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EDITORIAL NOTE

A scholarly journal does not often have the chance to publish an article whose author is an example of its subject. The feature article in this volume on ‘Ladas the Long-distance Runner’, a fifth-century Olympic victor, was written by Victor Matthews of the University of Guelph, who died soon after submitting the final draft for publication in 2004. Victor Matthews was a long-distance runner with an impressive time of 2:36:00 for the marathon and 15:55 for the indoor 5 000 metres at the age of forty. He was also a longtime coach of the University of Guelph’s track and cross country team. The editors are pleased to feature this article in his memory and apologize for the long period between its final submission and publication.1 The other main articles in this volume are on various works of Sophocles, Plato, Cicero, Vergil and Tibullus.2

As indicated in last year’s Editorial Note, in the interests of ensuring the availability of Scholia well into the future, the editors have agreed to permit ProQuest to serve as a repository for all its contents even though as a result Scholia can no longer place its contents online. Nonetheless Scholia will continue to exert a strong web presence with its main website, which contains comprehensive information about the journal, and its reviews website, which features Scholia Reviews, an electronic journal that contains the versions of reviews published in Scholia as well as other reviews that do not appear in printed form.

Since its inception Scholia has regularly included two sections that aim to serve its Classics constituency in its countries of publication. The In the Museum section, which contains news about classical artefacts in New Zealand museums, features an article in this volume by Diana Burton on a black-figure column krater at the Classics Museum of Victoria University, Wellington and an Attic black-figure neck-amphora at the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa.3 This volume also includes the 2007 J. A. Barsby Essay, which is the edited paper judged to be the best university student essay submitted to the Australasian Society for Classical Studies New Zealand undergraduate essay competition during 2007. The published essay by Dylan James (Canterbury) is entitled ‘Nature’s Best: Aspects of Natural Imagery in Horace, Odes 1’.4 The competition was adjudicated by Babette Puetz (Victoria, Wellington) and Patrick O’Sullivan (Canterbury).

William J. Dominik
Editor, Scholia

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1 See pp. 2-14.
2 See ‘Articles’, p. v.
3 See pp. 161-68.
4 See pp. 169-77.
LADAS THE LONG-DISTANCE RUNNER

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Abstract. This paper examines afresh our knowledge of the fifth-century Olympic victor, Ladas. It investigates the uncertainties concerning his native state and the date of his victory. In treating the latter problem the study discusses his famous statue by Myron in the context of other agonistic statues by that sculptor. The conclusions are that Ladas was an Arcadian and that his Olympic victory was in 460 or 456 BCE.

While the names of more than 700 Olympic victors have come down to us, the extent of our knowledge about individual athletes varies widely. For some athletes we possess apparently accurate and precise information on which Olympic event(s) they won, the Olympiad(s) when they did so, and which city in the greater Greek world they represented. In the case, however, of one rather famous Greek runner, Ladas, his event, the dolichos (δόλιχος, ‘long course’), is the only item in his biography that can be taken as certain. In this article I shall

1 This article is published posthumously.
2 See L. Moretti, Olympionikai: I vincitori negli antichi agoni olimpici (Rome 1957) [=Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei (Rome 1959) 8.8.2.53-199.]
investigate three interlinked problems: his *patris* (πατρίς, ‘fatherland’, ‘country’), the fame of his victory statue, and the date of his Olympic victory.

*The Patris of Ladas*

Ladas has the unusual distinction of being mentioned more often by Latin authors than by Greek ones (Catull. 55.13c; Juv. 13.97; Mart. *Ep.* 2.86.7f., 10.100.5f.; *Rhet. Her.* 4.4.14-21; Sen. *Ep.* 85.4.4f.; Solin. 1.96). For these Roman writers, he seems to have epitomized the great runners of the Classical age. None of these sources, however, provides us with any information as to what Greek city Ladas came from. Nonetheless, modern editors and commentators on several of these writers have been virtually unanimous in claiming that Ladas was a Spartan. He is also listed as such in Poralla’s prosopography of Spartans. These modern contentions that Ladas was a Spartan can be traced to a passage in Pausanias cited by many of the commentators:

προελθόντι δὲ αὐτόθεν σταδίους εἰκοσι τοῦ Ἐυρώτα τὸ ἱερὸν ἐγγυτάτω τῆς ὁδοῦ γίνεται, καὶ Λάδα μνήμα ἐστιν ὑπερβαλμένου ποδῶν τούς ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ δὴ καὶ ‘Ολυμπιάσιν ἐστεφανοῦτο δόλιχω κρατῶν, δοκεῖν δὲ μοι κάμνον αὐτικα μέτα τὴν νίκην ἐκομίζετο, καὶ συμβάσεις ἐνταῦθα οἱ τελευτῆς ὁ τάφος ἐστίν ύπέρ τῆν λεωφόρον.

(Paus. 3.21.1.1-7)

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6 P. Poralla, *Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier bis auf die Zeit Alexanders des Grossen* (Breslau 1913) 80 no. 463, who erroneously states that Ladas won the *diaulos* (διαυλός, ‘double course’).
When one goes on twenty stades from here [that is, from the statue of Aidos, itself thirty stades distant from Sparta (3.20.10.1f.) on the road to Arcadia (3.20.8.1)], the stream of the Eurotas comes very close to the road and here is a memorial to Ladas, who excelled in speed of foot the men of his time; moreover he was crowned at the Olympic Games for victory in the dolichos and, as I see it, upon falling ill immediately after his victory, he was being conveyed home and, since his death took place here, his grave is above the highway.7

We should notice that Pausanias does not say that Ladas was a Spartan, but merely that he died by the roadside, some fifty stades from the city, and that his grave was close by. One might suggest that had he been in fact a Spartan, it would have been both easy and natural to have taken his body to the city for burial. Indeed the fact that he was buried at this location only reinforces the belief that he was not a Spartan.

Moretti, in his list of Olympic victors, suggests (with a question mark) that Ladas in fact was from Argos.8 This belief is also rooted in a passage of Pausanias: τοῦ ναοῦ δὲ ἐστιν Ἐλάδος ποδόν ὑκύττητι υπερβαλλόμενος τῶν ἐφ’ αὐτοῦ . . . (‘Within the temple [of Apollo Lycius, the most notable building in the city (2.19.3.1f.)] is [a statue of] Ladas, who excelled in speed of foot the men of his time . . . , Paus. 2.19.7.1f.). But the presence of a statue of Ladas in a temple at Argos is not sufficient reason, in and of itself, to suppose that the runner was an Argive. In his very next section, Pausanias refers without further comment to the presence at Argos of a statue of a boxer, Creugas (2.20.1.1f.). But while discussing, in his description of Arcadia, the story of the pancratiast Arrhachion of Phigalia, who in 564 BCE died yet won his event in the fifty-fourth Olympics, Pausanias provides more details about Creugas (8.40). He compares with Arrhachion the case of Creugas, a boxer from Epidamnus, at the Nemean Games. After Creugas had died as the result of an illegal blow, by which his opponent Damoxenus had pierced his flesh and torn out his entrails, the Argives awarded him the victory and had a statue of him made in Argos. Pausanias then repeats that in his own time it still stood in the sanctuary of Apollo Lycius. We thus have clear evidence that an athlete did not have to be an Argive to be given a statue at Argos. Perhaps, like Creugas, Ladas was a Nemean victor. It is surely likely that, as an Olympic champion and the fastest runner of his generation, he also won his event at the lesser and more frequent Nemean Games, perhaps more than once. It is also possible that Ladas


was a victor in other games at Argos. There is thus no clear evidence from Pausanias that Ladas was an Argive.

There remains a third passage of Pausanias that mentions Ladas:

επὶ δὲ όδοις ταῖς κατειλεγμέναις δύο ἐς Ὄρχομενόν εἰσιν ἄλλαι, καὶ τῇ μὲν ἐστὶ καλούμενον Λάδα στάδιον, ἐς δὲ ἐποιεῖτο Λάδας μελέτην δρόμου . . .

(Paus. 8.12.5.1-3)

In addition to the roads mentioned, there are two others [leading from Mantinea, cf. 8.12.2] to Orchomenus, and by one of them is the so-called stadium of Ladas, in which Ladas practised his running . . .

The significance of this passage for the patris of Ladas has surely been overlooked. Wycherley indexes ‘Ladas, Laconian victor’ as the subject of all three Pausanian passages. Only Levi seems to have paid attention to this passage, listing ‘Ladas of Arkadia’; he also notes ‘Ladas was an Arkadian athlete from Mantinea’. In addition, Levi remarks that Ladas was buried near Sparta and that he had a statue in Apollo’s temple at Argos, and concludes with the comment ‘but is there not something peculiar about Ladas the Lakonian?’

Levi does not present any arguments for his case that Ladas was an Arcadian from Mantinea, but one might well ask why would there be ‘the stadium of Ladas’ near Mantinea, and why would the runner have trained there if he were not an Arcadian. His statue at Argos can be explained by virtue of a victory or victories at Nemea or Argos. His grave near Sparta can be accounted for by his sudden death a long way from his Arcadian home. It is notable that it occurred ‘on the road from Sparta to Arcadia’ (cf. Paus. 3.20.8, 3.21.1.1-7), that is Ladas, at the time of his death, may have been travelling not south towards a supposed home in Sparta, but northwards towards Arcadia. But if Ladas was from Mantinea, a troublesome question concerning Pausanias’ account is: why was the athlete near Sparta at all if he was returning home from Olympia? Is a sick man likely to have made such a southerly detour on his way from Olympia to Mantinea? But Pausanias is our only source for the circumstances of Ladas’ death, and it is notable that he prefixes his comment with the words δοκεῖν δὲ μοι (‘as I see it’, 3.21.1.5). In other words, what he presents is only his own opinion, or guess, at the circumstances. He cites no earlier authority to back up

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9 Such games are attested by Pindar (Ol. 7.81-86) and Bacchylides (Ode 10.30-35).
his story, and it may well be that we should accept only that Ladas died near the spot where his grave was situated.

**Ladas’ Statue**

As we have just seen, Pausanias refers to Ladas in three distinct passages, in his descriptions of Laconia, Argos, and Arcadia respectively. He personally saw Ladas’ grave near Sparta, a statue of him at Argos, and a running track that he used near Mantinea. It is initially surprising that there is no mention of this Olympic victor in Pausanias’ exhaustive treatment of Olympia, especially in Book 6 where he refers to numerous statues of successful athletes that were erected there.

How might we explain this absence? Pausanias does tell us in the opening chapters of this book that not all Olympic champions had their statues set up (6.1.1f.). He says that he is forced to omit those athletes who did not have statues erected because of the nature of his work, which is not a catalogue of all athletes who had won Olympic victories, but a record of statues and other offerings. Indeed he says that he will not even record all those whose statues had been set up because he knows that many men won through the chance of the lot and not by strength. So he will mention only those who had some particular distinction or whose statues were superior to the others.

Ladas might be thought to have met this last qualification for inclusion, since we have evidence that a memorable statue of him did exist in antiquity. The source is an epigram:

> ὁίος ἐς φεύγουν τὸν ὑπήνεμον, ἐμπνευΣε Λάδα,  
> Θόμον, ἐπ' ἀκροτάτῳ νεόματι θείς ὄνυχα,  
> τοῖν ἐχάλκευσέν σε Μύρων ἐπὶ παντὶ χαράξας  
> σώματι Πισαίου προσδοκίην στεφάνου.  
> *(Anth. Plan. 16.54.1-4)*

Just as you were in life, Ladas, flying before wind-footed Thymus, just touching the ground with the tips of your toes, so did Myron mould you in bronze, stamping on all your body your expectation of the Pisaean crown.

Thus there was a particularly lifelike statue of Ladas by the distinguished sculptor Myron, especially famous for his Discobolus, and a statue of a heifer that was itself the subject of numerous epigrams *(Anth. Plan. 9.713-42,*

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14 On the reliability of Pausanias, see C. Habicht, *Pausanias’ Guide to Ancient Greece* (Berkeley 1985) 28-63. He concludes that ‘when Pausanias speaks as an eyewitness he can be trusted’ (63).
Myron’s statue of Ladas was clearly not the one which Pausanias saw at Argos, since, if it were, he would surely have mentioned Myron’s name. Pausanias does in fact mention Myron as being responsible for several other agonistic statues that he did see at Olympia (6.2.2.6f.; 6.8.4.1-4; 6.8.5.6-9; 6.13.2.7-10). It is possible that he does not mention the statue of Ladas for the simple reason that it was no longer there in his day. Moretti has sought to explain the numerous references to Ladas by Roman writers by suggesting that the famous statue had been taken to Rome and thereby became familiar to Romans. Moretti’s suggestion also of course provides a neat explanation as to why Pausanias does not mention a statue of Ladas at Olympia.

The Date of Ladas’ Victory

The fact that Myron made Ladas’ statue can provide only a rough guide to the date of the runner’s Olympic victory, since the sculptor had a lengthy career, from ca. 480 until as late as 440. But other evidence may help us to narrow down the possible dates. Most important is the victor list provided by P. Oxy. 222 (= Olympionikenliste v. Oxy. FGrH 415), that covers the period from 480 to 448 (with some gaps). Robert, in the belief that Ladas was a Spartan, suggested that his name be supplied in the lacuna before the ethnic Λ[£]kwn under the year 476 (P. Oxy. 222 col. 1.7-19 = FGrH 415.1.11-17 [307]). But if, as we have suggested, Ladas was not a Spartan, Robert’s dating is no longer valid.

The only Olympiads in the period 480 to 448 for which P. Oxy. 222 does not provide any information on the dolichos victors are 480, 464, 460, and 456.

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16 Stewart [16] 1.256 does however list Myron’s Ladas statue as ‘perhaps at Argos’.

17 Moretti [2] 96. It is striking that some of the same Roman authors who name Ladas also mention Myron, as do other contemporaries. For example, on Myron’s reputation, cf. Cic. De Or. 3.26.2-5; Brut. 70.4f.; Mart. Ep. 4.39.1-5; 8.50.1; Petron. Sat. 88.5.1-3; Plin. HN 34.57.1-59.2; Prop. 2.31.7f.; Quint. Inst. 2.13.8-10; 12.10.7.1-3; on examples of Roman pillage of works by Myron, cf. Cic. Verr. 2.4.3.7-5.4; 2.4.93.1-8; Juv. 8.97-103; Paus. 9.30.1.8-13; Plin. HN 34.58.1f.; Stra. 14.1.14.15-20. Cf. Pollitt [16] 51.

18 For example, both Pollitt [16] and Stewart [16] discuss Myron under the Early Classical Period, ca. 480-450; Ridgway [16] 85 dates his activity from ca. 480 to 440; both Ridgway [16] 89 and Stewart [16] 1.148 date his Discobolus to ca. 460; Stewart [16] 1.256 suggests that his statue of Hecate, made for Aegina, must be earlier than 457/6.

But the year 480 was probably the occasion of the second victory by Dromeus of Stymphalus, while 464 is the likely date for the second victory by Ergoteles of Himera (also the winner in 472). Thus the years 460 and 456 remain available for the victory of Ladas. Moretti in fact lists Ladas’ victory under 460, saying that it was either in 460 or the next Olympiad, or (alternatively) after 444.

Perhaps examination of the dates of the other athletic statues made by Myron may enable us to decide between the earlier dating for Ladas (that is, 460 or 456) and the later one (after 444). Unfortunately, *P. Oxy.* 222 provides indisputable evidence for the date of only one of these statues, that of the pancratist Timanthes of Cleonae, victor in 456 (*P. Oxy.* 222 col. 2.4 = *FGrH* 415.2.16 [308]; Paus. 6.8.4). But there are grounds for supposing that another of Myron’s agonistic statues mentioned by Pausanias (6.13.2) dated from no later than that same year and was possibly as early as 472. This is a statue of the famous Spartan *stadion*/*diaulos* runner, Chionis, victor in these two events in three successive Olympiads, 664, 660, and 656. Pausanias begins by discussing a stele recording Chionis’ victories. He rightly charges with absurdity those who supposed that Chionis himself had dedicated this stele, rather than the Spartan people, since the stele itself apparently recorded that the *hoplitodromos* (ὁπλιτόδρομος, ‘race in armour’) had not yet been introduced and, if Chionis had been the dedicator, how could he have known that one day it would be. Pausanias then goes on to allege that even more stupid were those who claimed that the statue standing beside this stele was a portrait of Chionis, since it was the work of the Athenian Myron. Pausanias here is not denying that the statue was meant to represent Chionis, but rather is pointing out that it could not be an accurate likeness of him because of the long interval between the time

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24 Chionis is dated so by Julius Africanus, see I. Rutgers (ed.), *Sextus Julius Africanus: Olympionicae Fasti, or, List of the Victors at the Olympian Games* (Chicago 1980) 11; and by Moretti [2] 64 nos 42-47. Pausanias records him as victor in the *stadion* at the twenty-eighth Olympiad in 668 (4.23.4.1-4), a second time at the twenty-ninth in 664 (4.23.10.1-4), and a third time at the thirtieth in 660 (8.39.3.6-8). He may have confused him with Charmis, recorded as the winner in 668 by Julius Africanus (Rutgers [above, this note] 10); cf. Moretti [2] 63 no. 40.  
25 Stewart [16] 1.256 erroneously refers to ‘the hoplite-runner Chionis of Sparta’.
of Chionis’ athletic career and the period of Myron. Pausanias also mentions an apparently identical stele set up at Sparta itself, near the tombs of the Agiad dynasty (3.14.2.12-3.9). Here he tells that on it were written Chionis’ victories at Olympia and elsewhere, seven at Olympia made up of four in the *stadion* and three in the *diaulos*, again with the comment that the hoplite race was not yet one of the events.

When and why might the Spartan state have decided to erect a statue and two stelai honouring their great athlete Chionis? Why their curious emphasis on the fact that the hoplite race did not exist in the time of Chionis? Moretti points out that his statue stood near that of Astylus of Croton who, Pausanias says, won three successive double victories in the *stadion* and *diaulos* (6.13.1.1-3), that is the same triple double achieved by Chionis. Astylus’ victories are dated to 488, 484, and 480, and it is likely that his statue (by Pythagoras of Rhegium) was made shortly afterwards, *ca.* 476. It would appear that the Spartans, in a spirit of patriotic pride, chose to assert the claim of their own great multiple Olympic victor of the past against that of the contemporary athletic hero from Magna Graecia. It is notable that the other runners with multiple victories whom Pausanias goes on to mention are all much later than Astylus, and that Chionis provides the only precedent to Astylus’ feat.

It is this perceived rivalry with Astylus that explains the presence of the statement on the two stelai that the hoplite race did not exist in Chionis’ day. The point lies in the fact (not recorded by Pausanias) that Astylus in 480, in addition to the *stadion* and *diaulos*, also won the *hoplitodromos*, giving him a total of seven victories in all (*P. Oxy*. 222 col. 1.4 = *FGrH* 415.1.8f. [307]).

In presenting the claim of Chionis against Astylus, it makes little difference whether the Spartans could point to seven victories for their athlete,

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26 Pausanias was well aware that Chionis was active before the middle of the seventh century; cf. W. W. Hyde, *De Olympionicarum Statuis a Pausania Commemoratis* (Chicago 1980) 48.111.


28 The other multiple winners are Leonidas of Rhodes, four times a triple victor in *stadion*, *diaulos*, and *hoplitodromos* (Moretti [2] nos 618-20, 622-24, 626-28, 633-35); Polites of Ceramis, the only winner of the triple *stadion*, *diaulos*, and *dolichos* in 69 CE (Moretti [2] nos 196-98); Hermogenes of Xanthus, twice a triple winner in *stadion*, *diaulos*, and *hoplitodromos* (81, 89 CE) and double victor in *diaulos* and *hoplitodromos* (85 CE) (Moretti [2] nos 805-07, 812f., 817-19).

29 The suggestion that Astylus’ name be read as also the winner of the *hoplitodromos* in 476 (cf. *P. Oxy*. 222 col. 1.17 = *FGrH* 415.1.16 [307]) should be rejected. See Moretti [2] 90 no. 219.
as Pausanias states only six as is generally believed.\textsuperscript{30} On the first premise, Chionis could be seen as clearly superior, with seven victories (even without the opportunity later provided by the hoplite race for as many as four more) against seven for Astylus (but only six without the ‘extra’ one of the hoplite race). On the second premise, Chionis is at least as good (if not superior) with six victories (although lacking the opportunity for perhaps three more), against Astylus with six victories (a seventh only because he had extra opportunity).

It is probable that Myron’s statue of Chionis and the stele were commissioned and erected at Olympia not long after the statue of Astylus, possibly by the following Olympiad, 472.\textsuperscript{31} While this early dating for the Chionis statue seems preferable because of the connection to Astylus, one might suggest also a latest likely date of 456, on the possibility that the Spartans chose to commemorate the achievements of Chionis in the fiftieth Olympiad after the last of his victories.

Another Pausanian reference to agonistic statues by Myron also poses a problem (6.2.1-3). Pausanias first presents a list of victorious Spartan horse breeders, Xenarces, Lycinus, Arcesilas, and Arcesilas’ son Lichas. Pausanias then says that Lycinus brought foals to Olympia and, that when one of them was disqualified, he entered his team in the chariot race for full-grown horses and won; he also dedicated two statues at Olympia, the works of Myron the Athenian. Pausanias adds that, as for Arcesilas and Lichas, the father won two Olympic victories, but Lichas entered his chariot under the name of the people of Thebes, because the Spartans at the time were excluded from the games, and in person bound the ribbon on the victorious charioteer. For this offence, Lichas was whipped by the Hellanodicae and, because of Lichas, later the Spartans under king Agis invaded Elis and a battle took place within the Altis. After this war, Lichas set up his statue there, although the Elean lists of Olympic victors record not Lichas but the Theban people as the victor.

The difficulty with accepting Pausanias’ statement that there were two statues of Lycinus made by Myron is that the race for foals was not introduced until 384, as Pausanias himself tells (5.8.10.8-11.2). This date of course is far

\textsuperscript{30} A problem with accepting a fourth victory for Chionis in the \textit{stadion} is that there is no way to accommodate such a victory in Africanus’ list unless we suppose that the name Charmis as the winner at the twenty-eighth Olympiad in 668 is a mistake for Chionis. But the additional comment of Africanus that Charmis trained on a diet of dried figs seems to ensure that he is a different person from Chionis, who is characterized as an outstanding jumper at the twenty-ninth Olympiad. This is the view of Moretti [2] 63 no. 40, 64 nos 42-47, who accepts Charmis as the \textit{stadion} victor in 668, and lists Chionis as a double victor in \textit{stadion} and \textit{diaulos} for 664, 660, and 656.

\textsuperscript{31} Cf. Moretti [2] 64. Hyde [27] 15 no. 111 suggests that Chionis’ statue was set up at the seventy-seventh or seventy-eighth Olympiad, that is, 472 or 468.
too late for Myron to have made these statues. A common solution to the problem has been to dismiss the story of the team entered in the foals’ race, and to assign Lycinus’ victory to a date within the period of Myron’s activity, for example Robert puts it in 444, while Moretti suggests the later date of 432.\(^{32}\) To answer the question of why Lycinus should have had two statues when only one victory is mentioned, Moretti accepts his identification with a Lycinus who won the hoplite race in 448 (\textit{P. Oxy.} 222 col. 2.34 = \textit{FGrH} 415.2.11 [309]).\(^{33}\) This identification however is doubtful, since no ethnic epithet survives in \textit{P. Oxy.} 222, and Pausanias makes no reference to an earlier victory by Lycinus, as he does with other victors, for example Eubotas of Cyrene (6.8.3).\(^{34}\)

A better solution is to assume confusion or faulty transmission in the text of Pausanias.\(^{35}\) Pausanias, after mentioning the statues of the four Spartan equestrian victors, adds some details about the career of each of them. The reference to the two statues by Myron appears at the end of his story about Lycinus, but the verb in the relevant clause (\textit{ἀνέθηκε}, ‘dedicated’) does not have a named subject (6.2.2.6). In the following sentence, Pausanias mentions the two victories by Arcesilas (6.2.2.7-9), so it seems likely that it was he, not Lycinus, who dedicated the two statues by Myron. Either the name of Arcesilas has fallen out of the text, or there was confusion on the part of Pausanias himself.\(^{36}\)

The two chariot victories of Arcesilas can be securely assigned to the mid-fifth century (\textit{Plut. Cim.} 10.5.3-7 = \textit{Critias DK} 88 B 8).\(^{37}\) The victory of his son Lichas was certainly in 420 (Thuc. 5.49f.); since Xenophon describes Lichas as an old man at the time (\textit{ἀνδρὰ γέροντα}, that is possibly a member of the \textit{gerousia} and thus over sixty, \textit{Hell.} 3.2.21.6-21.8), his father’s victories are likely to have been won a generation earlier.\(^{38}\) Moretti lists them under 448 and


\(^{35}\) Hodkinson [35] 330 n. 15.

\(^{36}\) See Hodkinson [35] 330 n. 15; W. H. S. Jones (ed. and tr.), \textit{Pausanias: Description of Greece} 3 (Cambridge, Mass. 2002) 8 n. 1. Cf. Pausanias’ repetition of the name Xenarces for the Spartan equestrian victor just after giving the same name for an Acarnanian pancratiast at the beginning of this chapter (6.2.1.4, 6.2.1.10, 6.2.2.1).


\(^{38}\) See A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, \textit{An Historical Commentary on Thucydides} 4 (Oxford 1970) 66f.; Hodkinson [35] 307, 325f., 330 n. 15. Lichas was prominent in the Spartan negotiations with the Persians in 412/11, and died shortly afterwards (Thuc. 8.84.5.1-7): see also Hodkinson [above, this note] 332 n. 46. Since his
Myron’s statues of Arcesilas were presumably set up soon after his victories.

The final statue by Myron to be mentioned by Pausanias is that of the boy boxer Philippus, an Azanian (that is an Arcadian) from Pellana in Laconia (6.8.5.1-9). We have names, partial names, or ethnics that enable us to eliminate every Olympiad in the period 480 to 448 for Philippus’ victory, except 464 and 460 (P. Oxy. 222 = FGrH 415). The situation is in fact very similar to that of Ladas’ victory, namely a choice between an early date (here 464 or 460) and a later one (444 or after). In the case of Philippus, Moretti opts for a later date, assigning the boy boxer to 436. To the years 464 and 460 he assigns the victories of Protolaus of Mantinea (Paus. 6.6.1.4) and Cyniscus of Mantinea (6.4.11.1f.) respectively. The statue of Protolaus, however, was the work of Pythagoras of Rhegium. Although this sculptor’s statue for Leontiscus of Messana is securely dated to 456 (P. Oxy. 222 col. 2 = FGrH 415.2.15 [308]), most of his agonistic output can be dated appreciably earlier: compare Astylus, victor in 488, 484, 480; Euthymus of Western Locri, victor in 484, 476, 472; Mnaseas of Cyrene, victor probably in 484; Dromeus of Mantinea, victor in

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39 Hodkinson [35] 308 Table 12, 320 Table 13; Moretti [2] 102f. nos 305, 311. The evidence of P. Oxy. 222, while not providing a clear indication of the names of the chariot victors in 456 and 452, does seem to rule out Arcesilas for those Olympiads.

40 An Arcadian victor in boys’ boxing by the name of Philippus is honoured on an inscription from Olympia dated to the early-third century BCE: L. Moretti, *Iscrizioni agonistiche greche* (Rome 1953) 33 (= J. Ebert (ed.), *Griechische Epigramme auf Sieger an gymnischen und hippischen Agonen: Abhandlungen der sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig* (Berlin 1972) 55). In an attempt to link and reconcile this inscription with the information from Pausanias, Hyde [27] has suggested that this third-century Philippus was responsible for the restoration of a statue made by Myron in the fifth century of an Arcadian boxer whose name has been lost to us. Hyde 39f. argues that Pausanias was unable to read accurately an inscription on the statue itself or its base to the effect that ‘Myron made [this statue] and Philippus, an Azanian from Pellane restored it’ and wrongly deduced that it was a statue of Philippus; cf. W. W. Hyde, *Olympic Victor Monuments and Greek Athletic Art* (Washington 1921) 244f. This explanation, while ingenious, is too complicated (cf. Ebert [above, this note] 167), and it is better to accept that there were two different Arcadian boy boxers called Philippus, as Moretti [2] believes (nos 319, 529; cf. Moretti [above, this note] 85f.). Also, Pausanias’ phrase Αζήντον ἕκ Πελλάνως (‘the Azanian from Pellana’, 6.8.5.4) appears to suit a fifth century rather than a third century date (cf. Moretti [2] 85; Ebert [above, this note] 167).


Thus the year 484 (or even 488) is just as feasible for Protolaus’ victory as 464 or 460.44

Moretti’s other candidate for the boys’ boxing title in one of these two Olympiads, Cyniscus of Mantinea, might appear to have a stronger claim than Protolaus, since the (unsigned) inscription on the base of his statue (attributed by Pausanias to Polyclitus) is datable epigraphically to ca. 470-450.45 The only other victor statue attributed to Polyclitus, that of the pentathlete Pythocles of Elis, is dated to 452 (P. Oxy. 222 col. 2.14 = FGrH 415.2.2 [309]). Stewart says that if the attribution of Cyniscus’ statue to Polyclitus holds, it must be a very early work (that is on the basis of Moretti’s date of 464 or 460). But perhaps a slightly later date is possible since the names assigned by Moretti for the boys’ boxing victors of 444 (Charmides of Elis), 440 (Gnathon of Dipaea,) and 436 (Philippus) are all marked by question marks.46 Indeed Gnathon, like Philippus, would appear to be a candidate for an earlier date, since his statue was the work of Callicles of Megara, who also made that of Diogoras of Rhodes, the celebrated boxing victor of 464 (Paus. 6.7.2.1-6). It is thus very possible that the two missing victors of 464 and 460 were Philippus and Gnathon (in whatever order).

So if we review the likely dates for Myron’s agonistic statues, we find that of Timanthes securely dated to 456, that of Chionis most likely to ca. 472 (and 456 at the latest), and the statues for Arsesilas’ two chariot victories to 448 and 444, with Philippus’ statue just as likely to be 464 or 460 rather than as late as 436. While this investigation might be deemed inconclusive in that it has failed to completely eliminate a later date (that is 444 or after) for the making of Ladas’ statue, it does leave a general impression that most of Myron’s production of agonistic statues belonged to the years before 444. When this impression is combined with the availability of the years 460 and 456 and the

43 Astylus: Moretti [2] nos 178f., 186f., 196-98; Euthymus: nos 191, 214, 227; Mnaseas: no. 194; Dromeus: no. 202. The date 484 for Mnaseas is preferable to 456, for which the restoration of his name is too uncertain (P. Oxy. 222 col. 2.8 = FGrH 415.2.18 [308]); cf. Jacoby [20] 3B.308 n. 18). Such a late date for Mnaseas would also create a problem for the date of the chariot victory of his son Cratisthenes, and would have been too late for his statue to have been the work of Pythagoras. Moretti [2] 99 no. 277 assigns the hoplite victory of 456 to ‘Linas (?)’.

44 Moretti [2] 87 no. 193 assigns the boys’ boxing title of 484 to Epicradius of Mantinea, on the ground that his statue was the work of Ptolichus of Aegina, who also made that of Theognetus, winner of the boys’ wrestling in 476 (Paus. 6.9.1).


46 Moretti [2] nos 310 (Charmides), 314 (Gnathon).
lack of other possible candidates for dolichos victor in those years, it seems probable that one of those two Olympiads was the occasion for Ladas’ victory.

The Name Ladas

It may well be that Ladas was not in fact our runner’s true name, but a nom de guerre assumed because of its suitability for his chosen sport. It is extremely rare both as a proper name and (lower case) as a common noun. The word is explained by a citation in Hesychius: ‘λόδας ἔλαφος νεβρίας, Hsch.’ (Lex. lambda 73.1), that is, it is a word denoting a dappled deer. The implication is that both Ladas, the dolichos winner, and his homonym, the stadion victor of 280 BCE, were men who could run ‘like a deer’. There is a striking parallel for such an assumed name suggestive of impressive running ability in the runner known as Deerfoot, whose real name was Lewis Bennett. This man, a Native American from the Cattaraugus Reservation in upper New York State, gained great fame in his time, especially from a successful visit to England in 1862-1863, during which he defeated the leading English professional runners of the day. Like Deerfoot, Ladas was a distance runner. The connotation of their names is not so much all-out speed (as with Ladas the stadion victor), but rather the light-footed grace and relaxed running form associated with the animal.

Our examination of the ancient evidence concerning the dolichos champion Ladas indicates that he was an Arcadian athlete rather than a Spartan or Argive, and that he obtained his Olympic victory in 460 or 456 rather than after 444. It also appears that he owed his posthumous fame, which endured into the Roman imperial age, more to the fact that the outstanding sculptor Myron created an amazingly lifelike victory statue for him than to his actual achievement as a runner.

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49 Deerfoot’s greatest achievement was a race at Brompton, London on 3 April 1862 in which he established new world records for ten miles (51:26), one hour’s running (eleven miles 970 yards) and twelve miles (1:02:02.5). For these and other details of his career, see J. Cumming, *Runners and Walkers: A Nineteenth Century Sports Chronicle* (Chicago 1981) 51-62; P. Lovesey, *The Kings of Distance: A Study of Five Great Runners* (London 1968) 15-40.
THE CURSE OF OEDIPUS IN OEDIPUS AT COLONUS

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Abstract. This paper analyzes the dramatic use of Oedipus’ curse in *Oedipus at Colonus* to make Oedipus into a hero and Athenian. Oedipus’ change in status from refugee to hero is produced by his gradual comprehension and ultimate use of his power to curse his sons. The unfolding of the curse is also used as a vehicle for the reiteration and re-enactment of the causes for Oedipus’ hostility towards Thebes.

Recent critical attention has focused on the political use of myth in the Athenian state, and on the use of Athenian drama, in particular, as both mirror to and participant in the cultural and political discourse of Athens. Athenian drama was acutely sensitive to the circumstances of its performance and the immediate needs of the *polis* that formed its audience. This paper will consider a particular instance of the use of myth in tragedy, and examine how the myth of Oedipus’ curse on his sons in Sophocles’ *Oedipus at Colonus* was adapted to serve the needs of an audience in particular historical circumstances. I will argue that the development of the story of Oedipus’ curse on his sons in *Oedipus at Colonus* transforms the blind Theban exile into an Athenian saviour hero, before an audience in critical need of reassurance.

According to the second hypothesis, Sophocles composed the *Oedipus at Colonus* in 405 BC; it was performed in 401 BC, three years after Athens surrendered to the Spartans and their allies. Although in 405 BC the Athenians

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had not yet conceded defeat, the end was in sight. Since the Sicilian expedition Athens had heard no good news and, after many years of war, defeat was all but certain. The Thebans themselves posed special problems for Athens. The Boeotians had made an unsuccessful attack on Athens near Colonus in 407 BC, and the Thebans made serious depredations on Athenian territory for some time before the end of the war. After the Athenian surrender in 404 BC, the Thebans were in the forefront of those demanding the destruction of the city. The play’s intended audience of 405 BC faced looming defeat, and its performance audience of 401 BC had fallen entirely into the power of its dangerous neighbours.² Sophocles’ play presented to each group the promise of powerful supernatural support, in the form of a hero who had defected from the side of one of its most persistent enemies.

The story of Oedipus’ curse on his sons is used to effect the metamorphosis of Oedipus into both a hero, and an Athenian, in two ways.³ First, Oedipus’ change in status from refugee to saviour hero is produced by his gradual comprehension and ultimate use of his power to curse his sons. Secondly, the unfolding of the curse is used as a vehicle for the reiteration and re-enactment of the causes for Oedipus’ hostility towards Thebes, a necessary precondition for his new loyalty to Athens.⁴ Previous scholarship on the curse


³ ‘Curse’ will be used to translate ἀρά, used in OC to describe Oedipus’ speech to Polynices (1375, 1384, 1407; cf. 1389, 1406), the curses Oedipus calls down on Creon and his family (865, 952), and the curses of blindness and exile that the chorus fears Oedipus will bring down on them by contagion (155).

⁴ ‘Athens’ or ‘Athenian territory’ will be used to signify Athens and its surrounding territory, including Colonus, which was an Athenian deme; the two are not sharply distinguished in the play. Oedipus’ protection at the end of the play is extended to the whole territory, not to Colonus alone. See P. Vidal-Naquet, ‘Oedipus Between Two Cities: An
has concentrated on its use as an index of Oedipus’ divine status, or otherwise, by the point in the play at which he utters it; and on whether the curse itself was justified. This paper will focus instead on the function of the development of the curse in Oedipus at Colonus to make of Oedipus a hero for the Athenians.

All ancient sources agree that Oedipus cursed his sons, but the reason varies with the source. In the Thebaid, it was because they served him wine in Cadmus’ drinking cup and gave him only the haunch of an animal at a sacrifice. In Euripides, the gods compelled Oedipus to pass on the curse of Laius. In Aeschylus, he cursed them in horror when he discovered their incestuous origin. But all versions agree on the central point—whatever Oedipus’ reason, he cursed his sons; this curse caused their civil war, and they consequently died at each other’s hands. The Athenian audience, schooled in epic and well acquainted with drama, can reasonably have been expected to know the story of Oedipus’ curse on his sons. The suspense, for this audience, was not over whether Oedipus would curse his sons, but when, and why.

The varied reasons given in earlier versions for Oedipus’ curse on his sons allowed Sophocles to elaborate as a different explanation for the curse the treatment Oedipus had received at his sons’ Theban hands. This in turn provided an opportunity to introduce into the drama repeated descriptions of the sons’ misdeeds against their father, which give Oedipus ample motive for transferring his protection from Thebes to Athens. The audience’s knowledge of the

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8 Eteocles, for example, specifically blames his father’s curse for his civil war with Polynices in Aesch. Sept. 654f., 695-97, 709-11.
existence of an effective curse in previous tellings increased Oedipus’ ultimate credibility as a hero with the power to protect the city.

Oedipus gains comprehension of his specific power to curse his sons only in stages. Early in the play he is entirely unaware of his power. His knowledge grows in the scenes with Ismene and Creon, culminating at last with the curse in the interchange with Polynices.

Ismene

Ismene brings the news to her father that the latest prophecies from Delphi say that he will one day be sought living and dead by the Thebans, for the sake of their own preservation (387-90). Their power will depend on him (392) and on control of his tomb (402). Though they have heard these prophecies, his sons have nevertheless preferred rule of Thebes to his recall (419). Oedipus responds with a prayer:

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άλλῳ οἴ θεοί σφιν μήτε τὴν πεπρωμένην
ἐριν κατασβέσειαν, ἐν δ᾽ ἐμοί τέλος
αὐτοῖν γένοιτο τήσδε τῆς μάχης πέρι,
... ὡς οὔτ᾽ ἄν ὃς νῦν σκήπτρα καὶ θρόνους ἔχει
μείνειν οὔτ᾽ ἄν οὐξεληλυθὼς πάλιν
ἐλθοι ποτ᾽ αὖθισ.
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(Soph. OC 421-27)

May the gods not quench their destined quarrel,
and may the outcome of this battle between them
rest with me . . . so neither would he who now holds
sceptre and throne remain, nor would he who has gone away
ever again return.

Oedipus then gives his history in some detail (431-49), in a passage which justifies the anger he displays against his sons (421-27) by recalling their crimes. The city exiled Oedipus after he himself had stopped wishing for exile or death, and his sons did not speak out to prevent it, nor otherwise assist him (440-44). He owes everything he now has, food, shelter and assistance, to his daughters (445-47). His sons have preferred rule of Thebes to assisting him (448f.). They will never have him as an ally, he concludes, nor ever profit from the rule of Thebes (450-52), and gives as his authority for this statement his interpretation of prophecy:

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9 The text used is H. Lloyd-Jones and N. G. Wilson, *Sophoclis Fabulae* (Oxford 1990), except where noted.
The Curse of Oedipus in *Oedipus at Colonus*, L. M. Bowman

. . . to ἀτ' ἀγαθα, τὴνδὲ τὴ
μαντεῖ' ἀκοὺσον, συννοιὸν τε θέσφατα
παλαίφαθ' ἀμοι Φοίβος ἤνυσέν ποτε.

(Soph. *OC* 452-54)\(^{10}\)

. . . I know this, from hearing this girl’s oracles,
and considering them together with old prophecies,
which Phoebus has just brought to pass for me.

Two separate factors have produced Oedipus’ present understanding of the old
prophecies, at least as they relate to his sons: Ismene’s recent oracle, and
Apollo’s fulfilment of θέσφατα παλαίφατα (‘old prophecies’) Oedipus already
knew. The latter would remind the audience of the prophecies we are told
Ismene had earlier brought him in secret from Thebes:

σὺ δ’, ὦ τέκνον, πρὸσθεν μὲν ἐξίκου πατρὶ
μαντεῖ’ ἄγουσα πάντα, Καδμείων λάθρα,
ἀ τοῦδ’ ἐχρήσθη σώματος . . .

(Soph. *OC* 353-55)\(^{11}\)

And you, my child, came to me beforehand,
in secret from Cadmus, bringing details of everything
that your father with prophetic powers had said about me . . .

The placement of Oedipus’ interpretation of the prophecies he knows here, in
the context of a speech giving his motives for desiring his sons’ destruction, has
the effect of adding divine sanction to Oedipus’ wishes. What he most desires is
what is destined. At the end of this scene, Oedipus’ anger at his sons and at
Thebes, his desire for power over his sons, and his importance to Theban
fortunes have been established.

*Creon*

The exchange with Creon follows the same pattern as that with Ismene. Creon
has come ostensibly as a concerned kinsman, to beg Oedipus to come back to
Thebes and hide the shame of his beggary and exile (728-60). Oedipus again
begins by giving the causes for his anger, this time against Creon. Creon exiled

\(^{10}\) I accept here Lloyd-Jones’ [9] emendation of τε θέσφατα from the manuscript τε τάξ
ἐμοῦ (following F. Heimsoeth, *Kritische Studien zu den Griechischen Tragikern* [Bonn
1865] 330).

\(^{11}\) A reference to an additional passage can also be understood. When Oedipus is told that
he is in the grove of the Eumenides, he responds that it was prophesied by Apollo that he
would rest from his journey there (*OC* 84-90).
him after his desire for exile had dissipated, and only now that Oedipus has found sanctuary elsewhere does he offer to allow him to return. Furthermore, Oedipus knows that Creon in fact intends to imprison him on the border of Theban territory rather than accepting him back into Thebes as he claims (761-86). Oedipus continues with a twofold prophecy:

οὐκ ἔστι σοι ταύτ', ἄλλα σοι τάδ' ἔστ', ἐκεῖ
χώρας ἀλάστωρ οὐμὸς ἐνναίων ἀεί·
ἔστιν δὲ παίσι τοῖς ἐμοίσι τῆς ἐμῆς
χθονὸς λαχεῖν τοσοῦτον, ἐνθανείν μόνον.
ἀρ’ οὐκ ἀμείνον ἢ σὺ τὰν θῆβαις φρονῶ;
πολλῷ γ’. δισυπέρ κάκα σαφεστέρον κλώ,
Φοῖβοι τε καύτω Ζηνός, ὡς κεῖνον πατήρ.

(Soph. OC 787-93)

You won’t have that, but you will have this:
your vengeful spirit dwelling there forever;
and for my sons there will be allotted
just enough of my land to die in.
Don’t I understand matters in Thebes better than you?
Better by far, since I hear from better informants,
Phoebus and Zeus himself, who is his father.

He names Phoebus Apollo and Zeus as his authority for the prophecy, another reminder of the oracles he knows from Delphi and elsewhere.12

As in the scene with Ismene, Oedipus gives reasons for his anger, but ascribes the destruction of his sons not to that anger but to prophecies he knows and can interpret. By the conclusion of this scene, Oedipus’ anger at the Thebans, as represented by Creon, has been reiterated and amplified. Oedipus is represented as knowledgeable and skilled in the interpretation of prophecy, but not yet aware, and therefore not yet in possession, of his power to curse his sons.

**Polynices**

The scene between Oedipus and Polynices brings to a climax the growing emphasis in the play on Oedipus’ power not only to predict but also to effect his sons’ future. When Polynices arrives to beg his father’s assistance, he brings word of another oracle, which reveals that victory in the war between him and

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12 The mention of Zeus (OC 793) need not be taken as a sign that Oedipus has already become a seer who receives direct inspiration from the gods. Apollo, author of the oracles at Delphi, was generally held to speak for Zeus; see, e.g. (in Soph.), fr. 313 in A. C. Pearson (ed.), *Sophocles’ Fragments* (Cambridge 1917) and OT 151; Aesch. *Eum.* 19, 562, and 713; *Hymn. Hom. Ap.* 131; Pind. *Ol.* 8.43.
Eteocles will go to whomever Oedipus joins: οἵς ἀν σὺ προσθή, τοῖς ἔφασ转弯 κράτος (‘those whom you would lean towards, they will be made strong’, 1332). He therefore asks for Oedipus’ alliance.

Oedipus’ response to Polynices’ request (1348-397) is rendered more emphatic by the lengthy silence in response to his son’s pleas which precedes it. His answer when it comes follows the pattern of the previous two speeches to Ismene and Creon, but doubling increases its impact. He twice recalls his sons’ crimes against him and contrasts their impiety towards their father with his daughters’ loyalty (1354-369, 1377-379); twice curses his sons (1370-376, 1385-387); and twice names his divine support for so doing (1381f., 1389-392). He ends by ordering Polynices to leave (1394-397) as in the earlier episode he ordered Creon.

Both halves of Oedipus’ speech in this scene are introduced with a phrase in which Oedipus refers specifically to his act of speaking. These emphatic references to the act of speech mark his words as a performative speech-act of a particular sort: a ‘curse’, as Oedipus goes on to several times define it (ἁρπαξ, ‘curses’, 1375, 1384, 1407; cf. 1389, 1406). A curse may be defined as a speech-act which fulfils certain conditions: first, it is a performative, in that the very saying of the words is the creation of the curse; secondly, its illocutionary force is that the speaker is taken as desiring to call ill-fortune down on a person or enterprise; thirdly, although not all curses are fulfilled, if the disaster named does in fact occur, it must be accepted as having occurred because of the curse. To fulfil the final condition, the person making the curse must be thought to have the power to make that sort of speech-act. 13 Oedipus has earlier in the play been feared as a curse-bringer (155), and Creon accuses him of calling down curses on Creon’s family (952). But it is only here, where Oedipus calls down on his sons ἁρπαξ which the audience knows were fulfilled, that his status as one

with the authority and the power to bind the future in a shape harmful to his enemies is confirmed, and the performative speech act of ‘cursing’ is enacted on stage before the audience. This act firmly establishes Oedipus as a figure with unusual power.

Oedipus begins by using the term ὀμφή (‘the voice of a god’) for his own voice (1351); ὀμφή is ordinarily only used of a god’s voice, and its use here implies that the speech has more than human authority.¹⁴ He says that Polynices deserves to hear his present λόγους . . . τοιοῦθεν &: τὸν τοὺδ’ οὗ ποτ’ εὐφρανεῖ βίον (‘things which will not at all gladden his life’, 1350-353), a phrase which indicates that Oedipus himself believes that his words will have an effect. He then recounts Polynices’ sins at some length. Polynices was king when Oedipus was exiled in beggary (1354-356), and his sisters cared for Oedipus while Polynices and Eteocles did nothing (1365-368). Therefore Oedipus curses him:

(Soph. OC 1370-382)

For the god is watching you, not yet as he will soon, if these troops are moving towards the city of Thebes. There is no way for you to take that city, but before that you will fall polluted with blood and your full-blood brother too. Such curses I let loose upon you before and now call up to come to me as allies, . . . And these (curses) overpower your ‘supplication’ and your thrones, if Justice sits of old beside Zeus according to ancient law.

Oedipus then reiterates the reasons for his anger—his sons’ lack of piety, σέβειν (‘to worship’, ‘to be religious’) and respect towards him (1377-379). Oedipus introduces his second curse with a passage which again describes his speech, this time as a curse, and his act of speaking as ‘cursing’:

¹⁴ In Greek poetry, except choral lyric, ὀμφή is used in the singular most often (in Homer, invariably) of the voice of a god (Il. 2.41, 20.129; Od. 3.215, 16.96). In Sophocles it is used of the oracle of Apollo (OC 102) and of Oedipus (here and at OC 550). See Segal [4] 395 who argues that Oedipus’ speech here has the force of an oracle.
The authority Oedipus claimed for his prophecies of his sons’ destruction in previous passages was knowledge gained from prophecies known to him, or from the gods themselves. In this passage he claims not divine knowledge but divine support. Initially he claims the support of Justice and Zeus (1381f.). By the climax of his speech he has called also on the assistance of Tartarus, the Eumenides, and Ares who has caused his sons’ enmity (1389-392). The support he here claims does not reinforce his claim to knowledge of the future but rather his claim to be able to alter it by his words. His speech has now been given power by the gods themselves. Oedipus’ speech thus in his own representation of it is a curse in the full sense of a performative speech-act. It is intended to call down disaster on its objects, and it is represented as having the power to do so, thanks to the divine support given to the speaker.

At the same time, the earlier exchanges have made clear that Oedipus’ knowledge of his power to curse his sons is derived from his knowledge and interpretation of various oracles concerning them and Thebes. The curse itself

15 Bushnell [5] 96, 100f.; G. Ronnet, Sophocle: Poète tragique (Paris 1969) 308; and Segal [4] 369-71 argue that Oedipus’ curse is effective because he is near death; though see
is the act that provides and fulfils the interpretation of the prophecy. If, as Polynices has said, victory will go to whichever side Oedipus supports, it is now clear that neither side will be victorious. In dramatic terms, fulfilment of the prophecy has now been represented on the stage, although the actual enactment of the events does not occur within the timeframe of the play.

Its hearers accept Oedipus’ curse as binding. Antigone and Polynices both believe that the events described in Oedipus’ speech will come to pass. Their reactions differ only in that Antigone treats Oedipus’ speech as conditional, while Polynices accepts it as absolute. Antigone believes that Polynices’ doom can be avoided if he does not fulfil the initial condition of his father’s curse, the attack on Thebes, and therefore pleads with her brother to call off the attack and save himself (1416f.). Polynices however treats Oedipus’ speech as a statement about the future whose fulfilment is certain (1424, 1432-434, 1441) or which, if it is not, depends on the gods rather than on any action of his: ταύτα δ’ ἐν τῷ δαίμονι / καὶ τῇ δὲ φύσιν χατέρα (‘these things lie with the gods and so we are born with wishes’, 1443f.). Neither doubts that if the initial condition is fulfilled, the curse will be effective.

The death of Oedipus’ sons and the defeat of the Seven against Thebes do not take place before the end of the play. However, neither the characters on stage nor the audience before it have any doubt that these events will take place. The audience will have been well acquainted with the story of the defeat of the Seven and the death of Oedipus’ sons at each other’s hands. Oedipus’ curse on his sons is itself a fulfilment, on stage, of the prophecies that give him power over them. The development that Oedipus shows as he moves from wishing to have power over his sons, to predicting their fate without his own involvement, to taking active responsibility for their mutual destruction, creates precisely the growth from powerless outcast to vengeful hero he must make in the course of the play. Oedipus’ grasp of his power to bind the future, and to do so by the grace of the gods whom he calls on for support, is realized and demonstrated by his curse on his sons. His ultimate understanding and use of his power to curse

Wilson [5] 153. It is Oedipus’ interpretation of prophecy, however, rather than his proximity to death, which have been emphasized up to this point as the basis for the curse.

16 Even if the audience was ill acquainted with the Thebaid, several treatments of different parts of the story had been presented on the Athenian stage in living memory, including Soph. Ant. (442-41 BC), OT (ca. 430 BC), and most recently Eur. Phoen. (between 411 and 407 BC).

17 While it has previously been argued that Oedipus is progressively ‘heroized’ through the course of the play (cf., e.g., Bowra [6] 307-57; Burian [5] 408-29; Knox [2]; Segal [4] 362-410; Whitman [2] 229-43), the claim that this heroization is what makes his curse effective puts the cart before the horse. Oedipus’ ability to curse his sons here helps to make credible his imminent metamorphosis into a hero, not the reverse. His ability to curse, and to
his sons is the turning point for his status in the play. From this moment onwards, he is credible as a hero.

The climactic scene of the play, Oedipus’ inspired journey offstage without a guide towards his apotheosis, is made possible by his wielding of his curse. His remaining promises, or prophecies, that his body in its tomb will protect Athens from Theban violence in the future (607-23) are retrospectively given a trustworthy foundation, as spoken by a figure whose quasi-divinity has over the course of the play been not so much revealed, as developed and conclusively performed. And it is Oedipus himself who effects his transformation from indigent, impotent beggar to avenging hero, through divine support allied to the native wit on which the Athenians also prided themselves. After many long years of a losing war, the Athenian audience at the end of the fifth century BC could only have found this comforting.

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18 The full series of prophecies from Oedipus regarding his protection of Athens in future runs the length of the play: see OC 389f. and 457-60 to the chorus; 607-23 to Theseus; 788 to Creon; and 1552-555, his blessing on Athens at his exit.
Abstract. The principal themes of happiness and priorities found in Plato’s *Alcibiades Major* are also found in Plato’s *Apology*, rendering each dialogue a natural complement to the other. By first reading the *Apology* as a synoptic view of Socrates’ orientation and then reading *Alcibiades Major* as a specific illustration of Socrates’ cross-examination, we begin to see that Socrates is arguing for a radical perspective regarding one’s priorities: our lives should be directed at some ultimate end with other ends subordinate to it.

Establishing priorities in life is central for understanding Socrates’ conduct before the jury in Plato’s *Apology* and Socrates’ approach to Alcibiades in Plato’s *Alcibiades Major*. Socrates, in *Alcibiades Major*,
confronts an interlocutor that cares more about what he has (e.g., wealth, power, honors) than about what he is.⁴ Alcibiades is a soul in need of cultivation and his soul merits attention before all competing alternatives. The task of reorganizing the interlocutor’s priorities is facilitated by Socratic testing, exhortation, and examination. Socrates’ criticism of Alcibiades’ priorities in *Alcibiades Major*, and the Athenians’ priorities in the *Apology*, is informed by moral reflection that is eudaemonistic. Eudaemonism is the idea that our lives should be directed at some ultimate end (that is, happiness) with other ends subordinate to it.⁵ Once it is determined what happiness is, what should be sought is what contributes to happiness. In these two dialogues Socrates does not advocate a facile criterion for the proper ordering of priorities, but instead advocates by word and deed the best way to live.

In Plato’s *Apology* there are two instances where Socrates addresses directly the issue of priorities. The first instance occurs after Socrates rejects his counterfactual reflection that entertains the possibility of acquittal on the condition that he cease his investigations and stop practicing philosophy (Pl. *Ap*. 29c6-e2). The second instance occurs after the jury finds Socrates guilty (36b3-d1). In both instances Socrates addresses broadly the issue of Athenian priorities, mainly by focusing on the priorities held by the citizenry as a whole. The discussion of priorities in *Alcibiades Major* will complement the broad discussion of priorities in the *Apology* because Alcibiades is specifically approached by Socrates with the intent of trying to reorder Alcibiades’ priorities in order to assist him in the realization of his ambition.

**Priorities and the Apology**

In the presence of the Athenian jury, Socrates underscores the ordering of the priorities that inform his philosophical investigations and his general concern for the soul by presenting a counterfactual reflection. He entertains the possibility that the jury offers him an acquittal on the condition that he cease his investigations and stop practicing philosophy, or die. If he were acquitted on those terms, Socrates imagines himself to say:

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⁴ For a serious treatment of *Alcibiades Major*, and the issue of its authenticity, see N. Denyer (ed.), *Alcibiades* (Cambridge 2001) 1-27; T. L. Pangle (ed. and tr.), *The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues* (Ithaca 1987) 1-18. Denyer argues for the authenticity of *Alcibiades Major* by questioning the standard chronology of the dialogues: “early,” “middle,” and “late.” Pangle defends the entire Thrasyllan corpus as authentic. One of the problems with *Alcibiades Major*, for those who deny the dialogue’s authenticity, has been its inability to fit neatly into the chronology.

Gentlemen of the jury, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any one of you whom I happen to meet: “Good sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?”

Socrates admonishes the Athenians to be ever vigilant in ordering all that they care about and to have the appropriate priorities in mind. What might this ordering of priorities look like? Consideration of a related passage (Ap. 29d7-30b4) reveals Socrates’ standpoint in challenging the citizens of Athens for neglecting the right order through placing greater value on their personal possessions than their souls and thus attaching little importance to the most important things (e.g., wisdom, truth and the soul), while cherishing inferior things (e.g., wealth, reputation and honors). Socrates endorses the following claim:

"Οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἄρετή γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἄρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντᾷ καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία.

Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and everything else good for men, both individually and collectively.

We can interpret this passage in several ways. Either virtue makes wealth and other things good for humans collectively or privately; or virtue does not come

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6 See E. de Strycker and S. R. Slings, *Plato's Apology of Socrates: A Literary and Philosophical Study with a Running Commentary* (Leiden 1994) 138-41 on the various interpretations of the passage in light of the role played by the word χρήματα (“money,” “valuable possessions”). M. Burnyeat, “Virtues in Action,” in G. Vlastos (ed.), *The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Indiana 1980) 209-11 construes the passage as contributing to a larger discussion of the approach to moral philosophy exhibited by the Socratic concern for virtue, virtue, and character (or being), and the modern concern for methodology and actions (or doing). Burnyeat [above, this note] 210 considers that χρήματα is not simply money; rather, it means valuable possessions in the broadest sense of the word.
from wealth, but from virtue comes wealth and all other goods for man collectively and privately. The ambiguity may be intentional to allow for both interpretations, but each interpretation is anchored in an order that prioritizes three types of goods: goods of the soul, goods of the body, and external goods. Goods of the soul revolve around the mutually entailing ideas of knowledge and virtue; goods of the body include qualities such as health and strength; and external goods include wealth and honors. Socrates believes in the greater value of the soul than of the body and its possessions. What Socrates suggests is that only the goods of the soul allow one to use the other goods well. Even if external goods are most necessary, they are not the highest since the soul is what uses the others. When we consider that it may be true that the virtuous person is rich, for example, presumably it is because such a person knows how to make do or do the best with what he has due to the moderating influences of the soul.

We are now in a better position to appreciate why Socrates admonishes the Athenians as single-mindedly as his counterfactual reflection attests. The very things that give Athens the reputation eis sophia kai ischyon ("for both wisdom and power," Ap. 29d8) blind it and make it heedeteros ("sluggish," 30e4-5) with respect to the most important things (πλείονος, 30a2). Athens is blinded by its bodily goods and its possessions. Thus the right ordering of Athenian priorities becomes the concern of Socrates’ examination and exhortation of his fellow citizens.

Following the jury’s verdict of guilty, Socrates again addresses the issue of Athenian priorities and what role he played as a private citizen in trying to convince others to concern themselves with the state of their soul as opposed to the body and its possessions. Socrates explains that his counter-assessment must be commensurate with a life that has not been lived quietly nor concerned with what occupies the majority of Athenians: wealth, household affairs and political offices (Ap. 36b3-c1). The life that Socrates has tried to live is a life that has been useful, both to himself and to others:

... ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦν ὁ δὲ ἐλθὼν μῆτε ὑμῖν μῆτε ἐμαυτῷ ἐμέλλον μηδὲν ὀφέλος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἱδία ἐκαστὸν ἰὸν ἐνεργεῖτιν τὴν μεγίστην ἐνεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἔρχομαι, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκαστὸν ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μῆτε τῶν ἐαυτοῦ μηδέν ὀμησισθαι πρὶν ἐναυτῷ ἐπιμεληθεῖν ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἑσοτερικὸς, μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε άλλων οὕτω κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

(Pl. Ap. 36c2-d1)

Thus virtue (being) is prior to actions (doing) due to its capability of “dominating and organizing the whole pattern of a man’s life.” Burnyeat’s reflections reinforce the main lines of thought we have found in the passage.
... I did not follow that path that would have made me of no use either to you or to myself, but I went to each of you privately and conferred upon him what I say is the greatest benefit, by trying to persuade him not to care for any of his belongings before caring that he himself should be as good and wise as possible, not to care for the city’s possessions more than for the city itself, and to care for other things in the same way.

Whereas Socrates admonishes the Athenians for their lack of priorities in ranking the three types of goods in his initial discussion, in this later passage we find Socrates reflecting on the worthiness of a life that is dedicated to the state of the soul. What is appropriate that someone like Socrates should suffer who, having the proper perspective towards conventional goods, has gone around persuading people to care for themselves before any of their things or for the things of the city before the city itself? Socrates is a friend of Athens and has tried to benefit it as much as possible by being useful. What might Socrates have in mind when he describes his conduct as being beneficial and useful? Socrates is expressing the idea that the virtuous soul, which is directed by wisdom, determines how we put bodily and external goods to practical use; hence virtue is useful and beneficial.7

In Plato’s *Meno* we see Socrates considering the practical aspect of virtue in his discussion with Meno. The following exchange between the two amplifies Socrates’ assumptions in the *Apology* regarding the practical effect that privileging the soul in the ordering of his priorities and the soul’s quest for virtue had on his fellow Athenians and himself:

7 Xen. Mem. 2.4-7 insists that Socrates’ central characteristic is usefulness (esp. Xenophon’s discussion of Socrates’ approach to friendship); cf. Arist. Rh. 1366a36-38. V. J. Gray, *The Framing of Socrates: The Literary Interpretation of Xenophon’s Memorabilia* (Stuttgart 1998) 10f. n. 42 objects to Xenophon’s claim that Socrates’ primary characteristic is helpfulness or usefulness (Ωφέλιμος) to his companions, but she does not explain why she objects to Xenophon’s claim other than remarking that “Xenophon cannot leave the idea alone” (10).
Happiness and Priorities in Plato’s *Alcibiades Major* and the *Apology*, A. M. Archie

*Socrates* benefited the Athenians because his conversations, exhibited through testing, exhorting and examining, sought to persuade others to prioritize their lives in such way that all that they did, from the quotidian to the heroic, would take into account the positive, directing power that wisdom has on the soul. The passage under consideration is significant because it amplifies Socrates’ statement in presenting his counterfactual reflection to the jury—φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ἢς βελτιστῇ ἔσται ὅποι ἐπιμελὴ οὕδε φροντίζεις (“while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul,” *Ap*. 29e1-3)—and it clarifies why Socrates proposes dining in the Prytaneum8 as a counter-penalty to Meletus’ assessment of death.

For the Athenians to disregard and not give thought to wisdom, the directing factor, is to disregard the transformative, beneficial effect wisdom can have on the soul. It is only through wisdom that the soul can bring to fruition, by striving towards the appropriate ends through the appropriate means, the power at which Athens is reputed to excel.9 What Socrates’ characterization of

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9 Socrates says as much by voicing his objection, while presiding in the Council, to the Athenians wishing to try together the Ten Generals who had failed to collect the dead after the naval victory at Arginusae in 406 BC (*Pl. Ap.* 31e2-32e1). Socrates is defending against...
the transformative power of wisdom in the *Apology* (29d1-e3) and the *Meno* suggests is that wisdom has a particular type of nature. The presence of it in one’s soul entails happiness, but even the mere thought of it sets one on the path of distinguishing the soul from what the soul uses (that is, the body and its possessions). Wisdom prioritizes the soul’s goods (that is, the body and its desires). The nature of wisdom also goes some way in explaining why Socrates would propose dining in the Prytaneum as a counter-penalty.

The significance of Socrates’ proposing such a penalty was that there was no regular penalty provided by the main charge brought against him, corruption of the youth; so Meletus, the plaintiff, proposes death. Socrates, the defendant, is allowed to make a counter-penalty, which he does in a rather dramatic fashion:

οὐκ ἐσθ’ ὅτι μᾶλλον, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ στειρεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἡ εἰ τις ὑμὸν ἱππὸν ἡ συνωρίζῃ ἢ ζεῦγη εν συνεκκεκεν Ὀλυμπίασιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ υμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαιμονός δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰναὶ . . .

(Pl. *Ap.* 36d5-e1)

Nothing is more suitable, gentlemen, than for such a man to be fed in the Prytaneum, much more suitable for him than for any one of you who has won a victory at Olympia with a pair or a team of horses. The Olympian victor makes you think yourself happy; I make you be happy . . .

Such a man is a man who has not lived a quiet life nor has concerned himself with what occupies the majority of Athenians. When we recall that the Prytaneum was the town hall of Athens where, among other things, Olympian victors were celebrated upon their return home, we see Socrates’ counter-penalty as commentary on justice as distribution according to worth or merit. The true victors, like Socrates, have greatly benefited Athens by getting citizens to adopt a perspective toward themselves that takes seriously the state of their souls. The soul directed by wisdom is the standard of all values which in turn creates justice, good laws and right priorities in the city, which brings happiness to all. The Olympian victor, on the other hand, makes the Athenian seem happy because in the victorious wrestler, boxer, runner or chariot-racer he thinks he is witnessing the revelation of the victor’s divine ἄρετη (“goodness.”

the illegality of trying them en masse. Also he prudently thinks it foolish to kill your best generals in time of grave danger.


“excellence”).12 The athletic ideal becomes the standard of all values in the praise of the Olympic victor, but the ideal can only be appreciated properly once it is seen as being subordinate to the role of wisdom in upholding the welfare of the city. Socrates’ concern that his fellow Athenians maintain the appropriate priorities in their lives and the city as a whole makes him worthy of free meals in the Prytaneum.

Priorities and Alcibiades Major

In Plato’s dialogue Alcibiades Major we see Socrates’ orientation towards Alcibiades complementing the general discussion of Athenian priorities found in the Apology, since Alcibiades embodies big ambitions and τὰ μεγάλα (“great qualities,” Pl. Alc. 1 104a2-3) such as good looks, wealth, and a noble pedigree, with limited concern for the state of his soul. The characterization of Alcibiades recalls Socrates’ admonishing of the Athenians for their lack of self-examination and complacency in being πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὔδοκωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἱσχύν (“of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power,” Ap. 29d7-8). In both dialogues we see the interlocutor concerning himself with bodily and external goods as opposed to the cultivation of wisdom within the soul. The difference between the two dialogues, a difference which makes them complementary, is that in Alcibiades Major Socrates shows how the proper ordering of priorities plays out in a specific interlocutor with a specific ambition.

We find again two instances in Alcibiades Major where Socrates addresses the issue of priorities. The first occurs in the opening pages of the dialogue where Socrates introduces himself to Alcibiades after having observed him for a period of time (Alc. 1 103a1-104c6). Socrates’ introduction is designed to pique Alcibiades’ wonder in order that he answer Socrates’ questions. The issue at hand is why Alcibiades has been shunned by his pursuers. To Alcibiades’ satisfaction, Socrates ventures to list the many qualities Alcibiades considers himself to excel at, starting with his body and its possessions and ending with his soul. Socrates eventually explains to Alcibiades that his ambition of becoming a great Athenian leader can be realized only with Socrates’ help (105d2-106a1). How Socrates can help brings us to the first instance of Socrates’ discussion of priorities in Alcibiades Major. In the closing passages of the dialogue Socrates resums his discussion of Alcibiades’ qualities, not merely by listing them as he did initially to pique Alcibiades’ interest, but instead by listing them in the proper order in which they should be seen. This is done by getting Alcibiades to see that the user or the craftsman is

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12 See C. M. Bowra (tr.), The Odes of Pindar (New York 1969) 32, 69, 64, 106, 122.
different from what he uses (127e9-131d3). Thus, Alcibiades should appreciate that he is different from his good looks, family connections and influential friends, and that his true self, the soul, is in need of wisdom.

Socrates introduces himself to Alcibiades after having observed him for an unspecified period of time. Other suitors had pursued Alcibiades but they soon gave up after having concluded there was not much they could offer him to win him over. Socrates is the sole hold-out in the pursuit of Alcibiades. The tact Socrates employs to woo Alcibiades is to congratulate him by reviewing the qualities that made it so easy for Alcibiades to dismiss the other would-be lovers:

οὐδὲνὸς φής ἄνθρωπον ἐνδεχὴς εἶναι εἰς οὐδὲν· τὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχοντα σοὶ μεγάλα εἶναι, ὡστε μηδὲνὸς δεῖσθαι, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀρξάμενα τελευτῶντα εἰς τὴν ψυχήν. οἱ τί γὰρ δὴ εἶναι πρῶτον μὲν κάλλιστὸς τὸ καὶ μέγατος· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ παντὶ δῆλον ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐ πεῦδη—ἐπεῖτα νεανικώτατον γένους ἐν τῇ σεαυτῷ πόλει, οὕτως μεγίστη τῶν Ἑλληνίδων, καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρὸς πατρός τέ σοι φίλους καὶ συγγενεῖς πλείστους εἶναι καὶ ἀριστούς, οἱ εἰ τί δέοι ὑπηρετοῦν ἂν σοι, τούτων δὲ τοὺς πρὸς μητρὸς οὐδὲν χείρους οὐδ' ἐλάττους. συμπάντων δὲ ἂν εἶπον μείζω οἱ σοὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν Περικλέα τὸν Χανθίππου, ὅν ὁ πατὴρ ἐπίτροπον κατέλιπε σοὶ τε καὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ· ὃς οὐ καὶ μόνον ἐν τῇ τῆς πόλει δύναται πράττειν ὅτι ἄν ἐπούληται . . .

(Pl. Alc. 1 104a1-b7)

You say you don’t need anybody for anything, since your own qualities are so great there’s nothing you lack: I’ll list them, starting with your body and ending with your soul. In the first place, you fancy yourself the tallest and best-looking man around: and it’s quite plain to see you’re not wrong about that. Next, you think that yours is the leading family in your city, which is the greatest city in Greece: on your father’s side you have plenty of aristocratic friends and relations who would be of service to you if there was any need; and on your mother’s side your connections are no worse or no fewer. And you have Pericles son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as a guardian to you and your brother; you think he’s a more powerful ally than [all those people mentioned put together] . . .

The glaring omission of qualities pertaining to Alcibiades’ soul in contrast to the glib description of both his bodily and external goods is significant.13 Might Alcibiades pride himself only on his body and what pertains to it? After all, Socrates says he will list the qualities that made Alcibiades attractive to his

pursuers but hard to get. In the omission we see Socrates gradually bringing to the fore the issue of priorities in Alcibiades’ under-appreciation of the state of his soul.

The extent to which Alcibiades valued and excelled at the qualities that Socrates mentions is given more salience when we turn to Plutarch’s characterization of Alcibiades. Plutarch compares Alcibiades’ beauty to a plant because in each stage of his life, from infancy, youth and manhood, it blossomed, giving Alcibiades a grace and charm (Plut. Alc. 1.4f.). Alcibiades’ speech was accented by a lisp which added grace and a persuasiveness to his rapid speech prompting Aristophanes and Archippus to take note of it in their literary works (1.6-8). From his youth on, Alcibiades was distinguished by ambition and superiority. Such distinguishing characteristics are illustrated by the story of Alcibiades obediently obeying his masters when he began to study, except for his adamant refusal to play the flute because one had to disfigure the face in order to play it and one could not talk while playing (2.5f.). It was due to Alcibiades’ opinion that it was unbecoming of a free man to subject himself to such sordid practices that flute-playing ceased as a skill to be mastered as a part of a liberal education (2.7). What Plutarch tells us about Alcibiades’ aristocratic familial origins and prominent friends underscores another facet of what Alcibiades excelled at. On his father’s side Alcibiades was said to have descended from Eurytaces, the son of Ajax (1.1.1). On his mother’s side Alcibiades was said to have descended from the Alemaeonidae, a noble Athenian family prominent in politics whose first member was archon Megacles (ca. 632/1 BC), the father of Dinomache, Alcibiades’ mother (1.1.2f.). It is reported that Clinias, Alcibiades’ father, had a trireme constructed at his own expense, gaining honor in the sea fight of the battle of Artemisium during the Persian wars (1.1.3-5). As for prominent friends, Alcibiades was raised by one of the most popular Athenian leaders during the fifth century, Pericles (1.2). Having Pericles as a guardian also enabled Alcibiades to benefit from the

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14 On Alcibiades, see A. H. Clough (ed.), Plutarch. The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans: Translated by John Dryden (New York 1992) 1.258-60. The main classical sources detailing the public career of Alcibiades are Thuc. 5.43-8.109 and Xen. Hell. 1.1. Plutarch’s recollections of Alcibiades are significant because (1) the postclassical world’s image of Alcibiades is due to Plutarch’s Life, and (2) Plutarch’s recollections are a distillation of themes that span Alcibiades’ private, youthful life through his notorious, public exploits. Plutarch captures what D. Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens: A Study in Literary Presentation (Oxford 1999) 214f. calls the “Alcibiades tradition.” The first tradition, typified in the writings of Thucydides, focuses primarily on Alcibiades’ ἔθιμος ("way of life") and how it influenced his civic attitude. The second tradition, that of the Socratics, focuses primarily on Alcibiades as a moral agent shaped by his own choices as a young man.
extensive network of *ξενία* ("guest-friendship") that Pericles enjoyed\(^{15}\) (cf. Pl. *Alc.* 1 104a4-b8).

We are now in a better position to see that Socrates is, in fact, telling us that Alcibiades sends his pursuers packing because he sees himself excelling at all the conventional goods when compared to his pursuers, but that he fails to excel at the most important good, which directs properly the use of all conventional goods: cultivating wisdom within his soul. Reminiscent of his concern in the *Apology* for the "greatest" city of Athens with its reputation for both "wisdom" and "power," but blinded by disordered priorities due to the very conventional goods it excelled at, Socrates is concerned that the very goods Alcibiades prominently possesses will impede his combining a concern for his soul with his bodily goods and its possessions. For the city of Athens and for Alcibiades in particular, disordered priorities might even prove to be destructive if we are to take seriously Socrates’ remarks on those who excel at conventional gifts, reported by Xenophon in his *Memorabilia*. Socrates’ remarks are that those who have natural endowments are in need most of learning and education. Otherwise, those who are most gifted, but without the knowledge to exploit what they excel at, γενομένους κοικίστους τε καὶ βλαβερωτάτους γίνεσθαι: κρίνειν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπισταμένους ἄ δεῖ πράττειν, πολλάκις πονηροῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμασι ("they become utterly evil and mischievous; for without knowledge to discern their duty, they often put their hand to vile deeds," *Mem.* 4.1.4.6-8).

After having listed the qualities Alcibiades excels at, Socrates brings to the fore the issue of priorities by explaining why he is the last hold-out in the pursuit of Alcibiades:

\[\ldots\ \text{oùtw kágw parà sói ἐλπίζω μέγιστον δυνῆσεσθαι ἐνδειξάμενος ὦ τι παντὸς ἢξιος εἶμι sói καὶ οὕτω ἐπίτροπος οὕτε συγγενῆς οὕτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἰκανὸς παραδοῦναι τὴν δύναμιν ἢς ἐπιθυμεῖς πλὴν ἐμοῦ, μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέντοι.}\]

(Pl. *Alc.* 1 105e2-5)

\[\ldots\ I \text{hope to exert great influence over you by showing you that I’m worth the world to you and that nobody is capable of providing you with the influence you crave, neither your guardian nor your relatives, nor anybody else except me—with god’s help, of course.}\]

Socrates’ desire to exert great influence over Alcibiades is not unlike Socrates’ need to exhort, “test” and “examine” Athenian priorities in the *Apology*. Socrates deliberately refuses to remain quiet in the face of Alcibiades’ ignorance. It is Alcibiades’ great qualities that blind him to the need of tending

to his true self, the soul. Only through Socrates’ private exhortation, not his guardian Pericles or his relatives, will Alcibiades come to see the great benefit Socrates is attempting to bestow upon him. First Alcibiades must be brought to see that the concern for the state of his soul entails a radical reorganizing of his priorities, which bring us to the second instance of Socrates addressing the issue of priorities in *Alcibiades Major*.

Socrates’ initial omission of the psychical qualities Alcibiades excels at becomes the topic of conversation once Alcibiades has been shown, through several episodes of the Socratic elenchus16 (Alc. 1 106d-112e; 124b10-127b11, especially in light of the discussion of “doing the things of oneself”), that reliance on his natural endowments without knowledge has not equipped him to give an account of the type of knowledge that would make it possible to advise the Athenians about their business, or distinguish between the things he uses or cultivates and cultivating himself. The root cause of Alcibiades’ inadequacy in both regards is not recognizing the difference between the conventional goods he excels at and his soul as his true self. The soul as the topic of conversation, and Alcibiades’ complete ignorance regarding the soul as the true self, is on display in the following exchange between Socrates and Alcibiades:

\[\Sigma \omega. \ \Phi \acute{e} \rho e \ \delta \eta, \ \tau i \ \epsilon \acute{e} \tau i n \ \tau o \ \epsilon \acute{a} \nu t o u \ \epsilon \pi \acute{e} \mu e \lambda \acute{e} \iota \acute{e} \sigma \tau \acute{a} i — \mu \acute{h} \ \pi o \lambda \acute{a} \acute{a} \acute{k} i s \ \lambda \acute{o} \theta \omega \acute{m} e n \ \o u \chi, \ \eta \acute{m} o n \ \alpha \acute{u} t o n \ \epsilon \pi \acute{e} \mu e \lambda \acute{o} \acute{u} \acute{m} e n o i, \ \i o \acute{m} e n o i \ \delta e — k a i \ \pi o t \ \acute{a} \ \alpha \acute{u} t o \ \pi o i e \ \acute{a} \nu \theta \acute{r} \acute{o} \acute{p} o s; \ \acute{a} r \acute{r} \ \i o t a n \ \tau o n \ \alpha \acute{u} t o u \ \epsilon \pi \acute{e} \mu e \lambda \acute{e} \iota \acute{a}, \ \tau o t e \ \k a i \ \alpha \acute{u} t o u; \ \Lambda \Lambda. \ \E m o i \ \gamma o \acute{u} \acute{n} \ \delta o k e i.\]

(Pl. Alc. 1 127e9-128a4)

[Socr.] Well then, what does it mean to cultivate oneself—I’m afraid we often think we’re cultivating ourselves when we’re not—when does a man do that? Is he cultivating himself when he cultivates what he has? [Alc.] I think so, anyway.

Here we see Socrates confronting Alcibiades with the question, “What is caring for oneself?” He suggests that most suppose that they are caring for themselves,

\[\Sigma \omega. \ \Phi \acute{e} \rho e \ \delta \eta, \ \tau i \ \epsilon \acute{e} \tau i n \ \tau o \ \epsilon \acute{a} \nu t o u \ \epsilon \pi \acute{e} \mu e \lambda \acute{e} \iota \acute{e} \sigma \tau \acute{a} i — \mu \acute{h} \ \pi o \lambda \acute{a} \acute{a} \acute{k} i s \ \lambda \acute{o} \theta \omega \acute{m} e n \ \o u \chi, \ \eta \acute{m} o n \ \alpha \acute{u} t o n \ \epsilon \pi \acute{e} \mu e \lambda \acute{o} \acute{u} \acute{m} e n o i, \ \i o \acute{m} e n o i \ \delta e — k a i \ \pi o t \ \acute{a} \ \alpha \acute{u} t o \ \pi o i e \ \acute{a} \nu \theta \acute{r} \acute{o} \acute{p} o s; \ \acute{a} r \ \i o t a n \ \tau o n \ \alpha \acute{u} t o u \ \epsilon \pi \acute{e} \mu e \lambda \acute{e} \iota \acute{a}, \ \tau o t e \ \k a i \ \alpha \acute{u} t o u; \ \Lambda \Lambda. \ \E m o i \ \gamma o \acute{u} \acute{n} \ \delta o k e i.\]

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[Socr.] Well then, what does it mean to cultivate oneself—I’m afraid we often think we’re cultivating ourselves when we’re not—when does a man do that? Is he cultivating himself when he cultivates what he has? [Alc.] I think so, anyway.

Here we see Socrates confronting Alcibiades with the question, “What is caring for oneself?” He suggests that most suppose that they are caring for themselves,
but instead are often caring for their possessions rather than the self. Socrates is making a distinction between the parts of the body and the things that the body puts on either to conceal or adorn itself. He illustrates this distinction with examples that resonate with Alcibiades’ preoccupation with his conventional goods by asking him whether caring for things of the feet, such as caring for shoes, is the same as caring for the feet, or caring for a ring of the finger is caring for the finger. Alcibiades is not able to answer the question because he does not understand the distinction Socrates is making (Alc. 1 127e9-128b4). To help the matter along, Socrates clarifies what constitutes care. To care rightly for something is to make it better (128b5-10). The art that makes shoes better, or cares for shoes, is σκυτική (“shoemaking,” 128b11-c3). By this art we care for shoes rather than feet, but we make the feet better by that art through which we make the whole body better, γυμναστική (“athletics,” 128c3-d2). Thus, there are different arts by which one cares for oneself and by which one cares for the things of oneself (128d3-5).

Socrates is inviting Alcibiades not only to consider the art that would make himself better, but to appreciate that “care” necessarily prioritizes the way it goes about making X better in the same way as the soul prioritizes among goods of the body and its possessions. The order of priority, which goes from part to whole, is the topic of Socrates’ questions:

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἔγνωμεν ἂν ποτε τίς τέχνη ὑπόθημα βέλτιον ποιεῖ, μὴ εἰδότες ὑπόθημα; -ΑΛ. Ἀδύνατον. -ΣΩ. Όδέ γε τίς τέχνη δακτυλίους βέλτιους ποιεῖ, ἄγνοοντες δακτύλιον. -ΑΛ. Ἀληθῆ. -ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; τίς τέχνη βέλτιω ποιεῖ αὐτόν, ἢ ἂν ποτε γνοίμεν ἄγνοοντες τί ποτ’ ἐσμέν αὐτοῖ; (Pl. Alc. 1 128e4-11)

[Socr.] Now if we didn’t know what a shoe was, would we have known what skill makes a shoe better? [Alc.] No, we couldn’t have. [Socr.] Nor would we have known what skill makes a ring better if we didn’t know what a ring was. [Alc.] True. [Socr.] Well then, could we ever know what skill makes us better if we didn’t know what we were?

The assumption is that an art makes its subject matter better; the art of X makes X better, so the art of shoemaking makes shoes better rather than feet better. What is at issue is which art, if any, makes the self better. Socrates returns to the need to know oneself. Socrates asks if such knowledge is easy and for everyone, or difficult and not for all. Alcibiades wanders in his thought about whether such knowledge is for everyone or quite difficult (Alc. 1 128e10-129a10). Alcibiades’ confusion connects with his ambivalence about caring for himself. Socrates goes on to say:
Tell me, how can we come to know the self itself? Maybe this is the way to find out what we ourselves are—maybe it's the only possible way.

The ambiguity in the phrase “the self itself” is interesting. The most plausible reading for the argument being made, which is that the soul is the true self and must be cultivated in order for one to direct properly the body and its possessions, is that “the self itself” is the best part of oneself: that is, the soul under the influence of wisdom.

Socrates employs several other examples for Alcibiades to illustrate that the true self or soul is different from what the soul uses. One such example that Alcibiades seems to grasp is Socrates’ distinction between τὸ διαλέγεσθαι (“discoursing”) and τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι (“using speech,” Alc. 1 129b4-d3). Socrates illustrates the distinction by reflecting on what they are presently doing: that is, exercising λόγος, to indicate what using is and what the self is. Using λόγος pertains both to the answerer or the questioner; but saying things, that is, discoursing, pertains more to the answerer. Thus, although the soul may use λόγος, perhaps to talk idly, or use λόγος to express itself in authentic ways, the soul is distinct from what it uses.

Socrates now turns to other things that get used, especially the body. In discussing the body we see that it is what he primarily distinguishes from the soul. It is this distinction that resumes his initial promise of listing Alcibiades’ qualities starting with his body and ending with his soul (Alc. 1 104a1-4). The remainder of the dialogue is concerned with the soul as the ἀρχονσα (“ruling element,” 130a3-4) of the body and its possessions.

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17 We are sympathetic to Denyer [4] 211-13 in emphasizing that the soul, the best part of oneself, is the Form of the body. D. M. Johnson, “God As the True Self: Plato’s Alcibiades I,” AncPhil 19 (1999) 1-19 argues that Socrates is not referring to a form or to the intellectual part of the soul but to God. The soul is identified with God. If Johnson’s interpretation is correct, would it not suggest that Alcibiades Major may be the musings of a Middle Platonist? Although the Middle Platonists cannot be defined as a school, the idea of becoming like God unified their interpretation of Plato’s texts. However, J. Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New (Ithaca 1999) 52-71 points out that the passage famous for this idea, and foundational for the Middle Platonists, comes from the Theaetetus (176a8-b2). Interestingly, Johnson does not mention the passage as indirect proof of Plato’s authorship of Alcibiades Major.

18 In the passage considered from the Meno (87e3-88e4), Socrates uses the Greek word ἔγονεμένης (“directed”) to describe what the soul does in relation to conventional goods. It can direct harmfully or beneficially, depending on whether or not wisdom is present within the soul. In the section we are considering here from Alcibiades Major, Socrates does not use
Continuing his discussion of things that can be used, Socrates informs Alcibiades that the shoemaker not only uses his instruments such as knives but also uses his hands and eyes (129d4-e2). So the shoemaker will be different from the hands and eyes which he uses, and if a human being uses the entire body, the human will differ from this (129e3-8). The human uses the body and so differs from it. The question that remains is what then is the human? Socrates answers that the human is soul, and the soul rules the body by using it (129e9-130c7). The arts, on the other hand, that care for the body are caring for things of oneself rather than oneself. And the arts that care for possessions of the body are even further from caring for oneself. When Alcibiades exploits the conventional goods he excels at, he is caring for the body rather than for things of himself. Socrates’ purpose here is to discredit Alcibiades’ preoccupation with conventional goods by reorienting his perspective towards the appropriate ranking of his priorities. This reorientation of perspective is captured in the following exchange:

ΣΩ. Ἡστις δὲ γε τὰ χρήματα, οὐθ’ ἐαυτὸν οὕτε τὰ ἐαυτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐτὶ πορρωτέρῳ τῶν ἐαυτοῦ; -ΑΛ. Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ. -ΣΩ. Ὅθ’ τὰ συντοῦ ἀρα ἐτὶ πράττει ὁ χρηματιστής. -ΑΛ. Ὅρθως.

(Pl. Alc. 1 131b13-c4)

[Socr.] And isn’t someone who takes care of his wealth caring neither for himself nor for what belongs to him, but for something even further away?
[Alc.] I agree. [Socr.] So the money-earner is not, in fact, doing his own work.
[Alc.] Right.

There is nothing more conventionally good than money-making, and we see Socrates turning Alcibiades completely away from it and all the other goods he excels at. The only thing that Alcibiades is left with now is his true self, the soul, and its need for wisdom to rule appropriately the conventional goods he excels at. The prioritizing effect the rule of wisdom will necessarily have within Alcibiades’ soul is again captured by Socrates’ advice to the jury in the Apology:

Ὦκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετή γίγνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντᾶ καὶ ἱδία καὶ δημοσία.

(Pl. Ap. 30b2-4)

Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and everything else good for men, both individually and collectively.

the same word to describe the relation that the soul has to conventional goods (the body and its possessions). Although this is the case, the relation of the soul to conventional goods in both dialogues is to command, lead, or rule them. The connotation in both dialogues is the same.
Happiness and priorities are the overarching ideas that make Plato’s *Apology* and *Alcibiades Major* natural complements to each other. It has been shown that Socrates’ testing, exhortation, and examination is designed to facilitate the proper ordering of priorities both in the city and the individual. Athens excels at many conventional goods that distinguish it from other Greek and non-Greek city-states, but Athens is only apparently happy because it mishandles its conventional goods due to the lack of concern for the role of wisdom in upholding the welfare of the city. Alcibiades excels at many conventional goods that distinguish him from his fellow Athenians, but he sees his conventional goods as being the best part of himself. Under Socrates’ guidance, Alcibiades is reluctantly brought around to the realization that the best part of himself is not the conventional goods he excels at, but his soul. Only the soul under the guidance of wisdom can rule effectively both the body and the city. We have also noted the shared arguments in both dialogues due to their similar aims, and shared content due to their eudaemonistic perspective. What we may gain from pairing the *Apology* and *Alcibiades Major* is a better understanding of the challenge to philosophy that conventional goods pose. Hubris animated by wealth and power often perverts the ends that the virtuous life must seek. In both dialogues, we witness the resourceful Socrates using as means the interlocutor’s love of wealth and power in order to reorient him towards true ends. The dialogues thereby are unified in the ability to communicate on various levels.
THE DESCENT OF STYLE IN CICERO’S BRUTUS

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Abstract. One important innovation of Cicero’s Brutus is the way in which it represents the transmission, reception, and development of oratorical skills. Cicero dismantles and transforms existing family rhetoric of descent by using traditional vocabulary describing talent and familial influence in new ways. He emphasizes the possibility of learning from and differentiating oneself from age-mates and colleagues within the same generation. The result is an incipient republican aesthetic of oratory.

This essay examines one significant strand of the literary and cultural logic of Cicero’s history of oratory, Brutus: its way of representing style’s “descent,” that is, the transmission and receipt of oratorical skills across generations. I do not try to gauge Cicero’s politics in the 50s and 40s BC, nor am I concerned with the “Atticist controversy.” Instead, I attempt to appreciate Cicero’s subtle plan, namely the transformation of ideas of descent of style


2 The two styles, “plain” and “grand,” are at the heart of Cicero’s portrayal of orators in Brutus, in ways that support my thesis. I am in general agreement with Narducci [1] 114-33, with literature survey. Narducci [1] 120 correctly sees Atticism as a phenomenon whose “archaeology” (in the Foucauldian sense) needs more scholarly attention. Atticists such as Calvus offer an alternative “classicism” to that of Cicero: see Narducci [1] 128, 130, 132f.. For a reassessment, see J.-M. David, Le Patronat judiciaire au dernier siècle de la République romaine (Rome 1992).
within a work that forms an important part of his progetto culturale. The political ramifications of these ideas will be clear.3

In Brutus, Cicero, in his trademark wry, urbane dialogue, portrays oratory as a powerful4 art rooted in audience response and dependent on diligent practice and systematic training.5 Progress, he argues, has been made in this art

3 Narducci [1] coins this term in his title and throughout his book. Strasburger [1] 29 sees Brutus as the first in a series of philosophical and rhetorical works written in reaction to Caesar’s dictatorship; I do not disagree, but in this essay I discuss Cicero’s equally interesting micro-political cosmos.

4 More powerful than it was, during the period in which he was writing—Cicero’s vision of oratory’s expansiveness and political power was shaped by his experiences in winning large numbers of clients to himself in the Verrines, and other performances by himself and others on behalf of large groups of people during the 70s and 60s BC. His recognition that this power might now be gone for good is part of what gives Brutus its melancholy tone: see Narducci [1] 123f.

in the Latin language over time; the art is capable of being perfected. Moreover, talent in oratory is not, he argues, directly heritable: it takes enormous focused practice, and *ingenium* ("innate intelligence," "talent"), and achievement in it is not in the end attributable to birth or nobility. These ideas, simple though they seem, were an implicit attack on an aristocratic governing ideal: they implied that the lines of power of successful oratory (and therefore of successful political action) were not primarily birth-based. Cicero presents his challenge by introducing and developing new metaphors from agriculture and the visual arts for the process of developing one’s artistic skills and passing them on. He dismantles the existing rhetoric of descent by using in new ways the vocabulary of talent, ancestry, and family influence; he emphasizes the possibility of learning from and differentiating oneself from one’s age-mates and colleagues within the same generation.

*Deconstructing the Scribonii Curiones*

As one might expect, Cicero sometimes uses familial descent in *Brutus* to explain the passing on of skills:6 sons benefit from their fathers’ competencies

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6 The following discussion is based on the idea of Douglas [5], which I consider to be substantially correct, that *Brutus* is organized by orators’ birth dates, as they were being researched, discovered, debated and revised by Atticus, Cicero, and other friends, during the
and from those of their grandfathers. Domesticae disciplinae ("familial specialities," Brut. 98.1-3), like knowledge of civil law, are acknowledged to be an advantage to an orator. But the father/son relationship is not presented as terribly effective in producing or nurturing good orators. Only seventeen fathers and sons who are both orators are explicitly mentioned in the dialogue, disregarding conventional uses of the patronymic and naming of fathers or sons purely for purposes of identification. No son is said to have surpassed his father in oratory. In the few instances where the son really was probably a better orator than his father, for example P. Scipio, the son of Africanus maior (77), C. Gracchus (126), and Cato Uticensis (222), the father’s skill is artificially exalted to compensate, and the son’s achievements artificially lowered. Scipio, whose writings showed talent, is praised after his father has been called (on no

7 Fathers whose legal knowledge benefited their sons: P. Mucius Scaevola, cos. 133 BC (Cic. Brut. 98); C. Aculeo (264); Brutus’ father (222), and the father of M. Brutus M. f. (130, 175). The identity of this M. Brutus is a vexed question: W. Will, in NP 6 col. 60 [1.9], represents him as M. Iunius Brutus. But this seems to be an oversimplification and possibly a conflation. F. Münzer, RE 10 cols 972f. s.v. “Iunius 52” identifies him as the father of Brutus the Liberator (tribune of the plebs in 83 BC); cf. Plut. Brut. 4.1-3; Pomp. 64.3. As legate of M. Aemilius Lepidus, this Brutus was executed in 76 BC on the orders of Pompey, according to Plutarch (Brut. 4.1; Pomp. 16.3f.; cf. Cic. Att. 9.14.2.1-4). A. W. Zumpt (ed.), Commentationes Epigraphicae 1-2 (Berlin 1850-1854) 1.245, and M. Tullii Ciceronis Orationes Tres de Lege Agraria (Berlin 1861) 133, identifies M. Brutus with the Marian praetor of 88 BC, who as tribune founded the Cinnan colony at Capua before Sulla’s return in 83 BC; but Cicero is our only source for this colony, and the identification is not secure (Leg. Agr. 2.76, 2.86-97). See esp. P. B. Harvey, Cicero’s Orations De Lege Agraria: Studies and Essays with a Commentary on the Third Oration (PhD diss. Pennsylvania 1972) 83; “Cicero, Consius and Capua: 2 Cicero and M. Brutus’ Colony,” Athenaeum 60 (1982) 145-61. The fact that Cicero does not call M. Brutus by the name of pater (“father”) when speaking to Brutus in the dialogue may unfortunately swing in either direction, since this M. Brutus is clearly not considered to be a reputable character by Cicero. Q. Fulvius Nobilior, the son of M. Fulvius Nobilior (cos. 189), is said to have gained his taste for literature from his father, who was the patron of Ennius (Brut. 79.8-11) and a learned commentator on and editor of the Fasti. C. Curio pater learned good diction from his home environment (213.8-10); his father, C. Curio avus (“grandfather”), was illustris orator (“a brilliant orator,” 122.4f).
apparent evidence) *non infantem* (“not an awful speaker,” 77.4). Cicero adds that the son *in primis habitus esset disertus* (“would have been held to be among the most eloquent,” 77.6) if he had not been sickly. C. Gracchus might have equaled the glory of his father or grandfather (in attainment of public office, not oratory\(^8\)) had he lived. The younger Cato (222), whose father was clearly not an orator (118), is picked out as the only truly eloquent Stoic without reference to his father’s speaking ability. The great majority of examples shows sons and fathers whose oratorical skill is roughly equivalent (and generally not high),\(^9\) or sons who fall short of their fathers and grandfathers in eloquence, morals or both.\(^10\) At best, fathers give sons some specialized tools: knowledge of civil law, love of literature, neat diction. At worst, sons of eloquent fathers abuse their legacy (e.g., M. Brutus, 130.6-12).\(^11\) Conversely, if a man displays oratorical genius in *Brutus*, his father is not given direct credit.

This is a sharp contrast with older norms of Roman educational practice among the nobility. Emphasis on technical education is always a challenge to nepotism. The new vision reflects some of the contemporary, “democratizing” ideals of the so-called *tirocinium fori* that shaped Cicero himself—and which his own representations of his education in *Brutus*, *Orator*, and *De Oratore* have in turn shaped. Cicero’s descriptions in these works of his own relationships with his mentor, L. Crassus, and his youthful protégés, including M. Caelius and young Octavian, sometimes offer a vivid picture of parts of

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\(^8\) C. Gracchus’ father, Tiberius Gracchus (*cos.* 177 and 163, *cens.* 169), is called *civem cum gravem tum etiam eloquentem* (“a citizen both dignified and eloquent”); Cicero mentions his speech before the Rhodians (*Brut.* 79.1-4; cf. Diod. Sic. 31.17, 31.28; *Polyb.* 30.7f., 30.27, 31.1, 31.3.4, 31.19f.; see Broughton [5] 438; Douglas [5]). But Cicero elsewhere comments that he was *homo prudent et gravis, haudquaquam eloquens* (“a wise and dignified man, but hardly eloquent,” *De Or.* 1.38.7). Cicero does not mention C. Gracchus’ grandfather.

\(^9\) That is, the Q. Catuli (*Cic. Brut.* 133.5-34.5); M. Marcellus and his son P. Lentulus Marcellinus (136.6f.); P. and C. Popillius (son with father [95.1-3]; anecdote about an earlier ancestor, P., for whom there was no written evidence of speaking ability [56], and may be referred to obliquely [95]); and L. Aemilius Paullus and Scipio Aemilianus (77.3-7, 80.1-3).

\(^10\) C. Sulpicius Galba (*Cic. Brut.* 127), whose father Servius is praised highly (82.4-14); M. Brutus (130.6-12); Curio pater (213.8-14.3), whose father was *illustris orator* (122.4-9); C. Carbo (221.1-5), whose father is both praised and referred to (221.2) in the same words (*illius eloquentissimi viri filius*, “son of that most eloquent man”) as was Servius Sulpicius Galba (127.1f.); also note Q. Aelius Tubero, *nepos* of L. Aemilius Paullus (117).

\(^11\) The treatment of P. Crassus (*Brut.* 98) is a good example of one of Cicero’s common criticisms: mediocre talent with family support. In contrast, teachers and mentors, including even prominent Greek philosophers, are regularly given credit for nurturing the brilliance of their students, who frequently excelled their teachers in oratory. Cicero’s Greek education is detailed (310-16); Hortensius’ Greek teacher Meneclius is described (326).
Cicero’s ideas about “apprenticeship.” We have little other evidence for the training of orators during this period. The “democratic” political slant of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is interesting in this regard, but does not necessarily reflect the micro-politics of apprenticeship.12

This is nowhere clearer than in the treatment of the *Scribonii Curiones*, a grandfather/father/son trio well known as a family of successful orators and politicians (Plin. *HN* 7.133.4-7; Schol. Bob. [*In P. Clodia et C. Curionem*]).13 Father and son were sometimes friends, and sometimes enemies, of Cicero. The father defended Clodius in 61 BC in the *Bona Dea* trial, but also was consistently anti-Caesarian. Cicero had attempted for a while to take the son under his wing. Despite a general recognition of the speaking talent of each of the three, Cicero portrays this family in *Brutus* as an oratorical and political failure.14 Thanks to the ordering principles of the dialogue, discussion of the *Curiones* takes place in widely divergent sections of the text. Each of the three is treated in isolation, with family influence mentioned as having to do with public acceptance and basic Latinity, not oratorical skill.

Cicero calls the grandfather, Curio *avus*,15 *illustris orator* (*Brut.* 122.4f.); he applies the words *nobilis* (“noble,” 122.7) and *splendor* (“magnificence,” 124.7) to his speeches and his social standing. Cicero goes so far as to claim that he himself as a young man thought Curio’s speech *Pro Ser. Fulvio de Incestu*16 to be *omnium optima* (“the best of all speeches,” 122.7-9), a noble oration that he had almost memorized; Cicero as character coyly adds that it *vix iam compararet in hac turba novorum voluminum* (“now has almost disappeared amid this throng of recent books”)—that is, of Cicero’s own speeches! Cicero could

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14 The tendency becomes even more clear when one compares the relatively favorable account of Curio *pater’s* oratory included by Cicero in another work: *eloquentissimus temporibus illis* (“the most eloquent of that time,” *De Or.* 2.98.6-14); cf. Sen. *Ep.* 114.13.4f.; Tac. *Dial.* 37.3.

15 F. Münzer, *RE* (s. 2) 2 col. 861 s.v. “Scribonius 9.”

16 Douglas [5] 100 suggests that this could have been “the case in which L. Crassus appeared in 113”—which would nicely suit the fact that Cicero seems to have thought it a classic, since Crassus could have offered it to him to study. Cf. (agreeing) E. Gruen, *Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts 149-78 BC* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968) 129f.
possibly have been able to quote the speech. Cicero continues with critical remarks, and concludes by marveling that the man *cum et vita suppeditavisset et splendor ei non defuisse, consulem non fuisse* (“was never consul, since he lived long enough, and did not lack brilliance,” *Brut.* 124.6f.).

Father and son, although Curio *pater* achieved the consulship as his father had not, do not receive similarly positive comments. Speaking, after much intervening text, of Curio *pater*, Cicero explains his popularity, but voices his own dissent:

Erant tamen, quibus videretur illius aetatis tertius Curio, quia splendidioribus fortasse verbis utebatur et quia Latine non pessume loquebatur usus credo aliquo domestico. nam litterarum admodum nihil sciebat; sed magni interest quos quisque audiat cotidie domi, quibuscum loquatur a pupero, quem ad modum patres paedagogi matres etiam loquantur.

(Cic. *Brut.* 210)

Nonetheless, there were those who thought that Curio was the third [great orator after Cotta and Sulpicius] of that era, because he made use of ornate words and because his Latin was not the worst, due, of course, to a certain style he picked up at home. For he knew absolutely nothing about literature; but it makes a great deal of difference who one listens to daily at home, with whom one speaks from the time one is a child, how fathers, teachers, and even mothers speak.

Here, what virtue Curio *pater* had is attributed to his household, though his father died when he was young. In criticizing Curio *pater*, Cicero even flies in the face of his own sometime dictum (*Brut.* 184-93) and claims that Curio was not a successful orator despite significant crowd approval. Curio’s virtue was that he spoke good Latin, and this was due to the good influence of his *domus*. Thus Cicero affirms the possibilities of the *domus*, but hastens to add that Curio’s own self-imposed ignorance thwarted this good start:

Similiter igitur suspicor, . . . Curionis, etsi pupillus relictus est, patrio fuisse instituto puro sermone adsuefactam domum; et eo magis hoc iudico, quod

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17 The only known fragment of the speech *pro Fulvio* is found in Cic. *Inv. Rhet.* 1.80.13-15; the formulation is similar to Cic. *Rhet. Her.* 2.33.1-8, and the idea became a rhetorical stock illustration; see Douglas [5] 100.


19 For the idea compare Cicero’s description of P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, *cos.* 131, *qui et ingenio valuit et studio et habuit quasdam etiam domesticas disciplinas* (“who had both talent and enthusiasm, and also certain good [speaking] habits from home,” *Brut.* 98.2f.).
neminem ex his quidem, qui aliquo in numero fuerunt, cognovi in omni genere honestarum artium tam indoctum tam rudem. nullum ille poetam noverat, nullum legerat oratorem, nullam memoriam antiquitatis coniugerat; non publicum ius, non privatum et civile cognoverat.  
(Cic. Brut. 213.8-14.3)

Therefore, in a like way, I suspect that, . . . even though he was left an orphan, Curio’s house had been steeped in a pure style of speech because of his father’s custom; and I think this all the more because I know of no one, at least among a certain group, so uneducated, so ignorant of every type of gentlemanly art. He knew no poet, had read no orator, had picked up no knowledge of ancient history; he didn’t understand public law, or private law, or civil law.

Ironically for an orphan, Curio pater must have acquired his Latin-speaking ability from his home environment, effortlessly: for he had not actively pursued any studies at all. In the humorous vignette that follows, Cicero claims that a large and related failing of Curio was his lack of memory. Curio’s actual ingenium is called immemor (“forgetful,” Brut. 218.1), a comment on his relationship to his father’s brilliant tradition. Curio is held responsible for having isolated himself from his father’s oratorical legacy.

On Curio filius Cicero bestows mild praise. Cicero nods to the strength of the domus as it surfaced in the young Curio’s natural ingenium: atque hic parum a magistris institutus naturam habuit admirabilem ad dicendum; industriam non sum expertus, studium certe fuit (“moreover, although [Curio] had not been instructed at all by teachers, he had a wondrous natural talent for speaking; I do not know about his diligence, but he certainly had enthusiasm,” Brut. 280.6-9). Except indirectly by the allusion to his natura, there is no mention of the younger Curio’s family, or father—a tacit criticism of Curio pater that he had not given instruction to his son. One notices that avus, pater, and filius never seem to meet in Brutus: Curio pater learned from his “home environment” (shaped by his father, but as an orphan), and the young Curio was

20 Cicero brushes aside by means of a concessive clause the objection that Curio pater had not had the benefit of hearing and learning from his father’s speech, since he was orphaned at an early age: the house itself was steeped in pure speech; Curio’s faults were his own.

21 F. Münzer, RE (s. 2) 2 cols 867-76 s.v. “Scribonius 11”; David [2] 391, 398 (but not included in the book’s Notices). Elsewhere, Cicero is not so kind, attacking Curio filius as effeminate or weak (filiola Curionis, “Curio’s little daughter,” Att. 1.14.5.4). He was a friend of M. Antonius (Cic. Phil. 2.44.8-46.7). Both Antonius and Curio were one-time admirers, auditeurs but not disciples, of Cicero: see David [2] 391. Father and son were enemies of Cicero beginning in 61 BC (the year of the father’s censorship), when they supported Clodius on the charge of desecration of the Bona Dea rites.
not given systematic instruction by his father or anyone else (disregarding Cicero himself). The praise of Curio *filius* is followed by an attack on his politics\(^{22}\) that makes use of a brief appeal to Curio’s anti-Caesarian father, as well as his other male ancestors (281.1-10).

Cicero connects Curio *filius*’ sad change of politics directly with another wayward young man’s neglect of his ancestors: P. Crassus was another of Cicero’s failed young upper-class protégés.\(^{23}\) Despite Cicero’s urging, Crassus had followed the wrong *exempla*, namely those of Cyrus and Alexander, and became *L. Crassi et multorum Crassorum . . . dissimillimus* (“absolutely unlike . . . L. Crassus and the many Crassi [of his family],” *Brut.* 282.11f.). Curio *filius* likewise should have ascended the *cursus honorum* as his father had done. His and the young Crassus’ failure to imitate their own ancestors is an egregious sign of the failure of the noble family to pass on oratorical skill and political virtue from father to son. This self-destruction of an ideal oratorical family vividly illustrates Cicero’s sharp critique of aristocratic patrilineage as an ideology in *Brutus*. Cicero has taken a family proverbial by Pliny’s time for its unbroken legacy of oratory, and tried to break that incipient reputation by separating its members from one another and criticizing the speaking styles of the second and third generations, with whom he had personal feuds, mercilessly.

In contrast stands Cicero’s treatment of another family, one with which he was quite familiar. In the middle of the discussion of the abominable Curio *pater*, Cicero digresses:

> legimus epistulas Corneliae matris Gracchorum: apparat filios non tam in gremio educatos quam in sermone matris. auditus est nobis Laeliae C. f. saepe sermo: ergo illum patris elegantia tintam vidimus et filias eius Mucias ambas. quarum sermo mihi fuit notus, et neptes Licinius, quas nos quidem ambas, hanc vero Scipionis etiam tu, Brute, credo, aliquando audisti loquentem. Ego vero ac lubenter inquit, Brute; et eo lubentius, quod L. Crassi erat filia. Quid Crassum, inquam, illum censes istius Licinias filium, Crassi testamento qui fuit adoptatus? Summo iste quidem dicitur ingenio fuisse, inquit; et vero hic Scipio conlega meus mihi sane bene et loqui videtur et dicere. Recte, inquam, iudicas, Brute. etenim istius genus est ex ipsius


\(^{23}\) Caelius Rufus was another of Cicero’s failed young upper-class protégés: cf. E. Narducci, *Modelli etici et società: Un’ idea di Cicerone* (Pisa 1989) 210, who describes him as *un altro giovane ricco di qualità che non aveva seguito i suoi consigli, ed era stato travolto dalla foga con cui aveva cercato di bruciare le tappe del cursus honorum* (“another rich noble youth who had not followed his advice, and had been swept away by a passion that led him almost to burn down the steps of the ladder of the *cursus honorum*”). See also Narducci [above, this note] 219-25 on Cic. *Cael*.
sapientiae stirpe generatum. nam et de duobus avis iam diximus, Scipione et Crasso, et de tribus proavis, Q. Metello, cuius quattuor filii, P. Scipione, qui ex dominatu Ti. Gracchus privatus in libertatem rem publicam vindicavit, Q. Scaevola augure, qui peritissimus iuris idemque percomis est habitus. iam duorum abavorum quam est inlustre nomen, P. Scipionis qui bis consul fuit, qui est Corculum dictus, alterius omnium sapientissimi, C. Laelii! O generosam, inquit, stirpem et tamquam in unam arborem pluram genera sic in istam domum multorum insitam atque inluminatum sapientiam!

(Cic. Brut. 211.1-13.7)

I have read the letters of Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi: it is clear that the sons were brought up even more in the speaking style of their mother than they were in her warm embrace. I have often heard the speaking style of Laelia, daughter of Gaius: consequently I’ve seen that she was colored by the elegant speech of her father. [I’ve also heard] both Mucias, her daughters, whose speaking style I knew, and the granddaughters, the Licinias, both of whom I have heard—and I believe that even you, Brutus, at some point have heard the one, wife of Scipio, speaking. Indeed I have, and was very pleased, said Brutus; and all the more pleased, since she was the daughter of L. Crassus. What do you think of Crassus, I said, the son of that Licinia, who was adopted in Crassus’ testament? He is said to have been of the highest innate genius, he said; and moreover Scipio my colleague seems to me to converse and speak quite well. You’re correct, I said, in your judgement, Brutus. His blood too sprang from the tree of philosophy itself. We’ve already spoken about the two grandfathers, Scipio and Crassus, and about the three great-grandfathers: Q. Metellus, father of four famous sons, P. Scipio, who although a private citizen (and not a magistrate) set free the republic from the tyrannical rule of Ti. Gracchus, and Q. Scaevola the Augur, who was thought the most knowledgeable in law [of his day] and at the same time quite friendly and accessible. And how brilliant is the name of the two great-great-grandfathers: P. Scipio, who was twice consul, and who was called Corculus, and the other, wisest of all men, C. Laelius—O abundant tree-stem! he said. Just as many kinds of tree are grafted onto one, so is the wisdom of many grafted onto that one house!

Cicero offers this family as an alternative to the sterile patrilineal model of the Scribonii Curiones.24 After generalization about patres, paedagogi, and matres (Brut. 210.6), Cicero considers mothers who had spoken well and educated their eloquent sons. Prominent among these is Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi.

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24 Quintilian repeats and expands on Cicero’s remarks, but significantly uses as examples only Cornelia, Laelia’s sermo, and Hortensia, daughter of Hortensius (Inst. 1.1.6.4); Quintilian is not attempting, as is Cicero, to build up a family tree. Valerius Maximus tells anecdotes about three women orators, including Hortensia (8.3.3). For some evidence of Roman women’s oratory, see A. J. Marshall, “Ladies at Law: The Role of Women in the Roman Civil Courts,” in C. Deroux (ed.), Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History 5 (Brussels 1989) 35-54.
Cicero says that her children were apparently non tam in gremio educatos quam in sermone matris (“brought up even more in the speaking style of their mother than they were in her warm embrace,” 211.2f.). Cicero gives examples primarily of women whose speech was reflective of their fathers’ eloquence—for example, Laelia, daughter of C. Laelius, and the two Licinias, granddaughters of Laelia and daughters of L. Crassus (211.3-8). The patrilineal descent theory is modified and transformed by the fact that women participate in the passing on of familial talent so heavily.

The family of the Licinii Crassi, Mucii Scaevolae and Cornelii Scipiones with its abavi (“great-great-grandfathers,” Cic. Brut. 213.1-4),25 proavi (“great-grandfathers,” 212.8-11),26 and avi (212.7f.),27 as elaborated here, is a study in adoption and matrilineal descent. Brutus says of Crassus summo iste quidem dictur ingenio fuisse (“indeed he is said to have had the greatest talent,” 212.3). Brutus also estimates the speaking ability of Crassus’ house from the eloquence of Scipio, conlega meus (“Scipio, my colleague,” 212.4). Crassus’ full name was L. Licinius Crassus Scipio—he was son of Licinia and P. Scipio Nasica, and was adopted into his mother’s family by his grandfather’s will (212.1f.). Therefore, he is a part of the generosam stirpem (“noble line of descent”), the tree that has had many branches grafted onto it, but through his mother. The two avi and three proavi named are a completely matrilineal group, a family according to Cicero, but not recognized as such by Roman law and custom. Cicero has created a hybrid family of orators to serve as a model for the transmission of oratorical knowledge.

Cicero’s concluding metaphor sums up his ideology. Denying the efficacy of blood lineage for passing on speaking ability, Cicero offers an alternative: an artificially constructed, hybrid family of orators whose talent comes from an extended family, an erudite home environment, interaction and solidarity with peers and rivals, and personal devotion to the art. Oratorical education is a tree with spreading branches and roots (Brut. 213.5-7), an ever-


27 F. Münzer, RE 13 cols 252-68 s.v. “Liciuni 55” re L. Liciuni Crassus, cos. 95 BC, cens. 92 BC (see David [2] 714-16); Crassus married one of two Mucias; P. Scipio Nasica married a Metella, and their child P. Scipio Nasica then became husband to a Licinia, thereby marrying into the family of Crassus. See the chart in Douglas [5] 162.
expanding group of orators who meet each other horizontally as well as vertically, through their mothers’ families, by adoption, and by intermarriage and acquaintance—who practice and pass on their art to benefit the republic.

**New Paths of Descent**

Cicero is building a new aesthetic: he does this by transforming the existing language of familial descent, patrilineage, nobility, and adoption, utilizing these older forms of speaking in new ways, to describe relationships outside the family. He also develops new metaphorical language for the process of descent, borrowing images from agriculture, competition and rivalry, and the visual arts. Cicero envisions oratorical culture as built largely on stimulating, complementary, and non-hierarchical relationships between equal individuals. It is based on the *diligentia* (“loving diligence”) and *labor* (“hard work”) of systematic exercise more than on hereditary talent. Moreover, it is an aesthetic and artistic endeavor rooted in natural human responses to beauty.

**Transformation**

In *Brutus*, Cicero first transfers and transforms the idea of familial descent by extending it metaphorically to Hortensius (never far from Cicero’s mind in this work) and to Brutus, the Roman forum, and personified Eloquence itself. The dedication of the work to Hortensius is the first sounding of a metaphor developed throughout *Brutus*: parentage as descriptive of a relationship of loving care for a peer (or soon-to-be peer). Cicero begins his reminiscences of Hortensius at the beginning of *Brutus* with two facts about him: he was Cicero’s *amicus*, and he was his augural colleague—his co-opter—to whom Cicero owed filial duty (*in parentis eum loco colere debebam*, “I was obligated to take care of him as I would a parent,” *Brut.* 1.9). The respect Cicero accorded Hortensius is described in terms of a parent-son relationship.

Cicero speaks about Hortensius’ death as follows:

> Etenim si viveret Q. Hortensius, cetera fortasse desideraret una cum reliquis bonis et fortibus civibus, hunc autem aut praeter ceteros aut cum paucis sustineret dolorem, cum forum populi Romani, quod fuisset quasi theatrum

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28. R. Haenni, *Die litterarische Kritik in Ciceros Brutus* (Sarnen 1905) notices that individual orators are characterized even by their choice of speaking venue in *Brutus*.

29. This emphasis is prominent in Cicero’s philosophical writings, and he seems to have drawn it from Aristotle (e.g., Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1155a16-22 [8.1.3]): see Cic. *Amic.* 27, 70; *Fin.* 3.62.
Hortensius’ death is something that has “despoiled and left orphaned” the Roman forum of his magnificent and learned voice, placing Hortensius once again in the role of father. Hortensius is a symbol of oratory—to lose his voice is to lose oratory itself. A parallel loss of an orator’s voice—in this case, that of Brutus—provides the origin of the dramatic setting of the dialogue. Cicero (as character in the dialogue) claims that the discourse on orators that he and Brutus had shared in Tusculum a while back took its origin from Cicero’s praise of Brutus’ lost speech *Pro Rege Deiotaro.*\(^{30}\) Atticus remarks: *Scio, inquit, ab isto initio tractum esse sermonem teque Bruti dolentem vicem quasi deflectisse iudiciorum vastitatem et fori* (“I understand that that was the origin of the discourse, and that you, mourning Brutus’ luck, bewailed the emptiness of the law courts and the forum,” *Brut.* 21.8-10). Here the role of protective parent passes to Brutus, who modestly replies that he had not sought glory from oratory, but was content with its practice, which he would continue with the support (or perhaps on the model) of Cicero (*te praesertim tam studiosum*, “especially since you are so solicitous/enthusiastic,” 23.4f.): someone who studies oratory also studies *prudentia* (“wisdom”), needed by the state in both war and peace (23.5-8).\(^{31}\)

The image of oratory as a child or nursling in need of parental care is clarified by the warm praise of Isocrates amid the history of Greek oratory that follows. Isocrates threw open his home to be a school for Greece, and showed himself a great orator and flawless teacher *quamquam forensi luce caruit intraque parietes aluit eam gloriam, quam nemo meo quidem iudicio est postea consecutus* (“although he lacked the light of the law courts, and within the walls of his home nurtured a glory that no one, in my opinion, has ever again

\(^{30}\) On Brutus’ unsuccessful defense, Cicero reports that Caesar characterized its style as *libere* (“free-thinking”), i.e., pro-Roman republic (*Att.* 14.1.2.6). Brutus published the speech, which continued to be read and admired into the Roman empire (*Tac.* *Dial.* 21.6).

achieved,” Cic. Brut. 32.5-7). Cicero’s further remark on the flourishing of oratory at Athens brings the comment on Isocrates to its logical conclusion, and makes use once again of the image of oratory as nursling to be protected: eloquence is a companion of peace, an ally of leisure, and the child of a well established city-state (45.5). Isocrates’ genius was so great that he could nurture that child at home.

War is not conducive to good oratory. A generation that grows up amid intense war will be oratorical orphans. The point is implied (e.g., Cic. Brut. 123, 126), and is finally linked directly with Brutus (157): Brutus notes that Sulpicius’ long absence from public counsel, due to his military duties, together with Cicero’s own long absence, is to be mourned because it means that the Roman youth will not receive the benefit of a systematic introduction to oratory, but will have to glean the principles of good speaking haphazardly (itaque doleo et illius consilio et tua voce populum Romanum carere tam diu; quod cum per se dolendum est, tum multo magis consideranti, ad quos ista non translata sint, sed nescio quo pacto devenerint, “and so I grieve that the Roman people lacks both Sulpicius’ good advice and your voice for so long; which, although it is something grievous in itself, is much more of a sorrow when one considers the youth to whom these things have not been handed down in any regular way, but who have had them fall down upon them haphazardly,” 157.1-5). The young will not have received regular instruction from Sulpicius and Cicero—they will learn the art of politics haphazardly. At this point, the character Atticus reminds the character Cicero that he had agreed at the outset not to speak about politics, emphasizing the theme of suppressed mourning that runs through the dialogue (157; cf. 266). When Cicero for the last time takes up this theme of mourning, he develops the image of orphanhood and parental love and responsibility most fully, calling upon Brutus to serve with him as a responsible tutor (“guardian”) to the orphan eloquentia (“eloquence”):

Nos autem, Brute, quoniam post Hortensi clarissimi oratoris mortem orbae eloquentiae quasi tutores relictum sumus, domi teneamus eam saeptam liberali custodia, et hos ignotos atque impudentes procos repudiemus tueamurque ut adultam virginem caste et ab amatorum impetu quantum possumus prohibeamus.

(Cic. Brut. 330.1-6)

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32 When Cicero describes earlier Roman oratory (Brut. 53-55), almost every speaker is famous for creating a civil peace or avoiding an external war. Cicero later uses the same imagery (330).


34 Gowing [1] 48f., 52.
But we, Brutus, since we are left, as it were, guardians of Eloquence, who was orphaned after the death of Hortensius, the most brilliant orator: let us keep her at home, enclosed within the walls in an honorable custody, and let us turn back these ignorant and arrogant suitors so that we keep her a chaste maiden as she grows up and as much as we can protect her from the onslaught of lovers.35

Eloquentia must be walled in and cherished at home, saeptam (“enclosed”; cf. intraque parietes, “within the walls,” about Isocrates, Cic. Brut. 32.5), and be protected from the wrong suitor (cf. iurisprudentia, “legal knowledge,” as virgo indotata, “an undowried maiden,” Cic. De Or. 1.234-36 esp. 1.234.4). Ultimately, eloquentia must be given over to a husband and assume the responsibility of producing the next legitimate generation of orators. Under the impossible political circumstances of Caesar’s ascendancy, no such husband can be had. The best that Cicero and Brutus can do is to nurture the orphan girl-child at home and to hope for a time when the right kind of oratory can thrive.

In Brutus, the language describing oratory uses terms for aristocratic lineage and wealth in a technical sense: speaking virtues include elegantia (“elegance”), splendor (“brilliance”), gravitas (“dignity”), ornatus (“ornament”), subtilitas (“precision”), copia (“abundance”), amplitude (“fullness”), ubertas (“fruitfulness”), and auctoritas (“political command/authority”) belong to good speakers and speeches regardless of an orator’s social rank. Orators who achieve these virtues without having imbibed them through an aristocratic background are lauded emphatically, for example, Q. Pompeius, an excellent orator who achieved the highest offices sine ulla commendatione maiorum (“without any commendation from his ancestors,” 96.7-9). Cicero adjusts the language of aristocracy also by using the term nobilis to describe mainly speeches36 and non-nobles (99.3f., 169.9; nobilis oratio, “beautiful speech,” 122.7; causae nobiles, “well known [advocacy] cases,” 318.2; cf. poetae nobiles, “excellent poets,” 3.2f.; [oratores] nobiles, “excellent/well known orators,” 99.8f.).37 There are few uses of the term nobilis in Brutus to designate “a senator of consular rank or one whose family had had

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36 Similarly, the approximately thirty uses of elegans, elegantia, and (per)elegantanter are confined to the speech or life of nobiles (not to the people themselves). The use may be related to the second century BC evolution of the word elegans and its derivatives: B. Krostenko, Cicero, Catullus, and the Language of Social Performance (Chicago 2001) 34-39.
37 The Academic philosopher Antiochus is nobilissimus, and the rhetoric teacher Demetrius of Syria is non ignobilis (Cic. Brut. 315.2f.; 315.6f.).
a consul, dictator, or consular tribune)—and those uses are critical or hostile. L. Philippus and C. Claudius are mentioned—one notoriously bested in oratory by a non-nobilis (Philippus, 166.3-5), the other not a good speaker (Claudius, 166.6-8). They are sandwiched between the equites M. Herennius and C. Titius, who are praised (166.1-5, 167). Cicero discusses the suspect nature of many of the orations kept as “history” and proof of nobilitas (“noble rank”) in Roman aristocratic houses (62). C. Sulpicius Gallus is praised as qui maxume omnium nobilium Graecis litteris studuit (“who most of all the nobles studied Greek literature,” 78.4) subtly implying that there were non-nobiles who were more studious. The only exception is L. Brutus, founder of the republic, who is called illi nobilitatis vestrae principi (“that famous founder of your [Brutus’] nobilitas,” 53.1f.).

Cicero transforms ingenium into a quality that develops slowly, over time, and is affected by family, life circumstances, and diligence. Reading the speeches of C. Gracchus will refine an already existing oratorical sensibility in a young person, and will nurture the beginnings of one in someone who as yet lacks it (Brut. 126.7-10; cf. 59.5-7, about Cethegus). Cicero speaks of augendi (“increasing”) one’s ingenium (104.8) and, about M. Brutus, of degeneravisse (“to have become non-noble,” 130.12). For Cicero, ingenium is an embodiment of the qualities in a person that are susceptible to being developed and improved upon by education, training, and practice, or warped or broken down by depraved desires or neglect.

A weak ingenium may be compensated for by industria (“diligence”) and labor (“hard work”). Cicero berates well born but lazy orators (Brut. 91.8-10, on orators who do not write out their speeches for posterity because of the hard work involved; cf. 228.1-5, on Sisenna’s lack of diligence), and praises diligent


39 On the predominance of aristocratic memoirs from the aristocracy in the first century BC, see E. Rawson, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (Baltimore 1985) 227f.; on suspect “histories” kept in noble houses, see 231f.

40 Cicero regards ingenium as composed of separate parts: he names memoria (“memory,” Brut. 217.8) and mens (“reasoning,” 219.12) as the custos (“guardian”) of the other parts of the ingenium (219.9f.).

41 The same applies to the synonymous term acumen (“sharpness”): habuit a natura genus quoddam acuminis quod etiam arte limaverat . . . (“he had naturally a certain kind of sharpness, which he had also polished through technique,” 236.3f., about M. Piso, nobilis).
ones. For instance, he claims that M. Scaurus (a nobilis) was not a good speaker, but made up for it through industria (110.2-7). He then summarizes Scaurus’ utterly apparent fides (“trustworthiness,” 112.3-5) and natural auctoritas (“influence,” 111.4-6): habebat hoc a natura ipsa, quod a doctrina non facile posset (“he had from his nature what he could not easily gain from theory,” 112.5f.).

This description of Scaurus reveals tension between Cicero’s broad understanding of ingenium, which places emphasis on hard work, and its more usual meaning of innate superiority passed on biologically. In general, Cicero’s version of oratory recognizes no birth-superiority: Arrius is an exception (Brut. 243). Being himself one of those sine ulla commendatione maiorum, (a man who gained recognition on his own merits, and “without any commendation from his ancestors,” Brut. 96.7-9), Cicero speaks frequently of noster ordo (“my [senatorial] class”) in Brutus and elsewhere. Moreover, he makes great claims for the oratory of such relative nonentities as the Italian orator T. Betutius Barrus Asculanus, whose speech at Rome against Q. Caepio he calls nobilis, pointing out mischievously that the patrician Caepio (literally a nobilis) did not write his own speech in response, but used one written for him (169.6-10).

New Fields

Cicero develops new ways of speaking about the descent of oratory from one person to another, from one generation to the next, by extending already existing metaphors from both his Greek and Latin rhetorical training. He takes the implicit metaphor of inborn ingenium combined with the idea behind flos (“flower,” Brut. 16.3-6, 58.12, 233.8-12), the conventional Latin translation of the Greek κόσμος λέξεως (“ornament of speech”), and extends it throughout Brutus to include the organic growth and development of oratory. The metaphor was not new. Cicero himself had made use a few years back of a similar set of metaphors in De Republica, speaking of the birth, growth, development, old age, and death of political states, with Greek sources before his eyes (Rep. 1.58.3, 2.3.2, 2.21.1; Polyb. 6.57.10). Moreover, terms like flos (= lumen, “ornament of speech”), copia (“abundance [of wording/material]”), ubertas

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42 In a pedantic flourish, Cicero adds that one may acquire these things from theory—even if Scaurus did not do so. Douglas [5] cites Arist. Rh. 1356a1-13 [1.2.3f.]; [Rh. Al.] 38.2.

43 Cicero, when speaking of his own oratory, modestly stresses his hard work (e.g., Brut. 233.1f.).

44 Cicero uses wording similar to the phrase (forensi) luce caruit (“[Isocrates] abstained from the light (of the forum),” Brut. 32.5) to describe his own ancestors (Leg. Agr. 2.1.11).
(“fertility”), and floridus (“elaborate,” even “overblown”) were not unknown in previous literary criticism at Rome, becoming current, some through Cicero’s own agency, as translations of Greek rhetorical ideas. But Cicero uses these and other terms evocative of biological life and growth in a new way, to build a picture of oratory as an art form that is organic and natural, and yet subject to human care and attention, the diligentia and industria that he finds so essential.

Cicero applies this metaphor early in the dialogue to his own work:

ego autem voluntatem tibi profecto emetiar, sed rem ipsam nondum posse videor; idque ut ignoscas, a te peto. nec enim ex novis, ut agricultae solent, fructibus est unde tibi reddam quod accepi—sic omnis fetus repressus exustusque flos siti veteris ubertatis exaruit—, nec ex conditis, qui iacent in tenebris et ad quos omnis nobis aditus, qui paene solis patuit, obstructus est. seremus igitur aliquid tamquam in inculto et derelicto solo; quod ita diligenter colemus, ut impendiis etiam augere possimus largitatem tui muneris: modo idem noster animus efficere possit quod ager, qui quom multos annos quievit, uberiores efferre fruges solet.

(Cic. Brut 16)

I shall certainly make you a repayment of good intentions; but I find myself unable yet to repay the debt itself: I ask your indulgence for this. For repayment of what I have received can be made neither from fresh crops, as is the way of farmers—every shoot is so severely checked, and its blossom so scorched and dried up with thirst for its former lushness—nor from crops stored up, for they lie hidden in darkness, and I who almost alone had access to them now find the entrance blocked. I shall sow something in an uncultivated and neglected soil, and tend it with such care that I shall be able even to add interest to your generous gift, if only my mind is capable of doing the same as a field which, after lying fallow for many years, usually produces even more abundant crops.

This passage is difficult to understand as it relates concretely to Cicero’s literary output. But key images emerge: the mind and creative capacity is soil and seed; literary and philosophical works are crops, and develop from ideas and jottings, shoots and young plants, into maturity, to be offered as a gift of nourishment and beauty (first fruits) to another human being. Cicero’s ability to

45 Cf. also exarescere (“to dry up”), fetus (“full,” “burgeoning”), maturitas (“ripeness”) and alere (“to nourish”), all terms that Cicero uses throughout Brutus to describe oratory and speeches.

46 Douglas [5] 10f. suggests that the passage is a replacement for the usual dedicatory preface, Cicero dedicating Brut. to Brutus, or to Atticus. But one can also see this passage as a reference to another project (e.g., Leg., or a work of history or philosophy); conditi fructus (“crops stored up,” Brut. 16.4-7) could naturally refer to works begun but not now able to be completed, e.g., Leg.
continue with his previous writing agenda is rather like having nourishing crops and plants stored up that cannot now be accessed, perhaps due to the crisis of the republic, or his own position of powerlessness: he plans, however, to find a way, perhaps through his work on philosophical texts, to work fruitfully, and to offer new crops as a gift to his peers. Growth and plant metaphors are used similarly in other places in Brutus to describe style and “richness” or “fullness,” most notably in the abundantia (“fullness”) and copia (“richness”) that Cicero notoriously desires from good orators. Here, Cicero also uses the image of organic growth to describe the gradual improvement within the art of oratory over time. The discussion of Athens contains a high density of birth and growth imagery (27-49: e.g., florere, “blossom,” 28.4f.; vigere, “flourish,” 29.2, 39.6f.; ubertas, 44.9f.; copia, 26.5f., 36.3, 44.9f.; locuples, “richly provided,” 47.7).

The idea may be at base Peripatetic, but Cicero’s use of it to explain the perfection of an art and the creative process of an individual appears to be new. He applies it to himself, mourning his lost chance at honorable retirement, and its cause. The armed civil conflict had intensified so inopportune cumque ipsa oratio iam nostra canescret habet meretque suam quandam maturitatem et quasi senectutem, tum arma sunt ea sumpta, quibus illi ipsi, qui didicerant eis uti gloriose, quem ad modum salutariter uterentur non reperiebant (“at a time when my oratory itself was growing white-haired and having its own, as it were, period of ripeness and old age,” Brut. 8.5-9). Cicero is saying that his speaking style is showing its age and coming to a τέλος: that is, an individual style of oratory can develop naturally throughout the course of a career and finally perfect itself. Just as the perfection of oratorical artistry over time was used to underline the notion that oratory is an art, not only a means to a political end, so the idea of an individual’s stylistic τέλος brings into focus the individual orator as artist. Cicero uses this imagery to argue for the primacy of a descent model

47 Narducci [1] 128 n. 97: “In un senso più vasto, il Brutus è largamente strutturato sull’idea, di ascendenza peripatetica, dell’organica maturazione dei generi letterari fino a raggiungere la pieness e la perfezione . . .” (“In a larger sense, Brutus is broadly structured on the idea, stemming from the Peripatetic school, of the organic maturation of literary genres ending in a union of fullness and perfection . . .”).

48 Cicero later turns his vocabulary once again in this direction: ieiunitatem et sicicitatem et inopiam (“thinness,” “dryness,” “poverty”) are criticisms (Brut. 285.1f.; cf. exsiccatum genus orationis, “a dried-out type of speaking,” 291.2). See also florescere (“to [begin to] blossom/flourish,” 303.8); vigescere (“to acquire strength”).

49 Narducci [47].

50 Quintilian misreads the passage prescriptively, in order to strengthen his contention that older men should adopt a calmer, more dignified style of speaking (Inst. 11.1.31). Cicero makes Quintilian’s point (Brut. 326).
that challenges and replaces the notion of an individual family inheritance (such as that of the *Scribonii Curiones*). The new model uses the imagery of nurturing and growth, grafting, and cultivation, and emphasizes the individual among his artistic peers.

Competition and rivalry in *Brutus* is generally portrayed as friendly, good for the state, and good for the development of oratory as an art. About Hortensius, Cicero says:

... dolebamque quod non, ut plerique putabant, adversarium aut obrectatorem laudum meorum sed socium potius et consorsem gloriosi laboris amiseram. etenim si in leviorum artium studio memoriae proditum est poetas nobilis poetae aequalium morte doluisse, quo tandem animo eius interitum ferre debui, cum quo certare erat gloriosius quam omnino adversarium non habere? cum praevertim non modo numquam sit aut illius a me cursus impeditus aut ab illo meus, sed contra semper alter ab altero adiutus et communicando et monendo et favendo.

*(Cic. Brut. 2.6-3.7)*

And I grieved because I had lost, not (as many believed) an opponent or detractor from my public reputation, but an ally, and a comrade in work that brings glory. And if, in our study of less weighty arts, we find the tradition that noble-hearted poets mourned at the death of their rival poets: how should I, then, bear this man’s death? To fight with him was more glory-filled than to have no adversary at all. Especially since not only did I never impede his public career, nor he mine, but on the contrary, each of us was constantly supported by the other, by sharing communications, offering salutary warnings and extending favor.

This thought foreshadows Cicero’s descriptions of friendship between politically virtuous men in *De Amicitia*, *De Officiis*, and the lost *De Gloria*. No doubt Hortensius was not Cicero’s closest friend. He had been his rival in court cases—the thirty-four-year-old Cicero had notoriously bested Hortensius, consul elect for 69 BC, in the case against Verres. But Cicero was not lying when he expressed his comradely admiration for Hortensius. His appeal to Brutus and to the dialogue’s readership rests on the idea that two public figures who are age-mates, politically virtuous, and stylistically complementary orators can shape an age, and provide a living school for the upcoming generation. The idea is developed further in Cicero’s philosophical dialogues of 45 to 43 BC. But it is in *Brutus* that he first explores its potential.

Cicero is careful to point out that Hortensius was his older colleague and sponsor (*Brut. 1.3-9*), deserving his deep respect and gratitude. But the link

\[51\] See Strasburger [1] 88f. about *gloria* (“glory”) and fame as a theme of Cicero’s *De Amicitia* and *De Officiis*. 
between them is developed as one of comradeship: *consors* ("comrade," "partner") is a term with business associations (cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.57.1f.; 2.3.155.12-14); its metaphorical range in republican prose includes the idea of sharing spiritual goods (Cic. *Mil.* 102.4f.).

Links between peers also serve to frame and structure the dialogue. Cicero chooses to commemorate Hortensius in his dedicatory opening, to portray Hortensius and himself as companions and as talented, public-spirited orators, and to introduce as *dramatis personae* himself, Atticus, and Brutus (*Brut.* 1.1-10.7). Cicero insists in his introduction on the series of literary, historical, and philosophical writings, "gifts," that link Cicero to Atticus (15.1-19.3), Brutus to Cicero (17.4-19.3), and Atticus to Brutus (17.4-19.3). The link between Cicero and Hortensius, the orator of whom Cicero later claims *itaque cum Hortensio mihi magis arbitrabar rem esse, quod et dicendi ardore eram propri et aetate coniunctior* ("and so I felt I had more in common with Hortensius [than with Cotta, the other major orator of Cicero’s youth], in both warmth of style and age," 317.6-8), developed so elaborately at the beginning, is returned to toward the end of the dialogue.

As Gowing notes, the frame should close with the dead Hortensius. Moreover, Cicero does appear at first to be doing this, placing Hortensius chronologically among his *aequales* ("peers"), and pointing out that his career spanned several distinct eras of oratory (*Brut.* 229f.). But continued discussion of Hortensius is deliberately delayed. Instead, Cicero introduces the idea that anti-Caesarian orators of note have been dying because of the Civil War, and that he and Brutus are the sole remaining wards of the state (230-32). From *Brut.* 248 on, Cicero turns to discuss living orators, ultimately pairing himself and Marcellus (248.1-49.5). He then digresses to address several important topics, all at his fellow characters’ request (249.6-64.10). Cicero portrays Brutus as deeply stirred by his admiration of Triarius and Torquatus, recently dead anti-Caesarian orators (265f.). There follows a roll call of anti-Caesarian orators who have died in the Civil War, climaxing with the living Cicero and, *finally*, the dead Hortensius (267.1-79.6). Cicero’s remark *sed redeamus ad . . . Hortensium* ("but let us return to . . . Hortensius," 279.7f.) looks back to Hortensius (cf. 230). It turns out that Cicero’s insertion of himself as similar to Marcellus

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53 Cicero portrays his dialogue as a partial response to Brutus’ “letter,” probably the treatise *De Virtute*.

54 Atticus and Brutus arrive together for a visit (Cic. *Brut.* 10.1-5), and Cicero introduces the *procurator* joke in order to reiterate the bonds of friendship that link his visitors (17.4-7).

(248f.), and Brutus’ request that he discuss his own education, have prepared
the reader for a return to the subject of Hortensius through a reflection on
Cicero’s own life.

Once again, after insertion of another digressive discussion (of Curio,
Calvus, and the Attici, Cic. Brut. 279.8-91.7), Cicero urges *sed redeamus rursus
ad Hortensium* (“let us get back to Hortensius,” 291.8). But (as author) he
postpones treatment of the topic still further by interposing Atticus’ comments
on the “Socratic irony” evident in Cicero’s enthusiasm for Cato and other older
Roman orators (292-300). This final digression allows Cicero to make the
important point that in his youth these were the only models available and they
proved to be worthwhile stylistic guides. The point leads directly into the
education of Hortensius, Cicero’s slightly older contemporary, and brings us
full circle back to the chronological positioning of Hortensius (301-07, cf.
229f.). It is clear that Cicero wants to praise Hortensius, whose span of years
gave him access to several different generations of oratorical expression, as the
pioneer in oratory: *non probabantur haec senibus—saepe videbam cum
inridentem tum etiam irascentem et stomachantem Philippum—sed mirabantur
adulescentes, multitudo movebatur* (“the elders did not approve—I often saw
Philippus mocking and getting angry and annoyed—but the young admired him
[Hortensius], and the crowd was moved,” 326.9-11). As a result, Cicero is also
able to praise himself, as having learned his craft *in spatio Q. Hortensium ipsius
vestigiis persecuti* (“following the very footsteps of Hortensius in the public
arena,” 307.9). Cicero has successfully contextualized Hortensius by
surrounding him with his contemporaries.

Cicero explains his own oratorical development by using Hortensius as a
constant touchstone, even claiming that he is describing Hortensius in order
better to describe his own education (*Brut.* 307.6-9). In his early years, he says,
Hortensius and Cotta were the chief orators that Cicero listened to in order to
develop his own style—and he was closer in spirit to Hortensius (317; cf.
307.8f.). After Cicero’s return from Rhodes, Hortensius seemed no longer
willing to be the rival that he had been before, and his delivery became
gradually worse—at first only the most discerning critics could tell (*quasi de
picturae veteris colore detraxerat, quantum non quivis unus ex populo, sed
existumator doctus et intelligens posset cognoscere,* “... as though some of the
coloring of the old painting had faded, not so much that any man in the
populace could tell, but that only a learned and discerning critic could notice,”
320.8-10). But over time, his speed and grasp of periodic structure flagged
noticeably: *longius autem procedens cum in ceteris eloquentiae partibus tum
maxume in celeritate et continuatione verborum adhaerescens sui dissimilior
videbatur fieri cotidie* (“but over time, lagging behind both in other oratorical
skills and particularly in his speed and periodicity, he seemed every day less and less like himself,” 320.11f.). In Cicero’s analysis, Hortensius stopped practicing and developing, and so, despite retaining the basics of delivery and diction, as well as his prodigious memory, 56 he did not continue to grow and mature in his style as Cicero did. Cicero attributes the revival of Hortensius’ oratorical skills to his and Cicero’s rivalry and friendship, the dynamic of which ensured that Hortensius did not want to be outdone when Cicero was appointed as consul (323). Cicero claims that they were still able to enjoy each other’s talent and company (coniunctissime versati sumus, “we are very close,” 323.7). In this passage, Cicero changes his usage of nos from designation of himself alone to designation of Hortensius and himself. Before he appeals to Brutus to preserve the orphan Eloquence (330.1-6), Cicero describes his and Hortensius’ shared grief over the republic, signaling himself and Hortensius as a pair one more time (328f.) before moving on to consider Brutus, climactically, as a partner in the same endeavor.

The Hortensius frame, in which Cicero and Hortensius stand as the pair of orators who shaped their age, is recapitulated throughout Brutus. At the end of the text, Cicero asks nonne cernimus vix singulis aetatibus binos oratores laudabiles constitisse? (“do we not perceive that for each individual age scarcely two praiseworthy orators existed?” 333.1f.). He uses this principle to create the ages of oratory that he outlines: two prominent orators define many ages, supporting one another, complementing one another’s talents, and vying with one another for good glory. The pairs named by Cicero (333) are familiar from later contexts, especially De Oratore: Cato cedes to Galba, Lepidus to Carbo; the Gracchi achieve brief greatness; Antonius and Crassus reign in their age; finally, Cotta and Sulpicius then Hortensius—with an implication that Cicero’s name should follow (although Cicero often imagines himself as stylistic successor to the pair of Cotta and Hortensius). But these pairs are not the principal ones evoked in the rest of Brutus—Cicero “tries out” pairings throughout his history of oratory.

Cicero compares himself with the contemporary orators Servius (Brut. 150.2-57.5), Marcellus (248.8-50.12; Cicero makes a similar comparison when writing to Marcellus himself, Fam. 15.9.1.6-11), Hortensius, and Brutus. He also compares himself with Pontidius and Messalla (246). In Brutus, he points out that Messalla, consul in 61 BC, is his junior (246.7f.) and an extremely careful and hard worker; elsewhere, he calls him nostri laudator, amator, imitator (“my praiser, fan and imitator,” Att. 1.14.6.2f.). Cicero and Atticus,

56 It corroborates the general position of Gowing [1] on the importance of remembrance and silence, that Cicero chose to commemorate an orator whose claim to fame was his flypaper memory.
also age-mates, are represented humorously as a complementary pair in scholarship, with Atticus responsible for the serious historical research, and Cicero responsible for the rhetorical and aesthetic presentation of it (Brut. 42.1-44.3).

Within an age, orators are presented as complementary pairs, in part due to Cicero’s desire to respond to “Atticists”: two good orators who make use of opposing styles may define an age. But, here again, Cicero defines orators aesthetically in the context of their peers and age-mates—and de-emphasizes lineage. He is aiming not to define eras, ultimately, but to explain the arena of republican oratory, and the passing on of oratorical skill, as a project of active imitation and practice rather than of passive inheritance. M. Scaurus is memorably praised for having, like Cyrus, produced memoirs of a life worthwhile for younger people to imitate (Brut. 112.8-12).

A case in point is the treatment of C. Laelius and Scipio Africanus, two figures of the second century BC who appear as characters in Cicero’s philosophical dialogues. Cicero claims that they were among the chief orators of their age (in primis eloquentes, “in the first rank of orators,” Brut. 82.2-84.7 esp. 82.2f.). But he indicates first that in that age L. Cotta was thought to be an expert orator (82.1f.); and even after indicating the prominence of Laelius and Africanus, he speaks about Galba, an orator who had been predominant in that age and whose delivery had been brilliant, but whose written speeches now seemed antiquated and “dry” (82.4-14). The reader receives an impression of Cotta and Galba as virtual age-mates, handing over, or at least sharing, their oratorical reign with the slightly younger Laelius and Scipio. The throng of orators enumerated in the previous sections adds to the picture of a fluid forum full of collegial orators of distinct styles, among whom now one, now another, steps into glory.

The differences between Scipio and Laelius are minimized by Cicero: at oratio Laeli de collegiis non melior quam de multis quam voles Scipionis (“but the oration of Laelius On the Collegia is no better than Scipio’s speeches on many subjects,” Brut. 83.3f.). Cicero explains Laelius’ greater oratorical reputation by his consciously old-fashioned style and diction (83.5-8). He adds that people generally do not like to give credit for two kinds of talent to one person: Scipio was a brilliant general, so Laelius played the role of literary maven and orator (84). The differentiation does not have to do with talent, but with psychology and requirements of friendship.

Cicero shows us yet another pairing, Laelius and Galba, contrasted stylistically: Laelius is more precise and elegant, Galba more forceful (Brut. 86.1-89.6 esp. 86.1f., 86.6-11, 89.6). No comparison of talent is made—they are complementary. Cicero tells how Laelius handed a case to Galba in order that
Galba might use his more forceful brand of oratory on behalf of Laelius’ client. Scipio and Laelius are paired in order to establish both their similarity and the tendency of Laelius toward more elegant, less emotional oratory. They cover different areas of oratorical work due to their differing styles—allowing each to the other his proper scope. A similar concatenation of pairings occurs with C. Carbo and Ti. Gracchus said to be among the finest orators of their age (96.4-7, 103.1-06.6 esp. 104.1f., 106.1). Carbo and Ti. Gracchus are treated together, before a return is made to the consideration of Carbo’s career (105.1-06.6).

Mostly, pairs appear contrasted in their skills and talents—with the proviso that each partner is competent, even excellent, in the field of the other. A good example is the insistence on the unparalleled talents of both Scaevola and Crassus, who spoke against each other on opposite sides of the causa Curiana (Brut. 144.5-45.8, and in more detail 194-200, where Crassus is acknowledged victor, but Scaevola is strongly praised). The orators differ in their strong points, but Cicero insists that this is not a quantitative difference in talent, but a division of emphasis: eloquentium iuris peritissimus Crassus, iuris peritorum eloquentissimus Scaevola putaretur (“Crassus is reckoned to be the most expert lawyer among eloquent orators, Scaevola the most eloquent orator among expert lawyers,” 145.7-9). The point is reiterated and elaborated upon (148).

The model that Cicero is developing has several facets: completeness of the overall age’s stylistic range (that is, the anti-Atticist argument); collegiality of age-mates; similarity; and complementarity. The fluidity of the pairs Cicero presents (Scipio/Laelius, then quickly afterwards Laelius/Galba) gives complexity to the espoused stylistic ideals by pointing up several facets of the same person’s oratory. Few pairs are exclusive units: significant overlap and comparison prevent this. A community of individual orators is portrayed, all participating in a network of oratorical skill building and imitation.

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57 A centumviral case ca. 94-91 BC, to which Cicero comes back frequently in his theoretical works (esp. De Or. 1.180, 238, 242; 2.141; Inv. Rhet. 2.122).

58 The remarks that Cicero makes about Curio pater and his lack of all five orators’ qualities (Brut. 216.11f.) show clearly that the contrasts are not to be conceived as opposites. There are limits to the idea of complementarity, namely the good orator in Cicero’s eyes must be more than competent in every one of the officia oratoris (“duties of the orator,” 197.19, 198.10); only then can he be said to specialize in one or another area. This is also implicit in phrases like iuris peritorum eloquentissimus (145.8).

59 Cicero singles out comparison as the one thing that makes unskilled audiences more susceptible to bad orators than they should be in theory (Brut. 193).

60 Cicero describes a similar effect among people who were his own near-aequales (Brut. 179).
The teaching of equals transforms the question of “imitation.” Cicero has Atticus begin to point this out, starting by dismissing Cicero’s favorable comparison of Cato’s oratory with that of the Roman Lysias (Brut. 292.3-97.6, cf. 63-69). On one level, by having Atticus suggest it, Cicero agrees that one must make allowances for the barriers raised to our appreciation by age and archaism. But Cicero is also willing to treat his teachers as contemporaries, to acknowledge his debts, and to find a direct line from his predecessors to himself, not ignoring or trying to hide the sequence of development of the language out of vanity or ignorance. There is also complexity in Cicero’s relationship to the many written works that were his “models”: for instance, the speech of Crassus that Cicero calls a magistra (“teacher,” 164.1f.), and the speech of Curio avus (122.7-9). Transmission of artistry runs in many directions for Cicero—not in the single direction of blood lineage.

**Ramifications**

Cicero’s perspective in Brutus on the descent of oratorical skill is ultimately political. It is a way of attacking the idea of a strong man or tyrant as solution to state rule, and of proposing a form of friendship-like solidarity among republican political leaders. He replaces blood ties with social ties—not replications of the patriarchal aristocratic ideal, but ties grounded in Hellenistic political friendship theory (mainly through Aristotle).\(^6^1\) He presents a non-hierarchical teaching model for transmission of skills, stressing intra- and intergenerational learning through written speeches and lively exchange between peers and age-mates. Tradition is routed through peers and like-minded political actors, not aristocratic families; the focus is on individual goodwill toward the state and bonds created through this goodwill. This may be wishful thinking on Cicero’s part, but it is his thinking. He envisions a process of political perfection on the analogy of the visual arts.\(^6^2\) Oratory itself becomes better over generations and can find its τέλος; the republic itself, to which oratory contributes by definition, can be perfected. Or, as Cicero expresses it, there is such a thing as a perfected, balanced, functioning republic; oratory, which functions best in times of political stability and contributes to


peaceful government, is an equally perfectible art form, and one intrinsic to the wellbeing of such a government.

Cicero’s vision has distinct limitations. Obfuscation of the mechanisms of descent of power and their replacement by an ideal descent (oratorical talent and friendship) as a strategy for understanding the past does not grapple with the need for transfer of material resources. Emphasis on ideal teaching situations, age-mates, and complementarity leaves aside the question of household resources and emphasizes “spiritual” lineage. Cicero remains largely unaware of the question of social resources: for example, he attacks the unfortunate and low-born Q. Arrius (Brut. 242.8-43.9). In contrast with De Republica, however, Brutus is not an effort to imagine a perfect past to live up to, but an attempted revision of oratorical aesthetics in order to bring it more into line with the ideals of a true republic.
Abstract. Virgil’s procession of heroes in *Aeneid* 6 is based upon Roman funeral rituals and orations as described in Polybius. Furthermore, Anchises’ lament for Marcellus is similar to L. Aemilius Paulus’ *laudatio funebris* (“funeral oration”) for his sons. The death of Marcellus is a warning to Aeneas and to Rome about the dangers of excessive pride: Rome must learn to rule the world with mercy, ever mindful of changes of Fortune.

Virgil’s portrayal of the procession of famous Romans in book 6 of the *Aeneid* contains important elements of Roman funeral rites for aristocratic Romans. There are striking resemblances between Polybius’ description of Roman funerals (Polyb. 6.53f.) and Virgil’s parade of heroes (*Aen.* 6.679-892). Virgil also echoes one of the most famous funeral orations in Roman history, that of L. Aemilius Paulus for his sons (Livy 45.41; Plut. *Aem.* 36; Diod. Sic. 31.11). Virgil incorporated traditional Roman funeral processions, orations, and attitudes into the procession of Roman heroes and into Anchises’ description of Aeneas’ descendants.

Virgil scholars have paid very little attention to the relationship between Roman funeral rituals as described in Polyb. 6.53f. and the parade of heroes in *Aeneid* 6, with the exception of an important but overlooked article by Skard that observes several similarities. Also, there has been no recognition of the relationship between the funeral oration of L. Aemilius Paulus for his sons and

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1 The text of Virgil is that of R. A. B. Mynors (ed.), *P. Vergili Maronis Opera* (Oxford 1969). The text of Polybius is T. Büttner-Wobst and W. Dindorf (edd.), *Polybii Historiae* 1-4 (Leipzig 1889-1905); the translation of Polybius is that of W. R. Paton (tr.), *Polybius: The Histories* 3 (London 1923).

Virgil’s parade of heroes. Norden mentions neither Polybius nor Roman funerals, although he does find an element of panegyric in Anchises’ speech to Aeneas (Verg. Aen. 6.756-853) and he links the lament for Marcellus to a funeral speech.3 Highet finds no resemblance to funeral elegy.4 Even though Bailey concludes that elsewhere in the Aeneid Virgil fuses Roman funeral customs with Greek hero cult, he does not mention Polybius or connect the procession of heroes to Roman funeral practices.5 Camps, Clark, Delaruelle, Frank, Highet, Norden and Rowell all believe that Virgil was thinking either of archaic statue groups or of statues in Augustus’ Forum when he described the heroes of Roman history.6 R. Deryck Williams merely finds similarities with rhetorical writing, “visual art, friezes and groups of statutes.”7 Although Clark and Griffith suggest that Virgil has in mind “a Roman atrium-type house in which the effigies of Rome’s national figures, and not merely those of an ordinary family, were on show,” they do not recognize the role of masks in Roman funerals.8 Only Burke, Feeney, Highet and Skard accept that Anchises’ speech is a eulogy “inspired by the laudationes ['orations'] spoken in honor of dead Roman nobles”;9 they, Austin, Camps and Habinek note similarities


5 C. Bailey, Religion in Virgil (Oxford 1935) 301: the Aeneid contains Romans’ burials, the festival of the Caristia, and the ritual of the parentatio (“celebration of the family dead at the Parentalia”) at the tomb on the anniversary of the death.


7 R. D. Williams (ed.), The Aeneid of Virgil Books 1-6 (Glasgow 1972) 505 ad 6.752f.


between Roman funeral masks and Virgil’s parade of heroes. But most of these scholars, with the exception of Skard, only briefly mention the relationship of Roman funeral orations and masks with Virgil’s procession of heroes. Nevertheless, social historians and archaeologists who study Roman funeral customs accept a connection between Roman funeral masks, processions and funeral orations and the parade of heroes in *Aeneid* 6.

Skard persuasively argues that Virgil’s parade of heroes contains similarities to the Roman aristocratic funeral oration and to the procession of death masks at Roman funerals, and that Virgil would have known these customs well. Skard mentions some parallels between Polyb. 6.53 and Virgil. He believes that the parade of heroes replicates the actual funeral procession of Marcellus, although he acknowledges that a typical Roman funeral would only include a family’s heroes rather than those of the entire Roman people. Yet since, according to Bodel, the Roman emperors beginning with Augustus included the *imagines* (“masks”) of famous men who were not family in their funeral processions, the interpretation of the parade of heroes as a reflection of the *pompa* (“funeral procession”) of Marcellus, the heir of Augustus, may be accurate (cf. Cass. Dio 56.34.1-4).

I shall expand upon Skard’s comments by analyzing Anchises’ speech in greater detail in relation to Roman funeral rites. Anchises’ lament for Marcellus

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11 The analysis by Burke [2] is more detailed, but his conclusion that Virgil describes the funeral of Aeneas is unsupportable.


and praise of illustrious Romans form Marcellus’ funeral oration, and the procession of heroes is similar to the parade of ancestral masks that was traditional at aristocratic Roman funerals. But Virgil also echoes Aemilius Paullus’ famous funeral oration. Anchises’ speech to Aeneas, which is similar to Paullus’ oration for his children since it is a *laudatio* on the death of the young Marcellus, contains themes found in Aemilius Paullus’ oration for his sons. Both Paullus and Anchises subordinate personal sorrow to the good of the Roman people; both express sadness and grief, pride in the achievements of Romans, awareness of the uncertainties of life, and concern that excessive pride might prove detrimental to Rome. When Anchises’ remarks are considered in the context of Roman funerals and in comparison with Paullus’ *laudatio*, Roman funeral customs and Paullus’ oration provide unity to Virgil’s procession of heroes, and clarify the themes of the passage.

Polybius explains that during the funerals of illustrious Romans, a relative speaks to the assembled public in the forum about the achievements of the dead:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polybius 6.53.2f.</th>
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<td>[A relative] mounts the rostra . . . [and] discourses on the virtues and successful achievements of the dead. As a consequence the multitude and not only those who had a part in these achievements, but those also who had none, when the facts are recalled to their minds and brought before their eyes, are moved to such sympathy that the loss seems to be not confined to the mourners, but a public one affecting the whole people.</td>
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Masks that accurately reproduce the features of the deceased are placed in Roman house shrines, and these masks are displayed at public sacrifices and funerals (Polyb. 6.53.4-9). The masks remind Romans about the achievements of their deceased ancestors, and the sight of the faces of the ancestors keeps alive their memory. The Romans’ skill at creating portrait masks make the dead appear to be still living:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Polybius 6.53.9f.</th>
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<tr>
<td>οὗ κάλλιον οὐκ εὕμορας ἰδεῖν θέαμα νέω φιλοδόξῳ καὶ φιλογάθῳ τὸ γάρ τάς τῶν ἐπ’ ἁρετῇ δεδουλαζομένων ἀνδρῶν εἰκόνας ἰδεῖν ὁμοῦ πάσας οἷον εἰ ᾽όσιας καὶ πεπνυμένας τιν’ οὐκ ἄν παραστήσαι; τί δ’ ἄν κάλλιον θέαμα τούτου φανεῖν;</td>
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(Polyb. 6.53.9f.)
There could not easily be a more ennobling spectacle for a young man who
aspires to fame and virtue. For who would not be inspired by the sight of the
images of men renowned for their excellence, all together as if alive and
breathing? What spectacle could be more glorious than this?

At a funeral, family members wear the masks of ancestors with appropriate
dress and insignia and move in procession (Polyb. 6.53.6-9). The oration
reminds those present of the exploits not only of one man but also of his entire
family, in chronological order:

πλὴν ὁ γε λέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ θάπτεσθαι μέλλοντος, ἐπὰν διέλθη τὸν περὶ
tούτου λόγον, ἀρχεῖ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπὸ τοῦ προγενεστάτου τῶν
παρόντων, καὶ λέγει τὰς ἐπιτυχίας ἐκάστου καὶ τὰς πράξεις. ἐξ ὧν
καὶ παραποιημένης άει τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄνδρων τῆς ἐπ’ ἀρετή φήμης
ἀθανατιζέται μὲν ἢ τῶν καλῶν τι διαπραξαμένων εὐκλεία, γνώριμος
dὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ παραδόσιμος τοῖς ἐπιγινόμενοι ἢ τῶν
ἐνεργεσπάντων τὴν πατρίδα γίνεται δόξα. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, οἰ νέοι
παραρμόνεται πρὸς τὸ πάν ύπομένειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων χάριν
tοῦ τυχεῖν τῆς συνακολουθούσης τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῶν ἄνδρων εὐκλείαις.
(Polyb. 6.54.1-3)

Besides, he who makes the oration over the man about to be buried, when he
has finished speaking of him recounts the successes and exploits of the rest
whose images are present, beginning from the most ancient. By this means, by
this constant renewal of the good report of brave men, the celebrity of those
who performed noble deeds is rendered immortal, while at the same time the
fame of those who did good service to their country becomes known to the
people and a heritage for future generations. But the most important result is
that young men are thus inspired to endure every suffering for the public
welfare in the hope of winning the glory that attends on brave men.

The sight of the masks of the deceased and of his ancestors, combined with the
account of the achievements of the family, inspire both family members and the
public to emulate the dead and to try to achieve great deeds in the hope of
winning similar glory.

Eight main points may be summarized from these descriptions of Roman
funeral rites. First, a relative recounts the virtues and achievements of the

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18 Aristocratic Roman funerals usually included a procession, masks, laudatio, and
romanos: Problemas y perspectivas,” in C. Bonnet and A. Motte (edd.), Les Syncrétismes
religieux dans le monde Méditerranéen antique. Actes du Colloque International en
l’honneur de Franz Cumont à l’occasion du cinquantième anniversaire de sa mort: Rome,
deceased in a *laudatio funebris* (“funeral oration”). Secondly, family members wear the *imagines* (“ancestral masks”) and move in a *pompa* (“funeral procession of ancestors,” Polyb. 6.53.6-9). Thirdly, the public, which sees the funeral procession and hears the *laudatio*—which was frequently in the Forum (6.53.1)—is moved to sympathy. Fourthly, the *imagines* (“funeral masks”) are accurate representations of the features of the deceased (cf. Diod. Sic. 31.25; Polyb. 6.53.5), and the dead appear to be living and breathing. Fifthly, the masks of the dead are ἀθανατὰ (*an amazing spectacle,* 6.53.10). Sixthly, after the *laudatio* proper, the exploits of the ancestors of the deceased are recounted in chronological order, beginning with the most ancient (6.54.1). Seventhly, by this constant repetition of the histories of brave men, those who performed noble deeds become immortal and the fame of those who served their country becomes known to the people and a heritage for future generations. Eighthly, the funeral masks and orations inspire the young to emulate their ancestors’ courageous deeds.

Virgil includes all of Polybius’ eight components of the Roman funeral in Anchises’ description of the procession of Roman heroes that appears to Aeneas in the underworld in *Aeneid* 6. Anchises’ lament for Marcellus, mention of his funeral, and his description of Marcellus’ ancestors and other Roman heroes form a *laudatio funebris* for Marcellus—praise of a deceased aristocratic Roman followed by a recitation of the achievements of his ancestors. The procession of heroes in *Aeneid* 6 functions as a *pompa*, in which family members wear the masks and insignia of their ancestors and march in a funeral procession, for the funeral of Marcellus. Virgil emphasizes family connections, civic and military achievements, and the public impact of the procession. Anchises’ remarks,

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22 There is little Roman literary evidence for Roman funeral customs and orations besides Polybius (cf. Sall. *Iug.* 4.5f.; Skard [2] 60f.); but Virgil would have known Roman funeral customs, and need not be following the text of Polybius. Skard [2] 62-64 notes five specific parallels between Virgil and Polybius: masks, oration, procession, deeds of ancestors, and patriotism (for example, he says that Verg. *Aen.* 6.806 = Polyb. 6.54.3). Flower [2] 110 mentions as parallels: deeds of ancestors, emphasis on community, the theme of personal sacrifice, the visual element, and the educational value of the procession. Burke [2] 223 has four parallels between Roman funerals and Virgil: the procession, the recognizable appearance of ancestors, praise of ancestors, and sense of genealogy.

together with the appearance of the Roman heroes, arouse Aeneas’ wonder and sympathy, and encourage his patriotism.

It is appropriate that Anchises explains the procession of heroes to Aeneas since he is not only the eldest relative of Marcellus (*heu, miserande puer*, “wretched child,” Verg. Aen. 6.882; *animamque nepotis*, “the shade of my own kin,” 884), whose funeral oration he is reciting and whom he emphasizes at the end of the procession, but is also the father of Aeneas (*genitor*, “father,” 695; *nate*, “son,” 781; *sanguis meus!*, “my blood!,” 835; *o gnate*, “son,” 868; *pater*, “father,” 863; *natum*, “son,” 888) and the ancestor of most of the entire procession of heroes, who are primarily the descendants of Anchises and Aeneas.24 Virgil continually emphasizes family throughout Anchises’ speech.25

Each of the heroes that Anchises describes, and Aeneas sees, moves in a row in a procession that is similar to a funeral procession (*omnis longo ordine posset / aduersos legere et uenientum discere uultus*, “the long procession appeared in order and each face was able to be discerned,” Verg. Aen. 6.754f.; *proximus*, “next,” 767). The entire procession of Roman heroes functions as the funeral *pompa* for the young Marcellus, who is presented as if he had recently died (that is, in the age of Augustus).26 The Roman funeral procession ended at

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25 *Pater Anchises* (“father Anchises,” Aen. 6.713, 854, 867); *Dardaniam prolem* (“Dardanian offspring,” 756); *nepotes* (“descendants,” 6.757); *proles* (“descendant,” 763); *coniunx* (“wife,” 764); *iuuenes* (“sons,” 771); *Ilia mater* (“Ilian mother,” 778); *pater ipse* (“father,” 780); *nate* (“son,” 781); *felix prole* (“happy offspring,” 784); *gentem* (“family,” 788); *omnis Iuli / progenies* (“all the descendants of Iulus,” 789f.); *natosque pater* (“father, sons,” 820); *socer* (“father-in-law,” 830); *gener* (“son-in-law,” 831); *pueri* (“children,” 832); *sanguis meus!* (“my blood!,” 835); *pater* (“father,” 863); *filius . . . de stripe nepotum* (“son . . . from the family line,” 864); *o gnate* (“son,” 868); *Romana propago* (“Roman descendants,” 870); *puer* (“child,” 875, 882); *natum* (“son,” 888).

26 Although from Aeneas’ perspective the shades are not yet born, Anchises’ lament and mention of the funeral of Marcellus makes it clear that Virgil’s main focus is from the perspective of the Augustan age, when all the heroes except Augustus are deceased. Anchises also summarizes the entire lives of the heroes so that they appear to have completed their lives (that is, be dead), and the shades mostly proceed in chronological order so that later generations must obviously live after earlier ones have died. This makes it easy for the reader (especially the Roman reader) to view the procession of heroes as a funeral procession of ancestors in masks. (Also, as Burke [2] 222f. notes, since book 6 is set in the underworld, funerary associations are understandable). Augustus is out of chronological order because he is not part of a funeral procession of ancestors since he is not dead. He is, however, mentioned since he was present at the funeral of Marcellus and was one of Marcellus’ most illustrious ancestors. Since Aeneas is not part of the procession and therefore is also out of order, Virgil specifically connects Aeneas, Caesar, and Augustus by their non-chronological
the grave, just as Anchises’ description of the procession of heroes concludes with mention of the tomb of Marcellus (*tumulum praeterlabere recentem!*, “the new-made tomb beside the flowing stream!,” 6.874; *funera*, “funeral rites,” 874). Anchises’ lament for Marcellus is a *laudatio funebris*. His remark that he will heap lilies and purple flowers on Marcellus’ grave and pay a vow (883-86) is an example of funeral rites that formed part of a Roman funeral (cf. Cic. *Mil.* 33, 86). An enumeration of achievements of the dead was a standard element of the funeral *laudatio* (Cic. *De Or.* 2.11.46); Anchises recounts in encomiastic language Marcellus’ virtue, bravery, and victories in battle—those attributes most fitting for Roman aristocratic funerals (*heu pietas, heu prisca fides, invictaque bello / dextera! non illi se quisquam impune tulisset / obuius armato, seu cum pedes iret in hostem / seu spumantis equi / foderet calcaribus armos, “O sense of duty and ancient trust, O unconquered right arm! No foe would have met him in battle and not regretted it, whether he charged on foot or spurred his foaming war-horse against the enemy,” Aen. 6.878-81). Marcellus’ ancestor, Anchises, recounts the exploits of Marcellus’ ancestors in chronological order (*ordine singula pandit, “he enlarged on each point in succession,”* 723; *te tua fata docebo, “I shall teach you your destiny,”* 759; *per singula duxit, “proceeding from point to point,”* 888).

Polybius explains that when an assembled crowd hears a Roman funeral oration, *συμβαίνει τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γίνεσθαι συμπαθείς ὡστε μὴ τῶν κηδευόντων ἵδιον, ἀλλὰ κοινὸν τοῦ δήμου φαίνεσθαι τὸ σύμπτωμα (“the multitude . . . are moved to such sympathy that the loss seems to be not confined to the mourners, but a public one affecting the whole people,” Polyb. 6.53.3). Anchises says about the death of Marcellus: *quantos ille uirum magnam Mauortis ad urbem / campus aget gemitus! (“How great a lamentation of a multitude arises from the field of Mars, and strikes the city’s heart!,” Aen. 6.872f.).* The Roman funeral, through its encomiastic remembrance of the

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30 Walbank [21] 739 says that military or civil distinction of ancestors was important at funerals.

deeds of the deceased and of his ancestors, becomes a communal celebration since the entire community both is benefited by the family’s achievements and experiences sympathy for the loss of the dead man. This traditional prominence of the public aspect of the Roman funeral explains Virgil’s inclusion of some Roman heroes who were not part of the family of Aeneas and Marcellus, who was a relative of both Augustus and Aeneas. Virgil’s interest in all the great heroes of Rome acknowledges the traditional relationship between the Roman family and the Roman community as a whole, emphasizes how the greatness of Rome was intertwined with the success of the family of Aeneas and Augustus Caesar, and sets both the achievements of Aeneas and the loss of Marcellus within the context of Roman history.

The Roman imagines, which were accurate representations of the deceased (Diod. Sic. 31.25.2; Polyb. 6.53.5), are recalled through the poet’s mention of how Anchises and Aeneas are able to see each face in the procession (unde omnis longo ordine posset / aduersos legere et uenientum discere uultus, “the long procession appeared in order and each face was able to be discerned,” Aen. 6.754f.). Anchises recognizes Numa by his head and beard (quis procul ille autem ramis insignis oliuae, / sacra ferens? nosco crinis incanaque menta / regis Romani, “Look, who is that man far away distinguished by an olive-branch and carrying sacred emblems? I recognize the flowing locks and hoary beard of a Roman king!,” 808-10). Polybius says that Roman death masks appear to be alive and breathing (Polyb. 6.53.10). Anchises himself alludes to the tradition of Roman portraiture and how it “lives and breathes” when he declares excudent alii spirantia mollius aera / (credo equidem), uivos ducent de marmore uultus (“Let others mould the breathing bronze to fairer forms and bring forth living features from marble,” 847f.). Anchises himself is merely a

32 Bodel [12] 261-65; Flower [2] 110, 127, 131. Skard [2] 63 points out that the achievements of aristocratic families were a large part of Roman history because only a few families controlled the Roman government.


tristis imago (“sad image”) since he, too, is deceased (695; cf. 701), yet to Aeneas he seems to be alive.

Polybius explains that the funeral masks are θέαμα (“an amazing spectacle”) to those who see them (Polyb. 6.53.9f.). The sight of the procession arouses wonder in Aeneas: horrescit uisu subito causasque requirit / inscius Aeneas (“Aeneas shudders at the sudden sight and in his ignorance asks the cause,” Aen. 6.710f.); and Aeneas “marvels” at Anchises’ words (mirantibus, 6.854). According to Polybius, the purpose of the procession and oration is to inspire young men (Polyb. 6.54.1-3). Anchises hopes to encourage Aeneas: incenditque animum famae uenientis amore (“he fires Aeneas’ mind with desire for glory,” Aen. 6.888f.); and he explains the shades to Aeneas so that Aeneas’ heart will be glad: has equidem memorare tibi atque ostendere coram / iampridem, hanc prolem cupio enumerare meorum, / quo magis Italia mecum laetere reperta (“for a long time I have longed to show and tell you about my descendants, my son, so that you might rejoice with me all the more upon your arrival in Italy,” 716-18).

The Roman funeral included family history.37 Anchises proudly views his future offspring as they prepare to ascend to the world above (inclusas animas superumque ad lumen ituras / lustrabat studio recolens, “surveying and reviewing the confined souls who dwelt there awaiting entrance to the light above,” Aen. 6.680f.), and he ponders omnemque suorum / forte recensebat numerum, carosque nepotes / fataque fortunasque uirum / moresque manusque (“the whole number of his descendants, his dear children, their fates and fortunes, virtues and great deeds,” 681-83)—topics most suitable for the praise of ancestors in a funeral oration. Anchises’ long speech, like a funeral oration, relates the glory of his race: Dardaniam prolem quae deinde sequatur / gloria, qui maneant Itala de gente nepotes, / inlustris animas nostrumque in nomen ituras, / expediam dictis, et te tua fata docebo (“I shall explain the glory that shall follow the descendants of Dardanus, our Italian posterity, who shall be famous and prolong our names, and I shall teach you your destiny,” 756-59). Anchises begins in chronological order, with the first descendant (the most ancient if looking back in time), Aeneas’ son Silvius by Lavinia. Anchises makes special mention of how Aeneas Sylvius is pariter pietate uel armis (“renowned for faithful honor and for deeds of war,” 769). But he adds that all the shades are warrior youth with strong limbs, who gerunt civili tempora quercu! (“wear the civic oak on their brows,” 772)38 and who will build cities

38 R. D. Williams [7] 507 ad 6.772 remarks that the civic crown of oak was “awarded to a Roman who had saved a fellow citizen’s life in war.” See also Austin [2] 237 ad 6.772; cf.
for Aeneas and Rome (773-76). As in Roman funeral tradition, Anchises speaks primarily about wars, including those that Aeneas must wage: *exim bella uiro memorat quae deinde gerenda* (“he speaks of imminent wars,” 890). The various shades are distinguished solely for their political or military achievements: Tullus shall be great in battle (814), Brutus shall be the first consul (817-20). Anchises mentions great conquerors: Mummius (*triumpfata, “in triumph.” uictor, “victor,” 836f.), Aemilius Paullus, the Scipios, and Fabius Maximus *qui nobis cunctando restituis rem* (“who saved his native land by wise waiting,” 838-46). Anchises makes special note of the conquests of Augustus (791-805) and declares:

> aspice, ut insignis spoliis Marcellus opimis  
> ingreditur uictorque uiros supereminet omnis.  
> hic rem Romanam magno turbante tumultu  
> sistet eques, sternet Poenos Gallumque rebellem,  
> tertiae arma patri suspendet capta Quirino.  

*(Verg. Aen. 6.855-59)*

Behold the elder Marcellus, a victor bright with glorious spoil who towers over his warriors! He shall steady Roman power when it is shaken by tumultuous upheaval; he shall crush Carthage and rebel Gaul, and three times hang his trophy at the shrine of Romulus.

Rome herself is *felix prole uirum* (“proud mother of the brave!,” 6.784). Its purpose is to rule: *tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento / (hae tibi erunt artes), paciimponere morem, / parcere subiectis et debellare superbos* (“Roman, learn to rule the world. These shall be your arts: to impose peace, to spare the conquered, and to crush the proud,” 851-53).

The visual aspect of a funeral procession is extremely prominent: masks, robes, and insignia enable spectators to distinguish the identity and rank of each ancestor (Diod. Sic. 31.25.2; Polyb. 6.53.6f.). Virgil emphasizes that Aeneas is able to see not only the procession (*omnis longo ordine posset / aduersos legere, “the long procession appeared in order,” Aen. 6.754f.*) but also the faces of each shade (*et uenientum discere uultus, “each face was able to be discerned,” 755), just as he would see the masks at a funeral. Anchises begins by pointing out Silvius (*ille, uides, “do you see him?,” 760), then the Alban kings (*aspice, “see,” 771), and directs Aeneas to look at the face of Romulus and the crest on his helmet (*uiden, “look!,” 779f.*), the son of Mars who will

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39 Flower [2] 110: the visual is important in both Polybius and Virgil.

found Rome. Anchises orders Aeneas, *huc geminas nunc flecte acies, hanc aspice gentem / Romanosque tuos* (“Look keenly at your race, gaze upon your Romans,” 788f.); he devotes special attention to Augustus, who will establish a golden age, restore the reign of Saturn, and extend his rule to the ends of the earth (*hic . . . hic . . . hic, “he,” 789-805). Just as if viewing a funeral procession, Anchises recognizes Numa by the emblems he carries and by his head: *quis procul ille autem ramis insignis olivae / sacra ferens? nosco crinis incanaque menta / regis Romani* (“Look, who is that man far away distinguished by an olive-branch and carrying sacred emblems? I recognize the flowing locks and hoary beard of a Roman king!,” 808-10). Anchises continually orders Aeneas to gaze at famous individuals who are distinguished by insignia: *quin Decios Drusosque procul saeuumque securi / aspice Torquatum, et referentem signa Camillum* (“See the Decii and Drusi; behold fierce Torquatus with his axe and Camillus bringing back the Gallic standards,” 824f.); “see” Caesar and Pompey (*cernis*, 826). Anchises urges Aeneas: *aspice, ut insignis spoliis Marcellus opimis / ingreditur uictorque uiros supereminet omnis* (“Behold the elder Marcellus, bright with glorious spoil, who advances as a victor through his warriors,” 855f.). The younger Marcellus is *egregium forma iuuenem et fulgentibus armis, / sed frons laeta parum et deiecto lumina uultu* (“a beautiful youth in gleaming arms, but with sad brow and down-cast eyes,” 861f.).

The intention of the funeral oration and procession is to make the great deeds of past heroes known to future generations in order to inspire Roman youth to emulate deeds of courage, especially in war. Polybius also asserts that it is the purpose of history in general to teach students how to avoid or endure hardships through the examples of past heroes (Polyb. 1.1.1f., 1.35.7-10, 2.35.7f.). Anchises declares that *expediam dictis, et te tua fata docebo* (“he will explain and teach the fates,” Aen. 6.759) of his descendants and how *Dardaniam prolem quae deinde sequatur / gloria, qui maneant Itala de gente nepotes, / inlustris animas nostrumque in nomen ituras* (“the glory and fame of our Dardanian offspring in Italy shall prolong our names,” 756-58). He calls Procas the *Troianae gloria gentis* (“the glory of the Trojan Race at Rome,” 767) and declares *quantas . . . uiris* (“how great their strength,” 771). Anchises *natum per singula duxit / incenditque animum famae uenientis amore* (“leads his son though each individual event and fires his mind with desire for future glory,” 888f.). Anchises tells Aeneas *bella . . . quae deinde gerenda* (“of wars . . .

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41 The translation of T. Williams (ed.), *The Aeneid of Virgil* (Boston 1910) emphasizes how the sight inspires Aeneas: “Let now thy visionary glance look long on this thy race, these Romans that be thine.”

soon imminent”) and *quo quemque modo fugiatque feratque laborem* (“shows how to avoid or bear each hardship,” 890-92). Anchises declares about Brutus: *utcumque ferent ea facta minores: / uincet amor patriae laudumque immensa cupido* (“however the future will tell the story, it will bless such love of honor and of Rome,” 822f.). The purpose of relating such deeds is to enable future generations to be inspired with desire for honor and love of Rome. When Anchises wonders *et dubitamus adhuc uirtutem extendere factis, / aut metus Ausonia prohibet consistere terra?* (“Do we still hesitate to extend our virtue by deeds? Shall fear keep you from Ausonia’s shore?,” 806f.), he expresses hope that his mention of these heroic deeds will both block any potential fear and inspire Aeneas to carry out his destiny. Anchises uses “historical exempla and the promise of glory to steer Aeneas towards virtuous rule” and success in war.44

Since the aim of the Roman funeral is to inspire the youth to emulate the brave deeds of the deceased, Anchises fittingly wonders if any Roman shall ever hope to surpass Marcellus, thinking of those who will come after Marcellus (a time beyond the knowledge of the poet). Anchises declares in regard to Marcellus: *nec puer Iliaca quisquam de gente Latinos / in tantum spe tollet auos, nec Romula quondam /ullo se tantum tellus iactabit alumno* (“no Ilian youth shall ever so encourage his Latin race with hope of glory nor shall the land of Romulus ever boast of such a great son,” *Aen*. 6.875-77). But Anchises still hopes that future generations after Marcellus will live up to the greatness of their ancestors since his remark *et dubitamus adhuc uirtutem extendere factis* (“but do we still hesitate to extend our virtue by deeds,” 806) immediately follows his description of Augustus’ power, and looks forward not only into Aeneas’ future but also beyond Augustus’ reign. Anchises also (in a confusing mixture of time) encourages Aeneas to emulate not an ancestor but rather Marcellus and all the rest of Aeneas’ own descendants: *atque omnia lustrant. / quae postquam Anchises natum per singula duxit / incenditque animum famae uenientis amore* (“they surveyed all; Anchises guides his son from point to point and inflames his mind with eagerness for future fame,” 887-89). Polybius explains that the speaker at a Roman funeral inspires the young men, who see and hear the scene, to become eager to emulate the glorious deeds of their deceased ancestors (Polyb. 6.54.1-3). Anchises similarly encourages Aeneas to perform great deeds, but he does so by referring not to Aeneas’ history, but to the future—to Roman history. Aeneas, who as a Trojan previously had only Trojan achievements (and defeats) to encourage him, now participates in a


Roman festival since he is in the process of becoming Roman. By gazing upon his Roman descendants and learning about the greatness of Roman history, Aeneas is inspired to persevere and to act like a Roman.\textsuperscript{45} Aeneas is not only motivated to be courageous but also learns “Romanness” through viewing Roman achievements at a typically Roman ritual. But it is important that Aeneas views all the great Romans of history, rather than just those of his own family, since his task will be to precipitate Rome’s foundation and to begin not just his own family’s history but also that of Rome.

Virgil scholars have been troubled by the tone of Anchises’ speech as a whole and how his lament for the young Marcellus affects the rest of the procession of heroes. Some believe that Virgil’s entire underworld scene is pessimistic and fails to inspire Aeneas.\textsuperscript{46} A number of scholars think that the tragedy of Marcellus “threatens to overwhelm the magnificence of Roman achievements” in \textit{Aeneid} 6,\textsuperscript{47} and that Anchises’ sadness destroys the optimism of the previous lines.\textsuperscript{48} Many also argue that since the philosophical ideas presented in the depiction of the underworld conflict with Anchises’ emphasis on earthly achievements and desire for glory, Anchises’ praise of Roman heroes

\textsuperscript{45} Cf. A. J. Boyle, “The Meaning of the \textit{Aeneid}. A Critical Inquiry, Part I—Empire and the Individual: An Examination of the \textit{Aeneid’s} Major Theme,” \textit{Ramus} 1 (1972a) 80; “The Meaning of the \textit{Aeneid}. A Critical Inquiry, Part II—\textit{Homo Immemor}: Book 6 and Its Thematic Ramifications,” \textit{Ramus} 1 (1972b) 113-16, 128. It is interesting that just as Aeneas views his future and the ancestors of Marcellus rather than his own ancestors, so also the praise of ancestors in the \textit{Aeneid} precedes rather than follows the \textit{laudatio} proper for Marcellus.

\textsuperscript{46} W. Clausen, “The Interpretation of the \textit{Aeneid},” \textit{HSPh} 68 (1964) 143, 146; Lyne [36] 208 and n. 1; S. V. Tracy, “The Marcellus Passage (\textit{Aeneid} 6.860-886) and \textit{Aeneid} 9-12,” \textit{CJ} 70.4 (1975) 38; G. Williams [9] 207f.


appears false. O’Hara argues that Anchises’ encouragement in the procession of heroes is “undercut and questioned by numerous details of Vergil’s presentation,” including a conflict among the idealism of the philosophical doctrines (Verg. *Aen.* 724-51), the poet’s stress on seeking glory through “earthly achievements,” and the “theme of sons falling short of their fathers’ standards.” Gordon Williams believes that the Marcellus passage suggests that Augustus’ line will not continue and that the optimism of preceding verses is “destroyed.” Tarrant finds that Virgil combines the human, represented by Aeneas, and the philosophical, suggesting that Aeneas’ success will be limited by the shortcomings of the body. Zetzel says that Anchises’ combination of panegyric and historical allusions is discordant.

Scholars, however, have not recognized that such a blend of achievement, sadness, desire for future great “earthly achievements,” and philosophical concepts traditionally forms part of both the *lausatio funebris* (“funeral oration”) and the funeral *pompa* (“procession”). Praise of ancestors and encouragement of the young to emulate their great deeds were essential elements of the Roman funeral *lausatio* and *pompa*. An element of reincarnation was also traditional: since Roman funeral custom required that the family member who most closely resembled a deceased ancestor wear the mask of that ancestor, dress in the appropriate toga, and ride in a chariot preceded by the appropriate insignia (Polyb. 6.53.6-8)—that is, he would become his deceased ancestor (Diod. Sic. 31.25.2)—Virgil’s “Pythagorean” insistence on the rebirth of souls (*animae, quibus altera fato / corpora debentur*, “souls to whom other bodies are fated,” *Aen.* 6.713-21, 748-51) is as much a reflection of traditional Roman custom and a desire to honor and emulate ancestors as it is pure philosophical doctrine. As Roman tradition apparently believed that family members who were physically like an ancestor could repeat their ancestor’s achievements, Virgil’s “philosophical” elements are not discordant but rather are integral to his funeral context.


52 Tarrant [49] 54ff.

53 Zetzel [47] 197.

Moreover, Virgil’s blend of philosophy and “earthly glory” has a model in L. Aemilius Paullus’ famous funeral oration for his sons. Paullus mourned his two sons and hoped that Fortune might divert vengeance onto himself rather than the Roman people. Polybius included Paullus’ funeral oration in his *Histories*, and although his Greek text is now lost, the content of the speech is preserved in Livy, Plutarch, and Diodorus (Livy 45.41; Plut. *Aem*. 36; Diod. Sic. 31.11). It is probable that Virgil derived his knowledge of this famous oration from Roman cultural history, but he may also have read the oration in Polybius—*memorabilis eius oratio et digna Romano principe fuit* (“his oration was memorable and worthy of a Roman leader,” Livy 45.40.9). Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Macedon, who himself appears in Virgil’s procession of heroes (*Aen*. 6.838-40), is central to Virgil’s epic because he is the one who *eruet* . . . / *ipsumque Aeacidem, genus armipotentis Achilli, / ultus auos Troiae templa et temerata Mineruae* (“avenged the fall of Troy and Minerva’s outraged temple by defeating Perseus, who claimed descent from Achilles,” 838-40). Paullus’ own death aroused the grief of the entire city of Rome and surrounding regions (Diod. Sic. 31.25), and his elaborate funeral included life-like images of his ancestors with appropriate robes and insignia (31.25.2). Paullus’ funeral and funeral procession illustrate the style and impact of the Roman funeral as Polybius so vividly describes it. When Paullus’ funeral oration for his sons, in which Paullus tried not to let his grief overshadow his great conquests and triumph, is considered in relation to Anchises’ speech in *Aeneid* 6, Virgil’s blend of ideas becomes more understandable.

Aemilius Paullus lost his two young sons at the same time as his triumph for his victories in Macedonia. Plutarch (who closely follows Polybius’58) explains that Paullus understood that courage was necessary not just in battle but in enduring all misfortunes:

'Polybius 6.53f., Paullus’ Laudatio Funebris, and Virgil, Aeneid 6’, M. F. Williams

Aemilius [Paullus], however, reasoning justly that courage and resolution was not merely to resist armor and spears, but all the shocks of ill-fortune, so met and so adapted himself to these mingled and contrasting circumstances, as to outbalance the evil with the good, and his private concerns with those of the public; and thus did not allow anything either to take away from the grandeur, or sully the dignity of his victory. For as soon as he had buried the first of his sons (as we have already said), he triumphed; and the second dying almost as soon as his triumph was over, he gathered together an assembly of the people, and made an oration to them, not like a man that stood in need of comfort from others, but one that undertook to support his fellow-citizens in their grief for the sufferings he himself underwent.59

Paullus’ funeral oration for his sons at the funeral of his second son was directed not to family but to all Romans—eis ἀκκλησίαν τὸν Ῥωμαίον δήμον (“to an assembly of the Roman people,” Plut. Aem. 36.2.3); ἐν τῷ δήμῳ (“to the people,” 37.2.1)—and it was intended to support his fellow-citizens in their grief (cf. Diod. Sic. 31.11.1; contione, “assembly,” Livy 45.40.9). Paullus’ oration is a public event that both arouses the sorrow of the community and responds to public grief, just as Roman funeral orations traditionally did (Polyb. 6.53.3).60 Paullus’ mention of himself is an example of ancestral achievements: Paullus, the famous conqueror of Macedon whose fabulous triumph was still fresh in Roman minds,61 speaks not only about his own adventures in Greece, his victories, and the joy of Rome at his return (Livy 40.41.3-8; Plut. Aem. 36.3-6) but also his great defeat of Perseus (Livy 45.41.10f.; Plut. Aem. 36.9). Paullus’ oration, like Anchises’ laudatio for


60 Flower [2] 131: a funeral speech was “inherently political” because it was delivered from the rostra. Cf. Walbank [21] 737.

61 According to Livy 45.41.1, 45.41.9, Paullus mentioned his own triumph in this oration. See Bodel [12] 261 on the similarities between Roman triumphs and funerals.
Marcellus, is brief, as funeral orations traditionally were (cf. Cic. De Or. 2.84.341); it includes reference to the success of the Roman state as well as to personal misfortune; and both Paullus and Anchises mourn young men lost before their prime. Moreover, Paullus (like Anchises lamenting Marcellus) dwells on philosophical themes in part because of the youth of his sons: it was customary to alter the standard funeral oration when speaking on the death of the young since a traditional list of achievements could not be included.

Paullus explains that he never yet feared anything human but ὡς ἀπιστότατον καὶ ποικιλώτατον πράγμα τὴν Τύχην ἀεὶ φοβηθεὶς (“[has] always had a dread of Fortune as faithless and inconstant,” Plut. Aem. 36.3.2-3; cf. Livy 40.41.6). Even after he returned safely to Rome, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅραν εὕφροσύνης καὶ ζήλου καὶ θυσίων γέμουσαν, ἔτι τὴν Τύχην δ’ ὑποψίας εἶχον, εἰδῶς οὐδὲν εἰλικρινές οὐδ’ ἀνεμέσητον ἀνθρώποις τῶν μεγάλων χαριζομένην (“and saw the city full of joy, congratulating, and sacrifices, yet still I distrusted, well knowing that Fortune never conferred any great benefits that were unmixed and unattended with probabilities of reverse,” Plut. Aem. 36.6.2-7.1). He always feared that some misfortune would afflict his family, but is now free from this fear since his sons have died. This sorrowful theme, which runs through the oration, culminates in Paullus’ declaration: καὶ νομίζω τὴν Τύχην ὑμῖν παραμενεῖν ἀβλοβή καὶ βέβαιον. ἠκανός γὰρ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοῖς εἰς τὴν τῶν καταρθωμένων ἀποκέχρηται νέμεσιν (“I trust and am persuaded that in the future Fortune will prove constant and harmless to you; since she has sufficiently wreaked her jealousy at our great success on me and mine,” Plut. Aem. 36.8.1-9.2; cf. Diod. Sic. 31.11.3; Livy 45.41.8 Val. Max. 5.10.2; Vell. Pat. 1.10.3-5). Paullus believes that, by suffering such a great personal loss, Fortune will be satisfied and Rome itself will not be harmed.

Anchises emphasizes the greatness not only of Rome’s heroes but also of Rome herself. From Romulus, son of Mars, en huius, nate, auspiciis illa incluta Roma / imperium terris, animos aequabit Olympo (“Great Rome shall rise and, favored by his auspices, have power worldwide and men equal to the gods,” Aen. 6.781f.). The power and prominence of Rome is most evident in Anchises’ lengthy praise of Augustus Caesar, who will bring back the golden age of Saturn (791-805). Rome shall be so great that in the time of Augustus it shall

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64 Cf. Geiger [58] 103 n. 61.
65 Hic uir, hic est, tibi quem promitti saepius audis, / Augustus Caesar, diui genus, aurea condet / saecula qui rursus Latio regnata per arua / Saturno quondam, super et Garamantas et Indos / proferet imperium: iacet extra sidera tellus, / extra anni solisque uias, ubi caelifer Atlas / axem umero torquet stellis ardentibus aptum. / huius in aduentum iam nunc et Caspia
rule the world: *tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento* (“Roman, learn to rule the world,” 851).

Aemilius Paullus feared excessive good fortune: *mihi quoque ipsi nimia iam fortuna uideri eoque suspecta esse* (“for a long time I have suspected too much good fortune,” Livy 45.41.6; cf. Diod. Sic. 31.11.2; Plut. *Aem.* 36.3-6). He elsewhere exhorts his soldiers that success is momentary, fortune is unstable, and humility is a virtue:

... *parēkallêi toûs ên tô συνεδριῶ... μῆτε μεγαλανχεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς κατορθώμασι παρὰ τὸ δὲν μῆτε βουλεύεσθαι μὴδὲ ὑπερήφανον μηδ’ ἀνήκεστον περὶ μηδενὸς, μήτε καθόλου πιστεῦειν μηδὲποτε ταῖς παρώσαις εὑρισκίαις ἀλλ’ ὅτε μᾶλιστά τις κατορθοῖ κατὰ τὸν ἰδίον βίον καὶ κατὰ τὰς κοινάς πράξεις, τότε μᾶλιστα παρεκάλει τῆς ἕναντίας τύχης ἔννοιαν λαμβάνειν.*

(Polyb. 29.20.1f.; cf. Diod. Sic. 30.23; Plut. *Aem.* 27)\(^{66}\)

... [Aemilius urged] those present at the council... never to boast unduly of achievements and never be overbearing and merciless in their conduct to anyone, in fact never place any reliance on present prosperity. “It is chiefly,” he said, “at those moments when we ourselves or our country are most successful that we should reflect on the opposite extremity of fortune.”

ideò in secundis rebus nihil in quemquam superbe ac uiolenter consulere decet, nec praesenti credere fortunae, cum quandus ferat incertum sit. is demum uir erit cuius animum neque prospera flatu suo efferent nec aduersa infringent.

(Livy 45.8.6f.)\(^{67}\)

Therefore it is proper to offer no insult or violence to anyone, while one is in favorable circumstances, and not to trust to one’s present fortune, since no one knows what evening will bring. He will be truly a man, in a word, whose spirit is neither deflected from its course by the breath of prosperity, nor broken by misfortune.

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\(^{67}\) The text of Livy is from J. Briscoe (ed.), *Livius ab Urbe Condita Libri XLI-XLV* (Stuttgart 1986); the translation of Livy is by A. C. Schlesinger (ed. and tr.), *Livy, History of Rome 13: Books 43-45* (Cambridge, Mass. 1955).
Anchises insists that it is Fate that decides the destiny of each spirit (fato, “fate,” Aen. 6.713; fata, “fates,” 759, 869, 882); yet he also is aware that Fortune plays a role (fataque fortunasque, “fate and fortune,” 683). Like Paullus, Anchises recognizes that great achievements and such successes can only arouse the envy of Fortune and bring with themselves great calamities. His language contains warnings of excess: quem iuxta sequitur iactantior Ancus, / nunc quoque iam nimium gaudens popularibus auris (“boastful Ancus follows next in order, rejoicing too much in his people’s empty praise,” 815f.). The great Brutus, the first consul, was forced to punish his own sons, sentencing them to death: natosque pater noua bella mouentis / ad poenam pulchra pro libertate uocabit, / infelix (“the unhappy father shall punish his own sons on behalf of beautiful liberty since they joined in rebellion,” 820-22). Brutus, like Paullus, was distinguished by successes and glory but lost his sons, who rashly rebelled; and Brutus was perhaps also punished by jealous Fortune because of his superbam (“haughtiness,” Aen. 6.817; cf. superbe, Livy 45.8.6). But both Brutus and Paullus endure their grief in such a way that they receive credit for their love of Rome: utcumque ferent ea facta minores: / uinctet amor patriae laudumque immensa cupidio (“However the future age will tell the story, such great desire for honor and love of Rome shall prevail,” Aen. 6.822f.).

Paullus believed that since Fortune is unstable, men must not prize success too much but should learn humility from the misfortunes of others (Livy 45.8.6; Polyb. 29.20.1-4). Anchises’ warnings of the danger of rebellion and of the uncertainties of fortune culminate in his description of Caesar and Pompey, two Romans who achieved great things but who brought great suffering on their people through civil war. Anchises exclaims: ne, pueri, ne tanta animis adsuescite bella / neu patriae ualidas in uiscera uertite uiris; / tuque prior, tu parce, genus qui ducis Olympo, / proice tela manu, sanguis meus! (“My children! Do not accustom your souls to such great wars nor turn your mighty

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strength against your native land! But instead, my blood, a race that descends from Olympus, restrain your weapons!,” *Aen.* 6.832-35). Pompey and Caesar exemplify both the great achievements of Roman heroes and the calamities that can result from those successes.70 Anchises’ appeal that Rome at the height of its power in the age of Augustus must exhibit clemency and dislike of arrogance echoes Paullus’ declaration that success requires humility since it also brings reversals of fortune: *tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento* / *(hae tibi erunt artes)*, *pacique imponere morem* / *parcere subiectis et debellare superbos* (“Roman, learn to rule the world. These shall be your arts: to impose peace, to spare the humbled foe, and to crush the proud,” 6.851-53).71

The element of melancholy that runs throughout Anchises’ speech echoes Paullus’ oration. Paullus declares: *οὐδὲν εἰλικρινὲς οὐδὲν ἀνεμέσθην ἀνθρώποι τῶν μεγάλων χαριζομένην* (“Fortune never conferred any great benefits that were unmixed and unattended with probabilities of reverse,” Plut. *Aem.* 36.6.3-7.1; cf. Livy 45.41.8; 45.8.6). Anchises declares that the gods shall punish Rome for its great success under Augustus through the death of Marcellus: *nimium uobis Romana propago / uisa potens, superi, propria haec si dona fuiscent* (“O gods, you would have thought this offspring of Rome too glorious, had this one gift been sure,” *Aen.* 6.870f.). Anchises exclaims about Marcellus: *heu, miserande puer, si qua fata aspera rumpas, / tu Marcellus eris* (“O lamented child! If you could evade your fate, you shall be Marcellus,” 882f.).72 Paullus’ loss affected all Romans:

[There was no] Roman without a deep sense of his suffering, and who did not shudder at the cruelty of fortune, that had not scrupled to bring so much

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70 By mentioning Pompey and Caesar out of chronological order, this theme of arrogance is emphasized.

71 Paullus reportedly treated those that he conquered with such humility and kindness that Iberians, Macedonians, and Ligurians took turns carrying the bier at his funeral (Plut. *Aem.* 39.8).

72 Cf. Austin [2] 272 *ad* 6.882; Glei [9] 123f. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, “*Tu Marcellus Eris,*” *HSPh* 90 (1986) 199-205 discusses the meaning of the passage. But Servius [68] 122 *ad* 6.883 says the meaning is *talis, qualis est Marcellus* (“you shall be like your ancestor Marcellus”). Servius’ interpretation is particularly appropriate in view of the Roman funeral procession’s emphasis on succeeding generations having the characteristics and wearing the masks of their ancestors and Virgil’s concept of the souls of ancestors inhabiting the bodies of their descendants. The young Marcellus, if able to live, will be another great Marcellus.
sorrow into a house replenished with happiness, rejoicing, and sacrifices, and to intermingle tears and laments with songs of victory and triumph.

The loss of Marcellus afflicts not just his family but also all of Rome: _o gnate, ingentem luctum ne quaere tuorum; / ostendent terris hunc tantum fata nec ultra / esse sinent_ (“Do not ask, son, what heavy grief awaits your people; fate will only reveal this much of the future to the world, nothing more,” _Aen._ 6.868-70).

The most poignant parallel is found in Paullus’ remark:

_οὐκ ἀφανέστερον ἔχουσα παράδειγμα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἁθενείας τοῦ θριαμβευμένου τὸν θριαμβεύοντα πλήν ὅτι Περσεύς μὲν ἔχει καὶ νενικημένος τοὺς παιᾶς. Αἰμίλιος δὲ τοὺς αὐτοῦ νικήσας ἀπέβαλεν._

(Plut. _Aem._ 36.9.2-5; cf. Livy 45.41.10f.)

Fortune has made the conqueror as marked an example of human instability as the captive whom he led in triumph, with this only difference, that Perseus, though conquered, does yet enjoy his children, while the conqueror, Paullus, is deprived of his.

Paullus, the famous victor over Macedon, has lost his sons; Augustus, the greatest Roman ruler, has lost his hope of an heir, Marcellus. Anchises is like Paullus, who _παραμυθουμένου τοὺς πολίτας, δυσπαθούντας ἐφ’ οἷς ἐκεῖνος ἐδυστύχησεν_ (“undertook to support his fellow-citizens in their grief for the sufferings he himself underwent,” Plut. _Aem._ 36.2.4-3.1). Anchises’ long speech to Aeneas, and to the Romans themselves, is intended to support and encourage both Aeneas and Rome to overcome their grief caused by civil war and the deaths of those like Marcellus, the hope of Rome. Anchises does not want Aeneas to doubt his eventual success: _et dubitamus adhuc uirtutem extendere factis, / aut metus Ausonia prohibit consistere terra?_ (“Do we still hesitate to extend our virtue through heroes’ deeds? Or shall fear keep you from Ausonia’s shore?,” _Aen._ 6.806f.). Since Anchises primarily exalts the achievements of Aeneas and Augustus, he is like Paullus, who attempted to ὃστε τοὺς ἄγαθοῖς τὰ φαύλα καὶ τὰ οἶκεια τοῖς δημοσίοις ἐναφανισθέντα μὴ ταπεινώσαι τὸ μέγαθος μηδὲ καθυβρίσαι τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς νίκης (“outbalance the evil with the good, and private concerns with those of the public; and thus not allow anything either to take away from the grandeur, or sully the dignity of victory,” Plut. _Aem._ 36.1.4-2.1).

What scholars have viewed as a conflict in _Aeneid_ 6 between desire for glory and the reality of suffering and loss, between “earthly” achievements and philosophical ideas, in conjunction with Virgil’s parade of heroes can be reconciled if the passage is viewed in the context of Roman beliefs and

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traditions. Aemilius Paullus was not only one of the greatest Roman conquerors but also was one of the most educated and philosophical of the Romans: there was a legend that his family was connected with Pythagoras (Plut. Aem. 2), and Paullus employed philosophers to educate his sons (Plut. Aem. 6.8-10; Plin. HN 35.135). Paullus used his philosophical education to help himself ἁμαρτάνων ὑμᾶς τήν τῶν παράνομων σύγκρασιν (“he adapted himself to these mingled and contrasting circumstances of victory and loss,” 36.1.3f.). Just as Paullus in his oration for his sons balances his own great achievements in war with his philosophical beliefs about the dangers of too much success, so Anchises expresses his pride in the achievements of Rome and Rome’s heroes while still fearing that civil war and too much pride might damage Rome. Just as Paullus hopes that he might deflect the anger of Fortune from the Roman people onto himself through the deaths of his sons, so Anchises implies that the tragic loss of Marcellus, difficult though it is for both Augustus and Rome, might enable Rome to continue, having satisfied Fortune: nimium uobis Romana propago / uisa potens, superi, propria haec si dona fuissent (“O gods, you would have thought this offspring of Rome too glorious, had this one gift been sure,” Aen. 6.870f.). Just as Paullus addresses the Roman people ἐξ ἀπλάστον καὶ ἀλήθινον φρονήματος (“from a heart truly sincere and free from all artifice,” Plut. Aem. 37.1.1-2.1), so Anchises has longed to converse with Aeneas as ducebam animo . . . nec me mea cura fefellit (“I cherished this hope . . . and my thought did not deceive me,” Aen. 6.687-91) and to explain all so that Aeneas will rejoice as has equidem memorare tibi atque ostendere coram / iampridem, hanc prolem cupio enumerare meorum, / quo magis Italia mecum laetere reperta (“for a long time I have longed to show and tell you about my descendants, my son, so that you might rejoice with me all the more upon your arrival in Italy.” 716-18). And just as Paullus expresses a philosophical outlook that combines Stoicism and a Greek concept of Fortune in a Roman funeral oration, 74 so Anchises offers a mixture of Roman custom, a Greek concept of Fortune, Stoicism (724-32), and Pythagoreanism (713-21), 75 being customs and philosophies designed to prepare

Aeneas, and Rome, both to endure future misfortune and to deal with destined success. Rather than undercutting Anchises’ praise of heroic Romans, Anchises’ lament for Marcellus and awareness of the jealousy of Fortune is an apotropaic attempt to protect Roman society, to ease grief, and to encourage heroism in regard to an uncertain future.

Virgil’s procession of Roman heroes in Aeneid 6 incorporates all the essential elements of the Roman funeral, such as procession, masks and oration. Anchises’ emphasis on the achievements of ancestors, desire for glory, and the reality of suffering are standard themes in Roman funeral orations, and the re-enactment of a procession of ancestors was a central part of the Roman funeral. Anchises’ lament for Marcellus and recitation of the achievements of Roman heroes forms a funeral laudatio for Marcellus, and the procession of heroes represents Marcellus’ pompa. Anchises’ laudatio for the young Marcellus is similar to that of L. Aemilius Paullus for his young sons, since Anchises echoes Paullus’ concern that Rome not become too arrogant as a result of its great success and suggests that the death of Marcellus will deflect the jealousy of Fortune from the Roman state. The traditions of the Roman funeral oration and procession, together with the important model of Paullus’ oration, provide unity to Virgil’s description of the procession of heroes and clarify seemingly conflicting themes. Virgil does not deride Anchises’ description of Rome’s grandeur, and the sadness of the Marcellus passage is not out of place in the procession of heroes. Instead, the death of Marcellus is a means of deflecting Fortune so that Rome will succeed and it is a warning to Aeneas and to Rome, and especially to Augustus and those of his age, about the dangers of excessive pride. Rome must learn to rule the world with mercy, ever mindful of changes of Fortune that arise from arrogance: tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento . . . parcere subiectis et debellare superbos (“Roman, learn to rule the world . . . to spare the conquered, and to crush the proud,” 6.851-53).

76 Norden [3] 353f. and O’Hara [48] 164 think that Anchises’ speech is intended to encourage Aeneas, and O’Hara says that it aims to “steel him for continued perseverance.”

77 Otis [47] 303 believes that the Marcellus passage prefigures the deaths of the young heroes of later books, Pallas, Camilla, Euryalus, and Lausus. See also Glei [9] 123; Tracy [46] 37f. G. K. Galinsky, “Vergil’s Romanitas and his Adaptation of Greek Heroes,” ANRW 2.31.2 (1981) 996 comments that “Vergil’s concern (in the epic) is precisely to show the humanity and agony, both internal and external, which are required in the course of great achievements.”
FINDING ARCHAIC-AUGUSTAN ROME IN TIBULLUS 2.5

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Abstract. This article examines topographical imagery in Tibullus 2.5. While previous scholars have suggested that the proto-city in Tibullus’ poem is a pastoral scene that does not recall the city’s prehistory, it is argued that Tibullus’ placement of the proto-city on the Capitoline hill creates a vision of archaic Rome that resonates with memories of Rome’s early foundations and the city’s re-founding in the time of Augustus.

The mythic and unformed landscape of Tibullus 2.5 contains few topographical references and, as a result, the poem’s description of proto-Rome is often described as a pastoral and escapist vision of the legendary past. 3

1 I would like to thank Neil W. Bernstein, Avery D. Cahill, Mary Ann Eaverly, and William J. Dominik and the anonymous readers of Scholia for their advice and perceptive criticism. I am grateful also to David Lamontagne and Generosa Sangco-Jackson for their assistance.


Yet this pre-Roman landscape need not be interpreted solely as an Augustan topos meant to evoke an image of rustic peasants living an unspoiled, idyllic existence. Both this lack of detail and the less urbane setting allow Tibullus’ audience to consider the few monuments that do appear in his poem—the Capitoline, Palatine, and Velabrum—as places of importance for his narrative on the early origins of the city. My discussion of early Rome in Tibullus’ poem will focus on two of the three sites that he mentions: the Capitoline and Palatine hills. The Palatine in Tibullus’ poem is a grassy slope, with no suggestion of Evander’s proto-Rome, or of Romulus as the founder who engaged in an aggressive struggle to rule Rome. It is the Capitoline that contains early Rome’s foundations. Like the Palatine, the Capitoline hill is a site that resonates with memories of Rome’s foundations and the city’s re-founding in Augustus’ time. This article will show that such use of monumental sites by Tibullus in his poem indicates that it is not only what is remembered about Rome’s foundations, but also where the foundations are recalled, that contributes to our understanding of how the community of Augustan Rome restored and reconstructed the past.

When Tibullus selects the Capitoline hill as the setting for Evander’s rustic settlement, his literary reconstruction of archaic Rome calls to mind a feature of Augustan Rome that existed during Tibullus’ own lifetime: the physical recreation of the foundations of archaic Rome on the Capitoline and Palatine hills by the emperor Augustus. Traces of the ancient city existed as reconstructed artifacts. It is this foundation landscape, superimposed upon and intermingled with the urban cityscape, that I propose Tibullus encourages his audience to recall when he describes proto-Rome in his elegy. A reading of the poem that considers the meaning and memories associated with the foundations of the city on both the Palatine and Capitoline hills in Augustan Rome strongly suggests that it was the Augustan restoration of the Capitoline that influenced Tibullus’ choice of location for proto-Rome.

Tibullus does mention several sites of mythic and historical interest in his poem, his use of topography serves not just as part of a pastoral background, but also as a significant setting for the early history of Rome.

4 A. Gosling, “Tibullus 2.5 and Augustan Propaganda,” EMC 31 (1987) 333-39, however, finds elements in the poem that suggest Tibullus is providing social commentary on Augustan Rome.

5 Virg. Aen. 8 and Tib. 2.5, along with Prop. 4.1, 4.4, 4.9, form a nexus of poems that define the city’s prehistory. Although I am confining my comments to Virgil and Tibullus, recent discussion of Propertius’ use of allusions to the Augustan city in his descriptions of proto-Rome can be found in E. Fantham, “Images of the City: Propertius’ New-Old Rome,” in T. N. Habinek and A. Schiesaro (edd.), The Roman Cultural Revolution (Cambridge 1997) 122-35; see also J. B. DeBrohun, Roman Propertius and the Reinvention of Elegy (Michigan 2003) 40-97.
Virgil’s vision of early Rome in *Aeneid* 8 also captures Tibullus’ imagination. Both poets depict Evander’s community as a rustic settlement of huts on a hill. But the changes that Tibullus makes to Virgil’s Palatine settlement, including the change in location, are significant. If the description of the proto-city in Tibullus is put into the context of the emperor Augustus’ building program and Virgil’s portrait of Rome’s earliest foundations (*Aen.* 8.314-69), then it is possible to understand Tibullus’ transfer of the foundation story from the Palatine to the Capitoline as a reshaping of the Palatine myth of Rome’s foundations. By extension, my discussion of Tibullus’ shift in the location of proto-Rome from the Palatine to the Capitoline examines how the community of Augustan Rome remembered the past in its monuments; and considers why, when recalling the memory of the early city, the Romans did not have one foundation site but instead created two traditions for the founding of the city.

*Tibullus and Virgil: A Shared Tradition?*

Although this study explores the idea that Augustus’ topographical restoration of the archaic city was a possible inspiration for Tibullus’ elegy 2.5, any discussion of the foundation tradition in Tibullus must take into consideration Virgil’s potential for influence on Tibullus’ interpretation of early Rome. Murgatroyd determines the date of composition for Tibullus’ poem from an inscription containing Messalinus’ name among a list of the *Quindecimviri Sacris Faciundis* that can be dated to 17 BC (*CIL* 6.32323.152). If Messalinus’ appointment was a recent one, then it is possible that Tibullus composed his poem in 19 or 18 BC, right before his death. Because Virgil’s *Aeneid* was a work-in-progress by that date, Murgatroyd suggests that Tibullus was able to hear recitals of the *Aeneid* while composing his poem.⁶ Other scholars differ: Buchheit, for example, pushes back the date of Tibullus’ death until after 19 BC, concluding that the resemblances between Virgil’s *Aeneid* and Tibullus 2.5 are so close that Tibullus must have seen a polished version of Virgil’s epic before composing his poem.⁷ At the opposite side of the debate, Cairns and Della Corte are both hesitant to declare the *Aeneid* as having a considerable

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influence on Tibullus’ poem because of differences between the two works.\textsuperscript{8} But it is likely, as Bright points out, that while both poets are writing in a time when national security and the desire for conquest are of utmost concern, differences between the two works occur because Tibullus is writing elegy not epic, and the conventions of elegy do not allow for the same treatment of these topics.\textsuperscript{9}

Maltby’s recent discussion of the history of early Rome in Tibullus 2.5, Virgil’s \textit{Aeneid}, and Propertius 3.9 and 4.1 also considers the question of whether or not Tibullus was aware of \textit{Aeneid} 8 when he composed his poem; and, if so, how much inspiration he might have taken from the Evander episode in \textit{Aeneid} 8. His investigation concludes with the possibility that while Tibullus was familiar with the \textit{Aeneid} in some form, probably from hearing parts of the epic in a recital rather than having access to a more polished copy, the poet drew his inspiration for his elegy from a variety of sources in addition to the \textit{Aeneid}. These include Virgil’s \textit{Eclogues} and \textit{Georgics}, and earlier historical traditions about the founding of Rome, among them Livy, Ennius, and the Hellenistic κτίσεις (poems about the founding of cities).\textsuperscript{10} As Maltby suggests, the \textit{Aeneid} was a key influence on Tibullus’ poem, but Tibullus was aware of other discourses and traditions about the founding of Rome that could be used as a creative backdrop against which to define his own portrait of the proto-city.

\textit{Augustus and the Refounding of Rome}

The vision of archaic Rome that Augustus presented to the community should not be discounted as another source of inspiration for the poets. Both Virgil and Tibullus composed their works in the midst of a city that was being transformed by construction. The visual impact of Augustus’ reordering of the city was dramatic. Themes of social behavior and models of civilized authority appeared

\textsuperscript{8} F. Cairns, \textit{Tibullus: A Hellenistic Poet at Rome} (Cambridge 1979) 84-86; F. Della Corte, \textit{La mappa del’ Aeneide} (Florence 1984) 247-53; see also Bright [7] 68; cf. G. D’Anna, “Qualche considerazione sui rapporti di Tibullo con Virgilio e Orazio,” in \textit{Atti del convegno internazionale di studi su Albio Tibullo} (Rome 1986) 37-45, who argues that Tib. 2.5 demonstrates an awareness of Virgil’s \textit{Aeneid}, and Book 8 in particular, but does not conclude that there is enough inspiration from Virgil to allow a reading of Tibullus’ poem as a markedly derivative poem. See also Rothwell [3] 830 and Papaioannou [3] 682 n. 5, who argue that there is not enough evidence to determine which came first, Tib. 2.5 or Virg. \textit{Aen.} 8.

\textsuperscript{9} Bright [7] 69f.

\textsuperscript{10} Maltby [3] 291-303. For a thorough investigation of how Tibullus used the Hellenistic κτίσεις tradition in his work, see Cairns [8] 65-86.
everywhere for the community of Augustan Rome to consider.\(^{11}\) The restoration of the city suggests a commemoration of the triumph and renewal of Rome in a political and religious context that embraced Rome’s endurance and stability. Both the Palatine and Capitoline hills featured prominently in the restoration. Each site had long-standing historical associations with Rome’s religious and political past that could be compared to religious and political traditions that were initiated during Augustus’ reign.

The Palatine was traditionally the site of Rome’s archaic foundations and the site where Augustus, as the new founder of a renewed Rome, also resided.\(^{12}\) The Palatine’s reconstruction had begun as early as 36 BC when Augustus bought property on the hill on which to build his own house. When lightning struck the spot that Augustus had planned to use for his private residence, he built the temple of Apollo on the site instead. A residence for Augustus was then built on the Palatine at public expense (Dio. Cass. 49.15.5) and was directly linked to the Temple of Apollo by means of a ramp. The effect of the side-by-side residences was that Augustus appeared to have a close living and working relationship with his patron-deity.\(^{13}\) Thus, the Palatine hill became a focal point of the new Augustan building program.

In addition to establishing a connection between himself and Apollo, the emperor also suggested comparisons between himself and the city’s legendary founder Romulus by placing his house near the hut of Romulus. Although Augustus declined to grant the senators’ request that he accept Romulus’ name (Suet. Aug. 7.2), his decision to highlight Romulus’ role in the civil and moral affairs of the early city was apparent from his prominent placement of Romulus’ statue in the Forum Romanum, and from his restoration of the hut of Romulus, which stood on the Palatine as a symbol of Rome’s humble origins.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{12}\) C. Edwards, *Writing Rome: Textual Approaches to the City* (Cambridge 1996) 33 refers to Augustus as “Romulus’ heir, the new founder of Rome.” I prefer to use the phrase “the new founder of a renewed Rome,” due to Augustus’ emphasis on restoration and renewal in his building program.


In Augustus’ time, priests were required to stand guard over the hut and to restore it to pristine condition as soon as it showed any signs of damage or wear (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.79.11). As a symbol of how Rome’s modest origins developed from rustic foundations to a great empire, the hut focused attention on the humble lifestyle of the city’s early inhabitants.

In contrast, the Capitoline was the focal point of religious and political activity for the emerging city during the Roman republic. The religious center of the hill was the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, which was constructed in the sixth century BC. By Tibullus’ time, the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus dazzled visitors with its gilded roof, which was visible from many vantage points in the city. The poet’s decision to place proto-Rome on the Capitoline highlights the role that the hill played in the city’s origins, and its continued importance as a center of urban development. Its position as the final destination for the triumphant as he ascended the hill in order to place his spoils in the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus meant that the site held a special significance for the community as the guarantor of empire.

The role that the Capitoline assumed during Augustus’ reign is not easily defined. While the newer Palatine complex of buildings, which included the emperor’s residence and the Temple of Apollo, drew attention away from the former prominence of the Capitoline hill, Augustus’ building projects on the Capitoline defined Romulus as a leader who contributed to Roman religious and political development. As part of his restructuring of the hill’s architectural program, Augustus chose to build a second hut of Romulus in the vicinity of the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus sometime during the years 26-20 BC.

15 M. Jaeger, Livy’s Written Rome (Ann Arbor 1997) 5 calls the Capitoline “the center of Roman space” due to its importance for the religious and political development of the city during the Roman republic.


18 For the Capitoline’s new role in Augustan Rome, see D. Favro, The Urban Image of Augustan Rome (Cambridge 1996) 201-06. While Favro sees a decline in the Capitoline’s importance in Augustan Rome, I suggest that the Capitoline’s role is redefined by patrons and poets alike at the start of the Roman empire in order to emphasize the part the hill played in shaping the development of the community. By placing the hut of Romulus on the Capitoline, Augustus restored the memory of how the community that would evolve into the Roman empire had many of its political and religious origins on the Capitoline.

19 P. Gros, Aurea Templa: recherches sur l’architecture religieuse de Rome à l’époque d’Auguste (Rome 1976) 97. A. Balland, “La casa Romuli au Palatin et au Capitole,” REL 62 (1984) 57-80 argues that, since the first mention of the Capitoline hut is in literature from the Augustan period, it is likely that the hut was constructed in the time of Augustus. For evidence that the Capitoline hill was occupied as early as the ninth and eighth centuries BC, see Claridge [13] 229.
The Capitoline recreation of the hut stood in simple contrast to the impressive display of the golden-roofed temple of Jupiter. In the same precinct on the hill, Augustus also restored Romulus’ shrine to Jupiter Feretrius, the first temple built on the Capitoline. As the place where Romulus deposited his spoils of military victory, this temple first defined the role of the hill as central to the city’s military achievements (Livy 1.10.4-7; Mon. Anc. RG 4.1-8), and thus established an initial focal point on the site for Rome’s religious practices.20 Romulus was the first to celebrate the triple triumph on the hill, and later Augustus stopped his ritual of commemorating military victories on the Capitoline after he celebrated the triple triumph there in 29 BC.21 The ceremony of the triumph on the Capitoline suggests stability in this religious practice, and military success, from the kingship of Romulus to Augustus’ reign, with the hut of Romulus acting as a visual symbol of the continuity of a strong religious presence, and political leadership, on the hill. In this way, the emperor avoided too close a comparison between himself and Romulus on the Palatine by diverting attention to another site.

The emperor may have wished to do this because the Palatine was the site upon which Romulus stood in order to win the augury contest. When his brother Remus threatened the borders of the foundation that Romulus had established on the hill, Romulus murdered him (Livy 1.7.2f.). Thus, the Palatine was the setting for the murder, as the brothers fought over who would be king. Although many versions of the story of Romulus involved strife and civil discord as key factors in the founding of the city, by the time of Augustus’ reign there existed multiple stories of the city’s foundations and not all of them employed Remus as a murder victim. While the Romans were not notorious for conducting rites of human sacrifice, they occasionally resorted to the practice because they believed the hero-grave of a sacrificial victim protected the city (22.57.6). Wiseman points out Florus’ alternate version of the lives of Romulus and Remus (Flor. Epit. 1.1.8). It describes Remus’ death as a sacrificial offering of human blood that sanctified the city walls and ensured Rome’s safety.22 The death of Remus, therefore, does not have to be Romulus’ responsibility.

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While both the Palatine and Capitoline huts represent Romulus and the founding tradition of archaic Rome, this replication is never mentioned anywhere in the literary tradition. Virgil has Aeneas tour the hut of Evander, not Romulus’ hut on the Palatine (*Aen.* 8.359-65); and Virgil only briefly mentions the Capitoline hut of Romulus, which he refers to as *regia*, when it appears on the shield (8.654). Many theories have been advanced as to why Augustus had two huts of Romulus.

The most recent arguments suggest that the reconstruction that took place on both the Palatine and Capitoline may have prompted the building of a second hut. According to Balland, the impact of the Palatine restoration of the hill by Augustus, which included placing the emperor’s own residence next to the restored hut of Romulus, would have been lessened by the second hut’s appearance on the Capitoline. Balland regards Augustus’ construction of the Capitoline hut as creating a connection between Romulus and Jupiter that downplayed the effect of the Palatine restoration and Apollo’s new prominent position in Augustus’ cultural program. The newer and more important temple of Apollo on the Palatine overshadowed the Capitoline, which had been the religious center for the city during Rome’s foundation and the Roman republic.

Edwards suggests that the second hut of Romulus appeared on the Capitoline as a way to moderate the effect of the decline in the religious functions on the hill. During his reign, Augustus transferred some of the religious functions of the Capitoline to the Palatine. For example, in Tibullus’ lifetime, the Sibylline books had been kept in the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitoline hill, but they were moved to the Temple of Apollo Palatinus before Tibullus composed his poem 2.5: Suetonius mentions the placement of the books in gilded cages under the base of the Temple of Apollo Palatinus in 12 BC (*Aug.* 31.1). However, I propose that the Capitoline still played an important role for recalling many of the religious and political origins of the city, because Augustus placed Romulus’ hut on the Capitoline near the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus within a precinct of buildings that represented religious piety and order. The symbolism that the hut took on as a

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26 For more on the transfer of the books from the Palatine to the Capitoline, see Murgatroyd [6] 164; Zanker [13] 108.
27 M. F. Williams, “Lawgivers and the Rule of Law in the Aeneid,” *Latomus* 272 (2003) 218f. describes how Romulus is recognized as the inventor of laws and as a peacemaker in...
result of its Capitoline placement could evoke Augustan religious initiatives at the same time as it recalled Romulus’ leadership in the political and religious affairs of the city.

_E. Virgil, Aeneid_ 8.347-65

In Virgil’s _Aeneid_ 8, Aeneas is taken on a tour of the ancient city by the proto-founder Evander. The distinction between the urbane magnificence of the Augustan city and the ancient ruins, which by contrast often appear wild and overgrown, is evident. The tour begins with Evander’s tale of early Latium, which includes the story of the age of Saturn:

```latex
primus ab aetherio uenit Saturnus Olympo
arma loius fugiens et regnis exsul ademptis.
is genus indocile ac dispersum montibus altis
composuit legesque dedit, Latiumque uocari
maluit, his quoniam latuisset tutus in oris.
aurea quae perhibent illo sub rege fuere
saecula: sic placida populos in pace regebat,
deterior donec paulatim ac decolor aetas
et belli rabies et amor successit habendi.
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_Verg. Aen. 8.319-27_

Saturn first came from Olympus on high
escaping the might of Jupiter. In exile from a lost kingdom
he assembled from the lofty mount the race of untaught men.
He set the laws and called his kingdom Latium,
because safe within its boundaries he had hidden from view.
Under that king were the years which they name golden,
in this way guiding the people in gentle peace, until
little by little, a worse age, tainted, followed after,
bellicose and greedy.

In Virgil’s _Aeneid_, Saturn transforms from an exile to a proto-founder in order to establish the Golden Age in Latium. In addition, the description of Saturn’s rule during the Golden Age is a positive one, with Saturn “guiding the people in gentle peace.”28 The narrative also recalls an earlier passage in which the reign of Augustus reinvents the Golden Age and returns peace to Rome (6.791-95). Thus, the Golden Age community that Saturn established is gone in Aeneas’

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time, but will be restored in the distant future when Augustus becomes the first emperor.\(^29\) The hill in Augustus’ time will glow with the golden splendor of the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, yet it appears overgrown and rough to Aeneas and Evander:

\[\text{hinc ad Tarpeiam sedem et Capitolia ducit}
\text{aurea nunc, olim siluestribus horrida dumis.}\]

\[(\text{Verg. Aen. 8.347f.})\]

He leads him here to the Tarpeian rock and the Capitol now golden, then bristling with thorn-bushes.

The site’s future greatness is only a suggestion, barely hinted at and eclipsed by the bramble bushes. Long before the temple marks his following on the site, Jupiter establishes his attendance on the hill by thundering loudly to the Arcadians (8.351-54).\(^30\) Next, Evander points to the ruins of Saturn’s settlement on the Capitol, \emph{hanc Saturnus condidit arcem} (“Saturn founded this citadel,” 8.357), that existed even before Jupiter’s extensive reign. The visit to the Capitoline establishes the proto-urban history of Rome and demonstrates that, even before Romulus founded Rome, Saturn’s colony on the Capitol was a well-ordered community, as it had laws that the god enforced.\(^31\) The tour of the Capitoline area gives a positive representation of Saturn’s rule, but the Capitol itself is clearly uninhabited when Aeneas sees it.

Since the tour is meant to show Evander’s Rome, Romulus is not a central figure in Virgil’s description. Only a brief mention of him occurs before Aeneas sees the Capitoline, when Evander shows Aeneas the Lupercal (\emph{Aen.} 8.342-44). However, Romulus’ presence is felt as the tour ends at Evander’s Pallanteum, where Aeneas is welcomed into Evander’s humble home:

\[\text{talibus inter se dictis ad tecta subibant}
\text{pauperis Euandri, passimque armenta uidebant}
\text{Romanoque foro et lautis mugire Carinis.}
\text{ut uentum ad sedes, “haec” inquit “limina uictor}
\text{Alcides subiit, haec illum regia cepit.}\]


\(^30\) K. W. Gransden (ed.), \textit{Virgil: Aeneid 8} (Cambridge 1976) 130f. For the theme of social order as established by Romulus and reinforced by Augustus in Virgil’s \emph{Aeneid}, see Williams [27] 208-43.

\(^31\) Perkell [28] 20 notes that it is not Hesiod, but rather the Roman poets, who first envision the Golden Age as a community that acquires a sense of social responsibility.
While they were talking, they approached humble Evander’s home, all around they saw a herd of cattle lowing in the Roman forum and in splendid Carinae. When they had come to the dwelling, Evander said, “Triumphant Hercules entered this threshold; this palace received him. Dare, friend, to scorn wealth and imitate divine worth. Approach my poor home with kindness.”

The house of Evander is described instead of Romulus’ hut on the Palatine, but the fact that the hut is located on the site where Romulus will later have his settlement is suggestive of Romulus’ later attendance on the hill. For Virgil, the permanence of a leadership tradition on the hill was continued into the time of the principate, as Rome’s founding fathers—Evander, Romulus, and Augustus—all resided in the same place; and, in the case of Romulus and Augustus, the emphasis on the temporal distance between the two rulers was lessened by a visual highlighting of the proximity of their homes. Above all, for Virgil’s audience, Rome’s ascent to greatness from the settlement on the Palatine recalled Romulus’ rise to power on the hill in the city’s legendary past, and the magnificence of the Palatine in Augustus’ time.

Tibullus 2.5

Tibullus is a poet whose work neither overtly flatters Augustus, nor expresses any significant signs of dissent concerning contemporary political events. The conventions of elegy allow Tibullus, in the majority of his poems, to distance himself from themes of a life lived in the public-political arena, and instead to focus on love and the joys of a rural existence. Yet Tibullus 2.5 represents a marked departure from the elegiac theme of a quiet country life. Out of all of the poems in Tibullus’ corpus, this poem most closely resembles the work of his contemporaries, for whom the public affairs of the city were the subject of much commentary. But the poem also looks back to how Rome’s destiny was set in motion, and this concept is an equally significant part of both the Augustan

32 Edwards [12] 32f. suggests that, for Virgil’s audience, this description of Evander’s hut on the Palatine, here called regia (“palace”), recalled Augustus’ imperial residence.

transformation of the Palatine and of Tibullus’ poem.\textsuperscript{34} Certainly, Augustus’ presentation of Rome as a city modified and invigorated by the end of civil strife influenced literary and artistic presentations of the city and the values associated with it. The Augustan values of peace and an ordered society that appear in this poem suggest that Tibullus was, like his contemporary Virgil, participating in a dialogue on the virtues of the new regime when he recreated Rome’s archaic landscape as the precursor for Augustan Rome.

In his poem, Tibullus explores the events that led from Rome’s humble origins to the destined greatness of the city in the poet’s own time. Composed to commemorate a religious ceremony in the Temple of Apollo on the Palatine hill, the elegy celebrates Messalla’s son Messalinus’ induction into the priestly college of the \textit{quindecimviri sacris faciundis}. The priests, who were responsible for preserving, editing, and interpreting the Sibyline texts, also conducted ceremonial rites on the hill for Apollo and foreign gods (Livy 10.8.2).\textsuperscript{35} Apollo is the deity who is central to the poem and who provides the divine impetus for Tibullus’ composition.

Tibullus’ poem begins with a call to Apollo for inspiration, and the opening address ends with a request for guidance as Messalinus begins his official duty of interpreting the books (2.5.1-18). There follow descriptions of early proto-Rome and the Sibyl’s prophecy (2.5.19-38). She prophesies the future for Aeneas, the founder of Rome. His victory in war is the foundation for the imperial supremacy that the Sibyl predicts for Rome with Apollo’s aid (2.5.39-66). A mention of bad omens that identified the time of Caesar’s murder is relayed, along with a request for Apollo to bury this information in the water (2.5.67-80). Bountiful yield for farmers is foretold in anticipation of the celebration of the Parilla (2.5.81-104). A prayer to Apollo to ease the burden of Tibullus’ love for Nemesis, and further praise for Messalinus and his future military triumphs, end the poem (2.5.105-22). According to Gosling, the themes of Tibullus’ love for Nemesis and celebration of Messalinus’ prominent family, rather than direct approval of Augustus and his achievements, do not detract from the central theme of the poem: “Instead of using a myth or legend to illustrate his personal feelings, Tibullus has used his private relationship, as also the achievements of Messalla and Messalinus, to illustrate the larger issue of Rome’s greatness, founded on her legendary past.”\textsuperscript{36}

While Apollo is the primary god mentioned by Tibullus in his poem,\textsuperscript{37} I suggest that within the elegy Jupiter emerges as a key secondary figure whose

\textsuperscript{34} Gosling [4] 336f.  
\textsuperscript{35} See also Murgatroyd [6] 163-69.  
\textsuperscript{37} For Apollo’s importance in this elegy, see Gosling [4] 333-39.
role in establishing a new and peaceful Augustan age is central for understanding the significance of the Capitoline setting. In the poem, Tibullus’ use of the Capitoline and the reconstruction of the hut of Romulus on the Capitoline hill during Augustus’ reign are, I argue, evidence that the hill played a significant role in Augustan Rome because the hill contained the memory of how the city transformed from a modest gathering of huts into the community of Augustan Rome. An indirect reference to the Capitoline appears early in the elegy, when Apollo is asked to appear as he did when he hymned a song of Jupiter’s victory over Saturn:

Qualem te memorant Saturno rege fugato
Victori laudes concinuisse Iovi.

(Tib. 2.5.9f.)

They recall you as then, when Saturn was expelled from rule, you sang a song of tribute for Jove as victor.

Saturn’s reign in this elegy appears to be in contrast to a previous reference in Tibullus that recognizes Saturn’s kingship as a time when humans lived in effortless peace and without wars, and characterizes Jupiter’s reign as the beginning of endless strife and bloody conflict (1.3.35-50). In Tibullus 2.5, the end of Saturn’s reign in Latium brings the age of Jupiter, and it raises the following question: since physical effort on the part of humans to secure their own existence does not occur in the age of Saturn, does the arrival of Jupiter’s age indicate that the god has rescued humans from a too passive (albeit peaceful) form of survival? I suggest that Jupiter plays a role in the development of community and civilization in Tibullus 2.5: the establishment of new laws and an ordered society follows a reign characterized by a lack of labor and direction. The decline of Saturn’s Golden Age appears to save humans from an idle life in which they accomplish nothing and do not improve as a race.

38 Cf. Galinsky [14] 93 on the first Georgic: “the Golden Age that existed before Jupiter is shown not to be a desirable ideal because it represented slothful existence that required no mental or physical exertion.”

39 Both Bright [7] 75f. and Merklin [33] 301-14 read this passage as a sign of Tibullus’ regret over the recent violence of the civil war. However, Cairns [8] 85 sees this as a reversal of Tibullus’ previous beliefs (1.3): “This represents a change of view and an acceptance of the present as an age of peace and reason.” Gosling [4] 336 also sees the age of Jupiter as a positive development: “But we cannot escape the fact that Tibullus in 2.5 comes as close as he ever does to a political statement: that he accepts gladly the establishment of peace, and sees in it new opportunities for Rome, which he is prepared to express in terms of the saecular ideals that were current Augustan ideals.”
Thus, in Tibullus 2.5, Jupiter’s victory over Saturn is positive. The regulation of society is shown as beneficial here, even if war is the means by which order is maintained. Consequently, the Capitoline is a fitting site for the introduction of proto-Rome, as it is sacred to Jupiter, whose triumph ended the Age of Saturn. The origins of political and social development, along with a sense of community, will come from a proto-Rome gifted with labor and laws.

In place of Virgil’s Palatine settlement, Tibullus’ vision of the proto-city substitutes a scene of grazing cattle on the hill. This provides a distinct contrast to the Palatine in Tibullus’ day, which had a prominent display of temples and the casa Augusti (“house of Augustus”). Tibullus reminds the audience that the site has not yet been occupied by Romulus, and the scene described on both hills evokes Rome’s humble origins:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Romulus aeternae nondum formaverat urbis} \\
\text{Moenia, consorti non habitanda Remo,} \\
\text{Sed tunc pasecebant herbosa Palatia vaccae,} \\
\text{Et stabant humiles in Iovis arce casae.} \\
\text{(Tib. 2.5.23-26)}
\end{align*}
\]

Romulus had not yet constructed the walls of the eternal city that were not meant to contain his brother Remus. Back then cows fed off the grassy Palatine and humble huts stood on Jupiter’s citadel.

Tibullus’ narrative does not tell of Remus’ murder, but instead states that Remus will not inhabit the city with Romulus. But as Virgil’s description of Evander’s humble settlement on the Palatine demonstrates, Romulus’ absence does not mean that his presence is not felt on the site or in Tibullus’ story. By mentioning the walls of the city, which can suggest the alternative tradition

\[40\] For additional discussion of the benefits of Jupiter’s reign over Saturn’s Golden Age in Virgil, see Galinsky [14] 93-100; Perkel [28] 20-22. See also P. A. Johnston, *Vergil’s Agricultural Golden Age: A Study of the Georgics* (Leiden 1980) 66, who cites Ennius’ translation of Euhemerus’ *Sacred History* as giving a positive account of Jupiter’s overthrow of Saturn. Johnston [above, this note] points out that Jupiter’s role in Italy “is marked by his concern with improving the life of mankind. Jupiter encourages new discoveries (ap. Lact. 1.11.32), suppresses barbaric practices such as cannibalism (ap. Lact. 1.13.2) and establishes laws and customs (ap. Lact. 1.11.14).” For Jupiter’s legal authority in Virgil’s *Aeneid*, see Williams [27] 208-21.

\[41\] Bright [7] 75 points out that this is the first extant mention of Apollo hymning the victory song to Jupiter. For the role of Jupiter in Augustan religious policy, see J.R. Fears, “Jupiter and Roman Imperial Ideology,” *ANRW* 2.17.1 (1981) 56-66.

\[42\] Although Cairns [8] 72f. concludes that the violence associated with Romulus’s life meant that Aeneas became the more suitable founder for Tibullus’ poem.
of a human sacrifice protecting the city’s boundaries, this passage may allude to the other version of Remus’ death, and suggest another explanation of the city’s founding that did not involve the fratricide that took place on the Palatine. By suggesting an alternate location for the foundation, another image of Rome’s foundations can emerge, in addition to the familiar story of the murder of Remus.

Tibullus’ transfer of Evander’s settlement to the Capitoline highlights an aspect of Rome’s foundation that, I argue, focuses less on Remus’ death and more on the beginnings of a community that emphasized Rome’s civil and religious origins. His Capitoline community recalls the model of the hut of Romulus on the Capitoline. Markedly, Tibullus’ Capitoline is inhabited with people who exhibit a pious lifestyle with worship of agricultural gods. And an atmosphere of piety, peace and innocence characterizes the description that follows (2.5.27-38). If, as Murgatroyd and Maltby suggest, the humiles casae (“humble huts,” 2.5.26) remind Tibullus’ audience of the same phrase in Virgil (Ecl. 2.29) and of the contrast with the grander, more elaborate structures on the Capitoline in Tibullus’ day, then it is also possible to consider the hut that Augustus placed on the Capitoline as the inspiration for Tibullus’ site, since it too stood in marked contrast to the buildings around it. In particular, the description of the Capitoline in Tibullus’ poem is an allusion to the Augustan restoration that indicated how Rome’s religious and political community began with Romulus’ actions on the Capitoline. As the citadel of Jupiter, the site recalls Romulus’ religious and military activities dedicated to Jupiter Feretrius, which in turn recalls Augustus’ restoration of the temple Romulus built to Jupiter Feretrius on the Capitoline. Moreover, Tibullus’ choice of the phrase urbs aeterna (“eternal city,” 2.5.23) alludes to the Capitoline, and recalls the triumphs that are mentioned at the beginning and end of the poem.

This is the first recorded use of the term urbs aeterna in Latin literature; and it reminds the audience that, no matter how much Rome transforms into an

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43 Bright [7] 79 assumes that the reference to Remus is meant to indicate familial strife, but there is nothing in this passage that precludes the consideration of the other tradition of Remus as a sacrificial victim. C. Bannon, Brothers of Romulus: Fraternal Pietas in Roman Law, Literature and Society (Princeton, 1997) 169 argues that the passage is “ambiguous” and can refer either to the murder or the sacrifice.


urban center resplendent with new temples such as the one on the Palatine in which Messalinus’ ceremony took place, its lasting presence develops out of humble and rustic foundations, which are recalled by the community even in Augustus’ time. As a result, Tibullus’ vision of Augustan Rome extends beyond the immediate celebration of Messalinus’ induction on the Palatine; in Tibullus’ imagining of the mythic history of the city, his poem captures the dual nature of Rome’s character. By the start of the Roman empire, the hill had gained a religious and political significance so great that a reference to the hill could stand as a symbolic replacement for the city itself. Edwards suggests that the moment when the triumphator offered a sacrifice on the Capitoline was an extremely meaningful event for the city, as this was the time when both Roman general and Roman city became eternal and divine. Thus, Tibullus’ mention of the phrase urbs aeterna could recall either Rome or the Capitoline for his audience.

Tibullus uses the theme of the triumphator to begin and end his poem. Apollo is invoked at the start of the poem as a god of triumph (2.5.5f.), followed by a wish for Messalinus to be hailed as a conquering triumphator in Rome’s future military conquests (2.5.15-17). Tibullus’ use of Apollo as the central deity is reflective of Apollo’s role within the Augustan building program to signify Rome’s peace and prosperity in the emperor’s time. The mention of Apollo throughout Tibullus’ poem, and praise for Messalinus and his family, are indicative of Tibullus’ approval of the values of peace and prosperity that Augustus fostered in the new empire. Tibullus concludes his poem by expressing his wish to sing about Messalinus’ triumphal procession (2.5.115-22). Thus, the Capitoline, represented by triumphal imagery at the start and end of the poem, establishes a sense of continuity between the past and Augustan Rome.

While Tibullus’ Capitoline settlement is reminiscent of the topography of the Augustan city, many details from the proto-Roman landscape in Virgil’s Aeneid 8 also appear in Tibullus’ poem. Like Virgil’s Palatine settlement, it is not early Romans, but rather proto-Romans, whose simple lifestyle in Tibullus suggests a model of virtuous living. But Tibullus’ proto-Rome reverses many of Virgil’s key details: Saturn’s age is a threat to humans, the Palatine is

Augustus (Bristol 1992) 60 finds that the phrase urbs aeterna suggests an unchanging and “perfected” city, which stands in contrast to a “primitive pastoral” Rome. Hardie also notes that Livy uses a similar expression to urbs aeterna: in aeternum urbe condita, in immensum crescente (“in a city constructed for eternity and increasing without end”, 4.4.4.2).


unpopulated, and the Capitoline is the civilized area. Thus, Tibullus’ poem demonstrates how the dynamic nature of memory transforms the story of Rome’s origins over time, as even a well-known image from Roman literature, such as the portrait of the city’s origins, gains new meaning and memories for a community each time it is reinvented.

Tibullus, like Virgil, presents the theme of post-Actium Rome’s new and orderly saeculum for his audience’s consideration but, unlike Virgil, he does it without directly mentioning the emperor or any of his policies or accomplishments. In Tibullus, the Capitoline is a humble site that celebrates the achievements of the community, while the Palatine remains underdeveloped. Instead, Tibullus recognizes the Palatine’s prominence in his own time, as it is the hill upon which individual successes, such as Messalinus’ ceremony, are celebrated. Perhaps Tibullus did not mention Romulus’ or Evander’s settlement on the Palatine, because references to the hill in this context could recall the struggle for supremacy, and could be taken as a negative comment on Augustus’ appropriation of the site for his own use. Consequently, I suggest that Tibullus’ decision to place Evander’s proto-Rome on the Capitoline instead of the Palatine signifies that the poet’s vision of archaic Rome was in fact meant to highlight less violent aspects of Rome’s origins, including the early religious and political development of the city. While both Tibullus’ and Virgil’s landscapes evoke memories of the city of Romulus, Tibullus’ archaic city highlights Rome’s stability and the religious and political traditions initiated by Romulus and confirmed by Augustus on the Capitoline.

**Conclusion: Multiple Associations for Rome’s Foundations**

Memory played an important role in how Rome’s legendary past was created and contested by the community of Augustan Rome in both their landscape and their literature. In a study of the relationship between memory, landscape, and text, Edwards argues that it is through an event’s topographical placement that the Romans experienced multiple versions of their past. In particular, the transfer of a memory from one locale to another re-contextualized and

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51 Edwards [12] 42f.; cf. S. E. Alcock, *Archaeologies of the Greek Past: Landscape, Monuments and Memories* (Cambridge 2002) 1-35, who concludes that it is through descriptions of urban spaces and physical monuments that we can determine the patterns of remembrance and forgetfulness for a culture; F. Dupont, *Daily Life in Ancient Rome* (Oxford 1992) 74, who recognizes that understanding the importance of the topographical landscape of Rome is the key to perceiving how the culture experienced Rome’s past.
selectively edited prior versions of the account of an event.52 For the community of Augustan Rome, the past was easily reconstructed in multiple locations. Therefore, the place where an event occurred could be just as important to the story as what happened there. This meant that the physical landscape of the city took on significance as the dramatic setting for events; descriptions of the various locales held memories of the city’s past experiences imprinted on their monuments and in their topographical features.53 And the city as described by the poets in their texts reflected the changes that took place in the physical landscape in the Augustan Age during their lifetime.54 The presence of specific topographical sites in literature created a bridge between the legendary past, before the city of Rome took on a defined urban presence, and the transformation of the physical landscape of the Augustan city to reflect Rome’s origins. Therefore, the rustic setting of the Capitoline as *humiles in Iovis arce casae* is not merely an idyllic scene. Instead, Tibullus’ use of the landscape encourages his audience to take another look at the role that the hill played during the reign of Augustus in the concept of an *urbs aeterna*.


REVIEW ARTICLES

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READING AND RECEIVING:
ASPECTS OF CLASSICAL RECEPTION

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Reviewing (receiving?) works devoted to the theory and practice of classical reception and its associated scholarship is more than averagely likely to induce self-consciousness; you read me reading scholars reading Milton reading Virgil, and in doing so I am trying to synthesize a range of ‘kinds’ of reading of these works—as scholar, teacher, or imagined student—just as Milton reading Virgil does so as a Christian, and as a reader of Spenser (to name just two of many such possible sub-headings). Any introduction to the topic, whether theoretical or text-based, must aim both to open up these dizzily receding connections to the interested student, and to delimit them enough to provide meaningful access. These two volumes are trying to do different things for different groups of readers, but both may I think be said to succeed in this dual movement of provoking questions, and of offering a frame, or frames, in which those questions may be addressed.

Appropriately enough, both volumes, despite their differences, are organized as a series of ‘readings’ suitable for teaching and discussion, and both make valuable use of cross-reference; _Classical Literature and Its Reception,_ unusually for an anthology, is explicitly structured and signposted for cross-referral, and _Classics and the Uses of Reception_ gives a compelling and attractive sense of integration (though not, as Martindale notes in the introduction [p. 3], necessarily of agreement) between its wide range of short essays. The implied readership, however, is distinct; _Classical Literature and Its Reception_ is aimed at English students, and presents all its classical
material in translation and with elementary introductions, whereas *Classics and the Uses of Reception* is addressed to Classicists whose basic acquaintance with the texts and issues of the field can be assumed. ‘Reception’ in all its forms is an expanding field at undergraduate as well as graduate level, and one in which most students will begin, at least, with a marked imbalance of knowledge; skilled and experienced readers of English literature, who have no classical languages, and little experience of classical texts and genres; or classicists, who must gain expertise in the second field (whether literature of another language, philosophy, music or art) with which their particular instance of ‘reception’ is concerned. As such, introductory textbooks of various kinds are particularly important, and both these volumes fill a much-needed gap.

DeMaria and Brown’s anthology is arranged in two parts: first, extracts, all in verse, from English writers from Chaucer to Heaney, but with a weighting towards poets of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries; second, passages drawn from the classics, both Greek and Latin (but primarily Latin) from Homer to Juvenal. All these are also verse with the exception of book 7.44 of Thucydides (for comparison with Matthew Arnold’s *Dover Beach*). The classical texts are presented in English translations from a wide variety of periods, and the depth and variety of their versions is an additional complicating factor—but also a strength and challenge—of the volume as a teaching resource. (I was particularly pleased to see Marlowe’s excellent Ovid translations, and one at least of Ezra Pound’s Horatian odes.) The concise introductions to each author introduce the poet and his genre as well as directing the reader to relevant passages in the other half of the book.

Virgil, Horace and Ovid loom unsurprisingly large, both in the number of classical extracts provided, including nearly fifty pages of Virgil and over forty of Ovid, and in the number of times we are keyed to these authors in reading English passages. Perhaps inevitably, the shorter lyric passages that are closest to translations or imitations emerge best from this kind of prescribed comparison, and epic and lyric are in general better represented than non-epic hexameter verse of satire, epistle, or didactic. Horace *Epistles* 1.5, for instance, is introduced as an example of the ‘minor genre’ of invitation poem (p. 403), rather than as an element of the more significant genre of verse epistle. In general, the selection runs the risk of refracting our reading of Latin satire and epistle too narrowly through the constraints of the eighteenth century couplet, but this is a minor complaint and one easily remedied with supplementary texts.

The editors have inevitably had to be selective about the number of classical passages given for comparison with any given English poem, and some authors, both English and classical, come out of the selection better than others; John Milton, surely the heart of the volume, emerges particularly well (*Paradise Lost* is described without reservation as ‘the greatest poem ever written in English’, p. 66). For Milton’s *Lycidas*, Theocritus’ *Idyll* 1, Bion’s *Lament for Adonis*, Moschus’ *Lament for Bion* and Virgil’s *Eclogues* 5 and 10 are all given in translation. For most extracts, however, only one or two referenced texts are included, and this does mean that the
reader is inclined to trace (and therefore to see) complexities of allusive conversation more strongly in certain texts than in others. The indexes are helpful and well designed; a reader can look up an English poem and find a list of relevant classical passages included in the volume, and vice versa. The short introductions to each text, however, could in some instances be clearer; the reader must read it through to pick out the passages to which he or she is being referred, and the prose in these sections does not indicate whether classical passages noted are or are not among those included in the volume—a bold typeface, and page references, might have helped here, with perhaps a distinct couple of lines on suggested ‘further reading’ (that is, to passages not included in the volume). Similarly, there is no bibliography of suggested editions or related texts; this is just the kind of book, so likely to pique interest, which might benefit from some comment for the uninitiated on navigating among various editions and translations. On the whole, however, the principle of cross-reference works well, and the single-volume format with readily accessible introductions to each author at the most basic level will be a great boon to many students and teachers.

The clear and attractive presentation of the volume conceals considerable complexity. Even if we set aside any concerns about the certain identification of allusive or imitative models, for any given passage of English literature indebted to classical texts there may be more than one classical passage in play; the poet may be responding to the passage in the original language, in an English translation of his own period, or (in the case of Greek) a Latin translation of that passage. In addition, the editors of a volume of this sort must choose a particular translation of the classical passage in question, a further complication, and especially so if the translation chosen itself postdates the English poem; it seems a shame that the evident influence of Milton’s *Lycidas* upon Thomas Warton’s translation of the *Lament for Bion* (pp. 318-23)—here given as a source text for Milton’s poem—attracts no comment. Similarly there is (understandably) little attempt to denote in any depth intertextual relationships between classical authors. These issues matter, however, to the student of reception as well as to the traditional classicist because it makes a difference whether or not Milton, William Shakespeare or Seamus Heaney conceives of ‘his’ Virgil as himself a master of imitation. Once again, some ‘further reading’ might have helped to point the way.

This is in many ways a profoundly traditional volume, disseminating a traditional understanding of what we might mean by classical ‘reception’; one great poet (most probably from the sixteenth, seventeenth, or eighteenth century) reads the work of another and responds to it. Even the possibility of intertextual challenge or ironic allusion is broached only rarely and tentatively—in response to the difficulties of placing the tone of Ben Jonson’s *To Penshurst* the editors suggest that the elements of Martial in that poem might be adding a ‘certain urbanity’ or even a ‘knowing wink’ to the ‘dominant Horatian tone’ (p. 57). It would be good to see more awareness of this kind of intertextual conversation—not least because acknowledging possible complexity or even conflict in the choice of models would help to focus upon a major tacit conversation (or conflict) in most such work, that is, between Classical and
Christian (not only Biblical) material. No Christian authors are included under the ‘Classics’ here, which helps to preserve this rigid if silent distinction, although the introductory remarks to Chaucer, for instance, note the importance of Boethius to his work. But right through to the final English poem, Heaney’s *Bann Valley Eclogue*, the Classical world in these selections is held in productive tension with a Christian consciousness.

Martindale and Thomas’ volume is very far from being ‘traditional’ in this way; the essays include discussions of reception in the visual arts and in philosophy (including literary theory) as well as between items of literature. The central issues raised by DeMaria and Brown’s anthology—the relationship of Renaissance literature to that of the ancient world, the significance and influence of translation, the relationship between Christian culture and the appropriation of the classical world—are aspects relatively neglected by Martindale and Thomas. In fact, the relationship between Milton and Virgil discussed here by Craig Kallendorf, chapter 6, ‘Allusion as Reception: Virgil, Milton, and the Modern Reader’ (pp. 67-79), is the only such pair considered in either volume. The book is in essence a ‘reader’ of classical reception, understood rather broadly: that is, we find here both elegantly straightforward narrative accounts of the ‘reception history’ of a given work or period (such as Lorna Hardwick, chapter 17, ‘Remodeling Receptions: Greek Drama as Diaspora in Performance’ [pp. 204-15]; and Siobhán McElduff, chapter 15, ‘Fractured Understandings: Towards a History of Classical Reception among Non-Elite Groups’ [pp. 180-91], a fascinating piece on the circulation of classical texts among the non-elite in eighteenth and nineteenth century Ireland), as well as pieces of an almost entirely theoretical nature including William W. Batstone, chapter 1, ‘Provocation: The Point of Reception Theory’ (pp. 14-20). The aim, however, seems to have been to marry theory with case-study, and most of the essays in both halves of the volume blend theoretical considerations with some form of exemplary discussion of an individual text.

The book is divided into two main parts: part 1, ‘Reception in Theory’ (pp. 21-137), comprised of ten chapters of very varied focus, and part 2, ‘Studies in Reception’ (pp. 138-287), again of ten essays. Martindale’s Introduction, ‘Thinking Through Reception’ (pp. 1-13), and Batstone’s short chapter, the circulation of which initiated the discussions from which the volume ultimately grew, precede this format. The book concludes with Duncan F. Kennedy, ‘Afterword: The Uses of “Reception”’ (pp. 288-93), as well as a full and useful bibliography (including various items of suggested and related reading as well as the works cited) and an index.

The length of contributions has apparently been carefully policed. The longest is sixteen pages (excluding illustrations), and the vast majority are eleven or twelve pages long. This has certain advantages: of equity, obviously, and also of the volume’s reach and range—this is not an especially long book but it manages to cover a good deal of ground. The manageable and comparable lengths of the contributions also make the volume particularly suitable for setting essays for assigned reading. This feature has, however, been bought at some cost; in the first part (‘Reception in
most of the essays take the form of a substantial theoretical discussion, followed by a brief explication of a possible application to a particular work. Given the theoretical brief in this portion of the volume, such examples are appropriately subsidiary to the theoretical argument advanced, but in several of these essays I felt the discussion of classical texts or passages were reduced to such glancing brevity as to be of limited use. Kenneth Haynes, chapter 4, ‘Text, Theory, and Reception’ (pp. 44-54), for instance, deals concisely and well with one complex debate (on Gadamer and Habermas), and in so doing lays useful ground work for several later essays, but the second portion, on Peter Winch’s work and the interpretation of Achilles in the Iliad (pp. 52-54) seems underwritten. A couple of essays in the first half of the volume in particular are effective ‘overviews’ of a topic, but not much more.

A similar combined problem and challenge recurs in the second part of the book (‘Studies in Reception’), although in an almost reverse direction. These essays are focused upon individual instances of reception, and many of them are quite fascinating, but in several the closing remarks upon the significance of the instance under discussion seem rushed or over-compressed. It is noticeable that the essays by Elizabeth Prettejohn, chapter 19, ‘Reception and Ancient Art: The Case of the Venus de Milo’ (pp. 227-49), and Simon Goldhill, chapter 20, ‘The Touch of Sappho’ (pp. 250-273), which are two of the most effective essays in terms of combining close tracing of a particular theme or instance with thought-provoking implications, are also the longest, at sixteen and fifteen pages respectively even when the illustrations are discounted. Twelve pages is perhaps quite a taxing limit, and both of the editors have allowed themselves to creep over it—although Tim Whitmarsh, chapter 9, ‘True Histories: Lucian, Bakhtin, and the Pragmatics of Reception’ (pp. 104-15), rises to the challenge with an admirably succinct piece of great clarity and interest; it can be done, and to exhilarating effect.

Despite these reservations, the enforced brevity makes for a quick pace for the reader, and is overall a source of stimulation. Moreover, the problems it creates are to some extent mitigated by the real sense of internal dialogue and interaction that is a particular pleasure of the volume—one contributor’s rather glancing treatment of a point can be held up, and placed against, a refraction of the same idea in another essay. In addition, rather general remarks in the first half naturally invite comparison with, and consideration against, the specificities of the second; it would not be hard I think to find several very productive pairs of this kind for seminar reading. The physical quality of the volume is good, and I found few errors. The illustrations in chapter 18, Pantelis Michelakis, ‘Reception, Performance, and the Sacrifice of Iphigenia’ (pp. 216-26), and chapters 19 and 20 (all concerned with the visual arts) are mostly effective and well reproduced, though the small and rather dark reproduction, especially of the second version of the painting, mars the piece by John Henderson, chapter 21, ‘(At) the Visual Point of Reception: Anselm Feuerbach’s Das Gastmahl des Platon; or, Philosophy in Paint’ (pp. 274-87).

Ralph Hexter, chapter 2, ‘Literary History as a Provocation to Reception Studies’ (pp. 23-31), concludes his essay with a call for a ‘thick’ description of the
literary context for classical reception at a given point and place (pp. 30f.). *Classics and the Uses of Reception* is itself a kind of ‘thick’ snapshot of the state of thinking about classical reception in 2007 and despite minor caveats, and some unevenness, it is an enormously valuable one. If *Classical Literature and Its Reception* is ‘thinner’ in scope, the possible range of association it provokes, and in particular its value as a teaching resource for those coming to the subject for the first time, commends it very highly.

**COMPANIONS TO GREEK DRAMA**

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These two volumes are welcome additions to the most useful and rapidly growing Duckworth Companions series, the aim of which is to provide ‘accessible introductions to ancient tragedies’ through discussions of ‘the main themes of a play and the central developments in modern criticism’, which also address ‘the play’s historical context and the history of its performance and adaptation’ (cover). There is a standard format, which includes endnotes, a bibliography, a glossary, a chronology and an index. In common to Roisman and Griffiths are chapters on the mythical background and *Nachleben*. The discussions of the plays themselves, however, show considerable variations, caused by the differences between the two plays and the issues that they raise, and by the particular interests and emphases of Roisman and Griffiths.

Roisman begins with a preface that informs us (unnecessarily) that the *Philoctetes* is ‘an extraordinary and timeless play’ (p. 7). Chapter 1, ‘Theatre and Performance’ (pp. 9-23), offers an admirably succinct overview of the conditions of performance for fifth-century tragedy (it is also much fuller and more satisfactory than Griffiths’ equivalent section). There are, however, some rather strange and/or misleading comments. Thus, for example, we are told that the many other tragedians (apart from the canonical three) ‘have left only their names’ (p. 9). Then again, after being informed that ‘we have relatively few certainties about fifth-century Greek drama’ (p. 9), we are asked to accept that the three tragedians for the Great Dionysia in any given year were selected ‘from among the many applicants’ (p. 10), that the *mêchanê* (crane) was ‘fixed to the left side of the stage-building’ (p. 14), and that
gesture was used ‘only to a limited extent’ (p. 18). It is stated that ‘songs’ make up around thirty per cent of the lines of the Philoctetes, and that a Greek tragedy ‘generally ends with a choral song, sung as the chorus exits the orchestra’ (p. 15).

In chapter 2, ‘The Myth’ (pp. 24-40), Roisman offers an excellent discussion of the various sources of the Philoctetes myth, especially the ways in which Sophocles may have adapted it (though the later treatment in chapter 4 of the Homeric intertext could have been flagged). Once again, however, there are some strange comments. For example, after noting that most of the possible sources for the tragedians (apart from the Homeric poems) are lost, Roisman goes on to say ‘Whether this is because texts have not survived or because the bulk of mythic lore was oral, we do not know’ (p. 24). But, for a start, we do know about Sophocles’ use of the Epic Cycle. Then again, we are told that the fact that Aeschylus and Euripides had previously written a Philoctetes play ‘does not necessarily mean that Sophocles actually created his version after they did theirs . . .’ (p. 26). I can only conclude that Roisman means that Sophocles could have conceived his idea of how to handle the story years before he wrote his play. As Roisman has expressed it, however, it would be somewhat confusing for the aspiring student of tragedy. In addition, the entire Epic Cycle appears to be ascribed to Lesches (p. 30), and a very good discussion of the Neoptolemus figure in surviving literature omits any mention of Euripides’ Andromache (pp. 37-39).

Chapter 3, ‘The Play’ (pp. 41-56), gives a useful plot summary, while raising various issues as it goes. I just note another rather misleading comment (p. 130 n. 3). Roisman casts doubt on the approach often taken that the three possible methods of getting Philoctetes to Troy (force, trickery and persuasion) all fail. She argues that force is never really tried, that trickery does work till Neoptolemus’ conscience gets the better of him, and that Heracles does persuade Philoctetes. It is given, however, that Philoctetes’ possession of the bow will ensure his victory in a trial of force, in the event that trickery does fail, and that human persuasion does not work. Roisman also wants the trader to be Odysseus in disguise, despite what he says in the prologue, but it seems to make more dramatic sense to understand Odysseus as being behind the scenes, manipulating and pulling strings rather than doing the ‘dirty work’ himself.

There are certainly positives in chapter 4, ‘Contexts’ (pp. 57-71). Thus attention is nicely drawn to the climate of uncertainty in the play that can be summed up by the question ‘What shall I do?’ (p. 61). And it is suggested that this is basically why Sophocles introduces Neoptolemus into the story. Roisman also makes a good point about the Sophoclean strategy of ‘establishing Homeric underpinnings for his play and then deliberately departing from them’ (p. 61). The chapter as a whole, however, is somewhat discursive, starting with Homer and proceeding via Athenian democracy to the sophists and Aristophanes’ Clouds, the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian War and so to Pericles, Pericles’ death and the Sicilian expedition. The conclusion is that the sense of uncertainty in the Philoctetes may well stem from the circumstances in Athens following the death of Pericles. Now there is no doubt that Sophocles must have been affected, like everyone else, by events in his lifetime, and
that what he wrote would have reflected his life experience in some way. The concept of uncertainty, however, is not exactly an unknown in Greek literature prior to the last quarter of the fifth century!

In the next three chapters, Roisman approaches the play through its characters: in chapter 5, ‘Odysseus and Philoctetes’ (pp. 72-87); chapter 6, ‘Neoptolemus’ (pp. 88-105); and chapter 7, ‘Heracles’ (pp. 106-11). As far as Odysseus and Philoctetes are concerned, she argues against the view that basically labels the former as ‘bad’ and the latter as ‘good’, rejecting ‘oversimplification’ in favour of moral complexity and ambiguity (p. 72). Thus, despite his clearly negative aspects, there is something to be said for Odysseus’ actions (p. 75). Similarly, the ‘destructiveness of Philoctetes’ fury’ (p. 79) and the fact that he is ‘unable to give up his rancour’ (p. 83) significantly modify the hero’s claims for sympathy. And it is through the portrayal of Odysseus and Philoctetes that Sophocles shows ‘the enormous complexity of the choices facing Neoptolemus’ (p. 87). Few would disagree with this. What is obscured in such an analysis, however, when it is left hanging in the balance, is the fact that Odysseus is ultimately routed and discredited—a surprise awaits us, however, in chapter 7!

When we come to the discussion of Neoptolemus in chapter 6, we encounter further problems. Roisman’s understanding is that ‘Neoptolemus does act honourably in the end and does show a change of heart. This does not, however, mean that the play demonstrates the triumph of physis over nomos’ (p. 103). Although she thankfully eschews that mischievous position that reads Neoptolemus as simply a base liar, she nevertheless concludes, pointing to the young man’s ‘rapid corruption’ and ‘the skill with which he lied’ that we are dealing with ‘a combination of Odysseus’ teaching and natural inclinations, or physis, in his conduct’ (p. 103). Well and good. There is no escaping the fact, however, that his basic nobility or honesty, which he has presumably inherited from Achilles (what other source could there be?), is what does triumph in the end.

The chapter on Heracles is a let-down. We are informed that the divinized hero’s injunction for co-operative action on the part of Philoctetes and Neoptolemus indicates a philosophical shift from ‘Homeric to Athenian society’ since hoplites fought in a closed phalanx (pp. 106f.). But it takes more than two ‘to phalanx’, so to speak. More disappointingly, we find that Roisman’s interpretation all through has been coloured by the bathetic theory, to which she subscribes, that Heracles is really Odysseus in disguise. One of the arguments used is even that if this is not the case, then Philoctetes would be the only extant play (remember that there are only seven) to use the deus ex machina (p. 109). The theory, of course, makes a total mockery of the moral issues raised in the play.

All in all, then, this is certainly a provocative presentation of the play that engages with all the hotly debated issues. My main concern is that it might be too ‘Odyssean’ for the inexperienced readers at whom it is aimed.\footnote{A few technical points: talk of ‘the institution of the chorégoi’ should have been avoided by rewriting (p. 127 n. 3); there is an incorrect and confusing use of the word ‘It’}
In her contribution to the series, Griffiths has the rather more daunting task of trying to bring ‘order’ to the multi-dimensional, not to say self-contradictory and chaotic, figure of Heracles which springs up like a hydra from Euripides’ play. In general, she succeeds admirably in drawing the reader’s attention to a great variety of theoretical approaches and perspectives on the Heracles, while remaining lucid and concise. The strain of trying to handle such a mass of material within the constraints of her brief does, however, show at times. Griffiths draws on and engages with a much wider range of modern scholarship than Roisman does, and this is reflected in her bibliography of nineteen pages (as opposed to the nine pages of Roisman). In general, her references are highly pertinent. At times, however, we appear to be in the territory of misguided selection or footnoting for its own sake. I am thinking here, among a number of examples, of p. 135 n. 14 where, as referencing for a general comment about one of Sophocles’ plays, we read ‘On the Women of Trachis, see Bowman, “Prophecy and Authority in the Trachiniae”; Sorum, “Monsters and the Family: the Exodus of Sophocles Trachiniae”’. Without in any way wishing to belittle the value of these two works, are they really the two most useful starting points for the new reader?

In Chapter 1, ‘Introduction’ (pp. 9-14), Griffiths outlines a much more sophisticated theoretical framework for an understanding of her subject than Roisman does and, in connection with the Heracles myth, she delves into such areas as the conflicting claims of the ‘universality’ and ‘cultural and social construct’ approaches. Chapter 2, ‘Heracles and Greek Myth’ (pp. 15-29), is a concise discussion of the complexities of the subject of Heracles and myth which nevertheless ranges widely, even touching on aspects of the modern world and the general concept of ‘the hero’. I just pause over a quotation from the Poetics being described as belonging to ‘the early fourth century’ (p. 15).

Chapter 3, ‘Euripides, Heracles and Greek Tragedy’ (pp. 30-41), offers another wide-ranging discussion which moves from an all too brief account of the context of fifth-century drama, to a consideration of Heracles in tragedy and comedy, and then to an initial treatment of Euripides as a playwright, with even a glance at the idea of metatheatre at the end. Cursory indeed, but nevertheless pleasingly coherent. A few notes of caution. The orchestra of the theatre of Dionysus is stated categorically to have had an altar at its centre (p. 30); a quote from Goldhill, ‘Programme Notes’, will have the reader searching the bibliography in vain (p. 31); and we are said to possess today nineteen plays by Euripides plus the Cyclops plus the Rhesus (p. 32).
The richest (and longest) chapter in the book, chapter 4, ‘Dramatic Structure and Unity’ (pp. 42-64), now follows. An initial plot summary is then enhanced by a more detailed investigation of each scene approached through speculation about its possible original staging. This is capped by nuanced discussions of the relationship between the theatre architecture and the idea of ‘the house’, key imagery (in particular bird and boat imagery), and concepts of vision and storytelling. Various approaches to the question of the play’s dramatic unity or lack of it complete this most rewarding chapter.

Chapter 5, ‘Family Values’ (pp. 65-80), is a closely argued assessment of Greek ideas of family and the different types of family relationships in the play. The final section on Lycus and the debate on the bow, however, seem artificially stitched on to this discussion. The short Chapter 6, ‘Violence and Madness’ (pp. 81-90), starts a little uncertainly without a clear sense of direction. The first sub-heading is ‘The death of Lycus and the role of song’, but this is misleading and the link with ‘song’ is rather forced. The discussion becomes stronger when it moves on to Iris and Lyssa, the madness of Heracles, and the possible reasons for Her’s attack. There is a very useful coverage of the different scholarly approaches to the madness that focuses on the question of whether this is imposed and ‘unfair’ or whether it stems from an inherent aspect of the hero. Chapter 7, ‘Suicide and the Gods’ (pp. 91-99), another shortish chapter, does struggle to find a focus. The question of suicide and Heracles’ ultimate rejection of this is followed by a discussion of the divine-human connection and the link between storytelling and tragedy. The chapter concludes with a look at Zeus and then Athena who provides the transition to the treatment of Theseus in the next chapter. One gets the strong impression that a brief chapter like this simply cannot do justice to the ‘big’ issues at stake.

Chapter 8, ‘Theseus and the Role of Friendship’ (pp. 100-13), is a little problematic and some might well say that Griffiths is in fact ‘over-problematizing’ the Athenian hero’s intervention—she follows the line which raises significant doubts about the nature and effectiveness of his ‘friendship’. Considerable emphasis is placed on Theseus’ bad behaviour in other stories and sources without any real grappling with the general issue of whether any of this can fairly be said to be relevant to this particular play. Griffiths also moves into the minefield that involves the play’s possible date, the war, and what Euripides might be saying to his fellow citizens in this context. She ends indeed with Alcibiades and the claim that the story could be taken as a ‘warning to value family structures, rather than pursue individual aims and friendships’ (p. 113).

The final Nachleben chapter is an extremely brave effort, given that there have been relatively few documented productions/adaptations of this play. Because of the vast ‘afterlife’ of Heracles himself, however, Griffiths includes some of this material in her discussion, which is announced as having twin foci—‘What, if anything, does the play have to say to modern audiences? How have changing fashions and interpretations of Heracles brought us to his point?’ (p. 114). The meaning of the
second question is a little unclear and the chapter overall lacks a certain coherence, though it does provide much interesting information.\textsuperscript{2}

Overall, this is a very successful book. In general, I like Griffiths’ approach to interpretation—she offers a wide range of approaches from the scholarly literature and, while usually not coming out with ‘the definitive’ interpretation herself, from time to time she indicates particular views as ‘plausible’, while at the same time pointing to other factors which still have to be taken into account. Perhaps the main problem remains the fact that a short book like this simply cannot do justice to the material and, in a sense, Griffiths ironically shoots herself in the foot by attempting to introduce too many open-ended dimensions into an introductory study. For all that, though, this is an admirable resource that may well stimulate further interest and reading.

\textbf{ANOTHER COMPANION TO GREEK DRAMA}

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This book is part of the Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World series. As the series has two particular strands, one of which is Literature and Culture, it is not surprising that there is a companion to Greek tragedy. Given the fact that basic information about Greek tragedy is easily available elsewhere and introductory texts on the subject are appearing constantly, however, it is not unreasonable to wonder whether or not there is a need for another one. Furthermore, weighing in at 504 pages and comprising thirty-one chapters by different scholars, this is a ‘heavy’ companion. The chapters are arranged into four sections that bring together similar concerns, though each chapter is independent treatment of a particular theme and is immediately followed by a helpful ‘Further Reading’ note. The \textit{Companion} is obviously intended as a reference work and will be a very valuable addition to library shelves of universities with students of Classical civilization. In fact, several contributions are truly excellent and will undoubtedly serve as introductory reference points for a long time.

\textsuperscript{2} There is a rogue quotation mark (p. 122 at the beginning of line 9); and there is a perhaps inevitable substitution of ‘Griffiths’ for ‘Griffith’ (pp. 125, 145 n. 37) with reference to Mark Griffith, ‘The King and Eye: The Rule of the Father in Greek Tragedy’, \textit{PCPhS} 44 (1998) 20-84.
The first section, ‘Contexts’, has seven chapters that survey tragedy’s historical, religious, political, and artistic backgrounds. In chapter 1, ‘Fifth-Century Athenian History and Tragedy’ (pp. 3-22), Paula Debnar takes the reader through a narrative of Athenian history in the fifth century that is interspersed with discussions of particular tragedies. The aim is to show how, if at all, tragedy is to be seen as historical. In chapter 2, ‘Tragedy and Religion: The Problem of Origins’ (pp. 23-37), Scott Scullion considers the possibility that the origins of tragedy lie in religion. The issue about the origins of tragedy is notoriously controversial, and Scullion adopts a sceptical view on its religious ones. As the title of chapter 3, ‘Dithyramb, Comedy, and Satyr-Play’ (pp. 38-54), indicates, Bernd Seidensticker examines the other genres that were performed at Athens’ public festivals and considers mutual influences between these different literary forms. In chapter 4, ‘Tragedy’s Teaching’ (pp. 55-70), Neil Croally outlines the evidence for the didactic nature of tragedy. The chapter is structured around three questions and Croally outlines concisely what he developed at book length on Euripides.1

In chapter 5, ‘Tragedy and the Early Greek Philosophical Tradition’ (pp. 71-82), William Allan considers how tragedy reflected, or even contributed to, the development of Greek philosophical concerns before Plato and Aristotle. The chapter is an excellent resource for this topic and, importantly, Allan stresses the need not to neglect tragedy’s intellectual context in favour of its civic and political context. An aspect of the latter context is considered by Christopher Pelling in chapter 6, ‘Tragedy, Rhetoric, and Performance Culture’ (pp. 83-102), a very accessible introduction to what might otherwise be quite abstruse material for a non-specialist reader. Jocelyn Penny Small makes the final contribution in the first section in chapter 7, ‘Pictures of Tragedy?’ (pp. 103-19), where she dismisses the idea that vase-painting contains depictions of tragedy. While her scepticism is well-founded it is, arguably, overstated for a collection of essays aimed at a non-specialist.2

The second section is called ‘Elements’. Its six chapters examine features that distinguish this genre. Michael Anderson’s contribution is chapter 8, ‘Myth’

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2 Small is undoubtedly right when she argues that we cannot establish direct correspondence between the image on a vase and a particular tragedy. The idea, however, that this means that a vase-painter was never influenced by a tragic performance is just as weak as the assumption, which Small attributes to the non-sceptical Classicists, that it must always depict a tragedy. For example, Small dismisses the idea that five Attic vases from the second half of the fifth century BC were influenced by the production of Sophocles’ Andromeda (pp. 105f.). It is possible that the painters were influenced by a production in which the binding of Andromeda was a part of the dramatic action. In contrast with Euripides’ Andromeda of 411 BC that began with a bound heroine, the existing fragments of Sophocles’ tragedy hint that the binding was part of the action. So there is reason to be sceptical about Small’s arch-scepticism and to move towards a more central interpretative position.
(pp. 121-35). It lapses into a narrative of plot types and innovations, but it contains many great points. Anderson’s piece is appropriately followed by Deborah Roberts, chapter 9, ‘Beginnings and Endings’ (pp. 136-48), who treats these topics in tragedies and how they relate to myth. In chapter 10, ‘Lyric’ (pp. 149-66), Luigi Battezzato discusses the sung elements in Greek tragedy. He begins by looking at the formal and structural aspects of the sung element before considering its effects and place in tragedy. Michael Halleran considers very effectively the arrangement of non-lyric sequences of tragedy in chapter 11, ‘Episodes’ (pp. 167-82). After a general overview, he discusses three types of episodes—three-actor scenes, messenger scenes and agon scenes—in the three tragic poets before an appraisal of the Medea in particular. The chapter does an excellent job in conveying a sense of the structure and its effect on dramatic action. In chapter 12, ‘Music’ (pp. 183-93), Peter Wilson examines the evidence for the musical element in tragedy. It is, understandably, one of the briefer contributions, though it gives a good impression of what is lost. The section closes with John Davidson in chapter 13, ‘Theatrical Production’ (pp. 194-212). It is a full, though rather dry, list of issues related to physical aspects of the Theatre of Dionysus. Some illustrations would have helped the reader and it is odd that Davidson never states that the tragic poets were responsible for managing the performance of their own works.

The third section, ‘Approaches’, is the largest part in the Companion. The initial three chapters in this section comprise analyses of tragedies by Suzanne Said, chapter 14, ‘Aeschylean Tragedy’ (pp. 215-32); by Ruth Scodel, chapter 15, ‘Sophoclean Tragedy’ (pp. 233-50); and by Justina Gregory, chapter 16, ‘Euripidean Tragedy’ (pp. 251-70). Each is informed and engaging in its own right. These chapters are followed by Martin Cropp’s very useful chapter 17, ‘Lost Tragedies: A Survey’ (pp. 271-92). His survey of the lost plays of the three major tragic poets is wedged between analyses of early tragedy (pp. 272-74) and other fifth-century tragic poets (pp. 286-90). Five of the remaining six chapters address specific themes, though the next one in sequence is about a particular interpretative approach to Greek tragedy. In chapter 18, ‘Tragedy and Anthropology’ (pp. 293-304), Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood presents a concise description of her anthropological approach to interpretation. This method, with its ‘cultural filters’ and ‘zooming and distancing’, will already be known to scholars who are familiar with her work, though I could not help thinking that this chapter’s presence was something of an anomaly.  

Douglas Cairns, in chapter 19,
‘Values’ (pp. 305-20), provides a dense discussion of ethical concerns in tragedy. It ranges from societal relations to human-divine interaction embracing concepts like dikê, aidôs and hubris and concludes with an examination of Sophocles’ Ajax. By stressing the difficulties involved in determining what precisely the Athenians believed, Cairns presents a challenging and sophisticated reading to the non-specialist reader and/or undergraduate student. The divine element in the chapter leads neatly into Donald Mastronarde’s chapter 20, ‘The Gods’ (pp. 321-32). It covers visible presences and background influences in tragedies, and also raises the issue of mortal misgivings about the gods. The gods are also present in Mark Griffith’s chapter 21, ‘Authority Figures’ (pp. 333-51). He takes the reader through four broad fields and structures of authority: these are the public, domestic, religious and cultural. Judith Mossman contributes chapter 22, ‘Women’s Voices’ (pp. 352-65), a chapter on women in Greek tragedy, which is quite sophisticated for the non-specialist. It examines strategies for interpreting women’s speeches and possible feminine characteristics of spoken elements in tragedy. The final chapter in this section is Mary Ebbott’s chapter 23, ‘Marginal Figures’ (pp. 352-76), which examines some categories of such figures, such as slaves, and argues that their marginality usually confirms Athenian attitudes and conventions.

The fourth and final section is ‘Reception’. It deals with the afterlife of the plays covering transmission, interpretation and re-performance from antiquity to modern times. In chapter 24, ‘Text and Transmission’ (pp. 379-93), David Kovacs presents a concise and informative history of the transmission of the texts of Greek tragedy. Stephen Halliwell, in chapter 25, ‘Learning from Suffering: Ancient Responses to Tragedy’ (pp. 394-412), examines a variety of critical responses to tragedy in antiquity. It covers the responses from Classical Athens (Aristophanes, Plato and Aristotle), Stoic philosophers and Longinus. In chapter 26, ‘Polis and Empire: Greek Tragedy in Rome’ (pp. 413-27), Vassiliki Panoussi considers some effects of the reception of Greek tragedy on Roman literature by outlining some patterns and motifs in Greek tragedy which are employed by Virgil, Ovid and Seneca. The Companion remains in Italy with Salvatore Di Maria, chapter 27, ‘Italian Reception of Greek Tragedy’ (pp. 428-43), but leaps forward a millennium in order to consider the influence of Greek tragedy on the tragedy of the Italian Renaissance. In chapter 28, ‘Nietzsche on Greek Tragedy and the Tragic’ (pp. 444-58), Albert have perceived the hymn as being sung also by the chorus of Athenian men in the present. This perception is important, because in the world of the spectators the Erinyes were indeed worshipped, and this fact was inevitably activated for them through the chorus’s singing of this hymn’ (p. 298).

Although the point of the piece on Ovid is, admittedly, to highlight some motifs of Greek tragedy in the Procne story of the Metamorphoses, it is still odd that Panoussi does not once refer to Sophocles’ Tereus. An excellent discussion of other reception-related issues in the Procne story in Ovid is by D. Curley, ‘Ovid’s Tereus: Theater and Metatheater’, in A. H. Sommerstein (ed.), Shards from Kolonos: Studies in Sophoclean Fragments (Bari 2003) 163-97.
Henrichs offers a fascinating biographical account of the evolution of conception of tragedy which is found in Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy* and the critical reception of that work. Ismene Lada-Richards’ chapter 29, ‘Greek Tragedy and Western Perceptions of Actors and Acting’ (pp. 459-71), will be heavy going for a non-specialist reader. Starting with the metatheatricality of Euripides’ Helen, a premise that is far from uncontroversial, and the anecdote about the actor Polus in Aulus Gellius’ *Attic Nights* 6.5, Lada-Richards gives an account of the role of the actor in Greek tragedy and its influence on European performance history and the theory of the same. Herman Altena considers responses to, and issues related to the production of, contemporary performances of Greek tragedy in the penultimate chapter 30, ‘The Theater of Innumerable Faces’ (pp. 472-89). As many people experience Greek tragedy nowadays through contemporary translation and adaptation, it is appropriate that Paul Woodruff examines issues related to translation in the final chapter 31, ‘Justice in Translation: Rendering Ancient Greek Tragedy’ (pp. 490-504). It is a lucid and informative discussion. Its opening metaphor of translation as a lifeboat, however, and the concluding observations based on several translations of a passage of Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* could be interpreted as a negative swipe at the Greekless reader.5 This interpretation is probably wrong because it would be an unfortunate note on which to end a work that does so much to help a Greekless reader grapple with the issues and complexities of reading Greek tragedy.

As noted at the outset of this review, the wide availability of introductory material to Greek tragedy means that any new work entering the arena must fight hard for its very existence. This Blackwell Companion has staked a claim for longevity. Some contributions will not last long, but many are likely to appear as required reading in the bibliographies of courses on Greek tragedy for a long time. The Companion has one shortcoming: this is the absence of an overall introduction or, what would have been better still, introductions to each of the four sections. This was an opportunity lost. Although the book is undoubtedly intended as a reference work, such introductory pieces could have set the scene for the state of scholarship in the various areas at the start of the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, there is much to recommend. This Companion is a heavyweight who will be faithful to students of Greek tragedy for a long time.

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5 It would, of course, be an impossible task to cover every English translation, though some other notable ongoing translations such as those in the series *Greek Tragedy in New Translations* published by Oxford University Press and in the series *Cambridge Translations from Greek Drama* published by Cambridge University Press might have got a mention in the further reading.
GREEK AND ROMAN SEXUALITY:
A NEW LOOK AT THE ANCIENT SOURCES

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Any book that aims to provide a selection of sources on sexuality in Greek and Roman antiquity faces an almost Herculean task, both in terms of the sheer number—literary as well as non-literary—left to us by the ancients, and in terms of the almost endless variety. This is not surprising, since sexuality is such an integral part of human existence, and was perhaps even more so in the ancient world. It pervaded every aspect of life and had many facets.

With the exception of a relatively small number of non-literary sources and a few texts not easily accessible, the vast majority of texts selected by Johnson and Ryan are from the better-known authors in the classical canon. Furthermore, in their choice of a number of sources, the authors have clearly accepted a very wide working definition of sexuality. The authors do not explain their selection criteria, however, except to state that their aim was ‘to provide documents that will serve as illustrations of specific aspects of sexual life in Greece and Rome’ (p. xix). One also looks in vain for some coherent organizing principle not imposed from the outside by the authors, but which is organically appropriate to the topic. Sometimes the titles of the subcategories introduced by the authors oversimplify the content of the sources they are intended to define, or are misleading.

In an introduction, the authors offer a ‘socio-sexual background’ to the subject. Given the popular misunderstanding of Greek and Roman society as one of unbridled licentiousness, Johnson and Ryan insist that in Greece sexual conduct was strictly codified, albeit differently from ours. Furthermore, it is a well-known fact, as they do not fail to point out, that the prevailing view of Greek sexuality that has come down to us was shaped by males, and mostly aristocratic males at that. It was a world in which the male, by mere virtue of being male, always played the leading role. What will be regarded as double standards today, was viewed differently then. Thus, while fidelity in marriage was demanded of the female, it was only expected of the male. Johnson and Ryan also refer briefly to two other areas of popular misunderstanding regarding ancient sexuality: male same-sex relations and rape. With regard to the former, Johnson and Ryan mention the importance of age and the notions of ‘active’ and
‘passive’ partner. Relationships between an older male, who would assume the active role, and a younger male between the ages of twelve and seventeen, who would be the passive partner, were acceptable, provided these rules were strictly maintained. Apart from the erotic aspect, same-sex relations between males in Greek antiquity also served an educational purpose. Notably at Athens, the older man educated his younger partner in subjects such as philosophy and the responsibilities of a citizen. For same-sex relations between females, the literary sources are not as many, being limited to Sappho and passages from Plato, Asclepiades and Lucian.

One of the areas in which the ancient understanding of sexuality differed most markedly from the modern was in regard to marriage. While the idea of marrying for love was not entirely absent among the ancient Greeks, it was not—if the sources are to be believed—the primary reason. The role of a woman in marriage was to be a dutiful wife, bear children (preferably males), and manage the household. Johnson and Ryan further observe that in ancient Greece there were areas in the life of the male where the presence of eros was considered to have a destabilizing effect. As a result, the rules that determined the Greek male’s sexual conduct towards his spouse were quite different from those that applied in the slave-quarters. What was allowed in the latter was not allowed in the former. Personal desire was expected to take a back seat when it came to the interests of the polis. This explains why Athenian lawmakers saw adultery not in the first place as a moral transgression but as inimical to the public order. It is noteworthy that when it comes to sexuality in ancient Greece, generalizations are not possible, as Johnson and Ryan clearly demonstrate when they briefly compare Athens and Sparta.

With regard to sexual behaviour at Rome, Johnson and Ryan remark that there are similarities to that of the Greeks, but also significant differences. Roman source material is mostly aristocratic in origin. One area of sexual behaviour in which the two cultures were very similar relates to the purpose of marriage. As in Greece, the Roman marriage was primarily regarded as fulfilling a social purpose—to produce heirs and good citizens. It is no wonder then that the sexual freedom of the Roman matrona (‘wife’) was limited to the chaste relationship with her husband, while for freeborn Roman males it seems that sex outside marriage was not considered illicit. In other areas of private life, the Roman matrona enjoyed a measure of freedom unknown to her Greek counterpart. Part of the reason has to do with the influence of Hellenistic culture that so pervaded the Roman world when Rome’s power began to expand beyond Italy’s borders into the rest of the Mediterranean.

The disruptive influence of social upheaval during the first century BCE did not leave the institution of marriage unaffected, especially among the upper classes. As the role of marriage in the brokering of political alliances increased, so did the status of aristocratic women. Roman literature from the period records numerous examples of women from noble families at Rome indulging in marital infidelity and sexual licence. This phenomenon was probably another result of the greater measure of independence that these women came to enjoy at the time. The authors are careful, however, not to draw overhasty conclusions from the information provided by the
predominantly male literary sources. Rather than accepting that sexual licence was endemic among upper class women during the first century, they prefer to believe that the high incidence of references to female promiscuity is at least partly a reflection of increasing male insecurity in the face of what was perceived as growing sexual freedom especially among women of the nobility. As proof of the negative perception among males of female attitudes towards sex, Johnson and Ryan cite Augustus’ moral reforms, notably the *Lex Julia de adulteriis*.

With regard to Roman views on same-sex relationships, the authors comment that at Rome the prevailing culture was in some respects significantly different from what was regarded as acceptable or even encouraged in Greece. For freeborn Roman males, most types of Greek same-sex relationships would have been taboo except in cases where the passive partner was not freeborn or did not have Roman citizenship. From the relatively little information on female same-sex relationships at Rome, it seems that it, too, was quite different from what was acceptable practice in Greece, notably with regard to the initiation schools, or *thiasoi*, equivalents of which did not exist at Rome.

The introduction concludes with a review of two modern theories that, in the authors’ view, have made the most significant contribution to the study of ancient sexuality, namely feminist theory and Foucauldian theory. While feminist scholarship has beyond any doubt greatly enhanced our understanding of the status and role of women in ancient Graeco-Roman society, Johnson and Ryan point out that in a few cases some measure of bias has led to conclusions that are unsustainable. In some regards, Foucault’s theories of sexuality have been even more revolutionary. Noteworthy is his view that modern (post-nineteenth century) approaches to sexuality were, for the most part, quite foreign to the ancient Greeks and Romans. Not surprisingly, Foucault’s theories have not gone unchallenged. Especially feminist scholars have taken Foucault and his successors to task on a number of issues, notably their almost exclusive emphasis on male sexuality (especially in Foucault’s work), their neglect of sexuality in the Roman world, and finally the argument that homosexuality and heterosexuality are modern, Western categories not found anywhere in Graeco-Roman antiquity.

The major part of the book (pp. 18-199) is devoted to the authors’ selection of sources, according to the following categories: ‘The Divine Sphere’; ‘Beauty’; ‘Marriage’; ‘Prostitution’; ‘Same-Sex Relationships’; ‘Sex and Violence’; ‘Anxiety and Repulsion’; ‘Aids and Handbooks’. Each selection of sources is arranged according to a number of subcategories and prefaced by an introduction. Copious notes accompany each source. Given the nature of the subject matter, any categorization of ancient sources on sexuality can hardly avoid appearing to be arbitrary to some extent, especially in cases where the material overlaps. For example, the first piece in chapter 1, ‘The Divine Sphere’ (pp. 18-38), is taken from Homer’s *Iliad*, but since it deals with an aspect of the marriage of Zeus and Hera—Hera’s efforts to use sex to take Zeus’ mind off the war—it could just as well have been placed in the next chapter (‘Marriage’). This is perhaps, however, of minor concern.
In the introductory notes to the first chapter, the authors state that the sources they have selected for the category ‘The Divine Sphere’ reveal that ‘when it comes to sexuality, [the gods] are not so much figures of worship as characters in works of art that encapsulate and symbolize psychological and emotional conditions’ (p. 18). While it is understandable why the authors have chosen a passage from Homer to ‘set the scene’ as far as Greek conceptions of sexuality are concerned, the choice of the Augustan poet Ovid to do the same for Rome is rather odd, except for the fact that his poetry does serve to illustrate ‘the continuing influence of Greek mythology and symbolism in Roman epic’ (p. 18). But Roman epic is not the subject of the book, ancient sexuality is. While genre is indeed the golden thread which links Ovid with Homer, when it comes to sexuality almost a thousand years separate them. To what extent then can the Ovid text be said to ‘set the scene’ for the Roman perspective on sexuality in the realm of the divine? The remaining subcategories in chapter 1 deal with the Greek gods associated with love, and their Roman counterparts: Aphrodite and Venus, and Eros and Amor.

The relationship between beauty and sexuality does not receive the attention it perhaps merits in the introduction to chapter 2, ‘Beauty’ (pp. 39-60). There is a reference to the fear amongst ancient Greek and Roman males of the uncontrollable desire that can be aroused in them by women of extraordinary beauty. The link between beauty and sexual desire is by no means unique to ancient Greek and Roman society. What is perhaps unusual is the fear of the male members of these societies that this desire is something beyond their control. More germane to the topic are those elements of both male and female beauty that the ancient Greeks and Romans found particularly erotic. Yet, a number of texts dealing with beauty in chapter 2 have little or no bearing on ancient conceptions of sexuality. Some of the texts deal with the idealization of beauty that is quite far removed from its role in creating desire. Many of the texts in this chapter seem to recycle the same conceptions of beauty with the result that to the non-specialist reader the general impression is one of repetition. It would have been helpful if the authors had pointed out the unique contribution of each to the ancient conception of the erotic value of beauty. Other texts (for example, Apul. Met. 4.28) give only a very vague and general description of beauty, and consequently do not contribute much to a better understanding of ancient sexuality. The authors have selected a number of texts, however, that do provide interesting perspectives on the role of beauty in ancient Greek and Roman conceptions of sexuality, such as those that describe the features of the human body which ancient society found particularly erotic.

The place of marriage in ancient Greek and Roman conceptions of sexuality is the subject of chapter 3, ‘Marriage’ (pp. 61-87). In their introduction to this chapter, the authors observe that ‘Marriage is the principal vehicle for exploration of male-female relationships in antiquity’ (p. 61). While in some of the sources presented by the authors, marriage is dealt with in general terms (for example, the clearly misogynistic passages from Hesiod and Semonides), the sexual aspect of marriage in Graeco-Roman antiquity features more explicitly, albeit very briefly, in others, such
as in the quoted poems by Sappho, Theocritus and Catullus—which the literary tradition has often identified as *epithalamia* (‘marriage hymns’) —and in a few brief passages taken from Plutarch, Seneca the Elder, and Martial. The chapter concludes with a number of epigraphical and literary sources—both Greek and Latin—that evoke the heartache and distress caused by separation from the beloved, either through death or travel. None of these texts deal specifically with sexuality, but rather, as Johnson and Ryan point out in their introduction, all of them illustrate the ‘emotional bonds between husband and wife’ (p. 61).

It is really only from chapter 4, ‘Prostitution’ (pp. 88-109), onwards that the book fulfils the expectations raised by its title. While the authors make some valuable observations regarding Roman views on prostitution and the role of the practice in Roman public and private life, they seem to have less to say about the way in which prostitution was perceived in ancient Greece, except that, since adultery was prohibited by law, ‘an Athenian citizen had to relieve his extramarital desires among prostitutes’, and that investing in a brothel was considered an acceptable business venture (p. 88). The sources that Johnson and Ryan have assembled in this chapter cover almost every aspect of prostitution in antiquity, ranging from the character and qualities which were prized in *hetairai* (‘courtesans’), prostitutes, and kept women, the various kinds of sexual pleasures preferred by Greek and Roman males, and their fantasies, to the exploitation of the ageing whore, temple prostitutes, and male prostitution. Included in the chapter are a number of Pompeian graffiti which the authors have deemed fit to place in two separate categories according to whether they concern female or male prostitutes.

Chapter 5, ‘Same-Sex Relationships’ (pp. 110-35), is devoted to sources on same-sex relationships. It is well known that, unlike the custom at Rome where it was definitely illegal (especially in cases where one of the partners was a freeborn youth), in Greek society, for the most part, relationships between freeborn males carried no opprobrium provided they adhered to certain specific codified patterns. When it came to same-sex relationships between females, however, the Greeks as well as the Romans disapproved, although there were notable exceptions. The source material in chapter 5 provides some valuable perspectives on almost every aspect of relationships between members of the same sex in Greece and at Rome in antiquity. Not only were the ancient Greeks and Romans interested in the aetiology of these relationships (Plato, Pseudo-Aristotle and Athenaeus), they also debated in detail the merits of same-sex pleasure (mainly between an older male and a youth) as opposed to the heterosexual kind (Ovid, Plutarch, Straton, Achilles Tatius). The unique role of male same-sex love in a number of highly militarized ancient Greek societies is briefly demonstrated by two authors, Aelian and Athenaeus. Some space is also given to sources that deal with same-sex love between women. Here Sappho (frr. 49, 94, 96) is certainly the most obvious choice, complemented by a selection of two passages drawn from the poetry of Erinna and the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* respectively. The chapter concludes with a few sources that continue the topic of
female same-sex love, but from the highly disapproving viewpoint of males (Anacreon, Asclepiades, Martial and Lucian).

With regard to violent sex, the topic of chapter 6, ‘Sex and Violence’ (pp. 136-52), the authors note that the use of violence to satisfy sexual needs is commonplace in the myths and legends of ancient Greece and Rome (p. 136), but was often placed in a context which left no doubt as to the dire consequences of such behaviour for the perpetrator. As in other areas of sexual practice, the distinction between what was acceptable and what was forbidden usually coincided with that between freeborn and slave. While ancient society was willing to tolerate using a slave to gratify one’s lust, it did not extend the same sanction to sex with freeborn males or females. Perhaps one of the most famous examples of an act of sexual violence committed against a freeborn woman in Greek literature is the rape of Cassandra by Ajax during the sack of Troy. In the non-Homeric tradition that is also reflected in the first text cited, Alcaeus fr. 298.4-24 (pp. 137f.), Ajax violated Cassandra in the temple of Athena, at the very feet of the goddess’s statue. His deed was all the more horrific in that it transgressed established norms of conduct not only on the human but also on the divine level. Ovid’s account in Metamorphoses 6.455-562 of the rape of Philomela by Tereus, her brother-in-law, brings to the topic the idea that lust, when given free rein, can give rise to all kinds of violent and barbaric passions.

But what was the official stance on sexual violence? The first few texts presented by the book concern Athenian law. They offer, according to Johnson and Ryan, rather ambiguous testimony on the subject and leave one in some doubt as to the extent to which rape was considered a serious crime. None of the sources cited deal with Roman legal practice in this regard. On the other hand, there appears to have been no ambiguity in ancient Greek and Roman approval of rape as an acceptable form of punishment, especially if the person for whom it was intended had no claims to citizenship. It seems, however, that forcing the (female) partner through violent means, if necessary, to submit to intercourse for no other reason than to satisfy male fantasies, was not unusual either. Ovid’s Ars Amatoria 1.663-80 provides clear evidence for this. While there is no mention of sexual violence in the Archilochus fragment 196a (pp. 147-49), it does contain a very brief allusion to the partner’s initial unwillingness to engage in sex (lines 22f.—not lines 15f., to which the authors refer in introduction to part of this quotation). Given its often violent nature in antiquity, it is not unusual to find sport used as a metaphor for expressing the association of sex with violence, at least from the male point of view. In Aristophanes’ Peace 894-904, for example, Trygaeus imagines sex with Theoria in terms of a number of sporting events.

According to the authors, the sources selected in chapter 7, ‘Anxiety and Repulsion’ (pp. 153-73), reflect the various ways in which Greek and Roman males tried to compensate for the feelings of anxiety that they experienced as a result of their changing roles in society. As far as ancient Greece is concerned, Johnson and Ryan do not specify what caused the erosion of ‘codes of correct behaviour’ (p. 153) to which men reacted in this way, nor indicate when it occurred. For Rome, there seems to be
general agreement that the period of civil strife and unrest, coupled with military adventures outside Italy, especially during the first half of the first century BCE, saw (aristocratic) women becoming more assertive, both in the home and in public life. Examples of the male reaction varied from fear of sexual impotence (Philodemus, Ovid and Petronius) to disgust caused by the physical qualities or sexual preferences of the partner (Lucilius, Horace, Martial, Rufinus, Virgilian Appendix). In some sources (Aristophanes, Catullus, Martial, Hipponax, the Greek Anthology, Juvenal), men and women whose sexuality transgressed the accepted norms of sexual behaviour served not only as a focal point for satire and ridicule, but may also have enabled the poet and his audience to reaffirm their society’s traditional norms.

The source material assembled in chapter 8, ‘Aids and Manuals’ (pp. 174-99), explores the role of sex toys and sex manuals in ancient Greek and Roman society. In regard to the latter, the authors distinguish between, on the one hand, material which took a mere intellectual interest in sexuality and sought to find a scientific explanation for the origin of the human sex drive (Lucretius), and, on the other hand, practical handbooks aimed at enhancing the sexual pleasure of their readers (Athenaeus, Priapea, Martial). Not surprisingly, Ovid is well represented in this chapter and even merits a section devoted exclusively to extracts from his Ars Amatoria and Remedia Amoris. While the authors further note (p. 175) that pottery and literature in ancient Greece frequently mention the use of sex toys (‘dildos’), they provide only two literary sources, namely from Aristophanes’ Lysistrata and Herodas’ Mime. Johnson and Ryan are silent about the use of such devices in the Roman world, but they have included two sources from Latin literature (Propertius and Suetonius) which both deal with another form of sex-aid—the portrayal of erotic scenes on the walls of some Roman households.

While the specialist in the area of ancient sexuality will probably already be familiar with, and have a good understanding of, the vast majority of texts assembled by Johnson and Ryan, their book will still serve as a valuable aid to classical scholars and students who are new to the field and who are looking for an introduction via the primary sources. By providing these texts in translation, the authors have made this fascinating subject even more accessible to non-Classics. Throughout their commentary on the texts, they have retained the original Greek or Latin form of certain key words, each of which is listed in a glossary of terms (pp. 206-14), accompanied by a translation and, in some cases, a brief explanation as well. This is complemented by a glossary of authors (pp. 200-05), which would almost be essential for someone with little or no training in Classics.
**REVIEWS**

*Scholia* publishes solicited and unsolicited short reviews. Short reviews to be considered for publication should be directed to the Reviews Editor, *Scholia*.


This book on Aeschylus’ *Persians* is another in the Duckworth series of Companions to Greek and Roman Tragedy. The stated aim of the series is to provide ‘accessible introductions to ancient tragedies’ (back cover). Chapter 1, ‘The *Persians*, History, and Historical Drama’ (pp. 11-38), sketches the historical background, with some remarks on Phrynichus and Simonides. The next five chapters offer a running commentary on the play: chapter 2, ‘Fear’ (pp. 39-61; lines 1-248); chapter 3, ‘Pathos’ (pp. 62-82; lines 249-597); chapter 4, ‘A Tragedy of Succession’ (pp. 83-103; lines 598-786); chapter 5, ‘The Synoptic Moment’ (pp. 104-121; lines 787-907); chapter 6, ‘A Harvest of Tears’ (pp. 122-138; lines 908-1077). Finally, chapter 7, ‘Interpreting and Reinterpreting the *Persians*’ (pp. 139-64), offers a brief account of other scholarly interpretations of the play and some discussion of its influence on later literature, especially Timotheus’ *Persians*. There are twenty-three pages of notes, a seventeen-page bibliography, a brief guide to further reading, a chronology, a glossary, and an index. At 224 pages the book is considerably longer than what seems to be the norm for the series of 160-70 pages. Rosenbloom’s thesis is that the play ‘dramatizes a fictionalized fall of the Persian empire to demonstrate how empire collapses through overextension and to avert such an outcome for Athens’ imperialism’ (p. 97). He recognizes that the play ‘is today enshrined in the anti-war and anti-imperialist discourse of western culture’ (p. 163), and the contemporary relevance of this approach is suggested by the presence in his chronology of the item, ‘2003-: Second Gulf War’ (p. 214).

Rosenbloom’s thesis depends on the existence in 472 BC of an Athenian empire that could have been perceived by Aeschylus and his audience as resembling the Persian empire. This is clearly a highly unorthodox view, given that the transition from Delian League to Athenian empire is usually dated to the 450s. There are of course scholars who stress the more tyrannical aspects of Athens’ behaviour even in the 470s, but it is a long way even from the more extreme of these to the view that the Athenians would have seen anything of themselves in the Persians in 472. Rosenbloom dismisses Thucydides’ account (1.97, 3.10, *et cetera*) of the league’s democratic assemblies as ‘myth-making’: ‘There is no independent evidence for such assemblies and they are inherently unlikely. Even if they did exist, they did not prevent Athens from dominating the “Delian League” in its own interests’ (p. 32). It might have been more useful to point out that Thucydides’ account of this period is
expressly teleological (e.g., 1.89.1, 1.97.2) and thus more likely to highlight evidence of growing Athenian power than to suppress it.

Rosenbloom believes that empire is inherently expansionist, and that the heirs of an empire are inevitably led into ‘calamitous overextension of their power and resources in an act of invasion intended to emulate the greatness of the fathers and to increase their legacy’ (p. 95). Herodotus certainly presents Xerxes’ invasion of Greece as the logical continuation of a tradition of Persian expansionism of which Darius was very much a part, but it seems a fatal objection to Rosenbloom’s argument that Aeschylus makes such a sharp distinction between father and son. The Persian empire may not be eternal (lines 739-41), but Darius had believed that it was destined for many more years of prosperity in addition to the succession of kings which he lists (lines 765-81). The premature disaster was due entirely to Xerxes’ avoidable errors. In the unlikely event that the Athenians drew a lesson from Persians for their own empire, it need not have been (as Rosenbloom suggests, pp. 94-96) that empire is inevitably disastrous. He argues both that Darius is as guilty as Xerxes (p. 102) and that he is ‘a transcendent paternal figure’ (p. 147) whose condemnation of imperialistic hybris should be heeded by the Athenians (pp. 146f.). An objection to this is that Darius’ authority rests on his career as a successful imperialist. In general, more thought could have been given here to the nature of the political message that should be expected from a tragedy. It would be more legitimate to say that Persians expresses truths about the world which are relevant to the Athenians (and to everyone else), than that it is directly addressed to specific features of Athenian foreign policy.

The book contains some speculative and unsupported statements. Having observed, for example, that the Queen’s entry (line 155) interrupts the Chorus’ deliberations, Rosenbloom states: ‘The mistiming of the play’s staging is symptomatic of Persia’s misfortune. The Persians are unable to act at the right time or in the right measure’ (p. 49; cf. p. 77). This would, if true, be a remarkable use of stagecraft, but he offers no reason to believe that it has any such significance. He alleges that the trochaic tetrameters of the Queen’s first speech (lines 159-72) ‘indicate her emotional distress’ (p. 50) with no sense of any contradiction with the statement that a later conversation in the same metre (lines 215-30) ‘relieves the Queen and chorus of their premonition and anxiety’ (p. 58). The omen (lines 205-11) ‘has a meaning beyond the drama, symbolizing Delian Apollo’s “ravaging” the Persian eagle just as the Athenians sought vengeance “by ravaging the land of the king” (Thucydides 1.96.1)’ (p. 57), as if the same Greek word were used in each case (or that it would be relevant to Aeschylus even if it were). The Queen, describing her offerings, uses the kenning ‘a pure draught from a wild mother’ for wine (lines 614f.), evidently implying that the juice from a wild vine has particular purity (cf. Cropp on Eur. IT 163 for mountain cows, ‘unsullied by domestic and agricultural use’, in ritual contexts). Rosenbloom, however, states confidently: ‘The “wild mother” (614) suggests the “mountain mother” Cybebe, whose temple at Sardis the Athenians and Ionians burned’ (p. 84), one of several highly speculative remarks on this passage. He believes that ‘Darius

condemns his son for actions he himself committed’ (p. 102). What is the evidence that the audience should be taking this into consideration? ‘Aeschylus allows a hint of Darius’ transgression to slip through—Darius calls the Hellespont the Bosphorus when castigating his son’ (p. 102; lines 723, 746). This supposedly reminds us that Darius bridged the Thracian Bosphorus, although ‘Bosphorus’ is also applied to the Hellespont by Sophocles (Aj. 884) and Rosenbloom offers no reason to doubt the usual view that Aeschylus was unaware of or indifferent to the distinction.

Assertions of the kind discussed in the previous paragraph may be unsubstantiated or implausible, but they are at least meaningful statements about the play. Rosenbloom is also prone to making fanciful observations of no apparent relevance. He is prompted by the fact that Pericles was the choregos of Persians to remark, ‘it is worth noting that Pericles would come to play Darius’ role in his lifetime: the “father” and exponent of empire as patrimony, whose prosperity and happiness would prove to be unsurpassable’, adding for good measure that the ghost of Pericles was raised in Eupolis’ Villages (p. 17). He says of the offerings that the Queen brings for Darius (lines 607-18), ‘[f]ood and drink offerings counter Persian deaths by thirst and starvation (lines 482-84, 490f.)’ (p. 84), without explaining what could possibly be signified by the word ‘counter’. An even odder sequence of associations comes in his discussion of the kommos, which he compares for no apparent reason to laments for Adonis: ‘Adonis is a figure of luxuriant but unsustainable growth which ends in lament’ (p. 123), like the Persian empire. ‘Xerxes’ yoking of the Hellespont, a fruitless “marriage” which leaves Persian wives “yoked alone”, bringing barrenness to Asia, evokes Adonis as a “negative image of marriage and fertile union”’ (p. 123, quoting Detienne²). Always eager to find parallels between Persia and Athens, he concludes by remarking, ‘It is uncanny that while Athenian men were voting to invade Sicily in 415, tradition had it that Athenian women were celebrating the Adonia’ (pp. 123f.). Rosenbloom is undoubtedly well informed about Persians and its historical context, and this book, though speculative and dogmatic in places, is a politically engaged discussion whose underlying attitudes will be sympathetic to many.

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This book publishes papers delivered at a colloquium organized for the one hundred and second General Meeting of the Archaeological Institute of America held in San Diego in 2001, which was dedicated to ‘Households at the Margins of Greek Society’. Two further contributions, by William Aylward and by Monika Trümper on housing in the Troad and Delos respectively, have been added to broaden its scope.

² M. Detienne (tr. J. Lloyd), The Gardens of Adonis (Hassocks 1977) 106.
This has both the advantages and the disadvantages of conference proceedings. The main advantage is the reasonably prompt publication of up-to-the-minute research. The main disadvantage is that, largely, it relates to work in progress rather than full and definitive study, particularly through the multiplicity of authors and topics, even though they share a common focus. In the book, through the additional chapters, this focus is now concerned with variables rather than marginality.

Lisa C. Nevett’s ‘Introduction’ (pp. 1-11) stresses that detailed studies of ancient Greek housing which use both the architectural evidence and the material assemblages discovered within the buildings is a relatively recent phenomenon. She outlines the definable elements—cooking facilities, presence of bathtubs, the recognition of andrones (specialized rooms for male socializing), and so forth. Rather than concentrating simply on narrow specialisation of room function, the aim now is rather to emphasize variability. Thus the second article, by Franziska Lang, looks at ‘Structural Change in Archaic Greek Housing’ (pp. 12-35). One example of a change in typology that, as she says, can be recognized in Greece from the seventh century BC onwards is the decline of the apsidal and oval-sided house types and their replacement by rectangular buildings. However, she does not make the obvious point that the development of terracotta tiles in place of thatch is a simple practical explanation of this. The evolution of house plans, the arrangement of rooms and access to them is discussed and analysed in terms of the ‘economic sphere’, the ‘technological sphere’ (that is, the performance of crafts within the house), the ‘sociopsychological sphere’ (access from outside and access within the house), the ‘symbolic sphere’ (status and beliefs) and the ‘representative sphere’ (the function of different rooms and areas). Walter Aylward’s chapter is entitled ‘Security, Synoikismos, Koinon as Determinants for Troad Housing in Classical and Hellenistic Times’ (pp. 36-53). The evidence is fragmentary. Some of the houses discussed have left only the slightest traces, with full, but schematic, plans given only for houses at Neandreia and Alexandria Troas.

Chapter 4, by Nicholas Cahill, concerns ‘Household Industry in Greece and Anatolia’ (pp. 53-66), but in fact is limited to a discussion of the evidence from Olynthus and one small area of Sardis. These are two very different places and contexts, neither really typical. Olynthus is an artificial creation for a federated state on the borders of the Macedonian kingdom, dependant largely on agricultural activity, while Sardis is the capital of a non-Greek kingdom, and the industrial process, glass manufacture, found in the structures discussed points more to Mesopotamian contacts. Barbara Tsakirgis, ‘Living and Working around the Athenian Agora: A Preliminary Case Study of Three Houses’ (pp. 67-82), investigates the Classical period houses around the Agora of Athens, noting that there is no regular form—some are reasonably square or rectangular in plan, while others are irregular, the determinant factor being the line of the streets. She discusses the evidence for production or industry found in the houses, which reveals that they are not merely dwelling places.

Lisa Nevett contributes a chapter entitled ‘Between Urban and Rural: House Form and Social Relations in Attic Villages and Deme Centres’ (pp. 83-98), though she concerns herself only with three places: Thorikos, which is an industrial
community depending largely on the silver and lead mines; Ano Voula, a more typical and probably agricultural village closer to Athens; and Rhamnous, one of the most remote of the Attic demes. Manuel Fiedler, ‘Houses at Leukas in Acarnania: A Case Study in Ancient Household Organization’ (pp. 99-118), reports on recent work on Leukas, where a reasonably consistent house type emerges, making it possible to compare and assess how the different rooms which they contained functioned. Monika Trümper, ‘Modest Housing in Late Hellenistic Delos’ (pp. 119-39), takes the evidence produced by the far more extensive excavations of Delos to gather the less spectacular—and so less noticed by commentators—of the houses and shops there. Here, as at Thorikos, it is necessary to remember the unusual character of the town of Delos which (quite apart from the island’s religious significance) was devoted primarily to external trade with the extended late Hellenistic/Roman republic world. The theme of the smaller—or even very small—house unit is continued by Bradley Ault in ‘Housing the Poor and the Homeless in Ancient Greece’ (pp. 140-59), a chapter that also considers the evidence for brothels and hostelries. Finally, in chapter 10, ‘Summing Up: Whither the Archaeology of the Greek Household?’ (pp. 160-75), he and Lisa Nevett summarize the arguments presented in the book, and consider how the archaeology of the Greek household should develop.

Obviously, a ‘Study in Diversity’ is bound to contain disparate material. Where only small groups of material are presented in short papers, the wider context tends to be overlooked. This is particularly true where a single building is taken by itself without reference to the neighbourhood and environment in which it was situated. This can be illustrated by contrasting the chapter by Monika Trümper, who bases her argument on the extensive material available from the excavations on Delos with the small house from ‘Ano Siphai’ briefly referred to by Bradley Ault in the succeeding chapter as perhaps an example of a dwelling of the working poor. Hoepfner and Schwandner excavated this house.1 In publishing it, they overlooked the earlier complete survey of the walled enclosure that contains it, carried out in 1968 by John Fossey, Philip Rahtz, and myself.2 In this, we surveyed over fifty similar small structures (Hoepfner and Schwandner’s building is our Building BA), and planned two of them (Buildings K and W) in detail, both similar to Building BA. It is difficult to conceive of a village entirely given over to the abject poor and, with its exposed position at the top of a mountain pass, there are no economic resources which could possibly have sustained even the poorest of communities. The position, though, has a considerable military significance, controlling the easiest route from the excellent harbour at Siphai (modern Aliki) on the Gulf of Corinth over the mountain pass that separates it from the Boiotian heartland. The towns here are Siphai and Thisbe, while the site on the pass is a military one, like the slightly later watchtower just to the west (which replaced it) and the much later Justinianic castellum (which Hoepfner and

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Schwandner did not spot) in its northeast corner. We suggested it was a base established by the Spartans in the first part of the fourth century BC in order to guarantee them access to central Boiotia. We considered and rejected outright the idea that it was a normal village. A possibility was that it served the sanctuary of Artemis Agroteira included within its perimeter, but the difference between the limited, apparently fourth-century pottery that we found in the greater area and the much wider range (from early Archaic onwards) in the area of the temple led us to interpret it as having only a military significance. But whatever the explanation, building BA can only be interpreted properly in the context of the complete settlement, not in isolation. Taking it out of context makes it rather meaningless.

As a preliminary report of continuing research, the results discussed in this book are interesting and important. I wonder, though, whether this is the most suitable format, given the expense and the pressure on library space. Clearly much will have been superseded by a more definitive publication even by the time this review appears in printed form. The advantage of conference or colloquium papers is that they stimulate discussion, both within the actual meeting and afterwards. This could be better continued, it seems to me, by immediate electronic publication. There is a feeling, perhaps, that book publication like this better serves as a criterion for individual academic assessment. It is noticeable that each chapter has its own extensive list of literature cited, usually repetitive, where a single bibliography for the entire book would have sufficed and been simpler to use. In places these lists seem inflated—the introductory chapter lists Makaronas and Giouri on the houses of the Rape of Helen and of Dionysos at Pella simply as an example of a detailed study of an individual site without mentioning that these houses by their size and magnificence are altogether different from those normally found in Greek cities—and, indeed, in this book. Though this work is not definitive (and I do not think it would claim to be), it is a useful addition to the literature on ancient Greek housing.

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Ever since its publication in 1922, Eduard Fraenkel’s *Plautinisches im Plautus* has been central to any study of Plautus. The Italian translation of the book, published in 1960, widened its accessibility and allowed Fraenkel to qualify his earlier work by means of addenda to the original. In this age of globalisation, it is becoming a sad fact that English-speaking students and scholars are becoming less and less fluent in tongues other than their own, and Fraenkel’s groundbreaking readings were in danger of being lost. Thanks to this new translation by Tomas Drevikovsky and Frances Muecke, the audience who will be able to benefit from Fraenkel’s deep and insightful knowledge will broaden much further. Before an overview of the work itself, a word
about the translation. Fraenkel’s compact and academic German, typical of the time, is not an easy read. Muecke and Drevikovsky have done an admirable job of turning Fraenkel’s prose into clear English, while keeping as close as possible to the original text. While the result is a style often perhaps more formal than a more modern work, it is never over-clumsy or laborious to read. In keeping with modern trends, all Latin and Greek is translated, further extending the accessibility of the work to a less-specialized audience. The new translation opens with a preface by the translators that summarizes Fraenkel’s approach and trends in Plautine scholarship from Fraenkel to the present day, setting the work of Fraenkel in context.

As to the work itself, Fraenkel’s main concern was to focus attention on Plautus himself, rather than using the Plautine texts as a means to learn about Greek new comedy. His intention was to illustrate what was uniquely Plautine about Plautus’ plays, and he showed this through an analysis of aspects such as the verbal fireworks, slapstick, military metaphors of the crafty slave and cantica, which he claimed were Plautus’ own innovations. Thus the book is divided into ten chapters, each showing a different element in which, according to Fraenkel, Plautus diverged from his original. These chapters are entitled ‘Comparative Openings of Speeches’ (pp. 5-16); ‘Transformation and Identification Motifs’ (pp. 17-44); ‘Mythological Material’ (pp. 45-71); ‘Animating the Inanimate’ (pp. 72-77); ‘Expansion of the Dialogue’ (pp. 78-95); ‘Expansion of Monologues’ (pp. 96-144); ‘Implausibility in Conversations’ (pp. 145-58); ‘The Predominance of the Slave’s Role’ (pp. 159-72); ‘“Contaminated” Plays’ (pp. 173-218); and ‘The Nature and Origins of the Cantica’ (pp. 219-51). A final chapter, ‘Plautus as a Poet’ (pp. 252-86), completes Fraenkel’s original work. Fraenkel’s own introductions to both the German version and the Italian translation, and the addenda that appeared in the latter, along with his notes, bibliography, and index are also included.

Since Fraenkel’s work is such a standard text—it was described by Eric Csapo in 1989, as being still, ‘sixty-five years after its publication, . . . the most authoritative scholarly work in the field of Roman comedy’1—I will here outline the content of the book only briefly.2 In the first chapter, Fraenkel takes the opening of a group of speeches that he argues are similar in structure since, in each, a character or situation is extravagantly praised, by means of a comparison with an event from mythology or a famous legendary figure. Fraenkel shows that this use of absurd comparisons follows a specific formula and involves material introduced by Plautus himself, emphasizing that ‘Nowhere in the remains of Attic comedy, neither in the fragments nor in the longer passages, now considerable, and nowhere in Terence, do we find a single comparable passage’ (p. 8). Thus, he concludes, this element must be Plautine. The second chapter continues this trend, dealing with Plautus’ habit of playing with


2 For a contemporary review of the original work, see, e.g., H. W. Prescott, Review: E. Fraenkel, Philologische Untersuchungen Kiessling-Wilamowitz: Plautinisches im Plautus (Berlin 1922), CPh 19.1 (1924) 90-93.
transformation, whereby characters make comments such as: *formido male, ne ego hic nomen meum commutem et Quintus fiam e Sosia; quattuor nudos sopori se dedisse hic autumam: metuo ne numerum augeam illum* (‘I’m horribly afraid that I may change my name and be made Quintus out of Sosia; this fellow claims he put to sleep four naked men: I fear I may increase that number’, *Amph.* 304-07; p. 17). Fraenkel demonstrates that motifs such as this are widespread in Plautus and also found far more frequently in Old Attic Comedy than in New Comedy, again indicating deviation from his New comedic models and personal innovation.

Plautus’ use of mythology is the subject of the next chapter, and here Fraenkel openly challenges the assumptions current in his era, providing an enlightening glimpse for the modern reader of the situation of Plautine scholarship in his day: ‘We cannot just set up a priori an axiom such as the following: the mythology is Greek, Greek culture in Rome at the time of Plautus was very slight, so everything which is part of *historia fabularis* (“legendary tale”) has its origin in the Attic originals (leaving aside small deviations and alterations)’ (p. 45). Instead, Fraenkel argues that knowledge of Greek mythology must have been widespread in Rome, and that therefore mythological references could also have been, and indeed often were, introduced by Plautus himself. A rather shorter chapter follows, highlighting Plautine fondness for graphic description of inanimate objects as animate.

Building on these four introductory chapters, Fraenkel moves on to draw larger conclusions about Plautus’ originality, in two chapters dealing with Plautus’ expansion of dialogue (chapter 5) and monologues (chapter 6). Further chapters deal with his insertion of third person commentary in many scenes (chapter 7), the expanded role of the crafty slave (chapter 8), and Plautus’ creativity in the *cantica* (chapter 9). A final chapter, setting out how he views Plautus and his background, and what he regarded as the Plautine elements in Plautus, completes the original volume. The evidence of all these elements leads Fraenkel to draw the conclusion that Plautus was an innovative creator in his own right, a conclusion that revolutionized Plautine scholarship when the work was first published.

Since Fraenkel wrote his *Plautinisches im Plautus*, some of his theories have been rejected; indeed not all were even still held by Fraenkel himself in 1960 when the Italian translation was published, and Fraenkel’s qualifications to his earlier ideas are outlined in the addenda to the Italian version, found on pp. 390-426 of the English translation. Scholarship on Roman comedy has developed to include appreciation of Plautus as a gifted artist in his own right, with later readings, pioneered by Erich Segal, using the works of Plautus to examine social dynamics in republican Rome. Other scholars have placed an emphasis on stagecraft, examining self-consciousness

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and metatheatricality in particular. Yet the 1922 book was undoubtedly the catalyst for modern Plautine scholarship, and should still be the starting point for any serious work on Plautus. For that reason, this new translation is a welcome addition; it is to be hoped that the enthusiasm with which it will be greeted will provide the inspiration for Drevikovsky and Muecke to produce a translation of the earlier work of Fraenkel’s own teacher and mentor, Friedrich Leo. As it is, thanks to their efforts so far, the modern generation of Plautine scholars is much better served to continue working seriously on this most enticing of classical authors.

Lisa Maurice

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Brave and erudite must be the scholar who ventures to comment on De Divinatione; he squares his wits with Cicero, consul and augur, and with A. S. Pease, the most learned of modern scholiasts. David Wardle is well aware of the pitfalls of hubris but, as he notes in his preface, Pease’s commentary is to most contemporary students almost as baffling as Cicero himself. The book appears in the Clarendon Ancient History Series, and the new commentary, as the blurb informs, ‘is fully accessible to the reader who knows no Latin or Greek’. Classicists should indeed not turn away from a Latinless public; I remember how deeply thankful I am to scholars who provide for those unfortunates who do not know hieroglyphs, cuneiform, or Chinese exact translations, and illuminate them with precise notes. Wardle’s translation is exact and readable, the introduction lucid and informative, and the comments set an example of how such an enterprise ought to be conducted. For there is the ever present danger of simplification, of avoiding the difficult and the technical, and of treating the non-specialist as somehow also not very inquisitive. Certainly we can transmit only a general idea of linguistic form and style, but the matter itself should be treated as completely as possible. We have to confront concepts and notions, and, in particular, searching readers would wish that important technical terms be presented in the original form and adequately explained. For it is ultimately of such notions and expressions that religious systems, including that of divination, are construed. Wardle rises to the task. For example, on a few pages (pp. 174-80) the

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6 F. Leo, Plautinische Forschungen zur Kritik und Geschichte der Komödie (Berlin 1895).

reader is treated to concilium plebis, imperium, tripudium . . . sinisterum solistimum, templum, auguraculum, saxum solidum, vitium and dirae, and throughout the book he makes observations that will be of interest and instruction also to ‘professional’ students of Roman religion and divination. The bibliography that rounds up the volume is chosen with discernment. Wardle keeps his fingers on the pulse of scholarship, but he also cultivates the vetera; he adduces and utilizes two classics of augural studies, I. M. J. Valeton and P. Regell, because of their complexity often condemned to oblivion in various amateurish excursions into this difficult field.

The introduction (pp. 1-43) deals with two themes—divination as part of religio, and De Divinatione as a literary work. To peer into the mind of god(s) in order to find out what the future has in store for us is a common impulse. The procedure requires technique, and a multitude of such techniques has developed in the ancient Mediterranean. In Rome official divination was managed by priestly colleges of augurs and decemviri (later quindecimviri) sacris faciundis, who interpreted the Sibylline books, all aristocrats and mostly senators, and also by the Etruscan haruspices. This divination, as Wardle helpfully notes, served the state; individuals would consult assorted private diviners, astrologers and dream-interpreters (pp. 3ff.: he seems to dismiss oracles, but cf. p. 128). Wardle also opportunistically stresses (p. 2) that Roman state religion of the middle and late republic was not ‘a dead or fossilized system’, though the stab at Wissowa as to the alleged earlier spirituality and later sterility of Roman cult should rather be aimed at Latte.

A major problem is the character of the De Divinatione itself. In book 1, Quintus is a credulous speaker; in book 2, Marcus is a sceptic. It has been argued (notably by M. Beard and M. Schofield), and this view has attracted some following, that Marcus’ disproval of Quintus’ Stoic arguments cannot be taken as expression of Cicero’s personal beliefs or as ‘the triumph of a rationalist approach to Roman divination’. Wardle’s approach (pp. 8-18) is balanced and sensible. From the very fact

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2 Unfortunately there is a flaw: scores of titles that are cited in the commentary solely by the author’s name and the year of publication do not appear in the bibliography.

3 Valeton published in Latin in the Dutch Mnemosyne between 1889 and 1898 a series of fundamental papers. Regell, who was a Gymnasial professor in Hirschberg (in the then Prussian Lower Silesia), published between 1881 and 1904 in various places another series of fundamental contributions (in German and Latin). His dissertation, De Augurum Publicorum Libris (1878) is adduced by Wardle as ‘Diss. Vratislava’, but there is no such place. On the cover, the place of publication is given as ‘Vratislava’, (Breslau in German; Wroclaw in Polish); the Latin nominative is Vratislavia (also spelled Wratislavia). Cf. J. G. Th. Graesse, Orbis Latinus² (Berlin 1909).


that Cicero assigns the Academic part to Marcus—and I would add that Marcus
speaks second and last, like a senior *patronus* in a trial—follows that in the overall
structure of the dialogue the Academic arguments are given much greater weight than
the *exempla* of Quintus. The Academic philosopher counters, contradicts, but does not
construct. He shows that Stoic and Peripatetic arguments for divination are incoherent,
however—and I fully applaud this conclusion—‘he will not himself say how
divination might work or state for certain that divination does not exist’ (p. 16). This
fully and definitely disposes of the hasty argument of Beard, and it also offers a bridge
to understanding how a sceptical philosopher reconciled this position with his
obligations as a statesman and official priest. The Roman state has practised
divination since times immemorial, and Rome has prospered. It would be foolish to
abolish it. Thus the augur Cicero stands by the *mos patrius* (‘ancestral custom’) and,
as Wardle perceptively notes, he argues that this *mos* is much superior to the Greek
practice. The Greek μαντική (‘soothsayer’)—and also the augur of the superstitious
Marsi—attempted to gain foreknowledge of future events, whereas augury was not
engaged in telling the future (and was thus less offensive to reason).

As to the Greek sources of *De Divinatione* (pp. 28-36), we have to settle on
Posidonius and Cratippus—though the fruitlessness of the old Quellenforschung and
the more recent disagreements between F. Pfeffer (1976), W. Theiler (1982), and
I. G. Kidd (1988) should rather dissuade us from trying to be deceptively too precise.
Wardle would put the dramatic date in April 44 BC—Cicero was at Tusculum, where
the dialogue takes place, on 8 and 9 April. The date of the composition will be
between ‘late 45 and the death of Caesar’, with some revisions after the Ides—this is
very close to the old proposal of R. Durand, January-March 44—and the date of the
publication April/May 44 (pp. 28-43).

As valuable as the introduction is, most readers would rush to the commentary
to mine its riches. Wardle explains difficult concepts or involved passages with
lucidity and skill. Following are a few observations on selected points of debate. At
p. 171 (Cic. Div. 1.25), for augural symbolism on coins, compare with further
bibliography *RQ* 2.164-71. At p. 175 (1.28), the *paradosis* reads †aut tripudium fieri,
where the old emendation is avi (‘bird’). Pease suggests that a modifying adjective is
needed; Wardle convincingly opts for omni (‘any’), and points to 2.73 (omnem avem,
‘any bird’) and to Serv. Auct. Aen. 1.398 (qualibet avi, ‘any bird at all’)—but he fails
to notice that at 2.73 Pease had already, albeit hesitatingly, considered omni avi.
At p. 177 (1.28), on the *auspices nuptiarum*, compare (correcting Treggiari7)
*RQ* 2.530f. At p. 188 (1.31), on the praenomen of Attus Navius, see also O. Salomies,
*Die römischen Vornamen* (Helsinki 1987) 68f. At p. 340 (1.98), on ortus androgyni,
compare *RQ* 2.334. At pp. 362-71 (1.106-08), there is a very good discussion of the
auspical sign received by Marius and of the famous verses of Ennius about the
foundation of Rome, but compare now in greater detail *RQ* 2.1-19. I take genus
altivolantium (‘the tribe of those who fly on high’) as a poetic rendering of

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7 S. Treggiari, *Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the Time of
praepetes—thus Ennius avoids the repetition of the term. We certainly should emend
pictis to pictos and refer the description to currus. I doubt that longe pulcherrima avis
denotes Remus’ bird. The significance of vultures, not mentioned by Ennius, finds its
explanation in a new epigram of Posidippus where the vulture functions as the best
sign with respect to birth, and thus also the birth equals the foundation of cities.
At p. 392 (1.118), on the phrase hostias deligere, compare RQ 2.529. Despite Cicero’s
sceptical reservations, we should not shrink from a prediction: Wardle’s commentary
will stand for decades to come as a worthy modern counterpart and complement to
Pease’s grand opus. And let us hope that avibus bene iuvantibus a second volume on
book 2 will soon be in the hands of avid readers.

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Liz Oakley-Brown, Ovid and the Cultural Politics of Translation in Early Modern
+ 222, incl. 5 black-and-white illustrations. ISBN 0-7546-5155-X. GBP47.50

Liz Oakley-Brown’s aim in this book is to show that English versions of
Ovid’s Metamorphoses ‘are important sites of cultural and textual difference from the
fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries’ (p. 1). The texts under discussion are diverse, and
her choice ‘has been determined by those versions of Ovid’s poem which engage with
the construction of early modern identities in specific ways, some of which are
eccentric to the usual canon’ (p. 13). The survey touches on Titus Andronicus (and
Edward Ravenscroft’s post-Restoration reworking of it), Abraham Fraunce’s
generically indeterminate Countesse of Pembroke’s Yvychurch, George Sandys’
Caroline translation, a selection of lesser-known Ovidian adaptations and translations
by female authors, Samuel Garth’s 1717 edition by various hands, Caxton’s prose
translation, and Elizabeth Talbot’s sixteenth-century tapestries depicting scenes from
the Metamorphoses.

The ‘cultural politics’ of the title are for the most part the politics of gender
(though there is also analysis of George Sandys’ support for the personal rule of
Charles I, and of Elizabeth Singer Rowe’s Willamite and anti-Gallic adaptations of
Ovidian myth). In her discussion of Titus Andronicus, for example, Oakley-Brown is
interested principally in the idea of Lavinia as a female reader, and translator, of Ovid.
In her discussion of Fraunce’s versions of Ovidian myth, her focus is again on the
voice given to women within the text. Fraunce draws attention, she suggests, to Mary
Sidney’s reputation as a female translator. She surely goes too far, though, in
suggesting that Talbot’s tapestry of the fall of Phaeton ‘instead of simply depicting
women in a subordinate position . . . implicitly promotes their textual agency’ (p. 131).
In order to do so, she has to explain that one of the Naiads in the tapestry might

8 C. Austin and G. Bastianini (edd.), Posidippi Pellaei Quae Supersunt Omnia (Milan
2002) 48f. no. 27.
resemble Talbot herself, that Philip Hardie has argued that Phaeton’s body is effectively textualized through his mother’s discovery of his epitaph, and that it was the Naiads who wrote Phaeton’s epitaph. This is a tortuous reasoning, which has little to do with the matter in hand, and which is apparently prompted by a desire to find equivalence between the various texts under discussion. But even if one allows a connection between the sections that take gender as their subject, it can only be a connection of the most basic sort. And it is hard to see how the chapters on Sandys, or Garth, or Caxton relate to this material. Although Oakley-Brown has interesting things to say about all of these texts, there is a basic problem of integration. This is partly, no doubt, a consequence of the sheer diversity of her subject matter.

It is partly also because the book lacks a clearly stated aim or consistent methodological approach. Oakley-Brown dismisses at an early stage the idea of conducting ‘prescriptive comparative analyses between source and target languages’, for two reasons: first, she says (quoting Michael Cronin), because such an approach ‘ignores the fact that most people who read a translation do so because they do not speak the source language’; and, secondly, it is near impossible ‘to secure an originary source text for the early modern English translations of the *Metamorphoses*’ (p. 15). The first point is questionable, to say the least. The second is an important caveat, but surely not one to justify ignoring the source text altogether, as Oakley-Brown does. Translations can of course be read utterly independently of the texts from which they are translated. It seems strange to do this, though, in a study concerned specifically with the ‘cultural politics of translation’. Oakley-Brown’s summary of her own methodological approach does not make it entirely clear how she will approach her diverse subject matter: ‘Throughout the book, I largely explore Ovidian translation by way of the variable relationships between translator, patron, publisher, readership and critical reception in order to “critique the violence of my own language”’ (p. 15).

In any case, Oakley-Brown often reverts to the ‘prescriptive approach’ that she has rejected. In her third chapter, she suggests that George Sandys’ translation of the *Metamorphoses* tones down the violence inherent in Ovid’s Latin: ‘This . . . is particularly marked in his translation of the myth of Philomela. The restrictive prosody of the couplet form assists in reducing the depiction of the violence wrought against Philomela. . . . However, the extent to which Sandys plays down the violence is most apparent when his translation is considered alongside Golding’s version of the myth’ (p. 78). Since it gives an indication of Oakley-Brown’s approach to close reading, I quote the relevant passages in full:

While she reviles, invokes her father, sought  
To vent her spleen; her tongue in pincers caught, 
His sword devideth from the panting root:  
Which, trembling, murmurs curses at her foot.  
And as a serpents taile, dissever’d, Leaps:  
Even so her tongue; and dying caught her steps.  

(Sandys 6.577-82)

But as she yirnde and called ay upon hir fathers name,  
And strived to have spoken still, the cruell tyrant came,
And with a pair of pinsons fast did catch hir by the tung,
And with his sword did cut it off, the stump wheron it hung
Did patter still. The tip fell downe, and quivering on the ground
As thoug that it had murmured it made a certaine sound,
And as an Adder's tayle cut off doth skip a while: even so
The tip of Philomelaas tongue did wriggle to and fro,
And nearer to hir mistresse-ward in dying still did go.

(Golding 6.707-15)

To me, at least, it is not immediately obvious how Sandys has played down the violence of the scene. I can hardly think of a more gory or evocative image than the ‘panting root’ of Philomela’s tongue—surely all the more effective for being concise. Sandys’ only significant divergence from the Latin is in having Philomela’s tongue murmuring curses at her foot: an anthropomorphic detail, if a distracting one. Oakley-Brown does not quote the Latin, but tells us that ‘the anthropomorphic transformation of Philomela’s tongue, so poignantly rendered in the Latin text and Golding’s translation, is contracted in Sandys’ Ovid; this is a translation practice which continues throughout much of the Metamorphosis Englished’ (p. 78). Poignancy seems an unlikely quality to discover in either of these passages, which, like Ovid’s, tend towards the baroque; Oakley-Brown also finds poignancy in the innuendo-laden exchange between Narcissus and Echo (p. 104). In any case, the sole argument advanced for the greater poignancy—and, despite Oakley-Brown’s declared critical approach, accuracy—of Golding’s version seems to be that he uses more words. This passage is typical of the book as a whole. Oakley-Brown steers clear of detailed textual analysis, and asserts more than she argues.

Ovid and the Cultural Politics of Translation in Early Modern England can be hard work, for two reasons. First, Oakley-Brown has a taste for academic jargon, and a tendency to indulge that taste at the expense of clarity. The book’s final sentence, in which she tries to draw together its various strands, is a good example: ‘English translations of the Metamorphoses are the “very life of difference”; indeed, they are sites of différence in which the translation and transformation, construction and deconstruction, of English subjectivities may be explored’ (p. 193). At the close of a book covering such a broad range of texts, readers expect—and need—a cogent conclusion. This is obfuscation. Secondly, she quotes extensively and unnecessarily from other critics, whose words are often incorporated into her text without explanation. This is especially awkward, since the book has endnotes rather than footnotes. Thus, in order to find out what Oakley-Brown means when she promises to ‘explore Ovidian translations . . . in order to “critique the violence of my own language”’, we have to skip to the end of the chapter. When we do, and when we have tracked down a copy of Eric Cheyfitz’ The Poetics of Imperialism,¹ we discover that the quotation originally referred to the appropriation of Native American culture by Anglophone colonialists. It is hard to see how this adds to the reader’s understanding.

The excessive reference to other critics, as well as giving the book the feel of a cento, creates a false impression of punctiliousness. At one stage, Oakley-Brown wrongly attributes a quotation to Dryden’s preface to *All for Love*—it comes from his preface to *Troilus and Cressida*—and offers Paulina Kewes’ *Authorship and Appropriation* as her source for it (p. 35). Kewes, though, attributes the quotation correctly. This is a single example, accidentally encountered; it does not inspire confidence in the rest of the notes, which take up forty-one of the book’s 193 pages (not counting half-pages). The book does not give the impression of having been checked thoroughly. Typos are frequent. There is a stray page-break on p. 98. The notes are out of order on p. 93.

The range of this book is impressive, though it suffers from a lack of clarity and cohesion in places. Oakley-Brown has identified several fascinating topics relating to the reception of Ovid, all of which have a strong claim on our attention. They would perhaps be better served by separate critical accounts.

Henry Power

*University of Exeter*


This biography of the emperor Nero fits well into the Blackwell Ancient Lives series with its aim of presenting, in brief compass and in the form of accessible historical narratives, the lives of influential figures of antiquity. Preceded by a chronological chart, a family tree, and a map of the Roman empire, the story of Nero is told chronologically, rather than analytically, except for the three central chapters, where the emperor’s artistic pursuits, his provision of bread and circuses to the populace, and Roman foreign policy during his reign receive thematic treatment. There is an appendix giving an English translation from 1899 (with transliterated Greek) of ‘extracts’ from Suetonius’ biography, accompanied by the translator’s ‘Remarks on Nero’. There is also a useful, but not overwhelming, bibliography, and a helpful index.

The most curious feature of the volume, and one evidently not the responsibility of the author, is the appendix, where the only passage of Suetonius actually omitted in this antique translation is that giving graphic details of incest with his mother at the end of chapter 28, while the ‘Remarks’ have the tone of moral outrage suitable to that date. The body of the book, however, quotes the 1914 Loeb translation of Suetonius; while Malitz’ salutary scepticism about Agrippina’s poisoning of Claudius (p. 12), and about Nero’s responsibility for the fire and his provision of a musical accompaniment to it (p. 68), forms a curious contrast with the

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certainty of the ‘Remarks’ on both points (pp. 159, 161). The author has also been let down by his translator. It is not just a matter of unidiomatic expressions such as ‘no one got the idea to demand’ (p. 23), or of incorrect ones like ‘disinterested’ for ‘uninterested’ (p. 39) and ‘Neronian’ for ‘Neronic’ (p. 48), but of sentences which make no sense as when, after the murder of Britannicus, Agrippina is said to recognize ‘that her son could be just as scrupulous as she’ (p. 27—read ‘unscrupulous’), or when the *senatus consultum* (‘decree of the senate’) on the gold and silver coinage is said to be ‘an acknowledgement by the emperor that he owed the honor formulated through his form of address to the Senate’.

Given the limited size of such a volume, Malitz can only provide references to the ancient sources very sparingly (and not always explicity). But he quotes some of the best set pieces: Tac. *Ann.* 15.44 on the punishment of the Christians as responsible for the fire of AD 64 (p. 69); Suet. *Ner.* 31 describing the Golden House (p. 73); Nero’s speech, recorded on stone (*ILS* 8794), proclaiming the liberation of Greece (p. 92). These afford the reader the chance to read some ancient historical narrative and rhetoric. The blurb makes various predictable claims to originality and reassessment; it is more accurate in describing this as a balanced account which gives full weight to Nero’s promising beginning as ruler and to his artistic taste and patronage of the arts, while not palliatiing his crimes and his cruelty. It is a pity that when the translation from the German was made in 2005, no account was taken of Champlin’s eccentric but fascinating book on Nero, published in 2003¹, and fully exploring his showmanship.

Malitz attributes Nero’s actual fall from power to his tendency to panic in situations of crisis (pp. 28, 32, 102). He seems to ascribe Nero’s failure as an emperor to his mistake in valuing ‘applause in the theatre more highly than his reputation among the political and military elite’ (p. 52); though elsewhere he ascribes somewhat excessive political importance to popular support, speaking of ‘Nero’s awareness that it would be more difficult for him to do without this segment of public opinion than without the more critical segment of the senators’ (p. 49). In fact, the populace could not save an emperor when he had lost the loyalty of the senatorial army commanders and the praetorian guard. There are other inconsistencies. On p. 35 Nero’s failure to visit Athens on his Greek tour is ascribed to his fear, as a matricide, of the Furies (as in Suet. *Ner.* 34), but on p. 92 two different explanations are offered: successful flattery by Corinth, and Nero’s wish to honour ‘Roman’ as opposed to ‘classical’ Greece. The fact that Seneca was banned by Agrippina from teaching philosophy to Nero is ascribed (on p. 9) to leaving such instruction to Greeks, and (on p. 14) to a fear that Nero would lose interest in ruling; but on p. 38 it has become a later accusation brought against Seneca, for having taught a tyrant. More seriously, we hear, in the context of the Pisonian conspiracy, of those ‘who, based on descent and character, would be in a position to replace Nero and at the same time be acceptable to the senate’ (p. 80)—and it is certainly true that the claim of Caius Calpurnius Piso to Nero’s position rested on his descent from Republican nobility. But then we are told

that descent from Augustus was ‘the only essential rule of succession’ (pp. 77, 99, 101). In fact, there was no ‘rule of succession’, nor could there be, because the principate was not an avowed monarchy.

Though the author had no space in which to explore the political system, there are interesting insights into motive: that it was because Agrippina had her eyes on Acerronia’s wealth and will that she made no attempt to mobilize support after Nero’s attempt on her own life (p. 32); that loyalty of the praetorians to the imperial house was founded on their awareness that no one else could afford to pay them such bounties (p. 78); that Nero’s getting rid of suspects in AD 65 and 66 was a way of paving the way to a safe absence in Greece (p. 87). The translation of Nero’s remark quaeis artifex pereo as ‘what a loss for the world of the theater’ (p. 36) neatly extends the literal meaning of artifex as a cithara player in order to incorporate Nero’s attachment to showmanship. And it takes a computer buff like Malitz to discover for us that ‘there is software to “burn” CD-ROMs that carries the tradition-conscious name “NERO BURNING ROM”’ (p. 113).

Miriam Griffin  
Somerville College, Oxford


The present volume is the first such comprehensive study of the influence of drama—principally comedy, but with due attention to tragedy, mime, and pantomime—on Apuleius’ work. As the subtitle indicates, the evidence and interest skew heavily toward the sophist’s novel, the Metamorphoses or Golden Ass (although May studiously avoids the latter title): eight of the thirteen chapters are devoted to it. The first two chapters lay out the need for a comprehensive study and the case for drama as a living part, not just of sophistic education, but of Roman culture in the second century AD. The case for a living dramatic performance tradition in Apuleius’ day remains unfortunately tantalizingly thin: a brief section on ‘Theatrical Archaeology in North Africa’ (pp. 22-25) points to a relief mask from Khamisa, perhaps from Terence’s Eunuch, and friezes decorating the theatre stage at Sabratha, but proof of links to contemporary performances elude us. Comparison of Apuleius’ interest in archaism to that of Fronto and Gellius yields more. Situating her work in the company of Finkelpearl’s study of literary allusion, May stresses the significance of Plautus for the archaists, not just on a linguistic but also on a literary level.

The two succeeding chapters focus on the minor works and the Apology. Analysis of the Florida and the shorter works shows Apuleius using comedy to push the metaphor of life as a stage further than his philosophic contemporaries. Of particular interest is a short poem entitled Anechomenos, purportedly adapted from an

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otherwise unattested Menander play, in which Apuleius plays at being Plautus with a neoteric difference. The chapter on the *Apology* builds a convincing case for Apuleius’ use of tragic along with comic motifs and characters to portray his opponents as not only comic characters but also as bad actors, deserving to be hissed off stage. At the same time, Apuleius skilfully dissociates himself from the comic plotting and retains his position as philosopher aware of, but above, the foibles of others. While these earlier chapters lay a sound methodological and historical foundation, the later chapters devoted to the *Metamorphoses* will likely prove to be of the widest interest. A chapter on ‘The Texture of the *Metamorphoses*’ (pp. 109-27) revisits Smith’s characterization of the novel’s prologue as comic and especially Plautine, then quickly surveys clusters of dramatic terminology throughout the novel. The next chapter reads Aristomenes’ and Socrates’ story as a drama, emphasizing competing or ambiguous dramatic references—with the intriguing claim that Socrates’ language moves from tragic to emphatically comic after his apparent resurrection. Indeed, ‘this multiplicity of dramatic intertexts is . . . employed throughout . . . to increase suspense and confuse the first-time reader . . . [my emphasis]’ (p. 134).

Chapter 7, ‘A Parasite in a Comic Household’ (pp. 143-81), makes a persuasive case for a persistent characterization of Lucius as a comic parasite, even when an ass, with a Plautine rather than Menandrean hunger for food as well as stories. Photis becomes a pert *ancilla* with an equally Plautine pedigree, though the pair then become *adulescens* and *meretrix* in the seduction scenes. The Risus festival is paradoxically more resistant to a theatrical reading, the references much more of a stretch (especially an attempt to follow Fick-Michel in finding an obscure Aristophanic reference behind the name of Byrrhaena). May ends up suggesting that the dramatic intertexts will be clearer for a second-time reader. The chapter on Cupid and Psyche makes a case, in a very broad sense, for reading the narrative as a tragicomedy (as seen in Plaut. *Amph.*), with tragic elements at the beginning and comic motifs predominating at the end. This will prove to be important groundwork for May’s reading of the ending of the novel as a whole. Charite’s story, wrapped around the old woman’s tale, forms a counterpoint, with its mixture of comic and tragic elements at the beginning, moving toward an apparently comic happy ending of the marriage, then undercut completely by the unexpected tragic ending.

Book 9 apparently proved quite resistant to a reading through dramatic intertexts. Though one finds a few scattered references earlier, only as a second-time reader did this reviewer note that May’s sequential analysis skips straight from the end of Charite’s narrative in book 8 to book 10, where metamorphoses of comic into tragic narratives and vice versa come faster and faster. Thus, ‘the *Metamorphoses* becomes a rhetorical exercise in the crossing of genres, which appears to be Apuleius’ underlying

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structural principle . . .' (p. 274). Particularly striking among many promising ideas here is May’s proposal that Apuleius might have based the horrifying frame narrative—the young man who honourably tries to provide for his abandoned sister, only to provoke his wife into murdering the girl—on the prologue of a now lost play. Chapter 12, ‘The End: Isis: Dea ex Machina?’ (pp. 307-28), tackles the familiar problem of the novel’s ending and the apparent tragic—and therefore serious—pedigree of Isis as dea ex machina. Here May points to the evidence for such figures in the lost mythological travesties of Middle Comedy (unless we find an antecedent of Plaut. Amph. here). She then explores Isis’ identification with Tyche and Fortuna and their comic pedigrees. Thus Isis, ‘despite some tragic elements, is ultimately seen in an essentially comic light’ (p. 324), though that does not make her a laughable figure. A brief conclusion wraps up the whole volume.

May’s thorough study does much to ground Apuleius in the intellectual world of the Second Sophistic and draws welcome attention to many dramatic intertexts, especially within the Metamorphoses. Her Apuleius bears no small resemblance to Sullivan’s Petronius—a literary opportunist. One suspects, though, that the debate over the import of these resonances has a long course yet to run.

Niall W. Slater

Emory University


Quoting Napoleon and referring to the Wizard of Oz (pp. 1f.) may seem unlikely points of departure from which to study Tacitus’ Histories; however, this is perhaps not so surprising given the fact that Haynes is concerned with the ‘significance of the relationship of style to content’ and that ‘literary analysis, while indispensable to the interpretation of historiography, is inadequate unless it incorporates investigation into the experience of a lived, historical reality. In his history of ideology, Tacitus gives us ample ground for both analysis and investigation’ (p. 2). Haynes nuances her aims by adding that this ‘book traces Tacitus’s development of the fingere/credere dynamic both backward and slightly forward from the year AD 69’ (p. 3). The entire Julio-Claudian period before the civil war and years leading to Domitian’s assassination afterwards, in fact, figures prominently in the discussion.

The work as a whole is divided into five chapters: ‘An Anatomy of Make-Believe’ (pp. 3-33); ‘Nero: The Specter of Civil War’ (pp. 34-70); ‘Power and Simulacra: The Emperor Vitellius’ (pp. 71-111); ‘Vespasian: The Emperor who Succeeded’ (pp. 112-47); and ‘A Civil Disturbance: The Batavian Revolts’ (pp. 148-77). A conclusion is followed by endnotes, references, and an index (pp. 179-231).

In order to highlight the development of the ‘fingere/credere dynamic’ or what is imagined or believed (p. 4), considered here as ‘central to Tacitus’s narrative’ (p. 8), Haynes announces a chronological treatment of the principles of AD 69 with chapter 1 acting as an introductory section in which such make-believe can be contextualized. Speeches, either directly or indirectly related, by Otho, Germanicus, Segestes, Plato’s Glaucon, and Socrates all focus the discussion to the idea of simulation, analyzing what various characters—senate, princeps, hero, philosopher, urban plebs, soldier—believe or imagine. Haynes further seems to be suggesting that Tacitus ‘does not write about the reality of imperial politics and culture, but about the imaginary picture that imperial society makes of its relation to these concrete conditions of existence’ (p. 30). In chapter 2, the shadow cast by Nero and the Julio-Claudian dynasty on the events in AD 69 is examined through a discussion of Galba’s attempt to distance himself from the previous regime and through his adoption of Piso, while Otho’s known connection with Nero conflicts with attempts to set aside the accumulated baggage of that link. However, Galba’s ‘very short principate’ (p. 47) was actually nearly twice as long as Otho’s, and no ‘tangled web of civil war’ (p. 34) preceded Nero’s suicide. Since Tacitus provides no speeches for Vitellius, in chapter 3 the theme of simulation switches to those actions that may have been observed as spectacles, for example, the death of Junius Blaesus (pp. 80, 86; cf. p. 28). Here the order of the discussion itself becomes disjointed as Vitelli is placed first at Bedriacum (pp. 80-96), then at ‘Lyons, the next stop on his journey’ (p. 96), and then on arrival at Rome (p. 103) where the new princeps, with as much association with the Julio-Claudians as his two immediate predecessors, seems to be cast rather as another Nero (p. 111).

The focus in chapter 4 is the success of Vespasian, arising messiah-like from the east and, indeed, Haynes devotes much space to an analysis of Tacitus’ description of the Jews (pp. 140-45) and the omens and miracles which accompanied the installation of the new dynasty (pp. 118-22, 129-35). Ethnographic digression and reporting portents are both common elements in ancient historical prose, but Haynes seems to be arguing that here these points have an added dimension: ‘that Tacitus presents the ascent of Vespasian as a turning point in Roman ideology, where the emperor’s authority was now viewed as a product of military influence governed by the favour of the gods. He therefore becomes an object of superstition for all his subjects’ (p. 145). In chapter 5, the focus begins with Civilis’ address to fellow Batavians, then shifts to Mucianus’ letter to the senate (pp. 152f.), thence to speeches by Eprius Marcellus and Petillius Cerealis (pp. 163-71). Again Haynes uses rhetorical passages inserted into Latin historical prose as evidence of Tacitus’ inventiveness in showing that the Batavian leadership, in an apparent quest for freedom, behave all too like the Roman generals whom they oppose. This is useful and informative, but worrying if it is also advanced as being the foundation of the history. Finally, Haynes insists that ‘if we remain wary of illusions, we may glimpse both the appearance of the past, and the truth of historiography’ (p. 183).

Rather dubiously, all the rulers of AD 69 are entitled ‘pretenders’. This is frequently reiterated (pp. 4, 33, 54, 68, 80, 85, 116), but never explained. ‘Contenders’
might have been a more precise term for Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Vespasian, since all were *principes*. Haynes’ discussion noticeably lacks precision throughout; ‘republic’, for example, features frequently (e.g., pp. 50-52, 112, 121), but the word does not appear to derive its meaning from *res publica* even though Haynes refers to Plato, to the ‘normative concept of the Republic’ (p. 52), to the ‘rest of the country’ (p. 106), and to ‘the old days of the Republic’ (p. 112). Instead, Haynes manages to convey what appears to be an indifferent knowledge of what the *polis* or the ancient city-state represents. Imprecision and errors are uncomfortably frequent here. To state that Germanicus was not a military leader (p. 97) simply ignores the evidence to the contrary of his campaigns in Germany (cf. p. 116), Verginius Rufus did not instigate the civil war in AD 68 (p. 112), while Vespasian obviously had a distinguished military career (p. 116) prior to his acclamation as new ruler in AD 69. Errors may be observed in the quoted Greek texts (pp. 20, 113f.) and in the translations of the Latin text (pp. 45, 134)—in the latter *nepotes* refers to Augustus’ grandsons not ‘nephews’ as he had only one, and that one, Marcellus, is specified in the text. The characterisation of Marius and Sulla as being from opposite ‘ends of the social hierarchy’ (p. 158) is simply incorrect, while Pompey was no longer alive at the battle of Philippi (p. 158) and Domitian could not have arrived in Rome (p. 172) with Mucianus since he had never left the city. Further errors occur in the index, and something is not quite right with the footnote order to pages 134-37.

Ultimately the events in the *Histories* are not ‘make-believe’, and while Tacitus may be guilty or conversely innocent of dramatizing or even inventing scenes, it is still history, as it was to him, not fiction, and justifiable within the boundaries of ancient historical prose composition. He did not create a fiction and call it history. If we were to go down the road of disbelieving Tacitus or assuming that his history is simply an elaborate construction, then that assumption would also have to be applied to all other ancient writers of history. Where would that leave Ancient History as a discipline? The answer, I suspect, is as a sub-genre of Literary Studies, where we began.

Richard J. Evans

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This volume is a welcome addition to the growing collection of modern overviews of the later Roman empire. It is gratifying that a return to narrative history and a unified one-man view of the period is once more an acceptable approach for a major publisher—narrative history being by no means as out of date, nor as easy to write, as those who choose to regard it as old-fashioned like to think. Mitchell offers a convincing argument for the precedence of ‘political’ history in the broadest sense, since this is not only a convenient principle of structuring past time but also a major real structural element that provided the living framework within which changes in
social practice and mental attitudes took place. He deliberately places his book as a counter-model to the ‘tendency to study social attitudes rather than social structures, popular activity in preference to high culture, mentalities rather than educational patterns, issues of personal or community identity rather than questions of national politics’ (p. 8). Moreover, it is consciously modernizing in the best possible sense, drawing lessons for the interpretation of the later Roman empire from the rapid collapse of political structures that had seemed destined for eternity until they were suddenly gone, which we have experienced in the modern world over the last twenty years. The book can for this reason alone be thoroughly recommended.

This does not mean that it is always easygoing. The later Roman empire, where so much was happening at the same time at different levels in various regions, inevitably produces a very dense narrative. Furthermore, written source material of one kind or another is available in quantities and with characteristics that threaten to overwhelm the historian of the ancient world, accustomed as he is to wholly inadequate sources. It is therefore important and sensible that Mitchell devotes the whole of chapter 2 to ‘The Nature of the Evidence’ (pp. 13-46). Without aiming at encyclopaedic information, which would have produced a quite different type of book, Mitchell characterizes the main types of information available to the historian, drawing attention to the specific tendencies of each type of source and the problems that historians face in making use of them. Particularly important for the period in general are the material relics—artefacts of various kinds and archaeological remains—and Mitchell is careful throughout the book to draw on the results of modern art-historical and archaeological research and to incorporate its findings in his composite picture.

Two narrative chapters follow, full of exciting events, which take the story from Diocletian to Justinian (pp. 47-100). Mitchell successfully combines narrative history with emphasis on trends; he notes in particular the significance of the Gothic problem and the importance for the history of the time of the inadequate integration of the Gothic immigrants into existing Roman social, governmental, and religious structures. Religious developments, which occupy an enormous mass of the source material for the period, are also set happily into the political context that created them; and the relatively minor importance of religious affairs in the imperial priority-list before the time of Justinian, where governmental and especially military priorities always dominated imperial thinking, is adequately emphasized. The narrative of fifth-century events is less cohesive than that for the fourth century, almost inevitably as fragmentary and disjointed as the events themselves. Justinian, however, rescues the narrative, as he tried to rescue the empire, by offering an identifiable purpose and, in Procopius, a thorough and contemporary narrative historian as main source.

Chapters 5-10 discuss systematic aspects of the period, always drawing attention to the political context within which the structural elements that Mitchell treats took place. Chapter 5, ‘The Roman State’ (pp. 155-90), makes good use of iconography in order to illustrate the ideology and priorities of the imperial government, pointing out the significant absence of Christian symbolism before the reign of Justinian. Security, achieved through taxation and military expenditure, was
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top priority throughout; bureaucracy and law-giving served above all this central priority. Change in traditional city life and societal structural changes related to the spread of Christianity are also given close attention. Chapter 6, ‘The Barbarian Kingdoms’ (pp. 191-224), gives an excellent and differentiated survey of the ‘New Powers’, drawing attention to their differences as well as their similarities. Mitchell characterizes their way of life and their social structure, and shows the different ways in which the various groups adapted to existing conditions. The main emphasis here is inevitably on the west.

Chapter 7, ‘From Pagan to Christian’ (pp. 225-55), offers an excellent introduction into the historical complexity of the problem of the ‘Christianising’ of the empire, surveying the state of religious diversity in the third and fourth centuries, and showing the development of doctrinal problems as a major ecclesiastical issue as being a result of Constantine’s acceptance of Christianity. Here again the critical importance of the reign of Justinian for the assimilation of Church and State is rightly emphasized. The religious theme is continued in chapter 8, ‘Conversion to Christianity and the Politics of Religious Identity’ (pp. 256-300), where more personal factors for conversion are reviewed, and especially the prominent and reasonably well-documented examples of Constantine, Julian, and Augustine are discussed in the context of the development of the idea of defining identity through religious affiliation. Chapters 9 (pp. 301-28) and 10 (pp. 329-70) deal with the political economy and associated societal changes. Mitchell emphasizes the importance of the urban communities as mechanisms of regional and even empire-wide economic stimulus, especially the ‘Great Cities’ Rome, Constantinople, Carthage, Alexandria and Antioch. Regional surveys serve to relate the political narrative to the structural discussion; Mitchell emphasizes that, when the major cities collapsed, the regional economies that they had both stimulated and exploited also collapsed. This development was regionally diverse, and was always related to the ability of the imperial government to maintain the regional administrative infrastructures that generated taxation income and thereby guaranteed security. No real ‘global’ empire-wide, general picture emerges from Mitchell’s account, simply because there was none, merely different regional histories.

The book ends with the narrative chapters 11, ‘The Challenges of the Later Sixth Century’ (pp. 371-401) and 12, ‘The Final Reckoning of the Eastern Empire’ (pp. 402-24), on the post-Justinianic world. These emphasize the problems caused by natural disasters (especially the plague), the ongoing energy-sapping wars in Italy and Africa, but above all the challenges presented by Sassanians and Arabs, Avars, Slavs and Lombards. The story is complex, perhaps too complex for the brief treatment it receives here, though it was clearly an attractive proposition to bring the book to an end with the first successful onslaughts of Islamic forces. A select bibliography (pp. 425-45), a chronological list of emperors (pp. 446f.), and a detailed index (pp. 448-69) complete this very welcome modern account of the later Roman empire.

R. Malcolm Errington

Philipps-Universität
BOOKS RECEIVED

Books for review should be sent to the Reviews Editor, Scholia.


Books Received


Scholia publishes news about classical museums in New Zealand and articles on classical artefacts in museums. Information about classical exhibitions and artefacts is welcome and should reach the In the Museum Editor by 1 September.

CLASSICS MUSEUM
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON

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In 2006 the Classics Museum at the Victoria University of Wellington added to its teaching collection an Attic black-figure column krater attributed to the Leagros Group.\(^1\) In the following year the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa also acquired a Leagran piece, an Attic black-figure neck-amphora, which had formerly been on long-term loan.\(^2\) Both vases may be dated to \(ca.\) 510 BC.

The Classics Museum’s column krater has figured panels on both sides framed by tongues across the top and bands of ivy-leaves down each side, although the painter has omitted the ivy-leaves at the right-hand edge of the panel on Side B. There are rays around the base; a double ivy-leaf pattern on the outside of the rim; and linked lotus-buds on the flat upper surface of the rim, with a palmette between scrolls

\(^1\) Figures 1a-b: Wellington, Victoria University Classics Museum 2006.1; formerly Berge Collection; height 413 mm., maximum diameter 469 mm., diameter of rim 305 mm., diameter of base 250 mm., capacity approximately 27 litres. Attributed to the Leagros Group (Ede). Charles Ede Limited, Greek Antiquities (London 1994) no. 25 (sides A and B); D. Burton, ‘Two Pots by the Leagros Group’, NZACT 34 (2007) 15-18. The krater is complete, having been reconstructed from large fragments. I am grateful to Judy Deuling for her comments on a draft of this paper, and to Matthew Trundle for some lively discussion of helmets.

\(^2\) Figures 2a-b: Wellington, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa GH011680 (D32); formerly Burdon Collection; height 425 mm., maximum diameter 255 mm., diameter of rim 175 mm., diameter of base 145 mm. Attributed to the Leagros Group by Mrs J. V. Hobbs. D. von Bothmer, Amazons in Greek Art (Oxford 1957) 55 no. 167 bis, listed as ‘Karori, Wellington (N.Z.), R. Burdon’; J. Campbell, The Art of Greek Vase Painting (Auckland 1996) front cover (side A) and back cover (side B) (both images reversed); Burton [1]. See also R. O’Rourke, A Catalogue of Classical Antiquities in the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa (Wellington 2001, unpublished), and http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/objectdetails.aspx?oid=741917&coltype=history&regno=gh011680 (accessed 18 December 2008). It has been reconstructed and repainted. I am grateful to Ross O’Rourke for allowing me access to the piece, and for his generous help with photographs.
over each handle. There are no inscriptions. Side A shows a female figure (perhaps Semele or Ariadne) about to mount into a right-facing quadriga with Dionysos behind the horses. Dionysos, robed, with red beard and long hair, wears a wreath and holds up a kantharos by its stem in his left hand; it is viewed from the handle-side, as is common among the Leagros Group but rare elsewhere. Vines with bunches of grapes spread across the background of the scene; they have their origin in front of Dionysos, who may be holding one in his right hand. He is walking towards the right, but his head is turned back towards the female. Dressed in a peplos, with a himation over her shoulders, she is in the act of stepping into the chariot, with the reins of the horses in her hands. She too wears a wreath. Of the four horses, only two rumps and three heads are visible, but the painter has faithfully depicted all sixteen legs. In front of their heads is perhaps the most ambitiously posed figure on the vase, a nymph (wreath, sleeved chiton, krotala in her raised right hand) dancing toward the left, but with her body twisted so that she looks to the right. Although her torso is partially hidden by the horses’ heads and she is clearly behind them, her right foot crosses over in front of them. Small slips like this, and a general carelessness in the incision and added colour, show that this piece is not among the best work of the Leagros Group.

Side A fits into a small group of Attic pieces depicting very similar scenes from the last quarter of the sixth century. Dionysos, a female figure and a four-horse chariot are the key elements in scenes which range from Dionysos in the chariot with the female on the ground to both of them in the chariot. In our variation on the theme an (apparently) mortal woman steps into the chariot, while Dionysos stands nearby (rarely vice versa), the pair often accompanied by other Dionysian figures. Similar compositions can be seen on amphorae in Munich and the Vatican, neck-amphorae in Bologna and San Simeon, and a hydria in Würzburg. On the first a satyr stands be-

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4 See also a very sketchy, late black-figure lekythos in Dunedin, Otago Museum E 28.75, Manner of the Haimon Painter, *ca.* 500-450 BC: Beazley Archive 305693; *ABV* 539.15; *CVA: New Zealand* 1.18, pl. 23.3-5. One female steps into the chariot, one stands beside it, Dionysos stands behind the horses and a (male?) figure is seated in front of them. The identification of the charioteer is uncertain: ‘the goddess may sometimes be Ariadne—or Semele—, and sometimes even Leto’ (*ABV* 539.15). J. R. Green, *CVA: New Zealand* 1.18, pl. 23.3-5 simply describes the female figures as ‘goddesses’, but the similarity of composition at least makes it possible that this belongs with our group. I am grateful to Judy Deuling for drawing this to my attention.

side Dionysos, who looks forwards, and the nymph moves right with her head turned back; on the second a panther stares out by the horses’ front legs and at the right the female figure stands calmly facing left. On the others Ariadne has both feet in the chariot, and the female figure at the right is omitted altogether; on the third and fourth there is a goat, while on the last a horse raises one leg at a right angle to fill the corner space. While chariots are a common form of transport for deities (and Dionysos uses one from the mid-sixth century onwards) Carpenter points out that they are also used for transport between the worlds of gods, mortals and the dead. It is likely, then, that these scenes show the apotheosis of Dionysos’ mother, Semele. She is identified by inscription on only one vase showing this scene, a hydria by the Leagros Group, now in Berlin. Here Dionysos is in the act of stepping into the chariot, and Semele stands behind the horses’ back legs, facing him. There is a goat beside the horses’ front legs, and the background is clear of vines. Otherwise, the piece is similar, right down to Dionysos’ side-on kantharos and the details of the horses’ harness, although the quality of the painting on the Berlin hydria is finer than ours. Against the identification as Semele, however, Carpenter makes the point that ‘she is little more than a visual epithet’ in the scenes she shares with Dionysos. This criticism has more force when Dionysos is the one in the chariot, but her action in driving or mounting into the chariot does seem to lend her a little more prominence than a mere attribute.

As far as our piece is concerned, given the lack of inscriptions, some degree of doubt over the identification does exist. The woman in a similar scene on an amphora in solt, for example, was identified as Semele by Shapiro, Schefold and Kossatz-Deissmann, and as Ariadne by Beazley and Gasparri. So is she rather


7 Berlin, Staatlichen Museen F 1904, Leagros Group, ca. 520 BC: Beazley Archive 302049; ABV 364.54; LIMC 7 (1994) ‘Semele’ no. 22 pl. 533. A further inscription, previously read as Thyone (Semele’s name after her retrieval from the underworld and apotheosis, according to Apollod. Bibl. 3.5.3 et al.: see Kossatz-Deissmann [3] 718f. Carpenter [6] 63) is ‘sinnlos’ according to Kossatz-Deissmann [3] 722. A female bust is named ‘Semele’ on a cup, ca. 530 BC, and ‘Thyone’ accompanies Dionysos at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis on a hydria, ca. 520 BC: LIMC 7 (1994) ‘Semele’ nos 35f. In contrast, Ariadne is not named in any such scene with Dionysos at this time.

8 Carpenter [6] 64 states that ‘Semele’s role in myth was to conceive Dionysos, and outside of that she has little place in the narrative tradition’; however, mortals who have been immortalized tend to be inactive in narrative terms thereafter; Herakles is a prime example.

9 Würzburg, Martin von Wagner Museum L 267, Manner of Lysippides Painter (Mastos Painter), ca. 530-520 BC: Beazley Archive 302242; ABV 258.10; LIMC 3 (1986) 487 ‘Dionysos’ no. 769, pl. 390; LIMC 7 (1994) 722 ‘Semele’ no. 21. Here Hermes stands in
Ariadne, his lover? Semele appears as Dionysos’ companion in the sixth and early fifth centuries; Ariadne probably appears with him in the late sixth and through the fifth and fourth. There is thus some overlap. Given the inscription on the Berlin hydria, it might be easiest to assume that all our scenes show Semele, but Carpenter warns that ‘it is not certain that this is the same woman who mounts while Dionysos watches’. Confusion between the two women in Dionysos’ life would hardly be surprising; the fact that Dionysos himself is responsible for the apotheosis in both cases is sufficient to make either of them a possible candidate for the scene, and it is quite possible that both could have been identified in it by a viewer.

Side B shows a departing warrior scene with three couples. On the left an old man and a warrior face each other, while the other two couples show a woman facing a warrior. All three warriors are equipped with two spears, a helmet, greaves and large round shields; these, facing towards the viewer, form a dominant element in the scene, and are effectively balanced by the folds of the long robes worn by the old man and the two women. All three have shield devices, showing (from left to right) an anchor, a snake and a running leg—the latter a particularly popular device among the Leagros Group. Both women are veiled, and hold out their himatia in their left hands in the gesture elsewhere associated with weddings and with wifely aids. The woman in the centre also holds a circular wreath, after the fashion of some black-figure brides. Like most departing warrior scenes, then, these should be taken as family units: father and son, wife and husband, or mother and son, with the wreath perhaps symbolizing a bride. The scene, with the repetition of elements—the verticals of the standing figures, the round shields and the diagonal lines of the spears—gives a stronger sense of formal patterning than the image on Side A. At the same time, the

Dionysos’ place, Dionysos is in the nymph’s place and three satyrs have been added. Semele: H. A. Shapiro, Art and Cult under the Tyrants in Athens (Mainz am Rhein 1989) 92 pl. 40d; K. Schefold (tr. A. Griffiths), Gods and Heroes in Late Archaic Greek Art (Cambridge 1992) 46f. fig. 48; Kossatz-Deissmann [3] 722. Ariadne: ABV 258.10 [though the Beazley Archive has ‘woman (Ariadne?)’ here and elsewhere]; Gasparri [3] 487, who identifies the female in all of these scenes as Ariadne, except the one actually labelled ‘Semele’, pointing to a general increase in Ariadne’s presence through the second half of the sixth century BC (501). In LIMC 3 (1986) Addenda 1050-70, M.-L. Bernhard and W. A. Daszewski do not deal with this group under ‘Ariadne’, as they are covered under ‘Dionysos’.

10 Carpenter [3] 111 n. 54 accepts the identification of Ariadne when both figures stand in the chariot on analogy with ‘contemporary scenes depicting a wedded couple in a chariot’.

11 Carpenter [6] 69; cf. p. 62: ‘. . . there is no compelling reason to see her [Ariadne] as the woman with Dionysos on any Attic vases before the last quarter of the sixth’.


13 E.g., J. Boardman, Athenian Black Figure Vases: A Handbook (London 1974) 132, fig. 201.


15 E.g., Oakley and Sinos [14] figs 64, 69.
artist has gone to some trouble to vary the details of the scene, contrasting the old man with the two women, making the right-hand warrior’s spears point in the opposite direction, and varying the details of the armour. So, although all three wear Corinthian helmets, the warrior in the centre, for example, has a much taller, stilted crest, whereas his fellows wear lower crests, one white-striped, the other red-rimmed. Without attributes to identify individual characters, however, the figures remain non-specific and the scene deliberately ambiguous, open to both everyday and mythical interpretation.

Te Papa’s neck-amphora has a black foot, rays, lotus-buds and a meander below the figured scenes, strokes around the shoulder, and a lotus-and-palmette chain around the neck, incised and with added red. There is a very sparse palmette and tendril design under the handles between the figured scenes. Again, there are no inscriptions, but a potter’s or merchant’s mark is incised on the base in the form of two triangles joined at the apex. Side A shows Herakles in battle against four Amazons. All of the Amazons are dressed alike, with chitoniskoi, cuirasses, short cloaks, and high-crested Attic helmets. All carry round shields on their left arms and wield their weapons right-handed, moving forward to the left with their backs to us. At the left the first Amazon strides away from the struggle with her head held high. The device on her shield (seen in profile) is a sphinx. Her right hand is at her hip, but she does not appear to have any weapons, which may account for her rapid departure. Overlapping her is Herakles (chitoniskos, lion’s skin, red beard) lunging right, thrusting his long sword towards a falling Amazon. She is in a crouching position, falling back, with her sword in its scabbard and her shield raised (the device is a tripod) protecting her neck from the hero’s sword. Her shield is in front of Herakles and yet her legs are behind him. The result is that she looks entirely off balance, and about to fall, and the viewer’s awareness of Herakles’ invincibility is heightened. However, how much of this is deliberate and how much is due to painterly carelessness is open to question; in particular, the way in which her skirt is drawn makes it look almost as if she has one leg crossed over the other. Behind her the other two Amazons stride forward in tandem, shields up, spears raised and poised to lunge at Herakles. Again, the spears held in their right hands extend behind their heads, confirming the back view of their torsos. They have circles on their shields, and the one at the back, like the falling Amazon, carries a sword in a scabbard.

The subject on side A, Herakles in combat with a collapsing Amazon (usually Andromache, when named) and one or less often two Amazons, featured frequently among the very repetitive Amazonomachies which were very popular on Attic black-figure vases. In this category (G) von Bothmer identified six variants, and our vase

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16 For the hour-glass or double axe mark, see A. W. Johnston, *Trademarks on Greek Vases* (Warminster 1979) 106f., 199, figs 5f-g (type 24B); *Trademarks on Greek Vases: Addenda* (Oxford 2006) 91f.

17 A. M. Snodgrass, *Arms and Armour of the Greeks* (London 1967) 69f. It might be more accurate to describe it as Attic-Chalkidian, as Matthew Trundle has pointed out to me.

belongs in sub-section β in the last third of the sixth century; here the Amazon at the left of the image is a hoplite, not an archer, and she runs away without looking back.\footnote{19} Close parallels for the pose of this figure and of Herakles himself can be seen respectively on a neck-	extit{amphora} in Würzburg and a Leagran \textit{kalpis} in Sydney.\footnote{20} The unusual way in which the central Amazon falls backwards, and her tripod blazon, can also be seen on an \textit{oinochoe} in Auckland, although this time the Amazon at the right leaves the scene of the duel.\footnote{21}

The other side of the vase in Te Papa shows a far simpler scene, with two hoplites waiting for their companion, who stands naked between them fitting a greave to his left leg. His hair appears to be gathered at the back of his neck, ready for the high-crested helmet which, with the other (frontal) greave, is on the ground in front of him. His companions are rather more fully dressed. The man on the left holds a round shield on his left arm with a boar’s forequarters in added white on it, covering his body from chin to thigh; he wears a crested helmet, short cloak—the ends can be seen—and red-edged greaves, and holds two spears. Like the other armed man, his body faces away from the centre, but he has turned his head to look back at the man in the middle. The third man at the right also wears a crested helmet, red tunic and cuirass with incised pectorals, and red-edged greaves; he has a sword in its scabbard on a white baldric, a Boiotian shield in his left hand—the white volute decoration is visible inside—and two spears in his right. These two effectively mirror each other’s poses, even down to the spears, with the butt ends almost meeting at the central man’s helmet. All three helmets are Corinthian, with red or white on the crests, in keeping with the early date and the hoplite armour.\footnote{22} The lack of urgency in this scene nicely counterbalances the one-man force of destruction that is Herakles on the other side.

In sum, neither of these vases is of the finest work of the late sixth century BC, but the scenes are very much in the Leagros Group’s repertoire, in their choice of myths as much as in their style and depiction of detail. Between them, they epitomize much that is typical of Attic vase painting at the time.


\footnote{21} Auckland Museum 29699, Group of Vatican G.48, \textit{ca.} 510-500 BC: Beazley Archive 320447; \textit{ABV} 434.5; von Bothmer [2] 55 no. 170 pl. 43.6a-b; \textit{CVA: New Zealand} 1.13f., pl. 18.1-3.

\footnote{22} The Corinthian helmet without a cut-out near the ear was popular in the late sixth century BC, but other shapes offering improved vision and hearing became more popular in the early fifth century: H. van Wees, \textit{Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities} (London 2004) 50.
Figure 1a. Victoria University of Wellington VUW 2006.1. Attic black-figure column krater. Side A.

Figure 1b. Victoria University of Wellington VUW 2006.1. Attic black-figure column krater. Side B.
Figure 2a. Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa GH011680 (D32). Attic black-figure neck-amphora. Side A. (Photo: Te Papa, Wellington, New Zealand. MA_F.002344/01)

Figure 2b. Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa GH011680 (D32). Attic black-figure neck-amphora. Side B. (Photo: Te Papa, Wellington, New Zealand. MA_F.002344/02)
J. A. BARSBY ESSAY

The paper judged to be the best student essay in New Zealand submitted to Scholia by 1 September for the preceding year is published annually as the J. A. Barsby Essay. The competition is sponsored by the Australasian Society for Classical Studies. The Essay is in honour of New Zealand classicist J. A. Barsby.

NATURE’S BEST: ASPECTS OF NATURAL IMAGERY IN HORACE, ODES 1

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The Odes of Horace are incredibly complex, employing myth and history, the personal and the political, the natural and the human; however, these elements are in no way separate from each other. Nature is a universal language, one that is easily understood and identified with, which goes a long way towards explaining the prevalence of nature in the Odes. However, an examination of the natural imagery in Odes 1 shows that Horace uses nature rarely to discuss nature per se; but rather to show how the natural world compares with the human, and how they are both unavoidably intertwined. In this essay, the seasonal construction Odes 1, as it is revealed to us through natural imagery, will be examined. Horace’s use of nature as moral metaphor (following Commager) will also be examined, and in so doing we shall see how viewing nature in this light can illuminate other aspects of reading these odes. This should help us to understand Horace’s messages, which are often far simpler than his complex poetry would suggest. Scholars as far back as Verrall, and more recently Leach, have observed the presence of seasonal time in Odes 1; but none has fully examined the extent to which Horace stretches these cycles. Let us focus on the first twelve poems of Odes 1, identified by Porter as being structurally a complete group within the book. Horace’s natural imagery leads our realisation of the seasonal cycle within the construction of this book. Leach refers to the ‘alterations of nature itself’ and religious festivals as being the two ways in which Horace designates

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1 I thank Robin Bond at the University of Canterbury for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.


3 A. Verrall, Studies Literary and Historical in the Odes of Horace (London 1884) 108f.


seasons. These are indeed the primary indicators, particularly the natural imagery. But other factors also play a part, such as subject matter that often provides the link to the seasonal cycles in the absence of explicit seasonal references.

In *Odes* 1.1 Horace’s mixture of seasonal imagery looks forward to the imagery of all the seasons throughout that book. There is the autumnal storage of food, spring sailing, summer relaxation contrasted with summer army duties, and hunting *sub Love frigido* (‘under a cold sky’, 1.1.25) which suggests winter (1.1.9f., 13-15, 19-25, 25-28). After this initial poem, the natural imagery of the *Odes* begins to increase in significance relating to the seasons. Leach points to the recent late winter storms of *Odes* 1.2; to the start of the sailing season that heralds spring in *Odes* 1.3, furthered by the spring imagery of *Odes* 1.4; to the summer of the garlanded lovers in *Odes* 1.5; and to the snowy, stormy prospects of *Odes* 1.9 and 1.11 that continue the progress of the seasons into winter. These observations are justified. *Odes* 1.3 and 1.4 contain references to the ‘west wind’ (*Iapyga*, 1.3.4; *Favoni*, 1.4.1), which is identified with spring and thus serves as a seasonal indicator. In *Odes* 1.5, the motifs of the rose and young love suggest spring or early summer, and the lover’s amazement at wintry weather further hints at the summer ‘setting’ of this poem (*aspera / nigris aequora ventis / emirabitur insolens*, ‘unaccustomed he will wonder greatly at the waves roughened by black winds’, 1.5.6-8; *nescius aurae / fallacios*, ‘ignorant of the treacherous wind’, 1.5.11f.). Seasonal links in the following poems ease the descent into winter, with the transition being fully realized through the natural imagery of *Odes* 1.9 and 1.11. Leach touches on the importance of subject matter to the seasonal cycles in *Odes* 1 with her identification of the new voyage in poem 1.3 as set in spring. *Odes* 1.6, while containing no explicit natural imagery, is a summer poem with its military subject matter, summer being the season for military campaigning the ancient world. *Odes* 1.7 is an exhortation to Plancus to enjoy the summer while it lasts: *Notus*, the south wind, is spoken of as bringing good weather (*albus ut obscuro deterget nubila caelo / saepe Notus neque parturit imbris / perpetuos*, ‘clearing Notus will often wipe away the clouds from the dark sky; nor is it forever pregnant with rain’, 1.7.15-17). The images of the army camp and shady

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6 Leach [4] 64.
7 It is interesting to note that there are nine types of men listed by Horace before he turns to himself in this ode, which is the exact number of the ‘Parade Odes’. This suggests further the significance of *Odes* 1.1 as ‘looking forward’ to book 1.
8 Leach [4] 64.
10 Leach [4] 64.
grove are summer vignettes (1.7.20f.), while also echoing imagery from *Odes* 1.1.\(^{12}\) The new voyage of Teucer in the closing lines (*nunc vino pellite curas: / cras ingens iterabimus aequor*, ‘now drive off your cares with wine; tomorrow we shall again plough the vast ocean’, 1.7.31f.) is a spring or summer event, like Vergil’s voyage in *Odes* 1.3. *Odes* 1.8 is set in summer, with its themes of love and military matters. The natural imagery of the *apricum / . . . campum* (‘sunny Campus’, 1.8.3f.) and the sweltering imagery of the *pulveris atque solis* (‘dust and heat’, 1.8.4) of a Roman summer place this poem in a summer setting. Thus we have linked *Odes* 1.2 to 1.8 in a seasonal cycle, stretching from late winter, through spring and summer, and reaching the early autumn setting of *Odes* 1.9.\(^{13}\)

The ‘Soracte Ode’ (*Odes* 1.9) has been the subject of intense scholarly debate in recent years, with its ‘apparent discontinuity in the temporal progression . . . from winter’s depth to the springtime of amorous youth’.\(^{14}\) While we cannot go into great depth here, nevertheless it seems that this ‘apparent discontinuity’ ceases to exist when this poem is read in the context of the seasonal cycles highlighted so far. *Odes* 1.8 is set in summer, and *Odes* 1.11 is set in winter. So we must discern the seasonal links in the intervening poems. Moritz claims that, in *Odes* 1.9, the spring scene is pregnant both with the memory of the winter past, and the winter yet to come.\(^{15}\) This seems justified, but certain words in the very centre of the poem appear to place more emphasis on the coming winter, rather than one that has passed. The central position of the words *quid sit futurum cras, fuge quaerere* (‘shun seeking what the future holds tomorrow’, 1.9.13) seems to imbue them with extra significance, and indeed they appear to divide the two sections of the poem. Everything before these words seems to be almost a daydream: an image of the winter to come. Horace uses this technique of ‘imagination before realisation’ elsewhere in the *Odes*.\(^{16}\) This view is supported by the

\(^{12}\) The *castra* (‘military camp’) and *umbra* (‘shade/ghost’) of *Odes* 1.7.20f. are reminiscent of *castra* and *sub arbuto* (‘under the strawberry tree’) of *Odes* 1.1.23 and 1.1.21 respectively. The echoes of *Odes* 1.1 become even stronger when we compare the man who does not shun wine nor take time out during the day (1.1.19-21, immediately before *castra* and *sub arbuto*), with Plancus, who would be wise to remember to put an end to the sadness and labours of life with mellow undiluted wine (1.7.17-19).

\(^{13}\) J. Clay, ‘*Ode* 1.9: Horace’s September Song’, *CW* 83 (1990) 102-05.

\(^{14}\) R. P. Bond, Lecture Notes (University of Canterbury).

\(^{15}\) L. Moritz, ‘Snow and Spring: Horace’s Soracte Ode Again’, *G&R* 23 (1976) 175.

\(^{16}\) *Odes* 1.4 begins with a warm spring scene before moving abruptly to the underworld; Commager [2] refers to this change as the ‘antithesis’ of *Odes* 1.9. *Odes* 1.7 starts with the imagery of Greek cities, before praising Italian locations. *Odes* 1.26 begins with imagery of the sea, winds, and an icy shore, before changing to the warm spring imagery of garlands and flowers. *Odes* 1.28 starts with a tribute to Archytas, before the reader realizes (not until 1.28.21) that the speaker is not Horace but a dead sailor. *Odes* 2.9 is particularly noteworthy, starting with the imagery of wintry weather (rain, storms, ice, wind and even *orni* ['ash trees']), reminiscent of the imagery of *Odes* 1.9, before ‘zooming out’ and commanding the addressee (with imperatives) not to worry about such things—just as in *Odes* 1.9.
initial words *vides ut* (‘you see how . . . ’, 1.9.1) being used to introduce the image of the mountain (which is clearly the dominant feature of the first half of the poem, despite the noun Soracte being held back until the second line, 1.9.2); Vessey says that these words impose ‘nothing more than a (supposedly) visual perception of a state of affairs that would be true whenever snow had fallen on Soracte; that is, it is always true in a domain where the assertion of visibility is no less textual than the given object of vision’. This means that Horace is basically painting a picture of how Soracte might generally appear in winter, since Soracte is a ‘feature of a poetic domain’. The next two stanzas follow on from this treatment, serving the purpose of a poetic winter vision. Then come the central words *quid sit futurum cras, fuge quaerere*, which act as a kind of metaphorical awakening from the daydream of winter, since the wintry first half of the poem is that which the future holds. Horace urges the reader to embrace the pleasant seasons of youth: *donec virenti canities abest / morosa* (‘while the gloomy grey keeps away from the green’, 1.9.17f.). In the context of the seasonal cycles of *Odes* 1, this is an exhortation to enjoy the last days of summer before the onset of winter: not only the winter within the poem, imagined in its first half, but also the winter coming in the seasonal cycle of *Odes* 1, present in poem 1.11 and the end of poem 1.10, and the winter of one’s life, that is, old age. The repetition of *nunc* (‘now’, *Odes* 1.9.18, 21) emphasizes that this late summer is the current seasonal setting of the poem. Therefore it seems that the first half of *Odes* 1.9 is looking ahead to the coming winter, while the second half is set in the ‘present’ late summer or early autumn.

This ‘seasonal’ reading of *Odes* 1.9 seems borne out by the gentle progression of themes in the next poem, *Odes* 1.10, from joy in the youth of Mercury (*puerum*, ‘boy’, 1.10.10, and *risit*, ‘laughed’, 1.10.12, carry the lighter tone of this stanza) to his adult role as *psychopompos* (‘conductor of souls’ to the underworld, 1.10.17-20). Again we have a seasonal progression, now into winter. The youth of Mercury early in the poem echoes the joy of youth in late summer at the end of *Odes* 1.9; in the closing lines of *Odes* 1.10, the reference to death, suggestive of winter in *Odes* 1.1, completes the smooth transition to winter in the next poem. Horace explicitly sets *Odes* 1.11 in winter: *seu pluris hiemes, seu tribuit Juppiter ultimam, / quae nunc oppositis debilitat pumicibus mare / Tyrrhenenum* (‘whether Jupiter has assigned you more winters, or this is your last which now weakens the Tyrrhenian sea on the opposing pumice stones’, 1.11.4-6). Thus we round out Leach’s identification of seasons in *Odes* 1. However, *Odes* 1.12 also seems not only to be set in winter, but also to link back to 1.2, thus agreeing with Porter’s structural emphasis on the first twelve *Odes.*

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20 Santirocco [9] 44.
21 The *nunc* sets the current season at *hiemes* (‘winter’).
Odes 1.2 opens with Jupiter already having sent storms and lightning down on the nations of the world (iam satis terris nivis atque dirae / grandinis misit pater et rubente / dextera sacras iaculatus arcis / terruit urbem, / terruit gentis, ‘Father Jupiter has already sent more than enough snow and ominous hail onto the lands, and with red right fist has struck his sacred citadels and terrified the city and peoples’, 1.2.1-5). In Odes 1.12, such stormy weather is shown as being subdued, with winds and waters subsiding, just as wintry weather subsides with the approach of spring (rapidos morantem / fluminum lapsus celerisque ventos, ‘restraining the rapid flows of rivers and the swift winds’, 1.12.9f.; defluit saxis agitatus umor, / concidunt venti fugiuntque nubes / et minax, quod sic vo luere, ponto / unda recumbit, ‘the heaving seas flow down the rocks, the winds collapse and the clouds flee, and since they wish it so, the threatening wave subsides on the sea’, 1.12.29-32). Odes 1.12 seems to be set in late winter, thus completing the seasonal cycle from Odes 1.2. Reference to Jupiter’s future fulmina (‘thunderbolts’, 1.12.59f.) at the end of the poem further rounds out the links back to Odes 1.2 (rubente / dextera, ‘with red right fist’, 1.2.2f.). So, while Odes 1.2 opens with Jupiter having sent lightning and storms, Odes 1.12 shows the subsidence of these storms and closes with the promise of more lightning. Thus we have a complete seasonal cycle in the first twelve poems in Odes 1: late winter to late winter. Natural imagery guides this identification, but when it is lacking Horace inserts poems with specific seasonal connotations in order that they might aid such a realisation. The words of Paul Simon seem particularly relevant here: ‘Seasons change with the scenery; / Weaving time in a tapestry’. As we have seen, the tapestry of Odes 1 is certainly woven with the natural scenery of the seasons.

One of the most important contributors to the study of nature in Horace’s Odes has been Commager, who argues that the poet employs nature as a ‘moral metaphor’. Following Commager’s approach, let us examine certain Odes in order to illuminate Horace’s use of natural imagery to make a moral point. In Odes 1.2, Horace mentions grave . . . / saeculum Pyrrhae (‘the oppressive age of Pyrrha’, 1.2.5f.), which refers to the myth in which Pyrrha and her husband Deucalion survive a terrible flood. After the use of strange natural phenomena to describe the flood, Horace refers to a flood of the Tiber. The imagery of the flood and the specific people and places mentioned in this passage seem to suggest that the flood is a metaphor for the civil wars, or more specifically the general actions of Rome as represented by the flooding of its ancestral river. The waves are thrown back litore Etrusco violenter (‘violently from the Etruscan shore’, 1.2.14); since the Romans acknowledged their relationship to the Etruscans as being an important source of customs (Plin. HN 8.195, 28.15f.), these words could be interpreted as saying that Rome distanced itself from its

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23 The reference to the east may further suggest winter, since in Odes 1 Horace tells us that the east wind is hiemis sodali (‘winter’s companion’, 1.25.19).
ancestral ways through violent means. Horace soon refers to the Tiber flowing instead down the *sinistra* / *riпа* (‘left bank’, 1.2.18f.), contrasting with the Etruscan shore, which is on the right.\(^\text{27}\) The word for ‘left’ used here, *sinistra*, is likely to be a pun from Horace on the ‘perverse’ nature of Rome’s actions in the wars.\(^\text{28}\) In knocking down *monumenta regis* / *templaque Vestae* (‘the monuments of a king and temples of Vesta’, 1.2.15f.), the flood is destroying buildings that are at the very heart of Rome; just as the civil wars destroyed the moral foundations of Rome, as Horace notes later in the poem (1.2.25f.).\(^\text{29}\) The reference to Ilia, the mother of Romulus and Remus, is no doubt an allusion to the fratricide of Romulus, comparing it to the ‘fratricide’ of the Romans killing each other in the civil wars.\(^\text{30}\) Finally, the adjective *vagus* (‘wandering’, 1.2.18) used to describe the river probably refers to Rome as having ‘lost its way’ in the civil wars. This interpretation of the flood imagery as referring to the civil wars is borne out by the introduction, in the next stanza, of explicit references to the civil wars (*audiet civis acuisse ferrum*, / *quo graves Persae melius perirent*, / *audiet pugnas vitio parentum* / *rara iuventus*, ‘our youth will hear that citizens sharpened swords by which the harsh Parthians should rather have died, and they—too few, owing to the crimes of their fathers—will hear of the battles we fought’, 1.2.21-24). While others have tried to find what historical flood Horace is referring to, it seems that, as so often is the case in the *Odes*, Horace has inserted a common Roman image—one which any Roman could relate to given the regular flooding of the Tiber—and added subtle details which direct us towards this conclusion. Thus the natural imagery of the flood is used as a moral metaphor for the civil wars, and a warning of the disasters that occur when countrymen fight each other.

The structure of *Odes* 1.3 has been hotly debated, with scholars even going so far as to claim that it is actually two poems.\(^\text{31}\) The natural imagery of the poem betrays a definite structure, however, and thus highlights the moral message of Horace to its recipient, Vergil. Carrubba has shown how the unity of the poem can be explained by Horace’s references to the ‘four elements’ of earth, air, fire and water.\(^\text{32}\) This notion of


\(^{28}\) In the whole of the Horatian corpus, this is the only time the adjective *sinister* is used. Horace would no doubt enjoy playing with the various meanings of the word. While in Roman augury the left was favourable (P. G. Glare [ed.], *Oxford Latin Dictionary* [Oxford 2000] s.v. *sinister* 3), Horace is unlikely to be referring to this technical use of the word; he is more likely using the standard sense of ‘perverse’ or ‘unfavourable’ (Glare [above, this note] s.v. *sinister* 4a, 5) since the next words are *Iove non probante* (‘Jupiter does not approve’).

\(^{29}\) By describing the empire as *ruentis* (‘crumbling’), Horace reinforces the idea of physical/moral foundations. Cf. similar use in Petron. *Sat.* 120, the *Bellum Civile*.

\(^{30}\) This is supported by the later reference in the poem to *populo Quirini* (‘to/for the people of Quirinus’, *Odes* 1.2.46).

\(^{31}\) K. Prodinger, ‘Zu Horazens Ode 1.3’, *WS* 29 (1907) 165-72.

\(^{32}\) R. Carrubba, ‘The Structure of Horace, Odes 1.3: A Propempticon for Vergil’, *AJPh* 105 (1984) 168f. It seems likely that Horace’s probable direct source for this concept was Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Aristotle refers to Empedocles as being the first philosopher to
‘unity’ is contrasted with the notion of ‘division’ at certain points in the poem, perhaps referring to a ‘division’ in the poets’ relationship; if the suggestion that this voyage of Vergil’s is that of launching into the epic journey of writing the Aeneid, Horace could be emphasizing the growing distance between the two poets. Horace has elsewhere referred to his ‘inability’ or unwillingness to write epic, for example, in 1.6 where he tells Varius that he does not have the ability to write epic but instead sings of lovers’ tiffs) and is perhaps noting that Vergil is embarking into poetic waters different from his own. The motif of division is furthered by Horace speaking of Vergil as \textit{animae dimidium meae} (‘the other half of my soul’, 1.3.8). Horace also speaks of \textit{oceano dissociabili} (‘the dividing sea’, 1.3.22), seeming to represent both the physical distance between the poets with this journey, and the ‘poetic’ distance. The winds are \textit{decertantem} (‘battling’, 1.3.13) and could well be seen as both a reference to the trials of writing an epic and to the military nature of the epic genre. That Horace shows some doubt about Vergil’s poetic journey is supported by his use of mythical references (1.3.25-36), which help to inform the significance of the natural imagery. One feature that the three mythical figures have in common is that they travelled to places in which they did not belong: Prometheus came to earth and gave fire to men; \textit{Daedalus attempted to fly on wings pinnis non homini datis} (‘not propose all four elements of the universe (Arist. \textit{Metaph.} 1.984a5-11). A little after, Aristotle writes: \textit{λέγω δ’ οἶνον οὔτε τὸ ξύλον οὔτε ὁ χαλκὸς οὕτως τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ ποιεῖ τὸ μὲν ξύλον κλίνην ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλὰ ἔτερον τι τῆς μεταβολῆς αἴτιον (‘I am saying that neither wood nor bronze is responsible for changing itself; wood does not make a bed, nor bronze a statue, but something else is the cause of the change’, \textit{Metaph.} 1.984a22-25). These words seem also to have influenced Horace. By placing two materials which are not ‘responsible’ for changing themselves, around the heart, it seems that Horace is saying that only the thing inside the materials, the heart itself, can change; only Vergil can change his mind about going on the journey.

\textit{33} That the poem both begins and ends with the mention of a god, employing a ‘ring structure’, may further this notion of ‘completeness’ (\textit{diva potens Cypri}, 1.3.1; \textit{Iovem}, 1.3.40). The halfway point of the poem, which seems to take on more significance following \textit{animae dimidium meae} (1.3.8) also contains the word \textit{deus} (1.3.21).

\textit{34} C. Lockyer, ‘Horace’s \textit{Propempticon} and Vergil’s Voyage’, \textit{CW} 61 (1967) 42-45. Several mythical allusions may suggest that Horace is referring to Vergil’s upcoming epic: the \textit{monstra natantia} (‘swimming monsters’, 1.3.18) and \textit{mare turbidum} (‘wild sea’, 1.3.19) could easily be read as allusions to epic creatures Scylla and Charybdis, while also serving as metaphors for the trials of writing an epic. That the first line of the poem refers to Venus, and the last to Jupiter, may be a subtle allusion to the Trojan epic cycle; the war began with Venus promising Helen to Paris, and ended with Jupiter’s observance of ‘world fate’. Finally, the mention of multiple mythical episodes (Prometheus, Daedalus, Hercules) in \textit{Odes} 1.3 could be Horace’s way of referring to another of Aristotle’s works in which Aristotle speaks of epic as being \textit{τὸ πολύμυθον} (‘made up of many stories’, \textit{Poet.} 1456a12).

\textit{35} Although the Titans were of the earth and cohabited with men, Horace is here referring to the episode in which Prometheus brings fire to men, something that he should not have done, and therefore they should not have come to earth to do so.
given to man’, 1.3.35); and Hercules, a living man, broke through into the underworld. Horace then follows these myths by talking about how men are too daring in their stultitia (‘foolishness’), and even seek caelum ipsum (‘heaven itself’, 1.3.37-40). This would appear to be a warning to Vergil not to jump too rashly into such a venture. Thus the non-natural imagery of the poem helps to illuminate the moral meaning of the natural imagery. Horace uses natural imagery in Odes 1.3 to emphasize the contrasting ‘unity’ and ‘division’ of his friendship with Vergil, and uses the ‘four elements’, combined with mythic references, as a means of warning Vergil of the vast and difficult task which he is about to undertake.

It is important to remember, when studying the Odes, that they were originally meant to be read as complete books, and thus particular words take on extra significance when used in similar contexts throughout Odes 1. With this in mind, let us examine Odes 1.16, a poem about anger addressed to a young woman. Horace tells her to dispose of his criminosis . . . / . . . iambis (‘slanderous iambics’, 1.16.2f.) whether in the fire or the Adriatic Sea. Nisbet and Hubbard suggest that the Adriatic refers to the girl’s temper, since it was notoriously stormy. Fire and stormy waters are revisited only a few lines later when the poet claims that neither mare naufragum / nec saevos ignis (‘ship-shattering sea nor raging fire’, 1.16.10f.) can deter intemperate anger. Thus it seems Horace has now added harsh adjectives to describe the Adriatic and the fire of the first stanza; naufragum no doubt refers to the stormy Adriatic, and saevos could be seen as appropriate for any fire, especially one that burns poetry. Horace’s iambics are later referred to in this poem as celeres (‘swift’, 1.16.24) when describing his youthful anger. This adjective is only used elsewhere in Odes 1 to describe winds, and once Ajax in a situation when he is angry (1.12.10, 1.14.5, 1.15.3f., 1.15.18f.). So it seems that wind represents anger Odes 1, especially when ‘neither savage fire nor the ship-shattering sea can deter harsh bursts of anger’; so neither fire nor the sea can deter the wind—on the contrary, wind fans fire and increases its size, and only wind has the power to control the Adriatic (1.3.15f.). That wind represents anger is supported by other references in Odes 1 to winds in the context of negative emotions (nigris . . . ventis, ‘black winds’, 1.5.7, which refers to Pyrrha’s temper; protervis . . . / . . . ventis, ‘insolent winds’, 1.26.2f., to which Horace throws his gloom and fear). It is also interesting to note that the form stravere (‘laid low’) is used only twice in the Horatian corpus, both times in Odes 1: stravere ventos . . . / deproeliantis (‘[the gods] calmed the battling winds’, 1.9.10f.; and irae Thyesten . . . / stravere (‘anger laid low Thyestes’, 1.16.17f.). It seems that these winds in Odes

36 While in some traditions Hercules became a god, nevertheless this was at the end of his life; so it seems Horace is referring to the mortal Hercules who performed the twelve labours is therefore out of place in the underworld.

37 The fact that Vergil is going to Greece (finibus Atticis, ‘Attic shores’, 1.3.6) is probably significant, since the Homeric epics were Greek. That Homer himself was not traditionally from Attica is irrelevant, since Attica is probably just employed here as being a creative centre and generic Greek location.

1.9 represent youth. Likewise, the girl in *Odes* 1.16 is clearly in her youth, shown by Horace’s otherwise unnecessary mention of her mother and the reference to his own youth as a comparison to hers (me quoque pectoris / temptavit in dulci iuventa / fervor et in celeris iambos / misit furentem, ‘I too was assailed by my heart’s passion in my sweet youth, and driven raging to swift iambics’, 1.16.22-25). Thus, by using *stravere* in this context in *Odes* 1.16, Horace speaks of the girl’s anger in similar terms as to wind elsewhere in *Odes* 1, and so it seems that the winds represent youthful anger. An appropriate metaphor, since both wind and anger can come as if from nowhere, and be potentially damaging. Horace uses the language of winds and anger as a warning to his addressee not to yield to youthful anger as Horace himself once did.

Throughout *Odes* 1 Horace employs natural imagery for many purposes, appropriately so, given the complex, multi-layered nature of the work. The seasonal construction of *Odes* 1.1-12 has been examined in order to show that the poet uses natural imagery to lead the identification of such a construction. When no such imagery is present, he inserts poems that contain subject matter relating to a particular season; we often know that these subjects relate to seasons through usage in similar contexts elsewhere in the *Odes*. Following Commager, to which any student of natural imagery in Horace is unavoidably indebted, we have examined the use of nature as a moral metaphor in *Odes* 1. Horace consistently gives warnings, via the medium of his natural imagery, not to deny but to embrace the cycle of nature in all its beauty. Such moral interpretation of natural imagery can be the key to understanding certain poems in part or whole. Thus Horace uses natural images in *Odes* 1 not merely as decorative touches but as important structural texture and metaphorical analogies, which aid us in our understanding of these complex ‘mosaics of words’.

39 The winds are *deproeliantis* (‘battling’); the connotations of these words, in the context of the *Odes*, suggest youth. *Deproelians* reminds us of the *proelia virginum* (‘battles of maidens’, 1.6.17), an example of which can be seen in 1.9.21-24. *Proelium* is used elsewhere in *Odes* 1 in the context of Bacchus, who is more likely to be involved with *proelia virginum* (1.12.21) than *proelia militum* (1.17.24). It is also an appropriate word in relation to youth because it was, and still is, young men who fight battles. The ash trees are also *veteres* (‘ancient’, 1.9.12) and stop waving once the winds have ceased. So it seems that the winds and raging waters represent youth, and the trees old age; once raging youth is over, calm old age settles in.

40 The use of *celeris iambos* (‘swift iambics’) in the context of youth here further supports wind as representing youthful anger.

41 Just as Horace claims that anger is the *causa ultima* (‘ultimate cause’, 1.16.18f.) for wars and the like, his reference to Prometheus’ primeval sludge refers to the beginning of human nature, which seems to represent youth here, since it is in youth that we develop anger and begin to shape our lives.

42 As Horace’s winds often are: see, e.g., *Odes* 1.3.12f., 1.5.8, 1.28.

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