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Scholia features critical and pedagogical articles and reviews on a diverse range of subjects dealing with classical antiquity, including late antique, medieval, Renaissance and early modern studies related to the classical tradition; in addition, there is information about Classics programmes in African universities and schools, news about museums and articles on classical artefacts in museums in Africa, and the B. X. de Wet Essay. (Not all sections necessarily appear in any single volume.)

Manuscripts: Potential contributors should read the 'Notes for Contributors' located at the back of this volume and follow the suggested guidelines for the submission of manuscripts. Articles on classical antiquity and the teaching of Classics in Africa are particularly welcome. Every submission is reviewed by at least two suitable referees, usually one in South Africa and one outside the country. Time before publication decision: 2-3 months.

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EDITORIAL NOTE

This year's volume (1994) of *Scholia* features contributions from North America, Australasia, Africa and Europe.¹ *Scholia* 4 (1995) will feature contributions from prominent scholars in North America, Australasia, Europe, Africa and Asia. *Scholia* is distributed to scholars, universities and libraries in thirty-eight countries and has exchange agreements with over seventy journals. The Editors will continue with this international emphasis in the future. *Scholia* is approved for subsidy purposes by the Department of Education and Culture, South Africa.

The Editor publishes scholarly articles only after they are reviewed by an Editorial Advisory Board; this board presently consists of international scholars from twenty universities. Every article is reviewed by at least two suitable referees, usually one in South Africa and one outside the country. The Editor follows the advice given by this international board, which has accepted two-thirds of all submissions received since the inception of the journal in 1991.

Three long articles in this year's volume represent major contributions to scholarship. The lead article by David Konstan emphasises the priority of the biological tie in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, whereas the adaptations of the story by Seneca, Corneille, and Dryden displace the emphasis from biological kinship to themes of regicide and revenge.² Dougal Blyth argues that the text of Aristophanes' *Clouds* prepares well for the chorus' apparent role-reversal late in the play.³ Lewis Sussman demonstrates that Cicero depicted Antony as a *miles gloriosus* in order to stress his unsuitability to succeed Caesar as master of the Roman world.⁴ *Scholia* is also pleased to include the inaugural address of Professor Zola Packman, who was appointed to the Chair of Classics, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, in 1990. Her address on the categorisation of women in Roman law will prove interesting reading to Classicists and general readers alike.⁵

Scholia aims to provide critical reviews of publications in the fields of ancient Greek and Roman art, archaeology, history, literature and philosophy as soon as

¹ S. Georgia Nugent's 'Statius' Hypsipyle: Following in the Footsteps of the *Aeneid*' (advertised to appear this year) will appear in *Scholia* 4 (1995).

² D. Konstan, 'Oedipus and His Parents: The Biological Family from Sophocles to Dryden' (pp. 3-23).

³ D. Blyth, 'Cloudy Morality and the Meteorology of Some Choral Odes' (pp. 24-45).

⁴ L. A. Sussman, 'Antony as *Miles Gloriosus* in Cicero's Second *Philippic* Oration' (pp. 53-83).

⁵ Z. M. Packman, 'Undesirable Company: The Categorisation of Women in Roman Law' (pp. 94-106).

they appear. Contributors preferably should send their reviews by electronic mail, followed by one clearly printed copy by air mail; reviews can also be sent on a diskette accompanied by a printed copy. Reviews of 700 words or less are preferred. We wish to remind our readers that authors whose books are reviewed are invited to respond in writing to criticisms made by reviewers. Considered responses will be published by the Reviews Editor in the same or following year's volume; one reply by the reviewer will be permitted and will appear immediately following the author's response.

The Reviews Editor believes that reviews should be as detailed, informative and comprehensive as possible. In order to make it possible for the journal to provide reviews of this kind, given the constraints under which it is produced, reviews will be published over the international electronic network to registered subscribers. Subscription is free and without restriction. Once published, the reviews will be archived at the University of Natal, Durban and the University of Pennsylvania, USA, from which they can be retrieved by Gopher or FTP. *Scholia* is especially pleased that these reviews are available on the ccat gopher at the University of Pennsylvania. As we believe that access to the reviews at this location is more convenient for many of our readers, we are grateful to Professor James O'Donnell and the University of Pennsylvania for making this possible. Select reviews and instructions on how to retrieve reviews electronically will be published in each volume of the journal itself along with a list of books received.⁶

The B. X. de Wet Essay Editor wishes to bring to the attention of Heads of Departments, lecturers and students two changes regarding the essay competition. In the future this essay will be selected by a panel of three academics formed by Dr Jo-Marie Claassen (Stellenbosch University). The competition is open to undergraduate students every year and to Honours students in even-numbered years. The candidate whose paper is judged to be the best undergraduate essay submitted to *Scholia* will be awarded a prize of R100. Submissions should be sent by 30 June to Dr Jo-Marie Claassen, Department of Latin, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch 7600, Republic of South Africa. Papers should not ordinarily exceed 3 000 words in length. The author of the essay chosen for publication should be prepared to edit it if so requested by the B. X. de Wet Essay Editor.

William J. Dominik, John Hilton, Aileen Bevis
Editors, *Scholia*

⁶ See 'Retrieving *Scholia* Reviews Electronically' (p. 147) in this volume.

OEDIPUS AND HIS PARENTS: THE BIOLOGICAL FAMILY FROM SOPHOCLES TO DRYDEN¹

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Abstract. Oedipus' parricide and incest are defined in respect to his biological parents who exposed and crippled him, as opposed to the adoptive parents who cherished him. Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* insists upon the priority of the biological tie. By contrast, adaptations of the story by Seneca, Corneille, and Dryden displace the emphasis from biological kinship to themes of regicide and revenge.

On 29 July 1993 the Zimbabwean newspaper *The Herald* reported the following story from Sarasota, Florida:

Through a veil of tears, a 14-year-old girl switched at birth with another child said she wanted nothing to do with her biological parents.

'The definition of a dad to me is somebody that loves me, somebody who's been there for me,' Kimberly Mays told Barbara Walters in an ABC-TV special scheduled to air on Tuesday night. 'Biology doesn't make a family.'²

On 13 July *The New York Times* ran an opinion piece by Elizabeth Bartholet, a professor at the Harvard Law School, under the heading 'Blood Parents Vs. Real Parents.'³ Taking as her point of departure a recent case

¹ This paper was originally presented as a talk to the Student Classical Association at the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg on 18 August 1993 and at the University of Natal in Durban on 23 August 1993; it was subsequently delivered as the Constantine lecture at the University of Virginia in October 1993. I am grateful to colleagues and students at these several campuses for their kind reception.

² *The Herald* (29 July 1993) 3; Ziana-AP news services. A caption under the picture of a pensive girl in *The Natal Witness* (19 August 1993) stated: 'A Sarasota, Florida court ruled yesterday that the parents of Kimberly Mays (14), above, should have no contact with her.' 'Parents' here is evidently to be taken as blood parents. To bring matters further up to date: on 10 March 1994 *The New York Times* reported that Kimberly Mays has decided to move in with her biological parents, where, at the time of this writing (March 1994), she continues to dwell.

³ *The New York Times* (13 July 1993) A19.

in which a two-and-a-half-year-old child was returned to her biological parents after having been raised by foster parents since her birth, Professor Bartholet writes:

Children are paying a high price for the priority we place on blood ties. The foster care system is crowded with children who live in limbo because we are unwilling to cut their ties to inadequate birth parents and free them for adoption. Today's politically correct programs promote family reunification and preservation. They count their successes in intact biological families, without regard to whether staying with birth parents helps children or subjects them to ongoing abuse.

Professor Bartholet recommends: 'The law should stop defining parenting in terms of procreation and recognize that true family ties have little to do with blood.'

The view defended by the Harvard professor and the 14-year-old girl from Florida is not irrelevant to the situation in which Oedipus finds himself in the most famous of all Greek tragedies, Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*. Oedipus discovers that he has slain his father, King Laius of Thebes, and married Jocasta, Laius' widow and Oedipus' mother; the revelation is unendurable, and Oedipus blinds himself lest he gaze in this world or the next upon those he violated (1371-77). Now, Laius and Jocasta are indeed Oedipus' biological parents, but he was raised since birth not by them but by Polybus and Merope, the king and queen of Corinth. For Laius, warned by the oracle at Delphi that he must abstain from producing a child or else die at the hands of his own son, hobbled and exposed the infant Oedipus. Oedipus was saved because the slave ordered to abandon him delivered him instead to a Corinthian herdsman, who gave him in turn to the childless Polybus and Merope.

As a young man in Corinth, Oedipus suffered a taunt that he was not in truth the offspring of the king and queen who raised him, and he sought confirmation of his identity at Delphi. As is well known, the oracle announced that he was destined to kill his father and marry his mother, upon which Oedipus resolved to desert Corinth forever and made his way to Thebes, thereby fulfilling the prophecy he had sought to evade. Now, had Oedipus reasoned, as did Kimberly Mays, that 'The definition of a dad to me is somebody that loves me, somebody who's been there for me,' he might have experienced less regret, or at least less agonizing horror, at the thought that he had unknowingly slain the man who at the moment of his birth had crippled him and cast him out to die, and he might have offered a prayer of gratitude that he had not by some grim accident murdered Polybus instead,

who had raised him lovingly. 'Biology,' as Ms. Mays put it, 'doesn't make a family.' Professor Bartholet's observation that 'Children are paying a high price for the priority we place on blood ties' seems curiously apt. Similarly, had Oedipus discovered that he had slept with the woman who had nurtured him, he might have had genuine cause for revulsion. Sex with Merope would have been incest; Jocasta, who consented to his death in infancy, might be counted a mere stranger.

I am aware that in proffering this advice to Oedipus I may seem to be missing the point of Sophocles' harrowing drama. The play is about ironies of fate and deep anxieties over parricide and incest. The audience is not expected to disarm such weighty issues with the rationalizations of a Florida teenager about dads or moms who have been there for their children, excusing Oedipus' offense on the grounds that Laius and Jocasta were unfit parents and thus no parents at all. The tragic effect of *Oedipus the King*, a critic might exclaim, depends on the premise that the blood parents *are* the real parents, and to challenge that premise is to refuse to enter into the world of the play.

While there is a certain truth to this objection, it is possible also to turn it on its head. It is not that Sophocles' tragedy depends upon the prior conviction that biology *does* make a family, or at least upon the willing suspension of any contrary belief. Rather, the plot of *Oedipus the King* is constructed in such a way that it demands the biological view of the family as a condition for the intelligibility of the action. While the audience meditates on issues of determinism and freedom, guilt and pollution, it silently accepts the terms in which these problems are cast, which rest upon the unique claims of blood kinship. The play works by tacitly putting over its most controversial thesis while we are busy attending to the conundrums on the surface.

This kind of ideological displacement is a pervasive feature of literature: some critics might claim it is universal.⁴ To illustrate the

⁴ For the method, see F. Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca 1981); P. Macherey (tr. G. Wall), *A Theory of Literary Production* (London 1978).

Paraphrasing a comment in the *Autobiography* of the cultural theorist and archaeologist R. G. Collingwood, Hans Georg Gadamer, in G. Barden and J. Cumming (edd.), *Truth and Method* (New York 1975) 33 (citing Collingwood, *An Autobiography* [Oxford 1970] 70), writes: 'One can understand a text only when one has understood the question to which it is an answer.' With a view to the operations of displacement in a text, I would add that there is always a slippage between the question and the answer, so that the answer is the answer to a different question.

phenomenon, we may digress for a brief consideration of Molière's *Tartuffe*, perhaps his best-known comedy. Tartuffe is a religious hypocrite who exploits an image of ascetic piety to cozen Orgon, a well-to-do head of household, into signing over his entire fortune. Tartuffe's real nature is revealed in his attempts to seduce Orgon's wife. In the end, it is only the intervention of the king of France himself that upsets Tartuffe's scheme and restores Orgon to his fortunes. Molière's comedy is read as a brilliant exposé of pietistic hypocrisy, and audiences delight in the discomfiture of the scoundrel. But the attention to Tartuffe's chicanery distracts the reader from the fact that figures like Tartuffe represent as much of a danger if they are sincere as they do when they are manifest parasites. Honest or not, religious fanatics who gain control of citizen wealth are a threat to the bourgeois economy which was nascent in Molière's time. The case is analogous to that of media preachers in the United States, who collect huge sums through appeals on television to support their fundamentalist Christian denominations. Recently, several of these pulpit pounders have been caught in sexually compromising situations, and this has been taken as evidence that the ministers are corrupt and their parishioners gullible. But the danger these preachers represent is independent of their private perversions. Attention to the issue of hypocrisy conceals the underlying tension between two economies, that of the church and that of secular capitalism. Like the issue of biological versus foster families in *Oedipus the King*, this problem is latent in the text.

As in psychological repression, the text of Sophocles' *Oedipus* betrays symptoms of the displacement of its underlying theme.⁵ Thus, when Oedipus learns from the Corinthian messenger who bears the news of Polybus' death that Polybus did not beget him (ἐξέφυσσε 1017, ἐγείναι 1020), he exclaims: 'And did he cherish me, received from someone else's hand, so much?' (1023), to which the messenger prosaically responds: 'His earlier childlessness induced him to.'⁶ The verb that Oedipus employs is ἔσπερξεν, which refers typically to familial affection. But there is no need to exercise

⁵ For the idea of a symptomatic reading of a text, see S. B. Smith, *Reading Althusser: An Essay on Structural Marxism* (Ithaca 1984).

⁶ This is a traditional Athenian view. L. Rubinstein, *Adoption in IVth Century Athens* (Copenhagen 1993) 13 writes: 'Athenian adoption differed fundamentally from the institution of adoption in modern, western society. We tend to think of adoption as an institution primarily intended for the benefit of the adoptee, a child in need of parental care. . . . Not so in Athens. There, the institution was primarily construed as benefitting the adopter, providing for his need of a descendant.' The messenger's response does not, however, cancel Oedipus' recognition of the love and care his foster parents bestowed upon him.

philological subtlety: the drunken insult to Oedipus' lineage back at Corinth; the ambiguous reply of the oracle to the question he poses at Delphi; the choice that Oedipus makes to abandon his putative parents, which he undertakes without inquiring more precisely into the nature of their relationship to him though that is what drove him to consult the oracle in the first place (a move that critics since Dacier and Voltaire have deemed to be inconsistent with Oedipus' vaunted cleverness)—all these circumstances introduced by Sophocles into the narrative, together with Oedipus' momentary suspicion that Polybus may have died of longing for his absent son (969f.), are indices of a preoccupation with the quality of paternity and parentage within the play. It is not that Oedipus was uncharacteristically foolish when he fled Corinth for fear of parricide and incest without considering the question of his true lineage.⁷ His response, together with the role of Polybus and Merope in general in Sophocles' play, serves to authorize an intuition that in leaving Corinth, Oedipus left home.⁸

⁷ Critics have long expressed surprise that Oedipus, renowned for his intelligence, should have failed to interrogate the oracle on the identity of his parents before deciding to abandon Corinth; see especially L. Moland (ed.), *Voltaire: Oeuvres complètes* 2 (Paris 1883) 21-24 and the discussion in M. Mueller, *Children of Oedipus and Other Essays on the Imitation of Greek Tragedy 1550-1800* (Toronto 1980) 109-11. M. Scott, 'Psychoanalysis and Sophoclean Tragedy,' *Acta Academica* 24.2 (1992) 55-66, esp. 63f., has interpreted this lapse psychoanalytically as a sign of Oedipus' inner tension. I am suggesting that it is a symptom rather of a conflict within the text over who the true parents of Oedipus really are.

⁸ Sophocles himself insists on the primacy of nurture in his version of the *Electra*, where the portrait of Clytemnestra as an unnatural mother, devoid of maternal feelings, contributes importantly to the justification of her death at the hands of Orestes. After the pedagogue has delivered the false report of Orestes' death, Clytemnestra exclaims (tr. D. Grene, *Sophocles* 2 [Chicago 1957]):

Clyt. Zeus, what shall I say? Shall I say 'good luck'
or 'terrible, but for the best'? Indeed,
my state is terrible if I must save
my life by the misfortunes of myself.

Paed. My lady, why does this story make you
dejected?

Clyt. Mother and child! It is a strange relation.
A mother cannot hate the child she bore
even when injured by it.

Paed. Our coming here, it seems, then is to no purpose.

Clyt. Not to no purpose. How can you say 'no purpose'?—
if you have come with certain proofs of death
of one who from my soul was sprung,
but severed himself from my breast, from my nurture, who
became an exile and a foreigner;

Against the pressure of this subliminal perception, the chorus holds out for a rigorous defense of the oracle's literal truth, even when it threatens to destroy their beloved king: 'No longer shall I go in worship to the untouch-

who when he quitted this land, never saw me again;
 who charged me with his father's murder, threatened
 terrors against me.

(*El.* 766-79)

'Became an exile and a foreigner' translates *φυγὰς ἀπεξενούτο* (776f.), literally 'estranged himself from me as an exile'; R. Jebb, in his commentary on Sophocles' *Electra* (Cambridge 1907), cites as a parallel Euripides *Hipp.* 1085, where Theseus disowns his son. In Sophocles' *Electra*, Clytemnestra's joy at the reputed death of her son disqualifies her as a mother; Orestes may thus be exonerated for killing her in requital for the murder of his father, and Sophocles accordingly eliminates the role of the Furies who torment Orestes in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*. Oedipus is not granted such leniency. (There is no suggestion in Sophocles' *Electra*, as there is in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, that a mother is not a blood relation to her children; accordingly, the ingenious reconstruction of a Greek 'patrilineal ideology' by R. Fox, *Reproduction and Succession: Studies in Anthropology, Law, and Society* [New Brunswick 1993] 165-81, will not explain the difference in the treatments of matricide and parricide.)

Why the change on Sophocles' part in respect to the legitimacy of parricide? I offer a suggestion. J. M. Bremer has recently restated the arguments for dating Sophocles' *Electra* later than Euripides', and more specifically to the year 409 B.C. ('Exit Electra,' *Gymnasium* 98 [1991] 328f. n. 9, with brief bibliography; Bremer's view has been endorsed by Suzanne Saïd, 'Couples fraternels chez Sophocle,' in A. Machin and L. Pernée (edd.), *Sophocle: Le texte, les personnages* [Aix-en-Provence 1993] 299f.). This puts the production of the play in the immediate aftermath of the oligarchic revolution of 411 B.C. and the subsequent restoration of the democracy. The plot of the *Electra* centers on the return of an exile who overthrows a haughty and violent usurper and reasserts his legitimate title to rule. Is it far-fetched to see in this story an allegory of the political events in Athens? Sophocles accords the usurpers no mercy and no pity; their murder, despite ties of kinship, is, extraordinarily, accomplished without the stain of pollution or an appearance on the part of the Furies, as had been authorized by the versions by Aeschylus and Euripides. Sophocles seems to have gone out of his way to affirm the legitimacy of Orestes' and Electra's actions. Again, the political context may help to explain why. Responsibility for the take-over of 411 lay, or could be seen to lie, with a special board of ten commissioners or *probouloi*, who were appointed with emergency powers in the aftermath of the defeat of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 413 B.C. (for details and discussion, see W. M. Calder III, 'The Political and Literary Sources of Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus*,' in W. M. Calder III, U. K. Goldsmith and P. B. Kenevan (edd.), *Hypatia: Essays in Classics, Comparative Literature, and Philosophy Presented to Hazel E. Barnes on her Seventieth Birthday* [Boulder 1985] 2-4; Calder interprets Sophocles' *Philoctetes* of 409 B.C. as an apologia for his role as *proboulos*). By endorsing unreservedly the murder of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, Sophocles indicated, I believe, his support of the restored democracy. At the same time, he abandoned a conservative defense of the priority of blood ties in favor of recognizing that parentage, like rulership, depends for its legitimacy not just on status but on actions.

able navel of the earth, nor to the temple in Abae, nor to Olympia, if these [i.e., 'the prophecy that Laius should be slain by his son']⁹ will not square openly before all men' (897-902). Thomas Gould comments here that 'The Chorus hopes that all the oracles were right, though it would probably have been glad to accept some tricky but harmless interpretation.'¹⁰ But Oedipus and Jocasta both conclude that the failure of the literal meaning of the prophecy exposes the oracle itself as vain (964-72, 977-83). In Sophocles' treatment, belief in the cosmic order stands or falls with the truth of both oracles, to Laius and to Oedipus, and these, taken together, entail that Oedipus slay his natural father. Religion itself is implicated in the primacy of the biological family.¹¹

In identifying the question of the biological family as the sub-text or displaced tension behind *Oedipus the King*, I am indebted to a brilliant Stanford University dissertation by Kirk Ormand.¹² Ormand writes: 'The play suggests that, contrary to general expectations about parentage, biological identity is an unstable category, confirmed by processes of displacement.' He explains further:

I do not mean by this that Sophocles intends us to see Oedipus' identity as Laius and Jocasta's son as invalid, culturally produced, and therefore a sham. Oedipus really is who the play says he is. In this play, however, Oedipus' biological identity asserts itself as natural only insofar as it forcibly displaces other forms of identity.¹³

⁹ R. Jebb (ed.), *The Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles*⁴ (Cambridge 1966) ad 902.

¹⁰ T. Gould (ed. and tr.), *Oedipus the King by Sophocles* (Englewood Cliffs 1970) ad 902.

¹¹ Herodotus, who is said to have been a friend of Sophocles and to have inspired several passages in his tragedies, reports a belief of the Persians as follows: 'The Persians maintain that never yet did any one kill his own father or mother; but in all such cases they are quite sure that, if matters were sifted to the bottom, it would be found that the child was either a changeling or else the fruit of adultery; for it is not likely they say that the real father should perish by the hands of his child' (1.138; tr. G. Rawlinson, ed. E. H. Blakeney, *The History of Herodotus* [London 1910]). The issue of biological versus foster parentage was plainly in the air.

¹² K. W. B. Ormand, *The Representation of Marriage in Sophoclean Drama* (diss. Stanford 1992); the reader is referred to this work for full discussion and bibliography. See also the perceptive discussion in P. Pucci, *Oedipus and the Fabrication of the Father: Oedipus Tyrannus in Modern Criticism and Philosophy* (Baltimore 1992), esp. 119 on fatherhood as a culturally created relation; cf. also 108-12 on Corinth as the home of Oedipus and 127 on the chorus' wish that the oracles prove true.

¹³ Ormand [12] 163.

I have reduced Ormand's elegant analysis to the single opposition between what Professor Bartholet calls blood parents and real parents because it is the practice of adoption that represents the immediate cultural alternative to biological identity. Pericles' law of 451 B.C., which stipulated that only the offspring of citizens on both the paternal and maternal side could inherit, brought about an intense focus on the status of children, and this may have provided the context in which anxiety over foster families flourished.¹⁴ Ormand notes that Oedipus is heir to the throne of Corinth, although Polybus and Merope are aware of his foreign origins.¹⁵ In just this period, as Alan Shapiro has remarked, there is a new emphasis on Theseus' children as the legitimate heirs to the kingship in Athens.¹⁶ Simultaneously, the sophists were popularly regarded as undermining the respect owed to parents and cultural taboos generally by their reduction of social relations to an ostensibly anarchic state of nature. Thus in the *Clouds*, produced (423 B.C.) perhaps a half dozen years after the *Oedipus*, Aristophanes has Pheidippides, who has come under the influence of Socrates, argue that beating one's father is perfectly natural since chickens do it (the father describes this behavior as parricide, 1327).¹⁷ This corrosive critique of kinship, combined with a new emphasis, encouraged by Pericles' law, on consanguinity as the basis of Athenian identity, may plausibly have generated the anxiety over biological relations to which Sophocles' *Oedipus* appears to respond.

When Sophocles returned to the riddle of Oedipus at the end of his career in the tragedy *Oedipus at Colonus*, he removed the focus from the problem of Oedipus' genetic identity to that of the conflict between guilt and pollution, a topic that does not concern us here. But later dramatists who adapted the plot of *Oedipus the King* seem increasingly to have displaced or marginalized the emphasis on biology in relation to the crimes of incest and parricide. In contrast to Sophocles' version, the question of blood versus adoptive ties seems to lose its privileged place as the central issue of the tragedy, as concerns with royal succession and legitimacy crowd it to the edges. In the balance of this paper, I shall consider three successive

¹⁴ See C. Patterson, *Pericles' Citizenship Law of 451-50 B.C.* (Salem 1981).

¹⁵ Ormand [12] 172.

¹⁶ See H. A. Shapiro, 'Theseus in Kimonian Athens: The Iconography of Empire,' *Mediterranean Historical Review* 7 (1992) 46; Shapiro connects Theseus' children with Athenian imperial aspirations, since they are mentioned as founders of foreign cities.

¹⁷ I am not persuaded by D. F. Sutton, *Ancient Comedy: The War of the Generations* (New York 1993) 33f., that Pheidippides' expressed intention to beat his mother next carries a suggestion of incest.

adaptations of the Oedipus story by Seneca, Corneille, and Dryden, who are the sole playwrights who explicitly produced surviving versions of the Oedipus drama before the year 1700.¹⁸ In my interpretations of these texts, I shall attempt to indicate how the repressed or latent meaning of Sophocles' tragedy is progressively defused until, with Dryden, the love between Oedipus and Jocasta can be seen, if only momentarily, as innocent and natural.¹⁹ These subsequent reworkings of the Oedipus story suggest that the implicit affirmation of blood relations is not inherent in the myth itself but is specific to Sophocles' particular adaptation.²⁰

Seneca's Oedipus at the beginning of the play broods darkly on his own guilt as the cause of the plague that is ravaging Thebes. Apollo's oracle proves as opaque as ever, and Teiresias is brought in as a consultant. After some spooky hocus-pocus with a sacrificed bull, Tiresias decides that the only way to solve the riddle of the plague is to summon up the ghost of Laius himself to reveal the truth about his murder. The scene, as reported by Creon, has all the horror-movie effects one expects of Seneca, but the ghost is not content to identify his murderer and disappear in fumes of sulphur. Instead, he launches into a bitter invective against his son. Here are Laius' words, in the elegant translation by E. F. Watling:²¹

O Thebes,
By sin, not by the anger of the gods,
You are destroyed. Your plague has not been brought
By the dry breath of the rain-thirsty earth,
Nor by the south wind's scourge; but by a king
With blood upon his hands, who claimed a throne
As his reward for murder and defiled
His father's marriage-bed: unnatural son,
And yet more infamous a father he,

¹⁸ For variations on the Oedipal theme, as opposed to treatments of Oedipus himself, see Mueller [7] 105-52; R. A. McCabe, *Incest, Drama and Nature's Law 1550-1700* (Cambridge 1993) 96-126; but see pp. 120-21 on the *Jocasta* of Gascoigne and Kinwelmarsh (1566), modelled on Lodovico Dolce's *Giocasta*.

¹⁹ My account of the successive narratives of the Oedipus theme is different from the approach of Lévi-Strauss, who has affirmed that the core meaning of a myth remains invariant in all retellings. For an application of Lévi-Strauss' method to a topic in the history of drama, see R. Whitaker, 'Dimoetes to Dimetos: The Evolution of a Myth,' *English Studies in Africa* 21.1 (1981) 45-59, with references to Lévi-Strauss' theory in n. 6.

²⁰ On the constructed quality of the ostensibly 'natural' horror of incest, see McCabe [18] 7f., 67-74.

²¹ E. F. Watling (tr.) *Seneca: Four Tragedies and Octavia* (Harmondsworth 1966) 233f.

Who by incestuous rape did violate
 The womb which gave him birth, against all law—
 A thing scarce any animal will do—
 Begat from his own mother sons of shame,
 Children to be his brothers! Vile confusion,
 Monstrous complexity of sin, more subtle
 Than that shrewd Sphinx he boasts of. Murderer!
 Whose blood-stained hand now grasps the sceptre, thee
 I shall pursue, thy father unavenged;
 I and all Thebes shall hunt thee, and shall bring
 The Fury who attended on thy marriage
 With whips to scourge thy guilt; shall overthrow
 Thy house of shame, destroy with civil war
 Thy hearth and home. People, expel your king!
 Drive him immediately from your land;
 Soon as your soil is rid of his curs'd feet,
 Its springtime will return, its grass be green,
 The beauty of the woods will bloom again,
 And pure air fill you with the breath of life.
 With him, as his fit company, shall go
 Death and Corruption, Sickness, Suffering,
 Plague, and Despair. Nay, it shall even be
 That he himself would gladly quit our land
 As fast as feet can carry him; but I
 Shall halt those feet; I shall retard his flight;
 He shall go creeping, groping, stick in hand,
 Feeling his way like one infirm with age.
 While you deprive him of your earth, his father
 Will banish him for ever from the sky.

(630-59)

While Laius reproaches Oedipus with parricide and incest, his anger is motivated chiefly by the attack upon himself as king of Thebes, and it is this insult to his dignity and position that he wishes to avenge. Laius' rage is personal. His anger is not directed against Oedipus' pollution as such; that his assassin should be sitting on his throne inspires his frenzy. Correspondingly, it is not the salvation of Thebes that is uppermost in Laius' mind, but rather the punishment of Oedipus. Thus, he threatens, somewhat illogically, to retard Oedipus' flight from the city, even though his departure will, one supposes, accelerate relief from the plague. He speaks tactlessly of 'adding heavy delays to his feet' (655f.; Watling translates: 'but I shall halt those feet'), having forgotten, in his fury, that he has already crippled Oedipus in his infancy.

The role of Laius shifts the focus of the play from pollution to revenge, from fate to dynastic politics. While Oedipus is certainly guilty of horren-

dous acts, Laius casts him as a paragon of evil rather than as a victim of circumstances.²² The real crime is lèse-majesté, not parricide as such. We are firmly in the world of imperial Rome. When Oedipus, upon hearing Creon's report, accuses Creon and Tiresias of treachery, he acts the part of a Tacitean tyrant. To Creon's self-defense he replies:²³

He that once accused
Escapes conviction, harbours hate thereafter.
Better be rid of doubts.

(701f.)

And again:

No king can rule who is afraid of hatred.
Fear is the sovereign's shield.

(703f.)

Seneca is not concerned solely to portray the consequences of an involuntary violation of fundamental taboos. His interest is as much in the abuse of power, and with the scene of necromancy he succeeds in superimposing on Sophocles' narrative of familial sin a tale of violent usurpation and vengeance. That Laius happens to be Oedipus' biological parent heightens the enormity of his crime, but is at bottom just an embellishment on his seizure of power. In a sense, it does not matter that the two are blood relations: Laius has not the least tenderness for his offspring, and would have demanded the same harsh treatment of anyone who had taken his life and his throne. That the imperial succession in Seneca's time was through foster sons rather than biological children may have facilitated the change in emphasis in his *Oedipus*.

In Seneca's version of the story, then, there is the suggestion—it is no more than that, an implication in the text—that parricide and incest are tokens of a corrupt character on a par with other violations of law and decency. Parricide stands for any assault upon the king. If an attack against the king is like an assault against one's father, then the issue of biology is necessarily sublated into the general question of lawless violence. In this way, Seneca begins the process of dissipating the valorization of biological kinship that

²² J. P. Poe, 'The Sinful Nature of the Protagonist of Seneca's *Oedipus*,' in A. J. Boyle (ed.), *Seneca Tragicus: Ramus Essays on Senecan Drama* (Berwick 1983) 150, observes that Oedipus 'is not, then, ultimately the cause of nature's perversity, but he is its expression. It is in this sense that Oedipus is guilty: that he is part of a guilty universe.'

²³ Tr. Watling [21] 236.

had subtended Sophocles' tragedy.

For Corneille, no tragedy was complete without a romantic sub-plot, and he did not hesitate to provide one in his adaptation of the Oedipus story (1659), which he based on the versions of Sophocles and Seneca.²⁴ Theseus, it turns out, is in love with Dirce, the daughter of Laius and Jocasta and thus Oedipus' step-daughter and, unbeknownst to him, his sister. But Oedipus has already betrothed Dirce to Haemon, Creon's son. He offers to give Theseus Antigone or Ismene as wife, but Dirce is out of the question: 'The word of kings must be inviolable' (I.ii.185). Dirce, however, is proud. She is conscious that she is the proper heir to the throne of Thebes, as the sole surviving offspring of Laius; while she has consented to delegate this right to Oedipus, she insists on her privilege of choosing a king—not Haemon—as her spouse (II.i.468-78).²⁵ Oedipus is adamant: 'I am king, I can do what I like' ('Je suis roi, je puis tout,' 493)—the absolute French monarch speaks here. Dirce declares that she'll have Theseus, or death (504).

In the following scene, Dirce's maid, Mégare, informs her mistress almost casually that Tiresias has been busy evoking the ghost of Laius for a clue to the evils that are afflicting Thebes, but Dirce replies that she has had problems enough of her own (II.ii.546-52). It seems that heaven demands a victim pure and noble (571), and one of Laius' race must pay the penalty for an unpunished crime (605f.); but Laius has refused to name names. Dirce immediately volunteers, on the grounds that Laius made his fatal trip to consult the oracle in her behalf. Hence, she is guilty (655). Theseus, Jocasta, and Oedipus all remonstrate with her. 'Do you doubt,' she asks Oedipus, 'that I'm entirely ready to die when the gods, through my father, have asked for my head?' (III.iv.953f.). Oedipus reassures her of his confidence in her generous spirit, but reminds her that Laius has spoken less than perspicuously. At this point, Oedipus suddenly recalls the infant that Laius and Jocasta exposed in fear of dire predictions by the oracle

²⁴ Text in *Pierre Corneille: Théâtre complet* 3.1 (Rouen 1986). Corneille's *Oedipe* has received little critical attention. For comparative studies, see W. Theile, 'Stoffengeschichte und Poetik: Literarischer Vergleich von Ödipus-Dramen (Sophokles, Corneille, Gide),' *Arcadia* 10 (1975) 34-51; W.-H. Friedrich, 'Über Corneilles "Oedipe,"' *Romanistisches Jahrbuch* 15 (1964) 116-40; H.-G. Francq, 'Les Malheurs d'Oedipe,' *Revue de l'Université Laval* 20 (1965-66) 211-24, 308-17, 458-80, 560-69, 657-75. I have consulted Ada Ritter, *Bibliographie zu Pierre Corneille von 1958 bis 1983* (Erfstadt 1983).

²⁵ With Dirce's interest in the succession to the throne one may compare the analogous preoccupation of Phèdre in Racine's tragedy, where a mere hint in Euripides' *Hippolytus* is expanded into a major theme.

(III.iv.989-93), and begins the process of tracking down the child's history. But Theseus turns up and declares that the abandoned infant is none other than he, and he is prepared to die forthwith and spare his beloved Dirce: 'I loved her as a lover and love her still as a brother' (III.v.1118), he announces. 'Okay,' Jocasta replies, 'be my son, since you wish it, but give a sign by which I may know it' (1125f.). Corneille could not refuse Dirce and Theseus a scene in which they vie for the privilege of self-sacrifice (IV.i). Phorbas, an old retainer of Laius, who was with him when he was slain, is brought in to identify Theseus as the assassin, but Oedipus recognizes Phorbas as one of the band he attacked years before (1431f.). Theseus perks up at this news: 'Sire, I am the brother or the lover of Dirce, and her father or mine, stabbed by your hand . . .'; 'Prince,' replies Oedipus, 'I understand you, you must avenge this father, and my destruction seems necessary to the State' (1487-90). Thus everyone gets the chance to offer himself or herself for the higher good. Only Jocasta is disconsolate: 'I must see either my daughter or my son self-immolated, the blood of my son run by your hand or his blood pour by yours' (IV.v.1507-09).

The stand-off at the beginning of Act V, then, is between Theseus, who is still imagined to be the exposed child of Laius and Jocasta, and Oedipus, who is Laius' murderer. In this impasse, the Corinthian messenger arrives and reveals that Oedipus is not the son of Polybus and Merope. On these grounds, moreover, Polybus has denied Oedipus the throne of Corinth (V.ii.1687-1704). When the messenger, here called Iphicrate, explains that he received the infant Oedipus on Mount Cithaeron, Oedipus first suspects the secret of his identity (1740-43). With this revelation, as Oedipus declares, the obstacle to Dirce's love for Theseus is removed (V.v.1792). Dirce is not content to yield the honor of dying for her country so easily; she points out that Oedipus knew neither that Laius was king nor that he was his father, and she continues to insist on her own guilt (1841-56). But Oedipus' case is stronger, and he begs a brief interval to console Jocasta (V.vi.1878) before meeting his fate. The play ends, like Seneca's, with Jocasta's suicide and Oedipus' self-blinding.

Corneille has defused the culpability of Oedipus by representing him as simply one candidate among several for the role of scapegoat so that the plague may be lifted from Thebes. Dirce contends with Oedipus for the distinction of having killed Laius, and puts her indirect guilt on the same level as Oedipus' physical assault upon his father. It is as though Sophocles' Oedipus should have equated the grief he caused Polybus with Laius' death at his hands. The blinding of Oedipus, and his fall from power in Thebes, seem as much a consequence of his stubborn opposition to the love of

Theseus and Dirce as a function of incest and parricide, which are universally regarded as a wretched accident. As the blocking figure in a comic romance, he must be removed from the scene. Besides, the city requires a sacrifice to be rid of the plague: the emphasis is on the need for a noble scapegoat rather than on pollution and purification, and Oedipus' guilt serves primarily to pick him out as the appropriate victim, as opposed to Theseus and Dirce who are equally ready to offer themselves. Corneille tells us in a preface that he deliberately transformed Seneca's vengeful ghost into a cryptic riddler no less obscure than the oracle itself. Since the nature of the crime is hidden, Corneille can exhibit the mettle of the several leading characters, all of whom imagine that they are summoned to atonement and prove equal to the sacrifice demanded of them.

Corneille's addition of the subplot involving Theseus and Dirce threatens to take over the central action of the play, and thus displaces the focus on incest and parricide *per se*. Sophocles' preoccupation with fate and ignorance foregrounds the horror in the discovery that perfect strangers may turn out to be the closest kin and thus leave a person vulnerable to the worst kind of miasma despite the best of intentions; Corneille, however, amalgamates the subject of incest and parricide with the role of paternal obstacle to a love relation, and, in addition, intimates an equivalence between Oedipus' offense and those of Dirce and Theseus. The particular nature of the crime is of less moment than the virtue and honor of the protagonists, exhibited in their response to the crisis.

In Corneille's version, unlike Sophocles', Polybus denies Oedipus the succession in Corinth because he is not his biological heir, and this may seem to suggest that biology is even more important a consideration in the French play than it is in the Greek. But perhaps this detail works the other way around. Sophocles' Polybus is a father in everything but blood, while Laius is a parent by blood alone. This is the irony that underlies the text. Corneille disarms this tension by having Polybus cast out the adult Oedipus just as Laius had done to the infant. In turn, Corneille plays down the violence at the beginning of Oedipus' life: the mournful shade of Laius has none of the viciousness of Seneca's vengeful ghost. The opposition between blood parents and adoptive parents is elided in the French tragedy, and gives way to issues of personal nobility and royal authority as they crystallized in the age of Louis XIV.

Dryden was not much pleased with Corneille's adaptation, with the hero, as he puts it in the preface to his own *Oedipus* (1679), 'scarce

maintaining a second part in his own Tragedie.'²⁶ Gone is Theseus from this new version, since he cannot help but outshine, says Dryden, the hapless protagonist. Instead, Dryden gives us a full-blown conspiracy against the king, who at the beginning of the play is leading a campaign against the city of Argos. The chief plotter is Creon; his fellows, men who resent a foreign ruler:

Alcander: O that our *Thebes* might once again behold
A Monarch *Theban* born!
Diocles: We might have had one.
Pyracmon: Yes, had the people pleas'd.
Creon: Come, y'are my Friends:
The Queen my Sister, after *Lajus*'s death,
Fear'd to lye single; and supply'd his place
With a young Successour.
Diocles: He much resembles
Her former Husband too.
Alcander: I always thought so.
Pyracmon: When twenty Winters more have grizzl'd his black Locks
He will be very *Lajus*.
Creon: So he will:
Mean time she stands provided of a *Lajus*,
More young and vigorous too, by twenty Springs.
These Women are such cunning Purveyors!
(I.i.55-66)

Dryden is not subtle, but he has limned in several themes here: native versus foreign rulers; the wilfulness of the people; women's passionate natures; and, of course, the connection between Oedipus and Laius. Creon had set his hopes of succession to the throne upon his claim to Laius' daughter, Eurydice, to whom he was betrothed when she was still a minor. But he has found a rival in Adrastus, the prince of Argos and thus an enemy of Thebes, 'But is not so to her,' as Creon complains (97). Creon is thus in the position of Corneille's Haemon, while Adrastus assumes the role of Theseus. Eurydice's rejection of Creon has less to do with pride and more with

²⁶ Text in *The Works of John Dryden* 13 (Berkeley 1984); the title page of the first edition lists the authors as 'Mr. Dryden, and Mr. Lee.' Very little has been written on Dryden's *Oedipus*, and virtually nothing that bears on the subject of this paper; see A. Hirt, 'A Question of Excess: Neo-Classical Adaptations of Greek Tragedy,' *Costerus* 3 (1972) 55-119. I have consulted J. A. Zamonski, *An Annotated Bibliography of John Dryden: Texts and Studies 1949-1973* (New York 1975); D. J. Latt and S. Holt Monk, *John Dryden: A Survey and Bibliography of Critical Studies 1895-1974* (Minneapolis 1976); and especially J. M. Hall, *John Dryden: A Reference Guide* (Boston 1984).

fastidiousness; Creon is deformed:

Love from thee!
 Why love renounc'd thee e're thou saw'st the light:
 Nature her self start back when thou wert born;
 And cry'd, *The work's not mine*—
 The Midwife stood aghast. . . .

(I.i.133-37)

Creon and his henchmen attempt to stir up the masses against Oedipus, but Tiresias, loyal to Oedipus, reins them in again. At this point, Oedipus returns triumphant from the war, leading Adrastus as his captive. But so virtuous are the pair that they embrace in friendship. Oedipus, ever gallant, commands the prince, 'To love, and to *Eurydice*, go free' (397). Oedipus then notices the grief of his subjects, and learns of the plague and the oracle concerning the murderer of Laius.

Enter Jocasta, and then the touching scene of reunion. She remarks on Oedipus' resemblance to Laius. He replies:

Oedipus: I love thee more.
 So well I love, words cannot speak how well.
 No pious Son e're lov'd his Mother more
 Than I my dear *Jocasta*.
 Jocasta: I love you too
 The self-same way.

(I.i.526-30)

Jocasta puts in a plea for Creon's claim to Eurydice, but Oedipus objects:

Uncle and Neece! they are too near, my Love;
 'Tis too like Incest: 'tis offence to Kind.

(I.i.546f.)

This is the moment for some fireworks, and Dryden opens the second act with wild celestial phenomena. Oedipus begs the heavens for an explanation of the troubles afflicting Thebes, and they oblige. Here are Dryden's stage directions: *The Cloud draws that veil'd the heads of the Figures in the Skie, and shews 'em Crown'd, with the names of Oedipus and Jocasta written above in great Characters of Gold.*

Tiresias, summoning up all his mantic powers, discovers a further clue: that the slayer of Laius was the first offspring of his blood. Creon, nourishing his jealousy, accuses Eurydice. Adrastus stabs Creon, and Oedipus orders that he and Eurydice be kept under guard. Tiresias

undertakes to watch them, and to raise ghosts in order to clarify the question of their guilt. At last, Oedipus and Jocasta are ready to retire, but Oedipus, in a soliloquy, reveals a strange compunction:

Thou softest, sweetest of the World! good night.
Nay, she is beauteous too; yet, mighty Love!
I never offer'd to obey thy Laws,
But an unusual chillness came upon me;
An unknown hand still check'd my forward joy,
Dash'd me with blushes, tho' no light was near:
That ev'n the Act became a violation.

(II.i.289-95)

No sooner does he withdraw to Jocasta, than Oedipus emerges again, walking in his sleep and muttering of horrid visions. Jocasta comes to him, and Oedipus explains his dreams:

None e're in Dreams was tortur'd so before.
Yet what most shocks the niceness of my temper,
Ev'n far beyond the killing of my Father,
And my own death, is, that this horrid sleep
Dash'd my sick fancy with an act of Incest:
I dreamt, *Jocasta*, that thou wert my Mother.

(II.i.383-88)

Laius' ghost, in Dryden's version, is every bit as venomous as Seneca's. He exculpates Eurydice and Adrastus (the latter had sought to take the blame upon himself to spare Eurydice), and, in a flourish straight out of Seneca, points the finger squarely at Oedipus:

From *Thebes*, my throne, my Bed, let him be driv'n;
Do you forbid him Earth, and I'll forbid him Heav'n.

(III.i.376f.)

Tiresias is bullied into revealing Laius' charges to Oedipus, who, upon a hint from Creon, concludes that the prophet is in league with Adrastus and Eurydice. Reverting here to Sophocles' model, Dryden exploits a dialogue between Oedipus and Jocasta to reveal the Corinthian's taunt concerning Oedipus' parentage, the oracle he received at Delphi, and the details of Laius' death at the crossroads, where only the discrepancy in the number of assailants gives Oedipus some hope of being innocent. As in Sophocles, the question of the murderer's identity and that of Oedipus' own lineage are collapsed into one another, so that the problem of violence is transformed

imperceptibly into one of an offense against biological kinship. Oedipus, however, holds on to his consciousness of innocence: 'My hands are guilty, but my heart is free' (593).

While Creon stirs up the mob against Oedipus, a ghost keeps up the pressure on the king by calling out his name. Oedipus rallies his energies and, with Adrastus at his side, puts down the rebellion. At this point, the Corinthian messenger arrives with news of Polybus' death, and simultaneously reveals that Oedipus was not the true son of the Corinthian king and queen: 'My Lord, Queen *Merope* is not your Mother . . . Nor was *Polybus* your Father' (IV.i.317-19). The full truth of Oedipus' birth is soon out, along with his guilt for the death of Laius, and only the swift intervention of Adrastus prevents him from taking his life.

In the fifth act, Oedipus blinds himself, and Creon assumes power in the state. He attempts to seize Eurydice, but Adrastus fends him off. And here, Dryden stages his masterstroke. Enter Jocasta to the sightless Oedipus. She says:

Jocasta:	In spite of all those Crimes the cruel Gods Can charge me with, I know my Innocence; Know yours: 'tis Fate alone that makes us wretched, For you are still my Husband.
Oedipus:	Swear I am, And I'll believe thee; steal into thy Arms, Renew endearments, think 'em no pollutions, But chaste as Spirit's joys: gently I'll come, Thus weeping blind, like dewy Night, upon thee, And fold thee softly in my Arms to slumber. (V.i.217-25) ²⁷

This tender scene is interrupted by another manifestation of Laius' ghost, pointing at Jocasta (only she, of course, can see him). As he vanishes in thunder (stage direction), he calls out both their names. Jocasta, now mad, vows to die and seek out Laius, 'My dear, my murder'd Lord. O *Laius!* *Laius!* *Laius!*' (273).

²⁷ G. S. Rubin, 'Thinking Sex,' in H. Ablove, M. A. Barale, and D. M. Halperin (edd.), *The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader* (New York 1993) 31, reports: 'In 1979, a 19-year-old Marine met his 42-year-old mother, from whom he had been separated at birth. The two fell in love and got married. They were charged and found guilty of incest, which under Virginia law carries a maximum ten-year sentence. During their trial, the Marine testified, "I love her very much. I feel that two people who love each other should be able to live together."' The story appeared in the *San Francisco Chronicle* (16 November 1979) 16 under the title 'Marine and Mom Guilty of Incest.'

But all is not over. The battle still rages between Adrastus and Creon's men, while Creon holds Eurydice prisoner. By threatening Eurydice, he compels Adrastus to surrender his sword, then runs Eurydice through when she comes between him and her beloved. But Adrastus still has a dagger in his hand, with which he slays Creon; Creon's men kill Adrastus; faithful Haemon arrives a moment too late, and like Fortinbras surveys the carnage. Jocasta stabs herself, and for good measure kills her sons and daughters as well, taking a leaf from Medea's script. Oedipus, taken to the tower for his own security, finds an open window. Jocasta, in her dying moments (the scene is operatic), spies Oedipus about to jump, and cries:

What ho, my *Oedipus*! see, where he stands!
 His groping Ghost is lodg'd upon a Tow'r,
 Nor can it find the Road. Mount, mount, my soul;
 I'll wrap thy shivering Spirit in Lambent Flames!
 And so we'll sail.
 But see! we're landed on the happy Coast;
 And all the Golden Strands are cover'd o'er
 With glorious Gods, that come to try our Cause:
Jove, Jove, whose Majesty now sinks me down,
 He who himself burns in unlawful fires,
 Shall judge, and shall acquit us. O, 'tis done;
 'Tis fixt by Fate, upon Record Divine:
 And *Oedipus* shall now be ever mine.

(V.i.426-38)

'*Jocasta!*' cries Oedipus, 'lo, I come' (450). The tragedy is ended.

Like Corneille, Dryden has embellished Oedipus' story with a romantic subplot. However, instead of casting Oedipus as the obstacle to the lovers, he has made him the friend of Adrastus. Adrastus, in turn, gains no advantage in the death of Oedipus, as does Theseus in Corneille's version. Where Corneille provided his audience with a comic conclusion to the romantic theme, Dryden has the innocent pair perish immediately before the suicides of Jocasta and Oedipus. The parallel destinies of the two couples suggest a double tragedy of fate, which envelops noble spirits and brings them down without regard to their virtue. Despite the ghoulish tricks with ghosts and stellar displays, the fall of Oedipus is not simply a sign that the cosmos will rid itself of pollution, but one more example, complementary to the case of Adrastus, of a great man brought low by accident. The antagonist of Oedipus and Adrastus alike is not just some mysterious fatality, but the machinations of the demagogue Creon, whose appeal to the masses

brands him a scoundrel, in the Restoration ideology of Dryden. The question of incest and parricide, and the affirmation of the biological family which they presupposed in Sophocles' play, are partly neutralized in Dryden's version because they are embedded in a wider drama of sedition and the danger it poses to a virtuous ruler.²⁸

And this, I believe, is why Dryden's Oedipus insists to the very end that his conscience is clear, and can affirm his love for Jocasta even after he knows the nature of his relationship to her. Their love is not evil. She may have been his mother by blood, but she really is his wife.²⁹ Thus, with Dryden, who of the three successors to Sophocles comes closest to preserving the spirit of the original tragedy, the biological family is most consciously displaced from primacy in the context of incest and parricide. Though Oedipus and Jocasta are sufficiently appalled by their deeds to take their lives, the bond of nature is subtly overridden by the law of love, which unites them just as it did Adrastus and Eurydice. When Oedipus refused to marry Eurydice to Creon because the connection in blood was too close, it was the open knowledge of their kinship that offended him. As the play makes clear, his own case is different. Blood parents, in the formula of Professor Bartholet, are not necessarily real parents.

What all three adaptations of Sophocles' *Oedipus* have in common is a shift of emphasis from parricide to regicide, from an offense against the family to an offense against the state.³⁰ It may be relevant to note that

²⁸ F. Ahl, *Sophocles' Oedipus: Evidence and Self-Conviction* (Ithaca 1991) makes a case for a similar conspiracy against the throne in Sophocles' version. I believe that Ahl's interpretation, while ingenious, pertains better, as Charles Segal notes in his review of Ahl's book (CW 86 [1992] 155) to 'a play of which traces can be found in the versions of Dryden, Voltaire, and Gide but which Sophocles, alas, did not write.' The theme of Sophocles' tragedy is parricide, not regicide.

²⁹ Contrast Voltaire's *Oedipe* (1718), where Philoctetes, who had been in love with Jocasta even before she was betrothed to Laius, returns to Thebes (after the death of Heracles) to find Jocasta married to Oedipus; in her heart, however, Jocasta continued to love Philoctetes, and never gave herself wholly either to Laius or to Oedipus. Text in *Théâtre de Voltaire* (Paris 1923); for discussion, see C. Biet, *Les transcriptions théâtrales d'Oedipe-Roi au dix-huitième siècle* (PhD Thesis Sorbonne Nouvelle 1980) 298-300. Biet treats the 18th-century versions of the Oedipus tragedy by Voltaire, Biancollelli, Folard, La Motte, Legrand, La Tournelle, Lauraguais, Buffardin, Bernard d'Héry, Duprat de La Touloubre, Léonard, Chénier (table of French translations and adaptations on pp. 12f.). I am grateful to Suzanne Saïd for bringing Biet's thesis to my attention.

³⁰ Cf. Biet [29] 297: 'Durant l'évolution du mythe dans la tragédie au XVIIIe siècle, on passe en effet de la question de la culpabilité de l'homme et de son libre arbitre à celle du père puis à celle du roi—le roi raisonnant devenant parallèlement le père/fils d'une famille

Seneca, Corneille and Dryden were all writing in a period of autocracy: the reign of Nero, the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV, and the restoration of the English crown after the interregnum of Oliver Cromwell. In the tragedies of these court poets, the slaying of the father comes progressively to stand as a symbol for the disruption of the political order, which is analogized to patriarchy. Speaking of the conspirators who slew Julius Caesar, Cicero asserts: 'I concede that, if they are not the liberators of the Roman people and the preservers of the republic, then they are worse than assassins, worse than murderers, worse even than parricides, since indeed it is more outrageous to kill the parent of the country [*patriae parentem*] than one's own' (*Phil.* 2.13.31). Cicero is playing here on the title awarded to Caesar, but he captures the inclination under an autocracy to subordinate an offense against blood to an offense against the supreme authority.³¹ Analogously, the subversion of the social order in Dryden's tragedy is represented more by Creon's rebellion than by Oedipus' incest or parricide. In the context of the autocratic state, the meaning of the murder of Laius shifts subtly from an offense against the biological foundation of paternity to an assault on the royal institution. On these terms, Creon, as Dryden portrays him, is guiltier than Oedipus. Oedipus' pollution may thus be stripped of the symbolic freight it had carried since Seneca as a sign of his violent accession to the throne, and his involuntary parricide and incest may at last be revealed as innocent.

et d'un pays meurtris—.' Biet cites A. Green, *Un oeil en trop: le complexe d'Oedipe dans la tragédie* (Paris 1969) 260: 'Si le parricide est le plus affreux des crimes, on ne saurait nier que la sévérité avec laquelle il est puni est liée au régicide qu'il implique.' Cf. also McCabe [18] 77f. on Seneca and Nero and 272-77 on the political context of Dryden's version.

³¹ In *Eth. Nic.* 8.10 (1160b24f.), Aristotle notes the analogy between monarchy and paternal rule over sons. J.-J. Goux (tr. C. Porter), *Oedipus, Philosopher* (Stanford 1993) 11-15 *et passim* regards Oedipus' slaying of his father and marriage with his mother as a deformation of what he calls the monomyth of the hero's battle with the monstrous feminine (displaced by Oedipus' murder of Laius though residually present in the form of the sphinx) and his conquest of a marriageable maiden; Goux claims that this new myth, characteristic of Greek culture, inaugurates the modern rational and democratic subject.

CLOUDY MORALITY AND THE METEOROLOGY OF SOME CHORAL ODES¹

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Abstract. Readers either (a) register dissatisfied surprise at the chorus' apparent role-reversal late in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (1456-64), (b) deny their reliability even here, or (c) argue that the text prepares well for this development. Aristophanes' own distinction between the intellectuals and the rest of his audience supports the third view, for which the *parabasis* odes provide important evidence by revealing systematic poetic forewarning of the moral momentum of the play.

Faced with the apparent reversal of the role of the meteorological chorus at the end of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, contending modern interpretations of their dramatic character respond in a variety of ways. My first aim here is to defend the thesis that Aristophanes has prepared well for the eventually explicit announcement of the chorus' moral role. Indeed their finally revealed character is no mere ephemeral appearance, but integral to the moral and aesthetic structure of the play. Such a view, I acknowledge, has been proposed previously, although it faces difficulties to be discussed below on account of the literary sophistication it seems to attribute to the Athenian audience at large. Yet these difficulties can be resolved by distinguishing, as Aristophanes himself does in the *parabasis*, between the discerning connoisseurs of his wit and the general audience, a distinction which I hope to show has recently been misinterpreted.

I shall then turn in a second section to the importance of evidence provided by the *parabasis* odes (563-74 and 595-606) for an appreciation of Aristophanes' dramatic artistry. I aim to show that the significance of their language has been wrongly overlooked and misunderstood. Recognising the kind of sophistication upon which Aristophanes relies in the educated among his audience allows us to trace in the diction of the epic, lyric, and tragic reminiscences used in these odes a pattern of deliberate poetic forewarning that structures the moral momentum of the play.

¹ I owe thanks to Kevin Lee for the opportunity to present a first draft of this paper at the conference Greek Drama II held at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, February 1992.

I

The true role of the Clouds in the education of Strepsiades, Kenneth Dover suggests in the introduction to his edition of the play,² and the real nature of that education, are only announced unequivocally during the comedy's final sequence (1456-64). Here, immediately before turning his wrath on Socrates' school and following agonistic discomfiture by the son he has had trained in rhetoric, Strepsiades admits that he should not have tried to avoid paying his debts, in response to the Clouds' explicit revelation that it is their regular procedure to encourage the impious to bring a just evil on themselves. The chorus thus behave like gods in tragic legend, Dover remarks. Others have detected a distinctly Aeschylean air in the lines.³

Dover traces forewarning of the Cloud's true role only as far back as 1113f., where before the second *parabasis* the chorus address the departing back of Strepsiades, who has just given his son into the hands of the Worse Argument, and they announce the old man's⁴ impending change of heart; the only other reference to this role prior to the *finale*, according to Dover, would be the further warnings of imminent repentance in 1303-20,⁵ a responsive lyric system introducing the *agon*-scene between father and son, which does not end until Strepsiades is worsted and the truth revealed.

Yet neither of these earlier passages goes beyond the generic choral function of providing a popular ethical commentary on the action and certainly alone they do not prepare us for the Clouds' own involvement in Strepsiades' fate. We might expect a much closer integration of the chorus into the central dramatic idea in Old Comedy than is suggested merely by the passages Dover notes, particularly in a play where that idea is so strong as to be steered right through to the (usually athematic) *komos*. Dover's view

² K. J. Dover (ed.), *Aristophanes' Clouds* (Oxford 1968) lxx.

³ Thus, for example, H.-J. Newiger, *Metapher und Allegorie* (Munich 1957) 67: 'Ein geradezu aischyler Gedanke!', citing comparable passages; also C. Segal, 'Aristophanes' Cloud-Chorus', *Arethusa* 2 (1969) 143-61 (references to repr. H.-J. Newiger, hsg., *Aristophanes und die Alte Komödie* [Darmstadt 1975] 174-97; see p. 189). Such a view has been opposed, however, by K. Reckford, 'Aristophanes' Everflowing Clouds', *Emory University Quarterly* 22 (1967) 227 and more recently by A. Köhnken, 'Der Wolken-Chor des Aristophanes', *Hermes* 108 (1980) 165. For my response to this see below, esp. pp. 28f., 35.

⁴ The presumable referent of σοὶ (1113).

⁵ Dover [2] lxix.

follows that of Gilbert Norwood⁶ and also Cedric Whitman, who asserts that ‘. . . the clouds *suddenly* reveal themselves as deities of retribution’ and complains that ‘the motivation seems insufficient, to say the least, and the ending remains an anomaly in Aristophanes’.⁷ Indeed, purported parallels such as the Sausage-seller’s unexpected and rejuvenating laundry of the Athenian Demos in the *Knights* do not really match the case, as there is nothing either fantastic or victorious about a quasi-tragic dénouement in the *Clouds*.⁸

Yet the view that the conclusion of the play is at all tragic has been denied by Kenneth Reckford and more recently by Adolf Köhnken,⁹ who argues that ‘if a comic chorus . . . applies a tragic judgment with tragic pathos to a comic subject, then the effect, really, can only be comic’. He finds wit in the discrepancy he observes between the solemn style of the chorus’ dictum at 1456-64 and its petty object. But (i) injustice, represented by Strepsiades’ desire to avoid paying his debts, and the impiety of violent *hybris* to one’s parents, are scarcely petty matters: the subject here is not *only* comic, nor is it portrayed as such;¹⁰ (ii) the humour of the outcome is, to say the least, black, since Pheidippides remains corrupted; (iii) there is no particular *parody* discernible in the chorus’ tone; (iv) furthermore, some, at least, of the audience (as I shall argue below) must by this stage expect just such a revelation: the point is in principle neither humorous nor serious, but dramatic; it punctuates the *peripeteia* of the plot. Strepsiades’ impious plans have destroyed him, resulting in a moment of self-recognition, dramatised by the old man’s *anagnorisis* of the chorus.

⁶ G. Norwood, *Greek Comedy* (London 1931) 216: ‘the chorus makes a complete *volte-face* . . .’.

⁷ C. Whitman, *Aristophanes and the Comic Hero* (Harvard 1964) 128f. (my emphasis).

⁸ Cf. Dover [2] xxiv and Newiger [3] 67. Newiger [3] 68 poses the problem I wish to discuss in terms of the inability of the poet here to allow the chorus to *change their mind*, as do the Sausage-seller at *Eq.* 1316-1408 and Dionysus at *Ran.* 1471-78 (cf. 66-103), while the *Clouds* cannot remain opposed to the poet’s ‘own’ moral viewpoint. His explanation, that Aristophanes has found a solution to this dilemma by having the chorus make clear the ‘paedueutic function’ of the conceit of the play, does not take into account, as is needed, its dramatic effect; as a result, his appeal to authorial intention begs the question of the interpretation of the scene.

⁹ See Köhnken [3]; his account of 1456-64 is followed by D. O’Regan, *Rhetoric, Comedy and the Violence of Language in Aristophanes’ Clouds* (Oxford 1992) 121-23. Regarding Köhnken’s brilliantly ingenious hypothesis that the chorus’ masks were equipped with extended noses, signifying deception and mockery, see below, p. 29.

¹⁰ Contrast *Vesp.* 148, 187, 196f., 209.

Köhnken denies Strepsiades any self-understanding,¹¹ arguing that the ‘Twister’ once more ‘twists’ away, forgetting immediately (1464-66) his admission of guilt (1463), in his desire to turn the blame on Socrates. Yet the latter is no mere scapegoat but a willing instrument of corruption; there is no inconsistency in Strepsiades’ ‘changing sides’ as a result of the recognition, immediately corollary to that of his own fault, that Socrates’ school has deceitfully taken advantage of Pheidippides’ and his own vulnerability (1463-66).

Focusing on Strepsiades’ previous dismissal of his creditors, Köhnken claims the old man alone is himself culpable for his attainment of the object of his own original unjust desire. But the case is not to the point: since he flunked out of school, Strepsiades cannot here be himself employing the Unjust Argument: he merely acts in the typically rambunctious manner of an Aristophanic hero confident in the fulfilment of his plan; Socrates’ corruptive activity is not to be discerned in Strepsiades’ treatment of his creditors on stage but in the transformation of Pheidippides, whom his father expects hereafter to defend him in court but who rather attacks, beats and defeats the old man (1321-1451).

Furthermore, *Pheidippides*’ corruption is assuredly to be laid at the door of Socrates and his Arguments just as much as at Strepsiades’.¹² All the same, that Strepsiades’ own injustice and impiety are the original sources, he himself a victim of this, and that he does recognise as much at 1463 constitute an ineluctably moral, if not yet tragic, moment in the play. This is not too surprising, considering Aristophanes’ own words, τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον οἶδε καὶ τρυγῳδία (‘Comedy too knows about justice’, *Ach.* 500) and καὶ πολλὰ μὲν γέλοιά μ’ εἰ / πεῖν, πολλὰ δὲ σπουδαῖα (‘And let me say many funny things and many serious’, *Ran.* 391f.). But it is the fact that the Clouds, as divine agencies, have irresistibly stimulated his immoral desires so as to precipitate this educational self-punishment, which establishes the moment as genuinely quasi-tragic. Strepsiades is a victim not only of himself

¹¹ Köhnken [3] 166f. with n. 40. See also Reckford [3] 227: ‘We must not regard Strepsiades’ failure as tragic: he himself is resilient as Punch’. O’Regan [9] 122-27 gives an alternative and more sophisticated reading of the end of the play based on Aristophanes’ relation to his audience.

¹² Newiger [3] 69 would blame the Unjust Argument alone, but Socrates, after all, does keep this figure in his school and provide his educational services (886). His own immediate absence is required by the three actor rule (in fact Socrates’ player may well have been intended to return recognisably as the Unjust Argument). Newiger is certainly right, however, that the Clouds are not themselves responsible for the details of Pheidippides’ corruption.

but therein of the gods.

One prominent critical response to the problem of the apparently sudden transformation of the role of the Cloud-chorus is to deny any true nature, or at least any authoritative revelation of one, to the Clouds; accordingly W. J. M. Starkie charges that their final line of defence to Strepsiades ‘. . . is sophistical in character’.¹³ Kenneth Reckford too has interpreted their ‘everflowing’¹⁴ identity as ‘. . . widely suggestive of the power of delusion and self-delusion in human life, and of the shifting mysteries of human and divine knowledge and existence’.¹⁵ This interpretation emphasises Socrates’ explanation, in response to Strepsiades’ surprise at the chorus’ female noses, that ‘they become whatever they want to’ (348).¹⁶ Accordingly, we are to understand the Clouds as essentially formless appearances that mimic anyone they wish to criticise; without any true nature, their apparently sudden self-revelation as agents of traditional morality is just one more insubstantial posture.

The best case for this has been put by Köhnken. He appeals to the traditional motif of cloud-matter as the substance of illusions such as the Trojan Helen of Stesichorus and Euripides and in particular to the story of Ixion in Pindar,¹⁷ and argues that the reference to the chorus’ noses (344) implies that on their masks these were exaggerated to signify deception and mockery.¹⁸ Hence he infers that ‘the element of deception is indicated right from the beginning by the costuming of the Clouds’; from Socrates’ rules for their forms of appearance (348-55) we are to understand that the Clouds appear as corrupters in the play in mimicry of Strepsiades’ own *poneria* in

¹³ W. J. M. Starkie, *The Clouds of Aristophanes* (London 1911) xxiii.

¹⁴ ἄέοντο (275); against Dover’s rejection of this literal sense (*ad loc.*), see the defence of Köhnken [3] 157, who adduces the usage at *Ran.* 1309f.

¹⁵ K. Reckford, *Aristophanes’ Old-And-New Comedy* (Chapel Hill 1987) 314; see also Reckford [3] 223: ‘The Clouds, then, create their own definitions. They resist being pinned down; they are ever-changing, ever-becoming’.

¹⁶ Note Köhnken’s dispute ([3] 156; cf. 158) with Segal [3] over the interpretation of this phrase; Köhnken denies it implies that the Clouds appear as *what each man desires* (which is how Reckford [3] 225 also understands it).

¹⁷ Köhnken [3] 155, 162f.; see too Reckford [3] 231f.; the Ixion myth is found at Pindar *Pyth.* 2.21-48, yet, as my colleague Paul McKechnie has pointed out to me, the cloudy illusion of Hera by which Zeus deceived Ixion was at least real enough to bear him Centaurus and thereafter three more children to Athamas! For other ideas about the symbolism of a chorus of clouds here see Newiger [3] 556-58 and compare Reckford [3] 222.

¹⁸ Köhnken [3] 159f.

two phases, one of seduction (from their appearance to 813), the other of disavowal (from 1113 onward).¹⁹ Just so much would be unexceptionable, but Köhnken's emphasis on discovering an exclusive devotion to mockery in the Clouds prevents him from acknowledging any serious moral realisation in Strepsiades or non-deceptive identity in the chorus. The precarious ingenuity of his construction upon the evidence aside, I have already given reasons above for rejecting his judgment of Strepsiades.

More recently in the same vein Raymond Fisher claims in his commentary that at 1458-61 the chorus '... *pretend* to be the upholders of traditional morality and religion: the manner in which the *coryphaeus* sings these lines would reveal their comic insincerity'.²⁰ The latter piece of special pleading reveals the weakness of the case; as with Köhnken's suggestion about the chorus' noses, at most this lays claim to a possibility for production. But to see if the text as a whole could even sustain, let alone require, it we must look elsewhere. In brief, I suggest the unlikeliness of the fickle-to-the-core interpretation of the Clouds is shown by considering that (i) it involves assimilating the truth of the matter to Socrates' beliefs about them; (ii) it fails to observe the distinction between their physical appearances (flying wool, women, various animals) and what they say; (iii) it misinterprets their earlier involvement in the action; (iv) it ignores the fact that the authority of their final self-revelatory utterance is not compromised by any subsequent development onstage. But rather than argue at length for each of these negative points, which, I trust, reflection and reference to the text will sustain, in the second part of this paper I will consider evidence for a positive alternative view of the Cloud chorus.

It is worth remarking that Dover in the addenda to his edition of the play seems, without quite admitting it, to have changed his mind significantly. Here he corrects his own remarks in the introduction with this observation:

¹⁹ Köhnken [3] 167-69. Similarly, Reckford [3] 225: 'To show up Strepsiades, who wants a "cheating education", they have become beautiful cheaters'. M. C. Nussbaum enrolls in this view ('Aristophanes and Socrates on Learning Practical Wisdom', *YCS* 26 [1980] 77): 'The play ends with an abrupt reversal. Strepsiades, prompted by the changeable Chorus (who assume in this case, presumably, the form of his original moral nature based on *nomos*), reverts to the old values'. T. Hubbard, *The Mask of Comedy: Aristophanes and the Intertextual Parabasis* (Ithaca/London 1991) 89 also appeals in passing to Socrates' explanation of the nature of the Clouds, but see my immediately following reasons why this is unsatisfactory.

²⁰ R. K. Fisher, *Aristophanes' Clouds: Purpose and Technique* (Amsterdam 1984) 227 (my emphasis).

Not only is the parabasis (as we should expect, given the conventions of Old Comedy), in conflict with Socrates' view of the Clouds as novel deities, in the *parodos* also (278, 302 ff.) the Chorus acknowledges the piety of Athenians in worship of traditional gods. We have to listen to it as if the actual words which it sings were not heard or not understood, within the framework of the plot, by Socrates and Strepsiades. Thus we are prepared from the first for the Chorus's revelation, but the characters in the play are not.²¹

About the same time Charles Segal made a much more explicit case for a consistent presentation of the Clouds to the audience over the heads of the characters onstage as an original synthesis of vital nature and traditional religious morality.²² Accordingly he asserts that 'the "change" in 1454ff. . . . is only the fulfilment of a well-developed plan and the natural consequence of the Clouds' implicit partnership with the Just Argument'.²³ He finds the evidence for this not merely in the choral odes of the *parodos* and *parabasis* but in the Clouds' characterisation in the *epirrhemata*, in their behaviour during the *agon* of the two Arguments, and in the *coryphaeus*' dialogue with the characters. But more recently Rosemary Harriott²⁴ has reaffirmed (by implication, at least) Dover's original position, that only by reading the play backward, as it were, can we see that all along the Clouds were 'moral beings who reward or punish' in a conventional manner.²⁵

Yet two points need to be made, first to temper the excesses of Segal's position, and then to defend a more moderate version on the basis of the clear evidence of the text. It must first be acknowledged that Aristophanes wrote for a popular audience with diverse degrees of critical acumen. If he is to maintain the interest of both the intelligentsia and the groundlings, he must offer something for both, and if the same fare does not appeal universally, then something different for each. Now of course in the *parabasis* where the poet praises the *sophia* ('cleverness') and *dexiotes* ('ability') of the audience (521, 526f., 535—and I assume here we have a text revised for a production for which a chorus was never granted) he is lightheartedly flattering and chivvyng the mob, while alternately boasting of his own *sophia*. Yet his words, in particular the partitive genitive in ὅλλ'

²¹ Dover [2] 269f.; cf. Dover [2] 198 *ad* 813 and his *Aristophanic Comedy* (London 1972) 113, which are both contradicted by this.

²² See Segal [3]. He is now followed by M. C. Marianetti, *Religion and Politics in Aristophanes' Clouds* (Hildesheim 1992) 100-02.

²³ Segal [3] 188.

²⁴ R. Harriott, *Aristophanes: Poet and Dramatist* (London/Sydney 1986).

²⁵ Harriott [24] 184; see too 176f.

οὐδ’ ὥς ὑμῶν ποθ’ ἐκὼν προδώσω τοὺς δεξιούς (‘But I will never so betray *the able among you*’, 527; my emphasis) strongly suggest (the air of insincerity notwithstanding) just that distinction between buffoonery and surprises for the mob on the one hand, and on the other, scintillating wit and artful conceit, to seduce the reflective among the audience, whose good opinion he (clearly) equally craved. But then it is understandable that the significance of early indications of the true nature of the Clouds should not be entirely obvious to all, if the appreciation of such hints is designedly a recondite pleasure reserved for the few,²⁶ a point that is overlooked by Segal.

For the masses, Strepsiades’ discomfiture, surprised discovery of the chorus’ true role, and violent revenge would sufficiently provide, with a quite unexpected excitement at the end. Perhaps Gilbert Murray was right that inadequate catering to the *vulgus* caused the failure of the first version.²⁷ Now admittedly Segal correctly also insists that ‘even without the present ending, none but the most obtuse spectator could leave the theatre of Dionysus thinking Aristophanes an enthusiastic admirer of the new intellectual movement’;²⁸ nevertheless, his interpretation of the chorus is vitiated by the failure to distinguish even between the relatively obtuse and relatively intellectual spectator, assimilating both to the point of view of the modern scholar, with text at hand.

Thomas Hubbard has recently drawn attention to the attributions of *sophia* and *dexiotes* to the audience in the *parabasis*,²⁹ suggesting that the poet first appeals to all spectators as clever (521, 526f.) and then gradually limits himself to those ‘truly’ so (527, 535), thus encouraging the whole audience to identify individually with this elite and develop a taste for his brand of comedy. But further, arguing that 537-44 refer to the absence of cheap tricks in the first version of the play, now introduced in the revision to appeal to the mob, Hubbard claims:

²⁶ This question of audience diversity is overlooked in the otherwise valuable paper by M. Heath, ‘Some Deceptions in Aristophanes’, *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar* (1990) 229-41. Heath 230 emphasises Strepsiades’ stupidity over his would-be fraudulence: ‘it is this incompetence which leads to his undoing, not his dishonesty as such’; yet his admission that the Clouds, too, are deceivers (*loc. cit.* n. 3 with reference to 1456-61) requires the acknowledgement that it is Strepsiades’ *moral* stupidity which motivates their deception, a circumstance which the audience are challenged to recognise (cf. *Vesp.* 1049).

²⁷ G. Murray, *Aristophanes: A Study* (Oxford 1933) 86.

²⁸ Segal [3] 176.

²⁹ Hubbard [19] 94f. He is followed here by O’Regan [9] 73.

The text thus manipulates its audience by appealing to more than one level of understanding and by employing more than one level of irony. The poet is not only making stylistic pronouncements he fails to observe in his own practice; he is also reminding us, or at least the *sophoi* among us, that he did not in fact use these tricks 'the first time' . . .³⁰

This suggestion is too ingenious. The claim that Aristophanes has deliberately lowered the tone of the play, but that, uncomfortable with the admission, he shifts back and forward between versions, playing with the audience, 'winking at its more perceptive members, while deliberately confusing the majority',³¹ is far-fetched: it supposes the kind of awareness on the part of the 'perceptive' as to what the poet is doing which only a critic with leisure and book in hand (and preferably copies of both versions) could attain.

Hubbard interprets the implied distinction within the audience entirely in the context of the issue of revision and ignores any relation to the plot.³² But the kind of education and wit to which Aristophanes can appeal in his loyal supporters is more likely to be a familiarity with the spoken word: recognition of the performable texts of the established great poets and their comic (mis-)appropriation, and the ability to attend closely to the developing significance, for the play's outcome and meaning, of its incidental words and deeds. And for an audience raised on Athenian tragedy, a word of ominous ambiguity for the unfolding of the plot was a dietary item just as expected as parodic misquotation. It is in the evocative character of the language and its dramatic irony in relation to the plot, then, that we should seek evidence of Aristophanes' provision for those watching with their wits about them.

The conclusions above lead directly to my second point. Contrary to Harriott's assumption, it is not only the reader flicking backward through the pages of the text who can be expected to appreciate the role of the *Clouds*. Harriott restricts her brief to a study of Aristophanes' poetry, which perhaps explains her failure to take into account the implications of staging for this issue. Yet I will here limit myself to the poetic question. Rather than rehearse Segal's argument, which, with the strictures outlined above, I would

³⁰ Hubbard [19] 98; the argument continues to 102. O'Regan [9] 180 n. 36 (*ad* 74) opposes Hubbard on the ground that Aristophanes could not deliberately condemn the few wise spectators to deny their own merit by watching an inferior product in the revised version. In her view (74-76) they are offered a lesson on the need to accommodate *logos* to *gaster*. I do not find Aristophanes so philosophical.

³¹ Hubbard [19] 101.

³² He does, however, convincingly compare and contrast the professed *sophia* of the poet with that of Socrates (Hubbard [19] 95 and see 111f.).

endorse, I will just provide a brief context and then consider the case of the *parabasis* odes.

The earlier indications of the Clouds' occupation as dispensers of divine justice are identifiable in the light of Socrates' insistence on their *divinity* (250-53). This immediately precedes the quasi-mystic initiation of Strepsiades; the directly following *parodos* reinforces the emphasis on the Clouds' divine and mysterious power, as Strepsiades responds to Socrates' identification of the Clouds, just before they appear, by admitting that their song by itself has caused him to be overcome by his lust for sophistry (319-21). Scholars have noted that Strepsiades is already predisposed to injustice, which has motivated firstly his failed attempt to corrupt his son, and then his own approach to the *phrontisterion*, and is further evident in his lack of moral outrage at Socrates' theology.³³

Accordingly the mysterious divine power of the Clouds merely stimulates an existing tendency in Strepsiades. They sing first of their meteorological derivation from the god Ocean and association with physical nature (275-90), but then in stark contradiction of Socrates' theological teaching (which immediately preceded the *parodos*), in the antode (298-313) they praise Athens for her Eleusinian mystery cult, temples and cult statues of Olympian gods, festival processions, sacrifices and theatrical contests, icons all of traditional religiosity. Here in the *parodos*, where the chorus typically define their own nature and sing in character, they indicate their moral affiliation to anyone who cares to listen; and in this case that is all the audience can do, since the chorus are (surprisingly, throughout the *parodos*) still off-stage—a device of the poet that emphasises the question of the chorus' true identity and just how to 'see' them properly (314-26).

Further indications of the Clouds' ultimate role, on this view, are most apparent in: (i) the divine separation that the Clouds maintain from Strepsiades' actual corruption once he is turned over to Socrates for instruction (476f.), which suggests a degree of ambivalence in their immediately preceding recognition of his boldness (457-62), where the promised fruits of his association with them depend upon learning (460), a thing of which Strepsiades proves incapable (until 1456-64); (ii) the responsive ode and antode of the *parabasis* (563-74, 595-606—sung, of course, by the Clouds), quite serious cletic invocations of gods both of epic and cult, in language strongly evocative of their responsibility for the

³³ See, for example, Starkie [13] xi, Murray [27] 88, L. Strauss, *Socrates and Aristophanes* (New York/London 1966) 14f., and H. Erbse, 'Sokrates im Schatten der Aristophanischen Wolken', *Hermes* 82 (1954) 385f., 400.

punishment of the impious and even suggesting the distinctive agent of Strepsiades' own forthcoming punishment, his very son; (iii) following Strepsiades' reduction to *aporia* by his inability to benefit from Socrates' instruction, and the old man's appeal to the Clouds to come to his aid, the chorus' responsibility for the suggestion that he make another effort to persuade Pheidippides to enrol in the school (793-96).

The following choral ode (804-13) concludes by warning the alert among the audience that Strepsiades will not long remain enamoured of sophistic education: φιλεῖ γὰρ πως τὰ τοι / αὐθ' ἑτέρα τρέπεσθαι ('Such things do tend to have unexpected results', 812f.). The cumulative evidence presented above shows that Dover's claim³⁴ that only on a second reading or viewing could the warning here be apparent must be rejected. It has, in any case, no other dramatic point.

II

One strong reason for asserting an expectation, among the discerning, of just such results as Strepsiades ultimately suffers is to be found in the responsive odes of the *parabasis*, which I do not think have yet been appreciated by modern scholars in the way they might have been by the intellectually *dexioi* among an Athenian audience. The stage is empty and the chorus sing in their *vox propria* with more seriousness than that of the advice given in the *parabasis* itself. Dover asserts that the chorus here sing in character but fails to comment on the fact beyond complaining of its 'obtrusiveness'.³⁵ G. M. Sifakis, noting the contradiction between the Clouds' pious invocation of traditional gods and the 'Socratic' interpretation of their nature, denies they can be singing in character here, despite their address to Aither as their father (570).³⁶ More recently Ruth Scodel has argued that in the ode (563-74) the chorus portray themselves as nature gods saluting others and in the antode (595-606) as worshipping Athenian singers, 'creating a clear distinction between the two choral personalities that seems to be unique in the Aristophanic corpus'.³⁷ Such a novelty itself argues against so schizo-

³⁴ Dover [2] 198. Some of these and other points are argued by Segal [3] 188-91, but without acknowledgement of the important distinction between the different sections of the audience, which must control interpretation.

³⁵ Dover [2] 172.

³⁶ G. M. Sifakis, *Parabases and Animal Choruses* (London 1971) 57.

³⁷ R. Scodel, 'The Ode and Antode in the Parabasis of *Clouds*', *CPh* 82 (1987) 334f. Scodel is followed by O'Regan [9] 76.

phrenic an explanation. Hubbard's remark seconding Scodel, that ambivalence and irony in the poet's self-presentation are here paralleled by those of the chorus, presupposes his own tendentious account of the *parabasis*, discussed above.³⁸

Yet before progressing to the odes, I must respond to Köhnken's argument that in 'the parabasis section, in general, the chorus performs without regard to the actual plot,' which appeals to the authority of Dover and offers the example of the *parabasis* odes in the *Birds* (737-51, 769-84);³⁹ thus 'parabasis verses are not powerful evidence for the function of the chorus within the plot.' In fact the most Dover says where he is cited⁴⁰ is:

The dramatic status of the chorus is also ambivalent: they remain Acharnians, knights, birds, waspish jurors, clouds etc., but they speak and sing not as if they were involved in a fictional situation with Dicaeopolis and his private peace-treaty, or Bdelykleon and his father's mania, but as if they were visiting Athens on the occasion of a Dionysiac festival.

Indeed he allows within a page that there 'may be a certain relationship apparent between the gods selected and the character of the chorus'. Moreover, the claims to superiority over the Olympian gods made by the chorus in the *parabasis* odes in the *Birds* are thereafter fulfilled by action, which not only indicates a significant link between the content of the odes and the plot but also shows that Aristophanes did not feel constrained to have the chorus invoke and worship the traditional gods at this juncture; thus we may infer that it is a deliberately significant device where he does so in the *Clouds*. Finally, the issue at stake here is not, in any case, whether the chorus in the *parabasis* odes can influence the action, but what the odes reveal of the character and nature of the *Clouds* in this instance.⁴¹

³⁸ Hubbard [19] 106; see 107-09 and n. 57. See below, pp. 39ff. concerning his claim that Helios and Aither are not traditional but elemental powers.

³⁹ Köhnken [3] 157.

⁴⁰ Dover [21] 49-53.

⁴¹ On a distinct but related point, neither is the issue here one of Aristophanes' virtues as a lyric poet *simpliciter* (see M. Silk, 'Aristophanes as Lyric Poet', *YCS* 26 [1980] 99-152). Silk 111 finds the *parabasis* ode of elevated style, but largely conventional, with 'one or two unpredictable touches', the antode 'highly commonplace' but for 'an odd phrase'; he remarks that 'the writing in this case is pleasingly uncluttered but frankly unmemorable'. Yet Silk does recognise (105) that the 'lyrics of Aristophanes may, of course, like those of tragedy, have additional dramatic virtues'. Indeed the vocabulary of a song may well appear unmem-

The four divinities invoked in the ode are all connected with sky and weather, confirming the meteorological associations of the chorus; yet they include both Olympians and older figures of the traditional theo-cosmology; the tone is serious, the expansive and periphrastic references are instructive. Epithets and descriptions, precise matters in religious etiquette, attract attention to the question of the identity, role, and significance of each god invoked. It is important to note, in the attempt to establish the functions of the epithets and descriptions below, that while in some cases a significant occurrence in a universally known and influential work may be fairly definitive for the implications of a term in the odes, in other cases only a preponderance of sufficiently similar connotations in a variety of contexts will argue for audience reception of any particular significance. Furthermore, the fragmentary nature of the evidence of ancient Greek poetic texts leaves all conclusions merely provisional.

First named is 'Zeus, high-ruling king of gods' (ὕψιμέδοντα μὲν θεῶν / Ζῆνα τύραννον, 563f.). The introductory dactylic pattern of the choriambic dimeter suggests the epic provenance of the rare adjective ὕψιμέδοντα. Ὑψι-compounds fall into two distinct groups: the limited originary epic vocabulary⁴² and the wider range of lyric and tragic neologisms;⁴³ furthermore, the latter lexical experimenters are relatively sparing in their use of the traditional items, no doubt *metri causa* and because of their strong associations. Aristophanes uses ὕψι-compounds rarely; apart from the Homeric

orable when compared out of context with Pindar and yet in its dramatic context evoke a precisely orchestrated sequence of moral warnings and quasi-tragic forebodings.

⁴² Thus ὕψιβρεμέτης (6x *Il.* and *Od.*, 4x *Hes.*, 1x *Hymns*), -ζυγος (4x *Il.* and *Od.*, 2x *Hes.*), -κάρηνος (1x *Il.*, 1x *Hymns*), -κερως (1x *Od.*, 1x *Hymns*), -κομος (6x *Il.* and *Od.*, 2x *Hes.*, 1x *Hymns*), -μέδων (1x *Hes.*), -μέλαθρος (3x *Hymns*), -πέτης/-ηλός/-ήεις (9x *Il.* and *Od.*), -πυλος (3x *Il.* and *Od.*). This suggests three categories of association for the prefix: power, in the case of gods; dignity, in the case of mortals; physical height or grandeur, in the case of natural phenomena and artefacts.

⁴³ Thus in Pindar eight neologisms (while epic ὕψικερως and -κομος each occur once); in Bacchylides five neologisms (and epic -μέδων twice [significantly—see below], also -ζυγος three times, and -πυλος and -κερως once each); in Aeschylus three neologisms, and in Sophocles five (with epic -κερως and -πέτης once each). Ibycus has just epic -πυλος twice and Simonides -πυργος once (otherwise only tragic); Euripides, child of another generation, does not neologise, but uses just -πυργος and three epic compounds (-κομος, -πυλος and -πέτης) each once. Note that Aristophanes' own use of ὕψι-compounds is thus not a feature of his modernist 'Euripidaristophanising', and that among the 'pre-modern' neologisers, Bacchylides, who twice uses the epic ὕψιμέδων, is much less innovative than the rest (and see below).

ὕψιπέτης at *Av.* 1337 and ὕψιβρεμέτης at *Lys.* 773,⁴⁴ in the extant corpus there is only otherwise ὕψικέρατα, balancing ὕψιμέδοντα, in the third line of the *Clouds*’ *parabasis* antode (597), in connection with the birthplace of Apollo, the first of the four gods mentioned there as Zeus is here. The cognate ὕψηλός also occurs early in the *parodos* (279) in connection with the *Clouds*’ keensightedness and overseeing of natural processes in Attica, balanced in the antistrophe, as mentioned above, by their approval of traditional piety. The rarity of such compounds generally in Aristophanes, of the form ὕψιμέδων generally among the poets, and the consistently traditional associations it has in such a prominent position attract attention to its significance.

In such a case the *pepaideumenoi* in the audience might be expected to cast their minds back over those epic hexameters whose recitation by heart had played such a prominent part in the traditional education. In the absence of any Homeric usage they would have to turn to Hesiod, the other of the two authoritative composers of hexameters with whom they would be familiar, and then they might well recall *Theogony* 529 since there too ὕψιμέδοντος is used of Zeus. In the context Heracles is finally freeing Prometheus from Zeus’ dreadful punishment for an all too clever impiety. The comparison is indeed apt, suggesting that here in Aristophanes’ play Zeus is first invoked as the guarantor that divine justice will eventually befall the likes of blasphemous Socrates, the modern Prometheus. But the uncommon adjective ὕψιμέδων does also occur three times in extant lyric,⁴⁵ twice more or less decoratively, but once (admittedly restored) in a dithyramb of Bacchylides (15.51), in a speech by Menelaus (51-56), again referring to Zeus and again emphasising his divine justice.

Poseidon is not mentioned by name in the three lines devoted to him in the *Clouds*’ ode, which places all the more emphasis on the significance of the terms in which he is described: τόν τε μεγασθενῇ τριαίνης ταμίαν / γῆς τε καὶ ἄλμυρῶς θαλάσ / σης ἄγριον μοχλευτήν (‘mighty warden of the trident, who levers fiercely both the land and briny sea’, 566-68). We recall that in prohibiting Pheidippides from invoking Poseidon in connection with

⁴⁴ In a mock oracle, on which J. Henderson (ed.), *Aristophanes, Lysistrata* (Oxford 1987) 168, comments that reference is made to Zeus as guarantor of the natural order of things (and see his references).

⁴⁵ It occurs only once in Hesiod, once in Pindar (*Nem.* 2.19) and twice in Bacchylides (*Epin.* 1.2 and *Dithyr.* 15.51); not at all in tragedy. In *Nem.* 2.19 the reference is to Parnassus, in a context whose aim is to indicate the divine sanction and blessings involved in the four victories at the Pythian games gained previously by Pindar’s Athenian patrons the Timodemidai.

horses, Strepsiadēs blamed the god for all his troubles (83-85); the beginnings of the old man's impiety preceded his association with Socrates. Now, however, precisely as a result of that association and his introduction to the Clouds, another quite different and more sinister face of Poseidon comes to light. The god's trident is mentioned three times in Homer: (a) at *Odyssey* 4.500-11 the prophetic old man of the sea (like the Clouds, a shapechanger who finally tells the truth) recounts Poseidon's use of his trident to destroy Oilean Ajax for defiance of the gods; b) at *Odyssey* 5.291-94 Poseidon employs the trident to form the clouds (!) into a storm sent against Odysseus; c) at *Iliad* 12.25-33 he guides the rain and river water with his trident to destroy the Greek wall around the ships, since the latter was built without sacrifices with disregard for the gods (6-9).

In Aeschylus' *Supplikes* the trident is mentioned when Poseidon is invoked in defence of intra-familial justice for the Danaids, first at 218 in a list of four Olympian gods (Zeus, Apollo, Poseidon and Hermes) associated with the Argive altar at which the women are suppliants, and again at 755, where the plural τριαίνας occurs in metonymic reference to the common altar and the divine powers it invokes in protection of piety and justice. In Euripides' *Phoenissae* during Antigone's *teichoskopia*, when she spots Capaneus, who has boasted he will bring his Theban captive women to Lerna, the place is named as the location of Poseidon's trident (187)—significant perhaps in view of the boaster's forthcoming destruction by Zeus.

Where Creusa in Euripides' *Ion* 282 is recounting her father's sacrifice of his daughters and the consequent earthquake from Poseidon in which he was swallowed up, mention of the trident emphasises both the question of family propriety and more generally divine influence and power immediately before Creusa's concealed allusion to her rape by Apollo; but according to another tradition it was for striking down Poseidon's son Eumolpus that Erechtheus was killed with a trident blow at Macrae, where the earth received him,⁴⁶ and this is perhaps the version Euripides used for his *Erechtheus*, where in fr. 360 Erechtheus opposes Eumolpus and the worship of Poseidon on behalf of Athene (cf. τρίαῖναν ὀρθὴν στᾶσαν ἐν πόλεως βάθροις, 'the trident set up on the city's pedestal', 47). It is Erechtheus' fate, perhaps delivered by the trident, at which Athene seems angry in fr. pap. 65, where she warns Poseidon to keep the weapon away from Attica

⁴⁶ See Paus. 1.38.3, 7.1.2 and R. Graves, *The Greek Myths* 1 (Penguin 1955) 169 (§47e).

(55).⁴⁷

The convergent significance of Poseidon's trident in these contexts involves a web of ideas associating it with family disasters, divine punishment of impiety and injustice, and in Homer the marshalling of the clouds for this purpose. These associations strongly suggest, to those who recognise them, what power and moral imperatives lie behind the Clouds and what is brewing for a man who has already defied Poseidon. In Euripides' *Hippolytus*, produced to great acclaim only five years before the *Clouds*, Poseidon is also responsible for Theseus' destruction of his son on a charge of attempted incest with his step-mother, a filial impiety paralleling closely Pheidippides' offer of maternal assault. But no-one in the audience could predict more in the present case than that Strepsiades is destined for a quasi-tragic disaster of his own making from within his own household.

Scodel notes that whereas Aither is next invoked here as ἡμέτερον πατέρ' ('our father', 569), in the antode Athene in the corresponding position is ἡμετέρα θεός ('our goddess', 601); yet rather than creating a distinction, this repetition, in my view, links the two songs and establishes Aither more closely in the company of these Olympians. Recently Hubbard has followed Scodel and Fraenkel⁴⁸ in arguing that Aither and Helios are not traditional but elemental deities and that the modulation to lyric dactyls where they are named evokes the dactylic *parodos* where Socrates calls the Clouds companions of Aither (265; cf. 285). This is misleading, since 265, where the Clouds are so called, actually occurs in a passage of chanted anapaests, while in the dactylic *parodos* the sun is called ὄμμα . . . αἰθέρος ἀκάματον

⁴⁷ The word τριαίνα and its compounds occur a total of twenty-three times in extant pre-Hellenistic poetry. The use at Aesch. *PV* 925, where Prometheus is warning of coming destruction for Zeus and Poseidon as a result of Kronos' curse at replacement by his son (911-14), is complex since Prometheus himself is the one immediately punished and ultimately Zeus, reformed, will survive when Prometheus is released; the trilogy as a whole perhaps suggests that Zeus and Poseidon cannot be toppled (it is important to remember that the perception of Zeus as a tyrant in our play is Prometheus' perspective). Aristophanes uses τριαίνα twice in *Eq.*: at 559 in the *parabasis* ode, where Poseidon is invoked first as a god of horses by the chorus of cavaliers and then as sea god—he perhaps foreshadows victory over Paphlagon for old-fashioned decency, and again at 839 as a metonym for naval empire. *Pax* 570 uses the cognate verb with reference to hoeing, a sense which recurs in Eur. *Heracl.* 946 and *Bacch.* 348, while the seven Pindaric mentions of Poseidon as Ἀγλαοτρίαίνα, Εὐτρίαίνα, and Ὀρσοτρίαίνα (*Olymp.* 1.40, 1.73, 8.48; *Pyth.* 2.12; *Nem.* 4.86, frr. 52gf.1 and 52k.47) are perhaps cult names used *metri causa*.

⁴⁸ E. Fraenkel, *Beobachtungen zu Aristophanes* (Rome 1962) 196-98. The claims are repeated yet again by O'Regan [9] 76.

(‘Aither’s weariless eye’, 285), which Dover dismisses as a poetic cliché.⁴⁹ Helios, in any case, is personified as an Olympian already by Homer and, while not an Athenian cult deity, was sworn by in oaths.⁵⁰

It has been noted that the assertion of Aither’s paternity contradicts the apparent sense of 278 in the *parodos*, which refers to ‘deep-roaring father Ocean’ (πατὴρ ἀπ’ Ὀκεανοῦ βαρυαχέος) as the origin of the Clouds. But Ocean is merely the generic father of all watery things: a common ancestor; now, however, in accordance with their developing double significance as symbols of both sophistic voluble vagueness and also divine retribution, a more telling portion of the Clouds’ genealogy is revealed. As the gods of Olympus live above the clouds, so above the wet dank *aer* is the shiny divine *aither*, the clear sky.

The inclusion of Aither among traditional deities might suggest a demythologised reference to Ouranos, the ancestor of both Olympians and Titans at *Theogony* 127-210; certainly the chorus invoke him as βιοθρέμμονα πάντων (‘nurturing all life’, 570). Hesiod himself clearly distinguishes between Aither, child of Night, and Erebus, and Ouranos, the equal-born parthenogenic offspring of Gaia (*Theog.* 123-28), yet Ouranos is closely associated with Zeus’ αἰθαλόεις κεραυνός (‘blazing thunderbolt’) both as the younger god’s ancestor (501-05) and his realm (71-73), while the *Iliad* seven times situates *aither* immediately adjacent to *ouranos*.⁵¹ Yet by the early fourth century Plato’s Socrates can assert that ‘the pure earth itself lies in the pure *ouranos*, in which are the stars, and which most of those who talk about such things call the *aither*’.⁵² Euripides’ *Helen* involves a wholesale identification of Aither and Ouranos as the object of the foreign prophetess Theonoë’s cult, and the substance of the cloudy *eidolon* of Helen taken to Troy.⁵³ But that the identification is not only late is evident from the fragments of Parmenides, who extends the *aither* out to surround the heavenly

⁴⁹ Dover [2] 139 *ad loc.* and ref.

⁵⁰ *Od.* 8.271, 10.138, and on Helios in Euripides’ *Medea* see J. D. Mikalson, *Honor Thy Gods: Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy* (Chapel Hill/London 1991) 83f. Note too the association with Zeus at Aesch. *Supp.* 212f.

⁵¹ *Il.* 2.458, 8.555f., 8.558, 15.192, 16.300, 17.424f., 19.349-51. Cf. Solon fr. 13.17-24.

⁵² Pl. *Phd.* 109b7-9; similarly [Pl.] *Ax.* 366a7f.

⁵³ Eur. *Hel.* 605-07, 865-67, 1495-1500 and see Mikalson [50] 97-99, 114f., 235. This is a feature again of the image of the infant Dionysus, which Zeus presents to Hera at *Bacch.* 290-93, where *ouranos* and *aither* are further implicitly identified at 392-95 and 1082-85. See too *Ion* 1146-49, *Tro.* 1077-80, Eur. fr. 839.9-11.

bodies, then re-names what 'necessity bound to keep the limits of the stars as *ouranos*'.⁵⁴ Aeschylus in a fragment contentiously identifies both *aither* and *ouranos* (and everything else) with Zeus (fr. 105a.4f.), while the chorus of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* (865-68) derive the laws of piety from 'father Olympus alone' by way of 'ouranian Aither',⁵⁵ an apparent identification.

Aither is thus associated closely with both Zeus' power to punish impiety (his thunderbolt), and his moral authority, and certainly by the late fifth century can be identified with Ouranos, who, it will be recalled, tried to suppress his offspring and was castrated by his son Kronos. Although perhaps only on re-reading would the parallel with Strepsiades come to mind, certainly the emphasis on family relations is maintained in the *Clouds*' ode, where Aither/Ouranos is called the chorus' 'great-named father most reverend'.

Finally the chorus calls upon that astronomical charioteer the sun, whose divinity is now emphasised. The exotic term ἵππονῶμαν ('horse-handler', 571) reminds us of Strepsiades' impiety and injustice in refusing to accept the costs of so divine an activity as horsehandling (cf. 21-24, 83-85, 121-23). Furthermore, at least according to Plutarch (*Per.* 32), only ten years before the production of the first *Clouds*, the philosopher Anaxagoras had been expelled from Athens for denying the divinity of sun and moon following the decree of Diopieithes. If indeed so, the mention of Helios here suggests the kind of fate reserved for the impious character of Socrates in the play.

I turn now to the antode (595-606), again a cletic with four gods invoked. The structure and style of description parallel the ode, but the antode is addressed to *cult* gods. Thus in this case, if not in the ode, there is an expectation of public worship; accordingly society is threatened if these gods are ignored and the political ramifications of the issue are indicated. In between is the epirrhema, clearly from the original version of the play, in which the chorus leader recounts the *Clouds*' use of their meteorological

⁵⁴ Parm. fr. 10.9-15; it might seem *aither* is contained within *ouranos* but for the testimony of fr. 37.11f., which places *aither* outmost, and says the visible sky is (merely?) 'what we call *ouranos*'. See too G. S. Kirk, J. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*² (Cambridge 1983) 257-59, who say the 'theory seems to have been surprisingly influential'.

⁵⁵ The Greek is οὐρανίαν / δι' αἰθέρα τεκνωθέντες (866f.), but is metrically corrupt; see R. D. Dawe (ed.) *Sophocles, Oedipus Rex* (Cambridge 1983) 182, who suggests ταθέντες. Yet Dawe's corresponding line 876 does not itself follow the mss. The OCT prints Housman's conjecture for 866f.: οὐρανία 'ν / αἰθέρι τεκνωθέντες.

powers to reinforce traditional morality in Athenian political life. As Hubbard rightly points out, though the Clouds are not themselves traditionally worshipped, they are linked here with other gods who are and indeed send their omens by Zeus' own normal channels.⁵⁶ Furthermore, Harriott has noted here the parallels with the *Eumenides*: the Clouds' care for the land of Attica, the theme of persuasion (both by sophistic rhetoric and the chorus' addresses to the spectators), and the reversal of the Clouds' divine role, which is reminiscent of the transformation of the Furies.

The initial appeal in the antode to Delian Apollo (ἀμφί μοι αὖτε Φοῖβ' ἄναξ / Δήλιε Κυνθίαν ἔχων / ὑψικέρατα πέτρων, 'Come to me, Delian Lord Phoebus, holder of the high-horned rock of Cynthus', 595-97), while involving dithyrambic borrowing and a fragment of Pindar (fr. 325),⁵⁷ also reinforces the link with the *Eumenides*. The adjective Δήλιος⁵⁸ and immediate reference to Cynthus in connection with the origin of Apollo's name *Phoebus*, which the Clouds use, occur early in the prologue of the *Eumenides* (λιπὼν δὲ λίμνην Δηλίαν τε χοιράδα, 'leaving the pool and rocky isle of Delos', 9) in the mouth of the Pythian priestess, which encourages us to listen to the Clouds with an ear for prophecy. These associations are confirmed by the only other collocation of the name Phoebus with a reference to Delos, at Euripides' *Ion* 167 (again a scene situated at Apollo's oracle at Delphi and a threatening situation⁵⁹). Note that in the *Clouds*' antode, the connection with Delphi is reserved for Dionysus (603-06), which introduces other associations of danger. In the *Eumenides* the question is whether Orestes is to be exonerated of mother-murder. Pheidippides too will eventually threaten a similar impiety, but it is a testing question as to whether

⁵⁶ Hubbard [19] 108, referring respectively to 576-79, 584-89 (cf. 608-26), 579-83.

⁵⁷ The phrase ὑψικέρατα πέτρων may also refer to Delos at Pindar fr. 325.1. The word ὑψίκερως elsewhere only occurs in description of horned animals (a deer killed by Odysseus at *Od.* 10.158, an ox sacrificed to Athene at Bacchylides 16.22, in a hymn to Delphi, and the bull form in which the river Achelōus fights with Heracles, as related by the chorus at Soph. *Trach.* 509).

⁵⁸ In tragedy the adjective Δήλιος or its Doric form occurs elsewhere only twice in Sophocles and six times in Euripides; except for Eur. *Tro.* 89, where Poseidon significantly is planning a storm to punish the Greeks for impiety, all these are in lyric, in paeans (*OT* 154, *Ion* 167), lists of sacred abodes (*Hec.* 463), in connection with dancing (*Heracl.* 687), foredoomed invocations (*Aj.* 704, *Rhes.* 224), and an account of Apollo's life and prophetic power (*IT* 1235). In Pindar Δήλιος occurs in the refrain of a paeon (fr. 52e); elsewhere only once (*Pyth.* 9.10), where the god's amorous affairs are recounted.

⁵⁹ *Ion* threatens birds with his bow; the atmosphere of suppressed violence extends from Apollo's role in his conception to his mother's attempt to murder him later in the play.

by now anyone in the audience might have picked up on the consistent sequence of hints as to Strepsiades’ fate or just the threat of impending violence.

Apollo’s full sister, Artemis, is next invoked (598-600) by reference to her cult and temple at Ephesus. The adjective *πάγχρυσος*⁶⁰ (‘all-golden’), by which the temple is described, occurs in the epic form *παγχρύσεος* in each of the Homeric Hymns to Artemis (lines 4 and 5, respectively), in the first of her chariot (immediately before a reference to the skill in archery she shares with Apollo) and in the second of the deadly bow itself. *Πάγχρυσος* is used by Sophocles of the chariot by which Pelops killed Oenomaus and so, according to the chorus of his *Electra* (510), brought the curse on his family; again Ajax uses it of the trophies that in his madness he vows to Athene for success in slaughtering the Greek generals (*Aj.* 92); here irony makes the use ominous. Euripides uses it of the garment in which Polyxena is sacrificed (*Hec.* 528). Clearly the word can suggest the double-edged character of divine interest and mortal fate.

The epic form *παγχρύσεος* is found in Homer just once (*Il.* 2.448), where it is used of the tassels on Athene’s *aegis*, and it is with reference to the *aegis* that the chorus now turn to Athene as the local patron goddess.⁶¹ Two lines of lyric dactyls (ἦ τ’ ἐπιχώριος ἡμετέρα θεὸς / αἰγίδος ἡνίοχος, πολιοῦχος Ἀθάννα, ‘and our native goddess, driver of the *aegis*, city-keeping Athene’, 601f.) draw attention to Homer’s description of the *aegis* at *Il.* 2.446-49 with its one hundred all-golden tassels. This resplendent symbol of divine power appears immediately before the images and catalogues of the armies. At *Eu.* 397 Athene arrives directly from victory at Troy to answer Orestes’ call. She explains her use of the *aegis* for travel (404); it is thus not merely a symbol of physical might but of the ubiquity of her justice, and in particular of its presence in her own city where Strepsiades seeks to avoid paying his debts, an implication surely not lost on some in the audience.

The significance of calling Athene πολιοῦχος (‘city-keeping’) is quite

⁶⁰ In Alcman (fr. 1.1.67) the epic form describes jewellery, as at Eur. *Ion* 1427, and in *IT* 168 a libation bowl; golden sheep or fleeces in Hes. *Theog.* 335, Pind. *Pyth.* 4.68 and Eur. *Med.* 5, 480; and at Pind. *Ol.* 7.4, by hypallage, the pride of wealth possessed in marriage; it is to be restored once perhaps in Bacchylides fr. 20c.14, an uncertain context. Note that all these can suggest the divine, as source of wealth and blessings . . . but also terrible obligations.

⁶¹ Perhaps a significant association, matched in Eur. *Ion*, where prominent among the tokens connected with Athene, by which Creusa is reunited with her son, are the fringe of snakes like Athene’s *aegis* (1422) on the cloth she had wrapped him in and golden serpents (ritual jewellery given to children: *παγχρύσω γενει*, 1427).

clear; Aristophanes' *Birds* 827 shows that the criterion of a successful πολιοῦχος is the ability to keep the city 'well-disciplined' (εὐτακτος) and so law-abiding, while in Plato's *Laws* 921c the Athenian considers that anyone failing to pay his debts dishonours Zeus πολιοῦχος and Athene, and in the proposed colony would be subject to legal action. The invocation of Athene πολιοῦχος here reminds us of her role in ensuring that people like Strepsiades do not get away with their injustice.

Finally the chorus call upon Dionysus (603-06), the mention of whose wild outdoor abode on Parnassus (where *oreibasia* and perhaps *sparagmos* occurred)⁶² reinforces the connection between nature and traditional divinities in rejection of natural philosophy. In Sophocles' *Antigone*, once Creon has realised his impiety and left to release Antigone and bury Polyneices, the different local associations of Dionysus are reviewed and intermingled by the chorus, when they invoke him unsuccessfully as saviour of Thebes in a hyporchema (1115-54). In particular, *oreibasia* on Parnassus is emphasised twice in relation to the god's Theban connection within the space of 1115-45. The Delphic and Theban visages of the god are thus not so different and in that context forebode Creon's downfall.

This connection is also made in Euripides' *Phoen.* 226-38 during the *parodos* of a chorus of foreign women trapped in Thebes *en route* to Delphi as dedicated temple slaves. In an atmosphere of foreboding prior to the attack of Oedipus' renegade son Polyneices, the chorus explicitly associate Dionysus with Apollo, and Thebes with Delphi, in a description of Bacchic *oreibasia*.⁶³ Again the chorus of Euripides' *Ion* appeal to Bacchus (705-24, esp. 714-17) to prevent Xuthus and Ion unjustly acquiring Creusa's family wealth, with a similar description of Parnassian *oreibasia*. Thus the Clouds' invocation of Dionysus might well suggest a context of intra-familial injustice and potential violence. Certainly the association recalls the god's pre-eminence as a destroyer of blasphemous *theomachoi* such as Lycurgus and Pentheus.⁶⁴ The similarity to Socrates and Strepsiades at this stage is not

⁶² See E. R. Dodds (ed.), *Euripides, Bacchae*² (Oxford 1960) xii-xx and *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1951) 270-81 (Appendix I: 'Maenadism').

⁶³ I am grateful to an anonymous reader for drawing attention to this passage. See further E. Craik (ed.), *Euripides, Phoenissae* (Warminster 1988) 182.

⁶⁴ Dover [2] 176 further notes that the image of Dionysus dancing on Parnassus and the language in which it is expressed at *Clouds* 603-05 parallel closely the poetic descriptions of *oreibasia* at *Bacch.* 306-09 and in the fragment of Euripides' *Hypsipyle* at *Ran.* 1211-13. See too W. B. Stanford (ed.), *Aristophanes, Frogs* (London 1958) 174 *ad* 1211f. for further references. The community of language and imagery among these texts suggests a common cult source.

hard to recognise. In addition to highlighting their impiety and coming downfalls, it is also fitting, of course, for Aristophanes to invoke Dionysus at this point as the god of the festival, acknowledged already at the end of the *parodos* (311-13) and here reinforced with the epithet *κωμαστής* (‘reveller’, 605).

All these gods are invoked in language designed to recall their moral use of natural power and their jealous concern for mortal piety and family propriety. It is no accident, then, that it is finally only by an appeal to *filial piety* that Strepsiades actually persuades Pheidippides to go to school (861-66), an ultimate hypocrisy deserving of his eventual punishment by his own son for his own impiety.

The odes in this play’s *parabasis* send a concentrated message to the wise in the audience that the Clouds who sing them are allied with the traditional gods in the punishment of the impious and unjust among mortals, of whom Strepsiades, in planning to avoid paying his debts, is a paradigm. When this is finally made quite explicit (1458-61), the rest of the audience would no doubt have been just as surprised as some modern readers seem to be, having overlooked the artistry of Aristophanes’ moral and quasi-tragic foretelling. Yet from the *parabasis* odes and what follows the insightful spectator learns that the sophists and philosophers such as Socrates, those teachers of disbelief in the gods and how to pervert justice, are actually the unintentional instruments of divine punishment who stimulate an irruption of the evil that lies in the wrong-doer’s soul. Thus as a result of his association with such catalysts, Strepsiades quite rightly brings upon himself re-education by the meteorological agents of traditional morality.

HESIOD'S *THEOGONY*: OAK AND STONE AGAIN

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Abstract. Line 35 of the *Theogony* has exercised critics for centuries. Most scholars are divided along two interpretive lines: 1) that the phrase 'oak and stone' is proverbial and has to do with personal revelations that have no place in epic; 2) that the line structurally marks the poet's departure from the bucolic world. These theories are unsatisfactory. This article proposes that verse 35 be understood as a novel form of invitation to examine the value of the entire world.

Among the nettlesome difficulties of text and interpretation in Hesiod's *Theogony* is verse 35 (ἀλλὰ τί μοι ταῦτα περὶ δρῶν ἢ περὶ πέτρην; 'But what are these things to me around oak and stone?') to which M. L. West devotes considerable attention in his Oxford commentary on Hesiod's poem.¹ I wish to review and analyze some of the more prominent interpretations of this verse and add my own interpretation to the already considerable quantity of scholarly opinion. Another examination of the phrase may seem unpromising, given West's caution that it is best to acknowledge that the truth is lost in antiquity. But as the phrase continues to provoke comment and has been discussed in recent book-length studies of and commentaries on Hesiod, it is still worthy of consideration.

Verse 35 has modern critics divided in the main along two interpretive lines: 1) that the phrase 'oak and stone' is proverbial and has to do with personal revelations made by Hesiod in verses 1-34, revelations that have no place in the formal structure of epic poetry; 2) that the line structurally and thematically marks the poet's departure from an unsophisticated bucolic world, a world symbolized by oak and stone. I disagree with both of these claims.

The number of those critics who interpret the phrase as a proverb involving irrelevant or random speech is legion.² Munro says that the phrase means 'anything that comes to mind, at haphazard.'³ Evelyn-White

¹ M. L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 167-69.

² See West [1] 168. It is unclear how 'oak and stone' came to be applied to speech, but West believes that the origin may lie in a Near Eastern text.

³ D. B. Munro, *Homer's Iliad 13-24* (Oxford 1893) 388.

understands it as ‘why enlarge on irrelevant topics?’⁴ This explanation ramifies into others of the same sort, for example, ‘Why do I digress?’, ‘What use is this idle talk?’⁵ or ‘Why expatiate on private matters?’ This last deserves some attention.

In a note on the proem of the *Theogony*, W. J. Verdenius defends his explanation of verse 35 as meaning ‘Why expatiate on private affairs?’ with reference to Homeric epic, where ‘oak and stone’ figures twice.⁶ He says that ‘tree and rock talk is a proverbial expression for personal confidences based on the custom of enlarging on one’s descent.’⁷ The Homeric passages in question are *Iliad* 22.126f. and *Odyssey* 19.163. In the *Iliad* we are on the verge of Hector’s confrontation with Achilles:

οὐδέ τί μ’ αἰδέσεται, κτενέει δέ με γυμνὸν ἔοντα
αὐτως ὥς τε γυναῖκα, ἐπεὶ κ’ ἀπὸ τεύχεα δύω.
οὐ μὲν πως νῦν ἔστιν ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ’ ἀπὸ πέτρης
τῷ ὀαρίζεμεναι, ἃ τε παρθένος ἥθεός τε,
παρθένος ἥθεός τ’ ὀαρίζετον ἀλλήλοιιν.
βέλτερον αὖτ’ ἔριδι ξυνελαυνέμεν ὅτι τάχιστα·

(22.124-29)

Nor will he revere me, but will slay me naked like a woman, just as I am, when I put down my weapons. Nor is it possible to chat with him from oak and stone the things that a maid and a youth say to one another. Better it is to meet in strife straightaway.

In the first place, the close verbal proximity of ‘oak and stone’ and the confidences shared by young lovers is misleading. It is not so much the case (as Verdenius asserts) that lovers exchange confidences in the seclusion of oak and stone. That is to say that Hector here is providing a simile that particularly emphasizes language and not location. ‘I cannot speak to Achilles as young lovers speak to each other; no confidant he, this Achilles.’ There are two matters at hand here. The reference to young lovers provides a sharp counterpoint to the expected behavior of the hero, who is now confronted with his own cowardice. The reference to ‘oak and stone’ harks back to lines 82-103, wherein Hector receives an appeal from his mother and

⁴ H. G. Evelyn-White, *Hesiod: The Homeric Hymns and Homeric* (London 1914) 81. In conjunction with the views of Munro and Evelyn-White, see R. Hamilton, *The Architecture of Hesiodic Poetry* (Baltimore 1989) 11-14.

⁵ See West [1] 169.

⁶ W. J. Verdenius, ‘Notes on the Proem of Hesiod’s *Theogony*’, *Mnemosyne* 25 (1972) 225-60.

⁷ Verdenius [6] 241.

father to avail himself of the safety of the gates (πύλας, 99) and walls (τείχεα, 99)—‘oak and stone.’ To judge from the wider context the mention of ‘oak and stone’ has little to do with the customary haunts of young lovers. One cannot, however, deny the notion of personal confidences implicit in the mention of ‘the things which a maid and a youth say to one another.’ Although ‘oak and stone’ is used in a local sense here, the emphasis is on the impossibility of Hector having a confidential (unmartial) tête-à-tête with Achilles from his place of safety in the city.

Verdenius’ claim that ‘oak and stone’ has something to do with enlarging on one’s descent is based on Penelope’s address to her disguised husband:

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς μοι εἰπὲ τεὸν γένος, ὅπόθεν ἐσσί·
οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἐσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ’ ἀπὸ πέτρης.

(*Od.* 19.162f.)

But tell me your race, whence you are, for you are not from ancient oak or stone.

While the narrower context could support to some degree the interpretation dealing with descent, there are still difficulties with which to contend. It is clear that Penelope is alluding to descent (compare Odysseus’ response, line 166) when she bids her husband speak. Yet it seems that she refers to a descent of a specific kind. While it may have been part of ancient lore (παλαιφάτου, ‘ancient’, ‘spoken of old’, 163) that men were derived from stones or trees⁸ (and this is not fully demonstrable), Penelope may be suggesting something different if we examine once again a wider context. It could be argued that Penelope’s question suggests that Odysseus is not mute or inert like oak or stone, or has not been isolated in the country far from converse with men, and is fully capable of responding to her queries and providing her with information.⁹ Odysseus has already addressed the mistress of the house with a long introduction (19.106-22) and it must be clear to her that despite his mendicant-garb, this beggar’s mien displays an origin that is other than humble or rustic.

Verdenius’ interpretation seems to conflate two separate contexts of

⁸ παλαιφάτου (‘ancient’, ‘spoken of old’, 163) could agree with πέτρης (‘stone’, 163), but given the flow of the line it should be understood with δρυὸς (‘oak’, 163); cf. West [1] 167.

⁹ It has often been demonstrated that Homeric diction can display different layers of meaning within its apparently rigid formulaic structure. There is here, as elsewhere, a figurative as well as literal meaning to these words of Penelope.

‘oak and stone’ into a single inclusive definition. Further, his proffer of one definition based on two divergent contexts militates against a univocal and hence proverbial reading of the phrase. Verdenius is rather inventing a proverb and we would be better served in accepting οὐ . . . ἀπὸ δρυός οὐδ’ ἀπὸ πέτρης as a Homeric formula rather than a proverb whose meaning continues to elude us. As far as Hesiod is concerned, it is difficult to assert with Verdenius that Hesiod is following Homer. For one, the phrase is different in the two authors (ἀπό in Homer, περί in Hesiod). Even if the collocation of ‘oak and stone’ is proverbial, there is little agreement on what it means. At best it is a proverb ‘dont l’origine et sens exact étaient déjà incertains pour les anciens.’¹⁰

Let us now examine the interpretation of the second school, which claims that with this verse Hesiod is bidding farewell to the countryside. In the words of Hoffman, verse 35 marks Hesiod’s departure ‘aus dem abgeschiedenen böotischen Tal, um sich anderswo die notwendige Bildung als Sänger und Rhapsode zu verschaffen.’¹¹ Mazon is in agreement: ‘dans ce vers controversé, il faudrait interpréter la formule «chêne et rocher» comme l’expression de renoncement du poète à la vie bucolique.’¹² Here ‘oak and stone’ clearly countrifies Hesiod, putting him squarely within a rural setting. The theories of Mazon and others can in part be explained on a contextual basis, namely, the Muses’ reproach of the shepherd:

ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα . . .
(26f.)

Field-dwelling shepherds, evil reproaches, mere bellies,
We know how to speak many falsehoods like unto truth . . .

It has long been believed that this divine vitriol belittles the vocation of shepherd for being at the worst crude and at best unsophisticated. But the address is aimed clearly at Hesiod. The plural of the direct address should be construed no differently from the use of the editorial ‘we’ in ‘let us begin.’ Clearly, it is Hesiod who is commencing the *Theogony* just as it is clear that he, and not shepherding, is the object of Musaic vituperation in

¹⁰ P. Mazon, *Hésiode, Théogonie: Les Travaux et les jours, le bouclier* (Paris 1972) 33.

¹¹ H. Hoffman, ‘Hesiod *Theogonie* v. 35’, *Gymnasium* 78 (1971) 90-97.

¹² Mazon [10] 33.

26f.¹³

The assumption is then that the Muses disdain the rustic world symbolized by 'oak and stone' and that verse 35 marks a similar disdain in Hesiod. But such is not the case, or else how could one explain *Works and Days*, a poem later in composition than the *Theogony*?¹⁴ The vocations of poet and shepherd are not mutually exclusive. Werner Jaeger speaks of Hesiod's milieu: 'Country life was not yet synonymous with intellectual underdevelopment.'¹⁵ Indeed Hesiod responds to this rather acerbic invitation of the Muses but does not abandon the countryside. He is still the field-dwelling shepherd. What is remarkable about the claims that Hesiod is impugning the countryside in favor of becoming an epic poet is that after the question is posed in verse 35 he is still in a rustic setting. He has in effect exchanged one mountainside for another, Helicon for Olympus. Thus the line cannot mark Hesiod's disdain and subsequent abandonment of the countryside.

It may be helpful at this point to move from the interpretations of the verse to an examination of its function. However the line is interpreted, critics of both schools agree that it forms a kind of boundary. Verdenius contends that the verse marks the end of a personal digression, a departure from the customary content of epic poetry. By making personal revelations Hesiod has violated the conventions of epic. Implicit in this as well is the admission that the life of the shepherd is in itself unworthy of epic treatment. Thus Hesiod abandons the countryside for the more sophisticated world of epic poetry. Hesiod supposedly realizes that his personal conversion from shepherd to poet has no place within the epic scheme, catches himself in the midst of revealing it and hence verse 35. He then moves on to the subject of his poem.

As I have already mentioned, Mazon and Hoffman are in agreement with Verdenius on this score. Moreover, both schools assume that verse 35 is a question of contempt or rough dismissal and is condemnatory of the verses which precede it.¹⁶ But West suggests that it not be seen in this

¹³ Critics seem to have considered the Muses' declaration as a universal affirmative proposition, that is, all shepherds are base. But it is clear that the Muses address only Hesiod and find fault with him not because he is a shepherd but because he has been slow to recognize his poetic calling. Cf. lines 22-24 and 31f.

¹⁴ P. E. Easterling and B. M. W. Knox (edd.), *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature* 1 (Cambridge 1985) 94.

¹⁵ W. Jaeger, *Paideia* 1 (Oxford 1939) 59.

¹⁶ That we have repeated in verses 36f. the language and the topics of the poem's earlier verses should obviate such a notion.

light. In response to Sittl's interpretation of the verse ('But why do I reveal what I saw far from men, among rocks and trees?') West says, 'The short answer is, why not? The fact that a miracle happens in a lonely place is no reason for reticence in reporting it.'¹⁷ West's brief reply might well have been appropriately uttered by Hesiod himself.

Hesiod is indeed composing epic poetry and employing the meter of Homer. Despite the use of epic language and meter, the audience must have been aware of the novelty of Hesiod's *proemium*. It is fair to suppose that Hesiod, presenting a familiar epic device, the *proemium*, with new content, addressed this verse to his hearers with a view to explaining the novelty of his introduction. Rather than assume that Hesiod asked this question for the reasons others have offered, that is, as condemnatory and perhaps in a tone that indicated disdain of the bucolic world, let us consider the opposite. The question 'What are these things around oak and stone to me?' may very well have addressed the wonderment of an audience who was hearing poetry to which it was not fully accustomed, a new topic in old dress.¹⁸ The verse is a boundary of a kind but not the kind hitherto discussed.¹⁹ With it Hesiod defends the recitation of verses 1-34 and binds them to what follows. By dilating upon his conversion in the country, Hesiod is not simply investing the bucolic world with an importance it might not otherwise have; rather, he is giving the innate worth of country life its due poetic expression—and this is what he wishes his puzzled audience to realize.

The importance attached to the bucolic life, the workaday life of the peasant, lies in the didactic purpose to which Hesiod puts his genealogy. Far from bidding a contemptuous goodbye to the country for more sophisticated

¹⁷ West [1] 169.

¹⁸ Compare Odysseus' reaction to the songs of Demodocus in *Od.* 8.521-35. The singer could and did draw a wide range of reactions from the audience.

¹⁹ Ernst Siegmann and Kurt Von Fritz attempt to explain the verse not so much by its content as by its placement. For Siegmann, 'Zu Hesiods *Theogonie*proömium', in M. von Schröder (ed.), *Festschrift Ernst Kapp* (Hamburg 1958) 10, the line works structurally: it marks a boundary (along with verse 22) in the midst of which Hesiod places his account of his summons to be poet. Verse 35 *per se* receives no special consideration from Von Fritz, 'Das Proömium der hesiodischen *Theogonie*', in F. Beck (ed.), *Festschrift Bruno Snell* (München 1956) 12-14, who maintains that Hesiod wished to make an individual profession about his poetic calling, but since he could not fit it into the closed scheme of a *proemium* (36f.), he prefixed verses 1-35. A variation of this claim is made by W. Aly, cited in Von Fritz [19] 13 n. 20, who makes Hesiod more a footpad than a poet by stating that Hesiod was the reviser and not the author of the poem and that the poem began with verse 36 to which Hesiod affixed the first thirty-five lines.

literary terrain, Hesiod offers an epic on the Homeric model with a rural point of view whose roots are firmly planted in Greek soil—around ‘oak and stone.’ The myths of the gods, which were important for the aristocracy in terms of justifying their rule, were no less important to the peasant who found in these stories the expression of his ‘realistic and pessimistic view on life or . . . the causes of the social difficulties which oppress him.’²⁰

The Zeus of the *Theogony* is a bringer of stern justice, whether it be against the Titans for the outrages of Cronus or against mankind for the chicane of Prometheus. Zeus, the remote progenitor of earth-born rulers, oversees and dispenses a justice applicable to aristocrat and peasant alike. Just as the audience of Homeric poetry would already have been familiar with the gods Homer sang, so too would the audience of the *Theogony* have been doubtless aware of the multi-faceted father of gods and men. Zeus is not only βασιλειος²¹ (‘the king’); he is also ἔνδενδρος²² (‘the lord of the trees’). As his oracular seat at Dodona testifies, he is associated with the oak (*Od.* 14.328). Further, he is known by the epithet ἰκέσιος²³ (‘the protector of suppliants’), a function that he executes in the *Theogony* (80-93)²⁴ and in *Works and Days*. He is the remote source of justice for those who, like Hesiod, have been deprived of their rightful possessions.²⁵ Thus the functions and responsibilities of Zeus, adumbrated in the *Theogony*, span both heaven and earth, city and country, aristocrat and peasant.

There is no good reason to obelize verse 35, as some have wished to do, or to find fault with Hesiod for some imagined inaptitude or lack of attention. Let the reader/auditor, as I have suggested, think of the verse as a novel form of address, an invitation to reconsider the inherent value of the bucolic life and the wide compass of justice that embraces this life.

²⁰ Jaeger [15] 61.

²¹ F. Hiller von Gaertringen (ed.), *Inscriptiones Graecae* 1².115 (Berlin 1924).

²² F. Hiller von Gaertringen (ed.), *IG* 12(5).1027 (Berlin 1903).

²³ W. Dittenberger (ed.), *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*³ 929 (Leipzig 1915-24).

²⁴ For the various epithets of Zeus and their significance, see J. Vernant, *Myth and Society* (New York 1988) 105-07.

²⁵ The concerns of justice sketched in the *Theogony* are more fully articulated in *Works and Days*, a poem with deeper roots in the countryside and a poem which, to paraphrase Jaeger [15] 66, was not different from the *Theogony* in the poet’s mind despite the difference in subject matter.

ANTONY AS A *MILES GLoriosus* IN CICERO'S *SECOND PHILIPPIC*¹

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Abstract. A major strategy pursued by Cicero in his *Second Philippic* was to depict in the strongest possible terms Antony's *levitas* and thus his total unsuitability to succeed Caesar as master of the Roman world. Cicero accomplished this aim in devastating fashion by casting Antony in a variety of roles fashioned after the stock characters found in Roman comedy. The most pervasive, subtle, and damaging of these was the part of the *miles gloriosus*, the braggart warrior.

Cicero clearly had two major goals in composing his *Second Philippic*.² First, he wanted to defend his own person and his entire political career against Antony's caustic attacks contained in a Senate speech of September 19, 44 BC, a reply to Cicero's moderate, but damaging *First Philippic* of September 2. But more importantly, Cicero urgently desired to destroy then and for all time Antony's claim to the mantle of Caesar by demolishing his motives, methods, character, and political career.

In Cicero's view Antony did not possess the requisite leadership qualities to hold high office, to say nothing of becoming a one-man ruler on the model of Caesar. For this reason Cicero takes pains throughout the speech to demonstrate Antony's *levitas*, his shallowness and unreliability. This trait characterized his political career, but especially marked his personal life, thereby confirming his lack of the Roman quality of *gravitas*, which was considered necessary to occupy any position of power.³ We

¹ This study is an amplification of the final sections of an oral paper delivered at the November 1988 meeting of the Classical Association of the Middle West and South, Southern Section, in Gainesville, Florida, entitled 'Cicero's Comic Muse: Reflections of Comedy in Cicero's *Second Philippic*.'

² I have used throughout the text of D. R. Shackleton Bailey (ed. and tr.), *Cicero: Philippics* (Chapel Hill/London 1986).

³ See Gell. 6.11.1-2: by focusing on Antony's *levitas* Cicero degrades his claim to power. On *levitas* in Antony's personal life see Gell. 6.11.3-4. For discussion of Cicero's concepts of *levitas* and *gravitas* see J. J. Hughes, *Comedic Borrowings in Selected Orations*

therefore find the speech peppered with lively accounts of his sexual misconduct, association with the dregs of society, lavish spending, wild parties, public drunkenness, crude behavior, gambling, and blatant dishonesty. Cicero's rhetorical problem was how to organize a consistent, unified, artistic picture of Antony's personality and his *levitas*, which would be effective, recognizable, believable, sarcastic, humorous, and above all, intensely damaging. Cicero's brilliant solution, following the methodologies of Demosthenes' *De Corona*, but particularly his own masterly *Pro Caelio*, was in a coherent and consistent fashion to endow Antony with all the attributes of a stock character of comedy, in this case the *miles gloriosus*, or braggart warrior.⁴

Cicero is subtle and crafty in employing this strategy. We may look to the circumstances of the composition and publication of the *Second Philippic* for the reasons why. Ostensibly it is Cicero's immediate and direct reply in the Senate on September 19, 44 BC, to Antony's violent attack against him. In fact, Cicero, fearing for his life, had not been present at this session. It was only afterwards, probably during October, that the senior statesman meticulously and thoughtfully composed his reply, and then carefully revised it for publication after Atticus had gone over the draft (*Att.* 15.13.1; 16.11.1-3). Thus the characterization of Antony was painstakingly premeditated and the speech itself is a consummate piece of craftsmanship, long regarded as an exemplar of the political invective genre and a literary gem.

Cicero's use of comic techniques in the *Second Philippic*, a very serious speech of invective, should not surprise us.⁵ Not only was he the

of Cicero (diss. Iowa 1987) 89-91, 142-144, 149, 152, 176-178. Words of the *levitas* family occur in *Phil.* 2.63, 77 (cf. 2.53) and *gravitas* in 2.3, 7 (cf. 2.14, 24, 109).

⁴ On Demosthenes see G. O. Rowe, 'The Portrait of Aeschines in the *Oration on the Crown*,' *TAPhA* 97 (1966) 400-03, 406; 'Demosthenes' *First Philippic*: The Satiric Mode,' *TAPhA* 99 (1968) 362; W. Stroh, 'Die Nachahmung des Demosthenes in Ciceros Philippiken,' in O. Reverdin and B. Grange (edd.), *Éloquence et rhétorique chez Cicéron* (Geneva 1982) 1-40; on the *Pro Caelio* see K. A. Geffcken, *Comedy in the Pro Caelio* (Leiden 1973).

⁵ These occur in three broad areas: (1) language of comedy and theater (e.g., technical terms and words regularly used by Plautus and Terence but not normally found in Cicero's speeches); (2) narration of comic scenes (e.g., the 'affair' between Antony and Curio [2.44-46]); and (3) comic characterizations, that is, the depiction of characters in terms of stock figures from comedy. See L. Sussman, 'Antony the *Meretrix Audax*: Cicero's Novel Invective in *Philippic* 2.44-46,' *Eranos* (forthcoming).

most celebrated wit of his day, a point attacked by Antony in his speech replying to the *First Philippic*, but Cicero was also a keen student of the theory of the laughable.⁶ Furthermore, Cicero was fully aware of the effectiveness of humor in oratory, especially in a courtroom setting.⁷ We also know that Cicero was extremely interested in the theater, especially comedy, and he attended performances regularly; he had read deeply in the comic writers, whom he often quotes, and had studied voice and gesture under Roscius, the leading comic actor of his day.⁸

Cicero refined the comic methodology of the *Pro Caelio* by placing Antony into not one or even two comic *personae*, but a multiplicity of roles and in a series of comic situations, all of which are intensely amusing. In just one small section of text, for example, we can observe Cicero masterfully employing these comic techniques. This particular piece closely resembles a *paraklausithyron* and narrates Antony's trip home from Gaul, dressed in unusual clothing, to effect, among other objectives, a reconciliation with his

⁶ See his extensive analysis of humor in *De Or.* 2.216-90; also Geffcken [4] *passim*, esp. 1f., 7-9; D. F. Sutton, 'Cicero on Minor Dramatic Forms,' *SO* 59 (1984) 32 and nn. Cicero's excessive fondness for witticisms was notable; see the excellent notes of J. D. Denniston (ed.), *M. Tulli Ciceronis: In M. Antonium Orationes Philippicae Prima et Secunda* (Oxford 1926) 123f. *ad Phil.* 2.39 'locis,' 125f., also *ad* 2.42 'dicta' and ancient sources cited therein. For some samples of his humor see Macrobian *Sat.* 2.3 and Plut. *Cic.* 38.2-8; comprehensive accounts include G. Monaco, *Il trattato de ridiculis (De Oratore II, 216-290)* (Palermo 1964); A. Haury, *L'ironie et l'humeur chez Cicéron* (Leiden 1955); M. A. Grant, *The Ancient Theory of the Laughable* (Madison 1924).

⁷ See Geffcken [4] 7f. (cf. *Cic. De Or.* 2.236); F. W. Wright, *Cicero and the Theater* (Northampton 1931) vii.

⁸ The study of Wright [7] is standard and definitive; see esp. 78f. and on Roscius 16-20; cf. G. K. G. Henry, 'Roman Actors,' *University of North Carolina Studies in Philology* 16 (1919) 343-349. See also in general Geffcken [4] *passim*, esp. 7 and n. 4; J.-C. Dumont, 'Cicéron et la théâtre,' *Association Guillaume Budé: Actes du IXe Congrès (Rome 13-18 Avril 1973)* 1 (Paris 1975) 424-30; cf. A. Michel, 'Cicéron et la tragédie: les citations de poètes dans les livres II-IV des *Tusculanes*,' *Helmantica* 34 (1983) 443-54; M. Radin, 'Literary References in Cicero's Orations,' *CJ* 6 (1910-11) 209-217; E. Schollmeyer, *Quid Cicero de Poetis Romanorum Iudicaverit* (diss. Halle 1884); J. Schäfler, 'Ciceros Verhältnis zur altrömischen Komödie,' *Bayr. Gym.* 20 (1884) 285-97. For his interest in the more popular forms of drama, including mime, see R. E. Fantham, 'Mime: The Missing Link in Roman Literary History,' *CW* 82 (1989) 153-63, esp. 155f., 158f., and Sutton [6] *passim*. On Cicero's oratorical delivery (and its relationship to drama) see G. Austin (ed.), *M. Tulli Ciceronis: Pro M. Caelio Oratio*³ (Oxford 1960) 141-43, 173f. Interesting sidelights on the subject of acting and delivery are found in C. Garton, 'How Roscius Acted Ballio,' in *Personal Aspects of the Roman Theater* (Toronto 1972) 169-88.

wife Fulvia (*Phil.* 2.77f.)⁹ To strengthen his resolve for the confrontation with this stern woman (herself resembling a typical matron of comedy) and to write her a pleading letter, Antony stops and drinks heavily at a squalid tavern just outside of Rome. At sunset he takes a fast carriage to his house where he arrives in disguise with his face wrapped up in a cloak. He informs the doorkeeper that he is a courier from Antony with a message for Fulvia. Admitted inside, he craftily watches her reaction—she begins to weep—as she reads the letter in which he passionately states that he has broken off his relationship with the actress Cytheris and has transferred all his affections back to her. When Fulvia breaks into a full torrent of tears, Antony can no longer restrain himself: he reveals himself and embraces her. In this brief passage alone we find Antony in many of the *personae* and situations of comedy. He is a drunk in foolish costume, a young man in love with a *meretrix*, a repentant philandering husband, and a running slave. We find the comic ingredients of a common tavern, amatory passion, thwarted love, concealed identity, a recognition scene (*anagnorisis*) which resolves the comic complication, and a happy ending with reconciliation.¹⁰ Elsewhere in the *Second Philippic* Cicero portrays Antony as a young man in debt, an avaricious prostitute, a transvestite, a love-sick *adulescens*, a flattering sycophant, a drunk, and a cuckolded husband, all again highly reminiscent of stock characters in Roman comedy.¹¹

Mark Antony and the Role of the Miles Gloriosus

Of all the comic roles played by Antony in the *Second Philippic*, that of the *miles gloriosus* is at the same time the most important, though far less obvious than the preceding characterizations. Yet it is much more effective because of its very subtlety, its pervasiveness throughout the speech, and its accuracy. In examining this characterization, which I believe to be central to a proper understanding and interpretation of the *Second Philippic*, we need to examine three crucial points: why Cicero chose to portray Antony as a *miles gloriosus*; the reality of Antony's character; and how Cicero applied

⁹ Hughes [3] 145-63 analyzes the passage in depth as a *paraklausithyron* with some notable reversals of the genre. Cicero introduces the anecdote purposefully as an example of Antony's comic *levitas*: *at videte levitatem hominis* ('But look at the man's frivolity!', 2.77); cf. Gell. 11.4f.; Hughes [3] 131, 144, 152f., 162f.

¹⁰ See Hughes [3] 150, 152-60, 162, 170f., 176.

¹¹ Especially rich in such characterizations is the Curio episode (2.44-46); see also 2.82, 84-87, 99. On Antony's drinking see discussion below, p. 80 and nn. 99-101.

the conventional attributes of a *miles gloriosus* in Roman comedy to the historical Mark Antony.

Why Cicero Portrayed Antony as a Miles Gloriosus

In the *Second Philippic* Cicero has invited his audience to the comic theater and is following the successful methodology of the *Pro Caelio*. The latter speech was delivered on the last day of the *ludi Megalenses*, a festival in which *ludi scaenici*, dramatic presentations, were a major component of the celebrations. For this reason the topic of theatrical performances would be on the minds of the jurors and the audience. As a ploy to obtain their good will, since they had to miss the theater because of the trial, Cicero brilliantly turned these circumstances to his own tactical advantage: he simply brought the comedy which they could not attend and enjoy into the courtroom.¹² He accomplished this through a variety of devices, the most important of which was casting the major personages of the speech into the roles of stock comic characters easily recognized by the audience, and to which they would immediately react according to the stereotype: Clodia as a scheming *meretrix* (whom they would suspect and dislike), Caelius as the lovesick *adulescens* (for whom they would have sympathy and forgiveness), and Cicero as the *mitis senex*, the affable and helpful old man (whom they would respect and admire for his efforts to solve in a just fashion the comic complication).¹³ A similar process is observed in the *Second Philippic*. Its dramatic date of September 19 is the day after the conclusion of the *ludi Romani*, also noted for its component of drama, and the very day proposed by Antony for addition to the festival in honor of Julius Caesar, as indeed it later was (*Phil.* 2.110).¹⁴ The profusion of dramatic devices, characterizations, and references lends powerful support to the belief that Cicero once again followed the same pattern. Further, in at least one instance, it seems that Cicero actually visualized himself metaphorically as a playwright in composing the *Second Philippic*, when he pointedly describes in technical

¹² See Geffcken [4] 10-27; M. R. Salzman, ‘Cicero, the *Megalenses* and the Defense of Caelius,’ *AJPh* 103 (1982) 299-304, esp. 299-302.

¹³ There are also subsidiary characterizations such as Clodius as a *leno* and Appius Claudius as a *durus senex*; see Geffcken [4] *passim*, esp. 21-24, 31-47, 51.

¹⁴ See W. K. Lacey (ed. and tr.), *Cicero: Second Philippic Oration* (Warminster 1986) 238f. *ad Phil.* 2.110 ‘Date today’; Denniston [6] 169f. *ad Phil.* 2.110 ‘quartum . . . Romanorum’; Wright [7] 1; G. E. Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy* (Princeton 1952) 76, 78f.; W. Beare, *The Roman Stage* (Cambridge, Mass. 1951) 154; cf. Livy 24.43.

dramatic terms what he would have done in the aftermath of Caesar's assassination if he had written the script (2.34). Antony is of course Cicero's leading character in this speech and it appears that he enjoyed visualizing and manipulating him as an actor, perhaps because he was very closely tied to the stage. Among Antony's closest associates were actors and actresses, and of course his mistress Cytheris was one of the most notable and notorious stage ladies of her generation.¹⁵ More to the point, Cicero actually inserted Antony into several dramatic vignettes in a variety of stage roles.¹⁶ Cicero here is the playwright and director, and Antony is a mere *persona* whom he switches from role to role according to the dictates of his own script.¹⁷ The most effective and persuasive of these roles, as I hope to demonstrate, is the *miles gloriosus*, the swaggering and blustering stock figure of Roman comedy.

By projecting Antony into the world of comedy Cicero firmly establishes his *levitas*: he is a comic character and an actor playing the braggart warrior along with other similarly ridiculous roles, and therefore lacks the requisite *gravitas* and *auctoritas* to occupy high political office.¹⁸

¹⁵ On mime actors and actresses see 2.62 (Sergius and Hippias), 67. Cytheris is referred to as a *mima* or *mimula* (2.20, 58 [twice], 61, 62, 69 [twice], 77). On her acting career see Henry [8] 379; Wright [7] 14; cf. Cic. *Att.* 10.10.5; 10.16.5; *Fam.* 9.26.1-3; Servius *Ecl.* 10.

¹⁶ The Curio episode (2.44-46) and the *paraklausithyron* (2.77f.; cf. discussion above) are the most notable. To this we may add a dramatic fictitious speech (a *prosopopoeia*) which Cicero inserts in Antony's mouth (2.72), the account of Antony's speech against Dolabella, accused of adultery with his wife Antonia (2.99), but especially the Lupercal incident where Antony offers Caesar the diadem (2.84-87). Cicero treats it as an abbreviated piece of stage craft. It was planned ahead of time and 'rehearsed' by Antony (*meditatum* in 2.85 has that technical meaning; e.g., Plaut. *Mil.* 944; Cic. *De Or.* 1.147; cf. *Oxford Latin Dictionary* s.v. 'meditor' 4), and by implication, by Caesar, as a trial balloon to test the public's reception of Caesar's elevation to royal status. Both men were in unusual dress, and the dramatic offering of the diadem took place on the equivalent of a raised stage (the *rostra*). The crowd indicated displeasure when Antony offered the crown, applause when Caesar rejected it (the request for applause is a standard feature of Roman comedy; e.g., Plaut. *Asin.* 947, *Capt.* 1036, *Cist.* 787, *Rud.* 1423). Antony finally assumed the very theatrical pose of a suppliant, begging at Caesar's feet that he accept the crown (2.86). On the comic dramatic narrative anecdote *tamquam fabella* see *De Or.* 2.240f.

¹⁷ Cicero uses *persona* twice to refer to Antony: 2.53 (the cause of the civil war resided in his *persona*) and more dramatically in 2.65 (as a 'character in a farce,' *persona de mimo*). Cf. Wright [7] 100-103; Geffcken [4] 17 on a usage in *Cael.* 30.

¹⁸ Cicero uses *levitas* directly to characterize Antony in 2.63 and in 2.77 before the *paraklausithyron* scene. The standard technique of invective is, as Cicero does notably in the *Second Philippic*, first to draw attention to the speaker's own *auctoritas* and *gravitas*,

As Lacey points out, *levitas* is a characteristic of popular politicians, and so, in Cicero’s vocabulary, it is a term of abuse.¹⁹ The intermingling of the world of comedy and politics to establish Antony’s *levitas* is a crucial element of Cicero’s technique in what we may well term the comedy of invective. To make fun of an opponent has always been an important component of invective, and what better way to accomplish this than to place a living person into the *persona* of a stock comic character?²⁰ We may also identify some subsidiary motives for Cicero’s comic characterization of Antony, especially as a *miles gloriosus*. First, in his reply to the *First Philippic*, Antony had joked about Cicero’s poem *De Consulatu* and had derisively quoted *cedant arma togae* (‘Let arms yield to the gown,’ 2.20). Antony’s major successes were in the military sphere and Cicero plays constantly in the *Second Philippic* on his use of mercenary soldiers to coerce and intimidate the Senate (*Phil.* 2.6, 8, 15, 19f., 46, 100, 108, 112f.; cf.

which Cicero does especially in the first part of the speech (2.1-43) and at the very end (2.118f.). The speaker, Cicero in this case (2.43-117), also portrays in graphic terms his opponent’s *levitas*. This quality is especially associated with comedy, and to illustrate *levitas comica* Cicero quotes from Ter. *Eun.* 46-49 (*Nat. D.* 3.72); see Hughes [3] 90f. The sharp focus in the *Second Philippic* on Antony’s *levitas*, according to Hughes, is not just to demonstrate him to be *vilis* (‘worthless’) and *nullo honore dignus* (‘deserving no distinction,’ Gell. 6.11.1-6), but in a way to justify Cicero’s own actions in the summer of 44 BC which Antony had almost certainly—and accurately—characterized with the terms of *inconstantia* and *mutabilitas* when he replied to the *First Philippic*. Cicero was forced to demonstrate that Antony’s *levitas* was even more explicit than his own; see Hughes [3] 177f.; cf. 144f., esp. 88-128 *passim*, which deals extensively with the subject (see also above, nn. 3, 9).

¹⁹ See Lacey [14] 203 *ad Phil.* 2.63 ‘irresponsibility.’ He cites *Phil.* 7.4 and Z. Yavetz, *Plebs and Princeps* (London 1969) 52, 98.

²⁰ Compare the important summary of N. W. Merrill, *Cicero and Early Roman Invective* (diss. Cincinnati 1975) 151f.: ‘The large number of parallels between citations from Cicero and Plautine comedy indicates to me that stock figures and scenes from these comedies were adapted to suit the purpose of the orator indulging in invective. Comedy would be an obvious source for humor in invective. The orator could be sure that his audience would quickly recognize the stock figures and themes of comedy. To hear of a political figure or opposing lawyer accompanied by *lenones*, *scorta*, and *Graeculi* or drenched in *unguenta* and drunk would be both entertaining and repulsive to the audience. Opponents were to be stripped of their dignity and equated to comic figures.’ See also Merrill [20] 204f.; Geffcken [4] 66-70 (cf. 20); Hughes [3] 54, 166-84, esp. 175-78. Cicero was decidedly thinking about comedy during the time he was composing the *Second Philippic*; see *Att.* 16.11, which leaves the reader with the sense of Cicero’s great pride in the speech, his desire to destroy Antony through humor and comedy (note the mention of Aristophanes in 16.11.2), and his great attention to the details of composition and meaning.

2.16).²¹ The political supremacy of military men and their use of force to influence the normal conduct of civilian government were both repugnant to Cicero. Thus we find another motive in portraying such a man as a blustering soldier. In addition, as a close reading of *Philippic* 2.20 reveals, the literary slight wounded Cicero as much or more, vain as he was concerning his literary efforts. Cicero turns on Antony with a vengeance, attacking him as totally ignorant of literature. In a clever stroke, then, Cicero used a literary sword to wound his tormentor—the portrayal of Antony as a soldier of comedy, and an ignorant one, true to the conventions of that genre. Yet if, as Cicero maintains, Antony was poorly versed in literature, he certainly knew a great deal about theater, given its great popularity, his circle of acquaintances, and his attendance of performances even when it could cause public embarrassment (2.44). And Cicero must have been well aware that Antony, and everybody else for that matter, would easily recognize the clever manipulation of his character into a *miles gloriosus*.

The Reality of Antony's Character

We have seen the motivations for Cicero to portray Antony in the *Second Philippic* as a *miles gloriosus* of comedy, but how could he do so and get away with it? While Cicero, given the conventions of Roman invective, felt free to exaggerate or even at times to falsify aspects of Antony's character, where possible, he had to keep his subject recognizable.²² But Cicero was indeed fortunate: in Mark Antony he had found a very suitable subject, a man whose character and career all but begged comparison to the *miles gloriosus* of comedy. Although he was a shrewd politician, Antony was most successful as a military leader. He genuinely enjoyed command and the life of a soldier. He was intelligent, but not a scholar. His great energies after battle were often channelled into sensual pursuits and bodily pleasures: feasting, drinking, gambling, and womanizing.²³

Here then, in the reality, Antony's preferred activities and military

²¹ See Lacey [14] 162 *ad Phil.* 2.6 'An armed escort'; H. Frisch (tr. N. Haislund), *Cicero's Fight for the Republic* (Copenhagen 1946) 83f.

²² The Curio episode (2.44-46) is a singular example of fabrication or at the least a gross exaggeration. See E. G. Huzar, *Mark Antony: A Biography* (Minneapolis 1978) 24 and n. 19, 277; cf. 238f.; also Plutarch's more balanced view (*Ant.* 2.3f.) and C. B. R. Pelling, *Plutarch: Life of Antony* (Cambridge 1988) 118 *ad Ant.* 2.4-8 (his numbering) 'Antony's youth.'

²³ For a good summary see Huzar [22] 253-55.

career provided more than ample subject matter and a factual basis for the leading wit of his day to vilify and parody by cleverly identifying him in every specific with what we shall see were the conventional attributes of the braggart warrior of Roman comedy.

How Cicero Applied the Conventions of the Miles Gloriosus to Antony

The stock *miles gloriosus* figure can be traced as far back as Aristophanes, but is most familiar as the *alazon* ('boaster') of Greek New Comedy whose attributes were directly taken over into Roman comedy of the third and second centuries BC with few changes.²⁴ The character's longevity is a testimony to its popularity. The Romans found the braggart warrior of comedy especially amusing; he appears, usually as a major figure, in no less than eight plays of Plautus and once in Terence.

Two of these characterizations, one in each playwright, attract our notice because of their celebrity in antiquity and the great depth in which the *miles* is developed. Plautus' *Miles Gloriosus* is usually dated to 205 BC, a year in which the Plebeian games were given eight times, strong testimony to the play's popularity. Although he was well acquainted with Plautus, Cicero does not mention or quote the *Miles Gloriosus*; in fact, he only specifically mentions four plays of Plautus, two of which are quoted, perhaps because the playwright was less quotable than Terence, or not sufficiently urbane for his tastes.²⁵

On the other hand Cicero often refers to Terence and quotes him rather frequently; quite obviously he held this playwright in high regard. Of his plays, it appears that Cicero was especially fond of the *Eunuch* and quite probably saw it staged.²⁶ This comedy features the *miles* Thraso, his only major use of this stock character. Many critics consider the *Eunuch* his best

²⁴ D. C. Boughner, *The Braggart in Renaissance Comedy* (Minneapolis 1954) 3-5, cites the characterization of Dionysus in Aristophanes *Frogs*, 'an amorous reveler' (4) who dresses in the garb of Heracles, boasts of his military prowess, but in the pinch grovels like a coward. Boasting is a major characteristic, as Aristotle recognizes, in his definition of the general type of the *alazon* as one who pretends to qualities he does not possess or has them to a lesser degree than he claims (*Eth. Nic.* 1127a 12). On the braggart warrior in New Comedy and his reception into Roman comedy, see the comprehensive summary in Boughner [24] 5-20, an extended version of D. C. Boughner, 'The Braggart in Italian Renaissance Comedy,' *PMLA* 58 (1943) 42-48; cf. P. E. Legrand (tr. J. Loeb), *The New Greek Comedy* (London/New York 1917) 94-97.

²⁵ See esp. Wright [7] 64; cf. 61-64, 70.

²⁶ Wright [7] 65-70.

play—and his most Plautine.²⁷ Because of their popularity, their extensive characterizations of the *miles gloriosus* parts, and given Cicero's extensive reading and interest in Roman comedy, we can with a good deal of confidence assume that in casting for models of the braggart warrior he looked especially to these two plays. At any rate, they provide us with the best exemplars, and it will be profitable to discuss them briefly.

The two characterizations differ primarily in their degree of comic exaggeration. Plautus' Pyrgopolynices—even the name is comic and extravagant—is, as Boughner describes him, 'a boisterous caricature of the boorish military adventurer.'²⁸ He is a brash braggart who pompously swaggers out onstage in the first lines of the play where he leaves no doubt that his predominant qualities are an overwhelming boastfulness, especially about his military exploits, followed closely by such conceit and vanity in his appearance that he mistakenly believes all women are in love with him. The latter conviction, coupled with a certain talent for self-deception, and his innate stupidity, make it easy for others, notably in matters of love, to trick, manipulate, and humiliate this overdressed, boorish, and *nouveau riche* upstart.²⁹

Terence's *miles gloriosus* Thraso in the *Eunuch*, although he is similarly vain, boastful, and foolish, is a less rambunctious and swaggering character. He boasts not of his military feats, but rather, and to an inordinate degree, of his own clever wit. Self-deceived as to the real extent of his intellect, he prefers to appear master of the word rather than the sword, perhaps in order to gain acceptance in the upper class society of a city at peace. There is more depth to this character, and although inept in his wit, he is not a dolt like Pyrgopolynices. However he is almost as tasteless and boorish, and equally ill-prepared to court a woman. In his attempts to win over Thais, even with the extensive help of his parasite Gnatho, he reveals utter incompetence.³⁰

Cicero might very well have been looking to Demosthenes' portrayal

²⁷ Duckworth [14] 156; see also W. E. Forehand, *Terence* (Boston 1985) 71, 78f.

²⁸ Boughner [24 (1943)] 43; cf. Boughner [24 (1954)] 10. On the comic nature of the names see Duckworth [14] 349f.; cf. 345-49.

²⁹ For further analysis of Pyrgopolynices see esp. Boughner [24 (1943)] 45; cf. [24 (1954)] 10-14; also Duckworth [14] 146, 161, 314; L. Schaaf, *Der Miles Gloriosus des Plautus und sein griechisches Original* (Munich 1977) 140f., 144f., 196f., who finds a sympathetic side to him.

³⁰ See Duckworth [14] 265 (see also n. 58 and references therein). Also on the character of Thraso see Boughner [24 (1943)] 46-48; [24 (1954)] 18-20; Forehand [27] 69, 72-74, 77.

of Aeschines in *De Corona* for an oratorical precedent in representing Antony as a *miles gloriosus*. Also working in the genre of invective oratory, Demosthenes consistently portrays his opponent as a boasting *alazon* of New Comedy in a context replete with comic language, associations, and imagery.³¹ Cicero’s own oratory provides another precedent: in the *Pro Caelio* he had already in a very ironic, deft, and delightful manner depicted Clodia as a female general leading her soldiers in the sections dealing with the comic bath scene—a *miles gloriosa* (*Cael.* 61-67). Elsewhere in that speech he frequently refers to her in terms of military imagery.³²

While discussing Pyrgopolynices and Thraso as exemplars of the *miles gloriosus* in Roman comedy, we have in passing briefly touched upon the major attributes of this stock figure. Following the lead of Boughner, Duckworth and others, I have assembled these generally agreed upon standard characteristics for the sake of convenience and (I hope) logic into three groups.³³ Turning then to the text of the *Second Philippic*, let us systematically examine how Cicero molded or expressed the character of Antony under each category to mirror the comic *miles*.

1. The *miles gloriosus* is first and foremost a military officer. He is boastful and vain, primarily concerning his military exploits, but also about his wit and eloquence (although these qualities are totally absent), his foreign travel, physical beauty (which sometimes borders on the epic and divine in his own mind), and his consequent sexual attractiveness which is usually, but not necessarily always, heterosexual in nature. The *miles* appears lecherous and adulterous; yet because of his excessive conceit he is easily deceived in matters of the heart; paradoxically, he often seems ill at ease with women and acts rather submissively, especially in the presence of upper class ladies.

As we have seen, Antony was indeed a high ranking officer whose career included many accomplishments in which he could take great pride.

³¹ See Rowe [4 (1966)] 397-406.

³² See Geffcken [4] 37-41. Although not a *miles gloriosus*, Caepasius in *Pro Cluentio* has been described as an *orator gloriosus*, a species of *alazon*; see Hughes [3] 54f.

³³ The characteristics of the *miles gloriosus* are fairly evident and non-controversial. I have relied extensively in my subsequent discussion on the following and cite them here, but not further unless there is some special point to be made: Boughner [24 (1943)] 42-48; [24 (1954)] 3-20; Duckworth [14] 264f., 322; cf. 146, 161, 401 n. 20. Also R. Ribbeck, *Alazon* (Leipzig 1882) 57f.; Legrand [24] 94-97; J. A. Hanson, ‘The Glorious Military,’ in T. A. Dorey and D. R. Dudley (edd.), *Roman Drama* (New York 1965) *passim*, esp. 55, 58-59, 61, 67f., 70-72; Schaaf [29] *passim*, esp. 140f., 144f., 147f., 196f., 406f. nn. 144f.; E. Segal, *Roman Laughter*² (New York/Oxford 1987) 93-97, 123-28.

Similar to the captains of comedy, his first successes and heroic exploits took place in the East, where he proved to be from the outset of his career a courageous soldier and a promising military leader.³⁴ Cicero takes care to portray Antony as a soldier and general throughout the *Second Philippic* and does mention his victories, though grudgingly, and focuses pointedly on his excesses of cruelty.³⁵

The most salient characteristic of the *miles* is his boastfulness. The Latin word group most associated with this trait is the *glor-* family, whose derivatives occur ten times in the speech. Significantly, the first occurrence helps set the tone for the portrayal of Antony as a *miles gloriosus*, but it is the only time a word in this group may unequivocally be interpreted in the sense of simply boasting, here on Antony's part, and in what may be considered at least a partially military context.³⁶

Cicero chose an especially effective way of demonstrating Antony's boastfulness as well as his vanity by composing a *prosopopoeia* for him, a fictive and dramatically delivered speech in which an orator imagines what a given character might have said in a certain situation.³⁷ Here (*Phil.* 2.72) Cicero reproduces the imagined speech of Antony replying to Caesar, who had demanded that he settle the accounts for the home and property of

³⁴ On the eastern locale see Boughner [24 (1943)] 42 and n. 1; on Antony's early career as a soldier see Huzar [22] 26-41; on Antony's military courage and effectiveness subsequent to that and prior to the *Second Philippic* see Huzar [22] 50, 59, 61f. Cicero, not a military man, seems with good reason to be jealous of this aspect of Antony's talents; he refers to him as 'the little general' (*stratullax*): *Att.* 16.15.3; cf. J.-P. Cèbe, *La caricature et la parodie dans le monde romain antique dès origines à Juvénal* (Paris 1966) 178 and n. 5. Perhaps the *miles gloriosus* portrayal is intentionally meant to parody Antony's best quality.

³⁵ Cicero pointedly refers to his *felicitas* in command, attributing his undeniable successes to plain luck (*Phil.* 2.39, 59; cf. 2.67); on Caesar see *Phil.* 2.64. For a discussion of Cicero's views on *felicitas* see M. Gelzer (tr. P. Needham), *Caesar: Politician and Statesman* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968) 194 n. 2. For Antony as a military man see *Phil.* 2.5, 19, 20, 39, 48, 50, 55, 59-62, 70-72, 108; on his cruelty see *Phil.* 2.5, 55, 59, 71.

³⁶ In *Philippic* 2.5 Cicero is referring to Antony's *beneficium* ('kind service') to Cicero in that he refrained from killing him at Brundisium: *quem ipse victor, qui tibi, ut tute gloriari solebas, detulerat ex latronibus suis principatum, salvum esse voluisset, eum tu occideres?* ('Were you to kill the one whom the conqueror himself [i.e., Caesar], who, as you used to boast, had made you chief of his robber band [i.e., *magister equitum*], had wished to be safe?'). Eight uses of *glor-* words refer either to killing Caesar (*Phil.* 2.5, 25, 27, 32, 33, 86) or, less specifically, tyrants in general (2.114, 117), and also to Antony's attempt to kill Clodius (2.49).

³⁷ On this figure see Austin [8] 90f. *ad Cael.* 33f. with references therein; also Austin [8] 94 *ad Cael.* 35.

Pompey which Antony had bid for at auction and seized, but for which he had since refused to pay. Cicero had most memorably employed this device, but with more theatrical flavor, in the *Pro Caelio*, where he assumed successively the *personae* of Appius Claudius Caecus, Clodia’s stern and distinguished ancestor (*Cael.* 33f.), and her brother, Publius Clodius Pulcher (*Cael.* 36).³⁸ Although it is short, the *prosopopoeia* for Antony clearly demonstrates the boastful and vain aspects of Antony’s character in a very effective manner—a confession from his own lips, as it were:

‘A me C. Caesar pecuniam? Cur potius quam ego ab illo? An sine me ille vicit? At ne potuit quidem. Ego ad illum belli civilis causam attuli; ego leges perniciosas rogavi; ego arma contra consules imperatoresque populi Romani, contra senatum populumque Romanum, contra deos patrios arasque et focos, contra patriam tuli. Num sibi soli vicit? Quorum facinus est commune, cur non sit eorum praeda communis?’ Ius postulabas, sed quid ad rem? Plus ille poterat.

(*Phil.* 2.72)

‘Caesar demand money from me? Why not I from him? Did he win without me? He couldn’t. I gave him his pretext for civil war; I proposed pernicious laws; I bore arms against consuls and commanders of the Roman People, against the Senate and People of Rome, against our ancestral Gods and altars and hearths, against our country. Did he win only for himself? Why shouldn’t those who share the guilt share the loot?’ You were asking for your right, but what of that? He was the stronger.

The initial tone is blustering, swaggering, colloquial, but above all egocentric and conceited.³⁹ One notices immediately the powerfully deliberate emphasis on self in the first three short sentences: *a me, ego, sine me*. A triple anaphora of *ego* ensues, all highlighting Antony’s conceit and pride over his major role in all phases of the civil war. The third, climactic, and longest part of this figure focuses on Antony’s role in the actual fighting. The ensuing powerful parallel triple anaphora of *contra* here places into sharp relief the impious nature of civil war—a war against all and everything a good Roman considered sacred. The close juxtaposition of *ego arma* is

³⁸ In *Cael.* 37f. Cicero follows with a comparison of the two different kinds of fathers in comedy, the severe and harsh versus the kind and understanding, notably illustrated by several quotations from Roman comedy (for discussion, see Austin [8] 102 nn. *ad loc.* and Geffcken [4] 17-19, 23f.). It appears that the dramatic qualities of the *prosopopoeia* as well as the characters of Appius Claudius and P. Clodius Pulcher—a harsh father type (*senem durum*, *Cael.* 36) and a pimp—set Cicero’s mind in a comic mold.

³⁹ As Lacey [14] 211 *ad Phil.* 2.72 ‘Gaius Caesar’ notes: ‘The Latin is colloquial, much hyperbaton and many verbs omitted.’

likewise striking and underscores Antony's military role. He maintains that it was through his efforts as a general and through armed might that the war was successfully concluded. Antony is in debt and served Caesar well; he thus wants his share of the war plunder (*praeda*). In saying so, Cicero has Antony stupidly convict himself in his 'own' words as the cause of that war in both the civil and the military senses. Cicero's trenchant comment at the end means that both Antony and Caesar were thieves, thus both should in reality share the plunder. Since Caesar had more power, he got his way, and Antony fell from his good graces subsequently.⁴⁰

For all his bluster about martial courage and past glories, the *miles gloriosus* of comedy as portrayed by Plautus and Terence gives an apparent impression of cowardice, especially within the action of the play.⁴¹ On further examination, however, this is not so much unabashed timidity as it is what one might term Falstaffian discretion, where the character acts in accordance with the dictum that 'the better part of valor is discretion, in the which better part I have saved my life.'⁴² Thus the *miles* unheroically and carefully calculates in a given situation the chances of injury and death, and then acts according to his own best interests. Hanson has pointed out in the light of this definition that none of the braggart warriors in Plautus is actually shown as a coward on the stage. He argues convincingly that Thraso's command from the rear of the force attacking Thais' house is a prime example of Falstaffian leadership philosophy.⁴³ This is precisely the view that emerges in the *Second Philippic* of Antony's courage. He had, in fact, displayed valor in battle; this much Cicero had to concede, since it was well known. But similar to the captains of comedy, Cicero presents Antony as unwilling on several occasions to engage in combat, if not out of physical

⁴⁰ Also the tone of Cicero's remark *ius postulabas* ('you were asking for your right') is sarcastic and satiric; cf. Lacey [14] 35, 211 *ad Phil.* 2.72 'Or did.' We may detect here in addition the petulance of a high officer being removed from the good graces of his king/commander. Normally a *miles gloriosus* would make it a point to boast of his intimacy with his king or commander (cf. Plaut. *Mil.* 75-78, 947-52; Ter. *Eun.* 397ff.).

⁴¹ For this conventional view and discussion of individual instances see Boughner [24 (1943)] 47; [24 (1954)] 16-19; Duckworth [14] 265; Segal [33] 123, 126-128. Legrand [24] 94-97 notably omits this quality in his summation of the characteristics of the *alazon*. The most enlightening and unconventional treatment of cowardice in the *miles gloriosus* and his later successors in drama occurs in Hanson [33] 70-84.

⁴² Shakespeare, *Henry the Fourth*, Part 1, Act 5, Scene 4, 117f..

⁴³ Hanson [33] 70f. Pyrgopolynices' beating at the end of the *Miles Gloriosus* is a lecher's punishment, not a coward's, and he is being forcefully held by a group of slaves. Cf. Boughner [24 (1943)] 47; [24 (1954)] 18f.

fear, at least for utilitarian or political reasons. We may classify it as the courage of expediency versus that of the epic. A notable example regards Antony's reluctance to follow Caesar into Spain during the concluding stage of the civil war fought there.⁴⁴ Finally he did depart to join Caesar, but Antony claimed that he could not cross over the mountains to Spain from Narbo safely. Cicero unfavorably contrasts his inactivity with Dolabella's vigor (2.75). The latter somehow managed to reach Caesar, fight valiantly, and even suffer a wound. Although Cicero does not approve of Dolabella's cause, he does praise his consistency and, indirectly, his physical bravery. So also for their opponents, the sons of Pompey, who were fighting to recover their privileges and ancestral home: Why, Cicero asks, didn't Antony, who had confiscated Pompey's property, at least fight in defense of what he had stolen? Instead Antony remained in Narbo, carousing disgustingly at the home of his host, while Dolabella fought honorably at Caesar's side (2.75f.).

Cicero presents a more damaging instance of Antony's supposed cowardice in the aftermath of Caesar's assassination; here again we may well understand from a practical point of view why Antony chose to hide and protect himself during that very troubled period of confusion, rumor, and riot as Cicero could well appreciate, but not express.⁴⁵ Because of the murder and the threat he no doubt felt from the conspirators, Antony surrounded himself with a bodyguard to protect himself from a fate similar to his mentor's, something Cicero will not let the reader forget, but another action understandable and prudent in the light of the circumstances.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ *Phil.* 2.74; see Lacey [14] 213 *ad Phil.* 2.74 'Anyone': 'C is making the most of the paradox that A was courageous in battle, but was—or became—unwilling to fight unless he could see profit in it (Plut. *Ant.* 10).' Cf. *Phil.* 2.78. Cicero is saying in the quoted passage that Antony does not resemble the brave Roman soldier loyal to his commander and the republic; he is a mercenary, out for his own gain, as was the typical *miles gloriosus*. The comparison of Antony to a gladiator is very damaging: he is in fact not a real soldier, but a grotesque caricature of one.

⁴⁵ *Phil.* 2.88f. Plutarch tells us that on hearing of the assassination, Antony disguised himself as a slave and hid (*Ant.* 14.1). For a sound discussion of what Antony did immediately after Caesar's death and a listing of the ancient sources see Pelling [22] 150f. *ad Plut. Ant.* 14.1-4. Huzar [22] 80 equates Antony's actions not so much with cowardice as with discretion; cf. Huzar [22] 283 n. 49; on the previous incident in 2.75f. see Huzar [22] 67-70.

⁴⁶ Cf. 2.8, 15, 19, 46, 89, 100, 104, 108, 112f., 116, 118. Other references to fear on Antony's part occur in 2.18 (perhaps), 34, 36, 53 (implied), 71, 74, 76 (implied), 90 (only fear made Antony a *bonus*), 99, 115 (indirect), 116. Note the listing of things Antony *should* fear for his previous actions (2.115f.).

The *miles gloriosus* had an exaggerated notion of his cleverness and wit, when in fact he was inept, foolish or actually stupid. The comic writers had shrewdly observed how military men used to the army discipline of unquestioning obedience did not in their careers require or develop powers of independent thought. Accustomed to depend on their staff, they were often unable to function effectively without the constant efforts of their subordinates. So, for example, Pyrgopolynices relied on the treacherous advice of his slave, and Thraso was utterly dependent upon Gnatho.⁴⁷

Terence paints a notable portrait of Thraso in this regard; he boasts, as we have seen, not of his military exploits, but rather of his verbal repartee and general cleverness, when in fact he possessed neither.⁴⁸ Antony also emerges in Cicero's description as a man with a highly inflated opinion of his speaking ability and wit. In effect he acts the part of an *orator gloriosus*. By replying as he did to the *First Philippic*, he had entered into oratorical combat with the acknowledged champion of Roman eloquence. This motif permeates the entire speech, and is responsible for the particularly acidic nature of Cicero's response to this upstart, who, as he vividly describes, had to go into a rather unusual form of training for a period of some seventeen days to prepare for his match against Cicero.⁴⁹ The senior statesman had previously spoken well of Antony's eloquence; he had recently delivered a *praeclara . . . oratio* ('brilliant speech,' *Phil.* 1.2). But in response to Antony's scathing reply, Cicero inveighs heavily against his oratorical abilities at some length, and in some formal detail. For example, there is a very damaging technical assessment; Antony's argumentation (2.18) was totally inconsistent. His professional teacher and coach of rhetoric, though amply paid, failed to turn him into a decent speaker.⁵⁰ Antony is not *disertus* ('eloquent') and is an unworthy descendant of his similarly named

⁴⁷ See esp. Schaaf [29] 141, 144f., 147f.; cf. Legrand [24] 95.

⁴⁸ *Eun.* 412-433; cf. 1079. See Boughner [24 (1943)] 46 and nn. 33, 47; [24 (1954)] 18; Duckworth [14] 265.

⁴⁹ *Phil.* 2.42. And for recreation during this period Cicero sarcastically describes the heavy drinking of Antony, his teacher and coach of rhetoric, and their friends. Cf. Frisch [21] 132; Merrill [20] 192f.; see also below, p. 80 and nn. 99-101. Cicero describes an *orator gloriosus* in the person of Caepasius in *Pro Cluentio*, a man self-deluded concerning his oratorical abilities (*Chu.* 23; cf. 25); see also Hughes' [3] 54-58 insightful analysis. Cicero constantly mentions that Antony is an upstart for locking with him in oratorical combat (*Phil.* 2.2, 8, 11, 18, 42, 111; cf. 2.15, 16, 28, 101). Antony's speech (2.20) had some nasty things to say about Cicero's literary efforts; he must have also mentioned his oratory and this would undoubtedly have cut deeply.

⁵⁰ *Phil.* 2.8f., 43, 84, 101; cf. 2.96.

ancestor, Marcus Antonius, as an orator.⁵¹ Cicero is exaggerating. Antony was deeply interested in public speaking, but, as appears likely, more from a practical standpoint than a theoretical one. He kept in his entourage a professional teacher of rhetoric throughout the very busy and eventful 40's B.C. and prided himself upon an ability that was far from insignificant. The fact that he was indeed an effective speaker when the occasion demanded, yet not a literary and theoretical virtuoso like Cicero, may well account for the frequency and vitriol of Cicero's attacks against Antony's eloquence in the *Second Philippic*.

While Thraso had an exaggerated view of his intelligence, Pyrgopolynices was quite simply thick and dumb—as stupid as a stone.⁵² Cicero finds the latter Plautine variant also an amusing note to play throughout the *Second Philippic*, and he uses the most powerful terms at his disposal. In *stultitia* ('stupidity'), he says, Antony surpasses all; on one occasion his *stupor* ('stupidity') exceeds human dimensions: he is as dumb as a barnyard animal.⁵³ Cicero has thereby interwoven both the Terentian and Plautine versions of the foolish *miles gloriosus*. Antony possesses Thraso's exaggerated conception of his own speaking ability and Pyrgopolynices' total stupidity.

The *miles gloriosus* in the course of his service has travelled extensively, usually in the East, and is quite proud of it. He is usually portrayed as a stranger in town, a man with no roots or established home.⁵⁴ In Antony we discover one of the more well-travelled men of his age: up and down Italy, Greece, Syria, Egypt, Parthia, Gaul, and many places and islands in between. There is no direct evidence in the *Second Philippic* that he boasted of this, although one can easily imagine tall tales of strange, faraway places

⁵¹ On Antony as not a *disertus orator* see *Phil.* 2.8, 18, 101; cf. 111; as unworthy of the Antonius name, 2.42, 111; cf. 2.70. For general criticism of Antony as an orator see *Phil.* 2.2, 8f., 11, 18, 19f., 30, 42f., 86, 91, 101, 111. For a less prejudiced view of his capabilities see Plut. *Ant.* 2.4 and Pelling [22] 119f. *ad* 2.8 and G. Kennedy, 'Antony's Speech at Caesar's Funeral,' *QJS* 54 (1968) 99-108; Merrill [20] 191-94; Huzar [22] 26.

⁵² *Mil.* 235f.; cf. 1024. Schaaf [29] 141 describes him as a 'Dummkopf'; cf. Schaaf [29] 144f., 148, 407 n. 145.

⁵³ See *Phil.* 2.19, 30. Cicero refers to his *stultitia* ('stupidity') elsewhere in *Phil.* 2.8, 19; *stultus* ('stupid') in 2.23, 29; *stupor* (and related words denoting stupidity) in 2.30, 65, 80, 115. For other unflattering accounts of his intelligence see 2.11, 19f., 28, 31f., 68, 86; cf. 2.54. Stupidity occurs in his words, judgments, thoughts, and deeds; cf. Cèbe [34] 133 and nn. 11f.; G. Achard, *Pratique rhétorique et idéologique politique dans les discours "optimates" de Cicéron* (Leiden 1981) 231.

⁵⁴ For example, a *peregrinus* ('foreigner', *Eun.* 759).

told over dinner by a jovial Antony in his cups. But Cicero, who liked to stick close to Rome, seems to have found Antony's penchant for travel and his rootlessness somewhat odd—and a convenient peg for attack. Thus Cicero tells us that Antony went directly from Alexandria to Transalpine Gaul without stopping in Rome because, as Cicero says in utter amazement, he did not even own a home in the city. In this respect Antony is quite similar to the rootless *miles gloriosus* of comedy, and it helps to explain his addiction to confiscating the homes of Caesar's enemies.⁵⁵

The *miles gloriosus* is convinced of (and vain about) his physical beauty and thereby his surpassing attractiveness to women.⁵⁶ The picture that comes down to us of Antony fits precisely the ideal of masculine handsomeness in a warrior: a rugged, oval face topped by curly hair, a broad forehead, largish nose, somewhat protruding chin, and heavily muscled neck, attached to the powerful body of a man well trained in physical combat.⁵⁷ In typical fashion, Cicero rhetorically turns the tables on Antony's appearance. He does not have a powerful physique, but rather the overtrained body of a gladiator (*Phil.* 2.63). The speech, however, provides no testimony that Antony was vain about his looks. Yet he must have been very confident of his physical attractiveness because, as Cicero tells it, he successfully set himself up as an expensive homosexual prostitute (2.44). A better indication

⁵⁵ See Lacey [14] 192 *ad Phil.* 2.48 'Home': 'A's father's extravagance, and his own, had evidently left him without a house in Rome; C's play on *domus* prepares for §§ 62, 64, 103, A's seizing the homes and villas of Caesar's opponents. It is also a jibe; a senator was supposed to own substantial property to qualify.' Note how Cicero refers insultingly to Antony as an *inquilinus* ('lodger'), not a *dominus* ('master of the estate'), when he took over Varro's villa in *Phil.* 2.105. On this particular trip (in late 55 or 54 B.C.) see Huzar [22] 33.

⁵⁶ See Boughner [24 (1943)] 43-44 (esp. Pyrgopolynices; 44); cf. Boughner [24 (1954)] 11-14; also Hanson [33] 59; Schaaf [29] 141 (this claim to beauty may be pretended), 144. The two points are made repeatedly in *Mil.* and form a major motif of the play: 9-12, 55-59, 63, 68, 91, 768, 777-778, 959, 968, 997-999, 1021, 1037, 1042, 1086-1087, 1202ff, 1220ff, 1264-1265, 1320.

⁵⁷ Plut. *Ant.* 4.1; confirmed by the evidence of coins and statues: see Frisch [21] 139 and 140 n. 57; Huzar [22] 23 and 276 n. 16, (with much evidence collected); Achard [53] 227f.; Pelling [22] 123f. *ad Ant.* 4.2. Antony closely associated himself in appearance and ancestry with Hercules (*Ant.* 4.1f.). Pelling [22] 124 *ad Ant.* 4.1f. astutely observes: 'The description may be influenced by the comic *miles gloriosus*; cf. Pyrgopolynices, explaining that he is *nepos Veneris* (Plaut. *Mil.* 1265) or Stratophanes, announcing himself as Mars (Plaut. *Truc.* 515).' See below, n. 107. It is interesting to note that Hercules was a standard character in Greek comedy, especially in conjunction with Omphale; see J. Cody, 'The *Senex Amator* in Plautus' *Casina*,' *Hermes* 104 (1976) 473f.

of his self-assurance in this sphere was his string of successes with women, including Cytheris, the most beautiful courtesan and actress of her day, and Fulvia, an aristocratic lady of no small talent and wealth, whom he later married after a scandalous intrigue (2.99). Cicero implicitly and perhaps enviously recognized that Antony did indeed have great charm for women.⁵⁸

As does the *miles gloriosus*, Antony conventionally displays the traits of lust and lechery.⁵⁹ Vain about his looks and virility, the braggart soldier believes that he is sexually attractive, and acts the part boisterously and ostentatiously.⁶⁰ Antony also is ruled by his *libido*, and Cicero portrays him throughout the speech as a man seething with excess sexual desire.⁶¹ As a natural consequence of his *libido*, the warrior of comedy was always ready for adulterous affairs.⁶² Antony's love life was notably messy, even for that unsettled age. His first wife Fadia, by whom he had several children, is a shadowy figure. Since she was the daughter of a freedman, the arrangement certainly flouted convention, as Cicero takes pains to demonstrate, and there is a suggestion that the marriage may not have been strictly legal, although Antony did acknowledge the offspring. The connection is reminiscent of the common comic motif of an upper class youth having an alliance with a woman of lower social station, although given Antony's precarious financial position at the time, her family's wealth, not their class, may well have played a part in suggesting this relationship.⁶³ Antony's

⁵⁸ On Antony as a lover see J. Griffin, *Latin Poets and Roman Life* (Chapel Hill 1986) 32-47.

⁵⁹ E.g., Pyrgopolynices in Plaut. *Mil.* 988f., 1106f.; cf. 999f., 1003-1006, 1061ff., 1111ff., 1267ff. He 'itches' for Acroteleutium (1214; cf. 1253, 1385-1393). Terence's *Eunuchus* is, in keeping with the playwright's sensibilities, less sexually explicit; cf. 434f. See Boughner [24 (1943)] 43-45; Hanson [33] 58f.; Pelling [22] 35; Segal [33] 95.

⁶⁰ It may be possible to detect in this hidden concerns about impotence or lack of virility; cf. Duckworth [14] 430.

⁶¹ Cicero applies the term *libido* ('sexual appetite') to Antony five times in the *Second Philippic* (15, 45 [twice], 71, 104; cf. 115). See also on his sexuality *Phil.* 2.6, 34, 44-47, 58 (if *lenonibus* ['pimps'] is read), 70, 99, 104f. The last-cited passage is a notable spectacle of prolonged and novel debauchery in Varro's villa.

⁶² See Hanson [33] 58-60; this is an especially notable characteristic of Pyrgopolynices (*Mil.* 90, 775, 802, 924, 964ff., 1131; cf. 1390, 1398). The last act (*Mil.* 1394-1437) deals with the punishment meted out to an adulterer (here, Pyrgopolynices). See also Boughner [24 (1943)] 43-45.

⁶³ Cicero censures Antony for marrying a freedman's daughter; *Phil.* 2.3; cf. 3.17; 13.23; *Att.* 16.11.1. See Huzar [22] 25, 56; she [22] 254 later states: 'The shadowy freedwoman Fadia may have been a wife of youthful love or of social rebellion.' For a

second wife Antonia was equally unusual: she was his first cousin also.⁶⁴ She was divorced because of her adulterous liaison with the notorious rake, Dolabella (2.99). In effect Antony publicly played the cuckold when he brought up the matter before the Senate, a blocking figure between an amorous man and his more than receptive wife.⁶⁵ But before and while divorcing her, Antony, true to form, had another iron in the fire. As Cicero tells us he was already linked romantically with Fulvia, the widow of Clodius, and wife then widow of his former friend Curio. In this aspect we have Antony also playing the more familiar comic role of the *moechus* ('adulterer').⁶⁶ As if this were not enough, Cicero pointedly reminds us that, when later married to Fulvia, Antony carried on an open and scandalous affair with Cytheris, a freedwoman, mime actress, and famous beauty of her day, who nevertheless would be considered little better than a prostitute, a point underscored by Cicero.⁶⁷

Also sometimes present in the *libido* of the *miles gloriosus* is an element of homosexuality, fairly conventional in that age and, more than likely, in the military profession, although not without humorous overtones.⁶⁸ While the active partner in such a relationship would, for the most part, escape criticism, the passive member was usually singled out for

fuller discussion of this and Antony's other marriages, see E. G. Huzar, 'Mark Antony: Marriages vs. Careers,' *CJ* 81 (1985-86) 97-111.

⁶⁴ Compare the case of the *miles gloriosus* in Plaut. *Curc.*: He disputes for a girl who is actually his sister, but when he finds out her identity he bestows her on her sweetheart.

⁶⁵ *Phil.* 2.99; cf. Huzar [22] 67 and n. 10, 280 (with much additional citation); Huzar [63] 99 'Marriages'; also Denniston [6] 160 *ad Phil.* 2.99 'an improbrior . . . Dolabellam.' For the *miles gloriosus* as a blocking figure, for example, Thraso, cf. Boughner [24 (1943)] 47.

⁶⁶ As, for example, Pyrgopolynices at the end of *Mil.* (1394-1437), but he does not keep the woman; he is lucky to keep his *testes*. Lacey [14] 229 *ad Phil.* 2.99 'New match' believes that the text suggests sexual relations; Cicero implies that the liaison went all the way back to the time when Fulvia was married to Clodius (*Phil.* 2.48). See also Huzar [22] 70; Hughes [3] 142.

⁶⁷ *Phil.* 2.20, 58, 61f., 69, 77; *Att.* 10.10.5; 10.16.5; 15.22; *Fam.* 9.26.2; cf. Wright [7] 14; Hughes [3] 142f. Note also Verres' liaison (Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.78-82).

⁶⁸ Thus, Palaestrio on the bisexuality of Pyrgopolynices, see *Mil.* 1111-1113; cf. 1391f.; Boughner (24 [1943]) 44 n. 15; Hanson [33] 58f. On homosexuality among soldiers, cf. Plaut. *Pseud.* 1180f.; Quint. *Decl. Maj.* 3, and in general in Roman comedy, see Cody [57] 454-457, 461, 474f. (she deals especially with *Cas.* 451-456; cf. 733-739). On the charge of homosexuality as a *topos* of invective, see Merrill [20] 55-57.

derision and scorn.⁶⁹ Thus, while Cicero carefully inserts homosexuality into his picture of Antony's *libido*, he takes special pains to demonstrate that Antony primarily played the part of the passive partner. Cicero most notably depicts this submissive proclivity with decidedly comic overtones in the Curio episode.⁷⁰

Antony's homosexual passivity, as portrayed by Cicero, carries over into his heterosexual relationships. Huzar explains that this may be the result of his upbringing by a very domineering mother, married to rather ineffectual and incompetent husbands.⁷¹ Depicting a general and a high government official in such a passive manner would undoubtedly detract from his *gravitas* and will thus again emphasize Antony's *levitas*.⁷² This element of submissiveness seems especially incongruous in a military field commander, but exactly just such a trait is easily recognized in the behavior of the conventional *miles gloriosus*. At least in part because of his stupidity, his lack of ease with higher class people, and his overwhelming vainglorious conceit, he is easily maneuvered into a submissive role by women, slaves, flatterers, and the other lovers.⁷³ The conventional comic plot therefore usually concludes with the *miles* as the tricked fool, once proud and mighty, but now the butt

⁶⁹ See A. Richlin, *The Garden of Priapus: Sexuality and Aggression in Roman Humor* (New Haven/London 1983) 220-226 (for discussion of Cicero's attacks on Antony's sexual life see 14-16, 34, 101). See also J. P. Sullivan, *The Satyricon of Petronius* (London 1968) 234f.; T. P. Wiseman, *Catullus and his World: A Reappraisal* (Cambridge 1985) 10-14.

⁷⁰ *Phil.* 2.44-47; see Hughes [3] 129-142; Sussman [5]. On Antony's homosexuality see 2.50, and, indirectly, 2.86. Cicero identifies Antony with Helen of Troy (2.55) and Charybdis (2.67); see also the veiled suggestions in 2.34, 105.

⁷¹ Huzar [22] 21; see also H. Bengtson, *Marcus Antonius: Triumvir und Herrscher des Orients* (Munich 1977) 11-28.

⁷² Thus Cicero prefaces Antony's return to Rome and Fulvia in the *paraklausithyron* scene with a reference to his *levitas* (2.77; see above, n. 9). In the letter he announces his submission to Fulvia which earns for him the sobriquet *catamitus* from Cicero (2.77).

⁷³ Note how easily Pyrgopolynices is enticed into giving up Philocomasium; he falls for Acroteleutium *before* he even sees her through clever descriptions of her wealth, beauty, rank, and love for him (*Mil.* 951ff.). Compare Thraso and Thais' spell over him, e.g. *Eun.* 436ff., 455f., 618-628 (jealousy), 1026f., 1053; cf. 1054f., 1073-1094. On the ease with which Pyrgopolynices can be deceived see Duckworth [14] 265; cf. 274, 314; Boughner [24 (1943)] 43-45; Hanson [33] 58; Schaaf [29] 141. One can go through virtually all the *milites gloriosi* in extant Roman comedy; nearly all are tricked; cf. Boughner [24 (1954)] 15-20. Usually they are easily deceived since they have already deceived themselves, for example, Thraso (cf. Duckworth [14] 173 n. 61; Schaaf [29] 140f.; Hughes [3] 54).

of deception, brought low.⁷⁴ We can readily identify a similar complex of traits in Antony's character as presented by Cicero: his passivity and acceptance of servitude when dealing with more powerful or more talented people.⁷⁵ As in the case of the braggart warrior we find these qualities most obviously present in his relationship with a woman, his wife Fulvia: he is termed rather cleverly her catamite.⁷⁶ Even perhaps more remarkable is his utter submissiveness towards Caesar, perhaps the strong father that he never had.⁷⁷

2. The *miles gloriosus* of Roman comedy is characteristically from a poor, low class background, and suddenly becomes a millionaire through war plunder. He is a *nouveau riche* who is inordinately proud of his newly found wealth, which he spends ostentatiously and lavishly, especially on his table, thereby attracting cronies and parasites who flatter him in return for his hospitality.⁷⁸

An aristocrat, nevertheless Antony came from straitened circumstances: his father was a bankrupt. This fact no doubt rankled the young Antony, and led to the attempt to cover up his embarrassment by continuing to sit in the

⁷⁴ See, for example, the analyses of how Pyrgopolynices is tricked in Boughner [24 (1943)] 43f.; Duckworth [14] 264f.; Hanson [33] 58f., Segal [33] 125-28. On Thraso and how he is duped so that Thais ends up with Phaedria, see Boughner [24 (1943)] 47f. See also the convenient analysis and summary of plots involving the figure of the *miles gloriosus* in Boughner [24 (1954)] 10-20.

⁷⁵ At one point Cicero even portrays him in the dress of a slave messenger (*Phil.* 2.77); cf. Hughes [3] 157f.

⁷⁶ *Phil.* 2.77. The term (*catamitus*) of course raises once more the specific charges of homosexuality and effeminacy in 2.44-47. It also has the connotation of a foppishly dressed young man in Roman comedy. Hughes [3] 161f. brings up the example of the *adulescens* Menaechmus I dressed up to see his mistress; he likens himself to the appearance of *Catameitus* being swept up by the eagle (*Men.* 143-148): 'Thus, *Catameitus* also serves to describe [the] figure cut by the foppish *adulescens* as well. This being the case, Cicero is clearly passing comment upon Antony's role as a comic lover and as the expression of that *levitas* so abhorrent to the Roman nature' (Hughes [3] 162). On Fulvia's domination of Antony see Achard [53] 302f.; cf. *Phil.* 2.95, 3.10; 5.11; *Att.* 14.12.1; C. Babcock, 'The Early Career of Fulvia,' *AJPh* 86 (1965) 20f.; Huzar [22] 21, 70f., 239.

⁷⁷ *Phil.* 2.82; this leads into the Lupercal incident where Antony plays a decidedly servile role in offering Caesar the diadem (2.84-87; cf. 2.76 for more of the same toadying behavior).

⁷⁸ On the New Comedy origins of this convention see Legrand [24] 96f.; Boughner [24 (1943)] 42f.; [24 (1954)] 6.

equestrian section of the theater, barred by law to bankrupts.⁷⁹ Shortly after this, as Cicero describes it, he turned to homosexual prostitution, becoming the 'mistress' of Curio, whom he milked for money.⁸⁰

When Antony successfully bid at an auction for the home and possessions of Pompey, Cicero describes his joy over his newly found wealth in strikingly comic terms:

In eius igitur viri copias cum se subito ingurgitasset, exultabat gaudio, persona de mimo, 'modo egens, repente dives.' sed, ut est apud poetam nescio quem, 'male parta male dilabuntur.'

(*Phil.* 2.65)

Thus, plunging of a sudden into the wealth of such a man, he jubilated like a character in a farce, 'beggar one day, rich the next.' But, as some playwright has it, 'ill gotten is ill spent.'

While the first quotation refers to a mime character, the predecessor almost surely goes back to the New Comedy *miles gloriosus*, Bias, in Menander's *Kolax*, who effected a similar transition 'from rags to riches.'⁸¹ Similar to the warriors of comedy, Antony was rescued from his dire financial straits through plunder, and partially through Caesar's generosity when Antony served as his *quaestor*. Nevertheless Antony spent lavishly and soon squandered this new wealth, much as the *miles* did in comedy.⁸² In fact, Antony constantly exhausted his funds, primarily and comedically according to Cicero on sumptuous parties and entertainments, usually coarse, featuring copious amounts of food, wine, good fellowship, gambling, and sex; he

⁷⁹ *Phil.* 2.44 (in accordance with the *lex Roscia*). To sit in the designated fourteen rows when unqualified to do so was a criminal act until the time of Augustus (Suet. *Aug.* 40; cf. 14; *Jul.* 39).

⁸⁰ *Phil.* 2.44-46; further evidence of Antony's reaction to his family's lack of money, at least in Cicero's mind. We may compare how Pyrgopolynices was very eager to sell his sexual services (*Mil.* 1050f.).

⁸¹ See F. G. Allinson (ed. and tr.), *Menander: The Principal Fragments* (London/Cambridge, Mass. 1930) 386, lines 49f.; Boughner [24 (1943)] 43 and n. 5; [24 (1954)] 6. It is of interest that Bias was well noted as a very heavy drinker; Allinson [81] 395 fr. 292K-293K. In this respect he was very similar to Antony (see below, p. 80f. and nn. 99-101). The second quotation is from Naevius and may be reflected in Plaut. *Poen.* 844: *male partum male disperit* ('what is badly gotten is badly lost'); cf. A. G. Peskett (ed.), *M. Tulli Ciceronis: Oratio Philippica Secunda* (Cambridge 1913) 99 *ad Phil.* 2.65 'poetam', 'male parta.' On the newly rich soldier, Thraso, cf. Boughner [24 (1943)] 47.

⁸² *Phil.* 2.50. Compare Pyrgopolynices' wealth and propensity to spend it abundantly (*Mil.* 1062-1065; on his generosity see 938-984, 1204f.; cf. Legrand [24] 96f.). Thraso gives away a slave girl (a lavish gift) to Thais; *Eun.* 391ff; cf. 1072-1080, 1081f.

seems to have been especially extravagant during his luxurious tours through Italy.⁸³ Through this generosity and extravagance he understandably attracted an entourage of flatterers, friends, hangers-on, and parasites.⁸⁴ In case the reader misses the point that Cicero is dipping into comedy for this picture, he pointedly identifies some of these people with names taken directly from Plautus and Terence: Phormio, Gnatho, and Ballio. Especially revealing is the mention of Gnatho; he is Thraso's parasite and flatterer in the *Eunuch*.⁸⁵

3. The lower class and originally poor *miles gloriosus* chose the profession of arms not just to increase his wealth, but also to advance his social standing and thereby enter upper class society. He is accustomed to brag of his acceptance in higher circles, but in reality he was despised by those whose approval he sought because of his low origins and his coarse behavior.⁸⁶ Thus, for example, Pyrgopolynices recounts and boasts of his

⁸³ See 2.58, 101; cf. 2.61f., 106. Note the vivid descriptions of the carousing at Pompey's confiscated house (2.66-69; cf. 2.73) and at Varro's (2.104f.); cf. 2.6, 15 (Antony's drunken birthday party), 42f., 62f., 87, 101.

⁸⁴ Antony gave large and rich land grants to his teacher of rhetoric (Sextus Clodius) and to his doctor. Also sharing in his beneficence were his table companions, fellow gamblers, mime actors and actresses; *Phil.* 2.43, 101 (cf. *Phil.* 3.22). We may compare Pyrgopolynices' generosity and lavish gift giving; *Mil.* 1063f., 1067, 1302, 1304; cf. Boughner [24 (1943)] 45 and n. 21.

⁸⁵ *Phil.* 2.14f. Note the speech Gnatho gives on his station in life in *Eun.* 232-53; cf. 228f. Phormio is a parasite in Terence's play of the same name, while Ballio is a pimp in Plautus' *Pseudolus*. It is clear that Cicero wants us to understand them as parasites (2.15). Cicero makes constant reference to hangers-on, parasites, and flatterers in Antony's entourage (2.8 [cf. 106], 42f., 101 [*compransoribus tuis et conlusoribus*]) and to a rhetor (cf. 2.8, 42, 43, 84) and a doctor (2.101), on which as a comic type see Rowe [4 (1966)] 400. Many of these were low-life characters; see the discussion below, p. 80. On Antony and his flatterers see Pelling [22] 35 and n. 109 (where he identifies a New Comedy influence); cf. Pelling [22] 124f. *ad* Plut. *Ant.* 4.4 'A.'s camaraderie,' 181-83 *ad* 24.9-12 'Antony's simplicity'; here Pelling [22] 182 notes: 'A.'s susceptibility to flattery again (cf. 4.2n) recalls the comic *miles gloriosus*, but P.'s analysis introduces deeper elements: A.'s warmth, his readiness to admit error, his willingness to take a joke, the flatterer's touch of frankness.' See also Hughes [3] 80 and n. 21, 87 on *sycophanta* in comedy; on the close relationship between the braggart and the flatterer/parasite see Schaaf [29] 146 n., 407. The banquets where all convened were notable sites for drunkenness and lechery (cf. Merrill [20] 59f.), both closely associated with Antony's character and the comic components of it.

⁸⁶ See Legrand [24] 97; Boughner [24 (1943)] 42f., 45, 47f., 51.

intimacy with King Seleucus,⁸⁷ and seeks to inflate his social standing at Ephesus especially by bragging about his money (*Mil.* 1063f.). The *miles gloriosus* surrounds himself with low class and disreputable companions, people with whom he can be comfortable, since they come from the same background. He lacks knowledge of manners and the social conventions; he does not know how to dress properly, lacks honesty, and may drink excessively.

Cicero attempts to mold Antony into a close facsimile of this low class upstart, although his aristocratic background and distinguished ancestors present an obvious problem which he must try to circumvent. Cicero therefore brings the matter up somewhat indirectly in the very beginning of the speech when he mentions Antony's first marriage, to Fadia. Since she is the daughter of a freedman, Antony is the son-in-law of an ex-slave, and his children by her are the grandchildren and descendants of slaves.⁸⁸ The nobility of Antony's own blood ancestors of course cannot be ignored, but it can be subverted. Cicero constantly parades his illustrious grandfather, Marcus Antonius, before Antony as the proper example to emulate in his oratorical and political career, which of course he fails to do.⁸⁹ By implication, Antony prefers to follow the lead of his incompetent father (also named Marcus), his ne'er-do-well stepfather, and his debauched, weak, venal uncle, Gaius Antonius Hybrida.⁹⁰ Antony's father and succeeding stepfather were both poor financial managers and bankrupts. Thus, aside from his grandfather and his mother Julia,⁹¹ his family predecessors are a suspect

⁸⁷ *Mil.* 75-78, 947-952; cf. *Ter. Eun.* 397ff; Legrand [24] 97. There is a reversal in the *Second Philippic* where Antony falls out of Caesar's favor (71-74); cf. 2.78 and above, n. 40.

⁸⁸ *Phil.* 2.3; cf. 3.17, 13.23; *Att.* 16.11.1; cf. Huzar [22] 25; Huzar [63] 97 'Marriages.'

⁸⁹ *Phil.* 2.42, 70, 111; cf. Huzar [22] 13-15.

⁹⁰ On the father see Huzar [22] 15f.; on the stepfather, P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura (a corrupt man, expelled from the Senate in 70 B.C.), see *Phil.* 2.14 (note how Cicero glosses over the latter's career); cf. 2.56, 70, 98, 99. The uncle, C. Antonius Hybrida, Cicero's shady colleague in the consulship of 63 B.C., was exiled for misconduct as governor of the province of Macedonia; cf. Huzar [22] 16f. Both of the latter were involved with Catiline, see Huzar [22] 15-18. See also in general on Antony's ancestors and family Bengtson [71] 11-20.

⁹¹ Cicero in general treats her deferentially (*Phil.* 2.49, 58; 3.17; 8.1). Note the tone of *Phil.* 3.17, where Antony is pictured as habitually boasting (*gloriari* again) of his maternal lineage. This gifted, capable, strong, and politically astute woman was a Julian and third cousin of Caesar's; see Huzar [22] 12, 20f.; Huzar [63] 97, 99.

bunch: corrupt, ineffective, and dissolute.

An incident symptomatic of Antony's desire for respectability among the upper classes occurred during a luxurious procession through Italy. On this occasion, he compelled those who came to meet it and pay their respects to address his mime-actress mistress, a former slave, with the more dignified Roman name of Volumnia.⁹² This parade was a marvel of ostentation, inappropriateness, coarseness, and poor taste so typical of a *miles gloriosus*, and vigorously denounced by Cicero.⁹³

At least for a significant period, Antony did not own a home in Rome because of his lack of money; Cicero's disparaging remarks about it may hint at his sensitivity on this issue, something which almost automatically would exclude him from upper class society and entertaining.⁹⁴ Thus, at the first opportunity, he greedily seized the impressive villas of such aristocrats as Piso (2.62), Pompey (2.65-69), and Varro (2.103-105). But living in an aristocratic home did not mean behaving in an upper class manner. As Cicero is careful to relate, in each of these dwellings Antony and his crew conducted themselves disgracefully in constant banqueting, carousing, and sexual free play (2.68f., 104f.).

The Plautine *miles* shows some concern for cutting a dashing sartorial figure; he is generally dressed in the full regalia of a soldier (tunic, cloak, sword, and travelling hat), while his full head of hair is ornately curled and pomaded.⁹⁵ As an ostentatious means of calling attention to himself, Antony appears in dandified or totally inappropriate dress four times in this speech (2.44, 76f., 86). We have no direct references to him in a military uniform, although Cicero does identify Antony as a soldier or gladiator on a number of occasions; Cicero may be content to omit the obvious here.⁹⁶

⁹² *Phil.* 2.58. The occasion obviously called for solemnity. The name probably came from her status as a freed slave of P. Volumnius Eutrapelus.

⁹³ *Phil.* 2.57f.; cf. 2.62, 101. See Lacey [14] 200f. *ad Phil.* 2.58 'Ride.' Lacey [14] 200 calls attention to 'paradoxical and inappropriate exhibitionism' and also the description's satirical content: 'A himself is absurd—a people's champion in a war-chariot, a lieutenant with a general's escort.' (Thus Antony is pictured posturing as a triumphant general—a *miles gloriosus* if ever there was one.)

⁹⁴ *Phil.* 2.48. See the discussion above, p. 70.

⁹⁵ Dress: the *chlamys*, *machaera* and *petasus*; *Pseud.* 735; also *Mil.* 1423, *Amph.* 143-45; cf. Duckworth [14] 90. On his hair see esp. *Mil.* 768, 923f.; cf. *Mil.* 64 and Hanson [33] 58.

⁹⁶ Antony is built like a gladiator (2.63; cf. 2.74, 3.18). One particular reference to Antony stands out: Cicero describes him as entering the city at the head of an armed column, swords at the ready (2.108). Antony must have been dressed in full military gear; so also

Nevertheless, Antony was a dandy. On his return to Rome, and even while campaigning for office previously in Gaul, he preferred the more stylish and comfortable Gallic footwear and cloak (later adopted as a standard military garment), as opposed to the conventional dress he should normally wear as a high Roman official, the toga and red shoes of senators who had held curule office.⁹⁷

As we have seen in other contexts, Cicero likes to dwell on Antony's boorish and crude conduct. This runs the full gamut from a lack of personal civility and manners in quoting publicly a personal letter from Cicero (2.7-9) to, when suffering from a monumental hangover, vomiting all over the tribunal in the forum while conducting state business (2.63; cf. 2.76). But grossest of all are the disgusting, low class excesses committed during the occupation of Varro's villa. Cicero describes a protracted carouse notable for its drinking, gambling, vomiting, sexual excess and perversion (2.104-105), and seems to be illustrating in his description of Antony the dictum of Menander, 'There can be no such thing as a well-behaved (*kompsoi*) soldier, even if a god were to mold him.'⁹⁸ Cicero may also be paying back the man who in his reply to the *First Philippic* set himself up as the elder statesman's *emendator et corrector* (2.43). There are numerous other examples of crude behavior, but the most vivid of all for the light it sheds on his lack of social graces is his atrocious treatment of his wife Antonia and

for the triumphal procession in 2.57f.; cf. also the references to Antony as a military man above, n. 35.

⁹⁷ *Phil.* 2.76. Cicero contrasts Antony's unconventional foreign dress (mentioned twice here) to his own regular attire. See the exhaustive discussion of the new dress in Denniston [6] 142 *ad Phil.* 2.76 'nullis nec Gallicis nec lacerna.' Hughes [3] 155f. believes that Antony's barbarian dress is comic (cf. Plaut *Curc.* 288-94). In the following section (2.77), where Antony dresses as a slave messenger (a *tabellarius*; cf. Plut. *Ant.* 10.4f.), Cicero refers to him as Fulvia's *catamitus*, thus reinforcing the impression that he was a dandy. Of course in *Phil.* 2.44 we have the ultimate in dandy attire: he dressed in the clothes of a female prostitute. Antony apparently liked to dress up in various garbs: as Hercules (Plut. *Ant.* 4.2), in Athens as Dionysus (*Ant.* 24. 3f.), and as a gymnasiarch (*Ant.* 33.4); cf. Pelling [22] 208f. *ad Plut. Ant.* 33.6. Slave attire was especially preferred, though (*Ant.* 5.4, 10.4f., 14.1, 29.1f.). Cicero portrays him totally without clothing (or really, nearly so) in the Lupercal incident (*Phil.* 2.86; cf. 2.111, 3.12). On improper dress as a *topos* of invective, see Merrill [20] 85ff.

⁹⁸ Fr. 732K in Allinson [81] 528; cf. Legrand [24] 94. Legrand [24] 94f. follows with a list describing instances of bad behavior (*Hec.* 85ff; *Eun.* 456f., 737, 771ff.; *Bacch.* 42ff., 603, 842ff.; *Truc.* 613ff.). See also Boughner [24 (1943)] 45 (on Pyrgopolynices) and [24 (1943)] 47 (on Thraso; see esp. *Eun.* 740-42); cf. Cèbe [34] 137-38; Achard [53] 227f. On bad behavior in the New Comedy *alazon*, see Legrand [24] 94f.; Boughner [24 (1943)] 42f.

his relatives both by blood and marriage during the divorce.⁹⁹

Antony's boorishness extended to his drinking habits: his consumption was legendary and record-breaking and necessitated writing a public defense against the charge.¹⁰⁰ Only one *miles gloriosus* in extant Roman comedy appears to be a heavy drinker; thus Cicero's very frequent and sarcastic references to Antony's notable propensity for wine may owe more to the truth or the tradition of invective, drunkenness as a *topos* rather than the conventions of the comic braggart warrior.¹⁰¹

Nevertheless, this excess, its after-effects, its occurrence at lavish parties with disreputable companions, are all seemingly transferred from the comic stage as we have seen in the selection mentioned above (2.104f.). Antony's cronies are, from Cicero's point of view, the dregs of society. He identifies them by association and on one occasion by name (2.15) with the low-lives who inhabit the world of comedy, if not actors and actresses themselves (2.67)—all in situations strongly reminiscent of comedy. As a *miles* Antony is carefully shown to have more than his share of parasites and sycophants at his table; likewise inhabiting this comic coterie are gamblers, a doctor, drunkards, celebrating slaves, pimps, whores, thieves, Greeks, an actress-mistress, and other unsavory characters.¹⁰² Cicero also places

⁹⁹ *Phil.* 2.99. Other instances of crude behavior include wild parties (2.15, 66-69, 104f.), disrespectful treatment of his mother and Fulvia during his affair with Cytheris (2.57, 58, 69), shameful lack of activity on behalf of his uncle (2.56; cf. 2.70, 98f.), sitting in a forbidden section of the theater (2.44), stepping forward as the sole bidder for Pompey's villa and property (2.64f.), his disgusting activities in that villa (2.65-69), drinking in a disreputable tavern (2.77), his insolence and arrogance (2.84), and his bloodthirstiness (2.55, 71).

¹⁰⁰ Note the humorous anecdote in Plin. *Nat.* 14.147f. where Antony's wine-drinking record is finally broken by Cicero's son, who thereby gained a measure of revenge over the man responsible for his father's death; see Frisch [21] 83 and n. 93. On *de ebrietate sua* see Plin. *Nat.* 14.148; cf. R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford 1939) 277 and n. 3.

¹⁰¹ Therapontigonus in Plaut. *Curc.* (cf. 354, 359f.). However, in New Comedy we find the *alazon* Bias (*Kolax*) who is an epic toper; cf. Men. fr. 292K-293K in Allinson [81] 394. Legrand [24] 96 n. 7 cites as parallels Epinicus fr. 2 and Damoxenus fr. 2; cf. Boughner [24 (1943)] 43 n. 4. Cicero frequently mentions Antony's drinking (*Phil.* 2.6, 30, 42, 62f., 67, 68 [if *vi[n]olentus* is read], 75, 84, 101, 104-06). On drunkenness as a *topos* of invective, see Merrill [20] 3, 23, 59f. and n. 1, 93, 107ff., 111, 117-119, 122, 147.

¹⁰² Gamblers, 2.56, 67, 100; a doctor, 2.101 (cf. above, n. 84); drunkards, 2.42, 67, 104-07; slaves, 2.67, 91; pimps, 2.58 (if we accept *lenonibus*; note that Ballio is the name of a *leno*; see 2.15); whores, 2.69, 105; thieves, 2.62, 87 (cf. Cèbe [34] 137); Greeks (Hippias and Laco), 2.62f., 106 (Cytheris' nationality is not known; as actress-mistress see

Antony and his fellow revellers in locales which, if not immediately disreputable and comic, such as the low class tavern outside of Rome (2.77), are made so by their disgusting activities (2.65-69, 103-05).

As a result at least in part due to his own pressing poverty, Antony displays one other vulgar trait found so often in the *miles gloriosus*, an all-pervasive dishonesty, especially in the area of finances.¹⁰³ Cicero pillories Antony for his general stealing and looting, including the theft of land, villas, money, statues, and paintings: he acts the part of a plundering soldier, or worse, an insatiable common bandit.¹⁰⁴ But more reprehensible from Cicero’s point of view was Antony’s shameless forgery of Caesar’s will and papers to enrich himself directly or through bribes, while also employing them to consolidate his political supremacy.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, both before and after Caesar’s death, he was constantly involved in illegal and dishonest attempts to suborn the legal and political processes.¹⁰⁶ On a more individual level he was deceitful in his personal and political relationships with Dolabella (2.79) and with Caesar. Cicero mentions an assassination plot against his mentor which Antony refused to join, but did not report, as well as one which Antony himself contrived and only narrowly failed to execute (2.34f., 74). His romantic scene of reconciliation with Fulvia may well have been a device to obtain money from her and rescue himself from some pressing debts, as Cicero suggests (2.77f.).

The convergence of Antony’s well-known character, his career, and the standard conventions of the comic *miles gloriosus* provided too good an

above, n. 15). We also see parasites and flatterers (2.15, 42f., 101). On these characters in general see Wright [7] 25; Duckworth [14] 314; Cèbe [34] 137; Merrill [20] 122ff.

¹⁰³ The dishonesty of the *miles gloriosus* is most evident in his propensity to exaggerate wildly; from there it is easy to falsify facts; cf. Boughner [24 (1943)] 44; Schaaf [29] 140 and n. 144, 406f. See, for example, how Pyrgopolynices lies about his wealth (*Mil.* 90, 1063f., 1066). Note the way in which Pyrgopolynices plays a deceptive game to win over the girl through her mother and finally steals her (*Mil.* 104-13). See also Thesprio (in effect acting the part of a *miles*) in *Epid.* 10f.

¹⁰⁴ *Phil.* 2.62. Land was stolen from the state and given to his cronies (2.43, 101), in addition to the occurrence of more generalized theft (2.6, 35, 43, 50, 71). The villas of Pompey (which he tried to get free even though he bid on it at auction) and Varro were plundered (2.66-69, 103f.). Caesar’s statues and paintings, although bequeathed to the people, were carried off for Antony’s personal use (2.109). He forced wealthy people who did not even know him personally to name him in their wills (2.40-42).

¹⁰⁵ *Phil.* 2.35f., 97f., 100; cf. 2.8, 43, 103, 109, 111.

¹⁰⁶ *Phil.* 2.3, 6, 51f.; cf. 2.56, 80f., 82-84, 88, 92, 93-96, 99, 109, 111, 115.

opportunity for Cicero to pass up. Furthermore, Antony was himself fond of the stage, and sought out the company of stage people. Casting him in the *persona* of a braggart warrior was thus an extremely clever method of insulting and attacking Antony, one which he would immediately recognize as easily as the intended audience of the *Second Philippic*. The characterization was congenial to Cicero, a man who we have already seen was deeply versed in Roman comedy, the theater in general, and the theory of humor. Given all these factors, plus the propinquity of a drama festival to the dramatic date, one which Antony himself wanted to add to that celebration, and the opportunity to turn the tables on Antony by casting him as a comic figure on that very day, it is small wonder that Cicero invested his opponent with the comic *persona* of a braggart warrior throughout the *Second Philippic*. Independent confirmation of this may be detected in Plutarch's life of Antony.¹⁰⁷

In caricaturing Antony as a *miles gloriosus*, Cicero demonstrated the *levitas* of his opponent in terms which were vivid, persuasive, and unforgettably humorous. Cicero thereby found it easier to submerge Antony's serious purposes and activities, especially after the Ides of March, and to stain his entire political career as a rabble-rousing lackey for the likes of

¹⁰⁷ Plutarch seems to have been largely unacquainted with Latin literature, thus it is unlikely that he would have been familiar with the characterizations of the *miles gloriosus* in Plautus or Terence (cf. Pelling [22] 6). He did know his historical sources and in particular the *Second Philippic*, which he used and adapted to suit his own needs for the *Antony* and other lives (Pelling [22] 26f., 33f.; cf. 29, 30, 32). And in the introduction and commentary to his edition on a number of crucial occasions, Pelling [22] 35 detects Plutarch's manipulation of Antony's character into that of a *miles gloriosus*, although naturally in a greater depth than that of the comic stereotype: '[Plutarch] often borrows characteristics from familiar stereotypes. . . . In New Comedy the *miles gloriosus* is boastful, lecherous, extravagant, and gullible: so is A., though again he is distinctly deeper.' Antony's self-identification with Hercules may be compared with the comic braggadocio of Pyrgopolynices as the son of Venus or Stratophanes as Mars (*Mil.* 1265; *Truc.* 515; Pelling [22] 124 *ad* Plut. *Ant.* 4.2). Antony's passivity, straightforwardness and licentious tastes, and how his flattering drinking partners defeat his wits are described in terms reminiscent of the *miles gloriosus*. But especially noted in direct terms of similarity to the stock figure is his susceptibility to flattery (Pelling [22] 181f. *ad* Plut. *Ant.* 24.9-13). In Plutarch's description of Antony's boastfulness, excesses, jocularly, love affairs, and licentiousness, Pelling [22] 125 *ad* Plut. *Ant.* 4.4 also points to borrowing from the comic *miles gloriosus*. With this additional evidence and with the knowledge that Plutarch was using the *Second Philippic* as a source, it is hard to come to any other conclusion than that his representation of Antony as a *miles gloriosus* is a direct result, consciously or subconsciously, of his close reliance on Cicero's similar portrait and especially the more coarse and Plautine elements which would not have found favor in Greek New Comedy.

Clodius and Caesar. This characterization notably placed into sharper focus the admittedly disordered and rambunctious personal world of Antony.

Roman political invective was always scurrilous and scathing, but consisted of predictable and conventional commonplaces reduced to handbook form.¹⁰⁸ It was not usually taken seriously.¹⁰⁹ To avoid this while startling and amusing his audience, Cicero perfected the brilliant strategy of placing his adversary as a stock character in the world of Roman comedy. While planning the *Second Philippic*, Cicero must have pondered the smashing success of the method that he first employed in the *Pro Caelio* and adapted it to fit Antony, an especially suitable target who invited characterization as a *miles gloriosus*. To emphasize the comic aspect of Antony's character, he shrewdly crafted him into a number of comic *personae* of stock characters, of which he sustained the braggart warrior as a dominant motif throughout the speech, not only providing a structure of artistic unity, but adding a large measure of plausibility to his charge of *levitas*. Though subtle, this caricature of Antony as a *miles gloriosus* helped immeasurably to turn Antony then and for all time into the object of the most scathing, novel, ingenious, and as we can now identify, literary ridicule found in classical oratory. It was a depiction for which Cicero would pay dearly a year later.

¹⁰⁸ Merrill's valuable dissertation gathers and analyzes the evidence. The *topoi* of invective include most of the characteristics accorded to the stock *miles gloriosus*; yet as Merrill [20] 204 notes, these commonplaces are themselves indebted to comedy: 'Roman comedy was the ultimate source of many of the particulars included in these *topoi*. Orators quite probably exploited the parallels with comedy to their fullest extent. Effective ridicule could be wrought by linking one's enemies to known comic characters and scenes.' Furthermore, the dramatic imagery prevalent in the speech makes the case for the intentional depiction of Antony as a *miles gloriosus* all the stronger, but one must not forget the convergences with the conventions of invective which in this case are very close. See also on the invective of the late Republic, Syme [100] 149-152, 211, 276f.; R. Nisbet, *In Pisonem* (Oxford 1961) 192-97.

¹⁰⁹ See Syme [100] 151f.

CLAUDIUS' EDICT ON SICK SLAVES

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Abstract. Claudius' edict on sick slaves has so far been interpreted in diverse ways. It has variously been regarded as the first step in the humanisation of slavery, as evidence for the ever-increasing role of the *princeps*, or as a calculated measure for the maintenance of public order. This article attempts to prove that the aim of Claudius' legal reform was a judicious mixture of the above elements.

In his life of Claudius, Suetonius mentions what appears to be an edict (*Claud.* 25.2) of the year A.D. 47,¹ proclaiming that sick and weak slaves marooned by their owners on the Island of Aesculapius in the Tiber should gain their freedom. Furthermore, the charge against those masters who did away with their sick slaves would be murder:

Cum quidam aegra et adfecta mancipia in insulam Aesculapii taedio medendi exponerent, omnes qui exponerentur liberos esse sanxit, nec redire in dicionem domini, si convaluissent; quod si quis necare quem mallet quam exponere, caedis crimine teneri.

(Suet. *Claud.* 25.2)

When certain men were exposing their sick and worn-out slaves on the island of Aesculapius because of the trouble of treating them, he declared that all who were exposed became free, nor were they to revert to the master's control if they recovered. But if anyone wished to kill rather than expose, he would be liable to the charge of murder.

This legal reform has variously been seen as the first step in the humanisation of slavery,² as evidence for the ever-increasing role of the *princeps*,³ or as a calculated measure for the preservation of public order.⁴

¹ The dating is derived from Dio 60.29.7.

² E.g., M. Fasciato, 'Note sur l'affranchissement des esclaves abandonnés dans l'île d'Esculape', *RD* 27 (1949) 454; J. Vogt, 'Wege zur Menschlichkeit in der antiken Sklaverei' in *Studien zur antiken Sklaverei und ihrer Erforschung* (Wiesbaden 1965) 81; V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius* (Cambridge, Mass. 1940) 42f.; B. Levick, *Claudius: The Corruption of Power* (London 1990) 124f.

³ T. Wiedemann (ed.), *Greek and Roman Slavery* (London 1981) 184 no. 203.

It was probably a judicious mixture of these various elements. Only a thorough consideration of all the available factors can help us to evaluate more clearly what Claudius' intentions really were.

As the Aesculapian island is specifically named by the edict, its role in Roman medicine, particularly in relation to slaves, has to be looked at. The cult of the Greek healing-god Asklepios was transferred to Rome in 291 B.C. after repeated plague epidemics in 295 and 293 (Liv. 10.47), and installed in a temple on the Tiber island on a site chosen by the sacred serpent sent to Rome from Epidauros (Ov. *Met.* 15.622-744).⁵ For centuries thereafter a type of medico-religious healing *à la grecque* came to be dispensed there by the priests of the cult. At first this 'temple-medicine', which was a combination of some medical treatment with a large dose of faith-healing, probably did not gain much ground against the far more sober and prosaic traditional Roman customs and the general mistrust of all things Greek.⁶ The eventual penetration of Hellenistic ideas, which brought with it the practice of the rational Hippocratic school of Greek medicine, could not give the Aesculapian therapy a fresh impetus, as the latter appealed only to a certain stratum of Roman society.

The impact of Hellenisation, and with it the interest in scientific medicine, was limited mainly to the upper classes, while the attraction of the Aesculapian cult was largely confined to slaves, freedmen and *peregrini*, many of whom originated from the East. They were more inclined to be drawn to such superstitions and were also dependent upon the seemingly *gratis* treatment on the island. The quality of this treatment is not known, but it was probably inferior to that offered by the Greek physicians settled in Rome; it may, however, have been quite effective by reason of fostering the hope of a cure in susceptible patients.⁷ Another cultic-religious aspect needs to be mentioned here: alongside Faunus, to whom the island had originally been consecrated, and the god Aesculapius, there existed also a shrine of Ve(d)iouis: [AESC]V]LAPIO VEDIOVI IN INSULA ('To

⁴ G. Schmitt and V. Rödel, 'Die kranken Sklaven auf der Tiberinsel nach dem Edikt des Claudius', *MHJ* 9 (1974) *passim*; H. Bellen, 'Antike Staatsräson', *Gymnasium* 89 (1982) 465.

⁵ For a detailed description see C. Kerényi, *Asklepios: Archetypal Image of the Physician's Existence* (London 1959) 3-17.

⁶ Schmitt and Rödel [4] 108.

⁷ One is inclined to perceive here the possible beginnings of psychosomatic medicine; cf. O. Hiltbrunner, 'Die ältesten Krankenhäuser', *Hippocrates* 39 (1968) 502, quoted in Schmitt and Rödel [4] 111.

Aesculapius Vediovis on the island'.⁸ Without going into details regarding the actual nature and any other properties of this rarely attested deity, one may call attention to his attribute as the grantor of asylum and protector of slaves.⁹ It is feasible that this additional cult-quality of the island confirmed Claudius in his decision to impart freedom to abandoned slaves, but Kerényi probably exaggerates the importance of Veiovis when he imputes to him the principal role of liberator in the context of Claudius' edict.¹⁰

While Suetonius does not specify what legal form Claudius' decision actually took, Dio talks of the enactment of a law (61.29.7) and the jurist Modestinus (*Dig.* 40.8.2) of an edict, as does Justinian in A.D. 531 (*Cod. Iust.* 7.6.3-3a).¹¹ Dio writes:

Ἐπειδὴ τε πολλοὶ δούλους ἀρρωστοῦντας οὐδεμιᾶς θεραπείας ἡξίουσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἐξέβαλλον, ἐνομοθέτησε πάντας τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου περιγενομένους ἐλευθέρους εἶναι.

(61.29.7)

Since many masters refused to care for their slaves when sick and even drove them out of their houses, he *enacted a law* that all slaves who survived such treatment should be free.¹²

Modestinus' wording is similar:

Servo, quem pro derelicto dominus ob gravem infirmitatem habuit, *ex edicto divi Claudii* competit libertas.

(*Dig.* 40.8.2.; my emphasis)

The servant who is abandoned by his master because of grave infirmity earns his freedom *by the edict of the divine Claudius*.

In the far more detailed law of Justinian the terminology is also *ex edicto divi Claudii*, but then Suetonius is not known for the precision of his language, rather for enumerating interesting details. This may account for the fact that, while neither the *Digest* of Modestinus nor the *Code* of Justinian mentions the role played by the Tiber island, Suetonius' account,

⁸ *Fasti Praenestini*, 1 January: *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* 1² 231.

⁹ *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* 15.2 s. v. 'VEIOVIS 600-610'; G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (repr. München 1971) 236ff.; K. Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte* (München 1967) 81-83.

¹⁰ Kerényi [5] 113f.

¹¹ Quoted in Schmitt and Rödel [4] 111.

¹² Tr. E. Cary, *Dio's Roman History* 7 (London/Cambridge, Mass. 1961).

closest in time and with his penchant for *minutiae*, does so unambiguously.¹³ While hitherto the law for the emancipation of slaves had been based on manumission by the owner, in the present case liberty is won by the master's action of *exponere*, which does not come under the three classic manumission forms of *manumissio vindicta, censu, testamento*.¹⁴

Exponere is the *terminus technicus* for the exposure of children¹⁵, which allows for the possibility of later recovering them, but the legal consequences of such an act are not analogous with those of the Claudian edict, which precludes the retrieval of the abandoned slave by the owner. *Derelictio* would probably be the corresponding legal equivalent; in such an instance the owner would have intentionally to relinquish possession and ownership of his property, in this instance the slave. A witting termination of possession is to be perceived in the action of a master abandoning him on the Tiber isle, in the sanctuary of a god, so that the slave would henceforth be, so to speak, out of his grasp. At the same time it also means the renunciation of the master's right, as by his action he explicitly declares his unwillingness to further the slave's recuperation or to lay claim to any future services by him.

The conscious detachment of the slave from the control of the owner gains expression in *taedio medendi*. This makes it evident that what seemed at first glance to be merely a motive, actually renders the abandonment *derelictio*. The master gives up the slave with the declared purpose of getting rid of him. The interpretation gleaned from Suetonius, which equates *exponere* with *derelinquere*, is also confirmed by the legal sources. The third century Modestinus and the sixth century Justinian¹⁶ both define the act of setting out a sick slave as *derelictio*. It has to be taken into consideration, however, that the dereliction did not make the slave a free person *sui iuris*; his status as a slave remained unchanged. Among the first century jurists it remained a moot point whether the slave thus became a *servus sine*

¹³ Pace A. Watson, who in his *Roman Slave Law* (Baltimore/London 1987) 122 claims that nothing in the text of Suetonius shows that the edict was restricted to exposure there.

¹⁴ M. Kaser, *Das römische Privatrecht* (München 1971) 294f.

¹⁵ RE 2.2 2588f.; J. E. Boswell, 'Expositio and Oblatio: The Abandonment of Children and the Ancient and Medieval Family', *AHR* 89 (1984) 14f.; *The Kindness of Strangers: the Abandonment of Children in Western Europe from Late Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Harmondsworth 1991) *passim*.

¹⁶ Dig. 40.8.2 and Cod. Iust. 7.6.1.3, quoted in Schmitt and Rödel [4] 113.

domino,¹⁷ or whether the earlier master retained ownership until a third person assumed possession of the said slave. The first interpretation remained the preponderant one until the third century and serves as a basis for the Suetonian formulation of *nec redire in dicionem domini*, as a return presupposes the cessation of the master's authority.¹⁸ According to Claudius' instructions, however, the slaves specified in the edict should be free, not become *sine domino*, and most modern scholars of Roman law and history are now of the opinion that abandoned slaves, once recovered, did, indeed, acquire Latin status.¹⁹

In order to avoid the abovementioned contradiction with the nature of the dereliction, Volterra²⁰ proposes a solution whereby *exponere* is not regarded as *derelictio*, but as a particular type of manumission. Since the classic forms of manumission do not permit of such an explanation, he traces the freedom of the sick slaves back to the Greek temple-emancipation rites, claiming that these were being performed in the temple of Aesculapius and that Claudius, by his edict, gave recognition to this practice.²¹ Because there were sufficient forms of emancipation built into Roman law, this notion seems rather fanciful, particularly considering Claudius' predilection for old Roman customs.

As there must have been a specific motive for the mention of the island in connection with the emancipation of sick slaves, this has to be looked for elsewhere. One that has been put forward by Schmitt and Rödel, as well as by Bellen,²² is the principle of *utilitas publica*. According to this explanation, it was the increasing number of settings-out and the consequent encroachment on public order that gave rise to the need for legal reform. The popularity of the Tiber island among the lower stratum of Roman society

¹⁷ The position of a *servus sine domino* was precarious: he could be seized by anyone and lacked the protection that a master would normally vouchsafe; see Kaser [14] 285 n. 14.

¹⁸ Fasciato [2] 460.

¹⁹ E.g., A. Watson [13] 122. Levick [2] 124f., 130 cites as an authority on Claudius' legislation an article by G. Poma, 'Provvedimenti legislativi e attività censoria di Claudio verso gli schiavi e i liberti', *RSA* 12 (1982) 143-74. This certainly seems to be the implication of Justinian Codex 7.6.1.3.

²⁰ E. Volterra, 'Intorno a un editto dell'imperatore Claudio', *Rendiconti delle sedute dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei* (1956) 209.

²¹ But see A. Phillipsborn, 'L'abandon des esclaves malades au temps de l'empereur Claude et au temps de Justinien', *RD* 4 (1950) 403, who claims that Claudius, who shared the disdain of aristocratic Roman society for the superstitious practices on the island, set out to discourage them by his edict.

²² Schmitt and Rödel [4] 116f.; Bellen [4] 465.

must have induced more and more slave owners to choose (at least the temporary) abandonment of their sick and incapacitated slaves, rather than assuming the double burden of looking after and providing for an unproductive person. Taking into consideration the large number of slaves in Rome²³ and the possibility of an epidemic, as postulated by Fratto,²⁴ one can imagine conditions on the island and the potentially explosive situation if such a practice continued unchecked. Although the number of sick slaves on the island at any given time must remain a matter for speculation, the size of the isle itself must have been a strictly limiting factor. Its dimensions are given by Besnier as 270 metres x 70 metres maximum, although these may have been slightly more in antiquity.²⁵ The irrevocable loss of a slave who, if fully recovered, could still be taken back and put to work, would undoubtedly have discouraged many owners wanting to disencumber themselves of people temporarily unfit for work.

Claudius was following in the footsteps of Augustus by invoking—albeit tacitly—the principle of *utilitas publica*, but in a more positive manner. The interference of the state in slave-owners' rights was an innovation introduced by the latter with the promulgation of the *lex Fufia Caninia* and the *lex Aelia Sentia*, imposing severe restrictions upon the freedom of individual masters in liberating their slaves.²⁶ In both instances the *utilitas singulorum* was subordinated to the *utilitas publica*, as was the case with the Claudian edict. In that sense one has to agree with those scholars who regard it as a calculated measure for the preservation of public order and/or as evidence for the ever-increasing role of the *princeps*.²⁷ On another level, however, it must not be forgotten that the edict was introduced in A.D. 47 during the censorship of Claudius and, according to ancient Roman law, it was the censor's task to avenge and punish the groundless ill-treatment or killing of slaves (Dio 20.13).²⁸ In his dual role of *princeps* and censor this function

²³ F. G. Maier, 'Römische Bevölkerungsgeschichte und Inschriftenstatistik', *Historia* 2 (1953) 336 cites the number as being between 127,000 and 500,000. Tacitus remarks (under A.D. 24) upon the ratio of the freeborn to slave population shifting alarmingly to the detriment of the former (*Ann.* 4.27.2).

²⁴ F. Fratto, 'L'editto di Claudio sulla libertà degli schiavi', *AAN* 81 (1970) 176, quoted in Schmitt and Rödel [4] 116.

²⁵ M. Besnier, *L'île Tibérine dans l'Antiquité* (Paris 1902) 3, 10, quoted in Schmitt and Rödel [4] 117; cf. Kerényi [5] 3f.

²⁶ Kaser [14] 297.

²⁷ See above, pp. 84f.

²⁸ Cf. Kaser [14] 114.

came even more to the fore. We know from Seneca that by his time, under the influence of Stoic philosophy, a certain degree of *humanitas*²⁹ had insinuated itself into the general socio-ethical view as a result of which slaves were given the opportunity to appeal to a higher official by reason of their masters' *saevitia* ('cruelty'), *libido* ('lust') and *avaritia* ('greed', *Ben.* 3.22.3). Bellen informs us that this official was none other than the town prefect, the representative of the *princeps*,³⁰ and it became more and more customary for slaves wanting to avail themselves of this right of appeal to seek refuge near a statue of the *princeps*, thereby publicly proclaiming from whom they ultimately expected help (*Clem.* 1.18.2).

The second part of the edict refers to the killing of a sick slave, but by commission, not omission. It is not clear whether the threat of criminal proceedings was limited to those masters who chose this method rather than the one of setting-out, or whether it was intended to be a more general measure, covering all killings of sick slaves. The fact remains that in either instance it is hard to perceive other than humanitarian motives, as the abuse of the master's right over the life and death of his slave could hardly be seen as an infringement of public order.³¹ While Claudius' real intentions have to remain the subject of speculation, it can be proposed that, seeing himself as the spiritual successor of Augustus, he used his *auctoritas* to take into his *cura* all those in need of it.³²

²⁹ According to F. Beckmann, *Humanitas: Ursprung und Idee* (Münster 1952) 7, *humanitas* is an aristocratic notion *par excellence*, an expression of nobility (quoted in J. Hellegouarc'h, *Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la république* [Paris 1963] 270 n. 7). In the article on 'Humanitas' in *RE* Suppl. 5, col. 302-304 no.1, I. Heinemann insists that the notion of *humanitas* is understood by Cicero 'als eine ständische [Idee], die freilich dem Adel eine hohe innere Überlegenheit gibt'.

³⁰ Bellen [4] 464.

³¹ Schmitt and Rödel [4] 124 are very doubtful that the edict was issued with any humanitarian motive in mind, but freely admit that its effect turned out to be beneficial to slaves.

³² Cf. J. Béranger, *Recherches sur l'aspect idéologique du Principat* (Basel 1953) 114-131, 186-217.

RATIO STUDIORUM IN JUVENAL'S SATIRE 7.1 AND CICERO'S PRO ARCHIA 1.1

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Abstract. Juvenal, *Satire* 7.1 has been subjected to various types of scrutiny. Since the phrase *spes et ratio* seems only to occur in Cicero and Juvenal, it appears that Juvenal has taken the words from Cicero's defense of the poet Archias to point out the ironies of patronage and gratitude in both periods.

The opening line of Juvenal's seventh satire (*et spes et ratio studiorum in Caesare tantum*, 'both the hope and the practice of [literary] studies depend only on Caesar') has been subjected to varying amounts of scrutiny. Several scholars have labored to discover the specific identity of the unnamed Caesar.¹ Others have looked more closely at the meaning of the phrase *et spes et ratio*.² In 1962 W. S. Anderson suggested that this line provided a glimpse of 'the rational, hopeful satirist,' whose attitude 'especially through the words *spes et ratio* provides the dominant mood in Book 3.'³ 'His theme,' Anderson said, 'will be *spes et ratio*, the motto of the new Caesar's reign.'⁴ Several years later M. Coffey, cited in agreement by D. S. Wiesen, determined that it was 'perhaps better . . . to regard the opening line as the expression of a remote . . . hope.'⁵ In 1973 R. S. Kilpatrick stated bluntly that 'the opening is not a real dedication at all,' but a 'clear statement of theme combined with a careful and tactful exclusion of the emperor from the ranks of those he is going to attack: wealthy patrons.'⁶

Unnoticed by all critics, however, is some telling evidence in this first line that supports Kilpatrick's conclusion in part about the satire's theme.

¹ For a brief history of this question and the arguments for and against Domitian or Hadrian as Caesar, see N. Rudd, *Lines of Enquiry* (New York 1976) 84-90.

² G. B. Townend, 'The Literary Substrata to Juvenal's Satires,' *JRS* 63 (1973) 149.

³ W. S. Anderson, 'The Program of Juvenal's Later Books,' *CP* 57 (1962) 154f.

⁴ Anderson [3] 154.

⁵ M. Coffey, 'Juvenal. Report for the Years 1941-1961,' *Lustrum* 8 (1963) 208; D. S. Wiesen, 'Juvenal and the Intellectuals,' *Hermes* 101 (1973) 468 n. 3.

⁶ R. S. Kilpatrick, 'Juvenal's "Patchwork" Satires: 4 and 7,' *YCS* 23 (1973) 236.

This is the phrase *ratio studiorum*, which among the classical Latin authors seems to appear only in Cicero and Juvenal. In the *Pro Archia Poeta*, Cicero labored in the absence of Archias' more prominent patrons, the Luculli, to establish Archias' citizenship. He extended an umbrella of protection over his former teacher, and seems to have won the case with relative ease. At the end of the second sentence of the speech, Cicero declared: *hunc video principem et ad suscipiendam et ad ingrediendam rationem horum studiorum exstitisse* ('this man [Archias] was the first to have come forth [and equipped me] to undertake and engage in the practice of these studies.')

The irony of this situation and the point of the phrase were not lost on Juvenal. Archias never rewarded his surrogate patron Cicero with the long-hoped for *oeuvre* honoring Cicero's consulship (*Att.* 1.16.17). Juvenal recognized in the decades separating his and Cicero's own generation that, although the emperor had emerged as the single most powerful patron and had taken the place of the many patrons who were active during the Republic, the fundamental relationship between literary patronage, gratitude and the creation of a superior work of art hadn't changed, because human nature hadn't changed.

Neither the multivocal world of the Republic nor the univocal world of the Empire could insure that the *ratio studiorum* of the truly talented man of letters would be suitably acknowledged or properly engaged by patron or client. For the system of *officium* and *beneficium* did not always work justly. *Fidimus eloquio? Ciceroni nemo ducentos nunc dedit nummos nisi fulserit anulus ingens* ('Trust in eloquence do we?' [asks Juvenal] 'No one now would give 200 cents to Cicero, unless a huge ring were glittering [on his hand],'⁷ 7.139f.).

Thus, Juvenal is, as Wiesen noted about Juvenal's technique in general, 'up to his old trick of puncturing his serious assertion with ridicule and irony.'⁷ On one level, Juvenal is wondering how much hope he can, or should, have when a patron such as Cicero was ill-served by a client such as Archias that his own *ratio studiorum* will be sufficiently valued, especially when his would-be patrons despite their wealth are very probably ignorant and ignoble. On another level, Juvenal has used the image of the consul Cicero, whose status can be roughly equated with that of any emperor after Domitian, Hadrian included, to tell us that figures of the highest authority can demand and yet never obtain the type of immortality that the great artist

⁷ Wiesen [5] 471. For information on patronage in Juvenal's time see P. White, 'Amicitia and the Profession of Poetry in Early Imperial Rome,' *JRS* 68 (1978) 74-92.

can confer on his subject. Therein lies the final irony: in this uneasy and uncertain symbiosis between patron and client, the only guarantee is that neither one can do without the other.

UNIVERSITY OF NATAL INAUGURAL ADDRESS

The following is an edited version of the inaugural address that was delivered in Pietermaritzburg on 3 June 1992 by Professor Zola Packman, who was appointed to the Chair of Classics, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg in 1990.

UNDESIRABLE COMPANY: THE CATEGORISATION OF WOMEN IN ROMAN LAW

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Abstract. Women appear in several sections of the *Corpus Juris Civilis* in a sometimes bewildering array of persons disqualified from performing certain legal acts. These passages are compiled and compared and reasons, expressed and implied, are offered for their inclusion. It is suggested that the inclusion of women is the result of gains in women's civil competence unaccompanied by improvements in their political position.

As will become apparent to those who are engaged with the study of women's history or of law, I have come to the topic of my address not from a study of these disciplines but from the practice of classical philology. Philologists among you and others engaged with the study of texts of any sort will recognise the following exercise as a single segment of the daily process of trying to tease sense out of texts, sometimes texts which, if they were not designed to elicit this activity, might have been designed to frustrate it.

The texts that are read, studied, and taught in a department of Classics come from a period of over a thousand years, in two quite different languages, all far removed from us in time and space. Classicists keep on working at them because they find much in them that seems relevant to their personal and social interests, even at this long remove. There is also much in them that is strange to Classicists, because of their distance from them. Much of their effort is directed toward trying to explain to themselves, one other, and their students just those features of the ancient text that are not immediately apprehensible on the basis of shared humanity and comparable cultural experience. In the effort Classicists depend on the close reading of texts, collation of comparable material, and whatever knowledge they have been able to gain of the social, political, and material conditions of the ancient world. In what follows, I offer a small example of the kind of work that constantly engages Classicists. It begins with a text that attracted my attention because of the

appearance of women in it, and held that attention for some time because I found it difficult to grasp the implications of this appearance.

This exercise has its origins in classroom experience. The class in question was one of American undergraduates doing a semester's special topic in Classical Civilisation on the texts of Roman law. The pertinent experience developed when it was discovered during the course of a reading of Justinian's *Institutes* that the persons disqualified under classical Roman law from bringing suit on behalf of another person were soldiers, women, and persons marked by infamy. By no means am I an expert in ancient or modern law, but since I do have a great deal of experience in the reading of ancient Greek and Roman texts, I was surprised to find these three sorts of persons stacked, as it were, in the same slot. So I did what I usually do when I don't know how to account for a passage in a set work. I asked my students what they made of it. This was a good question, if a good question is one that students respond to: twenty young people put their noses down, their hands up, and all began speaking at once. It soon emerged that there were, as there often are in the reading of texts by a mixed group, two rather different points of view on this passage. Some of my students wondered why women should be classified with soldiers and persons marked by infamy (as of course I did myself). A different set of students wondered why soldiers should be classified with women and persons marked by infamy. My students found no satisfactory answer to either of these questions. The standard modern commentaries on Roman law (produced by persons not of the same gender as some my students and not of the same age as the others) offered no solution. My class left the matter at that, it being part of the reading of texts to identify what one cannot account for. But I have busied myself at odd moments since with trying to sort it out on my own. I will take this opportunity to try and bring the results of these efforts together.

Tracing my own steps in pursuing this question, I will describe other passages in the texts of Roman law where women are named among other kinds of persons as members of a designated category. I will summarise the reasons adduced within those texts for the inclusion of women and for the inclusion of the other persons with them. And I will offer my own suggestions as to the rhetorical and historical processes that produced these classifications. The texts I refer to are known collectively as the *Corpus Juris Civilis*, commonly known as the *Body of Civil Law*, the great sixth-century compilation of Roman law which comes down to us under the name of Justinian, the emperor under whose direction it was composed. The parts of the *Corpus* are the *Institutes*, an introductory survey of Roman civil law for the edification of students; the *Digest*, a massive collection of classical jurisprudence on points of civil law; and the *Codex*, an assemblage of imperial legislation including civil, criminal, and religious enactments.

Having searched the *Corpus Juris Civilis* for places where women stand with other designated persons in texts of the law, I have found just six such texts in addition to the one I began with: another in the *Institutes* and five in the *Digest*. The persons named in each passage vary in number from three to eight. In

ascending order of elaboration, they are: in one passage, women, slaves and children (*Dig.* 46.1.3); in another, women, soldiers, ambassadors, magistrates, and the chronically ill (3.3.54); in a third passage, women are grouped with senators, convicted criminals, veterans, and soldiers (49.14.18); in a fourth, with children, slaves, persons deaf or mute, those under guardianship due to intellectual or emotional disability, and persons marked with infamy (*Inst. Iust.* 2.10.6); a fifth set of persons consists of women, children, soldiers, magistrates, the infamous, and persons convicted of malicious prosecution (*Dig.* 48.2.8-10); a sixth, the most elaborate, consists of women, children, the deaf or mute, the blind, catamites, convicts, those convicted of malicious prosecution, those who hire themselves out to fight wild animals for show—and persons marked with infamy (*Dig.* 3.1.1.5f.).

The first and most obvious point to be made about all these assemblages is perhaps that they don't so much reduce the difficulty of interpreting the *Institutes* passage I began with as expand upon it. The full list of persons named in the seven relevant passages reads like nothing so much as a Roman satirist's depiction of the urban mob: magistrates and convicts, senators and slaves, ambassadors and wild-beast fighters, all mixed up with women, children, soldiers, the deaf, the blind; this indiscriminate assembly, which would have horrified the ancient moralist, is difficult to account for in the texts of Roman law. All the same, there are several other points that can be made about these seemingly ill-assorted groupings in these texts. First, the association of women with soldiers and the infamous is not peculiar to the passage with which I began. In all examples but one, women appear alongside persons of one or the other sort; in two out of seven examples, both soldiers and the infamous are present. Moreover, these are, along with children, the persons named in the largest number of these sets (four out of the seven in each case). Several other sorts of persons appear in only two of the passages (slaves, the deaf, convicts, magistrates) and even more make only one appearance each (senators, ambassadors, the blind, the chronically ill, the intellectually or emotionally disabled, catamites, and those who hire themselves out to fight wild animals for show). In addition, there appears to be an order of precedence among persons named, and some form of association among subsets of them. Women appear at the top of the list on five out of seven occasions. Where children appear, they are named alongside women in three out of four cases; where slaves appear, they stand alongside women and children in both cases. The infamous, by contrast, go to the back of the queue, where they are joined on occasion by a variety of other, as it appears, undesirables, whom I take to represent special cases of the infamous rather than quite separate categories of persons. Where magistrates and other dignitaries appear, they do so after women and children but before the infamous; this is the case also with the physically or emotionally disabled. Only soldiers appear to have no very well-defined place in this procession: they appear once at the top of the list, once at the bottom, and twice in between. Where they appear in between, it is alongside magistrates and dignitaries, and it may be that they belong to this cluster, as servants (albeit relatively humble servants) of the

state.

With reference to the circumstances under which these groups and individuals appear together, it is noteworthy that in every case the persons named are stated to be ineligible to take a specified legal action and that the legal actions which they are barred from taking are in some sense actions on behalf of another person. In four texts, including the one with which this study began, the persons named are forbidden to conduct a prosecution on behalf of another individual (two cases), or in a criminal case, or on behalf of the state (one case each). In one text each, they are forbidden to conduct the defence of another individual, to act as witnesses to a will, or to offer surety for another person's obligations. Bad actors (the infamous and their companions) turn up in noticeably greater numbers among those forbidden to bring a prosecution than in other places, suggesting that the state was concerned to protect honest citizens from having to defend themselves against known malefactors. But aside from that, the lists of persons disqualified from taking action differ much among themselves, even those excluded from bringing various sorts of prosecutions, where one would expect a high degree of consistency.

There are two passages, one from the *Institutes*, another from the *Digest*, which refer to persons who may not bring suit on behalf of other individuals. A comparison of the lists in those two passages is suggestive. For example, children are named along with women in one case, but not in the other. It does not seem possible that this represents a genuine difference of opinion on the question of whether a child might conduct a prosecution on behalf of another person. More likely, the writer does not aim at the kind of comprehensiveness that a modern reader would expect in this kind of a text. Slaves are not named in either text; it does not seem possible that slaves would have been entitled to conduct prosecutions on behalf of others: the writer simply does not find it necessary to name every possible member of the set. Similarly, soldiers appear in the relevant text from the *Institutes* but not in that from the *Digest*, while the deaf and blind are present in the *Digest*, but not in the *Institutes*. It is very doubtful that these discrepancies represent any change in the understanding of the law. It is rather likely that, just as not every possible member of a cluster must be recorded, so also not every possible cluster in the group must be represented. These lists are not comprehensive but representative; it is not out of the question that the appearance of a specific person in one list implies that that person is covered also by prohibitions appearing elsewhere. So much can be made of the groups of persons among which women are named in the texts of Roman law by simply considering the persons listed in the context in which they appear. It does not go far toward establishing why the itemised persons or implied groups (and particularly why women) are disqualified from taking legal action on behalf of other persons. For this it is possible to turn in the first place back to the texts. Five out of seven furnish some form of explanation for the inclusion of some or all persons named in them.

It deserves to be mentioned at the outset that the very presence of such explanation marks the texts as problematic from the point of view of the compilers.

The *Digest* is a collection of excerpts from the classical Roman jurists and the classical Roman jurists seem to have been very little disposed to explain how the law makes sense. Their job, as they saw it, was merely to state what the law was and how it applied. But these excerpts as published in the *Digest* had the effect of imperial legislation and the Justinian compilers were especially charged to produce a compendium that made sense (and therefore to argue that what they produced made sense), especially at the points where it appeared to do nothing of the sort. The trouble with having to explain a provision which seems problematic is that the explanation may turn out to be problematic as well.

The explanations offered for the persons or groups listed in the Roman law texts under consideration fall into two categories: those which are not very helpful and those which are not quite true. As an example of the former, there is in *Digest* 48.2.8-10 an explanation of a category consisting of women, children, soldiers, magistrates, and the infamous where the reader is told that persons might be excluded from taking action on the basis of sex, age, oath, privilege or misconduct. This explanation offers as many grounds for exclusion as there are persons to be excluded; the grounds are not quite comparable with one other, so as to add up to a comprehensible set; and they appear to lack explanatory force. If I am told that women may not take a certain legal action and if I then ask why not, I am probably not going to be satisfied with the response, 'Because of your sex'. Rather similar is the set of explanations given in *Dig.* 49.14.18, where it is stated that persons who may not bring actions on behalf of the state are women, senators, convicts, veterans and soldiers. Explanations given for women are the infirmity of their sex; for convicts, that they might act out of desperation; for veterans and soldiers, the honourable character of their service. No explanation is given for the inclusion of senators, which I would normally take to mean that the writer assumed that everyone would understand why senators were included. If, as the character of the lists suggests, soldiers and senators are in some way linked as servants of the state, the writer might have omitted the explanation for senators as being self-evidently the same as that for soldiers: the honourable character of their service. The explanation would be more helpful if we were told why honourable service should disqualify a person from bringing suit on behalf of the state.

For an explanation that is not quite true, I cite *Inst. Iust.* 2.10.6, where it is stated that witnesses to a last will and testament must themselves have the capacity to make a will; the persons who may not witness a will are then stated to be women, children, slaves, the deaf, the mute, the intellectually or emotionally disabled, and the infamous. This explanation, by contrast with those described above, appears to be clear, simple, and comprehensive. It also conspicuously fails to cover the cases adduced. Adult women did have the capacity to make a will and in fact did so: we have recovered for example from papyrus numerous examples of wills executed by women of Roman citizenship status. Nor are we obliged to look to actual examples: the competence of women to make wills is acknowledged at many points in the *Corpus Juris Civilis* itself (e.g., *Dig.* 28.1.5, which sets the ages

at which males and females become competent to do so). Similar to the above explanation is that given in *Dig.* 46.1.3, where it is stated that surety can be provided for the obligations of another (e.g., debts) only by persons who are themselves capable of incurring such obligations. Those who cannot provide surety are then stated to be slaves, children and women. Slaves and children were not capable of incurring obligations enforceable under Roman law. Women certainly were capable of incurring such obligations and did so regularly, as evidenced in the historical sources. To be fair to the writers, these texts do not state that all the persons named as incapable of taking either of these actions on behalf of another were also incapable of taking the same actions on their own behalf. They have merely been set up in such a way as to imply very strongly that this is the case.

The most elaborate explanation in the *Corpus Juris Civilis* for the appearance of women in an itemised category occurs at *Dig.* 3.1.5. Persons are there said to be disqualified from bringing suit on behalf of others on account of sex, disability, or turpitude. Those disqualified on these grounds are then itemised as women, the blind, catamites, persons convicted of a capital offence, those condemned for malicious prosecution, and those who hire themselves out to fight wild animals. This seems to be an improvement in some ways over the explanation in the passages already cited. The grounds for exclusion are fewer in number than the persons excluded, and at least grammatically comparable with one another. The explanatory force of the grounds given is still weak, but the writer appears to acknowledge this by expanding upon those grounds in two cases. Women are excluded on the grounds of sex, he tells us, because the action from which they are excluded would be contrary to the modesty appropriate to us. Then, perhaps feeling that this explanation is still not quite satisfactory, the writer goes on to give an explanation by way of example—a kind of aetiological myth. Once upon a time, there was a wicked woman (superlatively wicked: *improbissima*) named Carfania, who ‘by brazenly making applications and annoying the magistrate gave rise to the edict’. Modern scholars sometimes interpret this passage to mean that Carfania provoked the magistrate’s displeasure by excessive or ill-motivated litigation. In that case, the resulting disqualification of women in general would seem to be a marked departure from a legal principle still spoken of in Latin as *abusus non tollit usus*, which means that the abuse of a privilege does not bar appropriate use of that privilege. In other words, the fact that you might have engaged in malicious prosecution is no reason one should not bring suit in good faith. The wording of the *Digest*, however, does not guarantee this interpretation; it may be that the magistrate was offended by having a woman bring suit at all. The example of Carfania follows strictly from what precedes. Women are disqualified from prosecution on behalf of others because of their sex, specifically because it would be unbecoming to their modesty, and more especially because a particular magistrate expressed this opinion in a particular case.

The grounds of disability on which the blind are disqualified from bringing actions on behalf of others is also expanded upon in this passage in a way strictly

comparable with that used in the case of women: first a statement that the blind cannot see and respond to the magistrate's signals, then a story about how a prosecution long ago was frustrated when the magistrate turned his seat away and left the blind petitioner, one Publilius Asprenas, pleading to his back. That this unedifying anecdote offers little justification for a regulation that appears to be aimed at the object of malfeasance rather than the perpetrator of it seems to have been evident even to the writer, who goes on to acknowledge a puzzling discrepancy between the disqualification of the blind in this particular instance and their general empowerment in other areas of law and politics. If the magistrate appears to have behaved badly in the case of the blind petitioner, what light does that cast back upon the behaviour of the magistrate in the case of the litigious woman? The writer of this passage does not find it necessary to expand upon misconduct as a ground for being disqualified from taking legal action on behalf of others; he evidently finds this self-explanatory, as a form of punishment. It is the disqualification of persons who do not appear to have earned punishment that troubles him; this is also apparent in his earlier treatment of children and the deaf, who are stated to be disqualified from bringing suit even in their own behalf. The writer accepts that immaturity is suitable grounds for being prevented from bringing suit but dithers somewhat over just what age should be regarded as mature. He is at pains to point out that the deaf are disqualified for their own protection: a failure to respond to the magistrate's spoken instructions could result in undeserved penalties.

From what I have said about the explanations offered by the compilers of the *Digest*, it may seem that I regard the men who composed them as incapable of making sense. This is very nearly the opposite of the truth. I have a good deal of respect for the Roman jurists, classical and Justinian. They seem to have been men of the book in the highest degree, entirely competent in logic, rhetoric, and the interpretation of texts. They were perfectly capable of offering credible justifications for provisions of the law. They were even more capable of keeping quiet where they believed that a provision was self-evidently sensible. Where they do offer explanation or justification, it seems to come in anticipation of a challenge on the part of the reader, for example, where a change from traditional practice has been introduced or where apparent discrepancies exist between various provisions of the law. Where they offer an unsatisfying explanation, that is certainly because they believed that no satisfying explanation was to be found. The compilers of the *Digest* were charged by the emperor to identify and eliminate inconsistencies in earlier legal texts; this was one of the chief aims of the codification (*Const. Deo Auct.* 4). In many cases they seem to have done this. In other cases, they seem to have identified inconsistencies and referred them to the emperor for adjudication. The publication of the *Digest* is known to have been followed by a lengthy set of imperial determinations known as the *Quinquaginta Decisiones*, or the *Fifty Decisions*. In the meantime, in the *Digest*, weak explanations stand like red flags over dubious legal provisions: Here is a problem, waiting to be sorted out. While no single explanation given in the texts seems to account for the whole range of

persons named along with women as disqualified from taking legal action on behalf of others, enough is suggested in the lot of them taken together to move one step ahead. The persons who tend to show up clustered in the lists can be described as four classes disqualified for four separate reasons. One class consists of the blind, the deaf and the mute, persons incapable of participating in the formalities of trial procedure, as is very fully explained in one of our texts. A second class consists of senators, ambassadors, magistrates, and soldiers, persons whose privileges or responsibilities to the state appear to place them beyond the authority of the civil courts. This is only just barely suggested by what is stated of soldiers, but it is perhaps anticipated that soldiers or ambassadors might be called away in the line of duty and that this would cause delays in court proceedings; the duties or privileges of magistrates and senators might tend toward the same result. A third class consists of the infamous and the various malefactors associated with them: persons who have suffered a loss of legal privilege as punishment for misconduct. The fourth class consists of children, slaves, and persons under guardianship due to intellectual or emotional disability. Such persons, as is two or three times stated in our texts, are barred from taking action on behalf of others where they would not be allowed to take the same action in their own behalf. Being subject to the authority of others, such as their owners, their fathers, or their guardians, they have no legal capacity to act. This covers all cases except for women. Women are associated in the texts with persons in the class last described, but they do not strictly belong to that class, since they are in fact capable of taking on their own behalf any of the actions which they are disqualified from taking on behalf of another. But this is where history rears its unlovely head.

While it is true to state that women belonged to none of these categories in the time of Justinian and his codification of the Roman law, it is well known that they did belong to one of them in the time of the earlier jurists whose work that codification is based on. There exists by the most slender chance an earlier *Institutes* than Justinian's, the *Institutes* of Gaius, a second-century jurist generally credited with having developed the *Institutes* form as a general introduction to the Roman Law. In the opening sections of his work, Gaius introduces the law of persons, distinguishing between those persons legally competent in their own right from those legally subject to others. Slaves are of course under the authority of their owners, and children under the authority of their fathers. Women are among the classes of persons under guardianship, along with children whose fathers have died and the intellectually or emotionally disabled. Earlier I suggested that the later jurists sometimes offered a weak justification for a dubious provision of the law, leaving it to others either to improve the justification or to eliminate the provision. Gaius goes somewhat further in the case of the guardianship over women. He offers a traditional justification for this provision and then in a quite extraordinary passage repudiates the justification. Here is the passage:

There seems . . . to be no very worthwhile reason why women who have reached the age of maturity should be in guardianship; for the argument which is commonly put forward, that because of lightmindedness they are subject to deception and that it is therefore proper for them to be under a guardian's authority, seems to be rather specious than true. Women of full age deal with their own affairs for themselves, and while in certain instances the guardian interposes his authorisation for form's sake, he is often compelled by the praetor to give authorisation, even against his wishes.

(Gai. *Inst.* 1.190)

Gaius goes on to point out that the law goes so far in recognising the actual practical competence of women (as opposed to their theoretical legal dependency) as to disallow any suit for malfeasance against the guardian of a woman, such as could be brought against a child's guardian suspected of careless or criminal mismanagement, thus acknowledging that Roman women were in fact fully responsible for their own legal transactions (with the endorsement of the so-called guardian the merest formality).

In other sections of the *Institutes*, Gaius records that the guardianship of women had been partly retired in his time (1.145, 194). The emperor Augustus, more than a hundred years earlier, had introduced among his items of social legislation a provision which freed women from guardianship upon the birth of a third child. Augustus' introduction of the *ius trium liberorum* ('the right of three children') is generally represented as part of a programme meant to promote population growth, the idea being that women would be motivated to marry and bear children by the prospect of an improvement in their legal status. This is the emperor's stated motivation, as transmitted from antiquity (*Tac. Ann.* 3.25, 28), but the ancients also observe that the programme failed to achieve its purpose and in this they are followed by most modern scholars. At least one of the ancient authors also suggests that the real purpose of the legislation was not that alleged by the emperor at its introduction; in the case of the *ius trium liberorum* for women, it seems quite likely that he was right.

Considering what we know about the reproductive life of Roman women, particularly the absence of safe and reliable methods of contraception and abortion, and their tendency to marry in their early or middle teens and to remarry after a short interval in the case of divorce or the death of a husband (at least until they reached an age where their own children were grown), it does not seem possible that any significant proportion of them in any era ever reached the age of twenty-five without having given birth to three children. Therefore it does not seem possible that Augustus' introduction of the right of three children can have had any significant effect on the birth rate for Roman women; nor does it seem at all likely that it was expected to do so. Far more likely is that the effect on Roman women of the *ius trium liberorum* (and therefore in all likelihood its intention as well) was to emancipate them generally from a system of legal disability that was already seen as inappropriate and undesirable. If the intent of the legislation was concealed

behind an appeal to marriage and motherhood, that would be neither unparalleled nor unmotivated. The emancipation of woman was perhaps not a policy that would have sold well to the all-male constituency of the assemblies which had to ratify the Augustan legislation; nor would it have well comported with that emperor's carefully-cultivated image as the champion of traditional values. That women would have welcomed it seems very likely; we have evidence of vigorous resistance on the part of Roman women to portions of the Augustan legislation which they found offensive. But the most likely source of effective support for the release of women from guardianship (on the basis of the evidence available to us) was the Roman jurist, with his historical commitment to the practical conduct of private law, and to the production of texts that made sense.

The age of twenty-five given above as one which the mass of Roman women could hardly have reached without giving birth to three children was not chosen at random. This was the age at which Roman men of the classical period became fully independent of guardianship. A Roman boy whose father died was placed under strict guardianship (*tutela impuberum*) until puberty, conventionally regarded as occurring at the age of fourteen for boys. Thereafter the young man came under a lesser form of guardianship (*cura minorum*) until the age of twenty-five. With the introduction by Augustus of the *ius trium liberorum*, a similar situation will have existed for fatherless girls. They were put under strict guardianship (*tutela impuberum*), the same as for boys, until puberty, conventionally regarded as occurring at the age of twelve for girls. Thereafter a young woman was under a lesser form of guardianship (*tutela mulierum*) until such time as she gave birth to three children. The *ius trium liberorum* brought women into legal independence at various ages, but this situation was not unfamiliar to the Romans. Children whose fathers survived, both male and female, remained under the legal guardianship of their fathers until such time as, at whatever age, they were voluntarily emancipated by them.

This, then, was the situation in the time of Gaius: young women, like young men, passed into guardianship if their fathers died or if they were emancipated by them. It was a strict guardianship for children under the age of puberty and a modified guardianship for men under twenty-five or women probably under that age who had not yet given birth to three children. After the age of twenty-five for men or on the birth of a third child for women, adults were legally independent. The situation was very nearly the same for women as for men and such differences of form as there were eventually disappeared, for the guardianship of women was retired some time between the age of Gaius and that of Justinian, whereupon women were subjected to exactly the same guardianship regulations as men. But the guardianship of women seems not to have sunk without a trace. In the area where her practical competence had been vouched for by Gaius (the management of her own affairs), a woman gained full legal competence when the guardianship was retired. In some other areas, particularly as affecting her ability to act on behalf of others, she obviously did not. This is what accounts for the appearance of

women in portions of the Justinian codification of law where lists appear of persons disqualified from taking legal action on behalf of others. It probably accounts as well for her appearing so regularly at the top of the list. That or the end of the list, where she often found herself at the end of a chain of malefactors, was the easiest place to make an insertion; there is perhaps reason to be grateful that the other option was selected. It may account too for the failure of some explanations to cover the case of women. The explanation was devised first. Women were inserted later. No adjustment was made.

As to why women were prevented from taking legal action on behalf of others long after their competence to act in their own behalf was acknowledged, I can only put forward a suggestion based on hints in the texts and on the sharp distinction known to have been maintained by the Romans between private and political spheres of action. The gradual retirement of the guardianship of women represented an emancipation, but this emancipation was effected only in the area of civil competence. In the realm of political rights, Roman women were entirely disabled in all historical periods. By contrast, it was possible for mature men of any age, if they had not been formally emancipated by a surviving father, to be quite seriously disqualified in the civil sphere, for example, from owning property or entering into contracts, while at the same time remaining fully entitled in the political sphere, for example, by exercising the vote or serving in public office. The practice of advocacy represented a kind of intersection between public and private spheres, a place where their separation was imperfect. Conducting legal actions on behalf of other persons, even offering surety or acting as a witness to wills or private contracts were actions that were civil in nature, but they were regarded as a part of public life, a means of developing political support, and part of a civic career.

The grounds of sex on which women are three times stated to be disqualified from taking legal action on behalf of other parties were borrowed from the political sphere. The modesty which would have been offended by their taking such action was that which prevented them, as was often and piously alleged, from attempting to participate in the political life of the community. The wickedness, that superlative wickedness, of Carfania was that of a woman who may have made such an attempt. So were women added, normally at the top, to the list of persons disqualified from taking legal action on behalf of others. The addition of women to such lists of persons may have had further effects. It is not easy to see why it was found necessary in some of the texts considered earlier to specify that young children or slaves, for example, might not take legal action on behalf of others, when after all they were comprehensively excluded in the first place from taking action even on their own behalf. It seems likely that the classes of persons whom it was necessary to specify under these clauses of exclusion, persons otherwise of legal competence, were originally only those physically incapable of participating in the ceremony of the court, those whose special privileges or responsibilities put them partly beyond the authority of the court, and those who had incurred some loss

of legal standing through misconduct. When women were added to this list, they may have dragged in with them, as persons formerly associated with women through a common lack of legal independence, children, slaves and those in guardianship through emotional or intellectual disability.

From the perpetual guardianship of Roman women to both the retirement of that general disability under social and juristic pressure and the institution of specific disabilities preserving some of its effects, Roman law has left us a cautionary rather than inspirational example of how some of the effects of a general disability imposed on a broad class of persons can be maintained by special provisions even after the general disability has been discredited and discarded. On the positive side, the texts recording those provisions and the explanations produced along with them are sufficiently bizarre to gain the notice of even a quite casual reader, guaranteeing continued attention to the provisions themselves and to the social and intellectual circumstances that produced them. The aforementioned passages are of course only a small selection of those relevant to the general question of how women are represented in the texts of Roman law. Some of the other appearances of women in these texts are far more colourful and equally in need of interpretation. As an example, I would like to leave you with one last quotation from the *Corpus Juris Civilis*, that of *Dig.* 25.4.10. In this text the Justinian compilers preserve a classical jurist's citation of the urban praetor's edict which dictates measures to be taken when a widow claims to have been pregnant at the time of her husband's death. In considering this citation, it bears noting that the urban praetor's edict was the virtual backbone of classical Roman law, the nearest entity to an actual law code that society possessed. The jurisprudence excerpted in Justinian's *Digest* consisted in large part of learned commentary on the praetor's edict. The edict, like the commentaries, has perished, except for sections quoted in the *Digest*. The passage described here is the longest surviving section of the urban praetor's edict, especially selected for us to remember that document by, it would appear, on the part of Justinian's jurists.

This passage of the urban praetor's edict, then, dictates actions to be taken when a widow claimed to have been pregnant at the time of her husband's death. It begins by stating that interested parties, that is, those who would otherwise inherit the unborn child's portion of the estate, may send examiners to investigate the widow's condition. It specifies the number of examiners who may be sent (no more than five at a time), what sort of persons they are to be (freeborn women) and how the examination is to be conducted (without touching the woman's person, except with her permission). Intervals at which the examination may be repeated are specified and as the birth of the child approaches, it is stated that the widow is to take up residence in the home of a respectable matron (superlatively respectable: *honestissima*) designated by the praetor. I cite the edict of *Custodia Ventris* just after the point where the period of thirty days before the anticipated birth of the child is mentioned:

The room where the woman is to give birth must have only one entrance. If there are more, they must be boarded over on either side. Three freeborn men and three freeborn women with two companions must keep watch in front of the door of this room. Whenever the woman enters the room or leaves it to have a bath, the observers may examine it beforehand if they wish, and they may search anyone who goes in. The observers placed outside the room may search everyone who enters the room or the house if they wish. When the woman goes into labour, she must notify all the interested parties or their representatives, so that they can send people to be present at the birth. Up to five freeborn women may be sent so that as well as the two midwives there are not more than ten freeborn women in the room, and not more than six female slaves. All of those who are going to enter the room must be searched in case they are pregnant. There must be at least three lamps in the room.

(Dig. 25.4.10)

All this is apparently in aid of preventing the introduction of a suppositious child, and interpretation would probably come better from psychologists and anthropologists than from either jurists or philologists. From the point of view of a philologist, however, if the scene described in the lines I have just read seems to be something from a knockabout farce rather than from a monument of the law, the resemblance is by no means without basis. The subject of the suppositious child is one that occurs in two sorts of texts from the ancient world. One is comic drama. The other is enactments of law.

REVIEW ARTICLES

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OVID'S EXILE: IS THE SECRET OUT YET?

Raoul Verdière, *Le secret du voltigeur d'amour ou le mystère de la relegation d'Ovide*. Brussels: Collection Latomus 218, 1992. Pp. 168. ISBN 2-87031-158-3. BF400.

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To read Ovid's poetry solely for the sake of discovering the reasons for his relegation, as Verdière does, is to read beautiful poetry for the wrong purpose. That said, I shall review this book in terms of the parameters set by Verdière. His aim is to provide an update to John Thibault's *The Mystery of Ovid's Exile* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1964), which is considered to be the standard work on the subject. Verdière's bibliography (p. 163) lists in chronological order subsequent works by authors such as Herrmann (four articles), Hollemann (two), Verdière himself (four) and other well-known classical scholars such as Carcopino, Rogers (only the second half of a seven-year serial on 'the emperor's displeasure'), Barone, Levick, Syme, Stroh, Della Corte, Barnes, Green, Nisbet, Goold and Grimal. Other names (some of them publishing in less well-known journals) are Baligan (two articles), Nardi, Abbott, Denes, Corsaro, Meise, Birnbaum, Popescu, Phillips, Porte and Martin. The last two on the list published in *Latomus*, Porte in 1984, and Martin in 1986. One South African is listed: Buchert in *Akroterion* (1974).

After a short introduction, the body of Verdière's work is taken up by a chronologically arranged critical exposition of each author's theories, taken work by work, as may be seen from the *Table des Matières* (pp. 167f.), which lists, *inter alia*, 'Première contribution de G. Baligan', 'Deuxième contribution de G. Baligan'. Each theory is re-argued, with copious quotations from Ovid and from the author in question,¹ and then refuted with reference to other critics' reactions to the thesis

¹ Authors who write in languages other than French are translated, with their original words given in a footnote. There are some typographical errors in English quotations, e.g., 'genious' (p. 68), 'personnal', 'compromissing' (p. 98).

propounded. Rather surprisingly, Thibault himself is sixth on the chronological list and is preceded by papers which, Verdière explains, the master himself had apparently been unable to obtain. The papers which predate Thibault are the first of Herrmann's articles, the guesswork by Nardi and Carcopino, and Baligan's two papers. Verdière exonerates Thibault from potential accusations of superficiality by explaining that Baligan had published in an obscure and almost unobtainable journal. Baligan's theory was that Julia Minor had been Corinna, the heroine of Ovid's *Amores*. The imperial connection would then be clear. Verdière gives a copious exposition of Baligan's arguments, disagreeing with them, and finally indicates that E. Paratore has already adequately pointed out the inadequacies of this supposition (p. 48).

In the case of Nardi's paper, Verdière claims that Thibault 'would have been able to demolish his arguments in half a page' (p. 23). It takes Verdière seven pages to re-argue (with copious quotations from the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*) and then to demolish Nardi's theory that Ovid had discovered some crime 'committed by another' and that he had become involved in a political plot spearheaded by Julia the Younger, her lover Silanus and her brother Agrippa Postumus.

It is not the intention of the reviewer to re-argue or, like Verdière, to demolish individual theories. Verdière satisfactorily deals with bizarre ideas, such as Carcopino's view of Ovid as a Neo-Pythagorean martyr. Some well-known theorists receive short shrift, such as Herrmann, who partly follows Carcopino but turns Ovid into a second Clodius intruding on the Roman *Bona Dea* festivities while doing field-work for the *Fasti*, and Holleman, who portrays Ovid as proto-feminist champion of the woman's point of view and also as an opponent of Augustus' arrogation of deity. Herrmann's other contribution to the polemic, his stress on Ovid's assertion that he had completed the *Fasti* (of which we have only half), is given due recognition in the discussion of other theories.

Verdière's own theory, which the reviewer has always found unconvincing (based on the correlations Corinna=*ingenium*=*poena*=*fuga*, p. 81), is propounded at length in the discussion of his four papers. The author finds Ovid's Corinna in one of Augustus' many mistresses, namely Terentia, the wife of Maecenas, whose indubitable involvement with Augustus took place some thirty years before the poet's banishment. The abortion Ovid deplors in the *Amores* would then have been of a child of Augustus which, if it had been allowed to live, could have saved the dynasty. From his first contribution (1971) to his last paper (1983) and his final chapter in this book Verdière has the repeated opportunity to reply to various critics of his hypothesis, such as Stroh, André and Sabot; however, apart from newly stressing his suggestion that the first, five-volume edition of the *Amores* may have been a contributing factor in arousing Augustus' ire, he does not move from his position.

Essentially, Ovid gives two reasons for his banishment: *carmen* and *error* (*Tr.* 2.207). Critics' interpretations of both factors are widely divergent, as

Verdière amply shows. The chronological approach of Verdière's book is interesting in that it gives readers an opportunity to view fashions in interpretation of the poet over a period of some twenty-two years. The book appeared in 1992 but, according to the author's preface, was completed in 1989; the last essay was published in 1986. The author may therefore be excused for not including this reviewer's various pieces that have appeared since 1986, which in the context of the discussion of poetics do touch on the poet's references to his own exile.²

It is, however, inexcusable that no attention is paid to the theory that the poet was never exiled at all. This idea was first mooted in 1913 by J. J. Hartmann and was supported and refuted in turn by various scholars, as reported by Lenz in 1938.³ In 1951 Janssen argued extensively for the poet's exile as poetic fiction, undercutting his argument somewhat by ascribing such a bizarre exercise to Ovid's awareness of his 'failing powers'.⁴ The idea was revived (and has since been repudiated by others, notably Helzle⁵) by Brown in 1985, a work that Verdière should have obtained.⁶ The theory was subsequently taken up by Verdière, Schmidt and Hofmann and variously reported by them.⁷ This very beguiling theory has some merit but in the end there is too much against it, even if the association of the poet with his works is such an intrinsic part of his autobiographical stance, for example, in *Tristia* 1.1 and 3.1. For the sake of completeness Verdière should have mentioned aspects of the polemic and weighed the evidence critically, even if he did not want to commit himself to a conclusion. Another omission is the Marxist-tinged interpretation by Vulikh of Ovid as intellectual proto-resister against

² 'Error and the Imperial Household: An Angry God and the Exiled Ovid's Fate': *AClass* 34 (1987) 31-47; 'Carmen and Poetics: Poetry as Enemy and Friend', in C. Deroux (ed.), *Studies in Roman History and Latin Literature* 5 (1989) 252-66; 'Ovid's Wavering Identity: Personification and Depersonalisation in the Exilic Poems', *Latomus* 49 (1990) 102-16, esp. n. 44.

³ F. W. Lenz, *Ovid: Bericht über das Schrifttum der Jahre 1928-1937* (Leipzig 1938).

⁴ O. Janssen, 'De Verbanning van Ovidius, Waarheid of Fiktie?', in O. Janssen and A. Galama (edd.), *Uit de Romeinse Keizertijd* 3 (The Hague 1951) 77-105.

⁵ M. Helzle, 'Ovid's Poetics of Exile', *ICS* 13 (1988) 73-83; *Publii Ovidii Nasonis Epistolarum ex Ponto Liber IV: A Commentary on Poems 1-7, 16* (Hildesheim 1989) 15 n. 55.

⁶ A. D. F. Brown, 'The Unreality of Ovid's Tomitan Exile', *LCM* 10 (1985) 19-22.

⁷ Viktor Schmidt spoke at the Leeds International Latin Seminar in April 1989. Heinz Hofmann is quoted and soberly refuted by W. W. Ehlers, 'Poet und Exil: zum Verständnis der Exildichtung Ovids', *A&A* 34 (1988) 145, 155. Ehlers' paper should also have formed part of Verdière's review, since it gives a considered report on recent theories touching Ovid's reasons for his banishment and comes to the same general conclusions as this reviewer in 'Ovid's Poems from Exile: The Creation of a Myth and the Triumph of Poetry', *A&A* 34 (1988) 158-69.

totalitarian authoritarianism.⁸

Balanced appraisals of the evidence Ovid offers are in general given due weight. Of these the contributions of Green and Nisbet are the best, since both are careful rather than flamboyant in their approaches to the problem. Sometimes Verdière's *ira et studium* obtrudes. He cites Syme's *History in Ovid* on Thibault's (and others') earlier attempts to unravel the 'mystery' as 'a misdirection of the labour force' (p. 91 n. 219) but he is indignant about Syme's acerbic tone and the essentials of his criticism (pp. 90-93). It is clear that Verdière does not enjoy unalloyed Belgo-Gallic favour.

Not all the articles cited are reviewed at equal length. The contribution of Bernadette Buchert seems to have been (inexplicably) unobtainable; Abbott is summed up in three lines; Birnbaum's Hebrew contribution is summarised from *L'Année Philologique*; Barnes is cited 'from memory'; Grimal merits a paragraph (in which his omission of any explanation of the *error* is deplored); and Phillips is (rightly) censured for not citing Thibault. A longer analysis of Porte's theory that Ovid was involved with the political coterie of Germanicus is concluded with the phrase 'much ado about nothing' (p. 129). Martin's continued exploration of this idea is conveyed and condemned in just more than a page.

An excursus (pp. 131f.), further supplemented by an addendum that follows the bibliography (p. 165), reviews some theories on the identity of the exile's enemy whom Ovid reviles in the *Ibis*. A final chapter entitled 'La faute secrète' gives the author's considered opinion of the various and conflicting theories surveyed, ending with another allusion to Corinna's abortion, but further explores the possibility that Ovid lied (pp. 133-35). Again, Verdière is confusing *poetic truth* with *literal fact*. Ovid always is the poet of 'imagined reality'.⁹ Whether he was exiled (and why) or not is as immaterial to his poetic purpose as it should be to our purpose as readers of his poetry. What Ovid's poetry of exile conveys, the anguish of loss and alienation felt by all exiles everywhere and in every era, is even more relevant in the twentieth century with its *final solutions*, its *ethnic cleansings*, its *total onslaughts* and its aeronautical mobility than ever it was in an era of ships and swords and the emperor's displeasure.

To conclude this review with a reiterated rider would be in the spirit of Ovidian literary excess. While the reviewer has made her pleas for the return to the exilic poetry as poetry, she cannot do otherwise than express appreciation for a work such as Verdière's that gives successive theories in rapid review. One may not agree with Verdière's own theories, nor with his reactions to the theories of others, but he does make it possible for readers to come to some sort of conclusion of their own. This reader is tempted to agree with Green (cited by Verdière on pp. 99-104) when he says that 'no other explanation than a political one can make sense

⁸ N. Vulikh, 'La Révolte d'Ovide contre Augustus', *LEC* 36 (1968) 370-82.

⁹ Cf. B. Stirrup, 'Ovid: Poet of Imagined Reality', *Latomus* 40 (1981) 88-104; W. Nicolai, 'Phantasie und Wirklichkeit bei Ovid', *A&A* 19 (1973) 107-16.

of Ovid's exile'.¹⁰ Verdière concludes by quoting Thibault: 'The many . . . attempts to solve this mystery have . . . clarified the terms of the problem' and may eventually lead to 'an hypothesis which will be cogent'.¹¹ This reviewer agrees that the terms of the problem have become clearer but differs with both Thibault and Verdière in their assumption that a 'final solution' is attainable or even necessary.

ANCIENT EPIC POETRY: FROM *ILIAD* TO *CHRISTIAD*

Peter Toohey, *Reading Epic: An Introduction to the Ancient Narratives*. London and New York: Routledge, 1992. Pp. xiii + 248. ISBN 0-415-04228-3. £10.99. A. J. Boyle (ed.), *Roman Epic*. London and New York: Routledge, 1993. Pp. xii + 336. ISBN 0-415-04230-5. £45.

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Here we have two books from the same publisher, issued in successive years and dealing with similar subjects. This looks like overkill. But there are important differences. First, Boyle's book is confined to epics in Latin (including essays on medieval and Renaissance poems) while Toohey's deals with Homer and Apollonius as well as the classical Latin epics. Secondly, Boyle's book comprises fourteen essays by fourteen different authors, whereas Toohey's is all his own work. Thirdly, the aims of the two books are different. Toohey's is directed towards novices. As he states in his introduction: '*Reading Epic*, instead, has four targets: senior undergraduate students who are reading ancient epic for the first time in classical or modern literature courses; scholarly tyros and graduate students requiring something with which to orientate themselves in the field of ancient epic; and even hard-pressed university teachers (especially those outside the trade) who need a ready guide to authors beyond their normal range' (p. xi). The aim of Boyle's book is more ambitious: 'The result, I hope, is a book demonstrating not only the (largely unknown) poetic sophistication and (underused) political and social import of Roman epic but the undying moral and intellectual force of perhaps Europe's prime literary form' (p. xi). *Roman Epic* is, nevertheless, accessible to the primary modern audience for the ancient epics, undergraduates reading the works in translation, for all Latin is translated. These then are very different books.

¹⁰ P. Green, '*Carmen et Error*, Πρόφασις and αἰτία in the Matter of Ovid's Exile', *ClAnt* 1 (1982) 203.

¹¹ J. C. Thibault, *The Mystery of Ovid's Exile* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1964) 121.

How useful is *Reading Epic* as an introduction? What qualities should such a book possess? First, and most obviously, it should be factually reliable and readily intelligible to its intended readers. *Reading Epic* meets these criteria: it is almost invariably accurate as to matters of fact and is written in a simple, almost telegraphic, style.

Secondly, such a book should, in my view, accurately represent the current state of the subject. For the most part Toohey's book is well balanced. He devotes roughly eighteen pages to the question of genre, twenty-one to the *Iliad*, nineteen to the *Odyssey*, seventeen to Apollonius, five to the beginnings of Roman epic, eighteen to the epyllion, twenty-one to the *Aeneid*, nineteen to the *Metamorphoses*, seventeen to Lucan, nineteen to the Flavian epic poets and nineteen to late epic. Stated like that the book seems well proportioned. Most poems are allocated around twenty pages. But that chapter on the Flavians stands out: there are after all three Flavian epic poets. Why is so little space devoted to Statius, Valerius Flaccus and Silius Italicus? The ignorant might reply that that is all they deserve. The truth is, however, that superb work has been done on the Flavian epic poets in recent years, especially on Statius;¹ the claim that Flavian epic poets have little to say is likely to be met with scorn nowadays. To relegate these poets to the minor league, to give each of them less than Apollonius of Rhodes or the writers of epyllia seems a bizarre ordering of priorities. Moreover, not all of Toohey's claims about the Flavian poets are accurate. For example, he divides the *Thebaid* into Odyssean and Iliadic halves in the manner of the *Aeneid*. Such a division is of little use. The second half of the poem may be Iliadic in so far as its content is largely military but it hardly evokes our memories of the *Iliad* in the way the second half of the *Aeneid* does. And why call the first half Odyssean? Are these books of wanderings in the manner of Homer's *Odyssey* or *Aeneid* 1-6? In Books 1-3 Statius outlines the origins of the war, while in 4-6 he describes the journey of the Argive army from Argos to Nemea. Three years actually elapse before the Argives begin to move and then they remain at Nemea to hear Hypsipyle's tale and celebrate Opheltes' funeral games. Absence of movement and delay are more characteristic of *Thebaid* 1-6 than wandering. But Toohey's chief failure in dealing with Statius is his unwillingness to draw conclusions. He acknowledges that 'the Theban myth acts as a commentary on Roman history' (p. 189) and that 'identification of Theseus with the emperor Domitian is inevitable' (p. 196) but fails to consider Statius' characterisation of Theseus and to relate that to the poem's political stance. Toohey's account of Statius, and of the other Flavian poets, is superficial.

Thirdly, such a book should, I think, have a distinctive point of view and

¹ See, e.g., F. M. Ahl, 'Statius' *Thebaid*: A Reconsideration', *ANRW* 32.5 (1986) 2803-2912; F. M. Ahl, M. Davis and A. Pomeroy, 'Silius Italicus', *ANRW* 32.4 (1986) 2492-2561 and the articles by Philip Hardie, Donald McGuire, Martha Davis, William Dominik, D. E. Hill and Arthur Pomeroy in A. J. Boyle (ed.), *The Imperial Muse: Flavian Epicist to Claudian* (Bendigo 1990).

make a worthwhile contribution to its subject. That is of course true of all books. Some introductory books which meet this criterion spring immediately to mind: Howard Clarke's *Art of the Odyssey* (Englewood Cliffs 1967), William Anderson's *Art of the Aeneid* (Englewood Cliffs 1969), E. T. Owen's *The Story of the Iliad* (Ann Arbor 1966) and Simon Goldhill's *Aeschylus: the Oresteia* (Cambridge 1992). Toohey, however, sees his role as providing 'interpretive paraphrases' (p. 121) except in the case of the *Aeneid* and the *Metamorphoses*. This may be inevitable given the scope of his subject, but it is a risky course to take. Interpretive paraphrases can soon become banal summaries. Does Toohey avoid this danger? In my view he does not. Consider this paragraph dealing with *Odyssey* 5:

Odysseus finally becomes the narrative focus in book 5. He is pictured with Calypso where his resolve to return home is tested. This book is a fine example of the generic blend so evident and so appealing throughout the Homeric epics. After a divine assembly (5.1-27: often criticized for repeating material from the assembly of book 1; did it once begin the *Odyssey*?) Hermes is sent to instruct Calypso to let Odysseus go (5.28-115). She does so, but not without attempting to sway Odysseus from his purpose (she offers him immortality) (5.148-227). After accepting Calypso's help in constructing a boat (or a raft) he sails away, for seventeen days (5.228-81). But his scourge, the god Poseidon, destroys his craft in a storm (5.282-332). Odysseus subsequently swims to shore to the land of the Phaeacians (5.333-493).²

This passage is not atypical. We find dry summary interspersed with bald critical comments (e.g., 'often criticized for repeating', 'this book is a fine example') which lead nowhere. And what does that phrase 'generic blend' mean? Is this not imposing an alien term? If Homer includes a particular kind of episode in an epic, it is, by definition, the kind of episode appropriate to the epic genre. Moreover, the crucial issue in this part of the poem, Odysseus' choice between Calypso and immortality on the one hand and Penelope and mortality on the other, is confined to a four-word parenthesis.

Even where Toohey does adopt a different approach the results are not always satisfactory. For example, Toohey describes Aeneas' behaviour in the final duel with these words:

This lack of reconciliation permeates the epic as a whole. It is not confined to Dido. Aeneas butchers Turnus. Deaf to his opponent's pleas, Aeneas surrenders to a surge of anger and drives in the sword.³ . . . Turnus pleads for his life, and for a moment at least Aeneas seems to consider the possibility of mercy (*clementia*). But he sees Pallas' belt-buckle on Turnus and, in a fit

² P. Toohey, *Reading Epic: An Introduction to the Ancient Narratives* (London/New York 1992) 50f.

³ Toohey [2] 122.

of rage (recapitulating those of book 10), he kills the suppliant. Aeneas' reaction to the sight of Pallas' buckle may be understandable, but it is not a reaction controlled by a desire for reconciliation. Nor does it demonstrate that attitude of *clementia* urged by Anchises in Hades or by Aeneas himself when approached by the Latin emissaries at 11.108-19. The outcome of the combat seems to cast the possibility of reconciliation, *clementia*, and the imperial destiny into doubt. It is as if the generic claims of the heroic impulse have overwhelmed a hero more normally subject to the claims of empire and *pietas*.⁴

But when it comes to evaluating the poem's political stance Toohey explicitly rejects the idea that 'the duel represents a condemnation of Aeneas' behaviour and, through this, the cost of the aspirations of empire and Augustus' (p. 138). Toohey repudiates the implications of his own argument. And are we really supposed to believe that Aeneas kills Turnus because of generic constraints? He also misrepresents important details. Toohey rightly points out (p. 132) that Aeneas is described as *pious* at 10. 591 when he is about to kill Lucagus, but ignores the rest of the line: *quem pius Aeneas dictis adfatur amaris* ('whom pious Aeneas addresses with bitter words'). There is an irony here: the hero famed for piety speaks with bitter words. He then goes on to kill the suppliant. Is this *pietas*? Virgil sums up the whole episode by describing Aeneas not as *pious* but *furens* (10. 604).

To write a genuinely interesting book about a major work of literature for beginners is a difficult task. It can, however, be done, as the books of Clarke, Anderson, Owen and Goldhill testify. After reading Toohey's more ambitious book, I can only conclude that writing a worthwhile introductory book about more than twelve epic poems is probably beyond the capabilities of a single person.

A. J. Boyle, editor of *Roman Epic*, has avoided this problem by assigning individual epics to particular scholars. Thus we have Sander Goldberg writing on Livius and Naevius; William Dominik on Ennius; David Konstan on Catullus 64; Boyle on Virgil's *Aeneid*; William Anderson on Ovid's *Metamorphoses*; Frederick Ahl on Lucan's *Civil War*; the late John Sullivan on elegy, epigram and satire; John Henderson on Statius; Martha Malamud and Donald McGuire on Valerius Flaccus; Marcus Wilson on Silius Italicus; Peter Connor on Claudian; John Ward on *Waltharius* and *Gesta Ottonis*; and Philip Hardie on Petrarch's *Africa* and Vida's *Christiad*.

Roman Epic begins with a survey chapter in which Boyle discusses the 'palimpsestic nature of the genre' (p. 1). The concept is important because the master epic poets exploit their predecessors and the reader's awareness of them; they do not merely imitate. Boyle goes on to examine the aesthetic and political implications of writing epic poetry and to consider the interrelations between the different epic poets. In fact Boyle here provides something that is missing from Toohey's book: a sense of direction.

⁴ Toohey [2] 132.

The first three chapters deal with pre-Virgilian epic. In his chapter on Livius and Naevius, Goldberg writes that 'over two thousand years have passed since anyone has understood Saturnian verse' (p. 20). This may well be so, but he himself goes on to provide an extraordinarily subtle and sensitive account of Livius' *Odussia* and Naevius' *Bellum Punicum*. He establishes beyond doubt that 'Saturnian epic never lacked a sensitivity to style' (p. 31). This is a masterly essay. Dominik's primary thesis is that 'self-consciousness is a principal feature of Ennian epic' (p. 38). This claim is then substantiated through comparison of Ennius' poem with Hesiod, Homer and Callimachus. Dominik then goes on to establish both the Homeric and non-Homeric features of Ennius' work. He defines Ennius' distinctive achievement as 'depiction of the national achievement, the collective Roman hero' (p. 51). For Ennius it is the Roman nation which merits celebration, not the individual warrior as in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Konstan's work on Catullus is already well known, for some years ago he published an important book on the poem, *Catullus' Indictment of Rome: The Meaning of Catullus 64* (Amsterdam 1977). The prime question for many readers will be how Konstan will respond to the challenge thrown down by Richard Jenkyns in his book *Three Classical Poets: Sappho, Catullus and Juvenal* (London 1982), for Jenkyns claims that poem 64 was more the work of an aesthete than a moralist. Konstan opts for a compromise position: 'Catullus 64 has a dual quality, combining self-consciousness with ethical critique' (p. 76). And he makes that case convincingly.

The next three chapters are devoted to that triad of works which many would regard as the most important in the Roman epic tradition, Virgil's *Aeneid*, Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and Lucan's *Pharsalia*. Boyle's views on the *Aeneid* are well known from his book *The Chaonian Dove: Studies in the Eclogues, Georgics and Aeneid of Virgil* (Leiden 1986) and elsewhere. In the chapter entitled 'The Canonic Text: Virgil's *Aeneid*' he does not simply rehearse those views, for here he is primarily concerned with the ways in which Virgil transformed the epic tradition. He takes up such issues as Virgil's treatment of the relationship between myth and history, the moral issues explored by the poem, the *Aeneid*'s poetic power, the relationship between form and meaning, the relationship between the *Aeneid* and earlier poems and Virgilian reflections on the nature of art. There is much here that is new and valuable. In the chapter entitled 'Form Changed: Ovid's *Metamorphoses*' Anderson takes up two problems concerning Ovid's masterwork: '(1) What does this poem on the subject of changed forms discover that is new, significant, entertaining and capable of challenging Virgil's *Aeneid*? (2) How far does Ovid the elegiac poet change, as he composes his poem, and how far does he change the epic form in which he has chosen to work?' (pp. 109f.). Anderson begins with the problem of genre and the 'Generic Fallacy', arguing that to approach the poem with the expectation of finding an epic is unhelpful. After years of fruitless argument about the poem's genre it is most refreshing to find a major scholar dismissing the question in this way. Anderson then examines Ovid's use of Virgil's 'canonic text', not in *Metamorphoses* 13 and 14 but in Book 4. He then

goes on to draw inferences concerning Ovid's *Aeneid*: 'What some critics label Ovid's "Little *Aeneid*", therefore, emerges as very little concerned with the *Aeneid* at all, but with un-epic stories that Ovid loosely attaches to the narrative skeleton of Virgil's poem, concerning anything but Aeneas and his great mission' (p. 117). That 'therefore' worries. How can discussion of Book 4 alone justify conclusions about Books 13 and 14? Anderson concludes with a discussion of Ovid's treatment of human beings, focusing upon the Actaeon and Tereus stories, arguing that Ovid is concerned with 'human nature, its desperate and thwarted efforts to find happiness with other human beings' (p. 123). Ahl's essay 'Form Empowered: Lucan's *Pharsalia*' is as much about the state of Lucan criticism as it is about Lucan's poem. For him the prime disease afflicting criticism of Roman epic is 'minimalist' or 'flat' readings. Even now there are those who see the *Aeneid* as an 'encomium of Augustus and the *Pax Romana*' (p. 127). But, as Ahl observes (p. 130), this is more of a problem in connection with the *Aeneid* than with the *Pharsalia*. Ahl also objects to those scholars who berate Lucan and other literary opponents of the principate for their lack of realism, scholars who accept the inevitability of Caesarism and praise the value of efficiency. Would they take the same view if their own countries fell prey to dictatorship? In the end Ahl sees Lucan's primary importance as being the ancient writer who more than any other 'codified the political rhetoric of liberty which bore important political fruit in the era of the French and American revolutions' (p. 140).

As an interlude between discussions of Julio-Claudian and Flavian epic poets we have Sullivan's chapter entitled 'Form Opposed: Elegy, Epigram, Satire'. For Sullivan the essential subject of epic is 'the struggle for power' (p. 144). He notes that for Catullus and his circle aesthetics and politics went hand in hand in rejection of the epic genre: contempt for politicians and the values of public life was united with rejection of epic. The elegists too combined an attempt to subvert the traditional literary hierarchy with an assertion of private values. Satirists also rejected epic but for different reasons, claiming that their modes of writing were truly realistic, that epic's concerns were remote from the contemporary world. As Sullivan points out, such claims are plainly false for they ignore the possibility of engagement with contemporary issues by symbolic means.

After Sullivan's interlude comes the Flavian triad. Henderson's 'Form Remade / Statius' *Thebaid*' is a remarkable piece of work. This essay is a rewriting for a less specialised audience of a piece that first appeared in *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 37 (1991). For the unfamiliar this chapter (even in its modified form) may prove hard going but it is worth the effort. Henderson argues firstly that we should read the poem through the framing addresses to Domitian and that they point to the poem's 'undisguisably explosive potential to mean, within the Flavian cosmos' (p. 165). That case he substantiates by pointing to the *Thebaid*'s relationship to Lucan's *Pharsalia*, to the post-Lucanian civil war, and to the resemblances between the Flavian house and the house of Oedipus. Most of the paper is concerned with the nature of war in the *Thebaid* and the poem's

shifting perspectives on that subject. The treatment is dense, intricate, and enlightening. In 'Flavian Variant: Myth. Valerius' *Argonautica*' Malamud and McGuire argue that Valerius' *Argonautica* is an exercise in rewriting, a rewriting of Apollonius but with an eye on Virgil. Malamud and McGuire start with Borges' story of 'Pierre Menard, Author of the *Quixote*' 'because it exemplifies one of the issues at the heart of Valerius Flaccus' *Argonautica*: the relationship between production, reproduction and initiation within a textual tradition' (p. 194). Valerius and Menard have in common the fact that 'it is the author's engagement with his predecessor(s), and his readers' continual awareness of that engagement, that make the text signify' (p. 194). This claim is then substantiated through examination of a *topos* and an episode, Argo as first ship and the abduction of Hylas. Valerius follows the Catullan tradition of having Argo as first ship despite there being traces of earlier voyages. For Valerius, Malamud and McGuire suggest, 'the myth of Argo has become a trope for the impossibility of creating a truly original text' (p. 196). What is more, they argue, 'Valerius' poetic technique relies on this presumption' (p. 196), for the poem's readers are expected to supply from their knowledge of other versions of the Argo myth motivations unexplained by Valerius. The discussion of the Hercules-Hylas relationship is particularly subtle and complex and leads in to a tactful treatment of the Domitian-Earinus relationship. Wilson's essay 'Flavian Variant: History. Silius' *Punica*' offers us a paradoxical thesis: 'Silius' epic is uncompromisingly anti-historical' (p.219). Wilson argues for this view primarily through comparison with Lucan's *Pharsalia*. Consider the question of causation. Whereas Lucan outlines causes of a kind recognisable as such by modern historians, Silius turns to the Dido story and Juno's liking for Carthage, that is, he turns to Virgil rather than Livy. And the gods are given a major role in the action, directing events and manipulating minds. His treatment of battles, with emphasis on the duel and the *aristeia*, and of death have more to do with the *Iliad* and other epics than with historical narratives. Moreover, Wilson argues, Silius is anti-historical in another sense as well, in his treatment of contemporary themes, particularly in his treatment of the Flavian emperors. These three essays are among the most valuable in the volume, for implicit in the work of Henderson, Malamud and McGuire, and Wilson is the thesis that the works of the Flavian epic poets merit reading and study.

The last three essays of the volume deal with late antique, medieval and Renaissance epic. Connor's essay 'Epic in Mind: Claudian's *De Raptu Proserpinae*' is essentially a series of critical appreciations of selected episodes. Connor concludes that 'Claudian's *De Raptu Proserpinae* is very much a child of its time rather than an oddity. It must be viewed as one amongst many classicizing artefacts' (p. 258). The next two essays move into territory largely unfamiliar to classicists (including this one). Fortunately Ward is aware of his likely readership and so his chapter 'After Rome: Medieval Epic' begins with a concise and fascinating overview and then concentrates on two poems, *Waltharius* (late ninth century) and Hrotsvit's *Gesta Ottonis* (tenth century). It also includes brief plot

summaries. Ward aims to establish that 'epic remained a vital and frequently practised form of expression suited to the exploration of the largest and most perplexing of contemporary problems' (p. 262). Ward argues that *Waltharius* problematizes not only those values characteristically associated with epic, the values of loyalty and lordship, but also those associated with betrothal and marriage. Moreover, this poem is yet another rewriting of the *Aeneid* for it is 'essential to have in mind the 'meta-' or 'sub-' text of *Aeneid* 4 in order to grasp the full meaning and gist of what is going on' (p. 278). Ward concludes that *Waltharius* is *not* simply an aristocratic vernacular epic in Latin; it is not simply *translated*. It has been carefully and symmetrically recrafted by a skilled Latin-speaking Christian cleric in imitation of Prudentius, Statius and Virgil' (p. 283). Ward devotes less space to *Gesta Ottonis* than to *Waltharius*, arguing that 'the latter poem seriously influenced Hrotsvit's conception of her task and that this conception demonstrates again the creative, and, for the context of the time, pragmatic way in which medieval authors dealt with their Latin epic inheritance' (p. 286). This poem too concerns male-female relationships but is distinguished by the fact that it was composed by a woman. The final essay in the volume, Hardie's 'After Rome: Renaissance Epic', discusses Petrarch's *Africa* and Vida's *Christiad*. *Africa* is usually regarded as a noble failure. Hardie, avoiding the well-worn path, argues persuasively for the poem's merits, examining in particular the poem's relationship with Virgil and its moral and generic complexities. Vida too takes the *Aeneid* as model but in a way that 'transvalues and inverts the main Virgilian themes in order to bring out the lines of a truly Christian heroism and a truly Christian mission' (p. 307).

The essays contained in *Roman Epic* are almost all of a very high standard. The book as a whole bears witness to the extraordinary power and remarkable durability of Latin epic poetry for the best part of seventeen hundred years.

ANOTHER HELPING OF ROMAN STUDIES

C. Deroux (ed.), *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* 6, Brussels: Collection Latomus 217, 1992. Pp. 516. ISBN 2-87031-157-5. BF2 500.

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The articles collected in this latest supplement to the regular issues of *Latomus* cover a wide variety of topics. As with the previous volumes, no one theme unites them and there is no specific order in their presentation. The reader is confronted by a veritable smorgasbord of subjects, ranging from a catalogue of ancient veterinary terms to a reconsideration of the Emperor Titus' soldiering.

Some method can be glossed onto the madness, however, by a thematic survey which will hopefully offer a sense of the scope and content of the work. Of the twenty-nine articles, fourteen can be classed as mainly literary, eight as mainly historical and seven fall somewhere in between.

The most technical of the literary articles is undoubtedly that by G. B. A. Fletcher, which is a collection of *corrigenda* and *addenda* to Fr. Bömer's edition of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. P. Murgatroyd's concise and lucid study of the variations of setting in six accounts of the Hylas myth throws light on the narrative techniques of their authors (namely, Antoninus Liberalis, Dracontius, Apollonius Rhodius, Valerius Flaccus, Theocritus and Propertius). M. J. Edwards shows how Catullus borrows from Sappho's themes more than from her vocabulary, while M. Vinson proposes that Catullus uses the vocabulary and imagery of public life (e.g. *fides*, *amicitia*) to describe his relationship with Lesbia. However, Vinson's firm adherence to the view of sexual relations as predominantly power relationships (which is essential to the argument) is occasionally overstated (e.g., pp. 170f.).

Three articles, by S. Farron, F. E. Brenk and R. Gaskin, focus on Vergil; a further three, by W. M. Owens, R. Ancona and C. Deroux, on Horace. Cicero and Tacitus are the subject of one article each, by J.J. Hughes and P. C. Class, respectively. Finally, A. M. Keith studies Ovid's use of Propertius in *Amores* 1.1, while S. A. Frangoulidis investigates Apuleius's use of Vergil's Dido and Homer's Odysseus in his portrayal of Charite.

The historical articles are no less varied, covering in chronological scope the Middle Republic to the Later Empire. J. Briscoe presents an eloquent plea for the validity of prosopographical analysis of Middle Republican political groupings, which has recently come under assault from, among others, A. E. Astin, F. Millar and P. A. Brunt (cf. p. 70 nn. 1-5). The debate is far too complex to review here, but a few observations may be pertinent. Briscoe presents an overly stark choice between long-term groupings formed around families and friends, or individual senators swaying in the breeze of the political moment. Surely matters need not have been so polarized. Might not alliances have been formed and dissolved over short periods of time, as interests diverged and new opportunities presented themselves? Following from this, what does *amicus* mean in the political context of the Republic? Does it imply a persistent political ally, as Briscoe seems to assume (p. 77), or a current adherent? Finally, Briscoe omits discussion of one of the only surviving descriptions of senatorial debate and decision-making, although it is not from the period under study. In Sallust's *Catiline* (50.3-53.1) the members are swayed by force of argument rather than any pre-existing political groupings. The passage does not favour the prosopographical view.

V. M. Warrior's somewhat technical study of M. Acilius Glabrio's intercalation of 190 BC adds another chapter to the Antiochene War and provides further insight into the difficulties of ancient chronology. G. Wylie reviews the Sertorian War, asking whether Sertorius was in fact a military genius. While interesting, Wylie's article suffers from too narrow a focus: ancient battle accounts,

which constitute the bulk of his evidence, are notoriously unreliable, as he himself has to admit at several junctures (esp. pp. 157f.), and surely leave the answer as to whether Sertorius was a good or bad general beyond modern reach. Matters treated only tangentially here (e.g., Sertorius's war aims, whether he was a Spanish 'national' hero or a Roman opportunist) might have been more profitably investigated. A more successful assessment of military prowess is proffered by B. W. Jones who adds a further blemish to his already tarnished portrait of Titus in *The Emperor Titus* (London/Sydney 1984). By examining instances of Titus' behaviour in the Jewish War Jones concludes simply that 'Titus was reckless' (p. 420). He successfully differentiates recklessness from the personal courage expected of ancient commanders and shows that Titus cared more for his own glory than for the future of the newly-founded dynasty (pp. 417-20). It is difficult to counter Jones' conclusion, especially when we read that on one occasion the prince waded into a horde of Jerusalem's defenders with neither helmet nor breastplate (p. 414)!

W. Suder revitalizes the sex lives of Roman *senes* in a readable and entirely convincing contribution. Old Romans had sex, but then, as now, it was considered inappropriate. In fact, argues Suder, our view of sedate and sexless old folk stems from Roman attitudes. In a penetrating epigraphic study, M. R. Salzman throws new light on the Christianization of the aristocracy in the Roman West. Drawing from 319 men and women listed in *PLRE* for the period AD 284-423, Salzman analyses statistically information concerning their social status and religious affiliation in terms both of chronology and geography. Her findings do not support previous theories (e.g., conversion was essentially a random, personal event; aristocratic women played a key role in that they were initially drawn to Christianity and then helped to convert their husbands) but instead suggest a new pattern whereby a gradual shift of senatorial families away from the pagan cults is combined with an equally gradual convergence of pagan and Christian career paths. To be sure, appointment to higher office depended on an ideological compatibility with the ruling emperor, but Salzman's study also includes lower officials. Despite some difficulties of interpretation due to the survival pattern of inscriptions, Salzman's analysis is on the whole convincing.

Two articles deserve longer consideration. S. Johnstone offers a fascinating survey on the uses of arson in the Late Republic and Early Empire. Johnstone maintains that due to the close identification of the Romans with the physicality of their *urbs*, arson, real or alleged, was primarily a political act, a virtual *topos* in the political invective of the Republic. Later, responsibility for fires, or at least insufficient effort in preventing them, was a serious charge directed against 'bad' emperors (notably Tiberius and Nero). This interpretation offers insight into accusations of arson levelled at the likes of Catiline and renders Nero a *hostis* ('enemy of the state'). However, Johnstone overstretches the argument in contending that the *vigiles* were largely undifferentiated in mandate from the Praetorian Guard and were more of a political force than a fire brigade; his attempt

to divorce the former from firefighting is not entirely convincing (pp. 56-62): Dio is quite clear that the *vigiles* were recruited and maintained to guard against fires (55.26). It seems to me that a citation in Tacitus (*Ann.* 15.44), used imaginatively by Johnstone on pp. 65f., weakens rather than strengthens his thesis. Johnstone remarks that the Christians were hated not so much for their incendiarism as for their 'anti-social tendencies' (*odium humani generis*). Following Johnstone's argument, however, there would be no greater anti-social tendency than the burning of Rome. Why then the differentiation in the charge, unless arson was not necessarily seen as the ultimate political crime after all (at least in Tacitus's view)? Despite these quibbles, Johnstone's study is illuminating and informative.

In the light of recent studies of Roman medicine (e.g., R. Jackson, *Doctors and Diseases in the Roman Empire* [London 1988]; *ANRW* 37.1 [1993]), of special interest is G. W. Houston's well-argued and entertaining article 'Two Conjectures Concerning Nero's Doctor, Andromachos the Elder'. Andromachos is known from Galen, who styles him Nero's *archiatros* and quotes from and comments on his poem about antidotes for poison. But the good doctor goes unmentioned by Tacitus, Suetonius and Cassius Dio, and so has been ignored by most modern treatments of Nero, a situation Houston attempts to redress. On analogy with such men as Charicles under Tiberius or C. Stertinius Xenophon under Claudius, Houston argues that Andromachos may well have been a personal friend of Nero and thus a prominent figure at court (356-59). Houston further postulates that Andromachos was a source for Lucan's passage on snakes (*BC* 9.700-33), since the two courtiers would have known each other and shared an interest in poisons and poetry. This is an entirely plausible picture. There is, however, an overriding problem that goes unaddressed, namely why Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio should have ignored Andromachos' existence. Their silence is all the more curious when it is precisely from these sources that we hear of other court physicians like Charicles (*Tac. Ann.* 6.50) and Xenophon (*Tac. Ann.* 12.61) and when it is recalled what a prominent part poisons played at Nero's court, either in reality or in rumour (p. 358 n. 13). Either there was a conspiracy among these writers to blot Andromachos from the historical record or (perhaps more likely) he was not as prominent as Houston suggests. Assuming that Galen is not mistaken or exaggerating when he calls Andromachos Nero's *archiatros*, the latter may have enjoyed only a very brief period of favour, too brief for mention in the main accounts of Nero's reign. We know very little about the man's life and nothing at all of his death. Life at Nero's side could be perilous; perhaps Andromachos discovered this all too quickly.

Now the seven articles that fall between the strict 'literary' and 'historical' categories. L. R. Lind completes his survey of Roman ideals begun in the previous volume of this series by examining *religio*, *pietas*, *fortitudo* and *virtus*. The text is thorough but often difficult to follow, cluttered as it is with parenthetical references and direct quotations (esp. p. 12). Much of this could have gone into the footnotes. Lind's analyses of these important concepts are enlightening in themselves but might have been clarified by a conclusion or summary at the end of each section; indeed,

the article as a whole would have benefited from a synopsis drawing everything together. A. M. Lewis puts another book into the ancient schoolboy's satchel by arguing that the sustained popularity over some 1500 years of Aratus's third-century BC astronomical poem *Phaenomena* was because it had become a school text. Another education-oriented study is that of J. Moorhead, who surveys Cassiodorus's contribution to the canon of ancient liberal arts.

Two articles focus on questions of terminology. C. J. Simpson attempts to use Catullus 100 and various sections of Ovid to reconstruct the 'patois of the racetrack' and generally does so convincingly. Words such as *favere*, *felix* and *potens* likely had special meanings at the circus. However, Simpson's reconstruction of betting terms (pp. 211-14) is less felicitous since it is forced to be exceedingly speculative. Another terminological essay is J. N. Adams' reconstruction of ancient veterinary jargon. Given the absence of a specialist medical vocabulary in ancient human medicine (cf. V. Nutton in R. S. Porter [ed.], *Patients and Practitioners: Lay Perceptions of Medicine in Pre-Industrial Society* [Cambridge 1986] 23-53, esp. 31f.), one wonders to what extent there was a genuinely separate veterinary terminology rather than a simple recycling of otherwise regular words to suit the context (e.g., *pulmo* and *pantex* can mean, respectively, 'lung' and 'paunch').

D. B. George reconsiders Lucan's portrayal of Pompey and concludes that he is depicted as a Stoic *proficiens*, that is, a man standing between wisdom and foolishness or, more precisely, between Cato and Caesar, the respective incarnations of these qualities. V. Hunink searches for Lucan's last words among the poet's writings, since Tacitus claims that Lucan died citing himself (*Ann.* 15.70). Hunink makes an astute observation when he remarks that Tacitus' account need not be historically accurate. Tacitus is fond of putting 'famous last words' into the mouths of dying luminaries (cf. p. 393 n. 7), which can be taken as no more historically accurate than other direct quotations found in ancient historiography. Undaunted, Hunink argues that Tacitus must have had some specific verses in mind and, after due consideration of some possibilities, comes to the disappointing conclusion that these are indeterminable.

This book is not without the occasional typographical error or misspelling but, given its length, these are few and far between. An editorial policy on the citation of lengthy passages (that they be presented either untranslated in the original, or in translation, or both; as it is, all three possibilities are employed, sometimes within a single contribution) would have been helpful, but since few will read the volume cover-to-cover, this is not a major consideration. Altogether, *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* 6 represents an extremely useful resource to those working in these fields and can take its place alongside its predecessors.

ARCHAIC NAVAL POWER

H. T. Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-Power before the Great Persian War: The Ancestry of the Ancient Trireme*. Leiden, New York and Cologne: E. J. Brill, 1993. Pp. xv + 217, incl. 25 illustrations. ISBN 90-04-09650-7. Gld.140/US\$80.

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In this volume, the culmination of over a decade of articles on Archaic Greek naval matters, Wallinga attempts to give a thorough treatment of two intertwined themes: the development of sea-power in the Archaic period and the evolution of the trireme. Both themes have recently been dealt with at shorter length, the latter by J. S. Morrison and J. F. Coates (*The Athenian Trireme* [Cambridge 1986] 25-45) and the former by C. G. Starr (*The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History* [Oxford 1989] 15-28). These brief treatments have their problems; Morrison is marred by his tendency to manipulate the evidence to support his reconstruction of the trireme, whilst Starr's work lacks real depth.¹ Wallinga is more satisfactory than either.

Some of Wallinga's ideas are simple common sense and should not need to be brought to the attention of scholars (but clearly do). Into this category can be put his constant reminders to the reader of the importance of triremes, and indeed of most ancient naval vessels, as transport vessels. Likewise there is his argument that not all triremes were always fully manned (pp. 169-83); hence a fleet of three hundred vessels might have a paper manpower of 60 000, but the actual figure might be as little as half of that.²

Many other of Wallinga's ideas are quite radical and often at variance with commonly-held scholarly opinion; but only occasionally (e.g., when criticizing Meyer's view of the evolution of Athenian naval power on pp. 8-11) does he labour the point when opposing traditional interpretations. Many of Wallinga's ideas are worthy of serious consideration. So, for instance, he argues that the penteconter was without exception a twin-banked vessel rather than the more common view that there were both single and twin-banked versions (pp. 45-53).³ The introduction of the trireme he dates quite late to some time in the third quarter of the sixth century,

¹ See the review by P. De Souza, *CR* 40 (1990) 506f.

² The suggestion that a trireme could not move with a reduced crew is effectively argued against by Wallinga (pp. 171f.) and has been conclusively disproved by the trials of the reconstruction *Olympias*; see J. F. Coates, S. K. Platis and J. T. Shaw, *The Trireme Trials 1988* (Oxford 1990) 20, 23, which surprisingly Wallinga does not mention.

³ See J. S. Morrison, *The Athenian Trireme* (Cambridge 1986) 25-45.

dismissing the triremes attributed to the seventh-century Egyptian pharaoh Necho by Herodotus (2.159) as a mistranslation of the Egyptian word for 'ship', which in Herodotus' time was equivalent to Greek *trieres* but probably in Necho's time referred to the then standard warship (pp. 104f.).⁴ Wallinga finds it difficult to believe that these vessels can have been triremes for the very sound reason that if the trireme was in existence around 600 BC, it is strange that the Carthaginians did not use them at the battle of Alalia in the 540s BC to offset the otherwise superior Phocaeen penteconters (on which see pp. 67-83).

Wallinga further argues that the evolution of the trireme occurred not in the world of the Greek *polis* (where the speed advantage over the penteconter would not, without other factors coming into play, justify the trebling of the manpower requirement), but in Carthage and Egypt, and in two distinct phases; the Carthaginians added a third bank of oars to the penteconter as a means of countering Phocaeen naval superiority, and the three-banked system was in Egypt added to existing cargo vessels to counter a potential naval threat from Persia (pp. 102-18). This is in direct contrast to the usual view that the trireme originated in Greece and was then exported to the Near East;⁵ but though Thucydides says that triremes were built ἐν Κορίνθῳ πρῶτον τῆς Ἑλλάδος (1.13.2), it seems best, despite the objections of Morrison, to accept Wallinga's view (p. 31)⁶ that by this he means the first triremes *in Greece*, not the first triremes *ever*; this at least is the natural reading of the Greek.⁷ Wallinga's hypothesis seems far more plausible than the common view that the trireme evolved from the much smaller two-level penteconter with no intermediate stage, though it will not appeal to the Hellenocentric. According to Wallinga, the trireme only became the standard warship in the late sixth and early fifth centuries BC; Persia built them because Egypt had them, Athens because Persia had them, and the rest of Greece because of Athens.

The general historian of the Greek world will, however, have more interest in Wallinga's theories on sea-power rather than in those on the technical development of ship designs. Here again Wallinga often departs from accepted views to his (and the reader's) profit. He argues convincingly that most Archaic Greek navies (and a number into the Classical period) depended largely upon privately owned vessels pressed into service on behalf of the *polis*, one important exception being Corinth (pp. 13-32). It follows that most of these fleets would be without the expensive triremes until the *polis per se* rather than individual citizens took a leading role in the fitting out of the navy, in the case of Athens not properly until

⁴ The existence of triremes in the seventh century BC is usually accepted without question; see, e.g., Morrison [3] 38.

⁵ E.g., Morrison [3] 38.

⁶ Following, e.g., L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Princeton 1971) 81 n. 17.

⁷ E.g., 'The First Triremes', *The Mariner's Mirror* 65.1 (1979) 53-63.

Themistocles' naval bill in 483 BC (pp. 148-54).

At many other places Wallinga puts forward ideas that at the very least will force teachers of the Archaic period to rethink their approach. The naval power of Polycrates of Naxos, according to Wallinga (pp. 84-101) was funded by Egypt as a means of averting the Persian threat; the 'Ionian' thalassocracy of Thucydides (1.13.6) was that of Phocaea and Polycrates (pp. 66f.), the other Ionian cities not having any significant naval power until supplied with ships by the Persians (pp. 118-122);⁸ Miltiades' Parian expedition, often held up as evidence that the Athenians were capable of acts of simple imperialism that fitted in with no strategic plan, is seen as having as its objective the raising of funds for building and operating a trireme fleet to oppose Persia (pp. 144-48), anticipating (though Wallinga does not say as much) the financial demands of the Delian League.

With all these radical ideas, it might not be surprising if Wallinga went a bit too far on occasion, and indeed he does, chiefly in regard to his interpretation of Persian policy. The suggestion that Xerxes possibly planned to follow his conquest of Greece immediately with an attack further west (pp. 161f.), though supported by the comment that 'once [a large-scale expedition was] organized, commanders would want to exploit its potential to the utmost', pushes the reader's credulity, especially as Wallinga has already described the attribution of a similar plan to Cambyses as 'an armchair strategist's fancy' (p. 130).

This credulity is stretched to its limits by his suggestions that Darius I's tribute system was largely geared up to financing a fleet in the Mediterranean (pp. 126, 135 n. 15, with a related point at p. 126 that the crisis precipitated by Cambyses' financial measures to run a fleet is reflected in the stories of his madness and the revolt of Bardiya), and that Xerxes' decision to invade Greece was a reaction to Athens' acquisition of a trireme fleet (p. 161). The former is a rather Eurocentrist perspective; the Persian empire was vast, and Darius had more problems to worry about (and spend his money on) than simply the maintenance of naval dominance in the west. As for the motive Wallinga gives for Xerxes' expedition, though he disputes Herodotus' report (7.1.1f.) that Darius had any plans for a full-scale invasion of Greece (p. 160), a Persian invasion to forestall mainland Greek interference in Ionia must have been a serious possibility from the moment Cyrus the Great dismissed the threats of Spartan ambassadors after the fall of Croesus (Hdt. 1.152f.). After Greek involvement in the Ionian revolt and the humiliation of Marathon, it would be surprising if Darius did *not* plan an invasion.

There are omissions and infelicities. In his treatment of the trireme's evolution he accepts without question Morrison's reconstruction of the vessel.⁹ But

⁸ Wallinga first advanced this latter idea in 'The Ionian Revolt', *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, 37 (1984) 404-07.

⁹ J. S. Morrison and R. T. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships 900-322 B.C.* (Cambridge 1968); J. Coates and S. McGrail, *The Greek Trireme of the 5th Century B.C.* (Greenwich 1984); Morrison [3].

though Morrison has proved that the trireme *could* have been built in the way he suggests, there remain dissenters, who maintain that Morrison's view is not in fact the way in which the trireme was actually built.¹⁰ Wallinga nowhere acknowledges this. He should have done so, if only to dismiss the alternative reconstructions; though his interpretation of the trireme's evolution is markedly different from that of Morrison, it is important to Wallinga's view that Morrison's reconstruction of the vessel's final form is correct.

Wallinga's note of the small scale of early Archaic trade and therefore the lack of need for sail-powered merchant ships (p. 35) should mention the larger sailing ships of the Bronze Age found at Cape Gelidonya and Ulu Burun off the coast of Turkey,¹¹ and his discussion on the same page of the grain route to the Black Sea, which he believes began in the late seventh century, seems in ignorance of the much later date for this proposed by Noonan and Garnsey.¹² As an example of the infelicities, at p. 126 he states 'as argued earlier there is reason to assume . . . [Persian] permanent patrols [in the Mediterranean]'. In fact, the only previous mention of the patrols, at p. 119, merely asserts that they existed; the arguments are actually at p. 126 n. 55.

It is also regrettable that such a provocative book is marred by a poor standard of proofreading. Non-words such as 'Thukydides' and 'Korkyra' are more forgivable in someone whose first language is not English than they are in the anglophone, and only at one point (p. 176) do the numerous punctuation errors cause any serious confusion. The chief flaw lies in the bibliography. The following works are referred to in the text but not included in the bibliography: Bremmer 1990 (frequently cited), Bury 1900, Cartledge 1983, Heinimann 1945, Hornblower 1982, Hornblower 1983, Katzenstein 1973, Lloyd 1988, Ray 1988, Roebuck 1984. This constitutes rather too many omissions, and to make matters worse, Braun 1982, Gardiner 1961 and Warmington 1960 are cited in the bibliography as '1983', '1960' and '1964', respectively, while Harden 1962 and Bickerman 1968 appear in the text as '1963' and '1969'; and *The History of the British Navy* is erroneously attributed in the bibliography to David Lewis, rather than to the distinguished naval historian Michael Lewis.

But though these faults make the book annoying to use, only occasionally do they make it all but impossible (I have been unable, for instance, to deduce to what 'Ill. 76' at p. 49 n. 54 refers), and the book's errors should not be allowed to

¹⁰ In particular A. F. Tilley, most recently in 'Three Men to a Room—A Completely Different Trireme', *Antiquity* 66 (1992) 599-610, who does raise some salient points.

¹¹ Cape Gelidonya: G. F. Bass *et al.*, *Cape Gelidonya: A Bronze Age Shipwreck* (Philadelphia 1967). The Ulu Burun wreck has not yet been fully excavated; interim reports have appeared in *AJA* 90 (1986), 92 (1988), 93 (1989).

¹² T. S. Noonan, 'Grain Trade of the Northern Black Sea', *AJPh* 94 (1973) 231-42; P. D. A. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World* (Cambridge 1988) 108f.

detract from the important ideas advanced. This is a book that should be consulted not only by scholars of ancient naval warfare, but by anyone whose teaching or research interests lie in the period c. 800-480 BC. For by clarifying details of the use of ships and sea-power, Wallinga has mapped out a whole new interpretation of Archaic Greek history.

THE TRANSLATOR'S ART: VERSE AND WORSE?

Peter Whigham (ed. and tr.; intro. J. P. Sullivan), *Letter to Juvenal: 101 Epigrams From Martial*. London: Anvil Press Poetry, 1985. Pp. 119. ISBN 0-85646-092-3. UK£5.95.

Tony Harrison (tr.), *Palladas: Poems*. London: Anvil Press Poetry, 1992 (repr.). Pp. 47. ISBN 0-85646-127-X. UK£5.95.

Charles Tomlinson (tr.), *Eros English'd: Classical Erotic Poetry in Translation from Golding to Hardy*. London: Bristol Classical Press, 1992. Pp. 226. ISBN 1-85399-159-7. UK£9.95.

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Peter Whigham's collection of his own translations of a wide selection of Martial's poetry from the *De Spectaculis* and Books 1-14 of the *Epigrammata* is intended to rectify the old imbalance caused by the *Index Expurgatorius*, which gave the impression that Martial was the archetypal dirty old man with a lavatorially undergraduate sense of humour. What emerges from this 'fresh imbalance', as Whigham himself calls it (p. 9), is the impression that Martial was a rather dreary provincial, yearning (in verse drowning in otiose *doctrina*) for a funereal 'villeggiatura' in a Spanish necropolis called Bilbilis. The very title of this selection is based on the contents of *Epigr.* 12.18 (addressed to Juvenal) in which Martial contrasts the simplicity of his life in the countryside with the bustling clamour of Juvenal's life as a *cliens* in the decadent capital. After Horace and Tibullus, this well-worn *topos*, in its unremarkable translation, makes one suspect that Juvenal was better off in Rome. Bilbilis does have a sexy hunting boy, though; one 'some bosky dell would set you lusting' (p. 69). Would Juvenal seriously have preferred the bosky dells of Bilbilis to the sinful stews of the Subura?

Apart from the rather disappointing selection of Martial's verse (which makes hellish reading for the Latinless reader), I am not a great admirer of Whigham's abilities as a translator. For some years (before the appearance of Guy Lee's translation), I used his translation of the poems of Catullus in order to introduce a Latinless Classical Civilization class to Roman poetry. The translations often did not work at all and frequently gave a misleading impression of the Latin original;

in fact, one of the merits of the present collection of Martial's verse is that the reader is often forced to look at the Latin in order to clarify what exactly Whigham's version means. Examples of this abound. To begin with *Spect.* 1, which opens the collection, Whigham renders the initial couplet as 'Memphis, forbear anent your Pyramids / nor Syria boast your highrise skyline' (p. 27). 'Forbear anent': what on earth does this mean and why is this contrived archaism yoked with 'highrise skyline'? Does the Latin or Martial's tone here in any way justify this? One appreciates that all good translators translate not mere words, but ideas from one language to another and in the process interpret them. Does the idea of 'highrise skyline' make the line more accessible to a modern reader, particularly in the wake of the obscure 'Forbear anent'? Perhaps, but does the translation not lose the notion of *Assyrius . . . labor*? And what of the opening *Barbara* (surely necessary for contrast with the climactic final couplet)? Why has this been omitted completely? Whigham has entitled this poem 'Caesar's Ring' and ends with the couplet: 'O'er mankind's monuments towers Caesar's Ring, / the fame of each proclaimed in that of one'. Two intelligent readers, unfamiliar with Martial, could not tell me what 'Caesar's Ring' was—his backside? His fortifications? Again, the limpid clarity of the Latin came to the rescue: *omnis Caesareo cedit labor Amphitheatro; / unum pro cunctis fama loquetur opus*.

This tendency to obfuscate rather than illuminate the original text is evident elsewhere. What would 'Verona loves each vatic syllable' (p. 30) for *Verona docti syllabas amat vatis* (*Epigr.* 1.61.1) mean to a Latinless reader? Significantly, Whigham needs a note to explain his translation (p. 115). In his version of Martial's poem about the value of his Nomentan wine (*Epigr.* 1.105) which so improves with age that it can rival the finest, Whigham does his best to be clever, even importing the completely alien note of Thomist philosophy into his translation: 'With years, upon my Nomentan estate / The yield that in the cellar's laid unmixed, / Aging in bottle, transubstantiates / And tastes as per the labelling affixed' (p. 30). Again, Whigham makes a mystery of the final line of *Epigr.* 4.44 (on the grim aftermath of the eruption of Vesuvius): *nec superi vellent hoc licuisse sibi*, which he translates as 'And the gods themselves murmur at the force of their own doom' (p. 36). This makes interesting poetry ('murmur' is rather evocative), but what does the 'force of their own doom' really mean and is it an effective translation of the original? More examples of this would simply belabour my point.

Whigham has a further irritating habit: the frequent omission of the name of the poem's addressee. This sometimes has serious consequences. In his version of 3.65, he omits the name Diadumenus and the important *saeve puer* (*Epigr.* 3.65.9). Consequently, there is no hint in the translation that this is a homo-erotic poem in the tradition of the poet and the cruel *puer delicatus*. 'My cold jewel' (p. 33) is simply inadequate. In his translation of the elegant couplet *Epigr.* 5.83, the name Dindymus is omitted (p. 43) to similar effect, but is included in his version of *Epigr.* 10.42 (p. 55). The omissions are all probably *metri gratia*, but they smack of Victorian sanitization, although we are informed in the introduction that Martial

was an unmarried homosexual (p. 12). Whigham does call a *mentula* a *mentula* elsewhere (e.g., p. 63), but occasionally shrinks from the full force of the original (e.g., p. 73: *cacantes* in *Epigr.* 12.61.10).

Another irritating habit is Whigham's occasional foray into Elizabethan English. Is there really any point (apart from self-indulgence) in translating 12.34 in the following style: 'Just half our three score years & ten / I mind thee, Julius, spent with thee, / the bitter & the blessed blent— / The bless'd preponderant' (p. 71)? Whigham is also rather fond of Old and Middle English. In his Penguin translation of Catullus 63, Whigham uses 'carlines', 'housecarl' and 'huscarl' (*The Poems of Catullus* [Harmondsworth 1966] 137f.). Here we encounter the likes of 'Rome's fair bailiwick' (p. 61) for something as unpretentious as *moenia* . . . *pulcherrima Romae* (*Epigr.* 10.103.9).

It would be churlish not to give some credit where it is due. Many of Whigham's translations of the snappy and witty couplets in books 13 and 14 (the *Xenia* and the *Apophoreta*) work well, but on at least one occasion his efforts to contrive a rhyming couplet are very clumsy (e.g., p. 80: 'Those swaying hips, so sweetly lewd, would straight / Hippolytus himself make masturbate'.)

This selection of translated Martial is not strongly recommended, except for those interested in the process of translation and mistranslation, but it does include an elegant introductory essay by J. P. Sullivan and a strange preface by Whigham himself who begins with an ill-omened *anacoluthon*. The author provides some idiosyncratic notes and (fortunately) the Latin text, which departs from Ker's Loeb text in two instances. There is one noticeable misprint: on p. 77, the poem entitled 'Doves' should be numbered 66 and not 56 (which is about pigs' wombs).

Tony Harrison's collection of translated epigrams of Palladas, a bitterly cynical *grammatikos* in fourth-century AD Alexandria, is inspired by Peter Jay's re-arrangement by poet and period of some scattered epigrams in the *Palatine Anthology* (previously arranged by genre). The poems of Palladas occur chiefly in Books 9, 10 and 11 of the *Anthology*; both Jay and Harrison have thus done Palladas a great service by rescuing him from the oblivion to which the yellowing pages of Paton's Loeb consigned him.

The burning question is this: does Palladas deserve this untimely rescue? The answer is an unequivocal 'Yes', for in these sharply-pointed epigrams we do indeed, as Harrison claims (p. 8), get a pungent whiff of the 'last hopeless blasts of the old Hellenic world . . . before the cataclysm of Christianity'. Nothing escapes Palladas' scabrous tongue: philosophy (p. 13), except for Epicureanism (p. 15), human mortality (a favourite theme; pp. 14-16), the rich and greedy (pp. 21-23), the poor and needy (pp. 21f.), the *grammatikos* grinding through the opening of the *Iliad* (pp. 24-26), the ignorant (p. 28), politicians (p. 30) and women (pp. 33-38).

Unlike Whigham, Harrison is a translator who does not obfuscate but illuminates and often improves the original poems to the extent that Palladas merges into Harrison. In his version of the first poem in this collection, in which Palladas reminds puffed-up humankind of her rather lowly origins (*AP* 10.45), Harrison

displays this ability in his graphic translation of Palladas' rather tame final couplet: 'Think of your father, sweating, drooling, drunk, / you, his spark of lust, his spurt of spunk.' *AP* 11.289 and 290 (p. 23) give Harrison the opportunity to interpret some complicated mercantile imagery in a modern idiom: his moneylender blacks out for ever 'still with the total ringing on the till', whereas Palladas' dies still totting up the interest on his fingers. Impressively, his very loose translation of *AP* 11.290, in which the Greek is obscure and difficult, clarifies and interprets the poem effectively. Harrison attempts this again in his spirited version of *AP* 10.56 (p. 34), in which he offers an interpretation of the final troublesome line (and justification for it in his notes on p. 45) which is credible (i.e., that Palladas may well have had a wife who flirted with other men and Christianity); hence Harrison's use of Christian allusions (not discernible in the original) in his version of *AP* 10.49 (p. 38).

Palladas enjoys puns and word-play: so does Harrison. One of the best examples of this is Harrison's translation of *AP* 9.173 (p. 24), in which Palladas bemoans teaching the catalogue of disasters in the first five lines of the *Iliad*; Harrison's 'Sad study, grammar! Its whole content's one long string of accidents!' could not be more apt. There are further instances of Harrison's ability to capture Palladas' mordant wit, for example, his version of *AP* 11.381 (p. 33) in which women are granted two good moments: 'in bed and dead'. Even if Palladas may not have been the author of the poem on Hypatia (*AP* 9.400; p. 41), it was a good idea to include the homage to her here, particularly in the wake of Palladas' Juvenalian views on women.

Like all good translators, Harrison occasionally nods. His version of *AP* 9.175 (p. 26) succeeds until the last couplet where he is (like Ovid) carried away by his own cleverness and produces 'Help me, Theon, or all that'll stand / between poverty and me's an &'. 'Betterbrite' for good old ἔλαιον in *AP* 11.291 (p. 30) was lost on this South African reviewer. Palladas' wicked couplet, which parodies the pidgin Greek of a Gothic soldier dedicating his arms to a misnamed deity (*A.P.* 6.85), is translated by Harrison (and printed in naughty Gothic script) as follows: 'Mein Breast, mein Corset und mein Legs / Ja dedicates to Juice like all gut Griegs' (p. 31). Funny, but over the top: one misses the marvellous name Γορδιοπρι-λάπριος in the original.

These slips are few and far between and I strongly recommend this vivacious translation, which would make a welcome addition to the source material used by students of late antiquity, particularly those interested in ancient philosophy, education and attitudes towards women.

Charles Tomlinson's delightful collection of translations of classical erotic poetry is not only entertaining reading, but is also an excellent *vademecum* for anyone teaching Latin and Greek poetry to undergraduates. Valuable lessons in the technique of translation can be learned from some of the greatest poets in the English language. All the old favourites are here, such as Christopher Marlowe's superb translations of Ovid's *Amores* and Dryden's vigorous versions of extracts

from Vergil, Ovid and Juvenal, but the collection also includes translations by Aphra Behn (trying her hand at Horace *Odes* 1.5, along with countless others, like Lady Montagu), Branwell Bronte (with neatly chiselled versions of Horace), Elizabeth Barrett Browning (rendering Theocritus' *Polyphemus and Galatea* Idyll in suitably lush romantic style) and even a passable translation of Horace *Odes* 1.25 by the Young Gentlemen of Mr Rule's Academy at Islington.

It is interesting to note whom these poets and scholars considered worth translating. Catullus, Horace and Ovid (perhaps predictably), but also Vergil, Juvenal, and Martial, and on the Greek side Homer, Sappho, Anacreon and Theocritus. The refreshing aspect of these translations is that they are never merely mechanical classroom exercises (as one might have expected from some of them), but they are lively poems in their own right, crafted by poets who understood how the originals worked. They also reflect the cultural and linguistic milieu in which they were fashioned, in such a way that there is rarely notable dissonance between the translation and the original. Occasionally, one cannot resist a smile, such as in Golding's version of the Echo and Narcissus tale from Ovid's *Metamorphoses*: Narcissus, 'the stripling wearie', lies down at the side of the pool and stares at his reflection'. '. . . For like a foolishe noddie / He thinkes the shadow that he sees, to be a lively boddie' (p. 7). Dryden too provides some gems, such as Chloris' oath in Theocritus *Idyll* 27: 'I swear I'll keep my maidenhead till death, / And die as pure as Queen Elizabeth' (p. 77). Pope's 'gentle Reign of My Queen Anne' (in Horace *Odes* 4.1) is equally charming and most appropriate for this most Augustan of English poets.

Tomlinson, the Professor of English Literature at Bristol and an accomplished poet himself, provides an informative and well-written introduction. I have one criticism: the table of contents has regrettably omitted page numbers, which makes the book awkward to use.

REVIEWS

Scholia publishes solicited and unsolicited short reviews. Short reviews to be considered for publication should be directed to the Reviews Editor, Scholia.

John Miles Foley, *Immanent Art: From Structure to Meaning in Traditional Oral Epic*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991. Pp. xvi + 278. ISBN 0-253-32216-2. US\$39/UK£32.50.

John Miles Foley's approach to the decoding of meaning in traditional oral epic is based upon a profound understanding of the theoretical discourse on the nature of text and the theory of reception. Consequently he views meaning as essentially a participatory process rather than a purely textual phenomenon, an attitude that informs his theory of traditional referentiality, which is the focus of this book. The first two chapters are essentially theoretical, while the four that follow offer a series of examples of the application of the theory to three quite distinct oral traditions: Anglo-Saxon, ancient Greek and Serbo-Croatian, the latter subdivided into Moslem and Christian sub-traditions.

In the first chapter ('From Traditional Poetics to Traditional Meaning') Foley starts from what he terms the false dichotomy of mechanism versus aesthetics, an impasse which he regards as symptomatic of a theory of verbal art which, when applied to oral traditional poetry, is inadequate. He advocates that before asking *what* a traditional text means, one must ask *how* it conveys meaning, and he postulates that the process of production of meaning is significantly different for oral poetry, whether orally composed or oral-derived. His theory of traditional referentiality is outlined on p. 6, although the first and second chapters in their entirety are necessary for a full understanding. Focusing first on the recurrent noun-epithet phrases, which are the most striking characteristic of many oral traditions, Foley suggests that rather than referring to the specific context in which they may happen to occur, these evoke the whole tradition by way of the entirety of contexts in which they have been used and thus summon 'a context that is enormously larger and more echoic than the text or work itself . . .' (p. 7). This process of meaning-generation Foley identifies as metonymic (part for whole), in the sense that the unspoken context, far greater than the textual context, is encoded in the referent. Foley makes a vital distinction between conferred and inherent meaning: the former is a feature of literary texts, in which a poet seeks innovative expressions whose meaning is conferred by the context; the latter is characteristic of oral or oral-derived poetry, where the meaning of an expression has often little or no direct connection with the context in which it is used but, being conferred by traditional usage, may be said to inhere in the phrase. Foley exemplifies his

argument with short discussions of Serbo-Croatian (Moslem) oral epic, ancient Greek oral-derived epic, and Anglo-Saxon oral-derived epic, examining each in the original language. Foley's deep sensitivity to traditional nuances could not have developed if he had, like all too many oral theorists, gained access to his poetic material only through the mediation of translations. At the end of chapter 1, again with reference to the different oral traditions, Foley adumbrates the application of his theory to narrative patterns; this is discussed in greater detail in chapters 3-6.

Although Foley eschews adopting any other specific theoretical standpoint, in chapter 2 ('Traditional Referentiality: A Receptionalist Perspective') he translates his theory into the terminology of *Rezeptionsästhetik*, particularly appropriate because of its emphasis on the collaboration between poet and receiver in the creation of meaning. This provides an alternative perspective on traditional referentiality, helpful because it is more familiar; it also allows Foley to introduce Iser's concept of 'gaps of indeterminacy', references to which recur in his subsequent analyses of specific oral traditions.

These first two chapters are very densely (albeit very well) written, with the result that they demand slow and considered reading. Although this is not a book for occasional consultation, the chapters that follow focus on a single tradition at a time and therefore make the theory accessible in all its complexity through full and detailed exemplification. In chapters 3-6, Foley proceeds in linear fashion to develop his theme and at the same time laterally to provide exemplification from the different traditions; thereby he demonstrates the multi-applicability of the theory across diverse traditions and different cultures as the argument progresses.

In chapter 3 ('Serbo-Croatian Oral Epic: The Moslem Tradition') Foley turns to a living oral tradition as exemplified in the Moslem epics of the Serbo-Croatian tradition. He focuses here particularly upon story-level referentiality, showing that the Return Song pattern provides a reception context, a map that brings to the audience the ability to bridge the 'gaps of indeterminacy' of the particular song. He then continues with analysis of the Negative Comparison structure, demonstrating that this too has a referentiality larger than the immediate context, the context of the work as a whole, and even the story-type (the Return Song) in which it recurs. Next he turns to traditional phraseology, examining the contexts in which a specific phrase (*a od tala noge skočijo*, 'and he jumped up from the ground to his feet') is used in the different compositions by different poets within the tradition. This is an excellent and convincing example of Foley's methodology in the book, whereby he collects instances of a given phrase or narrative pattern and then identifies the extra-situational connotations they share, stripping away the denotative surface so as to reveal the deeper, metonymic structure of the tradition beneath. The same process is carried out for themes.

Chapter 4 ('Serbo-Croatian Oral Epic: The Christian Tradition of Kraljević Marko Songs') is devoted to the Christian tradition in Serbo-Croatian oral epic. Foley observes that these (shorter) songs are in some ways more like literary works (with greater textuality than their Moslem counterparts), although the same oral

heritage underlies both. There are detailed examples of various levels of compositional structure, and an analysis of the *Death of Kraljević Marko* in terms of story-pattern, other traditional structures, and thematic context (the full translated text appears in the appendix along with *Kraljević Marko Recognizes his Father's Sword*). The conclusion to this chapter makes transparent the comparison between the Moslem and Christian traditions, emphasising that while the former are more 'oral', the latter more literary in certain respects, both share the same compositional and referential traditions.

Iliad 24 is subjected to comprehensive analysis in chapter 5 ('Death, Honor and Peace in *Iliad* 24') according to a slightly modified version of the technique applied in chapters 3 and 4. Since only two very different epics survive from the early Greek tradition, comparison of the contexts and referentiality of traditional phrases and structures between different works and more significantly between compositions of different poets is impossible, so Foley 'reads' sample features of the text against the whole in order to draw up an interpretive map (to some extent at least) for decoding both conferred and inherent meaning. He recognises that in this oral-derived text there is a spectrum of referentiality whereby some traditional narrative and phraseological structures carry heavy extra-textual and extra-situational associations, while others bear almost none. The result of this sensitive reconstructive analysis is to raise the ghost of the original tradition and to situate both the fabric and the structure of *Iliad* 24 within it. The proof of the validity of Foley's methodology here is that from aesthetic and oral-theoretical standpoints it renders Book 24 more comprehensible, as being more interconnected with the *Iliad* as a whole, than do other, more conventional analyses. *Beowulf*, within the context of the Old English poetic tradition, is subjected to the same approach in chapter 6 ('Beowulf and the Old English Poetic Tradition'). By analysing selected phraseological and narrative structures Foley succeeds in demonstrating that in this tradition, which is culturally and methodologically divergent from the Serbo-Croatian and early Greek traditions, there is a metonymic resonance behind the patterns. Here too the result is access to a considerably enriched reading.

In his conclusion ('From Simple Forms to Complex Realities') Foley draws together the results of the previous chapters and thereby brings not only his study but also the reader's understanding to completion. His approach bridges the gap between mechanism versus aesthetics not by a feat of ingenious engineering, but by showing that the crevasse is a mere crack viewed hitherto through the distorting lens of an inadequate theory of verbal art. He defines a more appropriate theory and demonstrates its applicability to a variety of oral or oral-derived traditions from different cultures, showing in each case that it leads to a substantially enhanced reception of the oral traditional corpus. This book, which deserves acclaim as a significant advance of oral theory, seems set to serve as a blueprint for oral studies for some time to come.

James Tatum (ed.), *The Search for the Ancient Novel*. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1994. Pp. xvi + 463. ISBN 0-8018-4621-8. UK£20.50.

In 1957 a famous study of the rise of the novel by Ian Watt argued that this literary form first came into existence during the Industrial Revolution in eighteenth-century England and was different in kind from ancient prose fiction.¹ Watt argued that the eighteenth-century novel broke with the tradition of ancient fiction by not using 'timeless stories to mirror the unchanging moral verities' (p. 21), by avoiding coincidence as an explanation for the action of the plot in favour of consistently establishing the causal connection between past experience and present action (p. 21), by eschewing rhetoric and stylistic euphuism (p. 28), and by orienting the total literary structure towards formal realism (p. 33). In his introduction Watt admits that he glossed over the earlier traditions of fiction (p. 7) and these generalisations about the ancient Greek novel now look increasingly pale and insubstantial in the light of recent studies of the genre. In 1990 a similar work complained that the inclusion of classical and eastern prose fiction in the definition of the novel is pedantic, trivial, self-interested and confusing.² The present collection of articles refutes such charges by revealing strong lines of connection between Heliodorus and Tasso; Heliodorus, Richardson and Burney; Apuleius and Cervantes; Antonius Diogenes, Cervantes and Rabelais; Apuleius and Chrétien de Troyes; ancient and modern Greek fiction; and Longus and Margery Hilton. Attempts to Balkanise the genre on the basis of language and culture simply ignore the clear evidence of generic continuity between the ancient and the modern novel.

A further difficulty lies beyond the question of continuity. What exactly *was* the ancient novel? The term itself is an oxymoron, as the editor of this collection acutely observes (p. 3), and difficult to define. It is, of course, modern, since the ancients did not have a name for the genre. Selden's valuable essay ('Genre of Genre', pp. 39-64) side-steps the question by referring to Todorov's dictum 'the *historical* existence of genres is indicated by the discourse on genres' (p. 45 and n. 62).³ Selden aptly draws out the consequence of this point of view—that the discussion ceases to be concerned with literary form and shifts into the domain of ideology and the sociology of fiction. Selden's own answer to the question derives from a rhetoric trope, *symploke* or 'double-directedness', in which two divergent codes are deployed by the author simultaneously (p. 49). In support of his argument Selden invokes the late Jack Winkler's now celebrated reading of

¹ I. Watt, *The Rise of the Novel* (Berkeley 1957). The first chapter, 'Realism and the Novel Form' (pp. 9-34) is especially relevant.

² J. P. Hunter, *Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century English Fiction* (New York 1990) 7.

³ T. Todorov, 'The Origin of Genres', *New Literary History* 8 (1976) 162.

Apuleius.⁴ Such an approach works very well for the North African writer but can hardly be used to characterise the genre as a whole. The *Aethiopica* of Heliodorus is one example of a romance whose plot unravels in a linear rather than a circular direction.⁵ The linearity of the plot, together with the symbolism of the novel, suggests an ideological purpose.⁶ Winkler's own contribution ('The Invention of Romance', pp. 23-38) views the genre from a cultural perspective. Romance, for Winkler, is 'the elaboration of the period between initial desire and final consummation' (p. 28) and to understand romance the reader must 'understand how, when, and why these two spheres of activity—call them *gamos* and *eros*—came to be defined together' (p. 28). This leads Winkler into a wide-ranging and eclectic pursuit of evidence from Aristomachus of Colophon to Walt Disney for the ideal of romantic marriage, which turns out to be, in his view, 'a resident alien in Greek culture, a literary form born in and (presumably) appropriate to the social forms of Near Eastern culture, and which has been Hellenised in the wake of Alexander's conquests' (p. 35).⁷ The diversity of the approaches of Selden and Winkler is an indication that there is no critical consensus on the question of typology.

This collection of twenty-four articles from the ninety papers given at the 1989 Dartmouth conference on *The Ancient Novel: Classical Paradigms and Modern Perspectives* covers a wide range of material. In addition to critical studies of the genre, there are pieces on the novels themselves, their *Nachleben*, their readership, their realism, and their religious and literary nature. The wide variety of interests reflected in these articles is an indication of how popular the novels have now become with scholars from many different disciplines.⁸ The centrifugal expansion of enquiry from the novels themselves to their historical, social and cultural context and their reception in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is a consequence of energetic growth in this area of classical scholarship, which is also shown by the large number of recent publications on the ancient novel. On a more negative note, substantive readings of the novels themselves are restricted to short discussions by B. P. Reardon ('Μῦθος οὐ λόγος: Longus's Lesbian Pastorals', pp. 135-47), Froma Zeitlin ('Gardens of Desire in Longus's *Daphnis and Chloe*: Nature, Art and Imitation', pp. 148-70), David Konstan ('*Apollonius, King of Tyre* and the Greek Novel', pp. 173-82) and John Bodel ('*Trimalchio's Underworld*', pp. 237-59). It

⁴ J. J. Winkler, *Auctor & Actor: A Narratological Reading of Apuleius's 'The Golden Ass'* (Berkeley 1985).

⁵ See F. Létoublon, *Les lieux communs du roman: Stéréotypes grecs d'aventure et d'amour* (Leiden 1993) 108f.

⁶ See B. P. Reardon, *Courants littéraires grecs des IIe et IIIe siècles après J.-C.* (Paris 1971) 385.

⁷ For discussion along similar lines (but with a different conclusion) see D. Konstan, *Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres* (Princeton 1993).

⁸ See E. L. Bowie and S. J. Harrison, 'The Romance of the Novel', *JHS* 113 (1993) 159-78.

is, however, rather a merit of this collection that the scope of the term 'ancient novel' has been widened to include *inter alia* the *Acts of Peter*, Dictys of Crete and the Byzantine romances. Of the articles which do focus on the novels, Konstan's and Zeitlin's articles have since been published elsewhere (as have other contributions to the collection). To some extent this is inevitable in a publication of this kind, though the proportion of such pieces is high in this case.

Tatum has tried to impose some order on this medley of disparate scholarship by dividing the articles into eight categories. On examination, however, these turn out to be rather arbitrary. For example, the categories 'Remembering and Revising' and 'Pursuing the Idea of Ancient Fiction' are both concerned with the afterlife of the novels: Diana de Armas Wilson's discussion, 'Homage to Apuleius: Cervantes' Avenging Psyche' (pp. 88-100), is assigned to the first category, but David Rollo's piece, 'From Apuleius's Psyche to Chrétien's Erec and Enide' (pp. 347-69), is put into the second. Some categories, such as 'Theorizing Ancient Fiction' and 'Romance at a Critical Distance' are thinly represented (each consists of only two articles). Others, such as 'The Real World' and 'Fictions Sacred and Profane', are heterogeneous in the extreme. In the first case, the discussion ranges from Geoffrey Arnott's rather eccentric study, 'Longus, Natural History, and Realism' (pp. 199-215), to Brigitte Egger's sociological analysis, 'Women and Marriage in the Greek Novels: The Boundaries of Romance' (pp. 260-80); the second category includes 'Novel and Aretalogy' (pp. 283-95) by Reinhold Merkelbach and 'A Legacy of the Alexander Romance in Arab writings: Al-Iskandar, Founder of Alexandria' (pp. 323-43) by Faustina Doufikar-Aerts.

Despite these cosmetic blemishes, this collection contains much that will be of value and interest to scholars, students and readers of ancient fiction. For example, the collection contains important studies of the readership of the genre. Susan Stephens' piece, 'Who Read Ancient Novels?' (pp. 405-18), taken together with Ewen Bowie's more comprehensive chapter, 'The Readership of Greek Novels in the Ancient World' (pp. 435-59), effectively demolishes the view that young people, women, devotees of religious cults or the bourgeoisie read the ancient novels. Instead these two studies point to the conclusion that the readership was no different in kind from the readership of other classical literary genres. Ken Dowden ('The Roman Audience of The Golden Ass', pp. 419-34) also suggests, perhaps rather more tenuously, that the novel was written for an élite, educated audience in Rome rather than for readers in his home province of North Africa.

This collection contains much of value and interest to scholars, students and readers of ancient fiction; it also contains important studies of the readership of the genre. In my view, the editor's aim in collecting these essays was successfully realised. This book will provide engrossing reading for students of the Greek novel, the Roman novel, the early European novel, literary theory, and students of Graeco-Roman culture at the time of its slow transition to the medieval age.

S. Farron, *Vergil's Aeneid: A Poem of Grief and Love*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993. ISBN 90-04-09661-2. Pp. xii + 174. Gld 75/US\$43.00.

In what Farron regards as a heretical departure from modern interpretations of the *Aeneid*, he argues that the purpose of the *Aeneid* was to present a series of emotionally arousing episodes. According to Farron, this was what nineteenth-century scholars considered to have been the purpose of the *Aeneid*, a belief consistent with the purpose of literature to the Greeks and Romans. Claiming that scholars of the last hundred years have laboured under the misunderstanding that the *Aeneid* had to *mean* something, Farron hopes to 'enable readers to enjoy the *Aeneid* for the reasons it was always enjoyed' (p. ix). Naturally, the chapters are consistent with his purpose of demonstrating that 'the *Aeneid* is basically a poem of grief and love' (p. 1).

In chapter 1 ('Nisus and Euryalus') Farron maintains that the only interpretation that can be sustained by the text is that the purpose of the Nisus-Euryalus episode (9.176-502) is to portray an intense and tragic love. But is it really the case that the 'only important characteristic' of this episode is the love and loyalty of the Trojan pair for each other (p. 30)? Farron discusses what he deems to be the four main approaches to the episode and rejects them all (pp. 24-26, 155-65). The third approach (p. 26, 158-60), which considers *Aeneid* 9.446-49 to be ironic, is dismissed with the argument that irony can be imposed on any passage that does not accord with a critic's preconceived ideas about the lines in question (p. 26). No effort is made to take into account how the passage functions within its particular context and the work as a whole. In fact the entire Nisus-Euryalus episode is tinged with irony, for at the time the pair are slaughtering the sleeping Rutulians in 9.324ff. (conduct that is paradigmatic of Trojan behaviour in the second half of the poem), Aeneas is surveying the future site of Rome and, as he bears upon a shoulder the shield given to him by his mother, is taking pleasure in the various ideological representations of Rome's destiny on it (8.730f.).

Chapter 2 ('Ancient and Modern Literary Attitudes') endeavours to show that the main function of literature to Vergil and his contemporaries was to depict emotional, especially pathetic, episodes and that ancient literary critics were unconcerned with the meaning and unity of literary works. Farron contends that the characters and passages that pertain to the meaning of the *Aeneid* are dull and uninteresting and that the *Aeneid* has been regarded as a great work of literature because of its portrayal of grief and love. The main thesis of the book is elaborated upon in chapter 3 ('The Poem of Grief and Love'), which maintains that the *Aeneid's* purpose was to arouse the readers' emotions by presenting emotional episodes, especially those concerned with the loss of loved ones or something loved by the characters. Dido's love for Aeneas, of course, is the supreme example of such a love in the *Aeneid*. According to Farron, the only purpose of the Dido episode in book 4 is to arouse pity through the depiction of a tragic love. There can be no doubt that book 4 is concerned with the tragedy of Dido. But does Vergil

intend merely to show a tragic love and not to mean anything by such a description? In extremely personal terms the responsibility for the downfall of Dido, with whom Vergil's sympathy predominantly lies, can be said to be partly her own, but her tragedy ultimately illustrates in vivid personal terms the human cost of Aeneas' pursuit of empire. Dido is a victim not only of the gods but also of Aeneas and his destiny. She is a sacrifice upon the altar of Rome's imperial greatness. On a more general level Farron rightly observes that virtually all the major figures in the *Aeneid* die or are in some way related to someone who dies (p. 65), but he argues that the main purpose behind these deaths is to arouse sympathy and a sense of sorrow in the poem's readers. Is this all there really is to the scenes of human wastage scattered throughout the narrative of the *Aeneid*? One can stop at the point that Farron does here or look further and observe that this human loss and suffering is the result of Trojan efforts to found an empire and to fulfil Rome's destiny.

Farron is essentially descriptive and anti-interpretive in his approach. He insists throughout that his view of the *Aeneid* is in accordance with what Vergil and his contemporaries expected to find and appreciate in literature. But his belief that modern criticism is heretical and that to interpret necessarily means to impoverish means that he takes little or no account of the way particular scenes function in the work or within the entire Vergilian corpus. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Farron rarely quotes directly from the *Aeneid* in support of his thesis. He is really more concerned with what ancient and modern critics say about the *Aeneid* than with the text itself. As Farron himself observes in his 'Postscript', the 'test of any hypothesis is whether it explains the facts better than other hypotheses' (p. 146). If one pays close attention to the textual details of the *Aeneid* and the entire Vergilian corpus instead of pre-modern commentators such as Servius and Donatus, who are not the most sensitive literary critics, then the elements of grief and love assume dramatic and thematic importance. The achievement of this book lies in its emphasis on these elements, but little attempt is made to account for their significance.

Farron's approach to the *Aeneid* and ancient literature generally is not really all that heterodox or radical, since it is based mainly on a disinclination to interpret the text. Although the text has been misread and misunderstood by ancient and modern scholars, the *Aeneid* is a *readable* text. It is only lately that the *Aeneid* has been read both in terms of the intratextual connection between events, images and scenes and in terms of its intertextual relationship to the *Georgics* and the *Eclogues*. The *Aeneid* cannot be understood properly without attention to the link between it and other Vergilian works. This intertextuality in fact substantiates the pessimism of the *Aeneid*. The Dido and Nisus-Euryalus episodes illustrate the disparity between the ideology of empire and its manifestations in terms of human cost. They are certainly more than scenes of grief and love included for their own sake.

G. O. Hutchinson (ed.), *Latin Literature from Seneca to Juvenal: A Critical Study*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Pp. xiv + 368. ISBN 0-19-814690-6. UK£40.

This ambitious book by G. O. Hutchinson, which recalls his earlier bold effort in *Hellenistic Poetry* (Oxford 1988), has as its primary focus the aesthetic aspects of what is traditionally referred to as 'silver age' literature, a pejorative label that Hutchinson avoids using (something that even some of the self-styled new guard still cannot bring themselves to do). Hutchinson's aim is 'to excite or enhance [his readers'] enthusiasm' for the literature of the early imperial period (p. 3). The chapters are organised around a treatment of aesthetic concerns and the themes of death and the gods. Hutchinson devotes his discussion mainly to the writings of Seneca and Tacitus, but devotes considerable space to Lucan and Statius, while Juvenal, Persius, Valerius Flaccus, Silius Italicus and especially Petronius are also treated. Hutchinson examines each writer of the period under each concern or theme. Chapters 1 ('Conceptions of Genre: Criticism in Prose, "Lower" Poetry') and 2 ('Genre and Philosophy, History and High Poetry') are complementary, each dealing with themes of 'greatness' and 'reality'. Chapters 3 ('Wit'), 4 ('Extravagance') and 5 ('Structure and Cohesion') cover all the genres. Chapters 6 ('The Gods in Mythological Poetry') and 7 ('The Gods in Prose and in Lucan') deal with the role of the gods, while chapters 8 ('Death in Prose') and 9 ('Death in High Poetry') deal with the theme of death.

Hutchinson is at his best in describing the aesthetic aspects of imperial literature and makes some astute observations on the styles of individual writers. As can be seen from the chapter titles, he employs the terms 'high' and 'lower' poetry to describe what he deems to be the 'grander' genres (epic, tragedy, philosophy and history) and the other genres (satire, epigram, elegy, etc.); this is unfortunate, since it suggests that some of these genres are more important than others. His themes of 'greatness' and 'reality', which he defines as 'sublimity, grandeur' and 'truth' respectively, escape ready understanding because of their vagueness and opacity, despite his attempts to explain them. 'Wit' as a title for chapter 3 seems inappropriate in the way that it is applied to particular contexts. When Tydeus, for instance, is driven mad by Tisiphone in the *Thebaid* (8.757f.) and is constrained to besmear himself with the brains and blood of Melanippus' corpse (760f.), the snakes on the aegis of Minerva stand erect and shield her from the macabre spectacle (762-64), an incident that to Hutchinson contains 'comic wit and invention' (p. 93). 'Extravagance' as a title for chapter 4 seems equally inappropriate because it has been used by some modern scholars of imperial literature to suggest a peculiar affectation of style that is bathetic in its effects.

While Hutchinson's positive approach toward the literature of the period is to be welcomed, the numerous laudatory epithets such as 'brilliant' and 'exciting' sometimes seem a substitute for close critical scrutiny of the text that takes account of its socio-cultural and ideological context. This lack of context is the most serious drawback of the book, since many of the texts that Hutchinson deals with are

political in their treatment of subject matter, yet he generally ignores these elements. While Hutchinson analyses heroic political death scenes from Tacitus (Otho in the *Histories* and Seneca in the *Annals*) and Seneca (Cato and anonymous heroes), he discounts the possibility of political influence upon other poets' individual treatments of death.

Hutchinson makes little attempt to engage directly with the views of other critics or interact in any way with contemporary critical discourse. Although he is obviously aware of the work of other scholars, he does not indicate where and how he disagrees with them. As readers we have no way of knowing from what critical perspective Hutchinson is approaching his task. In addition, his prose style occasionally leaves the reader wondering if he has really said something meaningful. Here, for instance, is his opening remark on Valerius Flaccus in chapter 4 (p. 117):

Valerius [like Lucan] also cultivates extravagance persistently, but with somewhat less theatrical an air: he is not transforming history, and his play is more restricted in range. In Book iv he paints the ferocious boxing king Amycus in lavish colours; the lavishness is given point and tightness by the firm morality and the interconnections of language. But he also modifies it with wit and play, though less drastically and drily than Lucan; and he savours the extravagance with a certain detachment.

Does this description really heighten an aesthetic appreciation of the scene beyond that gained by a casual reading? Yet this is by no means the most obscure passage in the book. Another annoying stylistic aspect is Hutchinson's attempt to bring the reader into his aesthetic framework through his frequent use of the royal pronoun 'we' and adjective 'our' (e.g., eight times on p. 40 alone).

This book will be widely consulted by scholars and students working in the area; however, its value will be limited mainly to promoting an aesthetic appreciation of the literature in the reader. Since even the most capable scholar and literary critic would find it difficult to possess the knowledge and expertise that are necessary to write a book that ranges competently across the vast, complex expanse of early imperial literature, this in itself is no mean achievement. Most progress in the area of imperial literature is likely to continue to take place as the result of critical investigations by individual scholars on particular themes or writers. In fact, since the examination of death, for instance, occupies the final two chapters and the discussion of Seneca and Tacitus dominates much of the book, it might have proven more profitable for Hutchinson to focus his energies on either this important theme or on these two literary figures, which Hutchinson describes as 'the two greatest writers of Latin prose in our (or perhaps any) period' (p. 40). The latter comment might well lead one to ask where this leaves Cicero, but such enthusiasm for the subject is heartening and the assessment perhaps not as unwarranted as it may first seem. This positive approach alone is a welcome corrective to much earlier criticism of imperial literature. Much remains to be done.

Guy Lachenaud (ed. and tr.), *Opinions des philosophes*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1993. Pp. 352. ISBN 2-251-00433-5. FF335.

Students of Plutarch's philosophical writings owe a special debt of gratitude at the present time to the scholars of France and Italy. Under the leadership of Italo Gallo, the Italians have produced a series of editions of individual treatises contained in the *Moralia*, while the French have now issued well over a dozen volumes in the Budé series to which the present volume, containing the *De Placitis Philosophorum*, constitutes the most recent addition. Regarded since the seventeenth century as pseudepigraphic because of its verbal similarities to other doxographical treatises, *De Placitis Philosophorum* sets forth, in books 1-3, the opinions of Greek natural philosophers on the questions of the make-up of the cosmos and on the operation of various celestial phenomena, while books 4 and 5 treat of questions relating to the function of the human soul and to the nature of human reproduction and physiology. While obviously selective in its content and generally superficial in its treatment, the treatise nevertheless preserves much interesting material on topics widely debated in ancient philosophical circles. What the reader of *De Placitis Philosophorum* most desires is guidance through the thorny problems of the identification of the sources of the doctrines presented in the work, and here Lachenaud is excellent.

In the 'Notice' (pp. 5-51) that precedes his translation, Lachenaud declines to reopen the taxing question of the authorship of the treatise, professing himself content with the opinion of scholars since Voss (1624) that the work is not by Plutarch (pp. 15f.). Instead he concentrates on the more important questions of the structure of the work and of the sources of the physical doctrines touched upon in it. Especially useful is his close analysis of the technical philosophical vocabulary of *De Placitis Philosophorum* for information that might be provided on the doctrinal leanings of the treatise (pp. 28-46), which he complements by a synoptic table of parallel passages in other doxographical treatises (pp. 47-51).

Lachenaud's familiarity with Greek philosophical literature is most evident in his 'Résumé des opinions des philosophes' (pp. 191-315), a running commentary on the Greek text wherein he offers much helpful insight into the difficult vocabulary of Greek natural and metaphysical philosophy and Greek medical thought, generously augmented by exhaustive references to the secondary literature.

The treatises included in the *Moralia* of Plutarch in general make difficult reading. Lachenaud's edition admirably meets the challenges posed by *De Placitis Philosophorum*. Indeed, English scholars may especially rejoice at the appearance of this exemplary volume, since *De Placitis Philosophorum*, because of its doubtful authorship, is omitted from the Loeb *Moralia* which constitutes for most English readers the first and easiest approach to the still somewhat neglected treasury of works that make up that collection.

Danny P. Jackson (tr.), *The Epic of Gilgamesh*. Wauconda: Bolchazy-Carducci, 1992. Pp. xlv + 96, incl. 12 illustrations. ISBN 0-86516-252-2. US\$4.95.

The *Epic of Gilgamesh* survives in several parts from several places and in several languages. The most complete version comes from Assurbanipal's library. Important gaps in it are filled by texts in Old Babylonian, Sumerian, Akkadian, Hittite, Hurrian and Assyrian; some of these versions conflict, while others do not.

Scholars have taken several approaches to 'translating' the epic in the time since its discovery. Some, like E. A. Speiser (in J. B. Pritchard [ed.], *The Ancient Near East: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures* [Princeton 1958]) translate a single source text literally; others, like N. K. Sandars (*The Epic of Gilgamesh* [Harmondsworth 1972]), attempt to merge the texts into a continuous version. Because of the nature of the originals, neither approach is entirely satisfactory. From his introduction, it is clear that Jackson aims his version at the needs of the undergraduate classroom. Much material included in the edition, especially the photographs, makes it attractive for that purpose. Jackson has clearly seen that King James did not write the *Epic of Gilgamesh*. Serious questions remain. It is not clear whether his version is a translation or a retelling of the epic. Jackson correctly says that one problem which the epic poses for the modern student is the student's lack of familiarity with Mesopotamian culture. Other than raising this legitimate concern, Jackson ignores it: there are no notes on the text at all. This is troubling because there are questions about the source of some parts of his text. Jackson apparently organizes his work by column according to the original text. Yet comparing Jackson's work with Speiser's similarly organized text shows that Jackson includes material which Speiser does not. Are they new finds? Jackson doesn't say.

Some of Jackson's concerns are curious. He dwells on the word 'harlot' in his introduction but does not explain why he thinks substituting the word 'girl' for 'harlot' is more sensitive. He wishes to make the epic more accessible to the modern reader but does not explain why allusions to television shows (Jackson calls an unnamed goddess 'She-who-must-be-obeyed', the name that Rumpole of the Bailey calls his wife) or nursery rhymes ('One, two, three, alarie, / he slept with death-the-fairy') or translations of phrases into Latin, Bengali, Amharic, Gaelic, or Hebrew are necessary. Jackson is correct in sensing that a new readable version of *Gilgamesh* is needed. We need one that is authoritative, as well. The two needs do not conflict. Merely pointing to the Biblical parallels in *Gilgamesh* does not explain its value. *Gilgamesh* is more than a curiosity; it is the oldest ethical work we have. Scholars have paid much attention to the relation between Utnapishtim and Noah. The similarity between Gilgamesh's futile search for immortality and Job goes unnoticed. The hubbub surrounding the parallels with Genesis needs to be de-emphasized for the real *Gilgamesh* to emerge. Jackson's approach misses the worth of the epic while searching for the illusion of modernity.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Books for review should be sent to the Reviews Editor, Scholia.

T. D. Barnes, *Athanasius and Constantius: Theology and Politics in the Constantinian Empire*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. Pp. xix + 343. ISBN 0-674-05067-3. UK£39.93/US\$59.95.

Charles E. Bennett, *New Latin Grammar*². Wauconda: Bolchazy-Carducci, 1994. Pp. xvi + 304. ISBN 0-86516-261-1. US\$18.

Eva Cantarella, *Bisexuality in the Ancient World* (tr. Cormac Ó Cuilleain). New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994. Pp. xii + 284. ISBN 0-300-05924. UK£8.95.

Christopher P. Craig, *Form as Argument in Cicero's Speeches: A Study of Dilemma*. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993. Pp. xii + 254. ISBN 1-55540-879-6. US\$19.95.

Fabio Cupaiuolo, *Storia della letteratura latina: Forme letterarie, autori e società*. Naples: Loffredo, 1994. Pp. 618. No ISBN. £34 000.

William J. Dominik, *Speech and Rhetoric in Statius' Thebaid*. Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann, 1994. *Altertumswissenschaftliche Texte und Studien* 27. Pp. xi + 377. ISBN 3-487-09814-8. DM64.

Jaś Elsner and Jamie Masters, *Reflections of Nero: Culture, History and Representation*. London: Duckworth, 1994. Pp. iv + 239, incl. 8 plates and 12 illustrations. ISBN 0-7156-2479-2. UK£35.

John Miles Foley, *Immanent Art: From Structure to Meaning in Traditional Oral Epic*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991. Pp. xvi + 278. ISBN 0-253-32216-2. US\$39/UK£32.50.

Christopher Gill and T. P. Wiseman (edd.), *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1993. Pp. xviii + 263. ISBN 0-85989-381-2. UK£26.50.

- Harold C. Gotoff, *Cicero's Caesarian Speeches: A Stylistic Commentary*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. Pp. xlv + 260. ISBN 0-8078-2075-1. US\$15.35.
- Donna W. Hurley, *An Historical and Historiographical Commentary on Suetonius' Life of C. Caligula*. Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1993. Pp. xviii + 230. ISBN 1-55540-881-8. US\$19.95.
- Micaela Janan, *'When the Lamp is Shattered': Desire and Narrative in Catullus*. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1994. Pp. xviii + 204. ISBN 0-8093-1765-6. US\$28.50.
- C. F. Konrad (ed.), *Plutarch's Sertorius: A Historical Commentary*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994. Pp. lvi + 259. ISBN 0-8078-2139-X. US\$49.95.
- David Konstan, *Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 270. ISBN 0-691-03341-2. US\$35.
- Franciscus Laserre and Nicolaus Livadaras (edd.), *Etymologicum Magnum Genuinum; Symeonis Etymologicum, Una Cum Magna Grammatica; Etymologicum Magnum Auctum*. Athens: Parnassus, 1992. Pp. xxii + 528. ISBN 960-85212-0-3. Dr1 980.
- Françoise Létoublon, *Les lieux communs du roman: Stéréotypes grecs d'aventure et d'amour*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993. Pp. xxvi + 248, incl. 12 illustrations and 4 indices. ISBN 90-04-09724-4. Gld115/US\$65.75.
- Michael Maas, *John Lydus and the Roman Past: Antiquarianism and Politics in the Age of Justinian*. London: Routledge, 1992. Pp. ix + 207. ISBN 0-41506-021-4. UK£30.
- Steven M. Oberhelman, Van Kelly and Richard Golsan (edd.), *Epic and Epoch: Essays on the Interpretation and History of a Genre*. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1994. Pp. vi + 320. ISBN 0-89672-331-3. US\$30.
- Thomas Paulsen, *Inszenierung des Schicksals: Tragödie und Komödie im Roman des Heliodor*. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 1992. Bochumer Altertumswissenschaftliches Colloquium 10. Pp. 290, incl. 2 appendices. ISBN 3-88476-030-0. DM46.50

Luigi Pepe, *La novella dei Romani*. Naples: Loffredo, 1991. Pp. 316. No ISBN. £48 000.

Eli Sagan, *The Honey and the Hemlock: Democracy and Paranoia in Ancient Athens and Modern America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. Pp. x + 429. ISBN 0-691-00103-0. US\$27.

H. A. Shapiro, *Myth into Art: Poet and Painter in Classical Greece*. London: Routledge, 1994. Pp. xxii + 196, incl. 129 illustrations and 1 chart. ISBN 0-415-06793-6. UK£12.99.

Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*. New York: Atheneum. Pp. xxiii + 246. ISBN 0-689-12182-2. US\$20.

David A. Traill, *Excavating Schliemann: Collected Papers on Schliemann*. Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1993. Pp. xiv + 278, incl. 25 illustrations. ISBN 1-55540-891-5. US\$54.95.

H. T. Wallinga, *Ships and Sea-Power before the Great Persian War: The Ancestry of the Ancient Trireme*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993. Pp. xvi + 217, incl. 25 illustrations. ISBN 90-04-09650-7. Gld140/US\$80.

T. P. Wiseman, *Historiography and Imagination: Eight Essays on Roman Culture*. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 167. ISBN 0-85989-422-3. UK£13.95.

Ian Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. Pp. xxvi + 401. ISBN 0-19-814928-X. UK£45.

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IN THE UNIVERSITIES

Information about programmes in Classics at the university level in Africa is welcome and should reach the In the Universities Editor, Scholia by 30 June.

UNIVERSITY OF NATAL, DURBAN

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In 1993 a new course was introduced by the Department of Classics in Durban: Words and Ideas. Pitched at the Foundation Course level, it offers to those with a particular interest in language or to those who need language enhancement a study of groups of English words in common use that are derived from Greek or Latin bases. The syllabus is divided into topics and the selected words are introduced within their ancient context of ideas, customs and beliefs; two further sections of the course are devoted to word-building/history of language development and to study skills. The course is proving popular.

At the undergraduate level, in addition to the majors in ancient Greek and Latin, the Department offers a three-year major in Classical Civilisation. In the first year the two semester-courses are Introduction to the Ancient Greek World, followed by Introduction to the Ancient Roman World; these assume no prior knowledge of antiquity. Building on this platform, the remaining four semesters are more specialised, and must be selected from Oral Poetry and Mythology, Ancient Greek and Roman Art and Archaeology, Literature and Thought of Greece and Rome, Ancient History, and Mortals and Immortals in Ancient Greece, only two of which are offered in any given year (in rotation). Students majoring in Classical Civilisation are required to complete an additional self-study requirement in their final year.

Students are encouraged to continue to Honours in Latin, Greek, Classics (Latin and Greek combined) or Classical Civilisation; for the last there is a language requirement of one year's study of either Greek or Latin. All of these Honours degrees lead on to M.A. or Ph.D. studies, provided that those who have studied Classical Civilisation complete a major in one of the languages as a co-requisite to the M.A., while those offering Latin must complete at least one year's study of Greek. Increasing numbers of students are proceeding to higher research degrees after an initial study of Classical Civilisation and are finding the language study not only necessary for advanced research but also very rewarding. The Department offers excellent research facilities to postgraduate students: access to computers, to

CD-ROM consultation, and to the international networks relevant to Classics, in addition to the S. Whiteley Reading Room, a departmental library with collections of commentaries, sets of Oxford, Teubner, Budé, Loeb and Penguin texts as well as selected archaeological studies, language books and the *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*.

UNIVERSITY OF NATAL, PIETERMARITZBURG

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Undergraduate and postgraduate courses are offered in Latin, Greek and Classical Civilisation. Since the Faculty of Arts decided to semesterise all its courses two years ago, the Department has paid careful attention to restructuring its courses, emphasising interest and flexibility. In Classical Civilisation, for example, the Department offers two semester-courses at the first-year level. These courses focus on Greece and are taught chronologically and holistically: history, literature, art, philosophy, religion, mythology, sociology and music are taught in an integrated fashion so that the students can appreciate the richness of ancient Greek culture as a whole. A similar approach is adopted to the Roman world at the second-year level. Students must complete two further courses that explore special topics in depth in order to major in Classical Civilisation. Popular courses at the senior level include Mythology; Gender and Sexuality in Antiquity; The World of Aristophanes; and Greek, Roman and African Rituals. Introductory courses in Greek and Latin can also be taken instead of the special topics. In order to ensure maximum flexibility and marketability, no prerequisites are necessary for entry to any of these courses. The Classics Department also recognises courses such as Roman Law and The History of the Early Church, which are offered by other Departments, toward the Classical Civilisation major. One exciting development is the fact that from 1994 the interdisciplinary Gender Studies programme will be housed in and administered by the Department.

The School of Theology continues to provide the Department with many of its Greek students. A notable feature of recent years has been the steady trickle of students from this source taking Greek courses at the second-year and third-year levels. In order to accommodate their interests, the Department has mounted special courses in Philo and Josephus, among others, but the traditional Classical curriculum (e.g., Plato, Aristophanes, Thucydides) is still taught to these students and the few who begin with Classical instead of Hellenistic Greek. The Classics Department has made it possible for students at the senior level to include courses on the poetry of Catullus, the Roman elegists, Vergil, Sallust, Cicero, and even the *Institutes* of Justinian for those with legal interests.

UNIVERSITY OF THE ORANGE FREE STATE

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At the University of the Orange Free State there are Departments of Greek and Latin. Since most students in the Greek Department are studying theology, they are primarily interested in Hellenistic Greek. Recently the Department has been involved in the development of a computer-assisted course for beginning language students. The Latin Department teaches about two hundred students. Scholtemeijer and Hasse's *Legal Latin* is used as a handbook in an evening beginners' course, while the Classics-oriented day course is based on the *Oxford Latin Course*. In addition, the Department regularly has postgraduate students at the M.A. and Ph.D. levels. Recently three Ph.D. theses were produced and this year two students have registered for the M.A. degree.

The Latin Department attempts to be of service to the broader community. Involvement in a language-oriented bridging course is envisaged. For the past sixteen years Louis Van Ryneveld has organised a Latin Day for all Orange Free State Latin pupils. In addition, the Department has started a Ludus Latinus at the University. The project is aimed at acquainting Standard 5 (Year 7/Form 1) pupils with classical culture and the principles of the Latin language.

Research in the Latin Department is concentrated in the fields of Roman history, classical drama, poetry of the fourth century, and comparative work on Vergil and Dante. Dirk Coetzee has just completed a doctoral thesis in which he applies a narratological approach to Prudentius' *Liber Peristephanon*; a reappraisal of early Christian Latin poetry may result from this work. The Department is also involved jointly in a project with the Department of Roman Law to translate into English Felicius-Boxelinus' *Tractatus de Societate*, a neglected source for Roman-Dutch Law from the early seventeenth century.

RAND AFRIKAANS UNIVERSITY

Bill Hendrickx

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Johannesburg 2000

The Department of Greek and Latin Studies at Rand Afrikaans University offers undergraduate and postgraduate courses in Ancient Greek, Modern Greek (also by correspondence) and Latin as well as a two-year course in Classical Culture. In Ancient Greek 1-3 the focus is on Biblical and Patristic Greek.

Postgraduate students can study Homer as well as Sefiris. In Latin a balance is maintained between classical and Christian culture and legal studies.

Our staff, consisting of three professors, two senior lecturers, two lecturers and a number of part-time lecturers, is very actively involved in research of which the spectrum is remarkably diverse (e.g., Greek and Latin lyric poetry, emotions in ancient historiography, late Latin poets, New Testament studies, the Greeks in Africa, Byzantine manuscripts and official documents, and the Crusaders' impact on the Greek world). Numerous articles in national and international periodicals as well as books have been published by members of the Department.

The variety of courses offered and the broad spectrum of research and teaching activities reflect the Department's philosophy that Greek and Latin studies should not be isolated from other disciplines or limited to an ivory tower approach. They also reflect the belief that the study of Greek and Latin throughout the ages remains a living science in that it contributes to contemporary social values and requirements.

The Department publishes two periodicals: the scholarly accredited *Ekklesiastikos Pharos* and the popular *Lewende Woorde*. With almost five hundred students, the Department is one of the largest Greco-Latin departments in South Africa.

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

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Since the future of Classics at Wits will depend to a large extent on the success of the Classical Civilisation sequence once the Latin requirement for Law is abolished, the Department has worked hard over the past couple of years at restructuring and improving these courses.

Classical Civilisation 1 is taught on two diagonals to enable us to attract a greater number of students (the total enrolment in 1993 was 123; in 1994 it dropped alarmingly to 52). The course used to consist of a half-year of Greek history and literature and a half-year of Roman history and literature, a somewhat rigid structure that we have abandoned in favour of a more flexible, socio-historical approach. In 1994 the course contains eight sections of twelve lectures each on the following topics: An Outline of Greek History (c. 600-323 BC); Homer's *Iliad*; An Outline of Roman History (218 BC to AD 180); Greek Mythology; Ancient Egypt; Love and Sexuality in the Ancient World; Death, the Individual and Society in the Ancient World; and Cicero and Roman Society.

One of our problems in recent years has been the drastic drop in enrolments from Classical Civilisation 1 to Classical Civilisation 2 (in which we had nine

students in 1993). In an attempt to improve this situation, we are, from 1994, offering Classical Civilisation 2/3 on two timetable slots (diagonals), which is to say, two separate courses will be taught, either of which can be taken by students at either second or third-year level. This means that students who were in the past unable to take Classical Civilisation 2 because it clashed with one of their other subjects now have the option of taking it on another timetable slot. Third-year students are required to do more reading and more written work than second-years. Obviously students who proceed to Classical Civilisation 3 have no choice but to take the course they did not do in Classical Civilisation 2. On diagonal A the components offered are Ancient Epic, The Ancient Novel, Rome of the Caesars, and Philip and Alexander; the components offered on diagonal D are The Golden Age of Greece, The Fall of the Roman Republic, Ancient Art, and Ancient Drama. In addition, two components from each diagonal—Ancient Epic and The Ancient Novel from component D, and Ancient Art and Ancient Drama from component A—are being offered as separate half-courses in different halves of the year. These may be taken by any students at second-year level or above whether or not they have completed Classical Civilisation 1. (Faculty regulations do not permit first-year students to register for half-courses.) Those taking the half-courses are taught together with the Classical Civilisation 2/3 students so that staff are not burdened by additional teaching. It is hoped that these half-courses will appeal to a wide range of students in the Arts Faculty, particularly those studying modern European languages, art history, and drama and film.

Over the past few years we have had a steady trickle of students proceeding to Honours in Ancient History from Classical Civilisation 3. Students intending to pursue an Honours degree in Ancient History are not required to complete any courses in Greek or Latin, although they are encouraged to do so; many students, in fact, take one or more language courses prior to beginning this Honours degree. A pattern is now emerging whereby students choose to complete Honours in Ancient History part-time over two years and to enrol in Greek and Latin courses at the same time. Therefore it appears that the Classical Civilisation sequence is stimulating an interest in the ancient languages among the better students.

IN THE MUSEUM

Scholia publishes news about the University of Natal's Museum of Classical Archaeology. Information about Classical exhibitions and artefacts in other museums is welcome and should reach the In the Museum Editor, Scholia by 30 June.

MUSEUM OF CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF NATAL

TWO YOUTHS FROM BOEOTIA

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Abstract. Two hitherto unpublished Boeotian terracotta figurines in the Museum of Classical Archaeology, University of Natal, Durban, exemplify the recognised type of the naked, standing youth holding a cock.

Boeotia is an area of Greece which has yielded rich finds of terracotta figurines. From the fifth century on, some of these are of good quality, although they tend to represent figures according to a limited number of types. The Museum of Classical Archaeology has on loan two Boeotian figurines datable stylistically to the fourth century BC, each of which conforms to the common type of the standing, naked youth wearing a *himation* (cloak), which is arranged symmetrically over his shoulders so as to cover his back and sides, and holding a cock in the crook of his left arm (Pl.1).¹ Both figurines are made in the same manner: hollow-moulded, with a hand-made, unfeathered back. The underside of the base is open, but neither piece has the customary large, rectangular vent in the back.

The larger figurine (L.1989.N.209: Pl.2a),² which stands 332mm in total

¹ All photographs by the author. Some other examples of the type are: R. A. Higgins, *Catalogue of the Terracottas in the Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities, British Museum 1* (London 1969) cat. nos. 822-30, 852, 854, 870; Oxford 1893.96; Boston 1897.44; and see below, n. 6. The help of B. B. Shefton in relating the Durban figurines to this terracotta-type is acknowledged with gratitude.

² Loaned by the Durban Natural Science Museum through the goodwill of Brett Hendey. Although there is no recorded provenience or source of acquisition, this piece and the other figurine (see below, n. 5) are believed to have been donated to the Durban Municipal Museums early in the present century, perhaps by the same benefactor. This figurine is recomposed from twenty-seven fragments with a few minor pieces missing from the neck and from the back. The clay is brown, misfired slightly darker in patches on the base.

height (including the 58mm base), is the more delicately modelled, particularly with regard to the facial features (Pl.3a) where the almond-shaped eyes are defined by clearly marked upper and lower eyelids; tiny indentations under the nose mark the nostrils and the lips are given some shaping. There are three horizontal grooves on the neck under the chin, detectable despite the fragmentation in this area. The elaborate hair-style, which might seem more appropriate for a woman, is not uncommon on figurines of this type in the fourth century BC, when there seems to have been a fashion for youths to adopt such mannerisms: parted in the middle, the piled-up curls are represented by rows of comma-shaped impressions in the clay. Originally the figure was painted to make it more lifelike, as was usual with such terracottas,³ and a few faint traces remain: the hair seems to have been reddish-brown, while on the neck there are vestiges of the pink colour that was applied to all the flesh.

The youth stands with his weight on his right leg, his left at ease; in a contrapposto typical of the post-Polykleitan period his right arm hangs loosely at his side, while in the crook of his left arm he holds a cock very rudimentarily depicted (Pl.3c: the original paint would have helped to make it identifiable). The *déhanchement* of the hips is marked, although the curve of the upper torso does not correspond. The pectorals are smoothly modelled, the ribs are indicated by three horizontal incisions to either side of the *sternum*, and a small, round indentation marks the navel. The gently-rounded lower abdomen is divided from the upper thighs by two grooves running down into the groin. The genitals are small⁴ but accurately observed.

The folds of the *himation* are quite detailed, although only indicated on the front of the figure, forming abstract patterns which subtly enhance the curves of the naked body. The figure's right forearm emerges from the fall of cloth, the hand loosely grasping a fold. The drapery suggests that the optimal viewpoint was perhaps intended to be from about thirty degrees to the viewer's right of directly in front, as the folds extend further around on the figure's left side than on the right.

The second figurine (L.1989.M.123: Pl.2b)⁵ is considerably smaller, at a total height of 222mm (including a base 31mm high). The detail is much less finely executed than on the first figurine: on the torso the musculature is indicated by grooves, apparently incised before firing, rather than by modulated planes, and further incised grooves mark the figure's right leg off from the background. The facial features are not very precise, the eyes being formed by an eyelid above and an incised line below, while the mouth is cut into the lower face and the lips are not shaped (Pl.3b).

³ After the mid-sixth century, the technique was to paint in matt colours over a white slip applied directly to the clay.

⁴ On genital size see K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (London 1978) 125f.

⁵ Loaned by the Durban Local History Museum through the goodwill of Gillian Berning. Intact, with clay consistent in colour and slightly lighter than the other figurine.

The hair is arranged after the same fashion as the first figurine, but capped by a headdress that resembles the muzzle of Herakles' customary lionskin.⁶ The folds of the *himation* are not numerous and are largely confined to the shoulder area; however, the cock on the youth's left arm is the more recognisable for having a defined comb (Pl.3d).

The purpose for which these figurines were produced is not clear. Most Greek terracottas tend to represent deities or heroes, in which case Ganymede would be a possibility, but these figures are more likely to be young men. The cock is clearly to be regarded as a significatory attribute; although it is true that cocks were sacrificed to certain gods such as Asklepios and Dionysos⁷, in this context the fighting cock as a status symbol and indicator of social class seems more probable.⁸ Such cocks seem to have been a common love-gift from *erastes* to *eromenos*;⁹ it seems likely to suggest, given the youthfulness of the figures in this standard type, that the figurines were produced in this connection and were intended to serve as votives or grave-offerings. An unusual variation of the type in the British Museum¹⁰ has the youth holding a puppy instead of a cock on his left arm, while an adult dog (a bitch?) stands behind his legs. Higgins suggests that 'he is probably, like the cock-holding figures, merely a young man with his pets'.¹¹ It is open to conjecture, however, whether dogs may also have served as love-gifts,¹² in which case the inference can stand.

⁶ Compare an earlier figurine of the same type with the same kind of 'cap', from the Basel market: *Münzen und Medaillen* (October 1987) 52.

⁷ See W. Burkert, *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche* (Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln-Mainz 1977) 101, esp. n. 2. Compare also a Boeotian protome of a youthful Dionysos holding some of his attributes, including a cock on his left arm (Higgins [1] cat. no. 874).

⁸ As is noted by H Hoffmann, 'Hahnenkampf in Athen. Zur Ikonologie einer attischen Bildformel', *Revue archéologique* (1974), 212.

⁹ As is illustrated in the sixth century on the reverse of the black-figure amphora attributed to Group E, Vatican 352 (J. D. Beazley, *Attic Black-figure Vase-painting* [Oxford 1956] 134,30), where a number of men are evidently pursuing the favours of a youth, two holding cocks; on this see Dover [4] 92. In the fifth century Ganymede is specifically represented holding a cock on a bell krater attributed to the Berlin Painter (Louvre G 175, J. D. Beazley, *Attic Red-figure Vase-Painters*² [Oxford 1963] 206,124) and in the early Classical terracotta group at Olympia Ganymede holds a cock as he is carried off by Zeus.

¹⁰ Higgins [1] cat. no. 871.

¹¹ Higgins [1] 232.

¹² There are two dogs in the courting scene on the black-figure amphora referred to above (n. 9), although they are not being carried as love-gifts generally are; cf. Aristophanes, *Plut.* 157, where hunting dogs (along with horses) are named as love-gifts, and see Dover [4] 92.




Plate 1: Durban L.1989.M.123 (left) and Durban L.1989.N.209



Plate 2: a. Durban L.1989.N.209



b. Durban L.1989.M.123



Plate 3: a. Durban L.1989.N.209: head
c. Durban L.1989.N.209: cock

b. Durban L.1989.M.123: head
d. Durban L.1989.M.123: cock

B. X. DE WET ESSAY

The paper judged to be the best undergraduate essay submitted to Scholia by 30 June for the preceding year is published annually as the B. X. de Wet Essay. The competition is open to undergraduate students every year and to Honours students in even-numbered years. Classics Departments in Africa are encouraged to send their submissions to Dr Jo-Marie Claassen, Department of Latin, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch 7600, South Africa. Papers should not ordinarily exceed 3 000 words in length. The author of the essay chosen for publication should be prepared to edit it if so requested. There is a prize of R100.

This essay is named in honour of Emeritus Professor B. X. de Wet, who was Head of the Department of Classics at the University of Natal, Durban from 1975-89.

IS ARISTOPHANES A FEMINIST?¹

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Take off your coats and feel the heart beneath:
We're women, and our wrath is in our teeth!

By a modern reader these words can easily be read as an impassioned feminist declaration. The speaker is calling on women to recognise and assert their common humanity and solidarity. As she is a member of the socially oppressed gender, her declaration demands that the oppressors—men—take cognisance of this humanity and solidarity and, by implication, the bold statement also serves as a warning of women's potential strength as a mobilised force. She is thus articulating the collective voice of women who are saying, 'We have had enough. We will take no more.' Yet when the source of the extract is identified as Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*,² a Greek comedy written in 411 BC, one must necessarily be cautious in accepting a feminist interpretation without re-evaluating the extract with precisely these contextual key points in mind: 411 BC, comedy and Aristophanes. The question whether Aristophanes can be regarded as a feminist is problematic, yet it can be treated and made more manageable by focusing on three main issues.

¹ Thanks are due to Professor A. E. Voss, Dr W. J. Dominik, and Mrs A. P. Bevis for reading this essay and making many valuable suggestions.

² The lines cited above are from *Lysistrata* 685f. Translations of *Lysistrata* in this essay are those of A. H. Sommerstein, *Aristophanes: The Acharnians, The Clouds, Lysistrata* (Harmondsworth 1973).

First, one must examine whether there was any heightened awareness of women and their social position that can accurately be described as feminist in ancient Greece, particularly in the late fifth and early fourth centuries when Aristophanes wrote his comedies. This issue involves an historical consideration of men's attitudes toward women and women's self-perception in order to determine whether women were satisfied or dissatisfied with their lot. It is also necessary to redefine the term 'feminist' to prevent the anachronistic inaccuracy that can occur when attempting to impose modern concepts or terminology—such as feminism or Marxism—on an ancient society. For the purposes of this paper 'feminist' will therefore be a broad term denoting an awareness of womanhood as a socially oppressed category and discontentment with this ethos rather than the explicit advocacy of women's rights on a basis of the equality of the sexes, as the term is often used today.

The second issue is whether Aristophanes can be viewed as deliberately advocating a feminist perspective in his plays, bearing in mind that he is writing comedy. As a mechanism of his comedy Aristophanes delights in employing humorous paradoxes and absolute absurdity. Therefore his plays where women take on positions of political and social authority may be no more serious than Peisetaerus and Euelpides escaping from Athens and building Cloudcuckooland in the sky in *Birds*. This involves the question of the role of comedy, that is, whether it is purely for entertainment or whether, through entertainment, it conveys a message or satirises society.

Thirdly, a question that needs to be addressed is whether one can accurately determine Aristophanes' own perspective on the comic situations he presents in his plays. Aristophanes himself is in fact very elusive to the audience and to the reader. This is largely due to the second point above: the comic mechanism of absurd extremes and his conflicting roles of entertainer of audiences and contestant for a prize on the one hand and his duty as a social satirist and teacher on the other. One must question whether it is in fact possible to label Aristophanes, with any degree of certainty, as anything other than a comedian whose personal ideology may or may not be subordinated to these roles.

The question of men's and women's perceptions of what 'womanhood' meant in the ancient world is not without difficulties. This is because the ancient Greek literature that survives is predominantly written by Athenian men from the wealthier and more educated classes of society. Consequently there is very little written about women of other city states, with the exception of Sparta, whose women were different and somewhat of a curiosity. Since there is very little literature written about women by women themselves, it is difficult to detect women's self-perception. Women's silence in the spheres of literature and philosophy therefore becomes important evidence in the assessment of their social position. Because the literature is written by members of the socially ascendant groups, Wilkinson points

out that we know little about the poor.³ Comedy deals with the average person in Athens and in this aspect is more socially representative than epic and tragedy, in which the protagonists are usually mythological and heroic in stature. In addition, it is necessary to distinguish the citizen women from the 'other' women in Athens at the time. There were many non-citizen women or *xenai*, such as slaves, concubines and *hetairai*, who had considerably more social and intellectual freedom than citizen women. Since Aristophanes deals largely with average citizen women, the emphasis in determining women's self-perception must tend toward them.

Attitudes toward women can be traced in the work of Homer and Hesiod. Women appear in the Homeric epics either as goddesses or as daughters with some kind of divine parentage or as wives and daughters of prominent mortals, characters that by Aristotle's definition, like the characters of tragedy, are better than the average person in society and larger than life (*Poet.* 2.22). Locating the attitudes of Homer or the tragedians toward ordinary women is a complex task. In Hesiod evidence of a misogynistic attitude toward women becomes apparent. *Works and Days* gives the myth of the origin of women in terms of a punishment inflicted on men by Zeus. Hesiod describes the creation of Pandora by the Gods, saying that in making her Hermes used 'lies, tricky speeches and a thieving heart'⁴ (*Op.* 76f.). Here Hesiod articulates a stereotype of the degenerate character of women and enforces it with divine authority. Semonides shows a similar attitude in his poem on the female mind. He describes different types of women in terms of animals or elements that exhibit negative qualities which he wishes to expose as characteristic of the female gender. Although Semonides acknowledges that not all women are the same and briefly admits that there is one kind of woman that displays good qualities—the bee-type—he arrives at the indictment that women are 'the worst plague Zeus has made' (*On Women*).⁵

Semonides' 'bee-woman' is probably a valid picture of the generic concept of a good citizen woman, with regard to her domestic duties and social function (both clearly defined), that was predominant in the fifth century BC. A woman's foremost duty was to be a good wife and incorporated into this role was the bearing and rearing of children and the domestic administration of the household, which included managing the house-slaves efficiently, cooking and baking, supervising and taking part in the preparation of wool and its spinning and weaving. Women's primary function was therefore in the home and hence they spent a lot of time there. There is evidence that they were allowed out to attend religious festivals and important family gatherings like weddings and funerals or to attend to a relative or neighbour in childbirth. There is evidence to suggest that women were able to go for walks on occasion, but when they did leave their homes they were expected to

³ L. P. Wilkinson, *Classical Attitudes to Modern Issues* (London 1978) 50.

⁴ Tr. M. R. Lefkowitz, in M. R. Lefkowitz and M. B. Fant (edd.), *Women's Life in Greece and Rome* (London 1982) 13.

⁵ Tr. H. Lloyd-Jones, in Lefkowitz and Fant [4] 16.

be appropriately dressed and accompanied by a chaperone. So it appears that women were largely secluded from contact with the outside world.

The extreme nature of such social restriction should, however, be looked at in the context of the *polis* or city-state mentality of the fifth century BC, which in Athens was characterised by an emphasis on community and state values. The system of government was a democracy in which citizens (*astoi*) possessed the right to participate in the running of the state through participation in institutions like the *ekklesia* or the *boule*. Athenian citizenship was therefore highly valued and jealously guarded. It was important that citizens had legitimate children whose paternity was indisputable and many of the social practices of this period were motivated by a fear of adultery. Laws and social structures sought to preserve legitimacy, citizenship and hence the *polis*. Women's bondage to the home in the fifth century became a social necessity that was prompted by a kind of psychological necessity: women had to be kept secluded from men to maintain the legitimate inheritance of citizen rights and to keep the state in the hands of true Athenians.

In addition to their physical seclusion, women suffered exclusion from the authoritative and decision-making bodies and institutions of the state such as the *boule* and the *ekklesia*. Although women were citizens (*astai*), they did not participate in the political or legal mechanisms of the state. Women had no political or legal status and actions in law could only be brought or defended on their behalf by their guardians. Despite this exclusion in the public sphere there is evidence that women were interested in politics and law and that they discussed public affairs with their husbands.⁶ This interest was probably not deemed naturally feminine and the stereotype of women's natural character as irrational, silly, lying, thieving, promiscuous and flirtatious was still firmly entrenched.

Was there any kind of feminist consciousness emerging in the fifth century within which Aristophanes and in particular his plays about women (*Lysistrata*, the *Thesmophoriazousae* and the *Ecclesiazousae*) can be contextualised? In the *Republic* Plato proposes that women should be given more social responsibility (5.451c-461e.) In the *Laws*, however, he comments in response to the idea of letting women eat out with men that 'there is nothing the sex is likely to put up with more reluctantly: women have got used to a life of obscurity and retirement, and any attempt to force them into the open will provoke tremendous resistance from them' (6.781c).⁷ Here Plato puts forward the view that women were content with their traditionally defined role in society and accepted their confinement to domestic life.

⁶ The Neaera trial can be used to illustrate women's interest in public affairs and as evidence that they spoke to men about what was happening in the law courts and the political arenas. [Pseudo-]Demosthenes asks the jurors at the trial how they will answer to their wives, daughters or mothers if they acquit Neaera. He describes hypothetical conversations where the women interrogate their men and voice their anger at the (supposed) acquittal (*Against Neaera* 110f.).

⁷ Tr. T. J. Saunders, in Lefkowitz and Fant [4] 72.

Henderson explains this as being because that role was the point from which Greek women 'drew their civic identity and safety'.⁸ It is quite plausible that women who were treated as inferior and expected to be subservient on the basis of their origin and by virtue of their nature internalised the notion and regarded as natural a position that was continuously being reinforced by social institutions. Furthermore, their importance in the production of legitimate citizens may have placated them, particularly in view of the community mind-set of the *polis* to which the whims of the individual were subordinated.

Plato's argument that women should be given more responsibility is significant. Although philosophers during the so-called Sophistic Enlightenment of the late fifth and fourth centuries were not 'feminists' in the modern sense (Aristotle says that 'both a woman and a slave have their particular virtues even though the former of these is inferior to a man and the latter is completely ignoble',⁹ *Poet.* 15.6-8), they represent an awareness of women in their questioning of traditional attitudes and beliefs and are an important step toward the partial emancipation of women that occurred in the Hellenistic Age. Wilkinson says that 'preconceptions about women, as about everything else, began to loosen up in the so-called Sophistic Enlightenment'.¹⁰ He draws attention to the point that because Athens was engaged in war and many men were away on campaign for extended periods, women assumed greater importance, since an emergency often necessitates the relinquishing of clearly defined social roles.¹¹ But the changes that occurred from the Classical to the Hellenistic Age can largely be ascribed to the complex process of the declining power and disintegration of the city-state system and the rise of a power such as Macedonia. With these developments, fuelled by the intellectual revolution, the Greek world entered an age of introspection and individualism.

Aristophanes can therefore be contextualised into the continuum of Greek history at the point where Athens had reached its peak as a *polis* and was already on the path of its decline. The legitimacy of its social structures was being questioned and the community was in crisis, the fiasco of the Sicilian expedition was recent and further war posed an ominous reality. Aristophanes was contemporary with the earlier philosophers of the Sophistic Enlightenment. Could Aristophanes therefore in his women's plays be seen as a precursor of the increasing consciousness of women's issues that gathers momentum in the ensuing centuries? Can he be classified as a feminist in embryo—an analogy that allows Aristophanes to be a conscious or unconscious feminist—or does he merely reinforce the stereotype through his comic technique? In considering these questions, I shall examine briefly Aristophanes' three most 'feminist' dramas (*Lysistrata*,

⁸ J. Henderson (ed.), *Aristophanes' Lysistrata* (Oxford 1987) xxxiii.

⁹ Tr. L. Golden (ed.), *Aristotle's Poetics* (New Jersey 1968) 27.

¹⁰ Wilkinson [3] 62.

¹¹ Wilkinson [3] 62.

Thesmophoriazusae and *Ecclesiazusae*), his use of absurdity, humorous paradox and farce, and the general role of the comedian in Athenian society.

In *Lysistrata* the women citizens of Athens, at the instigation of the protagonist Lysistrata and in collaboration with the Spartan women, formulate a plan to end the war. The plan involves taking over the state treasury on the Acropolis and forcing the men to sign a peace treaty by sexually starving them. The Athenian women once again take action in the *Thesmophoriazusae*. Enraged with Euripides' slanderous portrayal of women in his plays, they assemble at the women's festival, the Thesmophoria, to condemn him to death. Euripides has sent his uncle Mnesilochus, disguised as a woman, to defend him, but Mnesilochus is revealed and held captive at the Temple of Demeter Thesmophoros. In the *Ecclesiazusae* the women disguise themselves as men and attend the assembly where they vote (as men) that the assembly should be handed over to the women. All three plays contain substantial 'feminist' elements and many 'feminist' speeches.

Lysistrata shows an assertiveness that suggests modern stereotypes of 'feminists'. When she first comes into contact with the magistrate she reacts to the order to tie her hands with a bold challenging statement, 'By Artemis, if he so much as touches me, I'll teach him to know his place' (435f.). She thus challenges the figure of male authority by identifying herself as a figure antagonistic to it and to the stereotype of the passive and subservient woman.¹² Her declaration that the women will control the treasury because Athens is squandering money on the war exhibits an understanding of an area of society that was traditionally kept remote from women. Her long speech (507-32) demands that she and (by implication) all women be heard and taken seriously. She speaks of the way women are treated, considered ignorant and expected to keep quiet when it comes to matters of war when they in fact have valuable advice to offer. Later she questions the ethics of the society where women play an important role in war by producing soldiers, yet which denies them an opinion on military matters: 'For one thing we've given you our sons and then had to send them off to fight' (589). She points out that the women have perceived the way the war has been mismanaged and the blunders that have been made and thus asserts a case for the intelligence of women. This is reinforced when she declares, 'I am a woman but I am not brainless' (1124). Calling Lysistrata a 'heroine' (540) and a 'child of valiant ancestors of stinging nettle stock' (548f.), Stratyllis is supportive of Lysistrata and encourages her not to give up her resistance. She also puts forward a consciousness of the women's common humanity in the bold statement that introduces this paper (685f.). The chorus of Athenian women contribute to the 'feminist' appearance of the play in their praise of the women: 'I'll dance forever, never will I tire to aid our champions

¹² It should be pointed out that this assertive, challenging woman may alternatively have been included for the comic potential envisaged in so outrageous and impossible a creature in the fifth century BC, as the discussion of Aristophanes' comic mechanisms of absurdity will bring to attention.

here. For theirs is courage, wisdom, beauty, fire; and Athens they hold dear' (541-47).

In the *Thesmophoriazusae* the assertiveness of the First Woman (Micca) parallels that of Lysistrata, although her part is not as large. She speaks boldly and with the same tone of urgency and determination. The chorus of women praises the eloquence of the First and Second Women: 'I've never heard a woman speak with such assurance, such technique' (433-35).¹³ In so doing the chorus endorses what the women are saying and exhibits the average Athenian woman's support of them. These words also divulge information about women's status in fifth century Athenian society: the chorus are surprised to hear a woman speaking out so well because they were not ordinarily given much opportunity of speaking out in public.¹⁴ But the most direct feminist sentiment appears in the *parabasis*, where the chorus leader steps forward and addresses the audience. She says, 'It's time we women stood up for ourselves and glorified the name of a sex that nobody praises much and everyone seems to blame' (785-88). She articulates the oppressed position of women and utters a general discontentment with it. The chorus supports her by asking whether the audience has ever heard of 'banditesses', 'kidnapperesses' or 'female pirates' (815f.), thereby pointing out the absurdity of the social persecution of women and asserting their worth by contrasting women with characteristically male deviants such as bandits, kidnappers and pirates. The *Ecclesiazusae* also has a sharp and eloquent protagonist who is responsible for devising the master plan and leading the women in their execution of it. Praxagora is a 'feminist figure' in her assertions that women have the ability to save the city and are capable of running society though men have denied them the opportunity. The chorus also praises her for her eloquence just as the choruses in *Lysistrata* and *Thesmophoriazusae* praise their respective protagonists.

It is largely the nature of the aforementioned speeches that would prompt a 'feminist' interpretation of the plays and as such attach the label to Aristophanes. Yet one cannot make such a deduction merely on the strength of the content of part of the plays. The question is far more complex than this simple reading and one needs to consider other elements in the play, the mechanism of comedy, the role of the comic poet and the audience for which he (Aristophanes) writes, before one can answer the question satisfactorily.

The role of the comedian in the fifth century was multi-dimensional. He was a provider of entertainment at the festival and also a competitor for a prize. The use of bawdiness or obscenity, the reversals of conventional social roles and the employing of absurdity and paradox are characteristic features of comedy. These elements are largely what would have kept the audience entertained and contributed

¹³ Translations of the *Thesmophoriazusae* are those of D. Barrett, *Aristophanes: The Frogs and Other Plays* (Harmondsworth 1964).

¹⁴ On the other hand the chorus, in so saying, could be expressing surprise that a woman is *capable* of speaking well at all.

to the success of the plays. As already stated the poet was writing for a particular audience and with the goal of winning the prize at the festival in mind. Aristophanes would have wanted his play to be popular with the audience and particularly with the judges; the composition of the audience is important in assessing whether Aristophanes can be regarded as a feminist or not.

Scholars disagree on whether women attended the theatre. Ehrenberg¹⁵ and Chapman¹⁶ both feel that women did not attend dramatic performances, but Wilkinson and Dover¹⁷ believe the opposite is probably true. Dover convincingly argues for the presence of women at dramatic performances but describes them as being second-rate members of the audience along with the slaves, children and foreigners. According to Dover, the fact that Aristophanes addresses his audience in the masculine does not mean that women were not at the theatre but rather that it was men, with their conservative attitudes toward women and women's roles, who were the important spectators. It was the men's opinions that 'determined the standing and reputation of the poet'.¹⁸ It seems unlikely that Aristophanes would have jeopardised his chances of winning the prize or his popularity by seriously advocating a feminist perspective to an audience of such a chauvinist nature. With this point in mind, can one not speculate that women in the plays portrayed in positions of power, Aristophanes' 'feminists', are absurd paradoxes? We do not suspect for one minute that Aristophanes seriously suggests that building an empire in the sky in *Birds* is a credible means of escaping the political and legal corruption in Athens. The solution he offers is an absurd paradox, a 'flight of imaginative humour'.¹⁹ The plays of Aristophanes derive much of their comic success from their utterly inconceivable, purely fantastic plots. Why then should *Lysistrata*, *Micca* or *Praxagora* in positions of power be anything other than this kind of paradox?

Aristophanes further informs the audience that they are not to regard seriously the 'feminist' elements in the plays by continually undermining them. No matter how noble and convincing the protagonists are or how eloquently they speak, the 'feminist' direction of the plays is undercut severely in a number of ways. In *Lysistrata* the undermining of the 'feminist' element occurs in the continuous derogatory interjections about women by the male characters, for instance, the magistrate (387-99, 403-30, 433-35), the male chorus leader, who says, 'Our noble magistrate, why waste your words on these sub-human creatures' (468), and the chorus of men, which says, 'Impossible, incredible! Our women if you please! We've kept and fed within our doors a pestilent disease' (256-61). Their comments

¹⁵ V. Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes* (Oxford 1962) 148.

¹⁶ G. A. H. Chapman, *Women in Protest* (Durban 1980) 29, 58.

¹⁷ Wilkinson [3] 56; K. J. Dover, *Aristophanic Comedy* (London 1972) 17.

¹⁸ Dover [17] 17.

¹⁹ Dover [17] 159.

constantly serve to reinforce the female stereotype, preventing the (predominantly) male audience from taking the women too seriously. This form of undercutting is supplemented by the women's own denigratory self-perceptions. Calonice's response to Lysistrata's remark that the salvation of Greece is in the women's hands is, 'In our hands? We might as well give up then' (31). She also says, 'The women! What could they ever do that was any use?' (42).

The male stereotype of women is also often reinforced through the actions and words of the women. Lysistrata says in frustration, 'I didn't know women were so far beyond redemption. The tragic poets are right about us after all; all we're interested in is having our fun and then getting rid of the baby' (137-39). There is frequent joking and parodying of women stereotyped as nymphomaniacs, alcoholics, by nature unreliable, inconsistent and fickle. The play opens with Lysistrata impatiently waiting for the women to arrive: they are late! *Ecclesiazusae* also opens in this way: Praxagora is waiting and complaining about how unreliable the women are. When Lysistrata announces the method her plan involves, the women, who have just declared they will walk through fire or cut themselves in half to end the war, change their minds because they enjoy sex too much—more than they desire peace, it seems, which makes the audience wonder how serious they are in wanting to achieve their goal. Their lack of commitment is further parodied in the scene where the women try to escape from the Acropolis to go home and in the ridiculous excuses they use.

Finally, however, the women achieve their goal: the men make peace with Sparta. Yet the audience feels that the men only sign the treaty because they are forced to do so through sexual deprivation, not because they have been persuaded by the eloquence and intelligent arguments of the women. This surely undermines a feminist interpretation of the play.²⁰ Furthermore, once the peace has been achieved, the women will return to their normal lives; they will not continue in their adopted assertive roles. Aristophanes' final portrait of women in *Lysistrata* is not one in which they are trying to bring about social change but rather one where they are attempting to restore their 'domestic normality'²¹ and return things to the *status quo*. Is Aristophanes not therefore rather the opposite of a 'feminist', since he depicts his women doing what Plato describes in the *Laws*, that is, resisting the changes to their domestic status (the sphere from which women traditionally derived their civic identity) brought about by war?

There are similar 'un-feminist' elements in the *Thesmophoriazusae*. There are Mnesilochus' words in which he issues a catalogue of the vices and secrets of women (555-57, 558f., 560-63). The women's self-denigration in the words of the

²⁰ However, one must note that Aristophanic comedy by convention always ends on a high note with a resolution that is favourable to most characters. Thus, by concluding *Lysistrata* in this fashion Aristophanes may merely be complying with the convention and may not be deliberately undermining the 'feminist' perspective in the play.

²¹ Henderson [8] xxxii.

chorus leader ('Nothing can be worse than a shameless woman—except another woman', 531f.) must have roused much laughter and nodding of heads in the audience, especially since the major 'feminist' speech in the play comes from her mouth (785-813, 830-46). In this speech she asserts that women are not taken seriously and are persecuted unjustly. Her 'feminist' speech, however, occurs directly after the farcical episode where Mnesilochus snatches the First Woman's baby (which is in fact a skin of wine) and sacrifices it. The First Woman's desperate attempts to save her 'child' and passionate cries ('No, no, I implore you, no! Do what you like to me, I'll take her place', 751f.) are hilarious, but they do not do much for the dignity of the First Woman's character and the seriousness of her intentions. After this episode the sentiments expressed in her speech would probably not have been taken very seriously at all. The reception of the audience more likely would have been something like, 'I'm not surprised'. Through mockery the episode also toys with the serious social role of women: motherhood.

The end of the *Thesmophoriazusae* similarly undercuts a feminist interpretation of the play. Initially the women were enraged with Euripides and intent on passing the death sentence on him. Euripides was very anxious about the meeting they were going to hold and afraid for his life. But somehow at the conclusion of the play Euripides has the upper hand: he has bargaining power. He offers them a deal: 'If I can only get him [Mnesilochus] away, you'll never hear another bad word from me' (1166). He does not at any point apologise; in fact, he follows his 'deal' with a threat: 'But if you refuse to help, I'll—when your husbands come back from war I'll tell them everything that has been going on at home' (1167). This is acceptable to the women, who agree without hesitation, and their original energy and passionate intentions to punish Euripides are defused.²²

The comedian's role as entertainer and his use of absurdity, paradox and obscenity do not negate his ability to offer serious social and political satire or, as Henderson says, to make 'true observation' and give 'just advice'.²³ Aristophanes skilfully isolates events, issues and contemporary controversies of direct relevance to the audience he addresses.²⁴ Aristophanes' role was not a revolutionary one nor one that prescribed what people should think or feel in the given circumstances. Rather, his comedy is largely descriptive of the way average Athenian citizens were thinking. Greek comedy can be viewed as some sort of barometer or mirror of society, giving valuable insight into that society and utterance to the average Athenian's opinions about it. Chapman qualifies the concept of a 'mirror', saying

²² Chapman deduces that 'the original *Thesmophoriazusae* is not really a play about women's liberation' and he offers ways in which the play could be adapted to give it a more contemporary 'feminist' flavour: 'Euripides might be made to apologise, and even promise to help the women's lib movement in future—to give the women a clear moral victory'. Chapman [16] 80.

²³ Henderson [8] xxx.

²⁴ An example is his parody of the judicial system in *Wasps*.

that the 'mirror' is a distorted one.²⁵ In *Birds* the satire of the corruption of the legal and political systems in Athens gives a serious message, while the means of conveying it, the building of a colony in the clouds, is absurd and preposterous. In *Lysistrata* one of the serious messages is that the Athenians and Spartans are old friends, but further that peace that is acceptable to both parties is desirable, while the means of conveying the message, women taking political action, is as preposterous as the example in the *Birds*. The art in analysing Aristophanes lies in detecting the serious message of the play. The mirror of comedy can also be described as being distorted through its 'selective treatment of reality'.²⁶ This is one of the characteristics of comedy; it is not bound to be consistent with reality or certain attitudes. For this reason it is difficult to assess whether the parody of the women in the three plays means that Aristophanes is trying to burlesque them any more than he in fact wishes to make fun of the men.

Whether or not Aristophanes can be regarded as a feminist is a complex issue. If one regards the substantial 'feminist' speeches in the three women's plays as sufficient evidence (by their mere inclusion), then the answer is yes. If, however, one studies the mechanisms of other Aristophanic comedies in their use of absurdity and paradox, the undercutting of the feminist speeches, his writing for a prize and the nature of the audience, one would be inclined to answer no. It could also be argued that Aristophanes does in fact wish to propose a feminist criticism of society, but since he is well aware of his target audience and not wishing to lose popularity, he presents the feminist case and then promptly and vigorously undercuts it to make the plays less revolutionary and more acceptable to the audience, thus saving his own skin. This possibility is interesting but it must of necessity remain merely speculative.

Even if one does not accept that Aristophanes is being deliberately or consciously feminist, there exists a further possibility. His plays, though rooted in the Classical period, may reflect the gradual change in attitudes toward women and a shift in focus from the centrality of the *polis* to an emphasis on the individual, an attitude that was characteristic of the Hellenistic Age. His plays may have had a subliminal psychological effect on the audience. The mere inclusion of women taking such firm action and the 'feminist' content of the speeches may have subconsciously stirred something in the women or caused the men to re-evaluate their chauvinist attitudes even if the plays were designed to do the opposite. If this was the effect, Aristophanes could be described as an unconscious or involuntary 'feminist'. Just as easily, however, the plays could have reaffirmed the men's attitudes and reinforced their derogatory stereotyping of women. Aristophanes, by virtue of the nature of his art, is elusive, often inconsistent, and invites such speculation. What is certain is that he can be described appropriately as a comedian, an entertainer and (with regard to his comments on women) a social satirist.

²⁵ Chapman [16] ii.

²⁶ Dover [17] 43.

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