*Les Bretons*

L'expédition en Bretagne met César aux prises avec les Bretons, inconnus jusqu'alors des Romains. Par leur *feritas*, ils impressionnent dès le début Volusénus, envoyé en reconnaissance pour recueillir le plus d'informations possible:

> Volusenus perspectis regionibus omnibus, quantum ei facultas dari potuit qui naui egredi ac se *barbaris* committere non auderet, quinto die ad Caesarem reuertitur . . .
>
> (Caes. *BGall.* 4.21.9)

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[30] L'ablatif absolu *omni pacata Gallia*, employé à plusieurs reprises (voir aussi *BGall.* 2.1.2) montre bien que 'César ne parle que de pacification et pas de conquête' (J. C. Goeury, *La Guerre des Gaules: Livres 1 et 2* [Paris 1997] 94).

[31] Sur la 'question très obscure et très complexe' des peuples habitant des deux côtés du Rhin, voir A. Chastagnol, 'La signification géographique et ethnique des mots *Germani* et *Germania* dans les sources latines', *Ktèma* 9 (1984) 97-102.

[32] Les Ubiens, habitant la rive droite du Rhin, sont les seuls Germains à devenir alliés de César (*BGall.* 4.16.4).

> Volusénus, après avoir reconnu les lieux autant qu'il put le faire car il n'osait pas débarquer et courir le risque d'un contact avec les *barbares* [=/ennemis/ /étrangers//menaçants/], rentre au bout de cinq jours vers César . . .

Effectivement, les Bretons vont empêcher le débarquement prévu sur la côte au nord-est de Douvres. Ils ont l'avantage, en particulier par leurs chars:[33]

> At *barbari* . . . praemisso equitatu et essedariis, quo plerumque genere in proeliis uti consuerunt . . . nostros nauibus egredi prohibebant.
>
> (Caes. *BGall.* 4.24.1)
>
> Mais les *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//menaçants/] . . . envoyèrent en avant leur cavalerie et ces chars dont ils avaient coutume de se servir dans les combats . . . pour empêcher nos navires de débarquer.

Ils provoquent la panique dans les rangs césariens. Mais très vite César réagit et la *feritas* va faire place à la *uanitas* des Bretons, puisque malgré l'avancée des ennemis les Romains réussissent à gagner. Ce changement de point de vue se confirme dans deux occurrences successives. Les Bretons ont d'abord l'avantage, malgré la nouveauté que constituent pour eux les longs navires de guerre: *naues longas, quarum . . . species erat* barbaris *inusitatior* ('des vaisseaux longs, dont l'aspect . . . était assez nouveau pour les *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//ignorants/]', *BGall.* 4.25.1). Quand César opère une manoeuvre navale qui permet aux trirèmes de se sortir de l'attaque, l'affolement diminue chez les Romains (*quae res magno usui nostris fuit*, 'cette manoeuvre fut d'un grand secours à nos troupes') pour s'accroître chez les ennemis: *permoti* barbari *constiterunt ac paulum modo pedem rettulerunt* ('les *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//qui-se-croyaient-menaçants/] s'arrêtèrent et reculèrent un peu', *BGall.* 4.25.2).

Une fois la paix assurée, les hostilités n'en reprennent pas moins quelque temps après, et les occurrences réactivent le sème /menaçant/. Enhardis par les dégâts qu'une tempête a causés à la flotte, les Bretons prévoient une embuscade: *aliquid noui a* barbaris *initum consilii* ('quelque attaque imprévue de la part des *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//menaçants/]', *BGall.* 4.32.2).

Forts de leurs attaques avec les chars, ils réussissent à réunir des troupes nombreuses à qui 'les *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//menaçants/] . . . ont expliqué quelle occasion s'offrait de faire du butin et . . . de conquérir pour toujours leur indépendance' (barbari . . . *quanta praedae faciendae atque in perpetuum sui liberandi facultas daretur . . . demonstrauerunt*, *BGall.* 4.34.5). Ils reprennent le dessus*: celeriter magna multitudine peditatus equitatusque coacta*

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[33] La manière de combattre sur les *essedae*, chars à deux roues attelés de deux chevaux, est décrite en *BGall.* 4.33.

*ad castra uenerunt* ('cela amena la concentration rapide de grandes forces d'infanterie et de cavalerie, qui se dirigèrent vers notre camp', *BGall*. 4.34.5).

Ces ennemis sont donc même plus dangereux que les Germains puisque le rapport est de quatre occurrences avec le sème /*feritas*/ pour deux /*uanitas*/. Cette dangerosité de Bretons est réelle, la première expédition de César étant complètement manquée, et présentée comme une simple reconnaissance, la deuxième aboutissant à une reddition et à des alliances peu solides.

Tableau récapitulatif pour le *De Bello Gallico*:

| *BARBARI* | GAULOIS | BELGES | GERMAINS | BRETONS | TOTAL[34] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nombre d'occurrences | 8 | 4 | 13 | 6 | 31 |
| dont *uanitas* | 8 = 100 % | 4 = 100 % | 5 = 38.5% | 2 = 33.5 % | 19 = 61 % |
| dont *feritas* | 0 = 0 % | 0 = 0 % | 8 = 61.5 % | 4 = 66.5 % | 12 = 39 % |

César s'adresse à des lecteurs avisés, qu'il s'agit de convaincre du bien-fondé de son action pour légitimer ses ambitions politiques. C'est ainsi que se dessine la distinction entre les *barbari*: les Germains et les Bretons sont plus barbares que les Gaulois et les Belges, leur danger justifie l'ingérence du conquérant sur le terrain gaulois. Le clivage établi par G. Freyburger affirmant que 'les vrais barbares du *De Bello Gallico* ne sont pas les Gaulois, ce sont les Belges, les Bretons et les Germains'[35] doit être rectifié: tous ces peuples sont des *barbari*, des 'ennemis étrangers', mais les différents sèmes de cette désignation établissent des nuances subtiles entre eux.

Ces analyses de *barbarus* confirment donc la manière dont l'idéologie de la prétendue mission civilisatrice du conquérant transparaît logiquement dans le lexique de l'écrivain. On a bien d'un côté le *barbarus* dangereux, Breton ou Germain, chez lequel les manifestations d'inculture et de sauvagerie l'emportent sur la *uanitas*; de l'autre, les Gaulois, avec les Belges, *barbari* également mais caractérisés, eux, par leur *imperitia*, incapacité à vaincre. César lui-même explique cette différence, dans sa digression du livre 6.24, par le contact qu'ont eu les Gaulois avec la civilisation romaine qui leur a fait perdre leur sauvagerie naturelle. Il insinue qu'il a eu raison de conquérir les Gaules, puisqu'il a 'pacifié' cette région contre le danger germain: par là il construit sa propre image, celle d'un défenseur généreux des valeurs romaines,[36] prêt à aider et

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[34] Si on prend en compte les onze occurrences du livre 8, on aboutit à des proportions identiques: soixante-deux pour cent du côté de la *uanitas* et trente-huit pour cent du côté de la *feritas*.

[35] G. Freybruger, 'César face aux barbares, sens et emplois du mot *barbarus* dans le *De Bello Gallico* et le *De Bello Ciuili*', *BFLM* 8 (1976) 13-20.

[36] C'est ce que dit également Barlow [26] 158 parlant de la 'magnanimité apparente ('seeming magnanimity') d'un vainqueur'.

soutenir ceux qui sont considérés comme 'récupérables',[37] c'est-à-dire en fait à assimiler ceux qu'il juge dignes de l'être dans la mesure où ils lui sont utiles.

### *Les occurrences de barbarus dans le* De Bello Ciuili

Le *De Bello Ciuili* place la question de l'ennemi sur un autre plan, puisqu'il d'agit de rivalités entre deux non-barbares, César et Pompée. Dès lors, l'adjectif *barbarus* ne désigne plus l'ennemi direct, mais les troupes auxiliaires, les alliés étrangers de Pompée ou les alliés de ses alliés. Nous y retrouvons les nuances de la *feritas* et de la *uanitas*, sauf dans deux occurrences où les sèmes évaluatifs sont absents: *barbarus* est le terme générique qui, dans une énumération, désigne les troupes de cavaliers espagnols de Pompée ou de son lieutenant Petrius.[38]

Sur un total de neuf occurrences, deux seulement actualisent le sème *feritas*. Les Albiques, alliés des Marseillais, sont un peuple celte, témoin de l'ancien peuplement de la ville[39] avant l'établissement des colons phocéens, qui sont qualifiés de *barbaros homines* ('*barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//dangereux/]', *BCiv*. 1.34.4), parce que leur implantation, au-dessus de la cité, les rend particulièrement menaçants.

Également dangereux sont les auxiliaires étrangers qui assurent efficacement la défense du camp pompéien, pendant l'affrontement à Pharsale:

> Castra a cohortibus quae ibi praesidio erant relictae industrie defendebantur,
> multo etiam acrius a Thracibus *barbaris*que auxiliis.[40]
>                       (Caes. *BCiv*. 3.95.3)

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[37] Freyburger [35] 18sq. L'auteur considère que le regard de César sur les *barbari* révèle le choix philosophique d'un épicurien qui recherche non le plaisir mais l'*utilitas*.

[38] Barbaris*que omnibus qui ad Oceanum pertinent ab Afranio imperantur* ('chez les autres *barbares* [=/étrangers//ennemis/] qui avoisinent l'Océan', *BCiv*. 1.38.3). L'autre occurrence concerne les troupes du Pompéien Pétrius: cum . . . barbaris*que equitibus paucis* ('avec . . . un petit nombre de cavaliers *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers/]', *BCiv*. 1.75.2).

[39] Pour un récapitulatif sur l'histoire de la ville et l'apport des fouilles récentes, voir A. Hesnard, H. Tréziny et A. Hermary, *Marseille grecque, la cité phocéenne (600-49 av.J.C.)* (Paris 1999).

[40] Par la structure de l'expression, *Thracibus barbarisque auxiliis*, 'la citation de ces peuples accompagnée d'une généralisation condescendante doit déprécier les Pompéiens qui s'abaissent à utiliser dans une guerre entre Romains l'aide des indigènes' (Freyburger [35] 15).

> Le camp était défendu activement par les cohortes qui y avaient été laissées pour le garder, et beaucoup plus vivement encore par les Thraces et autres auxiliaires *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//violents/].

A cette efficacité s'oppose, dès la phrase suivante, l'épouvante et la fuite des autres soldats, revenus blessés et fatigués de la ligne de bataille.

Cinq autres occurrences penchent plutôt vers la *uanitas*. Nous retrouvons une mention des Gaulois, maintenant incorporés dans les troupes césariennes, à propos des deux déserteurs Allobroges qui rejoignent Pompée autour de Dyrrachium. Après avoir rappelé leur particulière vaillance et les services rendus lors des campagnes en Gaule, César souligne qu'ils cumulent plusieurs des défauts liés à la *uanitas:* excès de confiance, vanité, déloyauté et cupidité:

> . . . stulta ac *barbara* adrogantia elati, despiciebant suos stipendiumque equitum fraudabant et praedam omnem domum auertebant.
>
> (Caes. *BCiv*. 3.59.3)
>
> . . . gonflés d'une arrogance absurde et digne d'un *barbare* [=/ennemi/ /étranger//vaniteux/], ils méprisaient leurs camarades, s'appropriaient indûment la solde des cavaliers et détournaient tout le butin pour l'envoyer chez eux.

Le schéma dégagé à propos des peuples vaincus du *De Bello Gallico* est repris ici: dans la mesure où ils ont perdu, ils sont *de facto* dévalorisés. Les Numides de Juba, par exemple, en route vers le camp de Bagrada sont facilement défaits par le Césarien Curion:

> Numidae enim quadam *barbara* consuetudine nullis ordinibus passim consederant. Hos oppressos somno et dispersos adorti magnum eorum numerum interficiunt; multi perterriti profugiunt.
>
> (Caes. *BCiv*. 2.38.4).
>
> En effet, les Numides, suivant une habitude des *barbares* [=ennemis-étrangers-imprudents] s'étaient arrêtés sans garder aucune formation et dispersés. Tombant ainsi sur ces hommes profondément endormis et disséminés de tous côtés, la cavalerie en massacre un grand nombre; beaucoup d'autres, en proie à la panique, prennent la fuite.

Le sème /manque de réflexion/ activé, dans la phrase précédente, par *imprudentisque inopinantis hostis* ('des ennemis qui ne s'y attendaient pas et sont pris au dépourvu', *BCiv*. 3.38.4) charge *barbarus* de cette valeur, confirmée par *nullis ordinibus* et *passim* ainsi que par les termes *oppressos*, *dispersos*, *interficiunt*, *perterriti*, *profugiunt*.

Plus loin César évoque les manoeuvres du Pompéien Octavius à Salone: il détache Issa du parti de César 'après avoir soulevé les Dalmates et les autres

*barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers//peu-fiables/]' (*concitatis Dalmatis reliquisque barbaris*,[41] *BCiv*. 3.9.1). La suite du paragraphe oppose ces populations aux citoyens romains auprès desquels les tentatives d'Octavius sont vaines et dont la résistance héroïque aboutit à son départ.

Deux occurrences particulièrement intéressantes se situent dès le livre 1. L'adjectif déteint, en quelque sorte sur les soldats d'Afranius, légat pompéien en Espagne. César commente leur manière de combattre: ils combattent sans garder l'alignement, en ordre dispersé, et quand ils sont mis en difficulté, leur comportement est indigne d'un soldat romain—ce qui explique la défaite d'Ilerda:

> . . . si premerentur, pedem referre et loco excedere non turpe existimarent, cum Lusitanis reliquisque *barbaris* genere quodam pugnae adsuefacti . . .
>
> (Caes. *BCiv*. 1.44.2)
>
> . . . s'ils étaient pressés par l'ennemi, ils ne jugeaient pas honteux de lâcher pied et battre en retraite, habitués qu'ils étaient à une certaine façon de se battre avec les Lusitaniens et les autres *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers/ /incompétents/] . . .

La phrase suivante souligne le fait que ce phénomène d'influence est fréquent pour le soldat qui séjourne longtemps dans une région donnée.[42] Ainsi donc un Romain peut devenir lui aussi proche du *barbarus*: toutefois, c'est une possibilité que César ne suggère que concernant le Romain ennemi.[43]

Plus loin César évoque en ces termes les cités de Celtibères, au sud de l'Èbre, réparties en deux groupes:

> . . . ex duobus contrariis generibus quae superiore bello cum Q. Sertorio steterant ciuitates, uictae nomen atque imperium absentis Pompei timebant, quae in amicitia manserant, magnis adfectae beneficiis eum diligebant, Caesaris autem erat in *barbaris* nomen obscurius.
>
> (Caes. *BCiv*. 1.61.3)
>
> . . . des deux groupes opposés qui s'étaient formés lors de la précédente guerre contre Sertorius, les cités vaincues craignaient le nom et le pouvoir de Pompée, bien qu'il fût absent, et les cités qui étaient restées dans son alliance et, comblées de grands bienfaits, lui étaient attachées, alors que le nom de

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[41] Sur le syntagme *Dalmatis reliquisque barbaris*, voir note précédente.

[42] Ce passage est donné en exemple d'insertion (entre les paragraphes qui relatent la bataille, 43.5, 44.4), comme preuve du travail de fabrication du *De Bello Ciuili* (Rambaud [23] 95sq.).

[43] C'est Cicéron qui, le premier, qualifie directement des Romains (Verrès ou Antoine) de *barbarus*.

> César était assez peu connu chez les *barbares* [=/ennemis//étrangers/ /ignorants/].

*Barbarus* sert, comme précédemment, à désigner les peuples étrangers alliés de l'ennemi, mais on peut déceler une nuance supplémentaire; le mot surgit par opposition à César. Ces peuples sont *barbari* car ils ne connaissent pas le nom de César—ou ne connaissent que celui de Pompée (qui les a achetés ou vaincus).

En combinant ces deux occurrences, on peut aboutir au raisonnement suivant dans la logique de César. Du côté de Pompée se trouvent non seulement ses ennemis mais les *barbari* ennemis de Rome, et peuvent devenir *barbari* les Romains qui s'acoquinent avec les alliés de Pompée;[44] en revanche, ne peuvent être ou rester *barbari* ceux qui connaissent le nom de César et reconnaissent son pouvoir, de son côté seul donc se trouvent les Romains authentiques.

Tableau récapitulatif pour le *De Bello Ciuili*:

| *BARBARI* | ALLOBROGES | NUMIDES | CELTIBÈRES | ALBIQUES | AUXILIARES | AUTRES[45] | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nombre d'occurrences | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 9 |
| dont *uanitas* | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | 2 | 5=56% |
| dont *feritas* | | | | 1 | 1 | | 2=22% |
| Neutre | | | | | 1 | 1 | 2=22% |

Tableau récapitulatif d'ensemble:

| *BARBARI* | BGALL. | BCIV. | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|
| nombre d'occurrences | 31 | 9 | 40 |
| dont *uanitas* | 19 = 61 % | 5 = 56 % | 24 = 60 % |
| dont *feritas* | 12 = 39 % | 2 = 22 % | 14 = 35 % |
| Neutre | | 2 = 22 % | 2 = 5 % |

Le faible total d'occurrences de l'adjectif *barbarus* peut étonner, surtout dans le *De Bello Gallico* consacré à des guerres contre des ennemis étrangers.[46]

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[44] César qui, dans le *De Bello Gallico*, 'avait fréquemment noté la bravoure de ses adversaires ou l'excellence de leurs dispositions tactiques', présente ici 'tous les Pompéiens qui défilent sous les yeux du lecteur comme antipathiques ou incapables', selon P. Fabre, *César: La Guerre civile* (Paris 1964) 30-33.

[45] *Barbarus* n'est pas employé par César à propos de la guerre d'Égypte: l'étranger, quand sa civilisation vous éblouit et que ses femmes vous séduisent, n'est pas qualifié de *barbarus*.

[46] Rambaud [23] 325 le relève aussi: 'dans un récit destiné à démontrer les torts de l'adversaire, désigner celui-ci par des termes péjoratifs était naturel. César n'a pas abusé de ce procédé, ni même du mot *Barbarus*'.

Nous constatons une évolution, minime mais intéressante, par les deux occurrences neutres de *barbarus*: entre les deux *Commentarii* de César, l'adjectif a pris son sens militaire, pour désigner objectivement les troupes auxiliaires recrutées chez les étrangers vaincus—mais cette valeur neutre reste exceptionnelle. Dans la grande majorité des cas (quatre-vingt-quinze pour cent) César utilise ce terme quand il veut dévaloriser son adversaire, ce qui va dans le sens de la redéfinition des territoires de la *barbaritas*: les Romains, par leurs victoires, n'en font pas partie. Le point de vue est politique et s'inscrit dans l'idéologie de l'auteur, comme dans celle de l'époque.[47]

L'habileté oratoire de César justifie son action militaire: par son usage mesuré et calculé d'un simple adjectif, sans doute senti comme porteur d'une riche polysémie, il infléchit son discours dans deux directions, qui toutes deux contribuent à sa propagande. Premièrement il confirme que les Romains sont bien différents des *barbari*—quoiqu'en aient dit les Grecs—parce qu'ils savent eux, et lui en particulier, gagner les guerres: comme le résume A. Goldsworthy, 'le César des *Commentaires* n'est pas simplement présenté comme bon, mais comme bon précisément à la manière des Romains'.[48] Par là il participe à la construction d'une idéologie générale dont il est un des bénéficiaires étant donné ses nombreuses victoires, des Gaules aux campagnes d'Égypte, d'Afrique ou d'Espagne. Deuxièmement, si les enjeux ne sont pas les mêmes dans les deux ouvrages, la dénomination de l'ennemi étranger par *barbarus* reste dévalorisante dans pratiquement tous les contextes, pour souligner principalement que cet ennemi est incapable de vaincre (soixante pour cent du côté de la *uanitas*). La présence menaçante des *barbari* est écartée et les faits, en -45, donnent à César toutes les raisons de croire que ses victoires sont maintenant assurées. C'est par l'ennemi intérieur, qui n'est donc pas un *barbarus*, que l'histoire prendra pour lui bientôt un autre cours.

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[47] J. J. Hatt, 'L'opinion que les Grecs avaient des Celtes', *Ktèma* 9 (1984) 79-88: 'les Gaulois étaient pour elle des barbares vaincus partiellement, à vaincre en totalité, puis à assimiler'; C. Kircher-Durand, 'De *barbaros* à *barbarus*, valeurs et emplois de *barbarus* chez Cicéron, César et Tacite', dans *Actes du colloque franco-polonais* (Nice 1982) 197-209, va dans le même sens: 'il faut les vaincre pour les faire progresser, soumettre leur naturel pour en faire des êtres civilisés'.

[48] A. Goldsworthy, 'Instinctive Genius: The Depiction of Caesar the General', dans K. Welch et A. Powell (edd.), *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments* (London 1998) 204, 211, insiste sur la conformité du comportement de César dans ses campagnes avec l'idéal romain du général : 'The Caesar of the *Commentarii* is not just depicted as good, but as good in a specific Roman way'.

# NOTE SULLA TRADIZIONE
# ANNALISTICA RELATIVA AL TEATRO
# 'A LUPERCALI IN PALATIUM VERSUS'

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**Abstract.** The stone theater built in Rome by C. Cassius Longinus in 154 BC was destroyed by a senate persuaded by Scipio Nasica. Although scholars have questioned its reality, the *theatrum lapideum* affair was a political fight characterized by the mutual hostility of the antagonists Cassius and Nasica. The ancient sources played a part in this struggle using their own weapons: the manipulation of history and the creation of myths.

Sebbene le fonti antiche divergano per qualche particolare, generalmente si ritiene che il teatro lapideo costruito a Roma dal censore C. Cassius Longinus nel 154 a.C. fu distrutto per ordine del senato persuaso da un appello veemente di Scipio Nasica (Corculum) quando esso era ancora in costruzione. L'avvenimento ebbe una grande eco sia presso i contemporanei che gli scrittori posteriori che l'hanno usato spesso a fini moralistici; tuttavia nessuno di essi ha tramandato una descrizione molto dettagliata dell'accaduto che ci permetta di comprendere le motivazioni dell'opposizione di Nasica al progetto di Cassius.

Nonostante l'opinione di alcuni studiosi,[1] l'idea che il senato e gli ottimati avrebbero a tutti i costi cercato di evitare la costruzione di un teatro stabile per difendere il *mos maiorum*[2] e per il timore di pericolosi assembramenti che sarebbero potuti degenerare in sedizioni, mantiene la sua validità. Non v'è necessità di sottolineare che una parte della *nobilitas* romana non fosse ostile ai costumi greci,[3] ma alla metà del II secolo a.C. i vecchi concetti di

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[1] E. S. Gruen, *Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome* (Ithaca 1992) 208s. Una versione preliminare di questo articolo è stata letta in inglese all'Annual Meeting of the Association of Ancient Historians, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, USA, tenutasi il 3-5 Maggio 2001. Ringrazio sentitamente il R. Mitchell per i preziosi commenti e il Jonathan Entwisle per l'aiuto nella prima stesura. Esprimo inoltre, i miei più cordiali ringraziamenti al William J. Dominik e ai referees della rivista *Scholia* per gli acuti suggerimenti. Naturalmente, ogni eventuale errore o svista è addebitabile alla mia esclusiva responsabilità.

[2] B. Linke e M. Stemmler (edd.), *Mos Maiorum: Untersuchungen zu den Formen der Identitätsstiftung und Stabilisierung in der römischen Republik* (Stuttgart 2002).

[3] E. S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* (Berkeley 1984) 257ss.; Gruen [1] 209. Cfr. le osservazioni in K. Mitens, 'Theatre Architecture in Central Italy: Reception and Resistance', *ActaHyp* 5 (1993) 98.

*grauitas* e *seueritas* potevano ancora rappresentare armi politiche pungenti.[4] In particolare, il caso della Magna Mater è emblematico: Scipio Nasica Corculum che si oppose al progetto di costruire il teatro di pietra nel 154 a.C. era figlio di colui che aveva accolto a Roma il simulacro della dea di origini greco-orientali (Liv. 29.37.2, 36.36; cfr. 29.14.10, 25.10.9)[5] cui erano dedicate performances teatrali alloggiate in un teatro temporaneo (Liv. 36.36.4s.).[6] Dopo l'affaire del *theatrum lapideum* un SC proibì di assistere agli spettacoli seduti (Val. Max. 2.4.2; Liv. *Per*. 48; cfr. Tac. *Ann*. 14.20): osservato oppure disatteso, questo decreto prova che l'interesse del senato romano per il *mos maiorum* era reale, sebbene esso potesse aver avuto maggiori preoccupazioni. È pur vero che il senato potesse paventare sedizioni popolari ogni qual volta veniva costruito un teatro provvisorio in legno; infatti, sebbene la capienza di un teatro temporaneo forse non poteva competere con quella di un simile edificio in pietra, proibire la costruzione di un teatro stabile non avrebbe eliminato il problema degli assembramenti popolari.

Tuttavia, non vi sono dubbi sul fatto che la preoccupazione di sedizioni incontrollate fosse ben viva a Roma almeno a partire dalla repressione dei Baccanali del 186 a.C., cui fece seguito nel 181 la *Lex Baebia de ambitu* (Liv. 40.19).[7] Forse non è un caso che essa fu accompagnata da una *Lex Orchia de coenis* (Macrob. *Sat*. 3.17s.; cf. Liv. 39.6)[8] che limitava il numero degli invitati ai banchetti pubblici, se lo stesso binomio legislativo fu riproposto qualche decennio dopo tra il 161 (con la *Lex Fannia cibaria*: Plin. *HN* 10.50.139; Gell.

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[4] Cfr. A. E. Astin, '*Regimen Morum*', *JRS* 78 (1988) 14-34. Non a caso, C. Gracco agli inizi del II sec. a.C. ancora rinfacciava ad uno dei suoi avversari di adornarsi alla maniera delle donne: Isid. *Orig*. 19.32.4.

[5] Inoltre: J. N. Bremmer, 'Slow Cybele's Arrival', in J. N. Bremmer e N. M. Horsfall (edd.), *Roman Myth and Mythography* (London 1987) 105-11; E. S. Gruen, *Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policy* (Leiden 1990) 15-20; P. Burton, 'The Summoning of the *Magna Mater* to Rome (205 B.C.)', *Historia* 45 (1996) 36-63.

[6] Cfr. Steinby, *Lexicon* 3.206-08; F. Bernstein, *Ludi publici: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung und Entwicklung der öffentlichen Spiele im republikanischen Rom* (Stuttgart 1998) 186ss.

[7] Cfr. G. Rotondi, *Leges Publicae Populi Romani* (Hildesheim 1966) 277; T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* 1 (Atlanta 1984) 384. In generale: G. Clemente, 'Le leggi sul lusso', in A. Giardina e A. Schiavone (edd.), *Società romana e produzione schiavistica* 3 (Roma 1981) 6.

[8] Alcuni datano la legge nel 182; altri nel 181 a.C.: G. Niccolini, *I fasti dei tribuni della plebe* (Milano 1934) 119; Rotondi [7] 276; Broughton [7] 382.

*NA* 2.24.1-6; Athen. 6.108, 274c; Macrob. *Sat.* 3.13.13, 16.4, 17.3-5)[9] e il 159 (con la *lex de ambitu* attribuita a Cornelius e Fulvius: Liv. *Per.* 47).[10]

Dunque, se in grandi linee la reazione senatoriale alla costruzione del teatro di pietra può essere comprensibile, sfuggono, comunque, non solo i contorni politici della vicenda, la cui ricostruzione appare viziata da un diffuso orientamento moralistico, ma anche dettagli altrettanto importanti.

Qualche tempo fa, però, M. Sordi,[11] con la consueta arguzia, è venuta a sconvolgere questo dibattito storiografico che dava per scontata la veridicità dell'episodio del 154 a.C. La studiosa, infatti, analizzando le fonti antiche sull'affaire del teatro lapideo, è giunta ad ipotizzare che l'intera vicenda potesse essere una semplice ricostruzione a posteriori che rifletteva lo scontro politico-ideologico sulla costruzione del teatro di Pompeo, primo vero stabile, realizzato nel 55 a.C. L'analisi proposta da M. Sordi è stringente e tiene conto di tutte le fonti letterarie disponibili sull'episodio del 154 e su quello del 55 che pure dovette suscitare scalpore. In particolare, è ben approfondito il quadro politico in cui lo scontro per la costruzione di entrambi gli edifici si inserirebbe.

La discussione su quest'affascinante proposta, tuttavia, merita un'ulteriore riflessione poiché sembra possibile addurre alcuni elementi nuovi per sostenere l'effettiva veridicità dell'episodio del 154 a.C. e le sue implicazioni storiografico-ideologiche. In questa nota, in particolare, dopo aver passato in rassegna le fonti che specificamente sono riconducibili all'affaire del primo teatro lapideo del 154 a.C., verrà esaminata la possibilità che un frammento di Pisone possa essere riconnesso al complesso problema del *theatrum lapideum*. Di lì si passerà ad analizzare altri aspetti della questione, tra cui l'idea che la posizione topografica del teatro, accanto al *Lupercal*, possa essere stata usata per sostenere la necessità della sua distruzione. Infine, verrà riproposta la suggestione secondo cui, accanto a fattori politico e ideologico, vi fosse anche una personale ostilità tra i due protagonisti dello scontro, Cassio Longino e Scipione Nasica.

### *La tradizione letteraria*

Le fonti relative al *theatrum lapideum* possono essere divise agevolmente in due gruppi (Vell. Pat. 1.15.3; Val. Max. 2.4.2; Oros. 4.21.4; App. *B. Civ.* 1.28; Liv. *Per.* 48; August. *De Civ. D.* 1.31, 33): da un lato il gruppo costituito dalla coppia Velleius/Appianus entrambi caratterizzati da un vistoso errore nel nome

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[9] Cfr. Rotondi [7] 287s.; Broughton [7] 443.

[10] Cfr. Rotondi [7] 288; Broughton [7] 445.

[11] M. Sordi, 'La decadenza della repubblica e il teatro del 154 a.C.', *InvLuc* 10 (1988) 327-41.

dell'oppositore (*Cepio* invece di *Scipio*) e nella sua carica, e dall'altro il gruppo che chiameremo 'liviano' costituito dall'epitome di Livio, Valerio Massimo, Orosio e Agostino.

Oltre agli errori sul nome dell'oppositore, la narrazione delle fonti appartenenti al primo gruppo è caratterizzata anche da un forte personalismo: non sono i due censori a volere il teatro, ma il solo Cassio. Al contrario, nel gruppo 'liviano', Cassio è nominato solo in quanto censore collega di Valerio Messalla e la responsabilità della costruzione del teatro è genericamente di entrambi. L'errore di Agostino che definisce Pontefice Massimo l'oppositore del progetto è spiegabile con l'uso propagandistico e moralistico che egli faceva dell'avvenimento ed in ogni caso aggiunge che era stato eletto dal senato con chiaro riferimento alla carica di Princeps Senatus coperta da Nasica nel 154. Agostino per di più confonde Nasica Corculum con suo padre,[12] che accolse la statua della Magna Mater a Rome. Questa confusione può aver avuto origine dal fatto che il teatro era verosimilmente destinato ad ospitare gli spettacoli (Ludi Megalesia) in onore della dea.

Per quanto riguarda le ragioni dell'opposizione, tutte le fonti prediligono l'aspetto moralistico in particolare legato alla *Graeca luxuria*, tranne Appiano e Orosio (e Valerio Massimo?) che aggiungono anche il motivo dell'ordine pubblico, delle sedizioni popolari. Probabilmente le due tematiche erano presenti in tutte le versioni e negli scarni resoconti di Livio e Velleio manca la parte relativa al pericolo delle sedizioni per ragioni di brevità; Appiano pur prediligendo il secondo aspetto non ha tralasciato l'aspetto moralistico, privilegiato da Agostino a fini di propaganda cristiana. Proprio il racconto di Orosio derivante con ogni probabilità da Livio e quello Appianeo, incentrato sulle guerre civili in cui è comunque presente la tematica dell'esaltazione del *mos maiorum* contro la mollezza incipiente dei Romani, conferma che le versioni originali avevano recepito entrambe le argomentazioni di Nasica.

La dipendenza di Orosio e Agostino da Livio è palese e comunque entrambi dipendono da una stessa fonte avendo usato la stessa locuzione *grauissima oratione* riferendosi all'appello di Nasica al senato; anche per Valerio Massimo è facilmente ipotizzabile la dipendenza Liviana testimoniata dall'appellativo di *auctore* dato a Nasica. Alcuni studiosi [13] hanno accolto l'indicazione cronologica fornita da Orosio (*eodem tempore . . .*) come un precisa data e connettendola, seguendo lo scrittore di origine spagnola, al 151 a.C. anno in cui Galba sconfisse i Lusitani episodio. Tuttavia, quell'indicazione potrebbe avere solo un senso generico; Orosio scrive che 'in quael periodo' i

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[12] Gruen [1] 206s.

[13] E. T. Salmon, 'The *Coloniae Maritimae*', *Athenaeum* 41 (1963) 5-9. Cfr. Gruen [1] 206-08.

censori cominciarono a costruire il teatro lapideo e non che allora esso fu distrutto. Di conseguenza, il passo di Orisio non può costituire una solida evidenza che l'orazione di Nasica e la demolizione dell'edificio avvennero nel 151 a.C.

Un diverso e più complesso problema è rappresentato dalle fonti dei due gruppi. La tradizione liviana, proprio per la genericità del dettato, è inquadrabile con difficoltà. Naturalmente, essa non deriva da scrittori apertamente ostili a Cassio né eventualmente da storici benevoli verso il censore del 154, ma comunque nel suo afflato moralistico risente di una tendenza filo-senatoria. Livio potrebbe aver attinto a molti possibili testi, ma è altrettanto probabile che Livio stesso possa aver formulato una versione in cui l'aspetto moralistico e filo-senatorio fosse preponderante rispetto all'attacco verso Cassio.

Invece, il gruppo di *Cepio* che ha avuto come esiti Velleio e Appiano, offre maggiori spunti di discussione. Proprio la presenza in entrambe le opere dello stesso errore relativo al nome dell'oppositore di Cassio e alla sua carica che è indicata come *consul*/ὕπατος ha indotto gli studiosi ad immaginare la loro derivazione da un'unica fonte. Come abbiamo visto, si tratta senza dubbio di una fonte che preferiva narrare l'episodio in maniera quasi personale (la proposta di costruire il teatro è di Cassio, non dei censori) e quindi non si andrà lontano dal vero affermando che essa non solo è di tendenza filo-senatoria ma risente anche di una particolare vena anti-cassiana. In più, c'è da tenere presente il doppio errore che può costituire un indizio interessante per risalire alla fonte originaria del gruppo di *Cepio*.

Innanzitutto, esclusa la possibilità che annalisti contemporanei, o quasi, all'avvenimento abbiano commesso un errore tanto marchiano, non resta che indirizzarsi verso una fonte intermedia verosimilmente di fine II-inizi I sec. a.C. che possa essere incorsa in tale fraintendimento. Essa potrebbe essere stata indotta in errore da un testo corrotto, ma è ugualmente probabile che possa aver tradotto affrettatamente la versione greca di uno storico latino. Anche questa seconda ipotesi permetterebbe di spiegare in modo abbastanza agevole l'errore sul nome: infatti, *Cepio* può derivare semplicemente da un originario (Σκιπίων >) Καιπίων. In ogni caso l'errore relativo alla carica ricoperta da Nasica può risultare invece da una banale confusione con il 155 a.C. anno in cui Nasica fu effettivamente console.

Secondo E. Salmon,[14] non si trattò di un errore ma una precisa tradizione creata per motivare lo scontro tra il console Cepione (cos. 106) e il tribuno L. Cassio Longino (tr.pl. 104). Il fatto, però, che Velleio dati correttamente l'episodio al 154 invece che al 111 BC (come Appiano) mostra che la loro fonte abbia usato una buona cronologia.

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[14] Salmon [13] 5-9.

## *Pisone e il Lupercal*

Com'è stato sottolineato, alcuni annalisti potevano presentare una versione dell'episodio di carattere anti-cassiano. In particolare, è presumibile che molto critico fosse Catone, poiché egli si oppose strenuamente alla presenza a Roma di filosofi greci nel 155 a.C.[15] Sfortunatamente, di Catone ci è pervenuto un troppo breve frammento relativo ad un'orazione pronunciata contro Cassio,[16] vero-similmente proprio nel 154 a.C., dal quale non è possibile stabilire la natura delle accuse al censore.

Invece, è possibile formulare qualche ipotesi maggiormente articolata per quanto riguarda l'opera di Pisone, anch'egli contemporaneo degli avvenimenti. Infatti, un celeberrimo frammento dei suoi annali relativo proprio al 154 a.C. riportato da Plinio (*HN* 17.38.244) c'illumina su un particolare 'prodigio' avvenuto a Roma lasciandoci intravedere sotto quale luce Pisone la presentasse la controversa censura.

Pisone afferma che a Roma, durante la guerra con Perseo, un ramo di palma spuntò sull'altare del tempio di Giove Capitolino come per auspicio di vittoria e dopo che esso fu abbattuto da una tempesta, nel corso della censura di M. Valerio Messala-C. Cassius nacque su quel luogo una *ficus*. Pisone, poi, *grauis auctor* non si esime dal commentare: *a quo tempore pudicitiam subuersam*. Che questa considerazione fosse originariamente contenuta negli annali di Pisone, è sostenibile poiché essa appare anche nel resoconto frammentario di Festo relativo al medesimo episodio probabilmente derivato da Pisone (attraverso Varrone?).[17] Lo stesso Varrone, poi, probabilmente scrisse sull'affaire del *theatrum lapideum* in un libro intitolato *De scaenicis originibus* giacché un minuscolo frammento recita *sub Ruminali ficu* ('sotto il fico Ruminale', fr. 72).[18]

A prescindere dall'aspetto 'folcloristico' dell'episodio, e dalla possibilità che la *pudicitia* possa alludere all'uccisione del console Postumio Albino

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[15] Gruen [3] 260ss.

[16] E. Malcovati (ed.), *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta: Liberae Rei Publicae*[2] (Torino 1955) 72, 45 n. 176.

[17] Fest. 398 (W. M. Lindsay [ed.], *Sexti Pompei Festi De Verborum Significatu Quae Supersunt cum Pauli Epitome* [Lipsiae 1913]; = 285 C. O. Müller [ed.], *Sexti Pompei Festi De Verborum Significatione Quae Supersunt, Cum Pauli Epitome Emendata et Annotata* [Lipsiae 1839]): *M. Vale* [. . .] [*Lon*]*ginus censores q. . .* [*pudici*]*tia in Capitolio in ara* [. . .] [*bello per*]*sico nata fuerat in* [. . .] [*na*]*tam ficum, infamesque* [. . .] [*sine*] *ullo pudicitiae respe*[*ctu*].

[18] G. Funaioli (ed.), *Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta* 1 (Lipsiae 1907).

avvelenato dalla moglie proprio nel 154 a.C. (Liv. *Per.* 48; Val. Max. 6.38),[19] questo brano induce ad interessanti riflessioni. Da un lato, non si può non notare come la datazione della seconda nascita miracolosa sia fornita con sospetta meticolosità e in modo del tutto irrituale su base censoria.[20] Pertanto, potrebbe essere visto come intenzionale il tentativo di far intravedere una connessione tra i censori e il prodigio. D'altronde, l'amara chiosa moralistica sulla pudicizia persa parrebbe rimandare il tono e il tipo di argomentazione usati da Nasica nella perorazione al senato.

Ma c'è di più. Il tipo di pianta usato per la messinscena svoltasi nei pressi dell'altare capitolino nel 154 a.C., la *ficus*, rappresenta forse l'elemento chiave del brano pisoniano la cui lettura getta nuova luce sullo scontro relativo all' 'affaire' del *theatrum lapideum*. Infatti, il 'miracolo' della *ficus* richiama alla mente la problematica tradizione sul doppio *Lupercal* di cui la *ficus ruminalis* costituiva la parte fondamentale.

La tradizione dell'allattamento dei gemelli sotto le fronde della *ficus* è antichissima. Almeno dalla fine del VI a.C. la leggenda della lupa sembra essersi già formata nei suoi caratteri fondamentali come potrebbe dimostrare la raffigurazione su un'idria caeretana[21]—una lupa con 2 cuccioli gemelli che viene sorpresa da due cacciatori fuori da una grotta (*Lupercal*) sotto un albero (*ficus ruminalis*). In ogni modo, la lupa bronzea c.d. capitolina è datata comunemente al V sec. a.C.[22]

Tuttavia, solo nel 296 a.C. gli edili Ogulnii aggiunsero le statue dei gemelli alla lupa e da quel momento in poi la tradizione sembra essersi consolidata rapidamente, giacché nelle coppe calene databili intorno alla metà del III sec. a.C. essa è presente in tutti i dettagli ad eccezione della presenza di Faustolo, lo scopritore dei gemelli.[23]

Le fonti letterarie tramandano due versioni circa la posizione del *Lupercal* originario che oscillano tra il Germalus, vale a dire le pendici del

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[19] G. Forsythe, *The Historian L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi and the Roman Annalistic Tradition* (Lanham 1994) 404-08. Per casi precedenti di casi di *matronae* coinvolte in avvelenamenti: Liv. 8.17.

[20] Valerio Messalla e Cassio furono censori nel 154: Broughton [7] 449.

[21] L. Pedroni, 'Mito e storia su alcune idrie caeretane', *Boreas* 23-24 (2000-01) 63-72.

[22] Recentemente: Steinby, *Lexicon* 6.292-96; A. Carandini, *La nascita di Roma* (Torino 1997) tav. 1s. In generale sui miti della prima Roma cfr. A. Carandini e R. Cappelli (edd.), *Roma: Romolo, Remo e la fondazione della città* (Roma 2000).

[23] R. Pagenstecher, *Die Calenische Reliefkeramik* (Berlin 1909) no. 19; L. Pedroni, *Ceramica calena a vernice nera: Produzione e diffusione* (Città di Castello 2001) 132 nn. 337s.

Palatino, e il Comizio. Secondo una diffusa leggenda,[24] al tempo del re Tarquino Prisco la *ficus ruminalis* sarebbe stata trasferita dal *Germalus* al Comizio sotto gli auspici dell'augure *Atta Nauius*.

 Dunque, qual'era il *Lupercal* originario? Il Coarelli ha sostenuto con argomenti convincenti che soltanto in età tardo-repubblicana sarebbe sorta la tradizione del *Lupercal* del *Germalus* e che in origine esso era invece localizzato al Comizio,[25] proprio dove, agli inizi del III sec. a.C., probabilmente gli Ogulni avevano aggiunto i gemelli alla statua della lupa (Liv. 10.23). L'idea che la tradizione del *Lupercal* del Germalus sia nata in età tardo-repubblicana è suffragata dall'iconografia di un denario argenteo sul quale è raffigurata la scena del ritrovamento dei gemelli allattati dalla lupa sotto la *ficus* da parte del pastore Faustulus.[26] La datazione di questa moneta è basata essenzialmente sull'interpretazione dell'evidenza dei tesoretti e su queste labili basi è stata assegnata al 137 a.C. Datando il denario al 137 a.C., è difficile proporre una spiegazione convincente della sua iconografia, a meno di non sostenere un significato generico.[27] Però non è possibile escludere una datazione più alta, non fosse altro per la presenza del segno di valore X invece che XVI o X̶ che potrebbe essere un indizio per datarlo prima della riforma che portò il denario d'argento a valere 16 assi di bronzo invece dei 10 originari. Tale riforma è attribuita dagli studiosi concordemente al periodo intorno alla terza guerra punica, con varianti tra il 147 e il 141 a.C.[28] Dunque una data anteriore alla riforma giustificherebbe appieno la particolare iconografia che altrimenti sarebbe poco significativa.[29]

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[24] Steinby, *Lexicon* 2.248s. Cfr. G. Lahusen, *Untersuchungen zur Ehrenstatue in Rom: Literarusche uund epigraphische Zeugnisse* (Rome 1983) 12s.; H. Lavagne, *Operosa antra: Recherches sur la grotte à Rome de Sylla à Hadrien* (Rome 1988) 203-15.

[25] Steinby, *Lexicon* 3.198s.; F. Coarelli, *Il Foro Romano II: Periodo repubblicano e augusteo*[2] (Roma 1992) 29.

[26] *RRC* no. 235.1; cfr. Steinby, *Lexicon* 4.1.130-32 n. 7; M. Krumme, *Römische Sagen in der antiken Münzprägung* (Marburg 1995) 36s.

[27] *RRC* no. 268. Cfr. anche W. E. Metcalf, 'Coins as Primary Evidence', in G. M. Paul (ed.), *Roman Coins and Public Life under the Empire* (Ann Arbor 1999) 4-10.

[28] R. Thomsen, *Early Roman Coinage* 2 (Copenhagen 1961) 214 (*ca.* 145 a.C.); *RRC*, 611-13; M. H. Crawford, *Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic* (Berkeley 1985) 145 (141 a.C.); L. Pedroni, *Asse romano e asse italico: Momenti di un'integrazione difficile* (Napoli 1996) 79-89 (147 a.C.). Tuttavia, cfr. P. Marchetti, *Histoire économique et monétaire de la deuxième guerre Punique* (Bruxelles 1978) 302-05 (fine del III secolo a.C.).

[29] Considerando che alcune fonti ricordano che i materiali di costruzione del teatro furono venduti, non sarebbe impossibile che l'argento per la coniazione del denario possa essere stato racimolato in quel modo.

La precisazione topografica fornita da Velleio sulla localizzazione del teatro di Cassio proprio accanto al *Lupercal* contribuisce con il frammento di Pisone a sostenere l'ipotesi che uno degli argomenti dello scontro politico possa essere stato proprio la tradizione sull'antico luogo sacro. Da questo punto di vista, l'iconografia del *denarius*, in stretta relazione con il *Lupercal*, potrebbe rappresentare il momento topico dello scontro sulla costruzione del teatro accanto all'originario luogo sacro.

Tra l'altro il curatore dell'emissione monetale è un membro della famiglia Pompeia:[30] Cn. Pompeio. Nel 142 a.C. Scipione Africano Minore (distruttore di Cartagine) ripudiò l'amicizia di Pompeio quando egli non appoggiò la candidatura di Lelio al consolato del 141 a.C., presentando invece se stesso (Q. Pompeio fu console proprio nel 141) Nella censura del 142 (tenuta da Scipione Africano Minore) Scipione Nasica Corculum fu rieletto Princeps Senatus. In tal modo non sorprende che nel 154 un membro della *gens* Pompeia possa essere stato, più o meno velatamente, a favore di Nasica contro Cassio.[31]

Pertanto, l'idea che Nasica abbia usato, tra i vari argomenti per convincere il senato a distruggere il teatro, quello del sacrilegio, la violazione del *Lupercal* ancestrale, è da prendere in considerazione. In definitiva, il frammento di Pisone relativo al prodigio della *ficus* (e si ricordi che l'annalista è un contemporaneo) e l'iconografia particolarissima del denario argenteo firmato da Cn. Pompeio sostengono la possibilità che in qualche modo ci sia stato effettivamente uno scontro politico sulla costruzione di un teatro lapideo nel 154 a.C.

### *Cassio e Nasica: Un'inimicizia personale?*

Sulla scorta di una suggestione del Mazzarino,[32] è opportuno a questo punto soffermarsi sulla presunta ostilità tra i due protagonisti dell'affaire del *theatrum lapideum*. Secondo Plinio (*HN* 34.14.10), Pisone avrebbe narrato l'episodio della rimozione delle statue erette senza l'approvazione del popolo e del senato romano da parte dei censori del 159-58 a.C.; tra quelle statue anche quella che presso il tempio di Tellus eresse per sé Sp. Cassio, fu fusa dai censori.

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[30] Alcuni studiosi hanno espresso dubbi sul gentilizio: G. Alteri, *Tipologia delle monete della repubblica di Roma (con particolare riferimento al denario)* (Città del Vaticano 1990) 106; W. E. Metcalf [27] 4-5. Fostlus rappresenta probabilmente il nome del pastore e non il *cognomen* di Pompeo.

[31] Potrebbe non essere un caso, comunque, che il primo teatro di pietra fu costruito da Pompeo Magno e che il denario d'argento con la scena di *Lupercal* fosse firmato da un membro della *gens* Pompeia.

[32] S. Mazzarino, *Il pensiero storico classico*[2] 2 (Bari 1983) 303s.

Generalmente si spiega questa particolare versione della storia del processo di Spurio Cassio attribuendola ad un errore di Plinio. Senza addentrarsi nel complesso problema della tradizione su quell'episodio della storia arcaica di Roma,[33] basterà qui ricordare che secondo la versione canonica, dopo la sua condanna, i beni di Sp. Cassio furono votati e dalla loro vendita fu realizzata una statua dedicata a Tellus. Dunque, contrariamente alla versione più accreditata confluita negli scritti di Livio e Dionigi secondo cui la statua fu realizzata con i beni confiscati al condannato, Pisone avrebbe affermato che la statua fu fatta da Spurio stesso, con l'ovvio motivo dell'auto-celebrazione, e quindi da lui dedicata a Tellus.

Come tramandano Livio e Dionigi (Liv. 2.41.10; Val. Max. 5.8.2; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8.79.1), sulla tradizione del processo a Spurio Cassio accanto alla versione più accreditata circolava una meno verosimile, ma che comunque era sostenuta da autori attendibili: ἐν γραφαῖς ἀξιοχρέοις φέρεται ('riportata in opere storiche autorevoli', Dion. Hal. 8.79.1). Secondo questa versione, Spurio sarebbe stato giudicato, condannato e messo a morte da un tribunale 'familiare' e la statua sarebbe stata dedicata con il ricavato della vendita dei suoi beni dal padre. Una versione senza dubbio favorevole a Spurio in cui si tentava, se non di mascherare la grave colpa dell' *adfectatio regni*, almeno di salvare l'onore della famiglia.

Lo stesso Dionigi ammette che questa versione era senz'altro meno credibile di quella in cui Spurio sarebbe stato messo a morte da un tribunale pubblico perché le statue e i beni dedicati a Cerere appartennero a Spurio e non a suo padre. In altri termini, la proprietà dei beni confiscati e dedicati alla divinità implica la *manumissio* del figlio che era indipendente e non poteva essere messo a morte dal padre.

Questa versione incentrata sul tribunale familiare è ricordata da Valerio Massimo (5.8.2) e potrebbe nascondere una diretta derivazione da un autore favorevole ai Cassi. Naturalmente, volendo fare un nome per una fonte favorevole ai Cassi, il primo è quello dell'annalista Cassio Hemina. Il frammento pisoniano sulla statua di Sp. Cassio diventa particolarmente interessante quando si considera che, secondo l'autore, essa fu tra quelle abbattute dai censori in carica nel 159 BC, i quali provvidero ad eliminare tutte

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[33] G. Niccolini [8] 8-10; E. Gabba, 'Dionigi d'Alicarnasso sul processo di Spurio Cassio', *La storia del diritto nel quadro delle scienze storiche* (Firenze 1966) 143-53; Broughton [7] 20; O. de Cazenove, 'Sp. Cassius, Cérès et Tellus', *REL* 67 (1989) 93-116; A. Bottiglieri, 'La storiografia anticassiana e la vicenda di Spurio Cassio', in G. Franciosi (ed.), *Ricerche sulla organizzazione gentilizia romana* 3 (Napoli 1995) 255-65; B. Liou-Gille, 'La Sanction des leges sacratae et l'adfectatio regni: Spurius Cassius, Spurius Maelius et Manlius Capitolinus', *PP* 51 (1996) 161ss.

le statue erette senza il consenso del popolo e del senato. Ora, non può essere casuale che uno dei censori in carica allora fosse Scipione Nasica Corculum.[34]

Forse, l'eco della polemica sulla rimozione delle statue può essere percepita da un'altra azione del censore Cassio che tentò di votare una statua di Concordia e per ntale motivo consultò i Pontefici. Quest'ultimi rimandarono la questione al popolo, affermando che solo il popolo potesse deliberare su tale materia (Cic. *Dom*. 130, 136). D'altro canto, l'episodio della tentata dedica della statua di Concordia, anche perché riferito da una fonte assolutamente fededegna quale Cicerone, conferma la gravità dello scontro politico del 154 a.C.[35] Per una fortunata circostanza uno dei rari frammenti tramandatici dell'opera storica dell'annalista Cassio Hemina riguarda proprio il caso della rimozione delle statue del 159-58. Esso è, purtroppo, troppo breve per lasciare intendere in che modo l'annalista giudicasse i fatti (fr. 23P[36]). Tuttavia, resta il dubbio se il frammento abbia fatto parte dei suoi Annali o di un'operetta dedicata all'attività dei censori.[37] Hemina fu con Pisone contemporaneo dei fatti e la sua opera ebbe vasta risonanza (cfr. Plin. *HN* 13.84, 29.12).[38]

Dunque, ricapitolando, pur ignorando l'esistenza di motivi di inimicizia personale tra Cassio e Nasica, sembra possibile ipotizzare uno scontro precedente all'affare del teatro lapideo. La costruzione di un teatro permanente destinato alle performances dei Ludi Megalesia presso il tempio della Magna Mater, monumento simbolo degli Scipioni Nasicae, poteva essere stato visto come un affronto personale. Cassio avrebbe in quel modo affiancato o addirittura sovrapposto il suo nome a quello di Nasica. Dunque, come ha ipotizzato il Mazzarino,[39] gli episodi delle censure del 159-58 e 154-53 sembrano costituire una sorta di pendant: Nasica fece rimuovere la statua di Cassio; Cassio tentò di costruire il teatro di pietra che poi Nasica fece abbattere.

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[34] Broughton [7] 445s.

[35] Altari o templi furono votati o dedicati a Concordia in periodo di crisi politiche interne: da Camillo nel 367 a.C. (Ov. *Fast*. 1.641-44; Plut. *Cam*. 42.4-6; Steinby, *Lexicon* 1.316-20; da Cn. Flavio nel 304 a.C. (Liv. 9.46.6; Plin. *HN* 33.19; Steinby, *Lexicon* 1.320s.; da L. Opimio nel 121 a.C. (App. *B. Civ* 1.26; Varro *Ling*. 5.156; cf. Plut. *C. Gracch*. 17.6; Augist. *De Civ. D.* 3.25; Steinby, *Lexicon* 1.316-20; L. A. Burckardt, *Politische Strategien der Optimaten in der Späten römischen Republick* (Stuttgart 1988) 70-85; da Cesare nel 44 a.C. (Cass. Dio 44.4.5; Steinby, *Lexicon* 1.321.

[36] C. Santini (ed. e tr.), *I frammenti di L. Cassio Emina: Introduzione, testo, traduzione e commento* (Pisa 1995) fr. 42.

[37] Mazzarino [32] 302s.; Santini [36] 197; *contra*: H. Peter (ed.), *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae*[2] 1-2 (Stuttgart 1967) Cass. Hem. fr. 23.

[38] Santini [36] 40.

[39] Mazzarino [32] 303s.

*Conclusioni*

La fondamentale questione concernente la realtà storica di un tentativo di costruzione di un teatro stabile alla metà del II sec. a.C. a Roma sembra confermata dall'analisi fin qui svolta. Non di meno, sebbene alcune fonti si mostrino più generiche, pare indiscutibile che Cassio abbia giocato il ruolo del protagonista nell'affaire del teatro lapideo, innanzitutto per la sua impetuosa personalità dimostrata già nel 171 a.C. quando invase la Macedonia contro l'ordine del senato[40] e poi perché egli tentò di dedicare una statua di Concordia (Cic. *Dom.* 130; cf. 136).[41] Entrambi episodi difficilmente ricostruiti dall'annalistica posteriore.

Tuttavia, gli interrogativi circa i motivi che spinsero Cassio a progettare un teatro di pietra vicino al tempio della Magna Mater sono destinati a rimanere senza risposte certe. In ogni caso, la presenza a Roma di alcuni famosi filosofi nel 155 a.C.[42] potrebbe aver costituito l'impulso decisivo per l'idea di un teatro permanente. Con l'entusiasmo suscitato dall'arrivo dei filosofi greci (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 22s.), sembrava essere giunto il momento per il partito filo-ellenizzante e per quelli più intolleranti al potere senatorio di realizzare una costruzione stabile. Sotto questa influenza ellenizzante, la scelta della localizzazione fu molto significativa: accanto al santuario della più greca delle divinità accolte nel pantheon romano alla quale erano dedicati giochi e rappresentazioni di tipo greco. La reazione del partito più conservatore (Catone) supportato dagli Scipioni (Nasicae) si oppose con successo al tentativo usando tutte le armi politiche, retoriche e propagandistiche a disposizione. Non si può escludere che l'uccisione di Postumio Albino console del 154 a.C., vicino al personaggio che accolse l'ambasceria dei filosofi greci l'anno precedente (Cic. *Acad.* 2.45.137; Gell. *NA* 6.14.8-10) e che fu rimpiazzato da un Acilio, appartenente anch'egli a una famiglia filo-ellenizzante (Gell. *NA* 6.14.9; Macrob. *Sat.* 1.5.15; Plut *Cat. Mai.* 22.4)[43] ma vicino all'entourage scipionico, possa essere connessa allo scontro di quel periodo. Naturalmente, nel 154 non vi erano le condizioni politiche, sociali e ideologiche per la realizzazione di un teatro stabile a Roma.

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[40] Broughton [7] 416; Gruen [3] 230s.; R. Feig Vishnia, *State, Society and Popular Leaders in Mid-Republican Rome 241-167 BC* (London 1996) 136s.

[41] Cfr. Burckardt [35] 74; F. Marco Simón e F. Pina Polo, 'Concordia y libertas como polos de referencia religiosa en la lucha política de la república tardía', *Gerión* 18 (2000) 285.

[42] Gruen [3] 341ss. Su Carneade a Roma: J. Glucker, 'Carneades in Rome: Some Unsolved Problems', in J. G. F. Powell e J. A. North (edd.), *Cicero's Republic* (London 2001) 57-82.

[43] Scrisse annali in greco: Cic. *Off.* 3.32.113; Liv. 25.39.11, 35.14.1.

Esse maturarono solo nel 55 a.C. quando Pompeo[44] costruì il primo vero *theatrum lapideum*, proprio ad un *saeculum* dopo il tentativo di Cassio.[45]

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[44] E. Frézouls, 'La construction du théâtre *lapideum* et son contexte politique', in *Théâtre et spectacles dans l'antiquité: Actes du colloque de Strasbourg, 5-7 novembre 1981* (Leiden 1983) 193-214.; F. Coarelli, 'Le Théâtre de Pompée', *DHA* 23 (1997) 105-24; Steinby, *Lexicon* 4.35-38.

[45] Sul significato simbolico del *saeculum*: F. Coarelli, 'Note sui *ludi saeculares*', in *Spectacles sportifs et scéniques dans le monde étrusco-italique* (Rome 1993) 211-45; G. Freyburger, 'Jeux et chronologie à Rome', *Ktèma* 18 (1993) 91-101; H. Pavis d'Escurac, 'Siècle et Jeux Séculaires', *Ktèma* 18 (1993) 79-89; L. Pedroni, 'La triga sui denarii repubblicani e i *ludi* del *rex*', *BNum* 20 (1993) 108s.; L. Pedroni, '*Saecula* e *ludi saeculares* sulle monete repubblicane: Nuovi elementi per un'ipotesi dimenticata', *RIN* 99 (1999) 93-112.

# REVIEW ARTICLES

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## NERO THE SUN KING

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Edward Champlin, *Nero*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2003. Pp. xii + 346. ISBN 0-674-01192-9. USD29.95.

A generation after his death the bleak image of Nero that dominates the modern tradition was firmly in place; it is evident, for instance, in the play *Octavia*, in which Nero appears as a murderous, unredeemable tyrant with pretensions to divinity.[1] Killer of his mother and wives, arsonist and first persecutor of the Christians—the indictment is all too familiar. But was Nero really as terrible as his reputation suggests? Under the Flavians Josephus records (*AJ* 20.154) that some earlier writers had good things to say of the last Julio-Claudian, and remnants of a favourable tradition still survive in a substantive portion of Suetonius' biography, a work from the early second century that purposefully segregates the emperor's if not praiseworthy then not altogether reprehensible accomplishments from the crimes and follies that are catalogued at greater length. The names of some of the early writers are known, but their writings no longer exist. It is impossible therefore to reconstruct the history of Nero from contemporary narrative sources and to distinguish the man from the myth. Even the best surviving account, that of Tacitus in the *Annals*, is not a true primary source (for all its greatness), contemporary as it is with Suetonius' life.

Trying to fathom who had earlier said what about Nero has long been a preoccupation of scholars devoted to the science (or art) of *Quellenforschung*, with results often disproportionate to the degree of ingenuity displayed. Not the least of the many fine features of Edward Champlin's brilliant new book on Nero, however, is a refreshing discussion of the lost sources on which the extant accounts drew (including that of the third-century Greek historian Cassius Dio), in which Champlin argues for the superiority of Cluvius Rufus' lost work over the versions of the elder Pliny and Fabius Rusticus but also more importantly shows how impossible it is ever to know

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[1] Though attributed to Seneca, the play was composed in the Flavian era: see R. Ferri (ed.), *Octavia* (Cambridge 2003) 5-30; cf. J. G. Fitch (ed.), *Seneca: Tragedies* 2 (Cambridge, Mass. 2004) 512f. (between AD 68 and 70).

anything of Nero's life and reign with real certainty. The facts about Nero as they appear in the surviving narratives must always be weighed for their inherent 'accuracy and probability' (p. 52), and historians must always be sceptical of how those facts were construed.

It is something of a surprise, however, to find in the body of the book that Champlin consistently takes passages from the extant narratives at face value with little regard for putting this principle into practice. Champlin follows Suetonius very literally on Nero's vices (p. 156); the tour of Greece (p. 170), where Suetonius' comments are 'more precise' than those of others; the great fire (p. 179), where Suetonius is 'eloquent'; conversely his story about Nero and the Vestal Rubria is dismissed as 'extremely unlikely' (p. 163); he can even quote the biographer to show what was in Nero's mind at the time of the eiselastic triumph of 67 (p. 233). Cassius Dio is taken very literally to support the notion that it was Nero who gave Sporus his name (pp. 149f.); Tacitus is also construed literally for the view that Poppaea persuaded Nero to kill Agrippina (p. 86) even though the truth behind Poppaea's rise to power is earlier said to be beyond recovery (pp. 46-48). Why in cases like these one source is preferred over others Champlin does not explain, confident enough in his own judgement, it seems, to decide what can and cannot be trusted in the surviving material. He is convinced comparably that Suetonius' unique and notoriously problematical account of Nero's flight from Rome and death is based on eye-witness accounts ('certainly', p. 6) and that Cluvius Rufus, presumably Suetonius' source, 'must have' interviewed them (pp. 49f.). But who those eye-witnesses were and precisely why they 'must have' been interviewed by Cluvius (no one else?) are matters that warrant no discussion.

Many of the details in the book are therefore open to question. But this does not alter the fact that the book is by far the most enjoyable and rewarding modern work on Nero I know. The chief reason for this is that it is not in any sense a conventional Roman historical biography. Traditional topics are mostly avoided (there is nothing on the influence on the young Nero of Seneca and Burrus); tortuous prosopographical reconstructions of Neronian politics are absent; and pedantic attempts, inevitably benighted, to create a reliable chronology for this year or that are wisely eschewed. Instead, Champlin's project is to reveal Nero as in every sense a theatrical ruler who consciously set out to present himself to Rome and the Romans as a showman and stage-actor, a figure whose every performance was an act of obsessive self-justification and validation and who deliberately sought and achieved mass popularity in everything that he did. In itself this is of course by no means new. But the way in which the project is carried out is new, for Champlin sets the facts in their cultural context in a way that has never been done before by pointing to the ubiquitous presence in Roman society and culture of myth and legend which, Champlin believes, provided Nero with a readily available language for communicating to mass audiences the explanations and justifications of the many crimes he was thought to have committed. At the same time Champlin insists that the events of the reign must be

evaluated from Nero's own perspective. So it is in the methodology and the assumption that Champlin takes as his starting point that the book's originality lies.

The results are often very good. Champlin maintains, for example, that the charges of murder that followed the deaths of Agrippina and Poppaea were publicly raised when Nero appeared on stage as Oedipus, Orestes and Hercules, and he stresses that these mythological roles had the effect of presenting the emperor to the world as an innocent victim of fate whose crimes were not his personal responsibility: 'By mythologizing himself and his crime, [Nero] both distanced the crime and clothed himself in the aura of a hero. The goal was not to prove his innocence, but to accept guilt and to justify it' (p. 103). Again, and more importantly still, by pursuing all the mythological ramifications of the Apolline, Solar, and Herculean imagery so prevalent in the sources, Champlin reveals how Nero consciously created an Augustus-inspired image of himself as a sort of superhuman 'Roi-Soleil' that his subjects would easily recognise and appreciate, and he argues persuasively that Nero's ideological and aesthetic experimentation became more and more self-conscious over time. Thus, if it was in 59 that he first promoted the idea of an Apolline golden age—detectable in Lucan's poetry and celebrations of Nero as Apollo on the coinage and as new Apollo on inscriptions—from 64 on he became Sol the benefactor of mankind who through the microcosmic medium of the Golden House presided over a macrocosmic empire in which Herculean acts such as the cutting of the Isthmus at Corinth were well within his reach. Champlin stops short of claiming for Nero a solar theocracy. But by relating the mythological imagery evident in the sources to the manner in which the Roman public saw its emperor in the theatre, circus and amphitheatre, he presents a powerful and seductive case for envisioning Nero as a sun-king who imaginatively contrived his own political ideology.

If contextualising myth is the main way in which Champlin finds a logic in the narrative sources, at times he extends the technique to other aspects of Roman culture. Thus the centrality of *spectacula* is spelled out to show the increasing professionalism of Nero as aesthete and sportsman (his skills as a horseman, incidentally, had a certain appeal for A. N. Sherwin-White). The conventions of the Saturnalia are explored to provide a view of Nero's sexual and luxurious excesses as topsy-turvy orchestrations by a philhellene with a taste for low company who found inspiration in the subversive behaviour of his ancestor Antony. And the traditions of the triumph are described to allow reconstruction of three richly triumphalist moments: the return to Rome after Agrippina's death in the summer of 59; the coronation of Tiridates in 66, in what amounted to an elaborate public pageant; and the iselastic entry to Rome in late 67, when 'the very streets of Rome were for a time one vast theatre and Nero was again the star performer' (p. 234). The account of Tiridates' coronation in the Roman forum is especially gripping (pp. 228f.):

> When Nero entered with the senators and the guard, he ascended the Rostra and sat in his chair of state, looking back down the Forum in an east-southeasterly direction. That is, as Tiridates approached him through the ranks of soldiers, the rising sun would have hit Nero full on the face, in all his

triumphal splendor. The prince then addressed the emperor from the ground, looking up to him on the Rostra: "I have come to you, my god, worshipping you as I do Mithra." The important point—something Nero would know as an initiate, whether others did or not—is that for Zoroastrians the sun was the eye of Mithra, and Mithra was often so closely associated with the sun as to be identified with it: "the Sun whom they call Mithres," as Strabo puts it. Moreover, when Zoroastrians prayed in the open air, they turned toward the sun, since their religion bound them to pray facing fire. Thus, when Tiridates stood in the open Roman Forum facing the sunlit emperor, and worshipping him as he did Mithra, he was in essence worshipping the sun. An ex-praetor translated his words and proclaimed them to the crowd. At this stage in Rome's history, very few of those present would have known who Mithra was, but there is a good likelihood that the interpreter relayed Tiridates' words as "I have come to you, my god, worshipping you as I do the Sun." For Nero, the marriage of Roman triumph and Parthian ceremony culminated in a splendid theatrical affirmation of his role as the new god of the Sun.

How credible is the overall case? The issue of the narrative sources apart, there are three considerations that give pause. First, the myths explored sometimes require an excess of faith to work as explanatory devices. Champlin believes (p. 106), for instance, that after Poppaea's death Nero sang the role of Canace in childbirth to win popular sympathy for her loss, but his reasoning is entirely speculative and depends on Nero's presentation in unknown form of one of several variations of what is admitted to be an obscure and minor story. Likewise, to bring forward Vesta's connections with the safety of the city as evidence that Nero himself started the great fire (p. 190)—though he hedges: 'It *looks as if* Nero was responsible' (p. 191; my emphasis)—is very close to special pleading.

Secondly, the theory that Nero was a dramaturge who used myth as a vehicle of communication demands a public audience able to understand his messages. This is constantly assumed but never convincingly argued. After the great fire Nero propitiated Vulcan and Ceres in ways, Champlin proposes, that made people recall on the one hand Romulus' digging of a trench when founding the city that became associated with Ceres as an entrance to the underworld (the *mundus*), and also reminded them on the other hand of Romulus' first victory in warfare and eventual death or disappearance on the Volcanal (pp. 192-94). But even if the point is granted that Roman audiences expected to see contemporary meaning in public spectacles, how could it be known or shown that the entire city population had the sort of intimate knowledge of myth and legend that this proposition requires, perceptible as that knowledge now is only through elite and often arcane literary texts such as, appositely enough, the tragedies of Seneca?[2] Champlin likes to say in such circumstances that everyone understood the rich treasury of classical myth and legend—'All these stories were familiar to every Roman' (p. 195)—but this is no more than assertion and the

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[2] On the highly literary qualities of Seneca's tragedies, see C. A. J. Littlewood, *Self-representation and Illusion in Senecan Tragedy* (Oxford 2004).

fact of the matter is never demonstrated (there is a difference). To take another example: a story of incest between Periander and his mother found in the Greek poet Parthenius is key to Champlin's notion that the Greek tyrant 'provided for Nero a veritable mirror for princes' (p. 109). Yet how could the Roman public have known the story and understood Nero's meaning if, as a recent critic has observed, Parthenius' story failed to find much of a following?[3]

Finally, the view that Nero was a highly self-conscious actor is again difficult to substantiate, so that the degree of initiative Champlin ascribes to him in the manipulation of spectacular events must often be left open. The idea, for example, that it was Nero himself who decided to dress his Christian victims as Danaids and Dirce (p. 123) might be appealing, but it cannot be authenticated any more than the notion that the 'creative reason' (p. 125) behind Nero's wandering through the city dressed as a sun-symbolising charioteer after the fire was to restore light to a darkened night. No one today will be unmindful of the implications of the 'fatal charades' that were so crucial an element of Roman culture, but the problem of establishing the historical actor's agency is fundamental here and needs to be addressed directly, which it is not. Sometimes, moreover, wider perspectives could come into play. Champlin attributes inspiration for the Golden House solely to Nero, which may of course be right, but the names of Severus and Celer are notably absent from his discussion of the Sun God's house, which means that any conceptual contributions to the complex that may have come from those gifted men (cf. Tac. *Ann.* 15.42) or from the painter Fabullus (Plin. *HN* 35.120), who is equally neglected, are automatically concealed from view.[4]

What Champlin has written, therefore, is a marvellously rhetorical brief for a theory that illuminates much of what remains in the historical tradition about Nero but which in the end raises as many questions as it answers. The book is imaginative, evocative, stylishly written and a delight to read (and re-read). It is based on impeccable research and a fine sense of Roman topography. But the points I have raised are, I think, real issues, no matter how captivating the rhetoric. And in the end of course, despite Champlin's sensitivity to problems of historical tradition and the early demonstration that Nero long retained the popularity he once enjoyed while alive, and despite the persuasiveness of the idea that Nero was an energetic artist and ingenious manipulator of his own public image, the monstrosity of the man cannot be dispelled. The loss of the early narratives that made counter claims on his behalf with an authority (one supposes) no longer attainable is a cause of enduring regret.

A final point. Suetonius (*Ner.* 56) records that Nero despised all cults except that of the Dea Syria. It does not seem to me to follow, however, that the Sun-King did not believe in other divinities, especially in Apollo, the god who was so important to him (cf. p. 133). Religious belief is a complex category in any time and place. Yet

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[3] E. Archibald, *Incest and the Medieval Imagination* (Oxford 2001) 60.

[4] For possibilities see L. F. Ball, *The Domus Aurea and the Roman Architectural Revolution* (Cambridge 2003); E. W. Leach, *The Social Life of Painting in Ancient Rome and on the Bay of Naples* (Cambridge 2004) 156-66.

what it meant in the polytheistic world of Rome calls for no investigation here. Moreover, the radiate crown with which Nero is shown on certain of his coins is correctly taken as a symbol of divinity, and the logical consequence must be that a personal claim to godhead was made. The divine Sun-King, I imagine, believed in himself.

# THE ORIGINS OF RACISM?

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In this ambitious, monumental book, Benjamin Isaac has produced a provocative, revisionist study on a topic of crucial relevance to our contemporary world. His book will be certain to provoke sharp debate and controversy. Many classical scholars subscribe to the views of Frank M. Snowden, who argues in two well-known books that the world of Greek and Roman antiquity was remarkably free of what we should call racial prejudice.[1] In another well-known book, Lloyd A. Thompson argues that although we clearly find signs of group prejudice and 'somatic norm preferences' among the Romans, we cannot say that the ancient Romans were racists.[2] Isaac challenges such views by arguing that there are unmistakable instances throughout Greek and Roman literature of what he calls 'proto-racism'. Whether or not one agrees with Isaac's contention will largely depend on one's conception and definition of racism.[3]

A lengthy introduction lays out the conceptual framework that informs subsequent chapters.[4] The stated aims are 'to contribute to an understanding of the intellectual origins of racism and xenophobia' (p. 4), and 'to show that some essential elements of later racism have their roots in Greek and Roman thinking' (p. 5). A

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[1] F. M. Snowden, *Blacks in Antiquity: Ethiopians in the Greco-Roman Experience* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970); F. M. Snowden, *Before Color Prejudice: The Ancient View of Blacks* (Cambridge, Mass. 1983).

[2] L. A. Thompson, *Romans and Blacks* (Norman 1989). For the Roman world, see the older study by A. N. Sherwin-White, *Racial Prejudice in Imperial Rome* (Cambridge 1967).

[3] Isaac concedes as much: '[I]t is appropriate to observe that no single definition will ever satisfy everybody, for racism is not a scientific theory or concept, but a complex of ideas, attitudes, and forms of behavior which are themselves by definition irrational' (p. 22).

[4] Remaining notes in this paragraph provide commentary and/or supplementary bibliography for specific peoples treated in individual chapters.

corollary aim is to provide an enhanced understanding of ancient imperialism by considering the degree to which negative attitudes towards other peoples contributed to it. The book breaks down into two parts: 'Stereotypes and Proto-Racism: Criteria for Differentiation' and 'Greek and Roman Attitudes Towards Specific Groups: Greek and Roman Imperialism'. Part One is subdivided into the following chapters: 'Superior and Inferior Peoples' (pp. 55-168), 'Conquest and Imperialism' (pp. 169-224), and 'Fears and Suppression' (pp. 225-48). Part Two is comprised of chapters on 'Greeks and the East' (pp. 257-303),[5] 'Roman Imperialism and the Conquest of the East' (pp. 304-23), 'Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Syrians' (pp. 323-51),[6] 'Parthia/ Persia' (pp. 352-70), 'Roman Views of Greeks' (pp. 371-80),[7] 'Mountaineers and Plainsmen' (pp. 406-10),[8] 'Gauls' (pp. 411-26),[9] 'Germans' (pp. 427-39) and 'Jews' (pp. 440-91).

Isaac defines racism as follows: 'an attitude towards individuals and groups of peoples which posits a direct and linear connection between physical and mental qualities. It therefore attributes to those individuals and groups of peoples collective traits, physical, mental, and moral, which are constant and unalterable by human will, because they are caused by hereditary factors or external influences, such as climate or

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[5] Isaac argues that the 'association of the East with despotism, effeminacy, moral degeneration, and lack of discipline is first encountered in the literature of the fourth century' (p. 297). While it cannot be doubted that negative Greek stereotypes of eastern barbarians, particularly Persians, quickened in the fourth century (as, for example, in Isocrates' *Panegyricus*), it seems to me that Isaac's statement goes too far. After all, what are we to make of the message of the 'Eurymedon *oinochoe*', dated *circa* 465 BCE and included in Isaac's plates (figures 2A and 2B), and the arguments of E. Hall (cited repeatedly by Isaac), *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self- Definition Through Tragedy* (Oxford 1989), who sees the formation of the Greek-barbarian bipolarity as a product of the Persian War experience? Indeed, according to M. C. Miller, *Athens and Persia in the Fifth Century BC: A Study in Cultural Receptivity* (Cambridge 1997), Athenian stereotypes of Persians had already passed through a violently hostile and negative phase by the late fifth century, by which time they had been tamed and incorporated as part of Athenian imperial culture. It is odd that we find no mention at all of E. Said, *Orientalism* (New York 1978), who cites Aeschylus's *Persians* as his first example of Orientalist discourse in western literature. On Aeschylus's *Persians*, see T. Harrison, *The Emptiness of Asia: Aeschylus' Persians and the History of the Fifth Century* (London 2000), who seeks to restore Athenian ethnocentrism and a condescending, patriotic triumphalism to the play.

[6] Add P. Barceló, 'The Perception of Carthage in Classical Greek Historiography', *AClass* 37 (1994) 1-14.

[7] I discuss this topic at length in *Cultural Politics in Polybius's Histories* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 2004), which was unavailable to Isaac at the time of writing.

[8] Add E. Dench, *From Barbarians to New Men: Greek, Roman, and Modern Perceptions of Peoples of the Central Apennines* (Oxford 1995).

[9] Add H. Bellen, *Metus Gallicus, Metus Punicus: Zum Furchtmotiv in der römischen Republik* (Wiesbaden 1985).

geography' (p. 23).[10] The crucial point for Isaac is the fact that racism is unlike ethnic and other group prejudices insofar as racial prejudice does not allow for 'the possibility of change at an individual or collective level in principle. In these other forms of prejudice, the presumed group characteristics are not by definition held to be stable, unalterable, or imposed from the outside through physical factors: biology, climate, or geography' (p. 27).

First of all, it is obvious that Greek and Roman forms of group prejudice based on unalterable physical factors are not the same as racism in the modern sense of the term. That conception had to await the nineteenth century, with Mendel's peas and Darwin's voyage on *H. M. S. Beagle*. Isaac explicitly states at the outset that he is claiming that important conceptual antecedents for modern racism are to be found in Greek and Roman antiquity; he is not claiming that the Greeks and Romans already had ideas of 'scientific racism'.[11] The crucial link between modern racism and ancient 'proto-racism' in Isaac's conception is the ancient preoccupation with environmental determinism. Here two key ideas emerge: that people can only become worse as a result of relocating to different climates and geographical locations; and that once environmental factors have determined degenerate characteristics, these characteristics cannot be undone even when an entire people permanently relocates to an optimal climate. In this connection Isaac discusses a remarkable chapter (14) in the Hippocratic treatise *Airs, Waters, Places*. In this passage we learn of the heredity of acquired characteristics: the 'Longheads' of Trapezus artificially elongated the heads of their children, but after sufficient time had passed, this was no longer necessary since children were born with naturally elongated heads (pp. 74f.).[12]

Isaac maintains that the environmental-determinist approach was the predominant one among Greeks and Romans for explaining collective differences among peoples and that the rigidity of this approach in Greek and Roman 'proto-racism' informed more recent and insidious forms of racism.[13] This is an assertion that is certainly open to challenge. A rival ancient explanation for collective

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[10] Isaac provides a comprehensive bibliography of modern works on racism at p. 15 n. 36, to which I would add I. Hannaford, *Race: The History of an Idea in the West* (Baltimore 1996). On prejudice and stereotypes, add G. W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, Mass. 1954); and J.-Ph. Leyens, V. Yzerbyt and G. Schadron, *Stereotypes and Social Cognition* (London 1994).

[11] 'I certainly do not claim that we are dealing here with the specific form of scientific racism which was the product of the nineteenth century' (p. 1); but cf. p. 165 on Athenian ideas of autochthony: 'It could even be said that the Athenians regarded themselves as a "race" in modern terms'.

[12] *Airs, Waters, Places* is, of course, the environmental-determinist tract *par excellence*. Another is Arist. *Pol.* 1327b23-33, with imperialistic overtones (see also 1285a19-22). In Roman guise, *mutatis mutandis*, see Vitruv. *Arch.* 6.1.11.

[13] '[T]he dominant approach . . . is the environmental theory: an environmental determinism which made it possible for Greek and Roman texts to describe foreign peoples in terms of fixed physical and mental traits, determined by climate and geography' (p. 503).

characteristics stressed political and social institutions. Indeed, it can easily be argued that state organisation is the single most important causal factor in ancient Greek theory on collective characteristics. At the inception of the Greek literary tradition, Homer characterises the brutish Cyclopes as beings without any formal institutional structures for law and order (*Od.* 9.111), and the sixth-century Milesian poet Phokylides contrasts the well-ordered polis and 'senseless Ninevah' (Sent. frag. 4D). Plato maintains that the *politeia* is 'the nurse of men' (*Menex.* 238c). The idea that institutional structures determine collective characteristics is at the root of Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* and Aristotle's *Politics*. In a famous passage Aristotle stresses the primacy of political association, stating that human beings are 'political creatures' (*Pol.* 1253a1-29); even in the environmentalist tract *Airs, Waters, Places* we find concession to the mitigating factor of governmental institutions (chapter 16). In a famous passage on the educative function of flute-playing in ancient Arcadia (4.21), Polybius explicitly states that institutions overcame environment. There is ample evidence to make the argument that political and social institutions trump environmental factors in the formation of collective group characteristics in ancient Greek thought.[14] The crucial point here is that these institutions are malleable and susceptible to historical change. Ancient ideas on political and social institutions as prime causal factors in the development of collective characteristics therefore pose a challenge to Isaac's rigid and unalterable Greek and Roman 'proto-racism'.

There are a few remaining criticisms, which are less important to the book's overall thesis than the undervaluing of political and social institutions for collective group characteristics in ancient thought. These concern the characterisation of Greek and Roman thought on self and others as a unity. The decision to bypass the Hellenistic period serves to create a deceptive seamlessness. As we have seen, Isaac posits a sharp break in Greek perceptions of Persians between the fifth and fourth centuries. We should be more wary of important distinctions between Greek and Roman thought on these questions especially when we keep in mind the omitted Hellenistic era that intervened. At times Isaac seems to gloss over these differences in treating Greek and Roman conceptions as Greco-Roman conceptions. This tendency is most evident in the discussions of Athenian notions of autochthony and Greek and Roman xenophobia. First, let us consider Athenian ideas of autochthony. Isaac provides a useful discussion of the idea of autochthony and 'pure lineage' at Athens (pp.114-24), which of course found concrete expression in Pericles' citizenship law of 451/450 BCE. But he does not consider the sections of Pericles' funeral oration as represented by Thucydides, which emphasise Athens' unguarded openness to foreign goods and ideas (Thuc. 2.38f.). While Isaac admits that we cannot find similar

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[14] On the importance of politics for the ancient Greeks, see the thought-provoking discussion of P. A. Rahe, 'The Primacy of Politics in Ancient Greece', *AHR* 89.2 (1984) 265-93. The primacy of political and social institutions in Greek thought for determining collective characteristics is one of the basic tenets of my own recent work (above, n. 7).

conceptions among the Romans,[15] he hastens to consider Roman ideas on autochthony of other peoples. Consequently, he downplays the crucial difference between Athenian myths of autochthony and Roman myths of mixed origins.[16] The distinctions in foundational mythologies are far more important than any similarities we might find and gave diametrically opposed mythological charters for Athens' jealously guarded political franchise and the steady extension of Roman citizenship. Then there is the related notion of xenophobia and contamination by contact with foreigners. On Roman views Isaac mentions only Arrian (*Tactica* 33) and the elder Pliny on the ideas that contact with foreigners can be salutary and that Romans borrowed much from foreign peoples. He concludes that authors 'who regard contact with foreigners as having deleterious effects are far more numerous and influential than those who emphasise its salutary aspects. The latter are a few Greek writing authors of the Roman period, the former range from the sixth century B.C. till late antiquity' (p. 244). This statement is exaggerated and misleading. The idea that Roman contact with foreign peoples and customs had been beneficial to Rome is not as uncommon as Isaac suggests; Cicero, for example, states it explicitly and at length (*Rep.* 2.30).

Some of Isaac's conceptual underpinnings, therefore, are not above contestation. But my criticism does not provide an indication of the impressive scope and range of the book. I cannot imagine that anyone could read this work without learning a great deal from it. Particularly noteworthy is the way in which Isaac relates ancient ideas on environmental determinism and acquired characteristics to modern racist conceptions of Cuvier, Buffon, Kant, Hume, Herder, Thomas Jefferson and many other intellectuals in the western tradition. I find the overall thesis that there are elements in Greek and Roman thought that easily lend themselves to modern racist ideologies to be persuasive, with the reservations stated above concerning the mitigating and contesting ideas among ancient thinkers on the force of political and social institutions in the formation of collective characteristics. Isaac's notion of 'proto-racism' among ancient Greeks and Romans, with the qualifications I have mentioned, is convincing and unproblematic. Debate and disagreement are likely to revolve around the transition from ancient 'proto-racism' to modern racism: are the similarities or the differences more important? And of course here objections will be raised that in etymological terms it is anachronistic to speak of 'race' in ancient Greek and Roman discourse. We have to wait until the nineteenth century for the words 'race' and 'racism' to begin to assume the meanings that we give to them today; ancient terms such as *ethnos* or *natio* are not synonyms.[17]

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[15] '[U]nlike the Athenians, the Romans never attributed to themselves a pure lineage or any notion of being autochthonous' (p. 134); 'Rome made no claim of being autochthonous or of pure blood, but applied those ideas to other peoples' (p. 514).

[16] For Roman 'inclusive' ideology see, e.g., Liv. 1.2; 1.8; Sall. *Cat.* 6.1.

[17] See the convenient etymological table at Hannaford [10] 5; cf. M. Banton, *Racial Theories* (Cambridge 1987); M. Banton, *Racial Consciousness* (New York 1988) 26 on 'racism'.

I have rarely been as engaged in writing a review as I have been in writing this one. Isaac's study has forced me to rethink some of my basic assumptions about the ancient world, and it has provoked sharp criticism on particular arguments. These are things that good books do and are perhaps indicative of the impact the book is likely to have. In sum, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity* is meticulously researched, impressive in scope, clearly presented and provocatively stimulating in argumentation. No one henceforth will be able to enter the debate on collective stereotypes and group prejudices in Greek and Roman antiquity without taking it into account.

# THE PRINCE AND THE STARS:
## GERMANICUS' TRANSLATION OF ARATUS

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Possanza's book represents an interesting contribution to studies of Aratus' *Phaenomena*.[1] Focussing on Germanicus' translation, Possanza aims to show that Germanicus re-interpreted the *Phaenomena* using Greek as well as Latin predecessors as part of a continuous tradition (pp. 1-20 and 112-114). Chapter 1 (pp. 21-77) studies the poetics of translating Greek poetry into Latin. Chapter 2 (pp. 79-99) and characterises Aratus' work as both a descendant of oral catalogue poetry and a masterpiece of Callimachean refined style. Chapter 3 (pp. 105-67) selectively examines Germanicus' method of translation. Chapter 4 (pp. 169-218) shows how Germanicus changes the *Phaenomena* in translation, with Possanza's conclusion being that the 'Greek poet's lofty theme of the constellations as "signs" of the providential deity's immanence in nature is completely subverted and in its place we find no theme of comparable religious and philosophical significance. Instead we discover that it is the poet himself who controls this cosmos, who as a storyteller and self-declared *vates* (bard) turns the map of heaven into a realm of Ovidian transformations where the revelation of what the constellations once were humanizes and dramatizes the existence of those distant astral bodies' (p. 208).

All of Possanza's arguments are based on the view, argued in Appendix A (pp. 219-43; see also pp. 15f., 105-109), that Germanicus, the son of Drusus, is the

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[1] D. Kidd, *Aratus: Phaenomena* (Cambridge 1997) has recently made Aratus more accessible.

author and that the poem was composed between AD 4 and 7. The manuscript evidence for authorship is 'inconclusive' (p. 220) and points, if anything, more strongly to Tiberius. The name Germanicus is not found in any of the primary manuscripts and the attribution depends on a later indirect tradition (Lactant. *Div.* 1.11.64, 1.21.38, 5.5.4, supported by Jerome[2] and possibly Priscian[3]). Possanza argues that the name found in the O family, *T*[*i*] *Claudi Caesaris Arati Phaenomena*, is an interpolated form of the name Germanicus Caesar, the name Germanicus being re-introduced in the fifteenth century. In Possanza's view, 'clues' (p. 227) in the first sixteen lines of the poem help to confirm Germanicus' authorship. These are that the dedicatee is the emperor, that this person maintained peace on land and sea, and that he had a son. The most natural candidate for the emperor is said to be Augustus (see pp. 231f.). If Augustus is the one being addressed, it might seem to follow that Tiberius is the author. Nonetheless Possanza sees the clues as pointing towards Germanicus. Others have differed; according to Gain, the evidence does not allow one to say whether Germanicus or Tiberius composed the poem.[4]

   In order to argue for the authorship of Germanicus while retaining Augustus as the dedicatee, Possanza must bridge a generational divide. A lot rests on his interpretation of lines 15f.: *haec ego dum Latiis conor praedicere Musis,* / *pax tua tuque adsis nato numenque secundes* ('While I attempt to set forth these things in Latin verse, may you and your peace attend your son and favour him with your divine presence'.) Possanza creates a disjunction between the authorial 'I', the subject of *conor* (I attempt), and the 'son', arguing that the son and the author of the proem are two different individuals, Tiberius and Germanicus respectively. As Possanza translates (p. 106): 'While I make my attempt to foretell these things, may your peace and you yourself be by the side of your son, and may you make your divine majesty favourable'. In Possanza's version, three separate things are happening in these lines: (a) the poet is writing (temporal clause, related to what follows only in terms of its contemporaneity); (b) the poet is asking the dedicatee to favour his son (not the poet); and (c) the poet is asking for this person to make his *numen* (divine presence) generally favourable. In my view, the parallels make it more natural to understand these lines as a prayer for poetic success for the poet/son, the same individual, involved in the poetic task. In Manilius, Caesar is hailed as a deity in the context of his favouring the poet in his poetic undertaking:

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[2] Migne, *PL* 26.606.706b.

[3] *IG* 2.351.4 (correcting Possanza's 3.351.4) and 3.417.1. Further argument is required to establish that Priscian's *Caesar in Arato* is indubitably 'shorthand for *Germanicus Caesar in Arateo carmine*' (p. 223).

[4] See D. B. Gain, *The Aratus Ascribed to Germanicus Caesar* (London 1976) 16-20. Generally Possanza marshals the existing scholarship well, but add to the bibliography S. Hinds, *Allusion and Intertext* (Cambridge 1998); M. Fantuzzi and R. L. Hunter, *Muse e modelli: La poesia ellenistica da Alessandro Magno ad Augusto* (Laterza 2002) 533-66; and K. Volk, *The Poetics of Latin Didactic* (Oxford 2002), especially for Manilius, something of an absent presence in Possanza's book although he touches upon this author on p. 103 n. 34.

> hunc mihi tu, Caesar, patriae princeps paterque,
> qui regis augustis parentem legibus orbem
> concessumque patri mundum deus ipse mereris,
> das animum viresque facis ad tanta canenda.
>
> (*Astronomica* 1.7-11)
>
> You Caesar, princeps and father of the fatherland, you who rule your father's
> heaven with august laws and, yourself a god, are worthy of the place in the sky
> given to your father; it is you who give me this resolve and grant me the
> power to sing of such great matters.

There is no separate prayer for the imperial family or for generalised favour. In the proem to Ovid's *Fasti* (1.5f.), Germanicus is the *numen* who favours the work dedicated to him: *officioque . . . / en tibi devoto numine dexter ades* ('come, favour with your godhead the work dedicated to you'). Later in the proem he is asked to approve the author: *adnue conanti per laudes ire tuorum* ('approve me as I attempt to sing your praises', 1.15). At no stage in the *Fasti* proem is there a prayer for the imperial family or a generalised prayer for him to make his divine majesty favourable as there is in Possanza's translation of Germanicus, *Phaenomena* 15f.

In fact, the proem to Ovid's *Fasti* would have helped a lot in Possanza's argument. As it is, he omits evidence which may point to Germanicus' composition of an astronomical poem despite arguing strongly for his authorship of the *Phaenomena*. In the *Fasti* proem, Germanicus is hailed as a *vates* ('poet', 1.25), most likely as author of the *Phaenomena*, and as predecessor of Ovid in the astronomical part of his task. This supports the hypothesis that Germanicus' *Phaenomena* had been written by the time the *Fasti* was revised, some time after Ovid's exile (between AD 14 and 17?).[5] Analysis of the relationship between the *Fasti* and the *Phaenomena* would be useful in settling the date of the latter. Given Possanza's programme of demonstrating that Germanicus' *Phaenomena* is closely related to Ovid, it would be worth asking with which version of the *Fasti*—pre-exilic or revised—Germanicus was working. Are we to see the composition of Germanicus' *Phaenomena* and Ovid's *Fasti* as proceeding hand-in-hand, both written around AD 4 (the *Fasti* a little earlier), both revised after AD 14? Or are we to see the entire *Phaenomena* as written after AD 14 with full knowledge of the *Fasti*?

The most serious obstacle to identifying the reigning Augustus as dedicatee of Germanicus' poem is the reference to the apotheosed Augustus in lines 558-60. Possanza therefore argues that the poem must have been revised and these lines inserted after Augustus' death, with its original composition taking place shortly after AD 4 when Tiberius became Augustus' son. Possanza puts the *terminus ante quem* for

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[5] On the dates of composition and revision of the *Fasti*, see G. Herbert-Brown, *Ovid's Fasti: An Historical Study* (Oxford 1994) 32f., with the bibliography in n. 1. On Ovid and Germanicus, see R. E. Fantham, 'Ovid, Germanicus and the Composition of the *Fasti*', *PLLS* 5 (1986) 243-81.

the original version at AD 7, when Germanicus took up imperial responsibilities. In addition, he argues that Ovid's exile in AD 8 would have prevented Germanicus from following in that poet's footsteps by giving prominence to the theme of illicit love.[6] But could not the *numen* of Augustus that appears in the proem be that of the apotheosed emperor as it is in 558-60? In this case, all of the poem could have been composed after AD 14.[7] The use of Ovid's exile to support an early *terminus ante quem* is hypothetical.

Are acrobatics with transmission, nomenclature and date ultimately useful? Surely the point is that, although Germanicus' *Phaenomena* could not be earlier than Ovid's *Fasti* or *Metamorphoses*, its Ovidian nature need not determine its authorship. Or does some sort of Tacitean characterisation ('if it's Ovidian, it has to be by Germanicus rather than crusty Tiberius') underlie Possanza's arguments? The important question is what the ascription to Germanicus does to our reading of the poem. Will this reading differ depending on whether the poem was written by a young Germanicus under Augustus, a more mature Germanicus under Tiberius, a young Tiberius under Augustus, or a not-so young Tiberius after Augustus' death? Possanza engages in little consistent argument about the political context. Although he states that 'the political ideology of the Augustan age exerted a powerful influence on the way in which [Germanicus] read and interpreted the *Phaenomena*' (p. 36), he remains throughout more interested in poetics, with the exception of the discussion of the proem (105ff.). Yet the date of Augustus' banishment of Ovid was given by Possanza as a *terminus ante quem* for the composition of Germanicus' *Phaenomena*. Possanza cannot use Augustan politics to date the poem externally without considering the role of Augustan politics in reading the poem as a whole and forming a view of the 'Augustanism' or otherwise of the poem in a more than purely literary sense. This is not to argue for a mindless return to the old 'subversion' theme of Ovidian scholarship[8] merely for more overt recognition of the co-extension of the literary and political dimensions of the piece.

Another element 'lost in translation' is Aratus' Stoicism. Possanza refers to Aratus' *Phaenomena* as 'theistic' (for example, p. 114). Stoicism should be mentioned as the driving force behind Aratus' teleology and recognition of it would be helpful in clearing up a number of details. It is stated, for example, that 'just as Germanicus's omission of Aratus' hymn to Zeus signalled his abandonment of the *Phaenomena*'s theological and philosophical perspective on the order of the universe, so his omission

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[6] The *Fasti* and *Metamorphoses* 'provided the models for Germanicus' handling of the erotic elements in many of the catasterism myths' (pp. 234f.); see also p. 169.

[7] Alternatively, if one does subscribe to the theory of early composition and later revision, that still does not rule out Tiberius' authorship. Gain [4] 20 argues that it 'is conceivable that Tiberius composed most of the poem many years before [the death of Augustus] and added lines 1-16 and 558-60 . . . only after Augustus' death, thus producing a sort of second edition'.

[8] Most clearly articulated in C. Newlands, *Playing with Time: Ovid and the Fasti* (Cornell 1995).

of the passage on the naming of the stars (*Ph.* 367-85) continues that deliberate program of editing to remove any suggestion that humans had a role to play in forming and naming the constellations' (pp. 207f.). But here Germanicus is specifically rejecting the idea of the natural connection between signifier and signified that underlies *Stoic* theory of language and its relation to theology.[9] Rejection of Stoicism is one reason for Germanicus' anti-theological stance.

There is another unexplored possibility. One of Germanicus' poetic predecessors is Lucretius. In discussing Germanicus' rejection of Aratus' weather-signs and substitution of a new meteorology, which includes the planets (pp. 110f.), Possanza reiterates that there is no room in Germanicus' poem for Zeus' *semata*. His argument rests on *Phaenomena* 12: *sideraque et mundi varios cognoscere motus* ('to learn about the heavenly bodies and the various motions of the heavens'), which he takes to refer to the 'various' movements of the planets as opposed to the regular movements of the fixed stars. But this line brings to my mind at least Lucretius 5.774f. (*solis uti varios cursus lunaeque meatus / noscere possemus* ('so that we would be able to know about the various motions of the sun and the movements of the moon') in a passage where the poet specifically argues against a theological interpretation of heavenly signs. It was Lucretius who gave the Romans a rationalistic way of thinking about natural phenomena; surely his influence should be considered.

Cicero did not have Lucretius to draw on in his *Aratea*. This could help partially to explain the differences between his and Germanicus' translations of the *Phaenomena*, as well as the factors mentioned by Possanza, who states that Germanicus' narrative voice is 'engaged in an intertextual dialogue with the *Phaenomena* or with Cicero's translation or with both' (p. 201). According to Possanza, Cicero is a 'negative influence of what was to be avoided because his translation in its language and meter represents the epico-tragic tradition of the old republican poetry' (pp. 115f). He explains the differences between Cicero and Germanicus thus: 'When Germanicus came to translate the *Phaenomena* sometime between AD 4-7, that fullness and weightiness of expression [found in Cicero's *Aratea*] had been disciplined and reduced by a strict regimen of Hellenistic poetics which had been adopted and mediated into Latin poetry by the Neoterics and Augustans' (p. 28).

Cicero is characterised as primitive, whereas Germanicus writes in accordance with Hellenistic poetics. We should not let ideas of poetic evolution blind us, however, to Cicero's own role in constructing the opposition between his poetry and that of the *neoteroi*, an opposition which in any case may not obtain for the *Aratea*, an early poem on an Alexandrian theme, which introduced refinements the *neoteroi* and their successors were glad to adopt.[10] Consider *Aratea* 35f. on the Pleiades: *Alcyone Meropeque, Celaeno Taygeteque, / Electra Asteropeque, simul sanctissima Maia*

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[9] See M. Frede, 'Principles of Stoic Grammar', in J. M. Rist (ed.), *The Stoics* (Berkeley 1978) 27-76; E. Gee, *Ovid, Aratus and Augustus* (Cambridge 2000) 73f.

[10] See Hinds [4] 75 n. 41; E. Gee, 'Cicero's Astronomy', *CQ* 51 (2001) 520-36.

('Alcyone and Merope, Celaeno and Taygete, Electra and Asterope, and also most holy Maia'). This predates Virgil's use of the device of filling a hexameter with Greek names, as in *Georgics* 1.437, *Glauco et Panopeae et Inoo Melicertae* ('to Glaucus, to Panopea and to Melicerta, son of Ino'). Cicero was on the cutting edge of this poetic practice (Quint. 12.10.33). Alexandrian poetics were already available for Cicero as they were for his predecessors Livius Andronicus and Ennius. Cicero chose in the *Aratea* to combine Alexandrian aspects with the diction of earlier Latin epic. This choice is a highly appropriate one. How better to render Aratus' Homeric dialect than to draw on the diction of early Latin epic, which itself strives to imitate Homer? Not evolution, but differing principles of choice can be said to operate in Cicero's and Germanicus' translations of Aratus. Whereas Cicero reads Aratus as Callimachean *epic*, Germanicus reads Aratus as *Callimachean* epic.

Cicero is a better model for Germanicus than Possanza admits. Both play at enacting poetic secondarity. Germanicus excuses his variant version of the Orion myth with the words *haec ego non primus, veteres cecinere poetae* ('I am not the first to sing of these things: the ancient poets did too', *Ph.* 647) According to Possanza, *veteres poetae* can be taken as a reference to actual predecessors, including Cicero (p. 198). But he misses the force of the intertextual play: the phrase is a *quotation* from Cicero, albeit a different passage (the Pleiades again): *sed frustra, temere a vulgo, ratione sine ulla / septem dicier, ut veteres statuere poetae* ('but it is an empty and rash belief of the common people, based on no reasoning, that [the Pleiades] are seven, as the ancient poets established', *Aratea* 33f.) Here Cicero is sceptical of tradition. Acknowledgement of this would make Possanza's argument about Germanicus' 'disclaimer' (for the myth, in his retelling) stronger. Cicero, a self-conscious witness to his own intellectual thoroughness in the *Aratea*, belongs in Germanicus with the other purveyors of spurious tradition he sought to discredit. At the same time, Germanicus playfully acknowledges his poetic debt to his predecessor, with critical dialogue marking respect of one author for another.

## IMPERIALISM THEN AND NOW

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For all those Classicists drawn into the slip-stream of media and communication courses, this is a very welcome and timely book that will give them a chance to compete on similar terms, should they choose to do so. First, the contributions to the book are on the whole perceptive, comprehensive, and well-

argued. Secondly, they address a worthy subject; Scott's *Gladiator* (2000) is a sophisticated, well-structured, fast-paced and visually stunning movie that has done more than anything else in recent times to bring ancient Rome to the attention of our postmodern generation of students. It has already drawn lively scholarly interest[1] and demands serious attention in its own right, as Winkler points out (pp. xif.). Thirdly, the film implies an intriguing analogy between the idea of Rome as a world empire and the role of the United States in world affairs today that deserves—and has here received—careful scrutiny.

The first contribution to the book, '*Gladiator*: From Screenplay to Screen' (pp. 1-15) by Jon Solomon, provides a fascinating insight into the development of the ideas of the production team. Solomon points out the wide array of resources for studying the film. Besides filmscripts, there are interviews with the director, stills (perhaps redundant in the age of frame-grabbers), discarded footage, neoclassical art (e.g., Gérôme's *Pollice Verso* to which Scott attributed part of his inspiration for making *Gladiator*), historical novels and the intriguing narratives of Cassius Dio, Herodian, and the *Historia Augusta* (conveniently printed at the end of the book on pp. 175-204).[2] All of this is, of course, everyday fare for today's media-conscious student. Solomon shows that the script writer, David Franzoni, who also wrote the dialogue for Spielberg's *Amistad* (p. 2), did make use of the ancient evidence, including archaeological material, and gives the reader useful apercus such as that Maximus' dog was in fact intended to represent the wolf of the Roman foundation legend, that Proximo is supposed to be 'a sort of Ted Turner' (p. 4), that the opening scene reflects the crushing of German freedom by the military technology of the Roman army (although how exactly this plays out in international politics today is unclear), and that Commodus' plea to his father draws from Marcus Aurelius' own *Meditations*. The last point was of course to be expected, but Commodus' perversion of the canonical Stoic virtues distorts them grotesquely under the inspiration of modern popular psychology: it rather incongruously implies that the emperor is guilty of not spending enough quality time with his son in the gladiatorial barracks.[3] In his chapter, Solomon anticipates two further lines of interpretation that are also followed by other contributors to the book: the degree of historical realism in the film and its relation to other cinematic representations of the Roman world. These are not unrelated since Franzoni's idea of ancient Rome was largely coloured by Fellini's *Satyricon* (p. 9). The use of a gladiator to represent the mythological Minotaur is a

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[1] See, e.g., A. Arenas, 'Popcorn and Circus: Gladiator and the Spectacle of Virtue', *Arion* 9.1 (2001) 3-12.

[2] Solomon helpfully provides the URL for a website that makes available the first two drafts of the filmscript and a transcript of the dialogue and storyline of the movie (http://www.hundland.com/scripts).

[3] Birley provides encouragement for this kind of analysis in his assessment of Commodus as a 'lonely figure'. See A. R. Birley, *Septimius Severus: The African Emperor* (London 1999) 57 and the criticism of Ward in the present chapter of Solomon (p. 35).

good touch; historical realism, however, suffers in the film at the hands of commercialism. The mass slaughter of animals in the arena is avoided in order not to offend modern sensibilities, for example, and the clay figures of Maximus' *Penates* become sentimental figurines of the hero's wife and son. Franzoni's script was fairly light hearted and the second draft, revised by John Logan, also had a fairly sanguine ending. In Scott's final version, however, the hero's vengeance for his family's murder comes at the cost of his own life. By using the two preliminary drafts of the script together with interviews with the director in this way, Solomon is able to prove convincingly that '*Gladiator* was always a work in progress' (p. 15).

Winkler's contribution, '*Gladiator* and the Traditions of Historical Cinema' (pp. 16-30), puts the movie into the context of films such as Mann's *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (1964). Winkler confronts the issue of historical authenticity versus artistic licence directly in this chapter. He concludes that the appeal of any recreation of the past 'rests at least as much on their fictional as on their factual side' (p. 17). Winkler argues somewhat tendentiously that ancient historians were no different in their approach to writing history; the speeches of Thucydides and the anecdotes of Herodotus are likewise 'inventions' (p. 18). This point of view reflects the antipathy to genre and the defacement of the author in contemporary criticism, where the distinction between history and imaginative fiction has been blurred by the convergent approximation of the two.[4] Scott follows earlier directors in feeling the need 'to stay true to the spirit of the period, but not necessarily adhering to facts' (p. 23). After dispensing with the shackles of historical veracity in this way, Winkler shows that *Gladiator* follows the pattern of archetypal hero movies such as *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (1964), more ideological films such as Kubrick's *Spartacus* (1960) and Delmer Daves' *Demetrius and the Gladiators* (1954), and non-classical action flicks such as Miller's *Mad Max* series (the name Maximus was therefore inevitable).

Historical inaccuracies in the film are, in fact, 'legion' (p. 31). Allen Ward takes up the challenge of pointing these out in his chapter, '*Gladiator* in Historical Perspective' (pp. 31-44). With regard to military history, there was no final battle in Germania immediately before the death of Marcus Aurelius; the Romans did not literally use war-dogs (nevertheless, Maximus' dog is a brilliantly polysemous touch invoking the Roman wolf, Shakespeare's 'dogs of war' at *Julius Caesar* 3.1.273, and the wild animals of the arena); and siege weapons such as *ballistae* would not have been used in close battles in the forests of Germania. The chronology of Commodus' reign is foreshortened. His family connections are oversimplified and misrepresented (especially in the case of Lucilla); here Ward or his editor Winkler could have

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[4] For history-as-fiction Winkler might have referred to the work of J. L. Moles, 'Truth and Untruth in Herodotus and Thucydides', in C. Gill and P. Wiseman (edd.), *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World* (Austin 1994) 88-121, and T. P. Wiseman, 'Lying Historians: Seven Types of Mendacity', in C. Gill and P. Wiseman (edd.), *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World* (Austin 1994) 122-146. Conversely, for fiction as history see G.W. Bowersock, *Fiction as History: Nero to Julian* (Berkeley 1994); J. R. Morgan, 'History, Romance and Realism in the *Aithiopika* of Heliodoros' *ClAnt* 1 (1981) 221-265.

provided a genealogical tree to clarify these complex relationships. Commodus' character is distorted: the film suggests sexual deviance arising from intense loneliness; in fact, Commodus was a married man who eventually fathered fourteen children. There was no desire to restore the republic in Commodus' day and in all probability Marcus Aurelius was not assassinated by his son, who had been joint ruler with his father for some time before his father's death possibly as a result of the plague.[5] The representation of gladiatorial fighting is full of inaccuracies. The Latin language is frequently garbled and grammatically wrong. Most importantly, there was no such person as Maximus Decimus Meridius. On the positive side, the film correctly shows that death was ubiquitous in the second century, but this issue is not adequately discussed in the present book, which lacks a full discussion of the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius and their relationship to Stoic teachings on this subject. Ward's most interesting point is reserved to last (pp. 42-44): the scriptwriters missed much of the dramatic material in the *Historia Augusta*, particularly the account the escape of Sextus Quintilius Condianus from Commodus' troops in Dio 73.5-6, which could have been used to excellent effect. Why, to take another famous example, do we not see senators chewing their garlands to prevent themselves from bursting out in hysterical laughter when confronted by Commodus holding the freshly decapitated head of an ostrich (Cass. Dio 73.21)?

Coleman's brief chapter, 'The Pedant Goes to Hollywood' (pp. 45-52), reinforces the arguments outlined above that the boundary between fact and fiction in ancient history has becomes blurred (p. 46) and that film-making is a complex process in which the lines of communication between historical consultant and the production team may easily break down (pp. 47f.). Coleman underplays her own accountability for the recent sustained surge of interest in Roman gladiatorial games,[6] but she does provide sensible insights into the role of the historical consultant in period films and shows how much of a challenge the reconstruction of the ancient world presents to the serious scholar of antiquity as opposed to the Hollywood director, especially when the ancient evidence may be limited or altogether lacking (p. 50). Her observation that film directors have to deal with the horizons of expectation of their audience is an acute one and her reference to the influence of Alma-Tadema on our preconceptions of the Roman world (pp. 50f.) is extremely important for a proper appreciation of the visual splendour of Scott's Rome; the garlanded young children who welcome Commodus to Rome from the steps of a temple/the senate-house and the splendid panorama of the crowd inside the Colosseum are memorable examples of this. Unfortunately, the book does not reproduce a single example of this kind of neoclassical art; even the supposedly influential painting of Gérôme, mentioned frequently in the book, is absent, and Pomeroy's reference to Thomas Cole's *Course*

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[5] See Eckstein's discussion on pp. 65f.

[6] See K. W. Coleman, 'Fatal Charades: Roman Executions Staged as Mythological Enactments', *JRS* 80 (1990) 44-73; K. W. Coleman, '"The Contagion of the Throng": Absorbing Violence in the Roman World', *Hermathena* 164 (1998) 65-88.

*of Empire* 1836 (p. 122) is without visual referent. A greyscale copy of Edwin Blashfield's painting of Commodus leaving the amphitheatre together with his gladiators is magnificent, but it is all that is provided (fig. 4). Perhaps a future edition might reproduce an Alma-Tadema (in colour naturally) in the place of one of the redundant black-and-white stills from the film or instead of one of the supernumerary views of the depressingly familiar ruins of the Colosseum that the book provides in abundance. On the subject of illustrations, the map of the Roman empire (fig. 1) has been badly photocopied; it is totally illegible and an atrocious precedent for a respected publisher to set for others.

In his chapter, 'Commodus and the Limits of the Roman Empire' (pp. 53-72), Arthur M. Eckstein makes a lively case for his view that Mann and Scott were wrong to show Romans struggling 'to bring the Germans north of the Danube into the Roman Empire' (p. 54) and to suggest that Commodus' decision to abandon the campaign was wilful and wrong. Eckstein argues that Commodus' decision to end the campaign was not motivated by the fact that the fighting had finally pacified the territory south of the Rhine-Danube frontier; neither was it influenced by Augustus' precept to limit the extent of the empire (Tac. *Ann.* 1.11.4); nor was it due to a lack of sufficiently remunerative targets in the region. Instead, Eckstein argues, the cessation of fighting in Germany was part of an overall tendency towards peace during this period associated with the demise of aggressive challenges to Roman power (pp. 62f.). Moreover, according to Eckstein (pp. 69f.), Commodus was not strategically wrong to end hostilities after his father's death. The Rhine-Danube frontier remained peaceful after his departure; the war had been expensive; and Roman honour had been upheld. Eckstein's discussion shows that the aims and methods of the ancient military historian are indeed very different from those of a Hollywood director (p. 72).

Central to *Gladiator* are the games (*ludi*). David S. Potter, 'Gladiators and Blood Sport' (pp. 73- 86), considers the importance of human and animal fighting in the arena for Roman culture. This chapter does not add much that is startlingly new to the subject. The dissonance with contemporary values is familiar material: although Romans invested considerable time and expense in these spectacles, they were nevertheless considered unsuitable activities for free-born citizens of either sex; gladiators shared this opprobrium with actors, which is a rather surprising link to modern thinking; and despite the possibility of death or flogging, free-born Romans did from time to time voluntarily join gladiatorial schools.[7] The importance of the games as vehicles of imperial patronage and as demonstrations of the power of the ruler has also been clearly established before, as has the use of amphitheatres as venues at which to reenact myths. Nevertheless, Potter provides an indispensable and convenient discussion that will aid student to understand this central aspect of the background to the film.

Winkler adds a discussion of the cultural significance of the Flavian amphitheatre in his chapter, '*Gladiator* and the Colosseum: Ambiguities of Spectacle'

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[7] A surprising omission from the bibliography is M. Grant, *Gladiators* (London 1967).

(pp. 87-110). The 'ambiguities' of the title refers to the combination of admiration and disgust that this edifice arouses in those who study it today. Winkler argues (p. 93) that modern north American architecture provides a contemporary analogue: just as the Colosseum was held to represent the stability of the Roman state, so the Statue of Liberty often stands for the fall or endurance of the USA. Surprisingly to a non-American, the inevitable connection with 9/11 is made only cursorily and obliquely (p. 4), but as always Winkler provides convincing substantiation of his general argument from film history. Winkler ends this chapter by considering the psychology of gladiatorial games and the role of digital technology in enhancing it. Violence sells; mass violence sells massively (p. 105). There is also a good discussion of the historical importance of the games for the characterisation of Commodus as an evil emperor.

Arthur Pomeroy builds a sustained comparison between Leni Riefenstahl's film of the 1934 Nazi rally at Nuremberg, *The Triumph of the Will* (1935), and *Gladiator* in his 'The Vision of a Fascist Rome in Gladiator' (pp. 111-23). In its use of conservative morality, technology and a nearly superhuman hero '*Gladiator* may be re-creating the Fascist values it appears to condemn' (p. 112). This is an exaggerated standpoint inasmuch as conservative values do not necessarily imply belief in national socialism, and Maximus is clearly portrayed as a moral rather than an amoral hero. To be fair, Pomeroy himself notes the clear differences, for example, the rejection of the doctrine of racial superiority through the prominence given to Maximus' black comrade Juba. The similarities that Pomeroy observes are striking, particularly the serried ranks of 'Romans' welcoming Commodus in the forum on his triumphant return from Germania and the massive and grandiose architecture of Rome. On balance, though, I found Pomeroy's analysis strident in places, particularly in the use of a word like 'reactionary' (p. 122), although his analysis is generally solid. The influence of the rather feminine neoclassical paintings of Rome on Scott and the ethical discussions of the ideology of Rome and her empire in the film go a long way to balance the fascist imagery.

The final two chapters of the book address the relevance of the film to contemporary north American society. Monica S. Cyrino ('*Gladiator* and Contemporary American Society', pp. 124-149) and Peter W. Rose ('The Politics of *Gladiator*', pp. 150-72) provide comprehensive discussions. Maximus is a reluctant hero, a Republican family-man, and a soldier disaffected by politics. Cyrino believes that his character reflects the views of many conservative north Americans today (pp. 136f.) especially in their attachment to the land and the rural way of life. The exhaustion of Marcus Aurelius and his cynicism about Roman politics may have its counterpart in the supposed contemporary disillusionment of many north American citizens. Here too, however, there is a danger of exaggeration: gladiatorial spectacles resemble American sports competitions only in part (p. 138), while resemblances between Commodus and George W. Bush are rather forced and trivial (p. 146). Moreover, Rome, like the United States, is a complex entity, towards which a wide variety of attitudes are possible. *Gladiator* reflects something of this complexity since

Marcus Aurelius, Maximus, Commodus and Lucilla all articulate competing views of the city and its cultural significance. Rose's insightful theoretical analysis gives a good idea of this. He shows (pp. 153-57) that at least some of the scenes devoted to the idea of Rome are borrowed from Mann's *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (1964), in which the ideals of empire and Rome's role in the socio-economic development of the Germans, for example, are more fully explored. He also underscores Cyrino's discussion of the political cynicism of *Gladiator* and its refusal fully to confront the problems of race (represented by Juba in the film), communism (as in Kubrick's *Spartacus*), sexuality (Commodus' sexuality is to some extent treated in the film, but women are dealt with altogether less prominently and less sympathetically on p. 169) and globalism (p. 171). The aesthetic quality of the film, its thematic richness, and Hans Zimmer's emotional score nullify the charge that the film is an adventure story for boys. On the other hand, I found the view that the emphasis on conspiracy in *Gladiator* 'convey[s] a message of the overwhelming complexity of a worldwide system that escapes the control of individual protagonists' (p. 172) rather unsubstantiated.

Despite the omissions and drawbacks noted above, this book provides a very useful resource that will enhance the analytical sophistication of students of Scott's film and one that will deepen their appreciation of the complexity of Roman society in the reign of Commodus as well as the problem of imperialism then and today. I have no doubt that it will be a great success and a distinct credit to its editor and his contributors.

# REVIEWS

Deborah Boedeker and Kurt A. Raaflaub (edd.), *Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. Pp. viii + 504. ISBN 0-674-01258-5. USD19.50.

This substantial volume collects papers originally presented to a colloquium at the Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington, in 1995. My copy is the paperback, which appeared at the end of 2003. Very occasional misprints (the overall production is excellent) remain uncorrected. The book comprises fifteen chapters. The first (pp. 1-14) and last chapters (pp. 319-44), which are by the editors, introduce and summarise the dominant issues, a commendable act of framing that gives the work greater cohesion than many such collections possess. The other thirteen pieces address specific areas of the intricate relationship between the arts (figurative, monumental, narrative, dramatic, rhetorical, intellectual) and the development of both democracy and empire in fifth-century Athens.

Raaflaub sets the scene with an informative survey of how Athens was transformed politically, militarily, economically and socially during the period (pp. 15-44). He lays particular emphasis on the scale and ramifications of thalassocracy. The consequences for artistic activity, however, are merely surmised, somewhat airily, at the end: 'it is not implausible to assume that all this had an impact on the arts' (p. 41). Lisa Kallet expands the economic picture (pp. 45-58); explaining the mix of different streams of public and private spending on 'cultural' works, she stresses that imperial revenues did not contribute as much as often thought—even, arguably, in the popular perception of the time—to the costs of the Periclean building programme. Ian Morris, representing a somewhat dissenting voice within the project, contends (pp. 59-86) that much fifth-century Athenian culture replicated wider Greek trends; an Athenocentric perspective is historically distorting. Using a version of 'the new cultural history', with its accent on an inclusive notion of material culture, Morris argues that both house building and burial practices show a general pattern (documented comparatively from Argos, Corinth, Eretria and Macedonia) of fifth-century 'restraint' followed by fourth-century extravagance. He claims a parallelism with visual art, where classical 'austerity' later gave way to more 'display and self-indulgence' (p. 63). Morris's command of archaeological data is impressive, but he leaves it entirely unclear how he would propose to elaborate his (rather fuzzy) comparison between houses/tombs and sculptural style. An inclusive notion of material culture can help refine some historical questions, but it can also blunt the point of others.

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Eric Csapo and Margaret Miller advance the thesis (pp. 87-126) that the fifth century saw a shift, which affected both visual and verbal narrative, from 'aristocratic temporality' (focussed on self-validation by reference to the mostly mythical past) to 'democratic temporality' (more historical, linear, rational and centred on the present and immediate future). The piece is an intellectually ambitious attempt to grapple with an important but elusive subject—the cultural evolution of attitudes to time. But any argument that endorses a sheer opposition between epic as 'absolute past' and tragedy as 'absolute present' (p. 111), for example, or that requires tragedy as a phenomenon of a classical 'theater of self-determination' to be aligned with the view that 'men determined history, not history men' (p. 114), has allowed itself to become intoxicated with excessive conceptual schematisation.

Covering safer ground, Alan Shapiro (pp. 127-52) lucidly reconsiders the treatment in fifth-century visual art—though mostly on vases, less so in public media—of the idea of Athenian autochthony (*qua* descent from earth-sprung Cecrops and Erechtheus) as a 'charter myth' for the city. He treats the theme as an instance of how democratic culture adapted older myths. Tonio Hölscher (pp. 153-84) takes a broader look at the visual arts by arguing reasonably for a 'multifactored' interplay between images and society. He emphasises that while the 'language' of fifth-century art was not specially Athenian, Athens made particularly intense use of it both in public forms (where myth and military victories outweighed attention to democratic motifs as such) and in the more open-ended but still communally relevant thematic repertoire of vase-painting. Deborah Boedeker (pp. 185-202) also concentrates on visual art in examining how historical materials (above all, the Persian Wars) were introduced in a mythologising spirit alongside the established subjects of heroic myth. She maintains that in trying to 'read' the present through the past the Athenians preferred (would-be) 'timeless' images of excellence to historiography's new way of reasoning critically about the past. Surprisingly (see p. 199 with p. 392, n. 88) she seems to think her view is consistent with that of Csapo and Miller (above), but in fact it cuts sharply across their position.

The next three chapters focus on intellectual forms of expression. Robert Wallace (pp. 203-22) modifies the once orthodox, largely Plato-derived view of the sophists as radically different from earlier intellectuals, overwhelmingly centred on Athens, and obsessed with rhetoric. He paints a picture of a much more fluid, colourful, pan-Hellenic intellectual field, where musical theory/research was no less important than political thought. But he does discern a major division between the impact of sophists on Athens before and after 430 BC: prior to that, they were positively engaged with and supportive of democracy; afterwards, they became associated with a disillusioned elite and increasingly extreme views. On the rhetorical front, Harvey Yunis (pp. 223-40) follows Thomas Cole's well-known thesis that there was no full-blown theory of rhetoric in the fifth century; sophistic rhetoric was essentially empirical. But Cole, he suggests, badly underrates the formal and substantive advancement of rhetorical practice in the fifth century when democratic pressures on public speakers led to techniques, not least that of antilogy (polarised debating), which in due course became assimilated into literary (not least Thucydidean)

and philosophical modes of writing/thinking. If Yunis, like Cole, believes (wrongly, in my view) that rhetoric only became fully theorised with Plato, Christopher Rowe argues (pp. 241-54) that Plato was not as straightforwardly antidemocratic as usually supposed. Once we see beyond the extreme idealism of the *Republic*, we can appreciate, according to Rowe, that the paradigmatic constitutions of the *Politicus* and *Laws* have been partly shaped by democratic principles of law, the common good of the citizens, and reciprocal involvement in 'ruling and being ruled', though all this is substantially modified by Plato under the influence of an unendingly Socratic commitment to rationality and intellectual progress.

Athens' two most home-grown fifth-century art forms were those of tragedy and Old Comedy. Jeffrey Henderson (pp. 255-74) sets himself to combat any suggestion that comedy was a peculiar, *sui generis* realm of discourse standing somehow outside the larger current of political speech. Comedians, he insists, did not have unlimited freedom of speech; legal and forensic measures were taken to subject their works to general democratic control. But if comedy was a fully civic performance art, it was also 'supracivic', tackling problems (including those of women) that went beyond those of assembly and courts; its poets, contrary to what many have thought, could expect to have some influence. I like Henderson's formulation of Old Comedy as 'a kind of experimental politics' (p. 273), and I think we might agree that the relationship between comedy and the life of the polis was complex. But I continue to differ with him on numerous issues too tangled to be pursued here (his notes document some of these). I will just mention a fundamental tension, not to say contradiction, in Henderson's position, since he seems to believe that Old Comedy served both as an agent of the demos' 'popular control' (p. 265) and as the voice of 'the politically excluded' (p. 269)—a lesson, perhaps, in how the genre may trap those who try to pin down its polycephalic character. Suzanne Saïd (pp. 275-96) provides a concise but usefully analytic conspectus of the different senses (from contemporary allusiveness to committed propaganda) in which tragedy has been taken to be a political genre. In combating any one global model of interpretation, she uses the relationship between *polis* and *oikos* in Theban plays by each of the three great tragedians to give a sense of the dramatic subtleties that critics need to reckon with. More the pity, therefore, that she succumbs at various points to superficial generalisations, for example, that Aeschylus 'is mostly interested in the community' as opposed to the family (p. 275).

The final chapter before the editors' summarising *envoi* is an interesting reappraisal of the Panathenaic procession, including its partial, stylised depiction on the Parthenon frieze, by Lisa Maurizio (pp. 297-318). Rather than a static reflection of democracy, the procession staged a dynamic intersection between political citizenship and a more all-inclusive 'religious citizenship' in which women and metics were prominent. In its use of order, objects and costume, the procession gave its participants opportunities for competitive display in pursuit of honour and communal recognition. It was, therefore, an active contribution to a discourse about identity and status within the polis that could modify the codified categories of democracy *per se*.

The standards of scholarship and writing in this volume are maintained at a high level; bibliographical referencing is thoroughly *à la page*. This is an indispensable collection for specialist study of the whole culture of fifth-century Athens. If the contributors do not always convey total conviction in their modelling of connections between political institutions/structures and various types of image-making or formal public media of expression, that is a symptom of the difficulty and depth of the questions at stake in their colloquium.

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D. R. Shackleton Bailey (ed. and trans.), *Statius* 2*: Thebaid Books 1-7*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. Pp. 459. ISBN 0-674-01208-9. USD21.50. / *Statius* 3*: Thebaid Books 8-12, Achilleid*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. Pp. 442. ISBN 0-674-01209-7. USD21.50.

The renaissance in Statian studies of the past thirty some years has now this new edition and translation of the *Thebaid* and *Achilleid* to boast, a feat following in the footsteps of an earlier Loeb volume by Shackleton Bailey containing Statius' *Silvae*. These replace the long outdated two-volume Loeb translation of Statius' entire *oeuvre* by J. H. Mozley, first published in 1928.[1] Since the new edition and translation is poised to replace Mozley in the future, comparisons with his work and with D. E. Hill's edition (1983)[2] are in order. The separation of the *Silvae* into a separate volume is a logical move, even though less economical. Now one has to purchase three Loeb volumes to own all of Statius' work. Nevertheless, scholarship in recent years has focused attention on the *Silvae* as a separate field of study and this justifies its separation from the epics in the Loeb volumes.

Shackleton Bailey's introduction to the *Thebaid* and *Achilleid* is necessarily sketchy due to the greater amount of information on Statius available to Shackleton Bailey's readers in comparison to that available to Mozley's. Given the fact that Shackleton Bailey offers not just a new translation, however, but also a new edition, more room could have been allotted in the introduction to a discussion of the manuscript tradition as well as to the author's editorial choices. In order to gain a full picture, the reader now has to consult Hill for a comprehensive review or Mozley, which provides a brief but systematic section on the transmission of Statius' text throughout the ages. Shackleton Bailey does not believe that Statius produced a second edition of the *Thebaid*, although the only hard argument that he cites against this theory is the parallel situation with Martial's manuscripts (p. 6). Kathleen Coleman's overview of recent scholarship on the *Thebaid* and the *Achilleid* gives a useful and concise bird's-eye view of the great strides made in the study of Statius' *Thebaid* not only in English, but also in German, Italian and Dutch. She outlines the

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[1] J. H. Mozley (ed.), *Statius* 1-2 (Cambridge, Mass. 1928).

[2] D. E. Hill (ed.), *P. Papini Stati Thebaidos Libri XII* (Leiden 1983).

many and sometimes mutually conflicting interpretive trends on the ground and puts together a basic eight-page bibliography that can serve as a solid starting point for any student of Statius' epic. The presence of an index distinguishes Shackleton Bailey's version from Mozley's and enhances the readability of the text. It saves space for more intra- and inter-textual referencing and comments, which help the modern reader to follow the often convoluted thread of the narrative. The index not only explains personal and place names but also lists the passages where the names occur. It is additionally helpful that the indices to the *Thebaid* and the *Achilleid* appear separately.

Shackleton Bailey's textual differences from Mozley's text are numerous; therefore, the reader has not just a new translation but a significantly enhanced and improved original. Many of Shackleton Bailey's editorial decisions converge with those of Hill's edition. Therefore, his text can be positioned closer to that of Hill and farther from that of Mozley. In his editorial decisions Shackleton Bailey generally sides with manuscript P except where the rest of the manuscripts (w) prevail by merit (p. 6). 'Merit' here stands for Bailey's own editorial freedom and it is exercised judiciously and most often convincingly. In *Thebaid* 1.10 he sides with Gronovius in reading *Tyriis* against the entire manuscript tradition. This choice has the distinct advantage of making not the mountains Tyrian but the walls (from the previous context Statius clearly means the city of Tyre). Here he is in agreement with Hill and differs from Mozley. However, Shackleton Bailey often differs from Hill. In the entirety of *Thebaid* 1, for example, Shackleton Bailey makes approximately ten decisions that contradict Hill. He convincingly prefers a *lectio difficilior* in *Thebaid* 1.71, where Oedipus digs out his eyes *digitis cedentibus* ('with yielding fingers'; P and Shackleton Bailey) instead of *digitis caedentibus* ('with tearing fingers'; w and Hill, Mozley), even though this choice has to be explained away as a transferred epithet. Most of the differences from Hill are to be acclaimed as distinct improvements contributing to a better, more logical and satisfying reading of the text.

Examples in *Thebaid* 1 that stand out as smoothing out logical blunders are Shackleton Bailey's choice of Schrader's emendation of *mitem Corinthon* ('meek Corinth'; all manuscripts) to *ditem Corinthon* ('rich Corinth', 1.334). He also chooses Madvig's emendation *nebularum intendit amictu* ('covers with a blanket of fog', 1.630) instead of *nebularum incendit amictu* ('burns with a shroud of fog'). Similarly Shackleton Bailey's adoption of Hall's emendation of the manuscripts' *exoratus abis* ('you go away having prayed) to *exoneratus abis* ('you go away cleared of blame', 1.666) is far more satisfactory because the phrase is addressed to Coroebus, who has just received an unexpected pardon from Apollo. The modern reader now has a more tightly coherent and more carefully edited text of the *Thebaid*.

Many of the new readings in this edition are a product of Shackleton Bailey's in-depth and long-standing engagement with Statius' manuscript tradition reflected in his two articles of 1983 and 2000.[3] Often these new readings have important interpretive ramifications, such as the reading *latior* (*Theb.* 7.701) instead of *laetior*,

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[3] D. R. Shackleton Bailey, 'Notes on Statius' *Thebaid*', *MH* 40 (1983) 51-60; D. R. Shackleton Bailey, 'On Statius' *Thebaid*', *HSPh* 100 (2000) 463-76.

represented in manuscript P, but ignored by former editors. The sky turning 'more favourable' (*laetior*) right before Amphiaraus' disappearance in a chasm opening in the earth is certainly a reading that one happily lets go, especially since the more contextually fitting *latior* (the sky turning 'wider') is backed by P. A long-standing editorial blunder is thus set aright. Examples of such insights can be further multiplied and are discussed in the aforementioned articles. From a literary interpretive point of view, however, one cannot but miss in Shackleton Bailey's edition the priceless text-critical notes to *virtute* in *Thebaid* 9.6. Here textual criticism and literary interpretation clash over the poet's ironic use of *virtute* referring to Tydeus' act of cannibalistic vengefulness. The use of *virtus* here has upset the sensitivities of numerous textual critics, thus generating a flurry of proposals for emendation, which are diligently reported by Mozley.

Shackleton Bailey improves upon Mozley's often Latinised structures by rendering the text into more literary, idiomatic and readable English that is enjoyable and easy to follow. Apart from occasional archaisms, the translation successfully captures subtle nuances, unpacks obscure images, and offers a helpful hand in the notes to bridge gaps in the meaning. The normalisation of the apostrophe in *Thebaid* 1.666 by turning the second person verb into the third person is stylistically problematic since the apostrophe serves as a vital component in Statius' dialogic style. For those who want to read the poem in translation and prefer a lucid prose rendition to Melville's verse, however, the new Loeb is a necessity. It entirely replaces Mozley's now dated version and provides a well-edited text equipped with the most essential commentary to those who want to read the epics in the original. The indices additionally enhance the value of these volumes by helping the reader to keep track of people and places and to trace their position in the entire text more easily.

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Rush Rehm, *The Play of Space, Spatial Transformation in Greek Tragedy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp. xi + 448. ISBN 0-691-05809-1. USD52.50.

This is one of those books where the title provides only a partial indication of the breadth of material included, for Rehm's study of ancient tragedy, while pointed towards an exploration of space in its widest context, manages to include much that will be of interest to students looking for new avenues of interpretation of the plays discussed. It is also a book worth persisting with, certainly beyond the introduction, which at times has a tendency toward pretentious verbiage and in places seems incapable of letting two sentences pass without some equally inflated quotation from other works. When Rehm turns to his main task, on the other hand, it is clear that the eight years taken in its production have resulted in something that deserves serious consideration; over a hundred pages of notes is ample indication of the wealth of scholarship that lies within it.

Rehm's opening words aptly sum up his theme: 'I base this book on the simple premise that space is a proper value of the theater, part and parcel of what it is and how it works' (p. 1). To those, like myself, whose interest in the ancient theatre has been traditionally rooted in Aristotle's view of plays as actions fleshed out by character and who have taken a factor such as setting as given, simply to be accepted unless of obvious significance, such a study comes as something of an eye-opener, something that goes far beyond the usual distinctions between public and private, what appears on-stage and what lurks unseen elsewhere. Rehm also underlines (pp. 8-10) the need to resist the temptation to introduce into our study of the genre thought patterns and analyses that are rooted in our usual approach through reading, a factor that both limits our own view to an internal private experience and obliterates any sense of what the original audience experienced in the broadest sense of content, delivery, context and immediacy. As he says (p. 10), '[m]issing in a text-driven approach is the simple fact that theatrical space demands presence—the simultaneous presence of performers and audience'.

In his first chapter, 'The Theater and Athenian Spatial Practice' (pp. 35-62), Rehm examines the Theatre of Dionysus itself and the festival for which it provided the venue before turning to an examination of specific tragedies used to illustrate the five themes which form the basis of subsequent chapters: space for homecomings, eremetic space, space and the body, space time and memory, and finally space and the other. In dealing with each of the plays he draws on six spatial categories that he regards as basic to the Theatre of Dionysus: (1) theatrical space; (2) scenic space; (3) extra-scenic space; (4) distanced space; (5) self-referential space; and (6) reflexive space. These he defines on pp. 20-25 as (1) 'the basic constraints and opportunities' of the theatre; (2) the setting of a tragedy determined by 'backcloth' and stage furniture but capable of considerable mutation, since plays like *Ajax*, *Choephoroe* and *Eumenides* indicate through the changes of location what their action indicates; (3) those elements of setting immediately off-stage: palace interiors are the most obvious; (4) those places which are further removed from the immediacy of the stage: distant cities like Corinth in *Oedipus Tyrannos*, Troy in *Agamemnon*; (5) references within the play to aspects of the theatre itself: allusions to choral dance or theatrical performance, most graphically illustrated by the recognition scene in Euripides' *Electra*; (6) and allusions to contemporary features of Athenian *polis* life designed to draw the city and its workings into the action of the play.

In turning to the theme of space itself Rehm illustrates his first category, space for homecomings, with a close analysis of *Oresteia* and *Heracles Mainomenos*, although he takes care to point out that there are several other tragedies where return forms an element within the action. The basic *nostos* elements here are clear enough: Agamemnon returns to disaster; Orestes returns for revenge and then moves in time and space to acquittal; and Heracles returns to rescue his family only to destroy it before being himself rescued from suicide by Theseus. Rehm demonstrates, however, that there are many other elements in the plays that have a bearing on his theme: in *Agamemnon* the use of interior space, the creation of ritual space, the manner of Aegisthus' entry (used to demonstrate his role as usurper); in *Choephoroe* the

dichotomy of the setting between the tomb and palace, Orestes' contrasting entry into the palace by deception, announcing his own death only to bring death to others; and in *Eumenides* the shift of scene from Delphi to the Acropolis and thence to the Areopagus. Rehm argues that of these the interior of the temple at Delphi, like Athena's temple, is represented not behind the scene, as usually thought, but in the very centre of the orchestra. In turning to the *Heracles*, Rehm juxtaposes Lycus' threats to send the hero's family to the underworld with Heracles' own return from it. As the hero falls into madness, he mentally converts the home he seeks to preserve into the vastness of his travels, just as his children, his latest quarry, shift their locations within the familiar, seeking safety from his violence. And finally Heracles gains respite from his disaster by a further shift, this time to Athens, just as the Erinyes shift their function by becoming the Eumenides through a similar incorporation into their adoptive city.

In dealing with eremetic space Rehm concentrates on the desolation that takes the stage in *Antigone*—how this resonates through the play in reality and image—and in *Ajax* with both its shift to the emptiness of the sea shore and the hero's increasing isolation from his family. But how was the vital shift of scene in this play engineered? Rehm suggests intervention by one of the actors, with Tecmessa ripping down the fabric of the tent in the course of her outburst in lines 803-12, a symbolic destruction of her home that is soon to become reality through Ajax's suicide. Two further plays figure in this aspect of the study, *Philoctetes*, set on the deserted island of Lemnos but replete with shifting references to other locations and character developments, and *Prometheus Bound*, set on the very edge of the world, fixed upon the static figure of the Titan, but ranging over the whole earth through those who come to visit him. As Rehm observes (p. 163), '[h]e is the other characters' audience and ours, just as we are his, a process of mutual observation that runs through the play'.

In chapter 4, 'Space and the Body' (pp. 168-214), Rehm draws attention not only to the way that playwrights at times emphasise dichotomies by using the same actor to play significantly different characters but also how clothes and accessories are often used to transform and amplify the spatial entity that is a character. In this discussion he targets plays like *Hecuba*, with its ghost, corpses, mutilation and prophesied metamorphosis, and Euripides' *Electra* and *Bacchae*, in which appearance so often underlines developing themes.

In 'Space Time and Memory' (pp. 215-35) Rehm fixes upon a single drama, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, ranging as it does over Oedipus' life and those memories that nudge the action to disaster, as he pieces together solutions to interlocking puzzles by concentrating on important places in his life. Finally, Rehm moves to 'Space and the Other' (pp. 236- 69), a topic he regards as overemphasised by many. Arguing that commentators have too often sought to locate in 'the other' all that is un-Greek or un-Athenian, Rehm demonstrates instead that this same 'other' often encapsulates those very qualities Athenians regarded as their own. The obvious focal plays here are *Persians* and *Medea*. In the first Rehm points out something that is often lost in works on the play: the fact that it was staged in a city still very much in ruin after its capture by those depicted on the stage and yet displays a remarkably restrained response both

to that disaster and to the Greek victory that followed. In treating *Medea* Rehm asks what kind of 'other' Medea actually is and examines how Euripides uses space to emphasise the situation in which Medea finds herself and how the play can be seen as a self-referential mirror of Athens in terms of the (mis)use of rhetoric and, in the years following Pericles' citizenship law of 450, its implications for marriage with non-Athenian women. And why exactly did Euripides introduce the apparently new development in the myth of Medea killing her own children? A number of possibilities are investigated. Rehm himself, though, suggests that such a course allows the depiction within the single character of a conflict between the masculine need for vengeance and the feminine instinct to preserve, a conflict that was already making itself felt in the wider context of contemporary Athens.

No review can adequately represent the width of ideas, analysis and discussion that Rehm has managed to inject into this work, many of them inserted in passing while dealing with more major topics. This, in fact, is part of its strength: an ability to combine the wide-ranging with the specific and to introduce a broad spectrum of detail within an overall theme. Of course, there is much that more traditional students of the ancient tragic theatre will inevitably find to take issue with—myself included—but a great deal of this stems ultimately from the author's approach to drama as a freelance theatre director. Time and again it is clear that his thoughts are founded not so much on the text as a piece of reading but as something to be visualised and actualised within the theatre. In a Greek context he stands as a *didaskalos*, but this, after all, is how the ancient record describes the playwrights themselves.

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Grace M. Ledbetter, *Poetics Before Plato: Inspiration and Authority in Early Greek Theories of Poetry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. Pp. xiv + 128. ISBN 0-691-09609-0. USD16.95.


It has been said that the history of Western literary criticism is 'a series of footnotes to Plato'.[1] This important new study, however, attempts to clarify our perception of criticism *before* Plato, and argues that Plato himself should be seen as developing and reacting to an existing critical tradition. If we are to understand Plato, then we will first have to get to grips with the earlier material. But what did Plato himself say about poetry? His writings have often seemed problematic and contradictory to those seeking to extract a coherent set of views. Ledbetter approaches the problem by making a clear distinction between Socratic and Platonic poetics: she argues that the earlier dialogues (*Ion*, *Protagoras* and *Apology*) preserve Socrates' own views in contrast to the later and more distinctively Platonic views encountered in the *Republic*.

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[1] P. Murray, *Plato on Poetry* (Cambridge 1996) 1, adapting A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York 1930) 63.

Ledbetter's two-fold aim, then, is first to elucidate pre-Platonic theories of poetry before moving on to discuss Socratic (but not Platonic) poetics. Since there are no surviving treatises or theoretical discussions that pre-date Plato, these early theories, as Ledbetter presents them, take the form of those self-conscious reflections on poetry and the figure of the poet that are found within early Greek poetry. Such reflections do not amount to a single early Greek view of poetry, but Ledbetter argues that they are united by a common aim, namely 'to minimize interpretation by poetry's audiences in an effort to maintain the poet's authority over his work' (p. 2). By contrast Ledbetter claims that Socrates challenges the poets' authority and problematises issues of interpretation but that, unlike Plato in the *Republic*, Socrates does not deny the value of poetry altogether. This argument is vigorously developed over five chapters: after a brief introduction, a chapter each is devoted to Homer, Hesiod and Pindar, while the final two chapters are concerned with the Socratic dialogues.

The influence of Auerbach's *Mimesis*[2] is clearly seen in Ledbetter's study of Homer, which concentrates not on Homer's view of poetry as such but rather on the question 'how does Homer *want* his poetry to be viewed?' (p. 13). According to Ledbetter, Homer presents his own poetry as a pleasurable source of knowledge, which is transmitted directly from inspired poet to audience without the need for interpretation. The extent and origin of Homer's own authoritative knowledge and his precise relationship with the Muses is left 'deliberately ambiguous' (p. 18); what matters is simply that we should be charmed into accepting what Homer says. On occasion, indeed, Homer depicts the effect of poetry on its audience: those who have listened go away delighted and more knowledgeable than before (e.g., *Od.* 12.188). The picture is complicated, however, by the fact that a variety of poets—and audiences—are depicted in rather different ways within the Homeric poems. We encounter, for instance, Phemius, Circe, the Sirens, Odysseus and Penelope as producers or consumers of poetry, but not all their poems are truthful and not all bring pleasure. Perhaps, it has been suggested, the concept of literary fiction is emerging here; perhaps the authority of epic poetry is being undermined; or perhaps Homer is contrasting genuinely inspired poets with uninspired ones. Regardless, there is an internal contradiction: as Ledbetter concludes, 'the Homeric poems . . . would unavoidably seem to invite the very sort of interpretation discouraged by Homeric poetics' (p. 39).

Hesiod and Pindar are read by Ledbetter 'against the background of' Homer (p. 59). Like the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, their poems seem to foreground their own status as authoritative knowledge; however, they each present the role of the poet in different ways, which seem calculated to fend off criticism or competition. In Hesiod, as in Homer, the voice of the poet merges with that of the Muses, but a certain distance is maintained, since Hesiod does not guarantee the truth-value of his own poetry. The Muses may transmit truth or falsehood, as in the often-quoted lines *Theogony* 27f.; the poet simply passes it on to his audience. Slightly different again is Pindar, who

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[2] E. Auerbach (tr. W. R. Trask), *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* (Princeton 1953).

Ledbetter claims presents the Muse as an oracle and the poet as her interpreter, a theory that relies heavily on a single fragment (frag. 150). Unlike the poet-figure of Homer or Hesiod, Pindar *mediates* between the Muses and his audience. Thus Pindar suggests a criterion according to which poets can challenge one another's authority: the superior poet is the better interpreter of the Muses' messages (p. 77).

Ledbetter interprets the Socratic poetics of *Ion*, *Apology* and *Protagoras* as a challenge to the other three poets discussed. Here, as before, the interpretation of poetry is seen as being at the heart of things, but it has nothing to do with inspiration. Ledbetter's Socrates (unlike Plato in the *Republic*) allows that poetry may harbour truth or wisdom, but he significantly rejects the poet's claim to possess authority over the meaning of his poetry. Who, then, is qualified to interpret poetry, and how should one interpret it? Ledbetter suggests that the Protagoras provides a partial answer to such questions. Socrates' notorious interpretation of Simonides in that dialogue is seen as a model of what not to do. In other words, it is so anti-Socratic that it shows by implication what a genuinely Socratic interpretation would look like. A Socratic approach would take the form of 'dialogic inquiry' into the meaning of poetry (p. 115) and ignore the (irrecoverable) intentions of the poet. Thus Socrates does not, as many have claimed, reject the possibility of interpretation, and poetry can after all be included in the subject matter of philosophical inquiry.

One seldom finds oneself wishing that an academic book had been longer. At a mere 128 pages, Ledbetter's book is far less prolix than most:[3] her writing is admirably concise and clear and the argument hangs together very neatly, perhaps a little too neatly. In fact, the reader may wish that a number of questions had been pursued at more length. Why, for example, should one restrict early Greek poetry to Homer, Hesiod and Pindar alone? Comparable passages of self-conscious reflection dealing with similar issues of truthfulness and authority can be found in the work of other contemporary poets, but there is little hint of how the theories of other writers correspond to the three poets discussed. Even Homer, Hesiod and Pindar are not milked dry, especially those passages which do not seem to conform to their author's overall view of poetry. And what actually happens if one reads the poets in the way they encourage us to read them? Apart from a short discussion of Homer (pp. 34-39; 'Does the theory apply to the poem?'), this area remains unexplored. Do the theoretical passages cause other passages or the meaning of the poems as a whole to appear in a different way? And how are we to explain the differences between the three poets? Should we approach all three in the same way? What about the concept of literary genre and its implications for truth and authority? These are not purely literary questions to be considered in the abstract; however, Ledbetter's literary-philosophical approach often gives the impression that Homer, Hesiod and Pindar were writing in a vacuum. Individual texts and their meanings are discussed, but little attention is paid

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[3] The book is also carefully produced and edited. Misprints are few and trivial: 'it's' for 'its' (p. 47), 'the' for 'to' (p. 51), 'Pinder' for 'Pindar' (p. 74), and 'Homer'' for 'Homer's' (p. 89). The Greek is quoted sometimes in the original, sometimes in transliterated form, and sometimes in English translation (for no very obvious reason).

to the literary scene in a broader sense or the society in which these texts were written, which means that Ledbetter is not telling the whole story. In archaic and classical city-states, poetry was written primarily for performance in a variety of contexts charged with social, political and religious significance. Recent scholarship has shown that, rather than to think purely of texts and readers, we need to think in terms of a dynamic culture of performance in which rival poets compete for prestige.[4] All of this has inevitable consequences for the issues of poetic self-presentation and authority with which Ledbetter is concerned.

The need for more context is most obvious in Ledbetter's treatment of Homer. Like other poems, the Homeric epics are treated as texts for reading rather than performing; the question under discussion is 'how Homer wanted to be read' (p. 10) and 'the reader' is mentioned repeatedly (e.g., pp. 11, 14, 39). More curiously, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are treated as if they were a single, unitary work with a single, coherent view of poetry; for example, Ledbetter refers to 'the poem' (p. 34). And there is nothing at all on the circumstances of Homeric composition. Are the two epics by the same author? How did they come into being? Knotty problems, to be sure, but they have a crucial bearing on the main argument. How might a living, oral poetic tradition comment on itself? Would one not expect a variety of perhaps conflicting views about the nature of poetry or authority? Can we talk about the figure of the poet without at least considering the Homeric question or the narratological aspects of poetic self-representation within the poem?[5] These and other messy questions make it hard to be entirely satisfied by Ledbetter's neat and tidy view of early Greek poetics. Nevertheless, her central argument and her view of Platonic poetics is certainly worth taking seriously.

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Andrew Ford, *The Origins of Criticism: Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical Greece*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp. 376. ISBN 0-691-07485-2. USD45.00.

This is an important and valuable book that with learning and thoughtful attention re-imagines the story of how the Greeks thought about poetry. Ford convincingly argues that because archaic poetry was socially located in particular occasions, comments about song in the archaic period should not be read as if poetry were already an independent field of study and as if particular evaluations always implied poetic norms. Defining criticism as praise or blame of performance, he argues

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[4] For a very different perspective on the same sort of material, see A. Ford, *The Origins of Criticism* (Princeton 2002). On ancient performance culture in general, see P. Murray and P. Wilson (edd.), *Music and the Muses* (Oxford 2004).

[5] As explored by, for example, I. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers* (Amsterdam 1987); I. de Jong, *A Narratological Commentary on the Odyssey* (Cambridge 2001).

that Xenophanes' poetic criticisms of poetry about the gods, for example, should not be isolated as philosophical but belongs with his other injunctions about symposiastic behaviour: singing good songs belongs with not becoming excessively drunk or holding a symposium in a dirty room. Similarly Ford stresses that poets like Simonides and Pindar compare their products to works of art because they are claiming superiority for their art as a way of spreading fame. Because archaic poetry is tightly bound to immediate social and competitive needs, so is criticism. Indeed, in praising or blaming the poetic performance, the critic is engaging in a social performance of his own that is itself potentially subject to praise and blame. Criticism is therefore profoundly rhetorical and social and needs to be understood as practice. Allegorical interpretation, for example, unites critic and audience as an elite group. By the fourth century, however, poetry has been separated from its original performance contexts and become available as an object of discussion and debate for itself; criticism in a modern sense is the result. The book defines this transformation and seeks to understand how it came about. It is thus right in the centre of recent work on archaic poetry with its emphasis on performance and particular occasions, but its application of such thought to poetics is original. Throughout the book is clear, thorough, lively and fair in its engagements with earlier work on the topic, and these qualities make it unusually enjoyable to read.

Ford gives special importance to literacy in transforming the understanding of poetry; as a written text, the song could have left its performance context to become a real object. But he does not assume that literacy alone caused the transformation of songs to poetic texts and he recognises that even in the archaic, oral context poems could be discussed as fixed texts and that the existence of written texts does not by itself entirely explain the development of thinking about poetry. He discusses the place of Democritus and Gorgias, whom he sees as compatible, and their attempts to understand the power of poetic language in materialist terms; he also reflects upon the importance of the sophists, who as professional teachers provide models for using poetry in sophisticated social performance and make the poets a usable past for themselves. Ford also has an interesting discussion of anthologising as a mechanism for making earlier poetry useful in the democratic city. His discussion of Plato emphasises the materialistic side he has already analysed in Democritus and Gorgias (the chapter is called 'Literary Culture in Plato's *Republic*: The Sound of Ideology', pp. 209-26). For Plato culture is a physical environment that impresses itself on the young and poetry is a mechanism that transmits this harmful ideology.

Ford argues that poetry as literature is a back-formation from artistic prose. This is not in his view a paradox. Rather, the process of creating rhetoric, of trying to define a verbal art that did not depend on the divine or special knowledge but was a teachable craft not surprisingly created a new problem for poetry. Literature was invented as prose and only then could poetry become literature. Once prose began to articulate its claims, poetry needed a territory that distinguished it by more than metre. Plato contributed not only mimesis but the definition of genres by formal criteria instead of those of performance. Finally, Ford argues, Aristotle understands poetry as a unique area of study with individual genres each with its own possibilities. The most

significant change is that 'ethical and religious criteria are replaced by technical appropriateness' (p. 263). Finally, Ford claims that poetic contests did not aim at evaluating works of literature as literature but that the judge of poetry was primarily 'a political authority and spokesman for social order' (p. 292), whether in the contest of Homer and Hesiod or in the Athenian Dionysia. Only in Plato and Aristotle do we see the beginnings of a distinction between form and content and the possibility of judging poetry by rules that do not focus on their social value.

There is, of course, much here with which one could disagree. Although it is a rich account and the story it provides is compelling, such a unidirectional narrative may oversimplify. Ford offers, in fact, an Aristotelian story with a beginning (archaic socially evaluated performance), a middle (Gorgias, Democritus, sophists, literacy, artistic prose), and Aristotle himself as the *telos*. It is hard not to feel that he undervalues the specifically aesthetic until he reaches Aristotle and that he then overvalues it to produce an elegant contrast. Aristotle's *Poetics* certainly defines tragedy as a genre with its own rules by which it should be judged, and he treats some forms of criticism as basically irrelevant since some mistakes are accidental, while others are 'about the art' (1460b16). Nonetheless, his very definition of the genre has ethical implications (tragedy must be serious) and his criteria for evaluating it are obviously ethical (a plot that shows good people falling into bad fortune is *miaron*). Social and ethical criteria never lose their importance in ancient criticism. In contrast, the book tends to understate the presence of criteria for judging poetry before the fourth century that are not social or ethical. He does not discuss Dionysus' moment of *aporia* as he must make a judgment (τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι σοφόν, τῷ δ' ἥδομαι, 'I think one wise; I enjoy the other', *Ran.* 1413), where it seems clear that Dionysus is not only a judge of social order, but experiences different kinds of response that do not cohere with each other. Ford suggests that Aristophanes' literary scenes 'usually present advanced criticism as high-falutin' nonsense' (p. 280)—maybe, but the Aristophanic joke often seems to cut both ways. The Socrates of *Clouds* may be ridiculous, but so is Strepsiades in his complete ignorance of metrics. The book mentions 'New Music' only briefly, in connection with Plato's support of generic restrictions, but Aristophanes' parodies of 'New Music' and its accompanying poetic forms clearly has an aesthetic as well as a social side. The two are profoundly intertwined from the start.

Ford rightly says that in Pindar's comparisons of his poems to elaborately wrought luxury goods 'artful design is only one aspect of the symbol's relevance' (p. 118), then seems to imply that it is really not an aspect at all but that the comparison to objects either differentiates song's power to circulate from static things or defines song within the system of guest-friendship. It is true, as Ford argues, that Pindar compares his songs to artefacts without making himself an artisan. Yet it seems as if Pindar wants to mystify his own position, not his poems' similarities to and differences from beautiful objects, which includes their complex form. And it seems absurd to follow A. P. Burnett, as Ford does (p. 123), in claiming that a victory ode

'was never produced again' after its first performance:[1] victory songs are clearly intended to be remembered, quoted, sung on different occasions. That is what they are for. When Bacchylides says that 'the light of mortals' *arete* does not disappear with the body, but the Muse care for it (3.90-92)', he is not talking about a single grand performance.

The book can provoke thought even where it does not treat a topic extensively. Our texts claim in general that poetic performance gives pleasure and distracts from sorrow, but they do not stress this in explicitly critical contexts until Aristophanes, who repeatedly mentions performances deficient in pleasure (*Ach*. 9-12, for example). At many symposia and festivals there must have been performances that were perfectly appropriate but just not as good as others, but archaic poetry emphasises success rather than failure and does not convey what made some poems more enjoyable than others. When Theognis imagines how people will praise him (21-24), he surely imagines a fame based at least in part on aesthetic excellence. *Charis* needs more attention than it receives here. So do the criticisms implicit in poetic re-workings, especially those of Euripides. Nobody could fairly demand, though, that one book discusses everything. This one will be indispensable in all future study of archaic and classical Greek poetics and we should be very grateful for it.

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Ludwig Bernays (ed.), *Otto Friedrich Gruppe 1804-1876: Philosoph, Dichter, Philologe*. Freiburg-in-Breisgau: Rombach Verlag, 2004. Pp. 283. ISBN 3-7930-9377-8. EUR39.90.

The Gruppe family was a dynasty in the field of Classics like no other. In 1904 Otto Gruppe commemorated the hundredth birthday of his father, Otto Friedrich Gruppe; in this book published in 2004, the great-grandson, Ludwig Bernays, commemorates the two-hundredth birthday of his great-grandfather. The son a hundred years ago edited a collection of his father's German poems, some of them set to music by such famous artists as Johannes Brahms, Richard Strauss, Karl Löwe and Franz Schreker. In our time the great-grandson presents us with a collection of fifteen chapters by contemporary scholars from France, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway and the USA; two of them are in French, seven in German, four in English, and two in Italian. They discuss not only the influence of Otto Friedrich Gruppe in many fields such as Classics, translation studies, German literature, linguistics, philosophy and mythology but also his work as secretary of the Preußische Akademie der Künste in Berlin, where he served for the last fourteen years of his life before being succeeded by the famous author Theodor Fontane. O. F. Gruppe's son, Otto Gruppe (1851-1901), is well known in Classics as the author of *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte* and of *Geschichte der Klassischen*

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[1] A. P. Burnett, *The Art of Bacchylides* (Cambridge, Mass. 1985) 76.

*Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte während des Mittelalters in Abendland und während der Neuzeit.*[1] The great-grandson, Ludwig Bernays, born in 1924, worked for four decades as a general practitioner. He studied Classical philology and published a number of valuable studies now collected under the title *Ars Poetica.*[2]

*Ecco la famiglia*—but what about the founder? And what about his present influence? The subtitle calls him 'Philosoph, Dichter, Philologe'. His poetry, however, is not discussed in this volume. His scholarly writings, on the other hand, are thoroughly analysed and their influence until the present day is outlined carefully. Fighting against Hegel, his Berlin teacher, Gruppe the philosopher was not appreciated by many academics during the nineteenth century; he was aggressively attacked by Karl Marx and severely criticised by others. But Gruppe the philosopher was rediscovered by Fritz Mauthner in 1913.[3] He was understood as a precursor of Wittgenstein by H. Sluga in 1980[4] and his 'Gegenwart und Zukunft der Philosophie in Deutschland' of 1855 was reprinted in 1996.[5] This development is described by Pascale Hummel, 'Savant et écrivain: O.F. Gruppe ou la philologie sans frontières' (pp. 15-29); by Olaf Briese, who calls him a 'Philosoph im nachmetaphysischen Aufbruch' (pp. 31-48); by Volker Peckhaus (on 'Gruppe und die logische Frage', pp. 49-72); by Katherine Arens ('On the Critique of Language', pp. 73-94); and by Luc J. M. Bermans ('Gruppe and Dutch Significs', pp. 95-114). A discussion of Gruppe's 'Preisschrift' of 1840 on the fragments of Archytas by Gregor Staab (pp. 201-25) outlines the fate and the consequences of this semi-successful work. The picture is rounded out by the final essay of the volume (pp. 249-79), 'Gruppe's Unique Place in the History of the Critique of Metaphysics' by Guido Vanheeswijk and Herbert de Vriese. They state that 'it is generally agreed that Kierkegaard and Marx had been influenced by Gruppe' (pp. 25, 254). William Baker, who traces 'the relationship between Gruppe and the great Victorian novelist George Eliot and her consort the philosopher, literary critic, distinguished editor and biographer, George Henry Lewes' (pp. 115-25), holds a place of his own. Here we come across Eliot's portrait of Gruppe (p. 120), whom she describes as a somehow Spitzwegian figure 'wrapt in a moth-eaten grey coat, once a great coat, now converted into a *schlafrock*, and a cap on his head'. There are also her contradictory remarks on his wife, who is 'about 20 years younger than himself' in 1855 and 'about 30 years younger' in her 'Recollections' many years later—not to mention Briese, who makes her 25 years younger (p. 46).

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[1] The first may be found in I. Müller (ed.), *Handbuch der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* 5.1-2 (Munich 1906), the second in W. H. Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie: Supplementum* 4 (Leipzig 1921).

[2] Ludwig Bernays, *Ars Poetica: Studien zu formalen Aspekten der antiken Dichtung* (Frankfurt 2000).

[3] F. Mauthner, 'Otto Friedrich Gruppe', in M. Harden (ed.), *Die Zukunft* 22 (Berlin 1913) 314-25.

[4] H. D. Sluga, *Gottlob Frege* (London 1980).

[5] O. F. Gruppe, *Gegenwart und Zukunft der Philosophie in Deutschland* (Berlin 1855).

What follows is mostly dedicated to Gruppe's contributions to Classical Philology. Mathilde Skoie's study on 'Gruppe: The Father of Sulpician Scholarship' (pp. 127-46), a concentrated version of a chapter from her book *Reading Sulpicia*,[6] points to the fact that it was Gruppe who made the scholarly world aware that there lived an Augustan poetess who composed a cycle of six short love poems; thus he enriched remarkably the history of Latin literature as well as the thesaurus of female poetry. What enabled him to do this was his ability not only 'to understand the Latin of the poems, but also their poetic quality' (p. 132). In fact, Gruppe stresses that one has not only 'Lateinisch zu verstehen, man mußte auch Poetisch verstehen' (pp. 4, 149). Ludwig Bernays himself explains 'Umstrittene Gedichte des Corpus Tibullianum' (pp. 147-68). This refers to Tibullus 3.9, the Sulpicia elegies, and the *Panegyricus Messallae*. He points to the achievements of his great-grandfather in this field and adds his own clarifications. Next follows Stefan Stirnemann's refreshing study ('Die Kunst der Obersetzer: Erinnerung an Gruppes *Deutsche Obersetzerkunst*', pp. 169-74) on a volume published in Hannover in 1866 advocating 'Freie Reproduktion'. The two Italian papers, by Sotera Fornaro ('Mito e Poesia: l'Ariadné di Gruppe nel suo tempo', pp. 175- 94) and by Andrea Ercolani ('Ober die Theogonie des Hesiod, ihr Verderbnis und ihre ursprüngliche Gestalt: Un libro quasi dimenticato di Gruppe', pp. 195-200) both discuss monographs dating to 1834 and 1841 respectively in which Gruppe paints a picture of the developments in early Greek poetry.

While the 'Dichter' Gruppe is dismissed here in a few annotations only (e.g., pp. 27, 196f.), the 'Philosoph' and the 'Philologe' of the subtitle are well illuminated in this small volume. Obviously there is room for more analytical discussion and need for more historical research on this multifaceted talent of two centuries ago. Instead of waiting for the third centenary in 2104, a full bibliography of Gruppe's publications (and unpublished material: see pp. 205, 21) might now be composed and published. On such a basis a full and detailed evaluation of his achievements should be presented. It might reveal interesting, even astonishing facts and facets of *Geistesgeschichte*.

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Jacques Brunschwig, Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd, Pierre Pellegrin and Catherine Porter, *A Guide to Greek Thought: Major Figures and Trends*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. Pp. xiii + 486. ISBN 0-674-02156-8. GBP12.95.

This book is a series of essays, written by a team of renowned scholars, primarily French and English. The essays were extracted from the considerably larger work *Greek Thought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge*, which is a translation of *Le*

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[6] Mathilde Skoie, *Reading Sulpicia: Commentaries 1475–1990* (Oxford 2000).

*Savoir Grec: Dictionnaire Critique.*[1] *Greek Thought* is a reference book with appeal not only to philosophers for its treatment of philosophical subjects, thinkers and schools of thought but also to literary critics for the abstract way in which it goes about this treatment: its purported aim is to investigate the self-reflective aspect of Greek thought without primary attention to philosophical content and historical context. In the introduction, the editors call this collection of articles 'the gaze of the moderns looking upon the Greeks looking upon themselves' (p. xii).

The original text *Greek Thought* is divided into five sections, the first three of which are reproduced in somewhat pared-down form in *The Greek Pursuit of Knowledge*.[2] The last two sections of *Greek Thought*, on 'major figures' and 'trends', are reproduced without alteration in the book reviewed here. *A Guide to Greek Thought* treats twenty-three 'major figures', including fifteen philosophers, five scientists and three historians, plus eleven 'trends' under the category of 'currents of thought' in the book consisting of nine schools of thought and two articles that discuss Hellenism and its relationship to Christianity and Judaism respectively. While the introduction to *A Guide to Greek Thought* gives a fine explanation as to the plan and purpose of *Greek Thought* and *Le Savoir Grec*, it gives the reader no indication of its own purpose other than the answers that immediately spring to mind—that the book is shorter and cheaper, more portable, and addresses more specific topics than its parent. The introduction to the present work, moreover, is in fact extracted from the reference volume with the sections particular to the essays included in *The Greek Pursuit of Knowledge* omitted. With this criticism addressed, the book will be a boon to those interested in questions regarding not what the Greeks thought but how they thought. *A Guide to Greek Thought* is recommended to those interested in the methodologically based mission of *Greek Thought* but would like to read something less overwhelming than the large (and heavy) reference text. It is especially recommended to those interested more in particular figures and schools of thought than the general philosophical topics or questions addressed in *The Greek Pursuit of Knowledge*. In addition, although the editors have chosen to 'step back from the products to the processes that gave rise to them' (p. xi), the articles do in fact sufficiently present the doctrines of individual philosophers and schools as well as places them in their historical context and makes some statement on reception. The book also provides a time line placing figures and movements addressed in the book alongside historical events.

The book is accessible for scholars and non-scholars, although the translations of the articles (if not the articles themselves) are often not easy to manoeuvre and the writing style makes the material more difficult than need be. This problem is a combination of thought lost in translation and abstract writing: one sentence in the

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[1] J. Brunschwig and G. E. R. Lloyd (edd.; tr. C. Porter), *Greek Thought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge* (Cambridge, Mass. 2000); J. Brunschwig and G. E. R. Lloyd (edd.), *Le Savoir Grec: Dictionnaire Critique* (Paris 1996).

[2] J. Brunschwig and G. E. R. Lloyd (edd.; tr. C. Porter), *The Greek Pursuit of Knowledge* (Cambridge, Mass. 2003).

article on Stoicism reads: 'To pull the rabbit of a singularly powerful moral rigor out of the hat of nature, the Stoics found, both in experience and in theory, a remarkably ingenious instrument' (p. 468). Unfortunately worthwhile content is at times obscured by such language. In addition, some of the writing errs on the side of the romantic, particularly the first paragraph of the introduction that discusses the Greek alphabet as 'halfway between the strange and familiar' yet 'welcomes us with signals clear enough to avoid complete illegibility' (p. ix). The paragraph goes on to discuss *inter alia* the loftiness of Roman inscriptions and the fascination of Chinese ideograms. Again, the pertinence of the paragraph seems to have been lost in translation and instead it distracts from the mission of the text. Still, this is really the only major criticism of the book, one which will probably be tolerable to most interested in the project.

In the first section of the book, 'Major Figures' (pp. 3-273), the editors have collected philosophers, historians and scientists, although it might have been interesting to see literary figures included. The works of Euripides, Aristophanes and Sappho certainly lend themselves to the issue of self-reflexivity. The editors do not explain how or why they made their selections of philosophers and currents of thought except to say that the selection process was a difficult one. All the same, the book offers a fine collection of philosophers: Anaxagoras, Antisthenes, Archimedes, Aristotle, Democritus, Epicurus, Euclid, Galen, Heraclitus, Herodotus, Hippocrates, Parmenides, Plato, Plotinus, Plutarch, Polybius, Protagoras, Ptolemy, Pyrrhon, Socrates, Thucydides, Xenophon and Zeno. The essays are treated by expert scholars in non-research oriented articles without footnotes and references to technical terms, although each essay ends with a bibliography of texts and translations and secondary works for further study. While the contributors bring their own mode of scholarship and thinking to their essays, the essays follow the same general format: brief biography of figure, list of works written, mention of historical importance and influence, followed by a large main section that treats the content of thought and methodology within the author's works.

Of particular note in section one is the treatment of Herodotus by François Hartog (pp. 120-26), who discusses the Greek concept of the barbarian, a topic that her *Mirror of Herodotus* deals with;[3] the chapter condenses in a clear explanation some of Hartog's key theses in that noteworthy book. In one section of the chapter, Hartog analyses what he sees as the political rationale for distinguishing between barbarian and Greek, presenting Herdotus as a 'Levi-Strauss of his time' (p. 122). Hartog first establishes the 'otherness' of people and places through opposition and analogy; when these customs are enumerated, he judges them through Greek 'politicised' *nomoi*. Martin Ostwald's 'Thucycdides' (pp. 241-56) is another treatment of self-examination with respect to a historian; in this case, Ostwald focuses on Thucydides' speeches as reflecting the attitude of the speaker. Ostwald connects Thucydides' mode of selecting speeches with his penchant for the rational over the

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[3] F. Hartog (tr. J. Lloyd), *The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History* (Berkeley 1988).

emotional. Christian Jacob investigates Polybius as he is reflected in his own works, in this case, self-reflection as seen through Polybius' method of describing events, particularly his discontinuity of the narrative in the *Histories* (pp. 190-98). Henry Blumenthal's 'Plotinus' (pp. 171-81) gives a helpful overview of Plotinian metaphysics, particularly intellect and soul. Françoise Frazier's article on Plutarch (pp. 182-89) looks for trends in Plutarch's history and philosophical works, which can be found when one considers that Plutarch takes characters out of history when writing lives and approaches historical topics as a moralist.

The second section of the book, 'Currents of Thought' (pp. 277-474), is a fitting complement to the first half in so far as it approaches groups of thinkers and trends in thinking rather than focusing on the trajectory of the thought of an individual. This section, because it selects major tenets of thought and watches how that thought is manipulated through stages of philosophical change, responds to the question of self-reflection very well. The currents of thought include the Academy, Aristotelianism, Cynicism, Hellenism and Christianity, Hellenism and Judaism, the Milesians, Platonism, Pythagoreanism, Skepticism, Sophists and Stoicism. R. W. Sharples' 'Aristotelianism' (pp. 300-20), which discusses the reception of Aristotle, tackles a large task by staying close to the theme of self-reflection. Sharples divides his treatment into five sections: logic; physics and metaphysics; fate and providence; soul; intellect; and ethics, politics, and rhetoric, each of which traces the development of Aristotle's thought on the topic among his followers, especially Theophrastus and Strato. Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé's 'Cynicism' (pp. 321-25) treats the non-systematic thought of Cynicism, which lacked a school, but whose followers were fervent adherents to the movement. Goulet-Cazé focuses on the social, political, religious, and other challenges Cynicism proposes for those around it. Alain Le Boulluec's 'Hellenism and Christianity' (pp. 336-47) looks at the Apostolic Fathers and the relationship between the early church and Hellenism and is less concerned with the content of comparative thought than the mode of transmission of thought, particularly hermeneutics. Serge Bardet's companion piece, 'Hellenism and Judaism' (pp. 348-59), focuses on the historical events which forced contact between Jews and Hellenes as well as the problems of integrating the two cultures. Only the last few pages of the article cover Greek influence in Jewish thought, particularly in the realms of historiography (Josephus) and philosophy (wisdom literature and Philo). Of the remaining articles in this section, Luc Brisson's Platonism' (pp. 371-95) is a highlight: he does a superb job of discussing this philosophy from the Old Academy to Proclus by tracing major developments in philosophy, particularly metaphysics, from school to school.

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Maridien Schneider, *Cicero 'Haruspex': Political Prognostication and the Viscera of a Deceased Body Politic*. Gorgias Press: Piscataway 2004. Pp. xii + 252. ISBN 1-593333-094-4. USD65.00.

In this reworking of a PhD dissertation Maridien Schneider argues that the increasing frequency of prophetic vocabulary in Cicero's correspondence from 49 BC until his death in 43 BC is suggestive of an awareness in Cicero of his own prognostic ability (p. 205). At the heart of the dissertation is the claim that the concept of *haruspex* can be used metaphorically 'to epitomise Cicero's role as a close examiner of the vicissitudes of the *res publica*' (p. 9). Almost half of this work is devoted to introductory material. Here are the standard features one would expect of a dissertation: the scope of the work (chapter 1, 'Introduction', pp. 3-16); an overview of scholarship (chapter 2, pp. 17-30); the nature of the evidence (chapter 4, pp. 37-44); the general philosophical and historical background of the first century BC (chapter 3, 'Historical Overview', pp. 31-36; chapter 5, 'Philosophy and Politics', pp. 45-58), and relevant historiographical and philosophical concepts (chapter 6, 'The Roman Concept of Decline', pp. 59-72; chapter 7, 'Theory and Practice Vs Practice and Theory', pp. 73-82). In these sections Schneider argues that Cicero attempts to bridge a traditional divide between philosophy and Roman politics in his philosophical works, especially the *De Respublica*. This theoretical standpoint is the springboard for the central discussion and the examination of Cicero's theories through his correspondence from 51 BC onwards.

The central discussion (chapters 8 to 10, pp. 83-170) contains much of merit. Here the dissertation is at its strongest. The discussion is thorough, at times engaging and lively, with some sharp insights. The section begins with Cicero's governorship in Cilicia (chapter 8, pp. 85-104). The particular focus here is on Cicero's correspondence with Caelius, which enables Cicero to keep abreast of events in Rome. During this period, it is argued, Cicero stops speculating about the political situation at Rome and begins to analyse affairs objectively—indeed to predict, much as Caelius already had, the forthcoming civil war. Chapter 9 ('Close Encounters', pp. 105-50) examines Cicero's disintegrating relationship with Pompey (pp. 105-25) and his adaptation to Caesar's regime (pp. 126-50). Schneider argues that Cicero with philosophical detachment draws connections between the past and present political situation and it is this which allows him with clarity to present himself in his final years as 'a moralist with a political agenda' (p. 150). Finally, with the death of Caesar, (chapter 10, 'And So the End Draws Near', pp. 151-70), Schneider sees Cicero predicting civil war anew and being unable to reconcile his theorising about politics with the practical direction that politics at Rome was taking in 44-43 BC.

Section 3 ('Exitus', pp. 171-209) is in essence a lengthy conclusion. Schneider argues that Cicero's ability to interpret the present political circumstances in the light of the past has enabled the statesman to interpret the future. In 43 BC Cicero stops resisting the inevitable political changes and increasingly refers to the destruction of the *res publica*. His late period is imbued with words that denote sickness, death and

decay. Ultimately, Schneider suggests, Cicero himself is a haruspical victim, with his head, hands and tongue evidence of his own prophetic ability (p. 209).

So much then for the basic outline and premises of the work. It is unfortunate that the underlying metaphor, 'Cicero *haruspex*', first introduced on pp. 9-14, is flawed. There appears to be precious little evidence that Cicero views the *res publica* in the manner of a *haruspex* inspecting the entrails. He rarely (despite the author's claim on p. 11 n. 17) refers to the *haruspices* in a political context and, as the author herself notes, 'Cicero never refers directly to himself as *haruspex*' (p. 14). It is not clear how the image of burnt corpses in Cicero (p. 13) is relevant even to a metaphorical analysis of the carcass of the republic. Nor is it obvious how the comparison of Cicero to the legendary Greek prophet Amphiaraus is germane to the metaphor (pp. 163f.). When Cicero makes a 'true' prophecy he does so in the style of the Pythia (p. 182). The extent to which the metaphor is stretched is evident in the final paragraph when the author offers the image of Cicero's head, hands and tongue as evidence of the 'eviscerated *res publica*' (p. 209). There are further confusions in Schneider's introductory treatment of the *haruspices*. She posits a Roman counterpart to the Etruscan *haruspices* and suggests 'a renown for their expertise in the interpretation of prodigies' (p. 9). Just three pages later she maintains the 'traditional *haruspex*' (is he Etruscan or Roman?) consults entrails in times of crisis (p. 12). As is evident from Cicero himself the *ars haruspicina* encompassed extispicy, portents and fulgural lore. Etruscan *haruspices* were invariably summoned to Rome for the purpose of interpreting dire prodigies. What the Roman *haruspices* did, who they were, or what their relationship was to the Etruscan diviners, is a matter for conjecture.[1] Elsewhere the translation of 'haruspex' with the cover-all 'diviner' is misleading (p. 9), as it is to contrast the Roman practice of augury with the 'Greek equivalent μαντική' (p. 10). The possibility that the terms *vates* and *haruspex* might be and often were synonymous is dismissed.[2] The reader is first introduced to Cicero's prophetic ability on p. 104 in a passage that is discussed again on p. 157. The terms προθεσπίζω, *coniectura* and *prospiciens* are not only uncharacteristic of haruspical activity but might be read alternatively as the tentative guesswork of the backstreet diviner (or *coniector*) whom Cicero denigrated (Cic. *De Div.* 1.132).[3]

A more secure grounding in the modern scholarly literature on divination might have placed the dissertation on a stronger footing. It is noticeable that secondary works as prominent as Bouché-Lecerq's *Histoire de la Divination* or Thulin's seminal

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[1] See, e.g., J. North, 'Diviners and Divination at Rome', in M. Beard and J. North (edd.), *Pagan Priests* (London 1990) 51-71, esp. 53; J. North, 'Religion in Republican Rome', in *CAH*[2] 7.2, 'The Rise of Rome to 220 BC' (Cambridge 1989) 573-624, esp. 583f.

[2] See, e.g., Livy 1.55.6, the passages concerning the praetor Aelius Tubero in Val. Max. 5.6.4 (*haruspex*), Plin. *HN* 10.40f. (*vates*), Frontin. *Str.* 4.5.14 (*haruspex*), Luc. 1.584 of the *haruspex* Arruns. See also M. Hano, '*Haruspex* et *Vates* chez Tite-Live', *Caesarodunum* Supplementum 56.3 (1986) 101-21.

[3] See A. Nice, 'Ennius or Cicero? The Disreputable Diviners at Cic. *De Div.* 1.132', *AClass* 44 (2001) 153-66.

thesis on the Etruscan *haruspices* are absent from the bibliography.[4] An analysis of the haruspical and other divinatory terminology that Cicero uses in the correspondence would have been helpful. The dissertation ends with a quotation from Cicero, *Epistulae ad Familiares* 6.6.12: *Habes augurium meum* (p. 209). 'Cicero *augur*', a priesthood he actually occupied, might have offered a more auspicious title and methodology. There are some other minor problems. Limitations of genre (pp. 126, 191 on *De Consulatu Suo*) are not addressed. Schneider's brief references to *De Divinatione* (pp. 11, 190f.) do not acknowledge the difficulties of interpreting either book as the word of Cicero. The alleged connections between *Epistulae ad Atticum* 15.11, Plato, and the winged seer Calchas on an Etruscan mirror (p. 168) are overworked. Sections 2.6 ('Manner and Style') and 2.7 ('On the Correspondence') are not sufficiently delineated. In Section 3, a meandering historical overview, can Appian and Plutarch prove Cicero right in regarding the Gracchan period as the beginning of the Roman revolution (p. 31)? Or are they simply following his lead? The political significance and implications of Caelius' trial are overlooked (p. 86). At times the detailed discussion of the correspondence loses sight of the metaphor.

Finally, Schneider is too honest when she acknowledges her failure to include the 'more extensive suggestions' (p. xii) of Kathryn Welch. What possible excuse can there be for rushing a work, any work, but particularly that of a young scholar, to the press? It is unhelpful to the writer who must suffer the stings and barbs of the reviewer, and unhelpful for the Classics community, which is already afflicted with ever more books and an ever-declining market even for the very best. All of this is regrettable given the sensitivity that Schneider has for Cicero's correspondence and the thoroughness with which she handles this complex material. If they can ignore the awkward and strained haruspical metaphor, Ciceronian scholars should find some of the central discussion useful. But like the majority of dissertations, this is a resource to be consulted rather than read in its entirety.

Alex Nice                                                                    *Reed College*

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[4] A. Bouché-Leclerq, *Histoire de la divination dans l'antiquité* 1-4 (Paris 1879); C. O. Thulin, *Die Etruskische Disciplin* 1-3 (Gothenburg 1905-1909). The brief introduction to divination by R. Bloch, *La Divination dans l'antiquité* (Paris 1984) would have been a useful starting point. Other works that could have usefully been consulted on the *haruspices* are M. Torelli, *Elogia Tarquiniensia* (Firenze 1975); B. MacBain, *Prodigy and Expiation: A Study in Religion and Politics in Republican Rome* (Brussels 1982); and J. North, 'Diviners and Divination at Rome', in M. Beard and J. North (edd.), *Pagan Priests* (London 1990). On Cicero and divination see R. J. Goar, *Cicero and the State Religion* (Amsterdam 1972); J. Linderski, 'Cicero and Roman Divination', *PP* (1982) 12-38; F. Guillaumont, *Philosophe et augure: Recherches sur la théorie cicéronienne de la divination* (Brussels 1984).

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Classical Collections, Otago Museum
Dunedin, New Zealand

In the public collections of New Zealand there are held about 500 ancient Greek, Roman, Byzantine and Islamic lamps. These lamps are representative of the full sweep of Mediterranean production, from the eighth century BC to the medieval period. More than half (about 300) of the lamps in New Zealand collections are housed in the Otago Museum alone. To date some seventy specimens—those securely provenanced from Egypt and held in the Otago Museum—have been published by Dimitri Anson, Head of Humanities at the Museum, and Robert Hannah, Honorary Curator of the Classical Collections and a member of staff of the Classics Department at the University of Otago.[1] Over the past year, with the assistance of Beatrice Hudson as a Research Assistant funded by a University of Otago Research Grant, they have prepared a full catalogue of the remaining lamps at Otago. In addition, Anson has catalogued the 200 lamps in other public New Zealand collections—in the Auckland Museum, the Canterbury Museum, Te Papa, and the Whanganui Museum. The full catalogue of all these lamps is due to be published as a supplementary monograph to the journal, *Mediterranean Archaeology*, in 2006.[2] The fact that there now exists an international group of lamp specialists, the International Lychnological Association, which is based in Geneva, is testimony to the growing interest among archaeologists in the publication of all known collections of ancient lamps.[3]

In archaeological terms, these small, ubiquitous, everyday household objects represent a key dating mechanism for other material found in excavations in the ancient and medieval worlds, because of the now highly developed typologies of their shapes and decoration. These typologies are not set in concrete, but are open to

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[1] D. Anson and R. Hannah, 'Lamps from the Egyptian Collection of Otago Museum', *MedArch* 12 (1999) 125-45.

[2] D. Anson, R. Hannah and B. Hudson, *Lamps in New Zealand Collections* (Sydney 2008).

[3] The website address of the Association is: http://ila.e-antiquity.org.

addition with new discoveries, or to reconsideration on the basis of different principles of analysis or organisation.[4]

Even objects with little if any background information, such as some museum objects bear, can serve an important function in extending our knowledge of the basic typologies and decorative schemes. An example in Otago is a lamp from Jebel Druse in Egypt.[5] This small, mould-made, circular lamp was presented to the museum in 1943 by Lieutenant Colonel Fred Waite, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E. Waite was the source of many of the Egyptian lamps in the collection, as he acquired them while serving with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in Egypt. His army duties gave him the opportunity to collect and to send home by troopship over two thousand Egyptian objects, mainly stone implements and pottery from Predynastic Egypt. On his return to New Zealand he became a member of the Otago Museum Management Committee, and Honorary Keeper of the Middle Eastern Collections, positions which he held until his death in 1952. He had a remarkable eye for both the authentic and the unusual.

The lamp has a short, rounded nozzle incorporated into the body. The wick hole, slightly blackened by use, is set within a channel defined by a raised ridge, which merges with the filling hole rim. A band of raised points surrounds the hole. The sloping shoulder is decorated on each side with two birds facing each other, with a ring-and-dot pattern between them. At the back of the lamp is a pierced lug handle, incised on its surface with a simple line. On the bottom, a base ring is surrounded by a fine raised line with three lines extending up towards the nozzle, and four towards the handle. The fabric is pink (Munsell 5YR 7/4), with traces of a red slip. Preservation is good, with just cracks at the join of the moulds.

Reasonably comparable in form is an Ephesian lamp of Broneer Type XXIX, now in the British Museum and dated to about AD 550-650.[6] However, the decorative scheme of the Otago lamp has so far defied comparison. It resembles that on another lamp in the British Museum, but this is of African origin, of a different type (Hayes Type IIA), and of an earlier date (AD 400-500).[7] Despite the mass-production in moulds that characterises Roman lamps, and the more than a century-long study of the artefacts, one is constantly made aware of the apparently endless variety of form and decoration that surviving lamps continue to present. This emphasises the need for publications of as many collections as possible to help determine better the typologies.

Other lamps at Otago have come via exchanges. The first such venture was with the Royal Ontario Museum in 1930, and similar exchanges soon occurred with

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[4] As has happened with Alexandrian lamps: see J. Młynarczyk, *Alexandrian and Alexandria-influenced Mould-made Lamps of the Hellenistic Period* (Oxford 1997).

[5] Figure 1: Otago Museum E43.64. From Jebel Druse, Egypt. Length 8.7 cm., width 6.8 cm., height 4.9 cm.

[6] London, British Museum 1984.10-4.2. D. M. Bailey, *A Catalogue of the Lamps in the British Museum* 3*: Roman Provincial Lamps* (London 1988) 392, Q 3203, pl. 113.

[7] London, British Museum MLA 1983.10-1.2. Bailey [6] 200, Q 1824, pl. 26.

the British Museum. One lamp gained from the latter was presented in 1935, along with several others, in exchange for objects from the Museum's general collection.[8] Exchanges with the British Museum tended to be for Maori artefacts, but exactly what the British Museum gained on this occasion from Otago is now unverifiable. Such exchanges also tend to indicate that the British Museum's offerings are 'duplicates', that is, objects of which at least one other example existed in its collection. So although this particular lamp lacks any indication of a definite provenance, its formal characteristics and the high probability that it is a duplicate allow us to posit a likely findspot.

The lamp is intact. Its shape is that of a Loeschcke Type VIII: it has a circular body, tipped by a small nozzle, which is rounded at the front and squared off at the back, where it is decorated with an impressed circle on each side. The carinated shoulder is of Loeschcke shoulder form VIIb, with a shallow, flat rim and a single inner groove. The circular discus is decorated with a mule or donkey facing left, the filling hole pushed off-centre towards the front and between the animal's legs. The base of the lamp is flat, barring a raised point at the centre, all within an incised ring. The fabric is pinkish white (Munsell 7YR 8/2), covered with a reddish brown slip (Munsell 2.5YR 5/4).

Form, fabric and discus decoration each find a precise parallel in a lamp held by the British Museum and dated stylistically to the second century AD.[9] This came from Charles Newton's excavations in 1858-59 of the so-called Demeter Sanctuary in Cnidus in south-west Turkey.[10] The very close similarity between this particular specimen and some of Otago's other unprovenanced lamps, on the one hand, and the Cnidian lamps now in the British Museum on the other, makes it likely that Otago was given a set of duplicate lamps, 'twins' to those of which the British Museum already had examples from Cnidus. While it is not provable, given the wide export of Cnidian lamps beyond the centre of production,[11] it is certainly possible that the Otago lamp also came from the Cnidian sanctuary.

Several hundred lamps were found by Newton in a pair of deposits in the sanctuary.[12] Some he thought may have been used in a ritual similar to that described by Pausanias in Corinth (2.22.3), where lit lamps were thrown into a pit in honour of Persephone as Kore, daughter of Demeter.[13] At the sanctuary of Demeter and Kore in

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[8] Figure 2: Otago Museum E35.263. Unprovenanced. Length 8.0 cm., width 6.8 cm., height 2.5 cm.

[9] London, British Museum 1859.12-26.120. Bailey [6] ix (for the shoulder form), 330 (for the nozzle form, which is classifiable as a Cnidus nozzle form Cn.E2), 352, Q 2856, pl. 90.

[10] According to Newton, the sanctuary was dedicated to 'Demeter, Persephone, Pluto Epimachus, Hermes, and perhaps Hekate and the Dioscuri': C. T. Newton, *A History of Discoveries at Halicarnassus, Cnidus, and Branchidae* (London 1863) 419.

[11] Bailey [6] 326.

[12] Newton [10] 393-96.

[13] Newton [10] 396.

Corinth, and at their sanctuary in Morgantina, lamps were also found in association with curse tablets.[14] The rituals were probably similar to those described in the magical papyri of Egypt, in which lamplight was used to assist in conjuring up and holding on to spirits for their favours. The lamps are sometimes described as containing a fixed amount of oil, which varies according to the spell, but which presumably signifies a fixed period of time in which the conjuring spell can be effectively performed.[15] Curse tablets were found by Newton in the Cnidian sanctuary too,[16] but not, it seems, with any lamps immediately nearby, so we cannot assume a magical ritual use for the lamps found elsewhere in the sanctuary, nor for our lamp in Otago.

Another significant means of acquisition has been through formal purchase. For the Classical Collections in general the majority of such acquisitions was made in 1948, courtesy of the Fels Memorial Gift. This bequest came from Willi Fels, a prominent Dunedin businessman and patron of various cultural institutions in the city, including the Otago Museum. The executor of his bequest was his nephew, the New Zealand writer, Charles Brasch, who used the fund on the Museum's behalf primarily to acquire objects on auction from the A. B. Cook Collection in 1948.[17] One lamp gained in this way is interesting for its decoration.[18]

Apart from chips to the nozzle, the lamp is intact. It is of Loeschcke Type IV, with a circular, mould-made body and a rounded nozzle joined to the body by a pair of volutes. The shoulder is of Loeschcke type IIIa, with a broad, flat rim and three inner grooves. The circular discus is decorated with the hovering figure of winged

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[14] N. Bookidis and R. S. Stroud, *The Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore: Topography and Architecture* (Princeton 1997) 285f.

[15] See, for example, K. Preisendanz (ed.), *Papyri Graecae Magicae: Die griechischen Zauberpapyri* (Stuttgart 1973) 13.124-34, 303-06; H. D. Betz (ed.), *The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation Including the Demotic Spells* (Chicago 1986) 172-82, and 336 on 'Lamps, not painted red'. On lamp magic, see S. Eitrem, 'Dreams and Divination in Magical Ritual,' in C. A. Faraone and D. Obbink (eds), *Magika Hiera: Ancient Greek Magic and Religion* (New York 1991) 176-79.

[16] Newton [10] 382, 719-45; H. S. Versnel, 'Beyond Cursing: The Appeal to Justice in Judicial Prayers,' in Faraone and Obbink [15] 72f.; J. G. Gager (ed.), *Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World* (New York 1992) 188-90.

[17] I was informed by Dale Trendall in the early 1980s that he had worked behind the scenes of the auction to ensure that a large part of Cook's collection could be bought through the Fels Fund for the Otago Museum. Trendall had good reason to assist: he was a graduate in Classics from the University of Otago and was keen to see his *alma mater* gain a good teaching collection for Classical archaeology; the Otago Museum was at that stage still part of the University, its status changing to a civic museum only from 1950; and Trendall was a student of Cook's in Cambridge before he gained the Chair in Greek at the University of Sydney.

[18] Figure 3: Otago Museum E48.91b. Unprovenanced. Length 11.3 cm., width 8.2 cm., height 2.6 cm.

Victoria, facing to the left and holding a large, plain, round shield. The filling hole is off-centre to the right. One airhole punctures the discus towards the nozzle, while another is marked on the nozzle between the volutes. The base is flat. The fabric is a light red (Munsell 2.5YR 6/6), the slip reddish brown (Munsell 2.5YR 4/3) and worn.

Again, this lamp has a very good parallel in the British Museum, possibly from Corfu and dated to the first third of the first century AD.[19] But the imagery on the discus may have wider connotations. The figure of Victoria, in one form or another, is fairly common on Imperial Roman lamps, but no more strikingly than on the large so-called 'New Year' lamps, which were given as presents for New Year's Day. On these she has exactly the same pose and dress as are displayed on the Otago lamp, but her iconography is extended by the addition of a palm branch on her left arm, while her shield bears an inscription offering best wishes for a successful New Year; the field surrounding her is also filled with New Year gifts, including coins (one appropriately with a Janus head), and various fruits, such as dates and figs. The British Museum has on public display a particularly good example from its founding collection.[20]

The Otago lamp's simpler discus represents the iconographical foundation for the full-blown 'New Year' type. In between in complexity lie lamps with the same type of Victoria but with her shield bearing the inscription OB CIVES SER[vatos]. This would usually signify the award of the wreath, the *corona civica*, 'for saving the citizens' (Plin. *HN* 16.3-5), but on coins and lamps we find the inscription also on a shield, so that the *corona civica* is assimilated to the *clipeus virtutis*. Victoria thus becomes in effect a goddess of success and good luck.[21] This will be the general message of the Otago lamp.

As this brief sampling illustrates, the forthcoming catalogue will present to the international community of Classical and Islamic archaeologists a wide-ranging set of ancient and medieval lamps in a relatively unknown group of collections in the southern hemisphere.

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[19] London, British Museum 1868.1-10.656. D. M. Bailey, *A Catalogue of the Lamps in the British Museum* 2*: Roman Lamps Made in Italy* (London 1980) xi (for the shoulder form), 159, Q 855, pl. 10, fig. 22.

[20] London, British Museum 1756.1-1.1082. Bailey [19] 26, 186f., Q957, pl. 21, fig. 22; second half of the first century AD. On 'New Year' lamps in general, see G. Heres, 'Römische Neujahrgeschenke,' *Forschungen und Berichte, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin* 14 (1972) 182-93.

[21] Cf. T. Hölscher, *Victoria Romana: Archäologische Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Wesenart der römischen Siegesgöttin von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des 3. Jhs. n. Chr.* (Mainz am Rhein 1967) 108-12, Tafel 13.

Figure 1. Otago Museum E43.64. Roman lamp.



Figure 2. Otago Museum E35.263.
Roman lamp.

Figure 3. Otago Museum E48.91b.
Roman lamp.

# J. A. BARSBY ESSAY

*The paper judged to be the best student essay in New Zealand submitted to **Scholia** by 1 September for the preceding year is published annually as the J. A. Barsby Essay. The competition is sponsored by the Australasian Society for Classical Studies. The Essay is in honour of New Zealand classicist J. A. Barsby.*

## BOOKS, SLAVES AND HORACE'S REPRESENTATION OF HIS POETRY IN *EPISTLES* 1.2

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The affinity between books and slaves provided Horace with an appropriate framework in which to discuss the asymmetrical nature of literary patronage in Augustan Rome. In *Epistles* 1.20 Horace addresses his preceding letters as a *liber* ('book'). He personifies this book as a slave boy. The association lies both in the objectification of slaves in Roman thought, the slave as *instrumentum vocale* ('speaking tool'), and in their implication in the production and circulation of literary texts.[1] Both slaves and poetry functioned as an extension of the author's self and the symbiotic relationship between these parties is developed to thematic effect in Horace's poetry. The opposition between slavery and freedom was potent for Roman citizens; slavery, as the extreme form of dependency, was an effective metaphor for any situation impinging on the autonomy of a free individual.[2] In *Epistles* 1.20 the figure of the slave, identified with Horace's *liber*, enables Horace to explore the slavish aspect of his relationship with Maecenas and at the same time assert his independence from him.

Each of the *Epistles* addresses several audiences: the addressee, the reading public, posterity, and what Oliensis terms the 'overreader', who is unnamed but is implied as participating in the audience.[3] Maecenas is not addressed directly but as the addressee of the collection: *prima dicte mihi, summa dicende Camena, / . . . Maecenas* ('you, of whom my earliest Muse has told, of whom my last shall tell—you,

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[1] K. McCarthy, *Slaves, Masters, and the Art of Authority in Plautine Comedy* (Princeton 2000) 22; cf. Varro, *Rust.* 1.17.1l; Cato, *De Sumptu Suo* fr. 173 (H. Malcovati [ed.], *Oratorum Fragmenta Liberae Rei Publicae*[4] [Turin 1976].

[2] W. Fitzgerald, *Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination* (Cambridge 2000) 71.

[3] E. Oliensis, *Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority* (Cambridge 1998) 6.

Maecenas',[4] *Epist.* 1.1, 3). He 'overreads' all the *Epistles*. A socially insignificant addressee such as the slave of *Epistles* 1.20 may therefore serve Horace as an intermediary in his address to the more powerful overreader.[5] This indirect form of discourse allows Horace to make known his values without jeopardising his relationship with his patron. One instance where the benefits of this indirection are particularly clear is in *Epistles* 1.10. The letter is addressed to Fuscus, likened by Horace to a twin brother: *hac in re scilicet una / multum dissimiles, at cetera paene gemelli / fraternis animis* ('in this one point, to be sure, we differ much, but being in all else much like twins with the hearts of brothers', *Epist.* 1.10.2-4). The theme is the rich man who is a slave to his greed, but Horace also warns about the plight of the poor man who becomes slavish through pursuit of the pecuniary advantages of *amicitia* with the wealthy: *sic, qui pauperiem ueritus potiore metallis / libertate caret, dominum uehit improbus atque / seruiet aeternum, quia paruo nesciet uti* ('So he who through fear of poverty forfeits liberty, which is better than mines of wealth, will in his avarice carry a master, and be a slave for ever, not knowing how to live on little', *Epist.* 1.10.39-41). Fuscus functions as a medial addressee. Horace's indirection means his own benefactor cannot take direct offence.[6] He employs the same strategy in *Epistles* 1.20 where the figure of the slave allows Horace to position himself inside the master/slave relationship and to address his relationship with Maecenas from this indirect stance.

The way in which the fictive master is able to cast himself as a slave reinforces the 'symbiotic' nature of their relationship.[7] The slave's close role in the production of a text contributed to this. Slaves were like an extension of their master's limbs. They carried out the limbs' work and were thus an extension of their master's body. Dependence on slaves was sometimes expressed in terms appropriate to the loss of limbs or bodily functions. Pliny expresses his concern: *alienis pedibus ambulamus, alienis oculis agnoscimus, aliena memoria salutamus, aliena et vivimus opera* ('We walk with another's feet, read with another's eyes, greet with another's memory, live with alien performance',[8] Plin. *HN* 29.19). Furthermore, some slaves were expected to have such familiarity with their master's point of view that they could act effectively in anticipation of their orders and conscious desires. According to Cicero, *denique imperium domesticum nullum erit, si servulis hoc nostris concesserimus ut ad verba nobis obediant, non ad id quod ex verbis intelligi possit obtemperent* ('Ultimately, there would be no household authority if we allowed our slaves to obey us in accordance with our words, and not comply with what can be understood from the

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[4] The text and translations of Horace are those of H. R. Fairclough (ed. and tr.), *Horace, Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica* (Cambridge, Mass. 1961).

[5] Oliensis [3] 6f.

[6] Oliensis [3] 167f.

[7] Fitzgerald [2] 31.

[8] Tr. Fitzgerald [2] 49f.

words',[9] Caecin. 51f.). Other sources show the relationship between the master and his *scriba*/*notarius* ('scribe'/'notetaker') and *lector* ('reader') to be very close. An epitaph for the slave Xanthias represents him as *erili . . . aurem proximam* ('his master's closest ear') and the only person to have known his master's intimate thoughts.[10] Similarly the *notarius* of Ausonius' *Ephemeris* 7 is represented as a continuation of Ausonius' own mind. The notetaker's 'agile right hand' seems to anticipate his words (*Eph.* 7.20-27) and wishes (*Eph.* 7.28) before he speaks: *quis ordo rerum tam novus, / veniat in aures ut tuas, / quod lingua nondum absolverit?* (How come things in so strange an order that what my tongue has not yet vented comes to your ears?,[11] Auson. *Eph.* 7.27-29) This closeness, the corollary of the author's dissociation from the manual and thus slavish labour of preparing a text, is a source of unresolved anxiety for Ausonius. Slaves were only useful as an extension of their master's persona, but the slave's own ability to exercise judgement in the appropriate spheres was much prized and perhaps essential to his role in the production of literature. Both his slave and his literary output represent an extension of the author's mind. The *liber* of *Epistles* 1.20 is a mouthpiece for Horace's views, acting as an extension of himself in two capacities closely related—that of a book and that of a slave. As a slave, Horace's *liber* also bears biographical information about him (*Epist.* 1.20.20-28). This is the consequence of the close interrelation between author, slave and text.

The need for Horace's book of *Epistles* to be released indiscriminately or for the manumission of his slave generates the major tension of the poem. As Oliensis, observes, the 'author purports to give voice to the desire of his book—ultimately, of course, his own desire—so as to expose its folly and impropriety'.[12] He shows vividly the anxiety that releasing his book of his own volition causes him and a large proportion of the poem is devoted to this (*Epist.* 1.20.1-22). The objectification of the slave brings about the identification of the poems' public circulation with prostitution. Horace's language invites the comparison: *prostes* (*Epist.* 1.20.2) is used especially of the sale of one's body. Slaves used *pumex* to smooth off the edges of a papyrus roll (Catull. 1.1f.); adolescent boys used it to slough off hairs that might detract from the allure of youth (cf. Juv. 9.95).[13] Horace's *puer* ('boy') may suffer when his sated lover's interest droops (*et scis / in breue te cogi, cum plenus languet amator*, 'and you find yourself packed into a corner whenever your sated lover grows languid', *Epist.*

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[9] Tr. McCarthy [1] 23f.

[10] *CIL* 13.8355 (epitaph from Cologne); tr. E. Courtney, *Musa Lapidaria: A Selection of Latin Verse Inscriptions* (Atlanta 1995) 131.

[11] H. G. E. White (ed. and tr.), *Ausonius* 1 (Cambridge, Mass. 1919) 27.

[12] E. Oliensis, 'Life After Publication: Horace, *Epistles* 1.20', *Arethusa* 28 (1995) 212.

[13] R. Mayer (ed.), Horace, *Epistles Book I* (Cambridge 1994) 269f.; J. Préaux (ed.), *Horace, Epistulae Liber Primus (Épitres, Livre I)* (Paris 1968) 215. Cf. also Juv. 2.12f., where, according to P. Green (tr.), *Juvenal: The Sixteen Satires* (London 1998), the '*passive role* [is] not only in sexual matters, but also as evidenced by slavishness'.

1.20.7f.) and will be fingered *manibus uulgi* ('by vulgar hands', *Epist.* 1.20.11). *Contracto* (*Epist.* 1.20.11) conveys the idea of repeated touching or handling of an amorous kind. The book may be as *uinctus* ('bound up') as the slave bound in chains.[14] The release of his slave and probable lover from service and the book from his sphere of influence poses a serious concern for Horace. The dangers of an 'indiscriminate readership' had been acknowledged since Socrates' time (Pl. *Phdr.* 275d-e).[15] To be sold at a bookshop implied access to the text by people who were not sufficiently connected to access it through the normal channels of circulation among the elite. In Catullus 14, the author threatens to gift his friend Calvus books of horrific poetry bought from the booksellers (17-20). Starr suggests that part of the joke here may be that the quality of the *oeuvres* is so low that Catullus simply cannot procure them through any of his acquaintance.[16] Horace is not eager to align his *Epistles* with such works by putting them up for sale. In *Epistles* 2.1, he asserts that he would rather be 'coffined [and] carted down to the backstreets where they peddle balm and spice and everything that's draped in misused paper' (*capsa porrectus operta / deferar in vicum vendentem tus et odores / et piper et quidquid chartis amicitur ineptis*, *Epist.* 2.1.268-70) than handled by an unsatisfactory audience.[17]

Horace is well aware that he can achieve long-lasting fame only through public recognition and that this involves turning his *liber* free. Like the book, Horace is not content at being shown only to a few: *odisti calues et grata sigilla pudico, / paucis ostendi gemis et communia laudas, / non ita nutritus* ('You hate the seals and keys, so dear to the modest; you grieve at being shown to few, and praise a life in public, though I did not rear you thus', *Epist.* 1.20.3-5). Like Horace himself, his book will have to use its poetic charms to make its way.[18] The prospect of its export to Utica or Ilerda (*Epist.* 1.20.13) is reminiscent of Horace's earlier claim that his poetry will take flight and be studied at the far reaches of the known world (*Odes* 2.20.13-20).[19] The figure of the slave permits Horace both to distance himself from and to sate his 'vulgar' ambitions. His slave, or *liber*, is the instrument of the elitism expressed in *iuuat imemorata ferentem / ingenuis oculisque legi manibusque teneri,* ('it is my joy that I bring things untold before, and am read by the eyes and held in the hands of the gently born', *Epist.* 1.19.33f.), and equally of his urge for popularisation.[20] In terms applied to Plautine comedy, where contrary impulses between the 'good' and 'clever' slave provide comic pleasure through the audience's capacity to identify with each, Horace plays both parts.[21] As 'good slave' he urges against manumission; as 'clever

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[14] Mayer [13] 271.

[15] Oliensis [12] 213.

[16] R. J. Starr, 'The Circulation of Literary Texts in the Roman World', *CQ* 37 (1987) 222.

[17] T. N. Habinek, *The Politics of Latin Literature,* (Princeton 1998) 101f.

[18] Oliensis [3] 180.

[19] S. J. Harrison, 'Deflating the Odes: Horace, *Epistles* 1.20', *CQ* 38 (1988) 474.

[20] Oliensis [12] 216; cf. Hor. *Sat.* 1.10.92

[21] Cf. McCarthy [1] 20, 27f.

slave' he asserts his desire for freedom from subordination and for recognition. Horace is slavish because he owes his position to the patronage of Maecenas. The son of a freedman (*Epist.* 1.20.20f.), he has sought to please Rome's most eminent men (1.20.21-23). In *Epistles* 1.10, he has already cautioned Fuscus against doing the same. Maecenas' appreciation of his poetry, while bringing him access to material resources, including scribes and slaves of his own, has cost Horace his artistic freedom. Oliensis observes that the 'relation between author and book replicates, lower down on the social scale, the relation between Maecenas and Horace, with master and slave replacing patron and client'.[22] Choice can only be exercised by the free. Horace represents choice as a commodity that he lacks and therefore reveals himself as slavish.

The *liber*'s role as slave has similarities with the role of Davus, Horace's house slave in *Satires* 2.7. Davus also operates as an extension of Horace's conscience and is a reminder of the anxiety caused by the closeness of the master/slave relationship.[23] Like the clever slave of comedy to which the name Davus alludes, he is as indispensable as an eye and as vexing as an itch (cf. Plaut. *Per.* 10-12).[24] He is omnipresent in Horace's affairs: *iamdudum ausculto et cupiens tibi dicere servus pauca reformido* ('I've been listening for ages and wanting to say a few words', *Sat.*2.7.1). When permitted to speak, Davus asserts Horace's servility. Horace is a lap-dog subject to Maecenas' caprice (*Sat.* 2.7.29-36). He must cast himself as a slave to indulge in elicit encounters with the wives of the rich and famous (*Sat.* 2.7.53-56). He is a slave to his own impulses, walking deliberately 'under the yoke' of his own lust (*Sat.* 2.7.75-7). Horace is likened to a puppet on strings whose position is worse than someone who is a slave by law. While Davus recognises his servile lot, Horace labours under a false illusion of personal freedom: *tune mihi dominus, rerum imperiis hominumque / tot tantisque minor . . . ? / . . . nam / sive vicarius est, qui servo paret, uti mos / vester ait, seu conservus, tibi quid sum ego? nempe / tu, mihi qui imperitas, alii servis miser . . .* (Are you my master, you who submit to other men's orders / and the constant pressure of affairs? / . . . a man who takes orders / from a slave may be called a *sub*-slave, as he is in your parlance, / or a *fellow* slave; anyhow, isn't that what I am to you? For you, / after all, though you lord it over me, cringe before another master',[25] Hor. *Sat.* 2.7.75f., 78-81). In Stoic thought, Horace's inability to recognise his lack of freedom condemns him to moral slavery. As Benstein notes, the 'real consequence of not being free is to be in flight from oneself'.[26] Davus compares Horace to a *fugitivus* ('fleeing slave') because he cannot face his reality (*Sat.* 2.7.112f.). Similarly Horace's only order to his *liber* slave in *Epistles* 1.20.5 is *fuge*

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[22] Oliensis [12] 222.

[23] Fitzgerald [2] 20.

[24] Fitzgerald [2] 21, 24.

[25] Tr. N. Rudd, *Horace: Satires and Epistles* (London 1973) 120.

[26] M. Bernstein, '"O Totiens Servus": Saturnalia and Servitude in Augustan Rome', *Critical Inquiry* 13 (1987) 467.

('flee'). Within the context of the Saturnalia and later through the medial addressee of his *liber*, both poems acknowledge Horace's anxiety about his dependence on Maecenas' patronage and his status as *totiens servus* ('slave many times over', *Sat*.2.7.70). *Epistles* 1.20, however, pushes towards a more independent role for the poet.

Horace's refusal to his patron sets the tone of the *Epistles*. He no longer needs to write verses or answer to a master: *nunc itaque et uersus et cetera ludicra pono. / nullius addictus iurare in uerba magistri* ('So now I lay aside my verses and all other toys. / I am not bound over to swear as my master dictates', *Epist.* 1.1.10, 14). Horace's *recusatio* refers to a 'past debt made good'.[27] His *Odes* have paid for his patronage and he should no longer be required to produce encomia for the Augustan regime. Within the larger social context of an exchange economy, poetry and patronage were part of a system of exchanging goods and services in a way that provided ideological cohesion and had the ability to 'control and persuade';[28] this encouraged the 'objectification of poetry as a concrete good' and 'tangible gift'.[29] Poetry endorsed by the regime was a slavish pursuit. Horace's *Epistles* display what Bowditch calls rhetorical 'gestures of autonomy'.[30] In *Epistles* 1.1, Horace expresses his concern that Maecenas is trying to coerce him back into the gladiatorial arena. As a gladiator, and hence a slave, Horace as a poet has been acting as his patron's medium for public address (*Epist.* 1.1.1-10). In *Epistles* 1.19 Horace takes on the stance of a *praeceptor*. He recalls the gladiatorial *ludus* ('spectacle', *Epist.* 1.1.48) after refusing to recite poetry for Maecenas and so rejects his subservient role in the system of exchange. By rejecting literature as a 'spectacle', he narrows his audience to either his elite cohort or to unknown readers of the published text.[31] This is the issue of readership that *Epistles* 1.20 addresses. The *Epistles* as a whole displays the conflicting tendencies of Horace's need for popular appreciation and of his desire to belong to the elite. Despite revealing the exploitative nature of patronage, Horace associates himself with the *otium* that such patronage affords.[32]

The Horace of *Satires* 2.7 threatens that the outspoken Davus will end up 'drudge number nine' on his Sabine farm (*Sat*.2.7.121). It is significant that at the end of *Epistles* 1.20, Horace does not choose to assert this authority over his errant *liber*, just as he feels Maecenas no longer has the right to do so. Fitzgerald comments: 'As a being without rights or honor, the slave can be treated and exploited like an animal or a thing, but as a human the slave has more to offer if given a degree of autonomy'.[33] This is the autonomy for which Horace is pushing. In *Epistles* 1.19, Horace displaces

[27] P. L. Bowditch, *Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage* (Berkeley 2001) 162.

[28] Bowditch [27] 2-4.

[29] Bowditch [27] 25.

[30] Bowditch [27] 3.

[31] Bowditch [27] 1f., 191f.

[32] Bowditch [27]16.

[33] Fitzgerald [2] 50.

Maecenas as a patron in his own right: *libera per uacuum posui uestigia princeps, / non aliena meo pressi pede* ('I was the first to plant free footsteps on a virgin soil; I walked not where others trod').[34] In *Epistles* 1.20, he prepares his *liber* for an onslaught of questions from curious posterity. The poetry book itself is the figure of Horace's poetic immortality. Just as his *liber* has freed itself from Horace, Horace has disengaged himself from Maecenas.[35]

In *Epistle* 1.20, Horace addresses the relationship between his own poetry and the system of literary patronage in Rome through a complex series of associations between the role of books and of slaves. He identifies his own book of *Epistles* with a slave and this permits him to play out both slave and master. By exploring each side of the connection, Horace acknowledges what he has suffered and how he has benefited from Maecenas' patronage and releases himself from their engagement. His reputation is now in the safe hands of his poetry and of the slaves who will reproduce it for him.

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[34] Oliensis [3] 180.

[35] Oliensis [3] 180f.

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
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
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