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Editor: W. J. Dominik

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Scholia features critical and pedagogical articles and reviews on a diverse range of subjects dealing with classical antiquity, including late antique, medieval, Renaissance and early modern studies related to the classical tradition; in addition, there is information about Classics programmes in African universities and schools, news about museums and articles on classical artefacts in museums in Africa, and the B. X. de Wet Essay. (Not all sections necessarily appear in any single volume.)

Manuscripts: Potential contributors should read the 'Notes for Contributors' located at the back of this volume and follow the suggested guidelines for the submission of manuscripts. Articles on classical antiquity and the teaching of Classics in Africa are particularly welcome. Submissions are usually reviewed by two referees. Time before publication decision: 2-3 months.

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EDITORIAL NOTE

This volume of *Scholia* is dedicated to Lloyd Arthur Thompson, one of the most respected classicists on the African subcontinent during the second half of the twentieth century. The dedication is intended to honour Professor Thompson for four decades of devoted service to the cause of classics in sub-Saharan Africa. The first article in this volume outlines the major events and most important publications of his career, but it only partly reflects the immense influence he has had on scholarship both within and outside Africa.¹ Professor Thompson was always supportive of *Scholia* and contributed an important article to the second volume of the new series.²

Scholia 6 also features an article by Michele Valerie Ronnick on the lives of three nineteenth-century African-American classicists.³ As in previous volumes, the subjects of the other articles in this volume, which range from Greek myth and Bacchylides to Claudian and Paulinus of Nola, reflect the broad scope of *Scholia*'s coverage of classical antiquity and the classical tradition.

This volume includes the conference proceedings of the Pacific Rim Roman Literature Seminar on 'Writing Revolution: Roman Literary Responses to Political Change' held at the University of Natal from 18th to 22nd June 1997.⁴ Organised by W. J. Dominik, this seminar attracted scholars from Australasia, North America and Africa. The publishing of these abstracts continues *Scholia*'s practice of publishing proceedings from conferences hosted by the Department of Classics at the University.⁵ For interested readers of these abstracts, some of the papers from the 'Writing Revolution' seminar will be published by E. J. Brill in a volume entitled *Flavian Rome: Culture, Image, Text* and edited by A. J. Boyle and W. J. Dominik.

The Editorial Committee wishes to express its gratitude to the Classical Association of South Africa for sponsoring the B. X. de Wet Essay competition and for subventing the cost of publishing the essay in *Scholia*. The Committee also gratefully acknowledges grants from the Centre for Science Development and the University of Natal toward the publication of this volume.

William J. Dominik
Editor, *Scholia*


¹ W. J. Dominik, 'Lloyd Arthur Thompson (1932-97): *In Memoriam*' (pp. 2-10).

² L. A. Thompson, 'Roman Perceptions of Blacks', *Scholia* ns 2 (1993) 17-30.

³ M. V. Ronnick, 'Three Nineteenth-Century Classicists of African Descent' (pp. 11-18).

⁴ 'Pacific Rim Roman Literature Seminar Proceedings. Writing Revolution: Roman Literary Responses to Political Change' (pp. 157-65).

⁵ See the proceedings of the University of Natal Roman Studies Conference in *Scholia* ns 1 (1992) 130-37 and the proceedings of the University of Natal *Epos* and *Logos* Conference in *Scholia* ns 5 (1996) 161-70.



Professor Lloyd Arthur Thompson (1932-1997)

LLOYD ARTHUR THOMPSON (1932-97): *IN MEMORIAM*

William J. Dominik

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Abstract. Lloyd Arthur Thompson (1932-97), one of the most respected classicists on the African subcontinent, devoted forty years of his life to the cause of classics in sub-Saharan Africa. The major events of his career and a list of his most important publications bear testimony to the immense influence he has had on scholarship both within and outside Africa.

This volume of *Scholia* is dedicated to Lloyd Arthur Thompson, one of Africa's most distinguished classicists of the twentieth century. Born in Barbados, West Indies, on 24th June 1932, Thompson was educated at Harrison College, Barbados, where he obtained an Oxford and Cambridge Higher Certificate with distinctions in Latin, Greek, Ancient History and Literature in 1950; the next year he achieved distinctions in the same subjects and was awarded the Hawkins Prize for *Proxime Accessit*, a competition for the prestigious Barbados Scholarship; and in 1952 he became the Barbados Scholar in Classics after obtaining his Oxford and Cambridge S-levels with distinctions in the aforementioned subjects. Thompson matriculated at St John's College, Cambridge, in 1953, winning a College Scholarship and College Prize in 1955 before being awarded his BA degree with distinction and a Thomas Exhibition in 1956; four years later he was awarded his MA degree.

After completing his BA degree Thompson married Alma Rosalind Platten on 1st September 1956. After marriage Thompson took up a position as an Assistant Lecturer in Classics at University College, Ibadan, Nigeria, an overseas college of London University, which later became the autonomous University of Ibadan in 1962. After a succession of promotions he was appointed Professor of Classics in 1967. During a career that spanned forty years at the University of Ibadan, Thompson held three Visiting Fellowships at St John's College and served as external examiner of Classics at the Universities of Ghana at Legon, Sierra Leone, the West Indies and Zimbabwe. He also held numerous administrative positions at the University of Ibadan, including three stints as Head of Classics and a period as Dean of the Faculty of Arts. He died in Cambridge on 28th August 1997 after a long illness; he is survived by his wife Alma, who lives in Cambridge, and children Kay, Nicholas and Richard.

It is for his achievements as a scholar that Thompson will be remembered most. From 1959-1994 he published numerous items, the details of which are

provided in his 'Publication List'.¹ His *Romans and Blacks*, published by Routledge in 1989, is probably the single most outstanding example of his distinguished contribution to classical scholarship. In this book Thompson argues forcefully that modern views of the ways that blacks were perceived in Roman society have been distorted by the preconceptions about 'blacks' that exist in predominantly 'white' societies; in a notable departure from previous scholars on the subject, he maintains that the Romans determined categorisation by the physical appearance of the individual person instead of according to modern notions of race involving categories such as 'black African' and 'white' with their respective group-statuses. There is arguably no greater testimony to Thompson's scholarly legacy than that *Romans and Blacks* is a book that must be consulted by any scholar examining the issue of race in classical antiquity.

The Times featured an eloquent obituary on Lloyd Thompson in its edition of 29th August 1997. It is a fitting testimonial to the standing he had in his profession and in the hearts of his colleagues and students, so I reprint it here with the Editor's permission, to supplement my brief summary of his career.

PROFESSOR LLOYD THOMPSON

Professor Lloyd Thompson, Professor of Classics at Ibadan University, Nigeria, 1967-95, died of cancer yesterday aged 65. He was born on June 24, 1932.

When Lloyd Thompson finally left the University of Ibadan in 1995, having joined the staff there less than ten years after its founding as Nigeria's first university, he was the longest-serving member of the academic staff. In nearly 40 years he had won enormous respect and affection from colleagues and students, and his special contribution was enhanced by his background and experience as a West Indian.

Lloyd Arthur Thompson was born in Barbados, and went to school at Harrison College, where the foundations of his classical scholarship and his sense of mischief were laid. In 1952 he was awarded the coveted Barbados Scholarship, and he read Classics with distinction at St John's College, Cambridge, with which he maintained lifelong connections. He began lecturing at Ibadan in 1956, in a strong department headed by John Ferguson, whom he succeeded in 1967.

Although Classics has declined in most English-speaking universities, there was a feeling in Ghana and Nigeria that only the best was good enough for Africa, and the classical tradition was perceived as important to university life. Classics had an honoured place, and Thompson played a large part in maintaining this at Ibadan. Because of his commitment to

¹ See below, pp. 5-10. Unfortunately I have not been able to provide complete details in some of the entries in this list; nor can I guarantee the accuracy of all the information provided. I thank Alma Thompson and J. A. Ilevbare of the University of Ibadan who have kindly assisted me in compiling Thompson's list of publications.

Africa, he became increasingly interested in the better understanding of the two cultures he had most at heart, the Romans and the black Africans. He collaborated with John Ferguson in writing and editing *Africa in Classical Antiquity* (1969), and in 1989 he produced his own book, *Romans and Blacks*, which was a deeply thoughtful study of what is and is not racist.

While democracy declined in Nigeria, Lloyd Thompson seized the opportunity of the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the world's oldest democracy, with the reforms of Cleisthenes at Athens, and organised a conference under the title 'Democracy, Democratisation and Africa'. Published in 1994, the papers in the book of that name constitute a challenge to the unhappy and undemocratic developments in African countries in recent years.

In 1956 Thompson married Alma Platten, whom he had met during his student days in Cambridge. Lloyd and Alma were uncle and aunt to successive generations of students, who filled their house and fed at their table. They both achieved profound insight into and affection for the young Nigerians, but never succumbed to any of the false values on offer. Lloyd was an approachable man who was friendly as well as wise.

He often acted as honest broker in difficult university affairs: people from every faction felt able to discuss their problems with him. Fearless and forthright himself, he never hesitated to express his views, even when it was dangerous to do so. His independent spirit enabled him to accept disruption and hardship with good humour and philosophic calm, and while he was disappointed to see standards decline in later years, he never gave way to cynicism or despair. Like all West Indians he was keen on cricket, and he captained the university staff team.

He is survived by his wife, a daughter and two sons.

© *The Times*, London, 29th August 1997

Publication List

1959

'Cicero as Politician: The Fight for Power and Glory', *Nigeria and the Classics* 2: 32-64.

1960

Review of E. C. Kennedy (ed.), *Caesar: De Bello Gallico III and IV*, *West African Journal of Education* (June): 92.

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1963

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1965

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1967

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1981

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1989

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1990

Principia Syntaxis Latinae (Ibadan: Floridula Publications) iii + 65 pp.

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1991

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Requiem for Lloyd
(Segun Ige²)

Worms for lunch, toads for supper.
Lloyd O Lloyd,
On your celestial journey
Do not take a bite,
For Heaven's staple food does merit your taste.

As the mighty Atlas can do no better
Than hold the world upon his shoulders,
So cannot Zeus delight himself more than cast
His thunderbolts from the high Olympus.
The cryptic riddles of Apollo,
That led Oedipus to a royal tragedy,
Led Cicero to find his destiny in the spoken word.
And whatever spirit led you to build lives in a classical fashion
Must be the spirit that now ascends the celestial zones.

These old bones that gather to the elders
The creaks thereof are sweet songs of triumph;
If the grey beard that graced many hearts with wisdom
Can comb the highway which you now journey,
Then ride safely your unicorn to the heights above.
Should the sumptuous feasts of heaven be delicious in taste,
Let Johnny Walk(er) the morsels down your transfigured throat.
Whether garlands of triumph or wreaths of victories,
Delicately stride the aisles to take your own.
The rollercoasters of Heaven and the Porsches that zoom past
Would mean the least to you, for in them is not your delight.
But the chivalric spirits that ascend along
Will swoop about your air with songs to greet your ghost.
But this one thing remember:

Worms for lunch, toads for supper.
Lloyd O Lloyd,
On your way to heaven
Do not take a bite,
For Heaven's staple food does merit your taste.

² One of Nigeria's talented young poets, Segun Ige was an undergraduate and postgraduate student of Lloyd Thompson at the University of Ibadan; his MA thesis on Cicero was supervised by Thompson.

THREE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CLASSICISTS OF AFRICAN DESCENT

Michele Valerie Ronnick

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Abstract. The impact of classical studies upon the creative and professional lives of people of African descent who lived in the past two centuries is a worthy, and heretofore little explored, field of scholarly inquiry. Here is a brief study of that dynamic, traced through the lives of a trio of nineteenth-century intellectuals of African-American descent.

Few classicists are aware that among the members of the American Philological Association (APA) during the latter half of the nineteenth century were several men of African descent, for little or nothing has been written about them in this regard. But in fact post-Civil War America was marked by heated debates over the questions related to the education of the newly freed slaves. This was particularly true about the position of the study of the classics. Intellectuals on both sides of the question—white, black, male and female—argued over the relative merits of utilitarian training vis-à-vis pursuit of a liberal arts education, whose core curriculum was based in the main upon the study of ancient Greek and Latin.¹

Between especially the years 1880 and 1920 prominent men of African descent such as Booker T. Washington, Alexander Crummell, W. E. B. Du Bois and Martin R. Delany played key roles in shaping the resulting discourse. The three men featured in this essay—Edward Blyden (1832-1912), Theodore Greener (1844-1922) and William Scarborough (1852-1926)—played equally prominent roles. Each one had been trained in the classics. All were known individually for their outstanding achievements as engaged intellectuals, public citizens and concerned educators, and all of them became members of the APA—Blyden in 1880, Greener in 1881 and Scarborough in 1882.

Here in brief are their stories. The lives of these men, whose training in Greek and Latin shaped their lives, illustrate in small an area of study that has been sadly overlooked by scholars—the impact the Graeco-Roman heritage has had upon the experience of people of African descent in America and the western world. My effort here is an initial one, made with a view to filling in

¹ On this topic see M. V. Ronnick, "A Pick Instead of Greek and Latin." *The African-American Quest for Useful Knowledge: 1880-1920*, *The Negro Educational Review* 47 (1996) 60-72.

this missing part of our knowledge. And its product is necessarily inchoate and anticipatory, for much useful work remains to be done, provided that we turn our energies to it.

*Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832-1912)*²

Edward Wilmot Blyden³ (1832-1912) was born in the West Indies on the island of St Thomas on 3rd August 1832. In 1842 his father, who was a tailor, and his mother, who was a schoolteacher, moved the family to Venezuela; two years later the family returned to St Thomas. In 1845 Blyden's budding genius and his special capacity for language studies attracted the attention of Reverend John P. Knox, who sent him to the United States in 1850 for further education. After being turned down by three theological schools, including Rutgers College, Blyden supported himself by day as a house servant for the next several months and by night attended school. He lost hope, however, of studying in the United States, and with the support of Mrs Knox and the New York Colonization Society, he made plans to leave. In January of 1851 he travelled to Liberia to study at Alexander High School in the city of Monrovia. His progress there was quick. In 1853 at the age of twenty-one he was asked to deliver the National Independence Day Oration marking the sixth anniversary of the country's establishment on 26th July 1847. By 1858 he had become the high school's principal. During 1855-56 he also served as the editor of the *Liberia Herald*.

Blyden is best known to us as a proponent of pan-Africanism and a supporter of black immigration to Liberia. Less well known to us, however, is the fact that a considerable portion of his life was spent in the study and teaching of Greek and Latin. After years of self-study and part-time teaching at Alexander High School in Monrovia, Blyden was named professor of Classics at Liberia College in 1862 and served in that capacity until 1871. From 1880 to 1884 he served as the president at the College, which was one of the first secular English-speaking institutions of higher education in tropical Africa.

Blyden counted among his acquaintances the statesman William Ewart Gladstone, whom he once called a 'classical premier'. Blyden corresponded

² Selected bibliography: A. Billingsley, 'Edward Blyden: Apostle of Blackness,' *The Black Scholar* 2 (1970) 3-12; H. R. Lynch (ed.), *Selected Letters of Edward Wilmot Blyden* (New York 1978); H. R. Lynch, *Black Spokesman* (London 1971); M. V. Ronnick, 'The Latin Quotations in the Correspondence of Edward Wilmot Blyden,' *Negro Educational Review* 46 (1994) 101-06; G. Shepperson, 'Blyden, Edward Wilmot (1832-1912),' in R. W. Logan and M. R. Winston (edd.), *Dictionary of American Negro Biography* (New York 1982) 49.

³ See plate 1, p. 17.

with Gladstone specifically about the life and poetry of Homer and about classical studies in general. Gladstone himself was a keen student of Homer and had published *Homeric Synchronism: An Enquiry into the Time and Place of Homer* in 1876. In a letter dated 20th April 1860 at Monrovia, Blyden asked Gladstone to send him a list of texts he wanted. These included Milton, Shakespeare, Herodotus, Homer, Cicero and Gladstone's own work on Homer. Both men had an abiding love for the Latin poet Horace (65 BCE-8 CE). Gladstone published his translation of Horace's *Odes* in 1894 and Blyden peppered his correspondence from 1857 to 1905 with quotations from Latin authors. Although Blyden quoted a variety of writers such as Vergil (70 BCE-19 CE) and Juvenal (c. 65-c. 135 CE), his favorite was Horace, and he drew freely from his *Odes*, *Epistles* and *Ars Poetica*.

Blyden soon became a prolific writer and scholar who used his training in the classics to document and defend his theories about civilizations on the continent of Africa. He was an eager student of languages and had knowledge of French, Spanish, Greek, Latin, Hebrew and Arabic. Blyden's interest in the ancient world stimulated him to put together one of the first articles written by a person of African descent to be printed in an American journal. This was his essay entitled 'The Negro in Ancient History,' which was published in the *Methodist Quarterly Review* in January 1869. In the inaugural address he delivered as president of Liberia College in January 1881, he declared his allegiance to the classics. In his speech, entitled 'The Aims and Methods of a Liberal Education for Africans,' he said:

Modern Europe boasts of its period of intellectual activity, but none can equal, for life and freshness, the Greek and Roman prime. No modern writers will ever influence the destiny of the race to the same extent that the Greeks and Romans have done.

A few paragraphs later Blyden averred that

what is gained by the study of the ancient languages is that strengthening and disciplining of the mind which enables the student in . . . life to lay hold of, and, with comparatively little difficulty, to master, any business to which he may turn his attention.

By the end of his life Blyden had decided that the time was not right for a great migration of African-Americans to Liberia. From the start he had met with considerable opposition to the idea and had come to see a lack of spirit and intellect among Americans, both black and white. Their pronounced preoccupation with material things led him to declare that the

Websters, Sumners, Emersons, Bryants, Longfellows, Holmes, Lowells, etc., have given place to the Vanderbilts, Astors and Goulds. The originators of thought and the prophets of the unseen are succeeded or superseded by the Standard Oil and rail magnates.

Blyden spent his later years on various diplomatic missions for Liberia to France and England. His death on 7th February 1912 was marked by memorial services throughout English-speaking Africa.

*Richard Theodore Greener (1844-1922)*⁴

Richard Theodore Greener⁵ (1844-1922) was born in Philadelphia and raised in Chicago. His parents took care to prepare him for college and sent him to Oberlin College in Ohio from 1862-63 and to Phillips-Andover Academy in Andover, Massachusetts from 1864-65 for training. In 1870 he rewarded his parents' attention and began to realize his promise by becoming the first African-American to graduate from Harvard. While there he won prizes in oratory, including the Bolyston Prize, and was class orator as well. His studies included courses in ancient literature and classical languages, at which he excelled.

Greener spent the next ten years in the field of education at the secondary and university levels. In the early 1870s he served as principal at the Institute for Colored Youth in Philadelphia and later at the Preparatory High School for Colored Youth in Washington, DC. In 1873 he went to Columbia, South Carolina to serve as Professor of Metaphysics and Logic at the University of South Carolina. There he taught a range of courses including Latin and Greek. In addition to working at the university, he earned a degree in law and was admitted to the bar in South Carolina in 1876. When reconstruction politics made his life in Columbia difficult, he left South Carolina in 1877 to teach in the Department of Law at Howard University in Washington, DC. For a period of six months from January 1879 to July 1880 he served as the Department's dean.

About this time Greener abandoned the academic life and struck out on his own. He became interested in politics and campaigned energetically for the Republican Party. After working for about ten years in the civil service in New

⁴ Selected bibliography: A. Blakely, 'Richard T. Greener and the "Talented Tenth's Dilemma,"' *Journal of Negro History* (1974) 305-21; M. D. Crowe, 'Richard Theodore Greener,' *The Negro History Bulletin* 6 (1942) 58; W. J. Simmons, 'Professor Richard Theodore Greener, A.B., LL.B., LL.D.,' in *Men of Mark* (New York 1968) 327-35; C. G. Woodson, 'Theodore Greener,' in D. Malone (ed.), *Dictionary of American Biography* 4 (New York 1932) 578f.

⁵ See plate 2, p. 18.

York City, he decided to seek a diplomatic appointment. In 1898 he accepted an appointment as the first American consul to Vladivostok, Russia and served there until 1905. He then retired to Chicago and resided there until his death in 1922.

Much of his intellectual life was conducted in public and involved considerable writing and speaking. In September of 1879 Greener spoke in a debate with Frederick Douglass about the topic of African migration in the United States from the south to the west, a plan that Greener supported. In June of 1877 he presented a paper to the members of the American Philological Association at their annual meeting, which was held at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. His paper concerned the University's rare book collection. While teaching law at Howard University four years later in 1881, he became the second African-American member of the APA.

Greener was a man of letters, whose writings include essays entitled 'Socrates as Teacher,' 'Benjamin Banneker' and 'John Milton.' His speeches abounded with illustrations and quotations from classical antiquity, a feature for which he was sometimes criticized. About the problem of racism, he wrote in the *National Quarterly Review* of July 1880:

Those who know us most intimately, who have associated with us in the nursery, at school, in college, in trade with the tenderer and confidential relations of life, in health, in sickness, and in death, as trusted guides, as brave soldiers, as magnanimous enemies, as educated and respected men and women, give up all senseless antipathies, and feel ashamed to confess they ever cherished any prejudice against a race whose record is as unsullied as that of any in the land.

*William Sanders Scarborough (1852-1926)*⁶

William Sanders Scarborough⁷ (1852-1926) was born in 1852 with the status of a slave in Macon, Georgia. His mother was owned by the household of Colonel William de Graffereid, whose humane values allowed her to marry and live independently with her husband, who worked for the Georgia Central Railroad. Through the kindness of J. C. Thomas, a man described as 'an intense Southerner,' young Scarborough received his early schooling, a thing which, if

⁶ Selected bibliography: W. J. Simmons, 'Professor William S. Scarborough, A.B., A.M., LL.D,' in *Men of Mark* (New York 1968) 410-18; F. P. Weisenburger, 'William Sanders Scarborough: Early Life and Years at Wilberforce,' *Ohio History* 71 (1961) 203-26; F. P. Weisenburger, 'William Sanders Scarborough: Scholarship, The Negro, Religion and Politics,' *Ohio History* 72 (1962) 25-80, 85-87.

⁷ See plate 3, p. 18.

discovered, could have landed Thomas in jail, for such instruction was against the law at that time.

After the Civil War, he enrolled openly in the Macon school system. At Lewis High School, where he remained until 1869, Scarborough studied subjects such as Latin, algebra and geometry. He then went to the newly created Atlanta University, which had opened in 1867. There he continued to study classical languages in the Preparatory Department under Professor Thomas Chase, a graduate of Dartmouth College. The school's admission standards required its applicants to have a solid grounding in Greek and Latin. One of his report cards from the period lists a 98 in Greek and Latin.

Scarborough continued his work at Oberlin College and graduated with honors in 1875. Fun at the time at Oberlin included a funeral ceremony for Thucydides upon the completion of the students' course of study. After he received an MA degree from the College, he was appointed professor of Latin and Greek at Wilberforce University, Ohio in 1878. During this period he rose to distinction by publishing *First Lessons in Greek*, a text that according to his obituary in the *New York Times* (12th September 1926) marked him out as 'the first member of his race to prepare a Greek textbook suitable for university use'.

Scarborough was keenly interested in fostering scholarly progress in languages and especially in classical philology. In 1882 he joined the APA. In December 1884 he became a member of the Modern Language Association. From 1884-1907 he contributed over twenty pieces to the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. Many of these were summaries of papers he had presented at meetings of the APA. In January of 1907 Scarborough was among those members of the joint meeting of the American Philological Association and American Institute of Archaeology who were received by President Theodore Roosevelt in the Blue Room of the White House when the annual meeting was held in Washington, D.C. In 1921, five years before his death, Scarborough represented the APA in England at the Classical Association meeting at Cambridge University. For several decades Scarborough played an important role for the African-American voters in the Republican Party in Ohio. His activities brought him into contact with national leaders such as Warren G. Harding, John Sherman, Andrew Carnegie, John F. Slater, and James G. Blaine. Richard Greener and W. E. B. Du Bois were among his circle. Du Bois in fact was professor of Greek at Wilberforce from 1894-96.

Throughout his lifetime Scarborough championed the cause of liberal arts and openly opposed Booker T. Washington's mandate for technical training. While Scarborough felt that the technical training touted by Washington was useful and needed, it was not sufficient in terms of a true,

well-rounded education. Scarborough's position is clearly seen in an answer he gave in the December 1898 issue of the *Forum* to the rhetorical questions 'Why waste higher education [in liberal arts] thus? Why not give the Negro industrial training exclusively? Why not give him a pick instead of Greek and Latin?' To these questions Scarborough replied that higher education 'is not wasted on the race. . . . It is no more wasted than it would be on white boys and girls, some of whom follow pursuits more or less menial in character. . . . It is not wasted because . . . there is hope of a future for other boys and girls—a future with better conditions.'

Surrounded by his loved ones, Scarborough died peacefully in Ohio on 9th September, 1926. Three days later his body lay in state on the Wilberforce campus. For more than forty years William S. Scarborough lived the life of an academic who was as pronouncedly active as he was contemplative. In terms of his classical studies he accomplished as much as many of the better-known figures of this era and in fact more than most. His distinguished career marks him as the first professional classicist of African descent to pursue successfully a lifetime career in the classics according to the standards recognized today, namely an affiliation on the national level, attendance and activity at meetings, and an impressive publication record.



Plate 1: Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832-1912)



Plate 2: Richard Theodore Greener (1844-1922)




Plate 3: William Sanders Scarborough (1852-1926)

INVENTION, GUILT AND THE FALL FROM INNOCENCE: REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF FEELING IN MYTH¹

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Abstract. As an expression of the psychic faculty identified by Jung as the feeling-function, myth is a narration of feeling-toned judgements about common experience. Psychologically considered, primary cultural values subsist in the story-teller and his audience as complexes of feelings, which myth expounds rationally as narrative. A comparative study of African and Greek myths reveals that the Promethean myth describes a species of guilt, appearing in Hesiod as a feeling of existential retribution.

It is often fashionable among classicists to speak of 'mythic thought' as a prelogical form of discourse.² This conception of myth attributes rational or proto-scientific motives to the tellers of stories which none the less 'often appeal', as H. J. Rose put it, 'to the emotions rather than to reason'.³ The structuralist treatment of myth altogether discounts the presence of feeling in mythic narrative with the claim that myth is a logical system in its own right.⁴ In this approach, unconscious forms of intellection supply the motive for a narrative whose meanings merge into the schematic exposition of the

¹ I wish to thank the Editor and the Editorial Committee of *Scholia*, and most particularly the referees, for their encouragement and help with the present paper. Thanks also are due to my colleagues and friends at Chancellor College in Malawi for their helpful comments on a first draft.

² E.g., F. M. Cornford, *The Unwritten Philosophy* (Cambridge 1950) 42; W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* 1 (Cambridge 1962) 29. This view is criticized by G. S. Kirk, *Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures* (Berkeley 1970) 238-51.

³ In M. Cary *et al.* (edd.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (London 1949) 594 s.v. 'Mythology'. E. Cassirer (tr. R. Mannheim), *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 2: Mythical Thought* (New Haven 1955) 69 romanticizes the role of emotion in the elaboration of mythic thought; cf. the critique by Kirk [2] 263-68 of Cassirer.

⁴ Cf. C. Lévy-Strauss (trr. C. Jacobson and B. G. Schoepf), *Structural Anthropology* (London 1968) 229f.: 'The purpose of myth is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming contradictions. . . . The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science'. For a critical appraisal of Lévy-Strauss's methods and logic, cf. C. Hubbard, 'Lévy-Strauss: An Anthropological Critique', in A. Cunningham (ed.), *The Theory of Myth* (London 1973) 79-103.

anthropologist. The rather more pragmatic and eclectic approach advocated by G. S. Kirk strives to situate myth within its proper cultural and narrative contexts.⁵ Such a functionalist treatment, working with the care of a taxonomist, faithfully renders the detail and form of a tradition, but omits to consider the vital element of feeling which animates it. These several avenues to the study of myth have in common a habit of disregarding or devaluing the presence of feeling in mythic narrative. However, if it is granted that myth originates in a set of primary cultural values, and if those cultural values subsist in the audience rather as deep-seated feelings than as rational concepts, the role of feeling in myth surely merits closer scrutiny. To consider it in this way, myth as narrative may broadly be said to set forth an ordered sequence of imagery which confirms common values and strengthens the force of deeply held collective judgements. Psychologically considered, the primary cultural values from which this narrative arises subsist pre-consciously in the audience and in the story-teller as shared feelings or judgements.⁶ The present paper will advance the thesis that the structures of mythic narrative to a certain extent inhere in the structures of these culturally sanctioned and largely unconscious feelings. Our approach will be to consider the role of feeling in two culturally disparate examples of the same motif, that of the fall from innocence, one example being from Africa and the other from Archaic Greece. The comparative approach has the advantage of highlighting a common elemental narrative structure.

For the purposes of our study, feeling may be thought of dynamically as a function of the psyche. This is to appropriate a conception of C. G. Jung's. Though Jung developed his theory of psychic functions for depth-psychology, his essentially biological and dynamic approach to the human psyche makes many of his definitions potentially useful in the field of cultural anthropology as well.⁷ Its potential usefulness notwithstanding, Jung's theory of psychic functions remains largely unfamiliar to non-specialists, and for this reason it would be well here briefly to summarize his thought and to establish a theoretical framework for our study. It must be stressed that, though our theory has its origins in certain terms and distinctions made in Jungian psychology,

⁵ Kirk [2] *passim*, esp. 252-61.

⁶ Cf. C. G. Jung (tr. R. F. C. Hull), *Symbols of Transformation*² (Princeton 1969) 11-17, esp. 17, on the relationship between language, feeling and cultural values: 'The secret of cultural development is the *mobility and disposability of psychic energy*' (original emphasis).

⁷ For what follows cf. C. G. Jung (tr. R. F. C. Hull), 'On the Nature of the Psyche', in H. Read, M. Fordham and G. Adler (edd.), *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*² 8 (London 1969) 159-234.

our approach makes no claim to be psychological or Jungian in any sense proper to those words.

In Jung's view, the human psyche is a vital function of the organism, the principal purpose of which is to maintain the equilibrium and balance of the whole. Though the psyche has both conscious and unconscious parts, the self-regulating principle of the whole operates automatically, that is, unconsciously. In this dynamic conception, the psyche has four primary modes of perception or functions which may be conceived as two polarized sets of intersecting axes. The 'horizontal' axis relates to non-valuative and non-reflective (in Jungian terms 'irrational') modes of perception, and has as its poles the antithetical functions which Jung terms sensation and intuition.⁸ Briefly put, sensation assimilates experience through the medium of the sense organs, intuition organizes experience by anticipation and empathic insight into the other.⁹ The 'vertical' axis, on the other hand, relates to valuative and reflective (or 'rational') modes of perception, and has as its polarities the functions of feeling and thinking. What feeling and thinking have in common is that both organize the contents of consciousness by imparting 'definite value in the sense of acceptance or rejection'; they differ in that feeling is the subjective valuation of experience itself, whereas thinking is the valuation of concepts.¹⁰

The significance of these distinctions for cultural anthropology needs to be spelled out, if only briefly. Human culture is the product of a process of interactions among persons who internalize the human world they inhabit. That world has both subjective and objective content by virtue of an elaborate dialectical interaction between subject and object involving projection,

⁸ For general definitions cf. 'Definitions' in W. McGuire *et al.* (edd.), *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*² 6 (London 1971) 408-95, *s.vv.* 'feeling', 'function', 'intuition', 'irrational', 'rational', 'sensation', 'thinking'. For a more detailed discussion of the psychological functions, cf. C. G. Jung, 'General Description of the Types', in McGuire *et al.* [above, this note] 330-407.

⁹ S. Baron-Cohen uses the term 'mindreading' in 'First Lessons in Mindreading', *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 16 June 1995, 18f., in summation of his book on autism *Mindblindness* (Cambridge, Mass. 1995): 'Researchers in developmental psychology were tackling the question "How does a child become social?" The answer seemed to be by becoming a proficient mindreader. That is, when the normal child (and adult) sees a social situation he or she interprets the situation in terms of people's mental states—their thoughts, desires, intentions, beliefs and so on'.

¹⁰ Jung [8] 434; cf. also 435: 'In the same way that thinking organizes the contents of consciousness under concepts, feeling arranges them according to their value. The more concrete it is, the more subjective and personal is the value conferred upon them; but the more abstract it is, the more universal and objective the value will be'.

introjection and reflection.¹¹ In all cultures feeling is a fundamental component of the process of socialization. This is so because the feeling-function partakes in both subjective and objective reality, in both the psychological and the social, in that feeling proceeds from within the deepest reaches of the personal psyche and extends outward into the social world in which the person is invested. All cultures exert influence upon this link between the inner and outer for the purpose of structuring personality in ways which suit the needs of the society. In all societies early nurturing makes a distinctive impress upon the basic affective structures of character, and these structures become the foundations of the social feelings which the culture fosters within its members. Rituals and ceremonies shape and structure feeling in specific ways which serve the interests of the particular society. The language of ritual—sights, smells, rhythms, repetitions—creates specific feelings and shapes these feelings as values for very precise social ends.¹² At the end of his rite of passage a boy, for example, has become a man imbued with a precise set of feelings and deeply felt values which will determine his behaviour for the remainder of his life; the content of those feelings depends upon the sort of man which his culture needs to have for its purposes.¹³ As a fundamental component of character, the conscious feelings, both public and private, that are allowable within a culture are a function of the needs of the culture in preserving and perpetuating itself. Bronze Age Greece produced violent and piratical warriors with few inhibitions ('Vikings', Nilsson calls them), because such qualities were needed to perpetuate the world of these Mycenaean lords.¹⁴ For the sake of contrast we may mention the warriors of the Boran, a pastoral tribe of Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya, who scrupulously observe peace and gentleness in their dealings among themselves while cultivating martial virtues in the face of constant threats from hostile neighbours. The character of individuals among these people is dictated by the needs of group solidarity in a

¹¹ P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City 1967) 3-28.

¹² W. Burkert (tr. J. Raffan), *Greek Religion* (Oxford 1985) 55-59, 246-68.

¹³ S. Heald, 'The Ritual Uses of Violence', in D. Riches (ed.), *The Anthropology of Violence* (New York 1986) 70-85. Cf. also the remarks on the role of strong emotion in the shaping of social consciousness by W. Burkert (tr. P. Bing), *Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth* (Berkeley 1983) 35-41.

¹⁴ M. P. Nilsson, *The Mycenaean Origins of Greek Mythology* (Berkeley 1932) 22, 89, 148, 201f.

harsh and conflict-riven environment.¹⁵ Whatever characteristics are socially desirable are developed and reinforced by rituals and formalized interactions, which serve to strengthen acceptable patterns of feeling.

It follows from these remarks that, from a comparative view of different cultures, the specific content of feeling is to some extent culturally determined and relative. One culture may allow its subjects a wide and rich range of feeling, another may impose deep layers of self-restraint upon its subjects, so that the feelings of which its subjects are conscious are particular to their culture. To this extent, feeling is a socially articulated aspect of consciousness, since the feeling-content of experience is determined by an awareness of what it is socially allowable and acceptable for one to feel. Paradoxically, feeling—the subjective valuation of experience—operates both as an automatic, habitual reflex and as something learned or acquired. One's experience within the community repeatedly reinforces the reality of certain feelings, and disallows the emergence of other feelings. One's social position determines the content, quality and structure of the feelings experienced, and the feelings experienced in turn support the social role which the personality fulfils. The range of possible feelings narrows and the feelings become increasingly particularized as the person matures. The complex of feeling-content that is allowable and socially acceptable in any given society operates within a systematic social ecology.

There is one further clarification that must be made before we can proceed to the consideration of the role of feeling in myth, and this concerns the essential distinction between feeling and emotion. Simply put, emotion is a response to an immediate situation confronting the organism and is physiologically measurable in a heightened pulse, a faster rate of breathing, an increase of perspiration and other innervations. Feeling, on the other hand, like thinking, is a durative and persistent pattern of consciousness which has only very subtle physiological effects.¹⁶

Pertaining to the function of myth in archaic cultures, two essential facts about myth are relevant to our inquiry. The first of these is the principle that in archaic cultures myth-telling is a form of collective recollection. Mythic narrative reproduces a supernormal reality which stands distinctively apart from normal experience. The *re*-production and *re*-creation of this reality by the act of narration is not so much a going *back* to something factual as it is a doing

¹⁵ P. T. W. Baxter, 'Repetition in Certain Boran Ceremonies', in *African Systems of Thought: Studies Presented and Discussed at the Third International African Seminar in Salisbury, December 1960* (London 1965) 64-76.

¹⁶ Jung [8] 411f. s.v. 'affect'.

over of something felt to be essential. What is recalled is not an *actual* temporal past but the *essential* preconditions of human culture.¹⁷ Narratologically, myth recalls another time belonging to divine or supernormal beings and cosmic forces presumed to be prior and superior to the present. Psychologically, what myth evokes is a form of consciousness shaded with significant feelings. The world evoked by myth constitutes a superior collective reality to which the community continually return as to a source. In such mythically oriented societies the concerns and interests of the individual in present time are vastly inferior to the collective universe. The events of mundane existence are utterly forgettable; facts and deeds have meaning only to the extent that they can be brought into relation to the more enduring reality. The ordinary and routine acts of everyday life are augmented and made grander by investing them with gestures and formulae borrowed from mythic narrative. What has to be emphasized about this feature of myth is that the validating power of mythic narrative extends not only to deeds, but to feelings as well. That is to say, just as a mythic tale supplies the reifying paradigm for specific routine actions, such as marshalling one's troops or hauling in one's fishing nets, so also it has the capacity to reify specific feelings: the mind of a man consumed with rage or filled with grief finds validation as a reality in the mythic paradigm of an Achilles or Gilgamesh. The only *real* feelings are those which find expression in myth or ritual. The second principle to be noted is that in archaic oral cultures both narrator and audience identify fully with the *content* of the myth. This identification transpires in the narrative act of reproducing the mythic world. What is remembered and revived by the narrative is not an abstract idea or concept, in relation to which the hearer stands as subject to object, but an essential moment in which the performer and his hearer participate fully. In his *Preface to Plato* Eric Havelock has remarked on the rhapsodic performer's 'power to make his audience identify almost pathologically and certainly sympathetically with the content of what he is saying'.¹⁸ We would like to extend the scope of this observation by noting that feeling is not simply a

¹⁷ M. Eliade (tr. P. Mairet), *Myth, Dreams and Mysteries: The Encounter between Contemporary Faiths and Archaic Reality* (Glasgow 1968) 48: 'The primordial event . . . was periodically re-enacted in the rituals . . . and one became once again contemporary with the mythic *illud tempus*'.

¹⁸ E. A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (New York 1963) 45. Cf. 159f.: 'The poetic performance if it were to mobilise all these psychic resources of memorisation had itself to be a continual re-enactment of the tribal folkways, laws and procedures, and the listener had to become engaged in this re-enactment to the point of total emotional involvement. In short, the artist identified with his story and the audience identified with the artist. . . . Psychologically it is an act of personal commitment, of total engagement and of emotional identification'.

medium or device for effecting recollection, but it is also an essential part of the message, since feeling is the very substance of that moment.

Now to consider the precise role of feeling as a structuring factor in mythic narrative. For this purpose we have chosen two myths from disparate cultures which, for all of their differences in form and content, will none the less illuminate one another by virtue of their common concerns. The first is a story of the Chewa (a people of East-Central Africa) about the invention of fire, the second is Hesiod's account of Prometheus' theft of fire (*Th.* 535-616).¹⁹

For the Chewa story I cite the text of Schoffeleers and Roscoe:

In the beginning there was Chiuta and the earth. Chiuta lived in the sky. Below him was the earth, waterless and lifeless. One day dark clouds built up and covered the sky. Lightning flashed and claps of thunder rent the sky. The sky opened and, in a great shower of rain, down came Chiuta, the first man and woman and all the animals. . . . Plants and trees grew on the earth, yielding abundant food, and Chiuta, man, and the animals lived together in happiness and peace.

One day man was playing with two sticks, a soft one and a hard one. He twirled them together and by accident invented fire. Everyone warned him to stop but he would not listen. The grassland was set alight and there was great confusion. Among the animals Dog and Goat ran to man for protection. But Elephant, Lion, and their companions ran away full of rage against man. Chameleon escaped by climbing to the top of a tree. He called to Chiuta to follow him, but Chiuta answered that he was too old to climb. When Spider heard this he spun a fine thread and thus lifted Chiuta to safety. So Chiuta was driven from the earth by the wickedness of man, and as he ascended into the sky he pronounced that henceforth man must die and join him in the heavens.²⁰

Certain features of the story deserve comment. The story is set beyond the reach of the present in a past which is not so much anterior to it as it is the essential and necessary precondition of it. The story pivots on a contrast between an ideal prior situation, when man, god (Chiuta) and the animals lived in harmony with one another, and a subsequent degraded condition, resembling the present, in which this spirit of harmony has been irreversibly disrupted. The

¹⁹ The comparison is cross-cultural, not literary. The two myths here considered are formally incommensurable: Hesiod's *Theogony* is a sophisticated poem with a complex theology embedded in a rich oral tradition; the Chewa story is a casual prose tale gleaned more or less at random by modern folklorists. The point of contact between the two is minimal, but it occurs at the deepest level. It is precisely the vast dissimilarity between the two stories which makes this point of contact between them illuminating and compelling.

²⁰ J. M. Schoffeleers and A. A. Roscoe, *Land of Fire: Oral Literature from Malawi* (Limbe 1985) 19f.

disrupting event separating these two conditions is a wilful act of playful inventiveness on the part of the human. The narrative organizes the contrast between these two conditions as a sequence of cause and effect which proceeds from the central act of invention. The contrast is heightened by a decided bias in the feeling-tone in the narrative: the prior condition is one of happiness and peace; the disruptive event attracts the alarmed censure of spectators; the disruption and division wrought by human inventiveness make the wild animals angry at man and earn from god his angry condemnation of humans to a permanent condition of isolation and death. The story represents inventiveness as the cause of god's anger at and separation from humanity.²¹

The Hesiodic account is so well known that a brief summation of the narrative will suffice for our purposes. Hesiod tells the story of the struggle between Zeus and Prometheus in the run-up to the larger theme of the struggle between Zeus and Cronus. Within the large design of the *Theogony*, the story about Prometheus is a digression introduced into the genealogy of the Titan gods (from 512). The digression explains, by way of anticipation, the fate of the sons of Iapetus, and particularly Prometheus, after Zeus has defeated Cronus

²¹ In the Yahwist account of the Fall in *Genesis* (3), the serpent ('the most subtle of all the wild beasts') represents the faculty of invention, with his quibbling gloss of the taboo as an artificial injunction which *may* be violated (i.e., he makes woman aware of the difference between 'may' and 'must': 'You *may* eat of any tree, but you *must* not eat of this one tree. If you do eat of it you will not die'). This myth in its turn has an interesting African parallel in the story of the fall current among the Pale or Asu people of Tanzania: Originally Kiumbi the creator used to mingle among the people he had moulded. But the people were cheated by a cunning serpent-person named Kiriamagi. Kiumbi had forbidden the people to eat eggs, but Kiriamagi persuaded the people that this injunction was just so many words without effect, so they ate the eggs. As a result of this violation, Kiumbi withdrew to an abode high up in the sky. Wanting to draw close to their creator as before, the people built a tower to reach the dwelling of Kiumbi. The higher they built, the farther up he receded. Finally, Kiumbi became angry at the people, and sent a severe famine, which killed all but two, a boy and a girl. All people on earth are descended from this pair. Since that time, Kiumbi remains remote, and communications with him may be had only through the ancestors, who are closer to him than to any other. For the full transcription and translation, cf. C. K. Omari, *God and Worship in Asu Traditional Society* (PhD diss. East Africa 1970); analysis of the ritual context in I. N. Kimambo and C. K. Omari, 'The Development of Religious Thought and Centres among the Pale', in T. O. Ranger and I. N. Kimambo (edd.), *The Historical Study of African Religions, with Special Reference to East and Central Africa* (London 1972) 111-21. The invention of the taboo against edible food (intended to regulate the use of valuable and scarce resources) and the necessary circumvention of it (the taboo *must* be observed, but it *must* also be broken) are clearly institutions of human culture in both myths: the blame for the guilt felt for violating the taboo falls upon the serpent, the embodiment of cunning and subtlety. The guilt is experienced as god's anger and adverse judgement upon the human condition.

and established a new settlement with the primeval powers of the world. Under the settlement of Zeus, Menoetius and his sons suffer permanent confinement: Menoetius is condemned to Tartarus, Atlas stands at the limits of the earth, supporting the wide sky, and Prometheus is chained to a pillar. Prometheus' condition of confinement has two phases, however. In the early phase an eagle daily eats at his liver, which is restored every night; in the later phase Heracles kills the eagle and so releases Prometheus from his daily torment, though the Titan remains chained.²² Hesiod explains that Zeus allows the killing of the eagle, not as a favour to Prometheus, but to increase the fame of Heracles. It is for this reason that Zeus quit his rage, we are told, even though Zeus was angry with the son of Iapetus. The mention of Zeus's rage becomes the occasion for a further digression (535-616) which recounts the origins of this rage. It is to be noted that the consequences of the Titan's behaviour persist even after his release from the torment: Prometheus remains chained and evil remains a permanent fact of human life.²³

Anger is the starting point for the tale of the contest between Prometheus and Zeus, and anger is also the end of the digression (at 614-616). In this account, as in the Chewa story, there is a prior condition of innocence, when men and gods sat down together to sort things out between them (535). The act which disrupts this aboriginal state of harmony is the inventiveness of Prometheus, and this is represented by three facts: the invention of the sacrificial meal, the preservation of fire in a fennel stalk, and the introduction of woman-as-wife.²⁴ Hesiod relates these facts in a sequence which has them following as effect from cause: Prometheus deceives Zeus with the division of the sacrificial ox. Thereupon Zeus becomes angry and withholds the source of fire from mortals (οὐκ ἐδίδου μελίησι πυρὸς μένος, 563).²⁵ Prometheus

²² M. L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 313: 'Hesiod does not say that Heracles released Prometheus from his chains, only that he killed the eagle and delivered him from his torment'.

²³ Zeus ceased from his wrath (χόλου), even though he was angry (καί περ χωόμενος παύθη χόλου, ὄν πρὶν ἔχεσκεν, 533). This does not mean that he stopped being angry, but that he desisted from his wrath.

²⁴ On the unity of the imagery, and the cunning of Prometheus in general, cf. J.-P. Vernant, 'The Myth of Prometheus in Hesiod', in R. L. Gordon (ed.), *Myth, Religion and Society: Structuralist Essays* (Cambridge 1981) 43-56.

²⁵ Ashwood burns well but does not furnish 'firesticks'. West [13] 324 suggests that 'perhaps we must supply the detail that Prometheus put it in the trees, so that it might remain there at men's disposal'. This cannot be right, since what Prometheus gave to mortals was not simply fire, but the means of transporting the *seed* of fire, viz., the use of the fennel stalk as a vessel. His theft is accomplished by an invention; his action does *not* make ashwood into a wood capable of supplying fire. On the use of this invention cf. West [13] 324f. *ad* 567.

counteracts this measure by stealing fire in a fennel stalk. As a pay-back for this theft (570) Zeus sends woman-as-wife to be an affliction to mortals. These three stages of the contest (sacrifice, theft, wife) are actually three expressions of a single fact, the human faculty of invention.²⁶ Sacrifice is a device which allows mortals to secure the attention and favour of the gods; the use of the fennel stalk as a carrying vessel gives humans easy control of fire; and, even though in Hesiod's story the wife is a creation of the gods which only a shortsighted Epimethean influence would embrace, there is no escaping the fact that she too is a Promethean product: for all the poet's protestations, marriage is unmistakably a human institution, a very productive invention which works by a social division of labour by gender. In spite of the triplication of symbols, then, what disrupts the aboriginal harmony between gods and mortals remains a singular fact, the cunning of Prometheus, and this is the sole cause of Zeus's anger. Promethean inventiveness causes the god to become angry, and this anger brings the evils and sufferings which mortals have as the permanent condition of their existence.²⁷

Both of these stories have as their common theme the human capacity for inventiveness, and both also identify invention as the cause of the permanent wretchedness of the human condition: the essential link between these two facts is the anger of god. Simply put, both myths state that god punishes man for being too clever.²⁸ Both seem to arise from a feeling that human cleverness is the cause of god's antipathy toward and alienation from humanity. This

²⁶ Though Prometheus is a Titan god and not himself human, he embodies an essential fact of the human condition. Mortals must live with both the benefits and the consequences of his achievements. Cf. Vernant [24] 44, 53-55.

²⁷ The god's anger is an essential fact in the story. Hesiod is hard put to reconcile the god's anger with the supremacy of his *boulê*. West [22] 321 *ad* 551 pragmatically observes that 'the statement that [Zeus] was not deceived (though he acted as if he was) is manifestly inserted to save his omniscience and prestige'. This view is preferable to attributing a logically consistent theology to Hesiod, as does Vernant [24] 240 n. 2: 'If we should accept that Zeus has foreseen all, we must at once add that this foresight involved . . . the king of the gods being furious'. Vernant justifies this attribution on the grounds that a comparable subtlety occurs in Christian theology (*viz.*, that the omniscience and omnipotence of God coexist with human freedom of choice): surely the existence of a sophisticated theology in one context does not establish that it is possible in Hesiod! Here the structuralist bias in favour of logic shows its true colours. In the more detailed account of *Op.* 90-99, the causal link between the god's anger and human suffering is more explicit: the wife whom Zeus sends as a pay-back for the deception lets disease and evil loose upon the world by removing the lid of her dowry-jar.

²⁸ For the place of cunning in Greek culture, see M. Detienne and J.-P. Vernant (tr. J. Lloyd), *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society* (Sussex 1978).

antipathy takes the form, not of a single act of retribution, but of a lifelong condition of endless toil ending in death. What this means, once we drop the trappings of explanation and dissolve the rational presumption of cause-and-effect, is simply this: that the faculty of invention involves feelings that one deserves to be punished. The underlying feeling seems to be that the common evils and mortality of human existence amount to a necessary payback for the advantages got from human resourcefulness. What is the basis of this feeling? In what sense is it that the faculty of invention involves the guilty feeling that one must make an offset or pay-back for the gains got thereby?

A clue to the answer to this question lies in the motive for the human invention which Hesiod identifies as the first cause of Zeus's anger, namely, the ritual sacrifice of an animal life. It is not the human way simply to kill the beast and eat it raw on the spot. Though man may own the domestic animal as property, the life in it, by which he sustains his own life, has a source that escapes his understanding. The fiction of the ritual transforms the animal life into something made over to the gods, and which the gods then share with men in a communal meal. The very act of cooking the meat—notice the role of fire in the process—transforms an animal into food. The gods receive the immortal portions, the vapours and blood, and people take the mortal parts, the flesh, and with it the portion of death.²⁹ Everything about the ritual sacrifice is designed to heighten an awareness of separation and distance from the gods, and an awareness of collective guilt: the entire community have blood on their hands.³⁰ The unmistakable message is that life and death are inextricably bound together. The classic motive for the ritual offering finds expression in the Latin phrase *do ut des* ('I give so that you may give.'). One gives a portion of the ritual sacrifice to the gods in the hope that they will give more in the future. At the earliest stage, however, one gave *back* to the gods what one had taken from them, an animal life with its blood. The portion offered to the gods, the bones gleaming in white fat, is, by the fiction of human ingenuity, a reconstituted form of the life taken. In its origins the act of offering is a deeply apprehensive gesture of restoring to its source something which has been taken for the benefit of the human community.³¹ Considered in terms of its motive, the ritual offering is a guilty act. The offering was not so much a bribe intended to buy the favour of the gods (though this is how it was perceived in the civilized

²⁹ Detienne and Vernant [28] 125f. Cf. also J.-P. Vernant, 'Sacrificial and Alimentary codes in Hesiod's Myth of Prometheus', in Gordon [24] 57-79.

³⁰ Burkert [12] 55-59.

³¹ Burkert [12] 58; Burkert [13] 38: 'The shock felt in the act of killing is answered by consolidation; guilt is followed by reparation, destruction by reconstruction'.

setting) as it was an act of restitution intended to avert the anger of the forces in whose power lie the origins of animal life. The *feeling* which underlies this primordial motive rests on the empathic sense that what is taken from another for one's own use must be restored in kind.³² If appropriate reparation is not made, the Other becomes angry. The sacrificial act involves a gesture of renunciation which intends to repair the damage done to the feelings of the Other. The social principle, then, which applies to relations among humans is projected onto the relationship with the environment. The ritual offering satisfies the 'feeling needs' of the community; it eases the guilt of taking sustenance and nourishment from sources which elude human comprehension, which are inscrutably Other.

The faculty of invention enters into the equation in this respect, that cleverness gives the human animal an incalculable advantage over nature and over other animals. The capacity for invention gives humans the power to take and control what nature has, and to do so largely at will. The use of this power evokes strong feelings of guilt and reflexive acts of reparation: the killer needs assurance that the animal victim gives its life for his benefit willingly;³³ the hunter needs to believe that the life he takes will not deplete nature's stocks; the farmer needs to feel confident that the goodwill of the gods will not desert him. The man of naive culture worries continually about the disposition of the gods: Does he have their favour? Has he gone too far or taken too much for himself? Such feelings constitute an apprehensive awareness of separation between the human subject and the world of the Other. This experience of alienation arises from a deep and continual worry about the effects of the human capacity to invent and control. The feelings associated with the faculty of invention are fundamentally ambivalent: on the one hand one has a sense of extraordinary power, on the other hand one feels deep guilt and apprehension over the effects of this power upon the Other.

In the Chewa myth cited above this ambivalence is represented by the image of fire. Fire provides warmth and protection for humans; it is used for clearing land in the dry season and for cooking, as well as for procuring food, since hunters wield it to drive game into their nets. But fire can also be a massively destructive force, and in this capacity fire serves as a symbol of the disruptive effects of human culture. As a cultural tool, fire and, by extension, all human inventions introduce divisions and distinctions into an otherwise

³² Cf. M. L. Hoffman, 'Empathy, Guilt and Social Cognition', in W. F. Overton (ed.), *The Relationship between Social and Cognitive Development* (Hillsdale 1983).

³³ Burkert [12] 56.

harmonious world.³⁴ Inventiveness has driven a wedge between humanity and nature: on one side of the divide stand humans with their domestic animals, on the other side are the gods with the animals of the wild. From the human side the distance created by the fact of this alienation *feels* like a punishment from god: 'henceforth man must die'. The inference implied in this judgement is an affective and not a logical one, and as such it defies logical exposition. The function of the myth is to set forth this inference in narrative detail as a sequence of cause and effect: because man made fire, god became angry and now humans must die. Much the same feeling-inference underlies Hesiod's equally pessimistic version of the fall of man: man must live on his own with the wretched consequences of Promethean ingenuity.³⁵

The essential feeling at the heart of the universal Promethean myth is evidently a species of guilt. This is not objective, self-conscious guilt as defined by an explicit moral code, but a largely unconscious primal guilt which lies at the root of all social consciousness.³⁶ Psychologically considered, social consciousness amounts to a *subjective* sensitivity to the reality of others. This sensitivity normally subsists as a capacity for discriminating among experiences according to deeply felt values, both social and personal. Such affective values necessarily have an autonomous determining and inhibitive influence over behaviour: one's own behaviour is actuated by the same values which one applies to others. For want of a better word, guilt is the appropriate term for the most inhibitive and controlling of these unconscious social feelings, since this feeling has the potential for effecting self-chastisement. From the anthropological perspective, religion and ritual exist, not to absolve man of guilt, but to cultivate it, for it is the internal control effected by guilt which makes us human. In its latent forms such guilt subsists subliminally as an inhibitive anxiety. In archaic societies, the fundamental social reflex of self-inhibition is experienced, not as a personal feeling, but as a collective anxiety

³⁴ Cf. Vernant [29] 74f.

³⁵ Hesiod's Zeus is inexorable on this point (ὡς οὐκ ἔστι Διὸς κλέψαι νόον οὐδὲ παρελθεῖν, *Th.* 613). In the *Works and Days*, Hesiod concludes his account of the five generations of men with the pessimistic judgement that without the tenuous and vanishing influence of fair dealing and social disapproval man has absolutely nothing in his favour. The same pessimistic feeling-tone pervades Yahweh's pronouncement upon man (*Gen.* 3.17-19): 'Accursed be the soil because of you. With suffering shall you get your food from it every day of your life. . . . With sweat on your brow shall you eat your bread, until you return to the soil, as you were taken from it' (A. Jones *et al.* [edd. and trr.], *The Jerusalem Bible: Reader's Edition* [Garden City 1966] 7f.).

³⁶ Called 'naive' or 'superficial' guilt by J. Carroll, *Guilt: The Grey Eminence Behind Character, History and Culture* (London 1985).

about the implacable antipathy of the Other towards humanity. In societies where consciousness is more individualized, such existential anxieties are experienced as something more personal. Primal social guilt, then, may be defined as an unconscious sensitivity on the part of the subject to the objective reality of social values.³⁷ One's unconscious sense of oneself as a social being works as a reflex of self-inhibition actuated by an internalized consciousness of the Other. It is in fact the shadow cast by the Other in the unconscious mind. This guilt is the internalized voice of the group, the voice of the elders, the voice of the parent, unconsciously felt, but admonishing, prohibiting and where necessary chastising. In its most subliminal forms primal guilt amounts to unconscious self-inhibition. As it manifests itself to the conscious mind, largely in disguise and indirectly, primal guilt appears, in highly introspective cultures, as the faculty of conscience. In more extroverted archaic societies, collective values are manifest to consciousness objectively, and all 'real' feelings are hence experienced by the group as objective facts. In such archaic contexts guilt in general is experienced as collective vulnerability, and primal guilt is felt, to the extent that it is felt at all, as existential retribution visited upon all mortals.³⁸

In archaic societies, advantages gained by cunning generate feelings of guilty anxiety. This anxiety refers both to the potential for failure and to the consequences of success. Such anxieties in turn find their validation in the

³⁷ Even in Homeric society behaviour is moderated by the mechanism of unconscious sensitivity to the values of the group. Psychologically considered, *timê* ('honour'), as well as the other primary values of that society, is something *felt*, not something believed or conceived. Such feelings are so basic to the Homeric heroes that they are the one species of feeling that does *not* appear in the objectified form of a divine epiphany. Achilles does not need an appearance by the goddess Athena to know that he feels dishonoured. Hence, even the most violent Mycenaean Viking must have internalized and subjectivized *as feelings* the values of his group, and those values necessarily operate unconsciously within his psyche to control and manage behaviour on the social plane. Otherwise, he would not be a social person; he would not be fully human.

³⁸ To complete the paradigm, the forms of unconscious guilt in introspective cultures may be characterized thus: Personalized, cultivated guilt manifests itself as unconscious control. Cultivated in proper measure, it is sublimated as productive energy (cf. Carroll [36] *passim*). Cultivated to excess, it appears as an over-abundance of unconscious control. Such excess of control is automatic, and may dispose the subject toward obsessive and/or compulsive behaviour which operates as a psychological necessity. The focus of the obsession may be a sensation or emotion or an idea or something anticipated. The behaviour so enforced may take the form of an addiction or compulsion, including religious or ideological fanaticism. The motive for the excess is control, and the ultimate tendency of it, in its extreme forms, is toward destruction of the organism.

persistent experience that the common and enduring evils of life 'feel like' a sort of collective retribution from an invidious Other.³⁹ It is this complex of feelings which the myth of the fall intends to make comprehensible as narrative.⁴⁰

³⁹ As a social feeling *nemesis* is justifiable resentment against another who has received more than his due share; it is the feeling that the distribution of public goods (cf. νέμω) has been done unfairly. When attributed to the gods this feeling of indignation takes the objective form of retribution. The same transference from the human to the divine realm occurs with the feeling of *phthonos* ('envy'). At the social level *phthonos* expresses the power of the evil eye; the *phthonos* of the gods, however, is the experience of their ill will. This is a profoundly guilty reflex, even if the guilt is experienced naively and collectively, rather than as a pang of personal conscience. Cf. J. Gould, 'On Making Sense of Greek Religion', in P. E. Easterling and J. V. Muir (edd.), *Greek Religion and Society* (Cambridge 1985) 1-33, esp. 32: 'Envy (*phthonos*) is an eminently human feeling and a god who displays it is reassuringly intelligible in human terms; but disorder (*tarache*), as men perceive themselves, is not, and the uniqueness of the divine is the combination of these contradictory aspects, predictable and unpredictable, human and non-human; the essence of divinity lies in the paradoxical coexistence of incompatible truths about human experience'. We should have said 'incompatible feelings', since *tarache* is not simply disorder, but upset as well. That is, it denotes both physiological and psychological upheaval. *Phthonos* seems human because it is a social feeling, easily attributable to a human agent; feelings of disturbance and tumult (or the feelings evoked by upheavals) cannot have a human face. In psychological terms these come from the unconscious.

⁴⁰ My insistence on the importance of feeling as a structuring principle in myth does not discount the equally important function of logic in the ordering of mythic structures. Rather, prior to the elaboration of logic as a conscious tool of the mind, the two functions would operate in conjunction, largely unconscious and indistinguishable from one another. My intent is to stress that feeling is *equally as important* as logic.

FORM AND MEANING IN BACCHYLIDES' FIFTH ODE

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Abstract. Ring-composition dominates the structure of Ode 5 in ways which are subtle, complex, and crucial to the poem's interpretation. At all levels of the poem, ring-structure provides thematic links and contrasts as well as serving the formal articulation of the ode. The myth apparently eschews forms of ring-composition common in lyric narrative, but in fact manipulates the conventions even as it departs from them.

The impulse for this paper arose first from surprise that the secondary literature on Bacchylides' fifth Ode seems, as far as I can see, to ignore much that is obvious about the way the ode is constructed, and secondly from a conviction that study of the form and structure of archaic poetry, despite the current tendency to stigmatize such study as 'formalist' (i.e., deeply unfashionable) and 'ahistorical', is still worth undertaking.¹ Understanding of form will always be an indispensable part of the study of literature, and the form of epinician is a tangible aspect of the poem as a culturally embedded artefact. In studying the form of occasional poetry such as epinician one can legitimately claim to be investigating the poet's presentation of his material in relation to the expectations of his original audience, a fundamental aspect of the genre as the product of a particular society at a particular period.²

My aim here, however, is not to undertake a complete defence of the importance of literary form, but a more modest one, namely to concentrate on Bacchylides' use of ring-composition in his fifth Ode, and to show first that the technique dominates the form and structure of the poem to an extent greater than hitherto realized,³ and secondly that Bacchylides' use of the technique in

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² See E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* (repr. Berkeley 1986) 16, 27, 46; cf. R. Hamilton, *Epinikion* (The Hague 1974) 1.

³ Maehler's discussion of the ode's form (*Die Lieder des Bakchylides* 1.2 [Leiden 1982] 82-84) is good, but there is more to be said. M. Lefkowitz, 'Bacchylides' Ode 5: Imitation and Originality', *HSCP* 73 (1969) 94 touches on ring-composition, but regards it as a simple technique operative at the level of the whole poem; H. Kriegler, *Untersuchungen zu den*

this poem gives the lie to the view that ring-composition is necessarily a simple or naive feature of the archaic poet's craft.⁴ But all this would be arid if it did not aid our understanding of the poem as a whole, and so I also suggest ways in which the form of the poem contributes to an appreciation of its meaning for an audience which knew how to be guided by the use of ring-composition.

The overall structure of the ode is straightforward enough; a beginning (proem plus initial praise, 1-55) and an end (second praise plus conclusion, 176-200) enclose a central mythical narrative (56-175);⁵ in such a structure, an element of ring-composition is wellnigh inevitable, given the formal autonomy of the myth as a form of excursus.⁶ In this case, however, application of the technique is more than just the echoing of the beginning in the end, or a return

optischen und akustischen Daten der bacchylideischen Dichtung (Vienna 1969) 223-53 argues that the structure of the poem is careful and considered, but does not go into detail. S. Goldhill, 'Narrative Structure in Bacchylides 5', *Eranos* 81 (1983) 65-81 ignores traditional forms; indeed (p. 66) he makes 'complicated' structure antithetical to ring-composition; and J. Pinsent, 'Pindar's Narrative Technique: *Pythian* 4 and Bacchylides 5', *LCM* 10 (1985) 2-8 is an unrevised public lecture which promises more than it delivers. Since the study of L. Illig (*Zur Form der pindarischen Erzählung* [Borna/Leipzig 1931]), analysis of ring-composition in epinician has tended to concentrate on its deployment in mythical narrative (cf. n. 40 below); on ring-composition as the organizing principle of whole odes, see C. A. P. Ruck, 'Marginalia Pindarica I-II', *Hermes* 96 (1968) 128-42; C. A. P. Ruck, 'Marginalia Pindarica III', *Hermes* 96 (1968) 661-74; C. A. P. Ruck, 'Marginalia Pindarica IV-VI', *Hermes* 100 (1972) 143-69; C. Greengard, *The Structure of Pindar's Epinician Odes* (Amsterdam 1980) esp. 81-88; cf. the analyses of G. W. Most, *The Measures of Praise* (Göttingen 1985). The importance of ring-composition in Pindar is down-played by Hamilton [2] 8, 12 n. 33.

⁴ E.g., Illig [3] 56, 59f., W. A. A. van Otterlo, *Untersuchungen über Begriff, Anwendung und Entstehung der griechischen Ringkomposition* (Amsterdam 1944) 33-44; Hamilton [2] 2 n. 4; Pinsent [3] 7.

⁵ That the traditional structure of a typical ('myth' as opposed to 'non-myth') epinician is tripartite is uncontroversial: Hamilton [2] 4-6, 8f. criticizes the 'traditional view' of an ABA' pattern, but (26f.) reaffirms the basic tripartite structure (in Bacchylides as in Pindar, pp. 79, 81); among Bacchylides' myth-odes (1, 3, 5, 9, 11, 13) 11 is a partial exception, in that, despite its tripartite structure, its brief conclusion is more an appendage of the myth than a return to praise, and the structure of 13 is complicated by the insertion of a mythical element (Heracles and the lion) between the proem and first praise (cf. the brief myth of Archemorus in 9.10-20).

⁶ On the formal autonomy of the myth, see Hamilton [2] 26, 56f.; this is even more pronounced in Bacchylides, whose myths generally form a more solid, self-contained, and unbroken narrative than Pindar's (cf. Hamilton [2] 82). For the basic association between ring-composition and digressions, etc. in archaic narrative style, see van Otterlo [4] 5-39; cf. B. A. van Groningen, *La Composition littéraire archaïque grecque* (Amsterdam 1958) 51-56 and K. Stanley, *The Shield of Homer* (Princeton 1993) 6-9 (with copious references).

to praise after a digression,⁷ but rather the fundamental means by which the poem's thought is articulated.

The basic form is tripartite, but since beginning and end correspond, there is also a tendency towards bipolar respension and antithesis; we shall see that this union of tripartition and bipolarity dominates the articulation of the poem. General correspondence of beginning and end is apparent in the fact that both the first and last sections begin with an invocation (of Hieron, 1-8; of the Muse Calliope, 176-78) which is followed by a reference to song (the poet has woven a song of praise [ῥῆμνον], 9f.; the Muse is commanded to sing [ῥῆμνησον], 179). More precisely, the central section is set within a chiasmic frame in which the proem which begins the first section (1-36) is answered by the conclusion (187-200) which ends the last section, both of these being largely concerned with the poet's relationship with the victor and the interdependence of success and song. Following the proem (in 37-49) and preceding the conclusion (in 178-86) comes praise of the actual victory won for Hieron by Pherenicus; the first part is answered by the last and the second by the second-last. This chiasmic correspondence in the poem's topical arrangement is underlined by verbal and conceptual echoes:⁸ thus, in the proem, 'general' (στρατα[γ]έ, 2), 'straight in its justice' (εὐθύδικον, 6), 'sends' (πέμπει, 12), 'servant of Urania' (Οὐρανίας . . . θεράπων, 13f.), and 'path' (κέλευθος, 31) are answered by 'peace' (εἰρήνη[α], 200), 'not [outside] the path [of justice]' (κελεύθου . . . οὐκ ἔκτος δίκας, 196), 'to send' (πέμπειν, 197), 'attendant of the sweet Muses' (γλυκειᾶν . . . πρόπολος Μουσᾶν, 191f.), and 'path' (κελεύθου, 196), while the wish for continued good fortune (36) which concludes the proem is answered by the similar wish which ends the entire

⁷ Van Otterlo's ([4] 5; cf. Stanley [6] 7) 'inclusive' and 'resumptive' forms of ring-composition (respectively). (Van Otterlo has disappointingly little to say on the former, because he virtually ignores ring-composition in self-contained productions such as lyric poems in favour of its use in articulating the component parts of extended narrative [esp. Herodotus]; and only by down-playing integral ring-composition can he reach the astonishing conclusion that 'Die in dieser Stilart abgefasste Schriftwerke konnten also niemals einen wirklichen Abschluss haben' [p. 44].) For an excellent account of large-scale 'inclusive' ring-composition in Herodotus, see J. Herington, 'The Closure of Herodotus' *Histories*, *ICS* 16 (1991) 149-60, esp. for his demonstration that ring-composition can encompass not only verbal, but also conceptual and thematic patterns. For an extensive recent defence of the interdependence of form and meaning in a work employing elaborate and complex forms of ring-composition, see Stanley [6]; cf. N. J. Richardson (ed.), *The Iliad: A Commentary* 6 (Cambridge 1993) 4-14.

⁸ Greengard [3] 20 claims that verbal recurrence in Pindar is more typically used for formal or aesthetic effect than to underline thematic recurrence; if she is right, then, on our evidence, Bacchylides' methods in this ode are somewhat different.

poem (200). Likewise, the motifs of the poet's willingness and ability to praise which are prominent in the proem are rehearsed in similar terms in the conclusion: thus ἐθέλει γᾶρυν ἐκ στηθέων χέων αἰνεῖν Ἱέρωνα ('He wishes to pour his voice from his chest and praise Hieron', 14-16) is taken up by πείθομαι εὐμαρέως εὐκλέα . . . γλῶσσαν . . . πέμπειν Ἱέρωνι ('I am easily persuaded to send my song of good fame to Hieron', 195-97), while the notion of lines 31-34 (that the prowess of the Deinomenids in the games and in war affords the poet endless opportunity to praise) is answered in the conviction expressed in lines 187-97 that achievement demands ἀλάθεια ('truth', i.e., faithful commemoration of the deeds of the past)⁹ rather than φθόνος ('envy'), that the divine favour enjoyed by the successful should lead to renown among men, and that justice (δίκαια) demands that Hieron be praised. And, of course, all these reflections on Hieron's success, achieved with the help of the gods as it is, recall the very first word of the poem, the apostrophe of its addressee as εὖμοιρε ('well-destined', 1).

Similarly, the first and second praise of the victor, which form the inner elements of the chiasmic frame, correspond in their references to Pherenicus (37 and 184), to the river Alpheus (38 and 180f.), and to the glory brought to Hieron by his steed (νίκαν Ἱέρωνι . . . τιτύσκων, 'fashioning a . . . victory for . . . Hieron' [49] answered by Ἱέρωνι φέρων [εὐδ]αιμονίας πέταλον, 'bringing Hieron a leaf of prosperity' [185f.]). Both the first and the second praise, moreover, are rounded off by *gnomai* on what it is to be successful and favoured by the gods (50-55 and 187-94).

Perhaps the most interesting of the correspondences between the poem's beginning and its end, however, concerns the reference to Hesiod in the conclusion (191-94):

Βοιωτὸς ἀνὴρ τὰδε φώνησε, γλυκειᾶν
 Ἡσίοδος πρόπολος
 Μουσᾶν, ὃν <ᾶν> ἀθάνατοι τιμῶσι, τούτῳ
 καὶ βροτῶν φήμαν ἔπρεσθαι.

⁹ On this (typically epinician) sense of ἀλάθεια in Bacchylides, cf. 3.96, 8.20f., 13.204 (note φθόνος in 200), fr. 14, with L. Woodbury, 'Truth and the Song', *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 331-35; to the references in his n. 10, add A. M. Komornicka, 'Quelques remarques sur la notion d' ἀλάθεια et de ψεῦδος chez Pindare', *Eos* 60 (1972) 235-53; D. Bremer, *Licht und Dunkel in der frühgriechischen Dichtung* (Bonn 1976) 161, 296-314; Maehler [3] 61 ad 3.96; A. P. Burnett, *The Art of Bacchylides* (Cambridge, Mass. 1985) 44f., 57-59; T. K. Hubbard, *The Pindaric Mind* (Leiden 1985) 100-06; see also M. Detienne, *Les Maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque*² (Paris 1973).

A Boeotian man spoke thus, Hesiod, attendant of the sweet Muses, that whomever the immortals honour, him should the voice of mortals also accompany.

Opinions are divided as to whether this is a citation of a lost work of Hesiod (hence 'fr. 344'¹⁰),¹¹ or a summary allusion to *Theogony* 81-97;¹² but the latter is more plausible, for the *Theogony* passage has already been the subject of extensive allusion in the opening section of the poem. With his understanding of the work of the Muses and his justice (3-6), Hieron is like the Muse-blest king of *Theogony* 80-93, as Bacchylides is the Muse-blest poet who can distract a man from his troubles (7-14, cf. *Th.* 94-103).¹³ That the *Theogony* passage is in Bacchylides' mind in the proem is confirmed by his use of the Hesiodic Οὐρανίας . . . θεράπων ('servant of Urania', 13f., cf. *Th.* 100); this allusion is then repeated in the ring-composition of 191-93 (γλυκειᾶν . . . πρόπολος Μουσᾶν, 'attendant of the sweet Muses'); thus the explicit reference to Hesiod in the conclusion refers back to the implicit allusion in the poem's opening sections; the existence of the ring corroborates the allusion, suggests that the same Hesiodic passage is in play at both points, and indicates that Bacchylides expected his audience to perceive both the ring and the unsigned allusion.¹⁴ The poem is written for one who has the ability to 'recognize the sweet-gifted ornament of the violet-crowned Muses' (3f.), and this ability entails appreciation both of the ode's relationship to a range of epic forebears¹⁵ and of its internal structure.

At the level of the whole poem, then, ring-structure is pronounced and pervasive, apparent both in the topical arrangement of the poem's themes and in numerous verbal and conceptual echoes, and even encompassing one of the ode's many debts to earlier poetry. The contribution of such a thorough-going deployment of ring-composition to the effect of closure and the sense of formal unity is readily apparent, but already in the case of the Hesiodic allusions we have seen that it is impossible to separate consideration of the poem's form from that of its meaning as a literary artefact. And in fact the contribution of the

¹⁰ R. Merkelbach and M. L. West, *Fragmenta Hesiodica* (Oxford 1967).

¹¹ So R. C. Jebb, *Bacchylides: The Poems and Fragments* (Cambridge 1905) 293; D. A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric 4* (Cambridge, Mass. 1992) 153; D. A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry*² (Bristol 1982) 433; Maehler [3] 122 (all *ad loc.*).

¹² So Lefkowitz [3] 90f. (cf. M. Lefkowitz, *The Victory Ode* [Park Ridge 1976] 73; cf. Merkelbach and West [10] on fr. 344).

¹³ On the Hesiodic allusion, cf. Lefkowitz [3] 50f., [12] 45; Goldhill [3] 67.

¹⁴ Contrast Goldhill [3] 67 n. 11.

¹⁵ Cf. Maehler [3] 117f.

overall ring-structure to the ode's meaning is considerable. We have seen how the process of responsion between post- and pre-myth sections begins with a second invocation to balance the first and continues with second praise of the victor in chiasmic opposition to the first. The invocation in itself indicates that the lines which begin the process of completing the ring and forming the poem's conclusion can also be considered a new beginning; and despite the verbal and conceptual correspondence which marks this new beginning as similar to the opening invocation, it is their difference which makes the greater impression upon the hearer. Thus the invocation of a Muse (a regular way of beginning a Bacchylidean epinician)¹⁶ contrasts with the opening invocation, unique in extant epinician, of the mortal Hieron.¹⁷ Equally, while 1-55 concentrate on Hieron's achievement and Bacchylides' ability to celebrate it, and conventional elements of praise appear sporadically (the victor's city, 1; his name, 16; his family, 35f.; the name of the winning horse, 37; periphrasis for place of victory, 38; previous victory, 41),¹⁸ the invocation which introduces the second praise is followed by an injunction to praise the patron deity of the games (178f.) and a positive profusion of typical elements—two periphrases for the place of victory (181f.), patron hero (181), Pherenicus (184), victor's city (184f.), victor's name (185).¹⁹ In many ways, the ode's second beginning is a more typical epinician opening than its actual beginning. The density of conventional elements in the second praise emphasizes the anomaly of the initial concentration on Hieron and his success; and, as Goldhill points out,²⁰ the stress on the Muse and on Zeus gains in effect from the fact that we have just heard and understood a myth which illustrates the mutability of human fortune and the dependence of human happiness on fate and divine favour.

¹⁶ Cf. Odes 1, 3, 12, 13; cf. the Graces in 9 and Hestia in 14B, and the personifications invoked in 2, 7, 10, 11.

¹⁷ The uniqueness of the opening address is noted by W. Steffen, 'Bacchylides' Fifth Ode', *Eos* 51 (1961) 11; Kriegler [3] 223; and P. T. Brannan, 'Hieron and Bacchylides: An Analysis of Bacchylides' Fifth Ode', *CF* 26 (1972) 201-03; but only W. H. Race, *Style and Rhetoric in Pindar's Odes* (Atlanta 1990) 184 has observed that the anomaly extends to the provision of a full-scale hymnic invocation of Hieron. 1-8 bristle with the conventional elements of a cultic hymn (see Race [above, this note] 85f.): Hieron is given an epithet and a title (1f.); his *sedes* is given (1); his powers are extolled (3-6); and finally there is a summons and request (8).

¹⁸ Hamilton [2] 82 notes that the two constant elements of the 'naming complex' (victor's name, place of victory) are unusually far apart.

¹⁹ 'Sechs Programmpunkte hat Bakchylides in diesen wenigen Versen (in einem einzigen Satz!) zusammengefaßt', Kriegler [3] 247.

²⁰ Goldhill [3] 79.

Despite the ring-composition which makes the end echo the beginning, the intervening myth has changed everything, and hymnic invocation of the victor alone, together with praise of the poet's own skill, has perforce given way to a proper emphasis on the role of the divine which is all the more striking for being postponed. The (apparently) purely formal technique of ring-composition brings the first and second invocations together and prompts the reflection which reinforces the connection between the mythical section and the argument of the poem as a whole.²¹

An audience, of course, can only perceive a ring when it is complete; thus the effects just described can be appreciated only when the performance is at or nearing its end. But this is not to say that they may not also be anticipated; for the structural principles which govern the poem as a whole are also to be found in the architecture of its parts—indeed, it is ring-composition which makes the greatest contribution to the articulation and formal distinctness of the parts.²² Thus in the first section the opening apostrophe of Hieron as εὖμοιρε ('well-destined') is answered by the *makarismos* in 50-55, including μοῖραν in 51 and εὐδαίμων, a synonym of εὖμοιρος, at the very end of the entire first section in 55; likewise the phrase 'if any mortal on earth' (αἴ τις ἐπιχθονίων, 5), used in the initial invocation to magnify Hieron's εὐδαιμονία, is answered by 'for no mortal on earth' (οὐ γάρ τις ἐπιχθονίων, 53f.) in the *makarismos* which concludes the first section, prepares for the myth, and begins to set Hieron's εὐδαιμονία in something like its proper context.²³ Once again, a technique which relies on the perception of similarity is used also to suggest difference, as the apparently unqualified εὐδαιμονία of Hieron in the invocation is set against the circumspection of the *makarismos* and *gnomai*, which in turn prepare for the dark foil of the myth which so colours our impression of the contrast between the poem's opening and closing sections.²⁴

Within the first section (1-55), the status of 9-36 as a sub-section distinct from the preceding invocation and dealing with the poet's task and the

²¹ That Bacchylides uses the ring to apply the lesson of the myth to Hieron's achievement offers no purchase to those who would emphasize Bacchylides' 'pessimism' here (e.g., J. Stern, 'The Imagery of Bacchylides' Ode 5', *GRBS* 8 [1967] 35-43); the reflections on the instability of good fortune in the myth and elsewhere are 'dark foil' (Bundy [2] 47-53, 74f.) for the magnitude of Hieron's success in achieving so much, given the odds against which human beings struggle. See now D. Arnon-Svarlien, 'Reversal of Imagery and Values in Bacchylides 3 and 5', *QUCC* 50 (1995) 35-45.

²² On this function of ring-composition in Pindar, cf. Greengard [3] 20.

²³ Cf. Goldhill [3] 71.

²⁴ The opening section also exhibits an inner ring in ξένοσ ('guest-friend', 11) and φιλοξείνω ('hospitable', 49).

interdependence of poet and victor (Schadewaldt's *Sieg-Lied-Motiv*²⁵) is confirmed by the ring created by ὕμνον ('song [of praise]', 10) and ὑμνεῖν ('to sing in praise', 33), while that of 1-36 as a slightly larger structural unit (the proem) is confirmed by the way in which the reference to agonistic success and martial prowess in 33f. (κυανοπλοκάμου θ' ἔκατι Νίκας χαλκεοστέρνου τ' Ἄρηος, 'by the will of dark-tressed Victory and bronze-breasted Ares') answers that in 1f., εὔμοιρε [Σ]υρακ[οσίων]ν ἵπποδινῆτων στρατα[γ]έ ('well-destined general of the horse-whirled Syracusans').²⁶ Ring-composition is also pronounced in the poem's final section (176-200), which exhibits the following chiasmic sequence:²⁷ sing Zeus (178f.); Pherenicus brings prosperity to Hieron (184-86); *gnome* 1 (187-90); *gnome* 2 (191-94); the poet sends his 'song of good fame' to Hieron (195-97); prayer to Zeus (200).²⁸ Thus a section which forms a chiasmus with 1-55 is itself chiasmic; and the section as a whole is contained within the emphatic references to the pre-eminence of Zeus, thus reinforcing the emphasis on human dependence on divine favour which we saw to be a by-product of the ring linking beginning and end of the poem.

So far we have looked at simple ring-patterns (ABA', ABCB'A', and ABCC'B'A') and have seen that these have a major role to play in the articulation of the poem and its argument. There is nothing naive or primitive about these patterns, but they are certainly perspicuous, and this might suggest that Bacchylides' application of the principles of ring-composition is quite straightforward. But there is more: while the first section of the ode (1-55) can be divided into two distinct parts (proem, 1-36, and first praise, 37-49, followed by gnomic link, 50-55) answered chiasmically by a bipartite final section (second praise, 176-86, followed by conclusion, 187-200), there is also evidence within that section of creative adaptation of the basic principle of ring-composition. The bones of this structure consist of a chiasmic pattern in which the initial invocation (1-8) is answered by the final *makarismos* and *gnome* (50-55); the invocation, in turn, leads seamlessly into the second section of the proem (9-16), in which the poet introduces himself as the victor's ξένοσ

²⁵ W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikion* (Halle 1928) 277f., 294, 298-306.

²⁶ On the way in which multi-correspondence in elements of ring-structure prevents the impression of mechanical joining of discrete elements, cf. Greengard [3] 25, 38.

²⁷ Cf. Ode 1.159-84 with Maehler [3] 9.

²⁸ The *gnomai* in 187-90 and 191-94 form the fulcrum on which the chiasmus balances, but in terms of their content they belong rather to the second of the two concluding sections (187-200), on the interdependence of poet and victor, success and song. Gnomes and reflections on the poet's task are typical elements in the conclusions to Bacchylides' mythodes; see Hamilton [3] 81-83.

(‘guest-friend’) and as worthy to praise his fame, and declares his willingness to praise (the *Bereitwilligkeitsmotiv*, 14-16).²⁹ This concern with the poet’s credentials and the relationship between song and success is taken up by the lines (31-36) which conclude the proem, in which the typical notion of the poet’s willingness to praise is answered by the equally typical idea that the victor’s excellence provides the poet with an abundance of material for praise (the εὐμηχανία motif/*Leichtigkeitsmotiv*).³⁰ Thus 1-8 (A) and 9-16 (B) form a recognizable chiasmus with 31-36 (B’) and 50-55 (A’). A clear ring-pattern might have been created had Bacchylides chosen to site the first praise of the victor (which actually occurs at 37-49) in the centre of this frame; but instead he does something more interesting. Maehler has pointed out how the inclusion of the simile of the eagle extends the proem to an unusual degree.³¹ This simile (which, in spite of its multivalence, has as its basic point of comparison [31] the poet’s εὐμηχανία)³² comes at the point at which one might have expected the first praise of the victor’s achievement. Thus the simile separates the *Bereitwilligkeitsmotiv* (B) from the *Leichtigkeitsmotiv* (B’), and forms the heart of what we saw to be a distinct sub-section (9-36), dominated by reflections on the poet’s task and his abilities.

Several details of the eagle-simile indicate that not only does the eagle represent the poet, but his majestic and unimpeded progress matches that of Pherenicus in the Olympic horse race;³³ the suggestion that the eagle represents

²⁹ Maehler [3] 85, 92 (and often).

³⁰ See Maehler [3] 92, 97, 165 and cf. Bundy [2] 61f., 64; E. Thummer, *Pindar: Die istsmischen Gedichte* (Heidelberg 1968-69) 2.26, 46. On poetic εὐμηχανία, see A. M. Miller, ‘Pindar, Archilochus, and Hieron’, *TAPA* 111 (1981) 135-43.

³¹ Maehler [3] 83.

³² For the image of the poet as eagle, cf. Pi. *O.* 2.87f., *N.* 3.80-82, *N.* 5.20f. For R. Stoneman, ‘The “Theban Eagle”’, *CQ* 26 (1976) 188-97, none of these refers to the poet, all extol the victor, while for P. A. Bernardini, ‘L’ “aquila tebana” vola ancora’, *QUCC* 26 (1977) 121-26 all refer to the poet; Hubbard [9] 149-52 and D. Steiner, *The Crown of Song* (London 1986) 104-06 argue for multivalence in every case, while I. L. Pfeijffer, ‘The Image of the Eagle in Pindar and Bacchylides’, *CP* 89 (1994) 305-17 rightly insists that we must judge each case on its own terms. Here, not only does the explicit connection, ‘Even so I, too’ (31), make the comparison between the sublime ease of the eagle’s progress (16-19, 24-30) and the poet’s εὐμηχανία (31-36) certain, but the analogy of eagle and poet is reinforced by the designation ‘messenger of Zeus’ (19f.; Lefkowitz [12] 47; Pfeijffer [above, this note] 308) and the contrast with the *voices* of lesser birds (22f.). This is not to deny that the image also has an application to Hieron (as protégé of Zeus, as confident in his own power [21f.], or as conspicuous for men to see [29f.]; cf. Brannan [17] 222; Goldhill [3] 68f.; Pfeijffer [above, this note] 316); on the application to Pherenicus, see below.

³³ Cf. Brannan [17] 227f.; Lefkowitz [12] 48, 51; Goldhill [3] 70.

the horse is already there in the reference to the former's 'fine-haired coat' (λεπτότριχα . . . ἔθειραν, 28f.), for both 'hair' and 'coat' are properly used of mammals, not birds (indeed, ἔθειραι—always in the plural—is in Homer exclusively used of horses' mane or horse-hair crests).³⁴ The parallel becomes apparent when we find that the description of Pherenicus' success at Olympia is made to mirror the eagle's flight. So the incomparable superiority of the eagle over other birds (21-23) is balanced by that of Pherenicus over other horses (43-45); the description of the eagle's plumage as 'fine-haired' in 28 is answered by the metrically equivalent ξανθότριχα ('yellow-haired') of Pherenicus at 37; where the eagle flies σὺν ζεφύρου πνοιαῖσιν ('with the blasts of the West Wind', 28f.), Pherenicus is ῥιπᾶ . . . ἴσος βορέα ('like the blast of the North Wind', 46; cf. ἀελλοδρόμαν, 'storm-running', 39); and as the eagle was ἀρίγνωτος ἀνθρώποις ἰδεῖν ('conspicuous for men to see', 29f.),³⁵ so 'Dawn saw Pherenicus winning' (Φερένικον . . . εἶδε νικάσαντα χρυσόπαχυς Ἄως, 37-40). The effect of balance between the simile and the account of Pherenicus' victory is reinforced by the near-exact correspondence in length (14:13 cola). Thus the eagle simile can be seen as both an element sandwiched between two passages on the poet's task and as the first of two parallel exaltations of pre-eminence separated by reflections on the poet's task; instead of the basic pattern, ABCB'A', we have ABCB'C'A', in which the central elements can be seen at once as alternating pairs and as two overlapping rings, BCB' and CB'C'. Bacchylides has used the basic tripartite structural principle of ring-composition to create a structure which is more complicated, subtle, and fluid than he is generally given credit for.

Let us turn now to the myth. Maehler, noting the eagle-simile's contribution to the unusual length of the proem, adds the observation that the proem stands in the same proportion (18 per cent) to the poem as a whole as the introduction to the myth (56-77) does to the mythical section as a whole (56-

³⁴ This fact led A. Bonnafé, 'L'Aigle dans Bacchylide V. 26-30', *ZPE* 9 (1972) 37f., to argue that ἔθειρα must refer not to the eagle's plumage but to its crest; but what we have here is a case of 'intrusion', in which a detail appropriate to the tenor of the simile/allegory (Pherenicus) has been attached to the vehicle (M. S. Silk, *Interaction in Poetic Imagery* [Cambridge 1974] does not discuss this example, but for similar cases of intrusion in allegorical contexts, see his pp. 144-49).

³⁵ The papyrus' μετ' (30), deleted by R. J. Walker, 'Bacchylides', *The Athenaeum* (18 December 1897) 856, would imply that the eagle is a man among men; the objection of Maehler [3] 96 *ad loc.* ('Der Adler jedoch mischt sich nicht unter die Menschen'; cf. Walker [above, this note]) fails to take account of the possibility of 'intrusion' (so Silk [34] 143; cf. W. J. Verdenius, 'Two Notes on Bacchylides V', *Mnem.* 28 [1975] 63), but his text is none the less preferable on metrical grounds (see p. 91 for his note on 11f.).

175).³⁶ This is only one of several ways in which the structure of the mythical section follows that of the whole poem. After the lengthy introduction that is Heracles' descent (56-77), the poem's central section falls into three subsections—the first-person narrative of Meleager's sufferings (93-154) enclosed within two shorter sections in which Meleager and Heracles converse (78-92 and 155-75). These, moreover, conform to the same chiasmic arrangement which we saw in the structure of the poem as a whole—Meleager speaks first (78-84) and Heracles replies (84-92), while after Meleager's tale it is Heracles who speaks first (159-69) and Meleager who replies (170-75). The effect of this chiasmus in highlighting Meleager's narrative as the ode's central element is reinforced by the stress at its beginning and its end on the tears of the heroes: Heracles' musings on the purposes of Hera and Athena provoke tears in Meleager (94), as he remembers the effects of divine purpose in his own case, and these are recalled first in his own description of his weeping as his life ebbs away (153f.) and then in Heracles' tears of sympathy (155-58); these details, serving as virtual quotation marks round Meleager's speech, in themselves contribute to the pathos which is the myth's (intended) effect; the fact that tears of resignation and melancholy at one's own loss are answered by and evoke tears in recognition of shared humanity is presumably no less significant.

Chiasmic focus on the ode's central 'event' is thus evident;³⁷ but the appearance of mechanical formalism is avoided by the preservation of a natural sequence of statement and counter-statement. Though Meleager's narrative takes centre stage, it is introduced as a response to Heracles' remarks (93f.) and itself elicits Heracles' reply (159); thus something of the alternating rhythm which we noticed in the ode's opening section is detectable. This is yet more evident in Meleager's speech itself. Though one might discern an external conceptual ring enclosing the speech (in so far as it is an answer to Heracles' question, 'Who killed you?' [89], and so its climax in Meleager's death completes the frame), the narrative itself falls into two distinct phases (the first, 104-20, describing the struggle against the boar, and the second, 124-54, continuing the tale with the war against the Curetes and the circumstances of Meleager's death), each preceded by a reference to the cause of all the trouble, the anger of Artemis (94-104, 121-24). Thus Artemis' anger rings the first phase of the narrative, but the last element of this ring becomes the prelude to a second phase of the narrative which balances the first. These two phases, however, are still linked by ring-composition: the initiation of the train of

³⁶ Maehler [3] 83f.

³⁷ Cf. the focus on Croesus' speech (37-46) in Ode 3, with Maehler [3] 39.

events is recalled in its climax as the hostile action of the κούρα ('maiden') Artemis in 104 is recalled by that of Althaea, Θεστίου κούρα ('daughter of Thestius') in 137. These details, making an outer ring round the entire tale, also participate in inner rings surrounding each of its two phases, for Artemis the κούρα of 104 is recalled in the Λατοῦς θυγάτηρ ('daughter of Leto') of 124, and Althaea the κούρα δαΐφρων ('fiery-minded daughter', 137) answers δαΐφρων . . . Λατοῦς θυγάτηρ (122-24).³⁸ Verbal repetition thus (a) frames Meleager's tale and (b) frames and links its two phases,³⁹ though there is no direct correspondence between the tale's beginning in the offence of Oeneus and its end in the death of Meleager.

Ring-composition, then, permeates the central mythical section, both in its overall (chiastic) form and in the conceptual fabric of its central element, the speech of Meleager. Yet this pattern is not allowed to impose itself too prominently or mechanically, so that the myth as a whole is presented as a linear narrative in which the chiastic form of the dialogue co-exists with its natural forward motion; similarly, Meleager's speech is bounded by rings which link Artemis and Althaea (and look forward to the climactic naming of Deianeira), but still takes the form of a sequential narrative in two distinct

³⁸ The adj. δαΐφρων is common in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, both in contexts in which it seems to convey a notion of hostility (cf. δαΐω, 'kindle', and so 'destroy', δάϊος, 'hostile') and in contexts in which it suggests skill or intelligence (from δαῖναι, 'learn'; see P. Buttmann (tr. J. R. Fishlake), *Lexilogus*⁵ [London 1861] 209-12); here, the culmination of the story in Althaea's burning of the brand (and its analogue in the shirt of Nessus' effect on Heracles' flesh, the prelude to his immolation on Mt. Oeta) makes it virtually certain that an etymology from δαΐς, 'torch', is active; this will not be clearly distinct from the senses 'hostile' or 'destructive', which are foremost in the etymology of the name, *Daianeira* (173).

³⁹ There is more to the repetition of the root, δαΐ-: repetition of δαΐφρων (122, 137) clearly indicates thematic significance, a significance which reaches its climax in the reference to Deianeira (173; like Artemis and Althaea, she too is a 'daughter'—104, 124, 137; cf. Lefkowitz [3] 86, [12] 68; J. Péron, 'Les Mythes de Crésus et de Méléagre dans les odes III et V de Bacchylide', *REG* 91 [1978] 323). The syllable is also repeated in the name (Daipylos) given to the father of Meleager's victim in 145 (cf. Burnett [9] 144), and Brannan [17] 245 also sees a play on δαΐφρων in δαΐμων in 135 and δαιδαλέας in 140; given that the first of these three is surely a deliberate way of making the crucial sound ring in the audience's ears, the case for the latter pair as echoes is not as far-fetched as might at first appear; cf. the way in which Aeschylus repeats the sound βου- even in words which have no etymological connection with 'cows' in *Supp.* 570, 586, 599 (context of Io's transformation; cf. more remotely 118, 129, 776). But however that may be, the certain thematic significance of the repetition of δαΐφρων and its connection with Deianeira establishes that, in principle, to pay attention to verbal repetition in epinician poetry is not necessarily to perpetuate outmoded practices of New Criticism. See in general W. J. Slater, 'Doubts about Pindaric Interpretation', *CJ* 72 (1976-77) 193-208, esp. 199f.

phases. Thus, while Bacchylides has not abandoned ring-composition in the myth, it is clear that he has also striven to give this part of the ode a particular character of its own, for the form of his narrative is closer to the epic or Stesichorean than to the typical epinician narrative style. The narrative unfolds in a straightforward chronological sequence; its use of ring-composition is purely formal, aesthetic, and thematic; in particular, Bacchylides seems to eschew the familiar epinician narrative technique by which the myth opens with its main point (the *kephalaion*) before proceeding first backwards, then forwards in time until it returns to (and sometimes advances beyond) the point at which it began.⁴⁰ Equally, though the speeches of the myth are arranged in chiasmic order, there is no explicit conceptual link between its beginning and its end; nor is there any sign of an exterior ring to frame the myth as a whole.

Now, narrative structure of the above type (external ring, *kephalaion* ring with flashback, linkage of beginning and end of myth) is not a prescriptive norm; but it is very frequent, whereas the narrative structure of the myth of Ode 5 is unique in Bacchylides and without close parallel in Pindar.⁴¹ In an ode, moreover, which is thoroughly permeated by ring-composition it is at least mildly surprising that the central myth appears so determinedly to avoid typical narrative structures in which ring-composition is crucial. This must be deliberate: Bacchylides clearly wants to present his narrative, highly indebted to epic forebears as it is,⁴² in quasi-epic style; but he also wishes to use the

⁴⁰ See Illig [3] 56-67, 88, 97, 102, followed (with varying degrees of modification) by H. and A. Thornton, *Time and Style* (London 1962) 27-35; Ruck [3] (1968) 129-32; Hamilton [2] 57, 61-65; Greengard [3] 23-26, 51-53; W. J. Slater, 'Pindar's Myths', in G. W. Bowersock, W. Burkert, M. C. J. Putnam (edd.), *Arktouros* (Berlin 1979) 63-70; W. J. Slater, 'Lyric Narrative: Structure and Principle', *Cl. Ant.* 2 (1983) 117-32; A. Hurst, 'Temps du récit chez Pindare (Pyth. 4) et Bacchylide (11)', *MH* 40 (1983) 154-68. The basic pattern (*kephalaion* ring, 'flashback', one or more inner rings) is discernible in Bacchylides 3 (heavily chiasmic), 11 (see Hurst [above, this note] 161-64; cf. Maehler [3] 203f.) and 13 (main myth, 100-67), but not in 9, while in 1 the text is too fragmentary to tell (although Maehler [3] 8f. guesses at *kephalaion* ring).

⁴¹ In Slater's terminology ([40 (1979)] 64f.) it exhibits not 'simple' or 'complex' lyric, but 'epic' narrative style; this type may be discerned in several odes of Pindar (*O.* 9, 13, *P.* 5, *N.* 1; Slater ([40 (1979)] 65), but in none of these does the straightforward linear narrative co-exist with elaborate use of chiasmic structure and verbal ring-composition; and the other examples of 'epic narrative' myths cited by Slater are all from Aeginetan odes, in which the treatment of myth differs markedly from that in odes for non-Aeginetan victors (see Hamilton [2] 57-60).

⁴² See in general Lefkowitz [3]; also Maehler [3] 103 *ad* 60-62, 104 *ad* 56-67, 105 *ad* 73, 108 *ad* 94-96 and 97ff., 115f. *ad* 151-54, 117f. *ad* 162-64; cf. H. Buß, *De Bacchylide Homeri imitatore* (Gießen 1913) 45 *et passim*.

opportunities for dramatic irony offered by extensive dialogue in the Stesichorean mode.⁴³ What I want to suggest, however, is that this epic/Stesichorean presentation, with its apparent departure from the norm, actually conceals the considerable extent to which Bacchylides exploits and accommodates the more regular epinician form.

First, we saw that Bacchylides does not extract the *kephalaion* from his narrative and present it as the opening detail of his myth; yet despite the linear progression with which the myth unfolds (Heracles descends, meets Meleager, they converse, Meleager tells his story, they converse again), the narrative does exhibit the temporal flashback associated with the *kephalaion* ring, in so far as the meeting of Heracles and Meleager encloses the tale of how the latter met his death. We have seen, too, how (apart from lines 56-77 which introduce the myth) the frame in which Meleager's tale is set is chiasmic in form. In retaining the backward-forward temporal sequence and the not infrequent chiasmus in the structure of the narrative, Bacchylides is thus employing elements of the narrative style which his audience will most readily associate with the genre. Will this lead them to look further for implicit or suppressed elements of the traditional form? I think it will. For is it really the case that there is no trace of ring-composition linking beginning and end of the myth? Heracles is first introduced as 'the gate-crashing, unconquerable son of Zeus' (ἐρεισιπύλαν [παῖδ' ἀνίκη]ατον . . . Διός, 56-58). Both epithets stress Heracles' previous success; but this detail comes immediately after the *gnome* of 53-55, that no mortal is fortunate in all respects, and thus an audience may be prepared to suspect that the epithets are used in preparation for the reversal that will confirm the *gnome*. (Ἀνίκηατος, of course, is ambiguous between 'unconquerable' and 'unconquered', and the latter may imply 'hitherto unconquered'.) Accordingly, when we look to the culmination of the myth as a whole in Meleager's reference to the youthful Deianeira, still ignorant of the ways of Aphrodite, the enchantress of mortals (172-75), we find clear allusion

⁴³ This is not to endorse the view that Bacchylides is following a Stesichorean version of the death of Meleager, as suggested by M. Croiset, 'Sur les origines du récit relatif à Méléagre de Bacchylide', *Mélanges H. Weil* (Paris 1898) 77-80 and J. March, *The Creative Poet* (London 1987) 44-46. There is no evidence for this (cf. L. H. Galiart, *Beiträge zur Mythologie bei Bakchylides* [PhD diss. Freiburg/Schweiz 1910] 42), and indeed every reason to believe that Bacchylides' version is an old one (see Buß [42] 10-13; J. T. Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* [Lund 1949] 13-16; B. Gentili, *Bacchilide: Studi* [Urbino 1958] 45; cf. A. F. Garvie, *Aeschylus: Choephoroi* [Oxford 1986] 209 [ad 603-12]; S. C. R. Swain, 'A Note on *Iliad* 9.524-99: The Story of Meleager', *CQ* 38 [1988] 271-76; J. B. Hainsworth, *The Iliad: A Commentary* 3 [Cambridge 1993] 131f. [ad 9.524-605]). For another perspective, see J. Bremmer, 'La Plasticité du mythe: Méléagre dans la poésie homérique', in C. Calame (ed.), *Métamorphoses de la mythe en Grèce antique* (Geneva 1988) 37-56.

to Heracles' ultimate defeat at the hands of a woman and by means of a charm designed to restore his love. The detail which ends the myth points to the ironic reversal of that which began it, all the more so given Heracles' enquiry regarding 'an untamed daughter' (ἀδμήτα θυγάτρων, 167); in this myth in which women conquer men, in a chain of events going back to the 'unconquerable [ἀνίκητον] anger' of a virgin goddess (103f.), it is the breaking of the untamed virgin that will lead to the defeat of the unconquered hero. As often in epinician, ostentatious refusal to relate an event (176-78) serves as an emphatic way of alluding to that event; and just as the abrupt ending and *Abbruchsformel* serve to emphasize the reversal of the positive details of the myth's beginning and thus complete the internal conceptual ring (the conquering of the unconquered Heracles), so they also complete the external ring, for the emphasis thrown on Heracles' ultimate downfall vividly exemplifies the lessons of the *makarismos* and *gnome* which introduce the myth; and these lessons remain with us as the poem's concluding lines seek to place Hieron's particular success and his general εὐδαιμονία in the proper context of the right relationship between man and god. The apparent suppression of detail and refusal of formal and narrative closure in the myth's abrupt ending in fact supply the crucial thematic link back both to the external frame of the myth and to its opening detail; this is perhaps the most remarkable of all of Bacchylides' creative adaptations of traditional form in this ode.

The above article has explored some of the crucial patterns of verbal and conceptual correspondence in the poem. It has not exhausted these (for there are many which do not perform the structural role with which we have been concerned); nor would a comprehensive study of such features, or even of all the formal conventions (and departures therefrom) that there may be in the poem, exhaust the possibilities for interpretation. But this is formalist poetry, and appreciation of the formal conventions of the genre is an absolute prerequisite for a proper understanding of the poet's presentation of his material to his original audience.

THE UNITY OF PLATO'S *CRITO*

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Abstract. Discussions of the *Crito* usually focus on the laws' speech in the latter half of the dialogue. It has not been observed how much the laws' argument that it is just for Socrates to remain in prison depends upon the first half of the dialogue in which Socrates argues about how he decides on a course of action. The rule of law should be seen to have close connections with the conditions for human conversation and deliberation.

Plato's Socrates spends his time engaged in conversations.¹ There are some accounts of actions taking place outside these discussions, such as Laches' report of Socrates' conduct in battle (*La.* 181a-b, 188c-189b) and Socrates' own tale of his resistance to trying the ten generals and to apprehending Leon of Salamis (*Ap.* 32a-e), but discourse so dominates his life that he conceives of nothing preferable to do. Even the afterlife he envisions for himself continues his conversation, perhaps with improved interlocutors (see *Ap.* 41b-c). Socrates is hardly inactive, however, since his very conversation is action and permeated with action. Often Socrates considers what advice to give or what those conversing should undertake to do, and he refers to himself in his discussions as engaged in Herculean labors (*Ap.* 22a). Yet only the *Crito* has Socrates occupied principally with determining what *he* should do.² This dialogue presents the philosopher deciding how to act, or justifying his decision about how to act, in confrontation with the challenge of death.³ He must choose between escaping prison or remaining to face execution. Which of these will be

¹ I am grateful to Dougal Blyth, H. D. Rankin, and an anonymous referee for *Scholia* for helpful criticisms of an earlier version of this article.

² Cf. T. C. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith, *Socrates on Trial* (Princeton 1989) 136.

³ Plato clearly saw various challenges to virtuous action. Consider, for example, how Callicles in the *Gorgias* initially champions the life opposed to philosophy, the life of limitless desire, because of the tremendous satisfactions it provides (483c-484c). Ultimately, however, under Socrates' attack he falls back on his last redoubt, that the virtuous person cannot protect himself from abuse (486a-c; cf. 510d-513c). Callicles thus turns from the glamor of vast pleasures to rest his case on protection from violent abuse. Virtue would stand most threatened if incapable of avoiding humiliating suffering and death. Aristotle seems to agree about this supreme challenge when he begins his treatment of the virtues of character with the virtue of courage. Were this virtue that enables us to endure confrontation with death unjustifiable, then the whole connection of virtuous life with happiness would disintegrate.

more consistent with his previous philosophical life? The *Crito* displays the philosopher trying to make his final deeds conform with his life of words.

The dialogue does not merely provide Socrates' reasons for staying to die, but prior to having him discuss what he should do, it displays his general reflection upon how philosophers should undertake action. Hence the dialogue concerns both Socrates' choice of action and how he should go about making choices. The *Crito* in fact divides neatly. The first half is about Socrates' decision procedure and the second half about what he should decide in the present situation.⁴ These two lines of reflection would seem to be intimately connected. Nevertheless, in spite of all that has been written about this brief dialogue, it rarely receives an integrated interpretation. Commentators typically rush through the first half to concentrate upon the second. Only with the entrance of the laws in 50a do they find much that captures their interest. But this limited approach diminishes the dialogue's philosophical power. I aim to reunite the *Crito* by restoring the significance of its first half and clarifying how it provides philosophical foundation for the argument of the second half of the dialogue. This unified understanding of the dialogue, which recognizes the dependence of the laws' argument on the argument that comes before, replies to those commentators who have questioned the seriousness of the laws' argument.⁵

It may be helpful to provide an overview of the integrated interpretation. Consider what occurs in the first half of the dialogue. We may delineate three strands of argumentation. First, Socrates justifies or legitimates his reliance upon argument in making decisions. He takes Crito to be calling into question much trust in argumentation when death looms. Though Crito apparently offers arguments about why Socrates should escape, he seems to suppose that the threat of death overwhelms previous agreements and all further arguments. In

⁴ The dialogue's name, Κρίτων, has particular pertinence because it derives from the Greek word κρίσις, which means 'decision.' We here have Socrates making a decision and considering how to make a decision. Besides having so fitting a name, Crito is the perfect interlocutor for this dialogue. He is Socrates' devoted, lifelong friend. His devotion to Socrates and fear for his death threaten to overwhelm his usual convictions. This allows the dialogue to take the form of a defense of Socrates' kind of life before someone favorable to but hardly secure in philosophy, and at grave risk of losing hold of it. This might in such circumstances be the reader's—and perhaps even Socrates'—own danger. Plato delicately and strategically represents the reader's doubts through Crito, and also eventually the laws.

⁵ G. Vlastos, 'Socrates on Political Obedience and Disobedience,' *Yale Review* 63 (1974) 519 and L. Strauss, *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy* (Chicago 1983) 66, for example, cast grave doubt on the quality of the laws' argument. Strauss says, 'Deeds are more trustworthy than speeches: Socrates did stay in prison, he chose to stay, he had a *logos* telling him to stay. But is this *logos* identical with the *logos* by which he persuades Kriton? We have indicated why this is not likely.'

response Socrates defends through argument his usual resort to careful argument. What makes locating the best argument so important in those cases that most concern us is that the welfare of the soul, the ultimate human concern, depends upon adhering to the better opinion. Secondly, Socrates argues for what serves as authority or criterion in argument. Some opinions, he contends, are better than others: in the best case they are secured by truth and knowledge or, where such authority seems lacking, they can at least be agreed upon by those engaged in the discussion. Even where agreement is not based upon truth and knowledge, there can be some intelligent reason for the agreement. Thirdly, the argumentation reinforces the special need for a philosopher such as Socrates to rely on argument. He has done so his whole life and should continue to do so now in spite of the threatening situation.

These threads of argument link directly with Socrates' decision to stay treated in the second half. We may again see the argumentation in three strands. First, Socrates argues that it is just to stay to face punishment. It is just because he has been found guilty and sentenced by due process of law. For him to leave would announce his conviction that law as such has no legitimacy or justification. If legal sanctions have no force because individuals threatened by them can nullify them, then law has no real standing. We recall that arguments would similarly seem to have no standing if an extreme situation took away their force. Thus the latter half of the dialogue justifies or legitimates political society and the rule of law much as, and with constant linkage to, the previous half that legitimates and justifies Socrates' mode of deliberation. Secondly, not only is political society and the rule of law legitimated but also there is reflection upon the authority or basis of law parallel to the reflection upon the authority or criterion within argument. Argument looks toward truth and intelligent agreement. Law might ultimately have some grounding in nature; where there is any reason to question this, it might have at least the authority derived from intelligent human agreement. Thirdly, Socrates' special attachment to the law of Athens in spite of the threatening situation receives consideration, corresponding to his need to adhere to his usual life of argument.⁶

⁶ D. Bostock, 'The Interpretation of Plato's *Crito*,' *Phronesis* 35 (1990) 1-20 discusses the possibility of one, two, or three arguments in the second half of the *Crito*. He says the common interpretation finds three distinct arguments (see his p. 12 n. 10). The three he refers to are: (1) Socrates should not escape because it is an attempt to destroy the whole system of laws, (2) Socrates has agreed to obey the law and it is a just agreement, and (3) a person should be obedient to all laws. These roughly correspond to the three strands of argument I find in both sections of the dialogue. We are viewing them not as three distinct arguments but rather components of a single large argument. A somewhat different general account of the

This overview should illuminate why the parts of the dialogue intertwine and are deeply serious. If the condition for appropriate human action and individual welfare is that some opinions and arguments are better than others, either because knowledge vindicates them or thoughtful humans are able to agree upon them, then under the same condition humans can live together in political communities governed by laws. Laws serve collectively as the expression of communal knowledge of what is right or at least thoughtful communal agreement. Stated somewhat differently, deliberations of individuals and the legal system of the political community interweave because our most serious concern, the soul, is ultimately at issue in both. Care for the soul demands at the level of the individual engagement in argument and at the level of the *polis* an embracing scheme of law. Socrates' argumentation in the *Crito* invites us to reflect upon the deep bond connecting the deliberations of individuals and the rule of law in political associations.⁷ In each half of the dialogue it is not so much a particular argument or law that is in question, but rather the whole basis and purpose of conversation and political life. Socrates as philosopher who has comprehended the connections of these fundamental factors in human life is committed both to conversation and the rule of law. We may now substantiate the suggestion of unity in the dialogue by a more detailed examination.

I

Crito enters the prison early—before daybreak (43a3f.)—so that he can be alone with Socrates. He may thus report the news that the sacred ship will be arriving that must precede the execution, and he may urge Socrates to prepare

argument of the second half appears in C. H. Kahn, 'Problems in the Argument of Plato's *Crito*,' in *Apeiron* 22 (1989) 33f., who sees the main 'covering argument' to be this: (1) If for Socrates to escape from prison would be for him to act unjustly, then Socrates should not escape, but (2) To escape would be unjust, so (3) Socrates should not escape. He then has the bulk of the argumentation in the second half as 'sub-arguments' in support of premise (2). We suggest that the argument of the first half can be put in quite parallel form: (1*) If for one to listen to the opinion of the many rather than better opinion leads to bad results, then one should listen to the better opinion, but (2*) To listen to the opinions of the many rather than better opinion leads to bad results, so (3*) One should listen to the better opinion. Much of the additional argumentation to be found in the first half then supports premise (2*). Thus my overall argument for the unity of the dialogue holds even for this different analysis. My unifying interpretation clashes, however, with Kahn's suggestion that 'the argument of the *Crito* is *ad hoc* and *ad hominem*. It is not an argument for obedience to law in general: it applies specifically to this man and this law' (35). I rather think that both halves aim to be profound.

⁷ Plato is hardly unique in considering the connection of *logos* and *nomos*. Heraclitus surely fosters such reflection (see, e.g., DK B 114). Also, consider Xenophanes DK B 2.

to escape. As Socrates responds calmly and grandly to Crito's excited promptings to escape, it presumably grows lighter (cf. *Prt.* 310a8, 312a1-7). Crito's high level of anxiety contrasts with Socrates' happiness, commented upon by Crito (43b3-9).⁸ Socrates tries to reassure his friend and allow him to resume a philosophical outlook.

Crito's anxiety derives not only from the gravity of the situation and the danger to which Socrates' friends will be exposed from the escape plan, but also from Crito's sense that Socrates will be unwilling to escape.⁹ Socrates recognizes that Crito, though a lifelong friend, has lost confidence in their usual arguments and agreements. Crito seems vulnerable to two sorts of skepticism about argument. He has succumbed to the many's views about the terror of Socrates' situation, and he has also despaired of persuading Socrates to save himself because he doubts that Socrates' staying is ultimately based on

⁸ Socrates observes that at his age he should hardly be nervous about dying, but Crito responds that other old men involved in such circumstances become vexed at such misfortune (43b10-c2). In spite of Crito's admiration for Socrates' calmness (43b8f.), he supposes that he should be anxious about death like other men. This exchange displays Socrates' effort to caution Crito against excessive worry about death and Crito's own difficulties with it. (J. Dybikowski, 'Socrates, Obedience, and the Law: Plato's *Crito*,' *Dialogue* 13 [1974] 521 comments on the irony of Socrates' suggestion that Crito's judgment should be disinterested because he is not about to die. Socrates is of course the cool one.) It also brings to mind Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates*, in which Socrates' willingness to die is explained by his advanced age. Perhaps a younger Socrates would not have been so ready to stand trial with its likely lethal result.

⁹ Evidence that Crito doubts that he will persuade Socrates appears in his reluctance to awaken Socrates (43b1-9, c5-8) and his response to Socrates' dream (44b5). Regarding the latter, he thinks it too clear that the dream means Socrates is ready to die. This dream P. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago 1933) 36 calls without explanation 'the most beautiful symbolic quotation in European literature.' Its aptness for the *Crito* is that it refers to *Il.* 9.363 where Achilles will not be persuaded by the emissaries but threatens to leave the fighting around Troy and on the third day come to his home in Phthia. Achilles in fact stays in Troy and dies and so does not get to Phthia. His threat to leave is empty talk. Socrates better matches his deeds and words. He adheres to his argument, stays, and dies, thereby setting out on his journey to the other world. Plato intends for us, of course, to find Socrates a new, more admirable hero than that of the epic. (We may recall in *Ap.* 28b-d as well that Socrates substitutes himself for the traditional hero Achilles. And see D. Clay, 'Socrates' Mulishness and Heroism,' *Phronesis* 17 (1972) 57.) Another irony of this passage is that 'fertile Phthia' is in Thessaly where Crito recommends Socrates go when he escapes (45c). Socrates is unwilling to go there in life, but he will 'escape' to there—or perhaps a more ideal version of it—in the afterlife. Also, the dream continues the theme that Socrates is a daimonic man watched over by the gods (cf. 43d7f., 54e1f.). Whether in fact Socrates simply accepts the evidence of the dream that the ship will come the next day rather than today is called into question by his later allowance that he may die tomorrow (47a1).

reasoned argument. Socrates initially tries answering the former by cautioning Crito against worrying about what the many will think (44c6-d10),¹⁰ and Socrates responds to the latter by reassuring him that his decision to stay is based on argument rather than obstinacy.

When Crito offers his cluster of arguments for the escape attempt, these arguments can be viewed both as disclosing sources of Crito's anxieties, the sorts of anxieties he shares with the many (44e-46a), and as merely perfunctory because it is not argument that really matters. Crito's putative arguments, Socrates holds (48c), resemble those that the many might offer: various sorts of rationalizations for escape, with the suggestion that argument is finally trumped by the specter of death.¹¹ Crito raises concerns that the many might about the honor and virtue of Socrates and that of his friends in regard to money and danger.¹² The overwhelming reality is that if he stays he dies by poison and those nearest him suffer all the attendant consequences. In the face of this imminent death with its apparent shame and hardship, do all counter-arguments cease to have any weight?

Before Socrates can start to present his reasons for remaining in jail, he must defend the viability of philosophical argument in the face of death. He must establish that all their previous life of discussion and agreement remains solid and compelling in spite of the immediate dangers.¹³ He cannot succumb to

¹⁰ Already in these lines Socrates points to the crucial consideration of the whole discussion, that is, the condition of the soul. The reason the many cannot do the greatest evil or greatest good is that they cannot make one intelligent or unintelligent (44d6-10), so they cannot put the soul in the best or worst condition. In 44c the issue is how concerned they should be about the opinions others, the many or the more reasonable men (ἐπεικέστατοι), have of them. These opinions are external to them and so do not necessarily shape their soul. What matters, of course, is how they value these various opinions, that is, the opinion they take of others' opinions. In the coming argument Socrates frequently has in mind this standpoint of what others think and say of them, but the crucial consideration is whether to listen to the many or only to the more serious.

¹¹ Note that Crito considers death from the many among the greatest of evils (44d) and in 46b Socrates comments upon Crito's eagerness to get Socrates to escape.

¹² See R. E. Allen, *Socrates and Legal Obligation* (Minneapolis 1980) 67-70 about the importance in Crito's reasons for escaping that shame be avoided. In Socrates' later answer the laws stress that it is escaping that is shameful (see esp. 52c-d, 53c-e). The most serious parts of Crito's arguments are his references to justice, courage, and virtue (see 45a1, c5, d7f., e6). These Socrates carefully answers in his arguments.

¹³ If Socrates can get Crito to remain attached to his previous agreements, then Crito can accept that Socrates should remain in jail. We should note how often Socrates will use the language of remaining with previous agreements and how this supports his remaining to face his penalty (see, e.g., 48b5, 9, d4, 49e2, 50a2; cf. *Ap.* 28c2-4, d6-29a1).

Crito’s insistence that the time for deliberation is past and that they should now devote themselves to exiting (46a4-8). Socrates will not take such an important step without due consideration; no matter how precarious the situation the appropriate choice of action must derive from proper deliberation. Socrates’ very readiness to engage in argument and his defense of argument respond to Crito’s anxieties and skepticism. By insisting upon argument, Socrates rejects the suggestion that fears of death, dishonor, and shame overcome reason, and he maintains that he always so far as he can relies upon argument.

Socrates thus begins his deliberations about whether he should leave or stay by announcing his standard approach to deciding such cases. He states that he is always the sort of person who adheres to nothing other than the argument that seems best to him when he has given due consideration (μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνεται, 46b4-6). Socrates must defend this approach, I have suggested, because no argument will mean much to Crito so long as he can either insist that avoiding Socrates’ imminent death outweighs all other considerations or suspect that Socrates acts based on something other than reasonable choice. If no opinions have greater value than others, then there is no point to argument and no reason to seek the best argument—Socrates’ whole philosophical enterprise of elenctic inquiry becomes worthless. One may as well simply align oneself with the view of the many or hold to any arbitrary conception. The precondition of the Socratic project of testing opinions and the discussion here in the *Crito* of the question whether Socrates should escape or stay is the reasoned conviction that argument is always appropriate whatever the circumstances and that some arguments have more weight than others.

Socrates’ argument aims to defend his persistent practice of adhering to the best argument. It begins in 46c and might be outlined thus:

1. One should honor some opinions and not others (46c6-47a6).¹⁴
2. One should honor the good (χρηστάς) opinions, not the bad (πονηράς) (47a7f.).
3. Good opinions are those of the intelligent (τῶν φρονίμων), bad those of the foolish (τῶν ἀφρόνων) (47a10-12).
4. A man in training listens to the praise, blame, and opinion of a doctor or coach rather than the many (47a13-b4).
5. He should listen to the one who knows rather than the many (47b5-12).
6. Ignoring the opinion of the one who knows and listening to the many leads to evil (47c1-4).

¹⁴ The way Socrates suggests in 46d2-4 that their previous arguments and agreements were child’s play and idle nonsense (παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία) now that he might die reconfirms that skepticism about argument is the issue.

7. The evil is corruption of the body (47c5-7).
 8. Regarding just and unjust, base and noble, and good and evil, to which the present deliberation particularly pertains, if one ignores the opinion of the one who knows—if there is such a knower—and follows the many, then one corrupts that part of oneself connected with justice and injustice (47c8-d6).
 9. Life is not worth living with a corrupted body (47d7-e5).
 10. What justice pertains to [that is, the soul] is even more estimable than the body (47e7-48a4).
 11. Life is not worth living with that corrupted (47e6f.).
- Conclusion: Some opinions are much more important than others: one should not listen so much to the views of the many about just, fine, and good things and their contraries but rather to the advice of the one who knows, if there is such a person, and truth itself (48a5-10).

We should trace the components of this argumentation. The main component of the argument contends that those aiming to achieve something (and all human life can be viewed as filled with desire to achieve something or other) must value those opinions that foster the achievement. Going along with bad opinions, that is, bad advice or bad praise or blame, has bad consequences. Therefore, since some opinions have better outcomes than others, clearly some opinions deserve greater respect than others. If this is the case in regard to care for the body, then it should apply as well for the soul. Were death the ultimate evil, as the many suppose, then opinions or arguments confronting us with death should be shunned; but since Crito agrees that death is preferable to life with a corrupt body or soul, death cannot be the extreme of evil and invalidate all arguments. The line of argumentation thus defends the power of argument even in the face of death. A further component of the argument is its introduction of two levels of authority. The most desirable situation is the guidance of knowledge and truth itself; where these are unavailable, and Socrates suggests the likelihood of this (47d1f.), one should still seek the better opinion. The opinion of the many as such is not usually well considered and intelligent, so it leads to inferior outcomes. Finally, Socrates' own personal, philosophical commitment to seeking the best argument is evident in the preface to this argumentation where he insists that not only now but always he follows the reasoning that seems to him best and that he and Crito must hold to their previous arguments unless they come up with better ones (46b4-e2). We thus manage to find in Socrates' argumentation the three strands or components that we suggested above in our overview.

Some aspects of his argumentation warrant further consideration. We notice that the early premises are also what Socrates seeks to establish. Crito is initially extremely reluctant to accede to them. Socrates has to ask again and

again whether Crito agrees that only some opinions are to be esteemed (46c2-47a5).¹⁵ In the light of this reluctance, Socrates develops an argument that motivates such agreement. He turns to an obvious sphere in which we seek expert advice in order to obtain good results, athletic training, and this makes it easier to agree that the same should apply generally, as well as in their deliberations.

This argument contains an implicit understanding of the situation of all deliberation and even all reflection. Socrates supposes that in all situations of deliberation we are determining which opinion to listen to, which should have authority or serve as standard. Our thought seems to be a forum in which competing views are in play, for example, the opinion of the many, that of our own personal obstinacy, and that of the expert. Even if there is truth and expertise, and we ourselves happen to be an expert, we still must determine to listen to the view that accords with truth and derives from our expertise and make it our own. Even where there is an authority its claim must be acknowledged. What this means is that Socrates implicitly embraces the model of thought we find explicit elsewhere in the *corpus*, that is, that it is like a conversation. The individual engaged in thought is involved in a silent internal conversation (cf. *Tht.* 189e-190a, *Soph.* 263e). All thinking is coming to agreement. The person engaged in such internal conversation determines more or less consciously which voice deserves most attention. Here is where true and false judgment arise. It is crucial to recognize that the individual *himself or herself* must agree or be persuaded to listen to one voice or the other, since otherwise we should say that the many can do the greatest harm when their advice leads to our corruption (see 44d). Socrates denies the many do such harm because it is the individual that determines to go along or not.¹⁶

Given this general understanding of the situation of deliberation or thought, that it is a type of internal conversation, there is some reason to

¹⁵ Since the conclusion appears as an initial premise of the argument, this is not what G. Vlastos, 'The Socratic *Elenchus*,' *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983) 27-58 calls a 'standard *elenchus*.' Apparently Socrates begins as he does referring to all opinions (47a3) and all men (47a4) in order to make the major component of his argument as widely applicable as possible and not limited merely to their present situation. We might notice that a more restricted argument might have begun with premise 4, as does the basically parallel argument of *La.* 184d-185a. In that case it seems more standard.

¹⁶ If this model of thought has close kinship with the public deliberations of political communities, then the many in the democracy will have to be viewed in two different roles: as advocates of certain opinions and as that which judges or decides (cf. *Resp.* 1.348a7-b4). If we are correct about this account of deliberation, then we may observe that adherence to law is not merely a case of going along with external authority. Citizens somehow themselves agree to the laws.

question whether Socrates' argument necessarily is restricted to moral or practical cases. It may in fact extend beyond decisions regarding action to all decisions whatsoever. He has taken an analogue from the field of art or craft, athletic training, because it fits usefully with the present case. He wishes to set up an analogy of care and corruption of body and soul. He seems aware, however, that his line of argument extends quite widely (see esp. 47a2-4, 47c8f.). He could similarly argue that a more theoretical line of thought, such as about mathematics or natural phenomena, will likely be ruined by listening uncritically to the many. Moreover, the doctor mentioned by Socrates as caring for the body may need to enter into some theoretical considerations and in 48a7 Socrates refers to 'the truth itself' as standard, a standard that need hardly be restricted to any particular field. So it might well be suggested that Socrates is providing the widest possible reflection upon decision-making.

Though the argument applies to all possible decision-making, in its context it concentrates on just action. One of its assumptions, readily embraced by Crito, is that justice is the good condition for the soul much as health or fine athletic condition is the good condition of the body. Were there no superior conditions or outcomes, there would seem to be little difference what decision is made. The underlying assumption of the whole argument therefore appears to be that some things or states are better than others, and hence those opinions or arguments will be best that contribute most to securing these better things or states.

The argument evidently looks to authority. Expert knowledge or the truth itself deserves attention in the course of deliberation and reflection because it has the better consequences. But Socrates mentions the possibility that there might not be anyone sufficiently knowledgeable, even in the field of their present concern, to serve as authority (47d1f.). How then should they decide? May they allow that there is still an intelligent approach? Rather than reject all argument, they presumably should still accept the argument that seems best. Where there is no clear criterion, where no expert knower appears, they must aspire to the truth and accede to or agree with that which appears best when they have sought the intelligent view and applied their intelligence as fully as they can.¹⁷ We should appreciate the power of the early third premise.

¹⁷ Ultimately, if god alone is wise, we may doubt there is an expert very accessible to humans (cf. below, n. 35). This makes careful human reflection crucial. Even in the case where there seems to be a clear expert, as with the person in athletic training, we may wonder if the athlete's body is destroyed through not listening to his coach. He may in fact only 'ruin' it with respect to some particular sport. Socrates wishes, however, to get to the point that life is not worth living with a corrupted body. Perhaps he has shifted, with Crito's assistance (see 47c7), to the example of the doctor where larger-scale corruption seems likely. (Notice that in

Where clear experts may be lacking, in the case of the soul, Socrates apparently hopes that the importance and urgency of what is at issue compensate for any lack of authority. If they cannot listen to any old opinion without endangering the body, how much more must this apply with regard to the still more crucial soul.¹⁸ Where something really serious is at stake, they should be ready on pragmatic grounds to accept that some arguments carry more weight than others. Of course they may have to struggle to gain agreement about what course is most intelligent and best. Yet they are hardly bereft of assistance, for in the coming argument Socrates can introduce the laws as a stand-in for the knower or expert. The law may oversee and direct deliberation about what is just and unjust in the care for the soul.¹⁹

At the conclusion of his argumentation, Socrates says someone might say in objection that the many are able to kill us (48a10f.). This acknowledges Crito's great resistance to the argument—resistance akin to that of the many and anyone tempted to go along with them—for this reraises a consideration that led to the argument in the first place. In answer all Socrates can do is reaf-

47d8 he refers to disease. The body may be corrupted so that it is not worth living without being in a terminal condition.) Crito's acceptance that life is not worth living under all conditions, for instance with a corrupted body, proves vital to overcoming his tendency to suppose that argument is void where there is a threat to life. The athlete's case is interesting because we might suppose that the athlete aims ultimately only for honor from the many. Yet to become good in the sport and win popular adulation, the athlete has to ignore the advice of the many about how to train. We may allow, then, that even the athlete might eventually become less concerned for the praises or blames of the many as he or she takes more seriously the standards of high-level performance intrinsic to the sport.

¹⁸ Not all interlocutors will acknowledge that the good condition of the soul is the most important of human considerations. Those who do not will be those mentioned in 49d as ever disagreeing with Socrates.

¹⁹ We may connect the *Crito*, then, with Socratic discussions of the question whether rule of persons or law is preferable (see, e.g., *Plt.* 292a-302b). Presumably, it is in part the absence of a completely wise ruler to serve everywhere as the expert that makes rule of law necessary and appropriate. As previously indicated, however, rule of law is not merely external authority because citizens have agreed to it. In the context of the *Crito*, the laws are the pertinent interlocutor because Socrates' escape would damage them. Among the suggested levels of authority in the dialogue we have first the dream of the woman in white, perhaps a goddess. Then Socrates proclaims he always listens to the argument that seems best to him and suggests there may be expert argument. Subsequently he introduces the laws and refers to their brother laws in Hades (about authority, see, e.g., the use of ἄκυροι and κυρίας in 50b). Even if Athenian law cannot be the highest authority for Socrates, we should hardly suppose that the laws' argument will not be convincing. After all, the laws perform on Socrates a Socratic *elenchus*, Socrates keeps hearing their argument at the dialogue's conclusion, and, if I am correct, the laws' argument is based on Socrates' initial profound argumentation.

firm what they have just said (48b3f.). What we have here is some indication of the limit of argumentation. There are inevitably problems with grounding reliance upon argument in argument. But if it is agreed that the soul is really crucial and that some conditions of the soul are superior to others and that some arguments contribute to these better conditions, then argument can defend itself and Socrates must adhere to this argument in the face of any temptations to do otherwise. We should notice the parallel to the conclusion of the argument with the laws. At its end Socrates says that he, like the Corybants hearing the flute, has the arguments resounding in his ears so that he is unable to hear other arguments (54d3-6).²⁰ This suggests that his arguments in both halves of the dialogue are complete and about as good as he can make them. Socrates can only keep repeating such arguments. Were there no possible completeness and adequacy of argument, neither argument nor action could ever justify itself.

The argument of the first half of the dialogue emphasizes that the very conditions of philosophical discussion—that some views are better than others and to fail to pay heed to these may endanger body or soul—have crucial consequences for the course of our life. The opening argument thus defends against skepticism about the worth of argument and justifies Socrates' personal commitment to listening to the argument that seems best. It is not an argument about any particular opinion but about the philosophical way of conversation and making decisions. Having secured Crito's acceptance of his general approach to deliberation, Socrates can instantiate it in considering the particular case before them.

2

The intimate connections of the forthcoming argument with that which preceded should be immediately evident. The initial premises for the argument for staying, that we should be most concerned to live well, not merely to live, and that to live well is to live nobly and justly (48b5-10), derive from what Socrates has said in 47c8-48a10.²¹ That it is not worth living in all conditions (47d9-48a2) implies that we should care most about living well rather than mere life. And in 48a9f. just, noble, and good things are so conjoined that it

²⁰ Cf. R. Eisner, 'Socrates as Hero,' *Philosophy and Literature* 6 (1982) 112.

²¹ G. Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Ithaca 1991) 214, esp. n. 59 gives the premises in 48b4-10 their due weight in formulating Socrates' moral position, while complaining that previous commentators have not recognized their significance. Yet even he does not consider how these premises link with the earlier argument.

seems they must be very closely identified.²² Moreover, in 48b5-10 forms of μένω (remain) start to appear prominently. These suggest not only that Socrates and Crito remain with the agreements they were making through their past life prior to the present circumstances, but also that they maintain the agreements they have just made in their argument. It is based on these very agreements, Socrates emphasizes (see 48b11-c2), that they can consider whether it is just or not for Socrates to try to escape.²³

Socrates seeks to establish that escaping is unjust and that it is just for him to remain in prison, that is, that his dying now is somehow living well. Having already obtained agreement that living well is living justly, he gets further agreement that doing injustice voluntarily for any reason, even if in return for injustice, is evil and base for the doer (49a4-c1).²⁴ Neither should one work any evil (κακούργειν) at all (49c2-11). Why Socrates adds this is perhaps because it might seem that though the laws are not doing Socrates an injustice they are working evil upon him (see 54b8-c5), and perhaps also because he needs to gain agreement that if his leaving is somehow to work evil then it is unjust (see 50a1).

Socrates and Crito agree that they must never do what is unjust or evil (49d5-e4). One sort of injustice that must be avoided is breaking our just agreements (49e6f.).²⁵ What Socrates will need to establish is that he has agreed

²² In fact, in 48a7 only just and unjust things are mentioned, but then in 48a9f. good and fine things and their contraries are added, which suggests these are closely united with just and unjust things (cf. 47c9-11, d4f.).

²³ We may say that their agreement is on two levels. They agree to the particular premises they are stating and they agree in general to adhere to argument. The argument of the first half of the dialogue secures both their initial premises and their reliance on argument. I have been trying to show how these levels are connected. Socrates now begins often to use words for agreement. See, e.g., 48b11, 49a7, 8, d1, e6, 50a2f. The agreement of those engaged in discussion to hold to argument prefigures, of course, agreement of the citizen to live according to law and of Socrates to adhere to the law of Athens.

²⁴ Socrates is well aware that not everyone would agree to such points (see 49c11-e3). It presupposes that one accepts that doing any injustice harms the soul of the doer and that no one should accept harm to his or her own soul no matter what other sorts of advantages there might be. Crito has accepted such a view in the first half of the dialogue. For a fuller discussion of the argumentation of 49a-c, see Vlastos [21] 194-99. In fact Socrates' repeated refrain that the many would not agree with what they are saying (48c6, 49b3, b10f., c4f.) reinforces my arguments that Socrates means to recall the argument of the first half of the dialogue and emphasizes that his premises for the second half depend upon it.

²⁵ Socrates' question in 49e6f. applies generally to just agreements, so it should apply to Crito's agreement to the argument of the first half of the dialogue as well. For him not to adhere to the view that will ultimately seem best to them when they have deliberated would be unjust deception.

to adhere to law and to legal procedure, that such an agreement is just, and that the present case is one in which such an agreement comes into play.

Socrates makes these points in a dialogue with the personified laws. As mentioned previously, the laws stand in for the expert sought in the argument of the first half of the dialogue. Socrates must introduce the laws because he is deciding what *he* will do, so he must *undergo* cross-examination, and there needs to be someone present capable of directing the *elenchus*. By introducing the laws Socrates heightens the seriousness of the discussion. Before the laws one should experience awe and should feel shame for acts of injustice (cf. 47c11-d3). Also, by having the laws on the scene Socrates can determine right away whether he can persuade them to relax Socrates' agreement with them; otherwise, he should obey.²⁶ Moreover, through conducting a conversation with the laws, Socrates relieves Crito from frequent agreements while his reasons for escaping are politely challenged. Perhaps, since Crito moves into the background and the laws address Socrates directly, we are hearing a rehearsal of arguments Socrates has gone through with himself. As directed at the philosopher Socrates, and obviously by himself, these arguments should be good ones and profound.

The speech of the laws—actually their cross-examination of Socrates—is more Socratically elenctic than is generally noticed, much as the first half of the dialogue is also elenctic.²⁷ The laws suggest a reason in 50c1f. why Socrates'

²⁶ The 'persuade or obey' injunction, which commentators have often discussed, appears in the coming sections (51b-c, 51e-52a; and see the preparation in 49e9-50a2). We observe that connecting the two halves of the dialogue helps explain the emphasis on persuade or obey. Agreement whether in argument or politics demands that one either adhere to the agreement or persuade otherwise. In the context of the philosophical argument and deliberation of the first half, one aims to determine the best *logos* and one adheres to what is agreed or tries to persuade others and oneself that it is other than supposed (46b-e). In the political context here in the second half, when persons are persuaded to enter into a just agreement, they should adhere to its terms unless the parties to the agreement become persuaded that it should be altered. The agreement that is principally in question in the *Crito* is the citizen's agreement to accept legal sanctions for law-breaking. This is the agreement pertinent to Socrates. He has been legally tried and sentenced. If he cannot now persuade the city that its sentence should be ignored, then he must obey the law and accept his punishment. The laws reasonably emphasize how fundamental this agreement is (see 50b2-5, 50c4-6, 53e1f.) and that Socrates has agreed to it (52d3-5). Those notorious occasions in the *Apology* when Socrates seems defiant towards authority should perhaps be construed as cases in which no just agreement binds him (cf. Brickhouse and Smith [2] esp. 192f.). Surely Socrates would not accept that his actual or counterfactual actions were at all unjust.

²⁷ Vlastos [5] 519 views the speech of the laws as undialectical and 'unsocratic,' but consider 50c7-9, which suggests that the laws are imitating the usual manner of Socratic conversation.

agreement might be abandoned and he might escape. The reason is that the city has treated him unjustly by incorrectly deciding his case. This nagging reason may be compared to the earlier refrain that the many may kill us (48a10f.), but we should note that though Crito readily endorses this reason for escape (50c3), it is not one that he himself had presented earlier in 44b-46a. Hence the laws' argument is addressed as much to Socrates, and reasons he might have for leaving, as it is to Crito. The laws' speech, developed through question and answer (50c7-9), refutes the supposition that Socrates has any good reason to break his agreement. Much as in the first half of the dialogue the many threatened to scare Socrates and Crito into abandoning their life of listening to the best argument, so now the thought that Socrates' sentence is unjust might lead them to forsake acceptance of the rule of law. Socrates is fortunately able to argue effectively against the threats both to his proper deliberation and his proper action.

The laws initially ask if Socrates has in mind to destroy them and the city completely. A city and legal system could not exist were legal decisions nullified by private individuals (50a8-b5). Escaping undermines the whole system of law so far as Socrates is able (see 50b7-9; cf. 53e1f., 54c7f.). Socrates in the name of the laws is not so much asking the consequences of the generalization of his escape—what if everyone did it?, that is, he is not formulating the universalization criterion of moral action,²⁸ but rather he is urging that a legal system presupposes the efficacy of its sanctions. If the legally determined sanctions against law-breaking are merely ignored, then the whole system of law seems overthrown because there can be no enforcement. This interpretation is supported by the parallel with Socrates' earlier thought. He has said he makes his decisions by listening to the argument that seems best to him (46b), and analogously the system of law is sustained by the legal decision that seems best. If opinions of the many overwhelm Socrates' deliberation or the whim of the individual foils the city's, then neither enterprise—philosophical conversation or the rule of law—can function properly.²⁹ They must now ascertain whether Socrates has justly agreed to abide by the city's legal decisions and that agreement still holds (50c4-6).

The discourse of the laws concerns Socrates' having agreed to the legitimacy of the city's pronouncement of legal sentence; his escape would

²⁸ On this see R. Kraut, *Socrates and the State* (Princeton 1984) 42f., 128-137; Kahn [6] 36-38.

²⁹ If conversation and political deliberation have significant similarity, as I have been suggesting throughout, then whenever individuals or the collectivity stray from the truth or what has been intelligently agreed, due to going along with the thoughtless many or personal or collective whim, the conditions for conversation and political life are threatened.

nullify this agreement. Socrates has agreed to sanctions for law-breaking because rule of law as such is so necessary and appropriate. Why admit punishment for law-breaking if law itself is unsustainable? Hence, to justify Socrates' acceptance of legal verdicts, the laws reflect profoundly on the foundations of political life. Socrates has had compelling grounds for adhering to legal procedures and decisions, that is, embracing rule of law: the benefits he as a human being receives. Parallel to the dialogue's first half in which better opinions were validated by their good consequences, the system of law here has its benefits in its defense. Laws governed the marriage of Socrates' parents through which he was begotten, and they regulated his nurture and education (50d-e). He might therefore be said in some sense to *belong* to the city—it 'made' him—and in this respect all people in the city are its slaves (50e2-4).³⁰ Now just as Socrates is not on such a level with his parents that what they deem appropriate for him he might do in return, so it is not right that what the city determines as appropriate for him he should do in turn to the city. The city is even more honorable than parents (51a7-b3).³¹ Apparently the condition for receiving the benefit from the city, that is, from political life, is that one accedes to its just orders. By putting the city into a position analogous to parents, and even stressing how the laws mediate the performance by parents of their functions (50d1-e4), Socrates suggests the city is natural for humans, that is, humans are naturally political beings. If such were the case, this would provide the strongest justification for the city and its system of laws. Much as the truth itself hopefully underlies arguments (48a7), so nature might sustain political association. Socrates has agreed to be a member of the political association and to adhere to its legal procedure because this seems natural for humans. If the *polis* is natural and rule of law essential, then whatever is required for rule of law, such as legal sanction against its violation, is also necessary. This Socrates has accepted.

³⁰ Humans as makers of the city and its rulers cannot merely be slaves, but as made by the city they are subordinated to it. Similarly, humans make agreements, but they must in turn follow them. This may not generally be the case with other human products, however, or people will succumb to idolatry or fetishism of their own creations. The city and conversations are thus unlike many other human creations.

³¹ Calling the city more honorable than parents may remind us of the earlier argument that the soul is more honorable than the body (47e7-48a4). The points might be linked by the consideration that our parents have much to do with keeping our body in order whereas our city should be principally concerned with our soul. It is important that the city is more honorable than parents since children grow up and attain the same rights as their parents. Might this be why the laws emphasize that Socrates and even his ancestors are slaves of the city (50e2-4)? Slaves will not naturally become equal. Moreover, even if Socrates were to escape prison he could not escape slavery, but he would enter an even worse form, slavery to men (see 53e).

We should notice that the laws imagined to be speaking do not in this first section really refer specifically to Athens. Only in the subsequent section (starting at 51c6) do they stress Athenian law and Socrates' agreement to live in *this* particular community. This confirms the point that the law's first long speech (50c-51c) emphasizes the naturalness of political association for humans due to its benefits. Life in political communities under law is natural for humans much as is making decisions based upon argument.³²

The second long section of the laws' argument (51c6-52d7) deals further with complications in the foundation of political life, particularly the troublesome analogy of city and parents. Individuals may leave one association for another, but they usually cannot escape the natural connection with biological parents. However much political association as such may be natural for humans, individuals live in particular communities—in Athens, Sparta, Crete, Thebes, Megara, and so on—and may have some choice of the community to which they attach themselves. The individual through his deeds, that is by remaining in the community, has at least tacitly attached himself to it (51e1-4).³³ It is not only the case that the individual agrees that a citizen in general must

³² The strongest statement of persuade or obey appears in 51b-c—actually here it is 'do or persuade'—in the context of the naturalness of the city. Socrates has impressed Crito with what piety demands toward our natural superior. Compulsion is inappropriately applied to parents or to the city (51c2f.). The laws state that 'in war, in court, and everywhere one ought to do what the city commands' (51b8-c1). War and court are spheres in which disobedience threatens the very survival of the city. Everywhere else the city commands only through law, which may be assumed to command what is just, and one has good grounds for adhering to it. The individual's only alternative is to persuade the community where the naturally just lies. It ought to be remarked that natural justice seems to be at issue (see 51c1). In the subsequent discussion of persuade or obey in 51d-52a—and here Socrates does speak of obeying or persuading, utilizing the passive and active forms of the verb *παίθω*—the emphasis is again upon the need to obey what the city enjoins, either because the city has begotten us or because it has nurtured us or because we have agreed to obey it. Our obligation to obey stems either from the natural obligation to what is superior to us and has benefited us or from our agreement to obey. Only persuading the city, our natural superior and party to our agreement to obedience, where justice really lies can change what we should do under the city's command.

³³ We here reaffirm the importance of remaining (see 51e1). The citizen chooses to remain in the city much as interlocutors remain with their agreements and Socrates remains in jail (see above, n. 13). Vlastos [5] 526 points out that the Greeks did not have any easy procedure of naturalization so that changing communities was quite undesirable because it involved loss of civic rights (the exception might be to move to a colony of the mother city, see 51d6-8). Yet we may observe that the laws are cognizant of this. They refer to it in 51d8 and in regard to Socrates' possibly taking his children out of Athens were he to escape (see 54a). Thus the laws' speech seems more subtle than Vlastos acknowledges (cf. above, n. 27).

adhere to political law, but also he has accepted the laws and procedures of *this* particular community (51c8-e4). Socrates by his special reluctance ever to leave Athens has displayed his agreement to adhere to its laws. Athens is referred to explicitly by the laws again and again (51d2, 52a5, a7, b3), for it is the laws of Athens that Socrates has agreed to. This section of argument stresses the role of agreement. It allows that individuals may be bound to particular associations by their agreement to be members of them. Once one agrees to be a member of the particular association, one has agreed generally to its laws and procedures. In this respect political life is more constrained than philosophical discussion. In conversation one can choose the particular statements with which one agrees and disagrees, though one should be consistent and seek the better view; in political life, after one has accepted the community, one has agreed in principle to abide by all its laws and legal decisions.

This second large section of the laws' speech should provoke us to ask the basis for Socrates' commitment to live in Athens. It is presumably an intelligent rather than an arbitrary agreement, and there are suggestions that it is intelligent. The emphasis placed on how long he has lived there and how little he went elsewhere (52a-d) indicates that Athens has deserved his loyalty not only as satisfying the basic requirements of a community (see 51e) but because for so long he could there live the sort of life that suits him. Perhaps it is in Athens that he can converse best with interlocutors most appropriate for or needful of him. There is some interesting irony in the laws' suggestion that Socrates did not need to leave the city to see any 'spectacle' (θεωρίαν, the word that may also mean philosophical contemplation) nor did he have any desire to know the laws of other cities (52b). Surely Socrates reveals much understanding of law in general and the law of other cities (see, e.g., 52e5f., 53b3-5, d2-4). We may conclude that Athens provides him all that is necessary for his philosophizing. We may well view the commitment of Socrates to this particular political association as a crucial instance of decision-making through listening to the argument that seems best.

The third long section of the laws' discourse (52d8-54d1), after re-emphasizing Socrates' special agreement to adhere to the laws of Athens, deals with Crito's arguments for escape. Given what has been said already about Socrates' concern for justice and agreements, escape would be entirely inappropriate for him. Neither would it help anyone else: his friends, family, or others. How could he be following the better opinion if there were such unsatisfactory outcomes? There is also finally some synthesis of the results of the previous treatments of the foundation of the city. Socrates should consider nothing before justice, only thus will his present and future life be best (54b). The laws of Athens, and presumably also of the other well-governed cities

mentioned (see 52e5f., 53b4f.), are said to have brother laws in Hades (54c6f.). This suggests that even the particular laws of a community, if not as a whole simply natural, have some connection with natural or divine law.³⁴ Our agreements to adhere to them thus may have a foundation, legitimation, or justification, beyond the simple fact of agreement or acceptance of them. Much as agreement in argument may be based on knowledge or the standard of the best opinion, so in political life law is based on nature or intelligent human agreements. The laws have established that Socrates or any thoughtful person has good grounds for accepting rule of law and legal procedure. Escaping the pronounced sentence in Socrates' case would be an inexcusable breach of just agreement.

We have now followed the design of the arguments in this dialogue. It has been shown, I believe, that appreciation of Socrates' arguments increases through attention to the whole course of the dialogue. Both halves of the argumentation are subtle and truly elenctic. Moreover, they fit together. We have noted many parallels in the arguments in their similar aims and structures. There is shared content in the arguments, especially because of the role of agreement in both. Also, Socrates' opening responses to Crito fit intimately into the argument for remaining to face his death because they provide the initial premises for it. And we have observed that the second half's argument is an instantiation of what the first half argues for, the reliance upon the best available argument. What we may gain from treating the arguments together is better understanding of the arguments and better appreciation of the various levels of Socrates' reflections. The initial argument about how we should argue operates at the most comprehensive and fundamental level because it considers the basis for any sound obedience and agreement whatsoever. It thereby provides a measure for the scope of Socrates' subsequent argument about his adherence to the city and agreement to the rule of law.³⁵

³⁴ Cf. P. Friedländer, *Plato 2* (New York 1964) 177.

³⁵ We might comment on the remark at the very end of the dialogue that the god leads Socrates (54e2) that there is no evident way to fit the gods into Socrates' approach to deliberation, that is, listening to the argument that seems best to him. Even if the gods speak to humans, the efficacy of the address depends upon the latter acceding to the former. Neither is it clear just how appeals to the gods or divine law should be understood in political life (see 54c6f.). All indications are that Socrates himself takes these matters quite seriously. He is confident that the gods are wise and that there are divine laws, but humans will have only limited understanding. In consequence of this limited understanding, that is, in the absence of clear expertise, Socrates can only attempt to determine what the gods expect of him in a particular case by considering which course seems better and more just; as a human being he is bound to adhere to human law. Thus, reflection on this comment about the god reinforces the main lines of thought we have found in the dialogue.

THE DATE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE *LEX ANTONIA DE TERMESSIBUS*

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Abstract. The *Lex Antonia de Termessibus* is normally dated 68 BC, because scholars believe, despite Mommsen, that Sulla completely banned tribunician legislation. Prosopographically, however, C. Antonius' colleagues fit 72 BC much better than 68 BC. Perhaps C. Cotta, consul in 74 BC, permitted tribunician legislation approved in advance by the Senate and supported by the whole board—the *Lex Antonia* met both these conditions.

The *Lex Antonia* concerning Termessus Maior in Pisidia was evidently presented by all ten tribunes, though only three names survive in its heading—C. Antonius M. f., Cn. Corne[lius] and C. Fundanius C. f.¹ It had received previous senatorial approval. The name of L. Volcacius *cur(ator) viar(um)* heads another inscription from Rome and below are the names of nine colleagues; since they include the three of the *Lex Antonia*, this is clearly the same tribunician board.² The *Lex Antonia* was passed at some time after 1 April 72 BC but, since most scholars, abandoning Mommsen's view, are now sure that Sulla robbed tribunes of all legislative powers, the law is commonly put in 68 BC. Tribunes other than these ten held office in 71, 70 and 69 BC.³ Now it

¹ I am most grateful to *Scholia*'s anonymous referees for constructive suggestions, which I have been glad to follow in finalising my text.

² See *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (hereafter *CIL*) 1² 589 (note *d[e] se[natus] s[ententia]* in line 3), 744. G. V. Sumner, *Orators in Cicero's Brutus* (Toronto 1973) 126 saw that L. Volcacius must also be a tribune. Tribunes could be entrusted with work on roads and bridges in Rome. See T. Mommsen, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin 1906) 3.31f. and *Römisches Staatsrecht*³ 2 (Leipzig 1887) 668f.; Dio Cass. 37.45.3 with *CIL* 1² 751 and T. R. S. Broughton, *Magistrates of the Roman Republic* (hereafter *MRR*) 2 (New York 1952) 174 (L. Fabricius in 62 BC).

³ See *CIL* 1² 589.1.3. Mommsen put the law in 71 BC (but Palicanus bars *this*), since he accepted App. *BCiv.* 1.59 on Sulla and the tribunate (see my n. 32 on this). For translations and commentaries see E. G. Hardy, *Roman Laws and Charters* (Oxford 1912) 94-101; A. C. Johnson, P. R. Coleman-Norton and F. C. Bourne, *Ancient Roman Statutes* (Austin 1961) 72-75; R. K. Sherck, *Rome and the Greek East to the Death of Augustus* (Cambridge 1984) 89-92; J. L. Ferrary, 'Lex Antonia de Termessibus', in M. H. Crawford (ed.), *Roman Statutes* 1 (London 1996) 331-40 (with Latin text). For an excellent treatment of all aspects of the *Lex Antonia*, see J. L. Ferrary, 'La Lex Antonia de Termessibus', *Athenaeum* 73 (1985) 419-57. For the modern consensus on 68 BC, see *MRR* 2 (1952) 138f., 141 n. 8; Ferrary 439-42. The

is usually unwise to reject Mommsen out of hand and one modern scholar has well stressed our ignorance of what exactly Sulla did with the tribunate, arguing that the role played by the question of tribunes' rights in the 70s has been misunderstood because of our over-confidence. This was a salutary reminder. Another scholar went further and argued the case for 72 BC with formidable new reasons.⁴ I aim later in this paper to follow his lead. Meanwhile, I would submit the consensus on 68 BC to rigorous examination. In a most important article supporting this dating, Syme pointed out that two tribunes of the *Lex Antonia* board, Cn. Cornelius and Q. Caecilius, might well be the Cn. Lentulus and Q. Metellus whom Cicero cited as having been legates the year after their tribunates. Now Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus was certainly a legate of Pompey against the pirates in 67 BC. Had he perhaps reverted to his father's original plebeian status in order to become a tribune? He is known as a *septemvir epulorum*, a member of a college established as a plebeian monopoly; all the other six known Republican members happen to be plebeians and the first certain patrician is Ap. Claudius Pulcher, consul in 38 BC.⁵ There is, moreover, other possible evidence for Marcellinus as plebeian. A certain Lentulus adopted P. Cornelius Dolabella in 48 BC, so that he could become tribune the next year. This can hardly be Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus himself, since he seems to have died before the Civil War: we hear nothing of him indeed in the abundant sources after 56 BC. His son, however, served as Caesar's quaestor at Dyrrachium in 48 BC and he very likely came to know Dolabella on that campaign: Dolabella returned to Rome before the end of the year and the younger Marcellinus could have accompanied him and there gone through the adoption process.⁶

first two works cited follow Mommsen's dating. M. Lollius Palicanus was a tribune in 71 BC (Cic. 2 *Verr.* 2.41.100; Suet. *Iul.* 5), Q. Cornificius and Q. Manlius in 69 BC (Cic. 1 *Verr.* 10.36): Plotius surely proposed as tribune in 70 BC his bill recalling the survivors of the party of Lepidus and Sertorius. See Suet. *Iul.* 5; Cic. 2 *Verr.* 5.58.151-53; Dio Cass. 44.47.4; *MRR* 2 (1952) 128, 130 n. 4.

⁴ E. S. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley 1974) 23-28; J. Béranger, *Principatus* (Geneva 1975) 61-76.

⁵ R. Syme, 'Ten Tribunes', *JRS* 53 (1963) 55-60; Cic. *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 18.59; J. M. Reynolds, 'Cyrenaica, Pompey and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus', *JRS* 52 (1962) 97-103 (Marcellinus in Cyrenaica). For the *epulones* see Livy 33.42.1 and 40.41.7 (three plebeians: P. Manlius is 'Pat.?' in *MRR* 1 (1951) 338, 390. But a plebeian succeeded him); Cic. *Har. Resp.* 10.21 (Marcellinus); K. Bardt, *Die Priester der vier grössten Collegien aus römisch-republikanischer Zeit* (Berlin 1871) 31f.; *CIL* 10.1423 (Pulcher).

⁶ For Dolabella and Lentulus see Dio Cass. 42.29.1; Cic. *Att.* 12.23.3, 30.1; Asc. *Pis.* 5C; Plut. *Cic.* 41; Macrobian *Sat.* 2.3.3. For the elder Marcellinus' presumed early death see *Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* 4.1 390 no. 228; D. R. Shackleton

Identification of Cicero's tribune with the elder Marcellinus has so far some plausibility. But how does the case stand with Cicero's Q. Metellus? Scholars mostly take him to be Q. Metellus Celer who was praetor in 63 BC and consul three years later. Syme, Sumner and Broughton argue that, since he was Pompey's legate in the East from 66 to 64 BC, he might well have served like his brother Nepos in the pirate war of 67 BC.⁷ Now Pompey was evidently granted fifteen legates under the *Lex Gabinia*. Thirteen are listed by Appian with the areas of the Mediterranean which they covered—and Celer is not among them.⁸ Two others seem to have had roving commissions. L. Octavius became embroiled in Crete with Q. Metellus Creticus, following the example set by Pompey's Peloponnesian legate L. Sisenna. L. Torquatus was active in Asia Minor. He was an obvious choice for this area, since he had served there as Sulla's proquaestor, and he was honoured at Miletus as a benefactor.⁹ There is no room for Celer among Pompey's legates in 67 BC. Nor is he likely to have been a legate of Creticus, Lucullus or Marcius Rex in Cilicia, in view of his later service under their enemy Pompey.¹⁰ Syme's case for 68 BC is surely

Bailey, *Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature* (New York 1976) 30. For his son see Caes. *BCiv.* 3.62.4, 63-65; for Dolabella see Cic. *Fam.* 9.9; *Att.* 11.7.2.

⁷ For Celer from 66 BC on see Dio Cass. 36.54.2-4. For 67 see Syme [5] 58; Sumner [2] 123f.; *MRR* 3 Suppl. (1986) 37.

⁸ See Plut. *Pomp.* 23.3; Dio Cass. 36.37 (fifteen legates); App. *Mith.* 95 (thirteen); Florus 1.41.9 (incomplete and confused); *MRR* 2 (1952) 148f., 150f. nn. 15-18. The twenty-four/twenty-five legates of Plut. *Pomp.* 26 and App. *Mith.* 94 are surely products of someone's fantasy.

⁹ For L. Octavius see Plut. *Pomp.* 29.2-5; Dio Cass. 36.18.1-19.1. For L. Torquatus see the long-unpublished inscription from Miletus as reread by P. Hermann, *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (hereafter *SEG*) 37 (1987) 1189 and T.R.S. Broughton, 'L. Manlius Torquatus and the Governors of Asia', *AJPh* 111 (1990) 72-74. His title was the normal πρεσβευτής καὶ ἀντιστράτηγος ('propraetorian legate'), as enjoyed by Marcellinus. In *MRR* 2 (1952) 151 n. 16 Broughton had tried to make sense of the reported bizarre reading πρεσβευτής καὶ ἀνθύπατος ('legate and proconsul!'). The legate Torquatus of Appian and Florus (active off Spain and Africa) must be A. Torquatus who governed Africa in 69 BC (*MRR* 2 [1952] 133, 151 n. 16). L. Torquatus struck gold and silver for Sulla after their return to Italy from the East: see M. H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage* (Cambridge 1974) 386f. no. 367 (82 BC).

¹⁰ For Pompey and Creticus see the passages cited in n. 9; for Pompey and Lucullus see Plut. *Luc.* 36.1 with 37.1; *Pomp.* 31; Strab. 12C 558; Dio Cass. 36.46.1-2; for Pompey and Rex see Dio Cass. 36.42.4-43.2 with 48.2 (like Lucullus he was unceremoniously superseded by Pompey).

weakened, but not fatally. The Q. Caecilius of the *Lex Antonia* could still be Q. Caecilius Niger, Verres' quaestor and would-be prosecutor.¹¹

The real objection to dating the *Lex Antonia* 68 BC is the presence of L. Volcacijs on its tribunician board. The tempting identification is with L. Volcacijs Tullus, the consul of 66 BC. A career with the tribunate in 72 and the praetorship in c. 70 BC makes excellent sense. We can really salvage the 68 BC dating only by postulating some other unknown L. Volcacijs as the tribune. Syme was not completely happy with this.¹²

In any case other members of the board fit the earlier dating very well. L. Hostilijs is surely L. Hostilijs Dasianus, whom Sallust characterised as *inquietus animi* ('of a restless disposition'): the very phrase suggests a radical like M. Lepidus and Syme acutely noted that 'the label suits a turbulent tribune'. Sallust featured several of these in his account of the later 70s and the Dasianus reference might belong there. Certainly some people identified him as the unnamed ally of Verres, who set up a spurious rival prosecution in spring 70 BC in order to have Verres' trial postponed to a more suitable time.¹³ Q. Marcijs in 72 BC will be the young recruit with Pompeius Strabo in 89 BC at Asculum, son of the famous consul of 91 BC. Termessus' basic rights under Rome went back to this consulship and it would be fitting for Philippus' son to be on the board which restored its lost freedom.¹⁴ C. Popillijs should be the notorious senatorial juror, who was finally condemned for embezzlement some time before August 70 BC. Perhaps he had embezzled during his tribunate. Q. Caecilijs can hardly be Niger in 72 BC, since he was then with Verres as

¹¹ For Niger see Syme [5] 58; Cic. *Div. Caec.* 9.30-11.35. But, if Cicero can be trusted, he may well have had no further career after its start.

¹² Syme [5] 59f. His instinct was sound. His other let-out can hardly stand. What could have led a consul of 66 BC to hold a tribunate *after* his praetorship? There is no parallel in all late Republican history. The precedent of M. Fulvius Flaccus (consul 125, tribune 122 BC) could not be invoked even before Sulla, much less after.

¹³ See Syme [5] 58; Sall. *Hist.* 4.55 (Dasianus) with 1.77.11, 17 (Lepidus *inquietus*), 2.25-27, 3.48.8, 3.48.10 (L. Sicinius), 3.17, 48.11 (L. Quinctius), 3.48 (C. Licinius Macer's speech, 73 BC), 4.43 (Palicanus: 71 BC); Cic. 2 *Verr.* 2.6-3.9 with Schol. Gronov. B (T. Stangl [ed.], *Ciceronis Orationum Scholiastae* 2 [Vienna/Leipzig 1912] 331) (Dasianus?: 70 BC).

¹⁴ For Q. Marcijs L. f. Pap. see *CIL* 1² 709, 714 with C. Cichorius, *Römische Studien* (Leipzig/Berlin 1922) 168f.: he is in the thirty-eighth place on the *consilium*, between the younger Pompey and Catiline (nos. 30, 46). For Termessus' freedom in 91 BC (apparently forfeited under Sulla), see *CIL* 1² 589 1.12-26 and 2.18-30 with A. N. Sherwin-White, 'Rome, Pamphylia and Cilicia', *JRS* 66 (1976) 12-14. Q. Marcijs Rufus, Crassus' legate in 71 BC (Frontin. *Str.* 2.4.7), was certainly not tribune in 72 BC—otherwise Cicero would have cited him in *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 18.59.

quaestor. The tribune must be Metellus Celer. He might well have been a legate of M. Pupius Piso in Spain from 71 to 69 BC. Piso finally reached the consulate of 61 BC with Pompey's backing and evidently backed Celer—another of Pompey's close circle—for the next year. He would have done this more readily if they had earlier been colleagues in Spain.¹⁵

None of this is quite probative for 72 BC and the name of L. Volcacius certainly remains the strongest prosopographic argument. But Syme's case for 68 BC has another serious weakness. The evidence for Marcellinus as a plebeian is tenuous. Syme himself admitted that Sulla, while increasing the number of priesthoods and abolishing public election, might have been tempted to end the anomaly of all-plebeian *epulones*. With four new places in the college this would have been easy.¹⁶ Moreover, Shackleton Bailey discovered another Lentulus with possible plebeian status. Cn. Lentulus Vatia makes just two appearances in history—in 73 and 56 BC.¹⁷ He could be a Servilius Vatia adopted by a Cornelius Lentulus, as the nomenclature might suggest. But the examples of P. Clodius Pulcher, who did not take his adoptive father's names, of D. Iunius Brutus Albinus and C. Visellius Varro point to the opposite conclusion—a Lentulus adopted by a Servilius Vatia, a plebeian and brother to the famous Isauricus.¹⁸

¹⁵ For Niger see *MRR* 2 (1952) 117 (72 BC); Cic. *Div. Caec.* 9.30-11.35 (73 BC? compare 2 *Verr.* 3.70.153). For Pupius Piso see *MRR* 2 (1952) 124, 133; for Pompey, Piso and Celer, see *Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* (hereafter *RE*) 23.1988-90 no. 10; 3.1208-10 no. 86.

¹⁶ See Syme [5] 57 n. 21; Shackleton Bailey [6] 29f. Sulla made up the three original colleges to fifteen members each, the *epulones* to seven; see Livy *Epit.* 89 with Serv. *ad Aen.* 6.73; Dio Cass. 43.51.9.

¹⁷ See Plut. *Crass.* 8.2 (Lentulus Batiatus); Cic. *QFr.* 2.3.5 (Cn. Lentulus Vatia); D. R. Shackleton Bailey, 'The Roman Nobility in the Second Civil War', *CQ* 10 (1960) 258f. and Shackleton Bailey [6] 31f., 114 with *Onomasticon to Cicero's Speeches* (Norman 1987) 38-40. Münzer (*RE* 4.1377 no. 209, 1407 no. 241) had already suspected that Plutarch's 'Batiatus' was the same man as Cicero's Vatia.

¹⁸ On Clodius see Cic. *Dom.* 13.55, 44.116; on D. Brutus see *RE* Suppl. 5.369f. no. 55a; for Visellius Varro see G. V. Sumner's review of D. R. Shackleton Bailey [6] 163f. for adoption by a Terentius Varro. Others make him a Terentius Varro adopted by C. Aculeo. See *RE* 9A 354f. no. 1 and Shackleton Bailey [6] 36, 134. But his tribe was Quirinia (*Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*³ [hereafter *SIG*] 747.62f.) and that was the tribe of the antiquarian M. Terentius Varro (*Rust.* 3.2.1). C. Visellius on adoption would naturally have taken on the tribe of the Varrones. For M. Servilius (Vatia) see *RE* 2A 1766, no. 19; Crawford [9] 328f., no. 327 (moneyer c. 100 BC); Vell. Pat. 2.28.1 (the two Servilii serving under Sulla in 81 BC).

Tribune in 72 BC and legate the next year this man could have adopted Dolabella in 48 BC. He could also have been the quaestor who struck coinage *c.* 75 BC for the Roman armies in Spain. The usual identification is with Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus. But there is a serious snag, which has curiously gone unnoticed. On this view Marcellinus must have been born *c.* 106 BC, so that he would have come some six years late for the praetorship in 60 BC.¹⁹ Admittedly there seems to have been a similar delay in the career of P. Lentulus Spinther, consul in 57 BC. He is generally recognised as the quaestor P. Lentulus, whose coinage both Grueber and Crawford dated 74 BC. But this is surely too early. Between the common issue of C. Postumius—also dated 74 BC by Crawford—and the issue of P. Galba as curule aedile in 69 BC Crawford can list only these issues:

L. Cossutius C. f. Sabula
 L. Plaetorius L. f. Q
 P. Lentulus P. f. L. n. Q
 Q. Pomponius Rufus
 Q. Crepereius M. f. Rocus
 L. Axsius L. f. Naso
 M'. Aquillius M'. f. M'. n.
 Kalenus, Cordus
 T. Vettius Sabinus

The issues of Rufus and the quaestors are of minuscule size, the others—apart from Aquillius—are rare. Sabinus could well go with Galba in 69 BC in place of Crawford's M. Plaetorius Cestianus, since the Mesagne Hoard proves that he belongs in the early 50s. Aquillius, Kalenus and Cordus form a plausible triumvirate for 70 BC. Rufus, Rocus and Naso could go with the quaestors in 71 BC.²⁰ Spinther once blocked a senatorial decree favourable to the Cretans and the story fits best in this year. He could have blocked it as quaestor, since decrees were not valid until received and registered at the Aerarium—and this

¹⁹ See H. A. Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum* (Oxford 1910) 2.358f.; Crawford [9] 82, 407 no. 393. Crawford saw the issue's erratic appearance in Italian hoards as confirmation of its being meant for Spain. He connected it with Sall. *Hist.* 2.34, 98.9: but these were exactions in 76 BC for Metellus in Gaul. Early in 74 BC money and troops were finally sent from Rome, after Pompey's desperate appeal (*Hist.* 2.98.10). This is perhaps a better context for Crawford [9] 407 no. 393.

²⁰ See Grueber [19] 1.406; Crawford [9] 409 no. 397 (Spinther). For the degrees of rarity of the issues see Crawford [9] 654f. (Table L). For Mesagne and the issue of M. Plaetorius Cestianus (C 405), see H. Mattingly, 'The Mesagne Hoard and the Coinage of the Late Republic', *NC* 155 (1995) 101f.

was the quaestors' responsibility. Like Trebonius apparently in 60 BC Spinther could have effectively used a quaestor's power of obstruction.²¹ On this redating Spinther's career would match that of Q. Hortensius exactly—aedile at thirty-nine, praetor at forty-two and consul at forty-five. If Marcellinus was quaestor *c.* 75 BC he would be quite isolated among his peers, coming to the consulship aged about fifty.²² Nor is this all. Cicero calls him *clarissimus adulescens* in 70 BC, a phrase which he would surely not have used of a man of his own age. In his usage *adulescens* fits a young man who has not yet started a career of honours. Contrast *vir ornatissimus* applied to Cicero's cousin and exact contemporary C. Visellius Varro, also in 70 BC.²³

With Marcellinus eliminated, Cn. Lentulus Vatia emerges from obscurity. Quaestor *c.* 75 and tribune in 72 BC, he then became a legate—probably of M. Crassus against Spartacus in 71 BC. This would have been doubly appropriate. His natural father was probably Cn. Lentulus Cn. f. Cn. n., who was consul with Crassus's father in 97 BC. Cn. Lentulus Clodianus was Cn. f. L. n., as we know from a statue base at Oropos, which he visited in the company of Sulla and Metella.²⁴ The Spartacus revolt was sparked off in 73 BC, when seventy gladiators escaped from Vatia's school near Capua. They had been driven too hard in training for a forthcoming show. Was that part of Vatia's canvass for the tribunate? It would seem fair that on leaving office he should be prepared to help crush the revolt, which his severity and ambition

²¹ For Spinther and the Cretans see Diod. 40.1.2 and Dio Cass. 30-35.111 with H. Mattingly, 'The *Denarius* of Sufenas and the *Ludi Victoriae*', *NC* 6.16 (1956) 200 and n. 1 (wrongly arguing for 70 BC). The Cretan embassy reached Rome soon after M. Antonius' death in 71 BC and they still had his quaestor as a hostage (Dio). For Trebonius see Cic. *Fam.* 15.21.2 with D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero: Epistulae ad Familiares* 2 (Cambridge 1977) 367. For the quaestors' powers see Plut. *Cato Min.* 17; Mommsen [2 (1887)] 3.1010-14.

²² Hortensius, consul in 69 BC, was born in 114 BC (Cic. *Brut.* 64.229). Spinther, consul in 57 BC, would—on my date for his quaestorship—have been born *c.* 102 BC.

²³ See Cic. 2 *Verr.* 2.42.103, 1.28.71 (Marcellinus and Varro). For Cicero's usage see Asc. *Corn.* 63f. C and pseudo-Asc. (Stangl [13] 207) on Metellus Nepos (*adulescens c.* 72, consul 57 BC); *Brut.* 45.327 (Hortensius a brilliant *adulescens* before honours came); 2 *Verr.* 1.53.139 (L. Domitius Ahenobarbus *clarissimus adulescens* 70, consul 54 BC); 2 *Verr.* 1.12.33 (Verres *adulescens*, then honours); *QFr.* 1.2.15 (C. Cato *adulescens* 59, *tr. pl.* 56 BC); *Cacl.* 30.72 (Caelius *adulescens* 56, *tr. pl.* 52 BC); *Phil.* 3.3.7 (*quaestore, civi optimo*).

²⁴ For Sumner [2] 124 Clodianus was the consul's son and Broughton followed him (*MRR* 3 Suppl. (1986) 67). Both missed *Inscriptiones Graecae* 7.311. This must go with 264 (Sulla) and 372 (Metella). Of all Oropian dedications in the second/first centuries BC only 311 and 372 couple Hygieia with Amphiaraos. For Clodianus' absence from Italy in 86-83 BC see Cic. *Brut.* 90.308, 311.

had precipitated.²⁵ We next hear of Lentulus Vatia as a prosecution witness against P. Sestius on an *ambitus* charge which seems to have been dropped. This should place him firmly in the camp of P. Clodius and P. Vatinius in 56 BC.²⁶ Nor is this perhaps his only Clodian connection. Classed with the coinage of the quaestor Cn. Lentulus is another issue with the same types and the legend *Lent.cur * f(1)—curator denariorum flandorum*. It is less common than the quaestor's issue, but its absence from all hoards until the huge Mesagne deposit looks significant. Was it perhaps not issued till 58 BC?²⁷ Among the many schemes of P. Clodius' tribunate that year Cicero scornfully cites a *ratio flandae pecuniae*. I would suggest that Clodius gave this possibly lucrative job to Lentulus Vatia and that he understandably used the types that he had devised as quaestor.²⁸ In the Civil War Vatia was apparently firmly on the Caesarian side, as his politically motivated adoption of Dolabella implies.

Prosopographically then 72 seems a much better date for the *Lex Antonia* than 68 BC. On historical grounds it should be preferred anyway. In 73 BC Mithridates sent an army into Mysia and Phrygia to destabilise Roman Asia and another force under Eumachus attacked Lycaonia, Isauria, Pisidia and Pamphylia—Rome's province of Cilicia. The southern army was driven out by an irregular force hastily raised by Caesar and was then despatched by the army of King Deiotarus of Galatia. The northern group was also decisively routed. The Mysi Abaitae honoured the legate C. Salluvius Naso for saving them 'in the war with Mithridates' and he must have played an important role.²⁹ 'The war with Mithridates' recurs in the *Lex Antonia* and implies the same context.

²⁵ See Plut. *Crass.* 8.2 (Lentulus Batiatus); Oros. 5.24 (Cn. Lentulus); Livy *Epit.* 95 (Lentulus). Cicero's consular law banned the giving of gladiatorial shows within two years of standing for any office: *Sest.* 64.133; *Vat.* 15.37.

²⁶ See Cic. *QFr.* 2.3.5 with Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero: Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem et M. Brutum* (Cambridge 1980) 178 and Shackleton Bailey [6] 29-31.

²⁷ For Mesagne see C. A. Hersh and A. Walker, 'The Mesagne Hoard', *ANSMusN* 29 (1984) 103-34. There were 105 specimens of Cn. Len. Q. and 33 of Lent. cur.* f(1): see their two tables after p. 132. Crawford unfortunately failed to separate the two issues in his hoard table in [9] 84f. But we can learn something from his Table L on pp. 654f., where they are split, and from Grueber's table in [19] 3.44f.: in particular the large S. Gregorio di Sassola hoard—also buried in 58 BC—had three quaestor's coins and none of the *curator*. This is at least suggestive. See also Mattingly [20] 104f.

²⁸ Cic. *Sest.* 30.66: *quae ratio aut flandae aut conflandae pecuniae non reperiatur?* ('What means of coining or purloining money was not discovered?'). It would be an apt jibe, since Vatia was one of Sestius' enemies in 56 BC.

²⁹ See App. *Mith.* 75; Livy *Epit.* 94; Oros. 6.2.18; Suet. *Iul.* 4; *CIL* 1² 743 (Naso); D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (Princeton 1950) 294, 327.

Termessus lost its freedom in the first war and Sulla did not change his mind later. The *Lex Antonia* gave Termessus its freedom again, presumably in compensation for its sufferings in the Mithridatic invasion and in recognition of its loyalty. That reward should not have been long delayed.³⁰ The city remained tributary and liable to censorial *locatio*, like many other free cities, as the text of the law makes clear. An important new epigraphic discovery has shown that interest in fiscal matters in Asia was particularly keen in the later 70s. The *Lex de Portorio Asiae* reveals that the consuls of 75 and 72 BC were much concerned in leasing *vectigal* in Asia and that Cn. Lentulus Clodianus and L. Gellius Poplicola—who would be censors together in 70 BC—even added to the basic provincial law on harbour taxes (*portoria*).³¹ From this angle also the late 70s form a perfect context for the *Lex Antonia*.

The early dating may now seem assured. But how can we explain the tribunician legislation in 72 BC against the presumed Sullan ban? First we must note that the *Lex Antonia* was presented *d(e) s(enatus) s(ententia)* and that Appian reports that Sulla in 88 BC legislated that no tribunician bill should be presented without having first been approved by the Senate. Despite Mommsen most scholars now doubt whether such a measure ever formed part of Sulla's thinking—either in 88 or 81 BC. But was Appian quite mistaken? Someone in Sulla's inner circle may have felt that this provision alone might keep tribunes in check. There is one man who could fit the bill. We know that C. Aurelius Cotta, as consul in 75 BC, removed Sulla's ban on tribunes proceeding to higher office. Sallust made C. Licinius Macer declare in 73 BC: *nisi forte C. Cotta, ex factione media consul, aliter quam metu iura quaedam tribunis plebis restituit* ('unless perhaps it was anything other than fear that impelled C. Cotta, a consul from the very heart of the oligarchy, to restore certain rights to the

³⁰ For 'the war with Mithridates' see *CIL* 1² 589 1.35-2.5. The Termessians had lost family and slaves and Rome promised help in their recovery. This war is clearly contrasted with the 'first' war of 1.25f., 29f. For excellent treatments of Termessus' fortunes at this time see Magie [29] 285, 295, 1176f.: A. N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East* (London 1984) 89, 245, 250 with n. 31 (supporting a date *before* 70 BC for the *Lex Antonia*). Ferrary [3 (1996)] 332 sees that Eumachos' invasion in 73 BC 'presumably offered Termessus Maior the chance to rehabilitate itself in Roman eyes and recover what it had lost'. I entirely agree, but this would seem to point to the earlier date. Ferrary, however, concludes that '68 BC is the most likely'.

³¹ For *locatio* and *vectigal* at Termessus see *CIL* 1² 589 1.18-26 and 2.31-36. For the law on the Asian 'harbour taxes' see H. Engelmann and D. Knibbe, 'Das Zollgesetz der Provinz Asia. Eine neue Inschrift aus Ephesos', *EA* 14 (1989) 1-170 and *AE* (1989) 681; *SEG* 39 (1989) 1180; C. Nicolet, 'Le monumentum Ephesenum et les dîmes d'Asie', *BCH* 115 (1991) 465-80. The consuls appear in lines 72-78, 84-88. Those of 75 BC were also empowered by the Senate to lease the tithes of wine and oil in Sicily (*Cic. 2 Verr.* 3.7.18).

tribunes of the people’). What *right*, other than the right to office, had Sallust in mind here? Did Cotta also allow tribunes limited right of legislation, subject to senatorial approval?³² Certainly in the very next year we find a tribune flexing his muscles impressively. L. Quinctius vigorously revived the practice of calling public meetings, dead since Sulla, and in a speech of 66 BC Cicero even characterised him as a tribune *summa potestate praeditus* (‘a man of the greatest power’). If Cicero played down the significance of the *Lex Aurelia* in 65 BC, this can be explained by the needs of his case: the noble opponents of C. Cornelius had always been enemies of the tribunician power. Cornelius’ ‘abuse’ of power could be defended by good precedent and was anyway minimal—as minimal as C. Cotta’s changes and the same nobles had objected to *them*.³³ It is possible that Cotta’s law encouraged, if it did not actually require, tribunician unanimity. The *Lex Antonia* was presented by the whole board—a very unusual procedure which must have made it more acceptable. The board of 71 BC showed a similar spirit, twice issuing edicts in the name of all ten.³⁴

The *Lex Antonia* may not be the only tribunician bill of the late 70s. C. Antius, one of its board, must surely be C. Antius Restio who proposed a sumptuary bill not long after Sulla. He might have done this as a praetor, but all other sumptuary laws were proposed by either consuls or tribunes. The tribunician *Lex Orchia* in 182 BC was presented *de senatus sententia* and this phrase may well have appeared in the heading of the *Lex Antia*, as it did in the *Lex Antonia*. It is interesting to note that a consular law of 72 BC also included it.³⁵ In that year, as we have seen, L. Volcacius was tribune and road-commissioner under a *Lex Visellia*. This could have been a praetorian law, but no known Visellius could have been praetor *c.* 70 BC. Perhaps then we should

³² For Sulla see App. *BCiv.* 1.59 (88 BC); Livy *Epit.* 89: *omne ius legum ferendarum ademittit* (‘He took away all their right of legislation.’); Cic. *Leg.* 3.9.22; Caes. *BCiv.* 1.7. For Cotta see Sall. *Hist.* 3.38.8; Asc. *Corn.* 66, 78.

³³ On L. Quinctius see Cic. *Clu.* 40.100, 28.79. For C. Cornelius see Asc. *Corn.* 78 C: *inimicissimi C. Cottae fuerunt, quod is consul paulum tribunis plebis non potestatis, sed dignitatis addidit* (‘they were bitter enemies of Gaius Cotta because as consul he had added a little dignity, but no power to the tribunes of the people’).

³⁴ The building works of *CIL* 1² 744 in 72 BC were also approved by the whole board. On 71 BC see Cic. 2 *Verr.* 2.41.100. In 52 BC the ten tribunes presented the bill allowing Caesar to stand for the consulship in absence: Cic. *Att.* 7.9.4 with 3.4 and Caes. *BCiv.* 1.32.3 with 9.2. But in 57 BC only eight tribunes could be found to back Cicero’s return from exile: Cic. *QFr.* 1.4.3 with *Sest.* 35.75; *Red. Sen.* 8.18-22; *Pis.* 15.35.

³⁵ On the sumptuary laws see Gell. *NA* 2.24.3-13; Macrob. *Sat.* 3.17.2-13; Syme [5] 59. On the consular law see Cic. *Balb.* 8.19.

look for a tribune of 74 or 73 BC. The only available Visellii are Cicero's cousins, sons of C. Aculeo. C. Visellius Varro, quaestor in 74 BC, should probably be ruled out. But his brother, who may have been the elder son, should be considered. He is first heard of with his father in L. Crassus' circle in 91 BC and perhaps reappears in 58 BC as a supporter of the exiled Cicero's cause.³⁶

I hope that I have cleared the way in this paper for setting the *Lex Antonia* in its right historical context and making better sense of it there. This was my main aim. But the enquiry has perhaps revealed something new about how the Sullan settlement was being remoulded by his successors, both at home and abroad, in the crucial years after his death: the revolution of 70 BC was perhaps less radical than its sponsors and some modern scholars liked to claim.

³⁶ On Varro see *SIG*³ 747.62f. (most junior senatorial witness, 73 BC) and above, n. 18. On Aculeo's two sons see Cic. *De Or.* 2.1.2. Sumner [2] 138f. with [18] 163f. saw that the Visellius of Cic. *Att.* 3.24.4 (58 BC) was probably not Varro, but very possibly the author of the *Lex Visellia*.

CLAUDIAN: A GREEK OR A LATIN?

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Abstract. Although contemporary scholarship regularly cites Alexandria as Claudian's birthplace, this has not always been the case. Renaissance scholars gradually developed arguments for an Egyptian origin eventually pinned down to Alexandria. However, Jeep's incisive observations on the incongruity of this assumption, in view of Claudian's extraordinary Latinity, have been completely ignored. Also significant are the absence of ancient evidence and the questionable assumption of truly autobiographical references in Claudian.

The Renaissance was a time in which the Classical world was, to a remarkable degree, rediscovered—and even recreated.¹ One of the significant inventions of the period was the development of an Egyptian origin for a great Latin poet of Late Antiquity, Claudius Claudianus, usually called Claudian (*fl.* AD 395-404). Although this invention has been almost completely accepted ever since, there are compelling reasons for considering it a work of fiction. These are the transparency of the invention, the absence of supporting evidence, and contra-indications from Claudian's poetic practices.

In the absence of clear information from the ancient world, the tradition before the Renaissance is well summarized by Flavio Biondo (*c.* 1388-1463): *famaque est nullo nobis confirmata auctore Claudianum poetam Florentia oriundum* ('There is an unconfirmed tradition that Claudian originated from Florence.').² This great historian from the Renaissance shows a commendable caution.

Attempts to fill in a void were based on available texts. Clarke, citing the fifteenth-century manuscript Anonymus Riccardianus 3007,³ mentions the tradition (traced to Donatus) that Claudian was a Florentine, but also discusses his Egyptian birth. She quotes another fifteenth-century manuscript, Anonymus

¹ I am indebted to *Scholia's* anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions and to David H. J. Larmour for checking the editions of Celsanus and of Camers in the British Museum. The abbreviations used for Claudian's works in this article are those recommended by H. Schweckendiek, *Claudians Invektive gegen Eutrop* (Zürich 1992) 1f. These abbreviations were originally used in my *Concordantia in Claudianum* (Zürich 1988).

² F. Biondo (ed.), *Italia Illustrata* (Basel 1559) 304G.

³ A. Clarke and H. L. Levy (edd.), *Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum* 3 (Washington D.C. 1976) 163.

Riccardianus 153,⁴ which discusses only the second possibility, in two places. First:

Aegyptius vero fuit, ut ipse ad Gennadium scribens ostendit cum ait *Graiorum populis et nostro cognite Nilo* [CM 19.3]. Idem ad Hadrianum: *Audiat haec commune solum longisque carinis / Nota Pharos flentemque attollens gurgite vultum / Nostra gemat Nilus numerosis funera ripis* [CM 22.56-58].

In truth he was an Egyptian, as he himself, writing to Gennadius, shows when he says 'Known to the peoples of the Greeks and to our Nile.' The same man, to Hadrian: 'Let the common ground hear these things and Pharos, known to ships far off, and let the Nile, raising his weeping face from the water, lament our funeral rites, along his numerous banks.'

Second:

Claudianus Aegyptius fuit, testante Sidonio Apollinari his versibus: *Non Pelusiaco satus colono / Qui ferruginei thoros mariti / et musa canit inferos superna* [9.274-76].

Claudian was Egyptian, as Sidonius Apollinaris testifies in these verses: 'Not descended from a Pelusian farmer is the man who sings the beds of a dark husband and the infernal ones, by means of a heavenly muse.'

Note that *colono* has replaced the *Canopo* in Sidonius' text, thereby facilitating an appropriate understanding. Biondo's caution is now being replaced by citations taken out of context and treated as though their applicability were self-evident.

Birt cites five early lives as he recalls the first discussions (in books) of Claudian's birthplace.⁵ All of these claim that Claudian was Egyptian without, however, acknowledging the difficulties involved with such a hypothesis. The first life, in Celsanus' edition of all but the *Carmina Minora*, begins as follows: *Cl. Claudianus poetarum omnium qui habentur ferme recentissimus Alexandria Aegypti urbe oriundus fuit. quique sunt qui Hispania malint.*⁶ ('Claudius Claudianus, most recent of all poets who are usually considered, was born in Alexandria, a city of Egypt. There are some who would prefer in Spain.')

The second is found in Parrhasius' 1500 commentary on the *De Raptu Proserpinae*, which appears in Asulanus' 1523 Aldine as follows:

⁴ Clarke and Levy [3] 153.

⁵ T. Birt (ed.), *Claudii Claudiani Carmina* (Berlin 1892) i-ii n. 6.

⁶ B. Celsanus (ed.), *Cl. Claudiani Opera* (Vicenza 1482) 2.

Cl. Claudiano poetae simile quiddam contigit, quod Homero, quippe quem sibi civem nonnulli vendicant: et in primis Hispani, et Florentini: qui dubia diu victoria certaverunt: nos Aegypto adiudicamus ex eius ad Adrianum versibus.⁷

Claudius Claudianus the poet experienced something similar to Homer. Several actually claim him as their own citizen, especially Spaniards and Florentines: they struggled long, with victory doubtful: we give the award to Egypt, from his verses to Adrian.

After quoting *Carmina Minora* 22.56-58 and 19.3, he continues:

. . . ubi nostro Nilo sic ait, ut Martialis ad Licinianum, nostraeque laus Hispaniae. Sed et Suidas Alexandrenum fuisse tradit: et Apollinaris Sidonius hoc hendecasyllabo.

. . . where he so speaks to our Nile, as Martial to Licinianus, and there is praise of our Spain. But Suidas also reports him to have been an Alexandrian: Sidonius Apollinaris also, in this hendecasyllabic.

There follows Sidonius *Carmina* 9.274-76, although in this passage the first word is *et* rather than *non*.

The third is found in Camers' 1510 edition of the entire corpus:

Suidae ac Apollinaris Sidonii testimonio arguuntur qui Claudianum poetam Hispanum fuisse asserunt . . . pari errore falluntur qui Claudianum Florentinum fuisse oppinant: Suidas in suis *Collectaneis* Alexandrinum Claudianum fuisse scribit. Sidonius vero Canopitam ob locorum horum vicinitatem fortassis. Verba Sidonii Apollinaris in commemoratione peritorum virorum de Claudiano loquentis sunt.⁸

Those who assert that Claudian was a Spanish poet are refuted by the testimony of Suidas and Sidonius Apollinaris . . . They are deceived by equal error who think that Claudian was a Florentine: Suidas writes in his *Collections* that Claudian was an Alexandrian. Sidonius, in truth, a Canopitan, perhaps because of the nearness of these places. The words of Sidonius Apollinaris speaking of Claudian are in a commemoration of skilled men.

After quoting Sidonius *Carmina* 9.274-76 (although, as in Parrhasius, the first word is *et* rather than *non*), Camers continues:

⁷ F. Asulanus (ed.), *Cl. Claudiani Opera* (Venice 1523) 4.

⁸ I. Camers (ed.), *Claudiani Opera* (Vienna 1510) 541.

idipsum constat Claudiani ipsius carminibus. sic enim in deprecatione ad Hadrianum Pharium de se canit.

That very thing stands in songs of Claudian himself. So, in fact, in a deprecation to Hadrian of Pharos, he sings of himself.

He goes on, after quoting *Carmina Minora* 22.56-58:

et alibi ad Gennadium scribens Graiorum (inquit) et nostro cognite Nilo.

And elsewhere, writing to Gennadius, he speaks of Greeks, and known to our Nile.

The fourth is that of Petrus Crinitus (1465-1504).

Cl. Claudianus, poeta insignis, Archadii et Theodosii temporibus floruit. patria fuit Alexandrinus, nobilissima urbe Aegypti. quidam Florentinum faciunt parum diligenter observantes veterum commentarios. Authores Graeci (qui de poeta Claudiano meminerunt) Alexandrinum appellant cui sententiae idem astipulatur, dum Nilum suum vocat ut nihil praeterea dubitari possit, ei patriam fuisse Alexandriam.⁹

Claudius Claudianus, a noted poet, flourished in the times of Archadius and Theodosius. He was an Alexandrian by fatherland, a most noble city of Egypt. Some make him a Florentine, observing the commentaries of the ancients with too little care. Greek authors [who remember a poet Claudian] call him an Alexandrian. The same man supports this opinion, while he calls the Nile his own, so that there can be no additional doubt, that his fatherland was Alexandria.

The fifth is that of Lilius Gregorius Gyraldus (1479-1552).

Cl. Claudianus, Theodosii et filiorum Arcadii et Honorii temporibus floruit. patria ei fuit Alexandria Aegyptia. id quod et Suidae, et aliorum testimonio facile cognoscimus. idem et suis ipse carminibus comprobatur, ut cum cecinit: et nostro cognite Nilo. quidam tamen insulse eum Hispanum, alii Florentinum existimaverunt.¹⁰

Claudius Claudianus flourished in the times of Theodosius and his sons Arcadius and Honorius. His fatherland was Egyptian Alexandria. That is a thing which we also recognize by the testimony of Suidas, and others. He

⁹ P. Crinitus (ed.), *De Poetis Latinis* (Basel 1532) 506.

¹⁰ See C. Barth (ed.), *Claudii Claudiani scriptoris praegloriosissimi quae extant* (Frankfurt 1650) a 4; N. Heinsius (ed.), *Cl. Claudiani quae extant* (Amsterdam 1665) 2.

himself also demonstrates the same thing in his own songs, as when he sang:
also known to our Nile. Nevertheless some witlessly thought him Hispanic,
others Florentine.

There follows a fifteen-line attack on Petrarck, Landinus, and Collutius, all of whom fell into the second category.

et ex Aegypto illum scribit his versiculis Sidonius Apollinaris.

Also in these little verses Sidonius Apollinaris writes that that man was from Egypt.

There follows Sidonius, *Carmina* 9.274-76.

Thus the lives, especially those of Parrhasius, Crinitus, and Gyraldus, asserted an Egyptian origin. No further argument was devised until one was developed by the inventive mind of Caspar Barth, who linked *Carmina Minora* 21 and *Carmina Minora* 22 together.¹¹ *Carmina Minora* 21 is a satirical poem, so far unmentioned.

Mallius indulget somno noctesque diesque;
insomnis Pharius sacra profana rapit.
omnibus hoc, Italiae gentes, exposcite votis,
Mallius ut vigilet, dormiat ut Pharius.

Mallius indulges in sleep nights and days;
the sleepless Pharius seizes the sacred and the profane.
Races of Italy, demand this in all prayers,
that Mallius should wake, that Pharius should sleep.

Asulanus' Aldine gave this the title *De Theodoro et Adriano* ('Concerning Theodorus and Adrian'),¹² which has since been *De Theodoro et Hadriano* in all major editions, at least from Barth's time.¹³ It was called an *Epigramma* up to the time of the second volume of Jeep's edition,¹⁴ and it was printed from nine to 107 pages after *Carmina Minora* 22, which was classified as an *Epistola*. It was Jeep who first devised the term *Carmina Minora*.¹⁵ For *Carmina Minora* 22 Asulanus uses the title *Epistola ad Adrianum* ('Letter to

¹¹ Barth [10] 1069 (*Animadversiones*).

¹² Asulanus [7] 167.

¹³ Barth [10] 83.

¹⁴ L. Jeep (ed.), *Claudii Claudiani* 2 (Leipzig 1879) i.

¹⁵ Jeep [14] 130.

Adrian'). Barth uses *Ad Hadrianum* and Heinsius *Deprecatio ad Hadrianum Praefectum Praetorio* ('Deprecation to Hadrian, praetorian prefect'), which has been adopted by the subsequent major editions, although often without the *Praefectum Praetorio*.¹⁶

Here is Barth's creative thought, in a note on *Carmina Minora* 22:

susplicamur hoc illud esse Epigramma, quod ut expiaretur Epistola ad Hadrianum deprecatoria opus habuit Claudianus.¹⁷

We suspect that this is that Epigram because of which, so that it might be expiated, Claudian had need of the deprecatory *Letter to Hadrian*.

Once this suggestion had been made, it was used as an argument in support of an Alexandrian birthplace, despite the fact that it is only a conjecture. It is quoted by Heinsius in a note on *Carmina Minora* 22.¹⁸ Pyrrho makes much of it. His introduction to *Carmina Minora* 22 quotes *Carmina Minora* 21 in full and a note on *Carmina Minora* 21 refers back to *Carmina Minora* 22.¹⁹ In addition to using the standard title for *Carmina Minora* 22 he also adds:

in veteribus libris legitur hic titulus.
Epigramma satisfactionis apud Hadrianum.²⁰

In old books this title is read.
Epigram of apology to Hadrian.

Gesner's note on *Carmina Minora* 21 refers to *Carmina Minora* 22.²¹ Burmann cross-references the two poems.²²

Jeep's innovation (*Carmina Minora*) was followed up in a dramatic manner by Birt, who rearranged the order of all the minor poems. Most significant here is the fact that the poem on Mallius and Pharius is now called *Carmina Minora* 21, immediately ahead of *Carmina Minora* 22. Of the

¹⁶ Barth [10] 73; Heinsius [10] 808.

¹⁷ Barth [10] 1069 (*Animadversiones*).

¹⁸ Heinsius [10] 884.

¹⁹ G. Pyrrho (ed.), *Cl. Claudiani opera quae extant* (Paris 1677) 620, 688.

²⁰ Pyrrho [19] 620

²¹ I.M. Gesner (ed.), *Cl. Claudiani quae extant* 2 (Leipzig 1759) 698.

²² P. Burmann (ed.), *Claudii Claudiani opera omnia* 2 (London 1821) 1054, 1161.

subsequent editions, only Crépin retains the traditional order.²³ Most students of Claudian, however, encounter him in Birt, Koch, Platnauer, or Hall, with the title *De Theodoro et Hadriano* only five lines ahead of the title *Deprecatio ad Hadrianum*.²⁴ Barth's conjecture now appears obvious, and few have asked questions since the appearance of Birt's edition.²⁵

Although dissenters can be cited, they have been especially hard to find since the appearance of 'The Poet from Egypt,' the first chapter of Alan Cameron's book on Claudian.²⁶ Here Cameron also examines Greek poems by *Klaudianoï*, concluding that some were written by our Claudian while others were not. Cameron's view has been virtually unchallenged since. However, despite the absence of direct challenge, which represents a genuine tribute to Cameron's impressive scholarship, this does not mean that the issue has been settled. It is instructive to quote from P. G. Walsh's review of Cameron's book: 'Those who like the reviewer have found it difficult to credit that Claudian was a native Greek will find the notion more acceptable after reading this enlightening section, though the question remains open.'²⁷ Cameron himself summarizes the current wisdom clearly: '. . . there is no reason to doubt the testimony of Hesychius, confirmed as it is by Claudian's own explicit statement, that he was born in Alexandria.'²⁸ The concept of an Alexandrian origin did not encounter systematic opposition until the nineteenth-century edition of Jeep.²⁹ This editor asks enough probing questions of the traditional evidence that a suspension of belief is merited, pending a fresh examination of the issue. That such an examination has never occurred is probably due to the fact that Jeep's edition has not received much attention since 1892, when Birt's great edition appeared in the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* series.

²³ V. Crépin (ed.), *Claudian: Oeuvres complètes* 2 (Paris 1933) 290-94, 352. That the order adopted by Birt has no great authority has been capably demonstrated; see G. Luck, 'Disiecta membra: On the Arrangement of Claudian's *Carmina Minora*,' *ICS* 4 (1979) 200-13.

²⁴ Birt [5] 297f.; J. Koch (ed.), *Carmina* (Leipzig 1893) 224-5; M. Platnauer (ed.), *Claudian* 2 (London 1922) 196-200; J.B. Hall (ed.), *Claudii Claudiani Carmina* (Leipzig 1985) 354-56.

²⁵ E.g., J. H. D. Scourfield, 'Claudian (Claudius Claudianus)' in S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (edd.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*³ (Oxford 1996) 337: 'A native of Alexandria'.

²⁶ A. Cameron, *Claudian* (Oxford 1970) 1-29.

²⁷ P. G. Walsh, *CR* 22 (1972) 351.

²⁸ Cameron [26] 3. He believes that the reference in the *Suda* is taken from Hesychius' dictionary (sixth century).

²⁹ L. Jeep (ed.), *Claudii Claudiani Carmina* 1 (Leipzig 1876) v-xiii.

I argue that a fresh examination is long overdue, beginning with the conclusion of Jeep's arguments:

nunc tantum id unum addam, iam per se patere vix fieri potuisse, ut unus idemque poeta duabus in linguis ita esset versatus, ut in una suae aetatis longe princeps esset poeta, in altera satis elegans et non contemnenda arte conspicuus. . . . quae cum ita sint, fieri non potest, ut accurate intellegamus, utrum etiam noster Claudianus Alexandrinus fuerit, necne.³⁰

Now I shall add only one thing, that it is inherently clear at this point that it could hardly happen that one and the same poet would be so skilled in two languages that in one he would be the chief poet of his time by far, in the other elegant enough and notable for a skill not to be despised. . . . Since these things are so, it cannot happen, that we may know accurately, whether our Claudian would also have been an Alexandrian or not.

I consider Jeep's second sentence an accurate assessment. I also consider the first sentence a pointer to further progress. It is not simply that we have been asked to believe that Claudian was skilled in two languages; we are asked to believe that he was a mediocre poet in his own language—and the greatest poet since Ovid (some would say) in an acquired language! It is essential that the evidence listed for a Greek origin be examined systematically, within the particular contexts.

Four pieces of evidence have been cited in support of the invention: (1) *Carmina Minora* 19.3, already cited above on page 80. Note the Loeb translation of this line: 'known to the peoples of Greece and to Egypt, land of my birth'). Some manuscripts indicate that this poem was addressed to a Gennadius (unmentioned in the corpus of Claudian), but this would be conjectural. (2) Two passages in another poem of Claudian: (a) *conditor hic patriae; sic hostibus ille pepercit* ('This man was a founder of a fatherland; thus that man has been merciful to enemies,' *CM* 22.20). Note the Loeb translation's "'Twas thus the founder of our country spared his conquered foes.' (b) *Carmina Minora* 22.56-58, also already quoted above on page 80. Note the Loeb translation's use of phrases such as 'our common fatherland' and 'Father Nile.' Some manuscripts indicate that this poem was addressed to Claudian's great 'patron' Stilicho, while others indicate a Hadrianus (unmentioned in the corpus of Claudian), but all this would be conjectural. (3) A passage in a later poet, Sidonius Apollinaris (c. 431-486), *Carmina* 9.274-76, also already quoted on page 80. Note the Loeb translation's 'that son of Egyptian Canopus.' This phrase is commonly presumed to refer to Claudian. (4) A mention in the *Suda*

³⁰ Jeep [29] xiii.

(tenth century) of a Greek poet named Claudianus, who was in Alexandria during the times of Arcadius and Honorius (395-408). Some presume that this is a mention of our Latin Claudian.

Such was the material used for construction. And it would be used, in all innocence, by scholars who did not examine it in context; these scholars, rather than trying to understand poetry, were merely seeking possible evidence for Claudian's birthplace, since that was unknown. They were following a practice familiar to the ancient world; a practice which produced lives of poets where no reliable information was available, as Lefkowitz has well shown for Greek poets:³¹ 'Recent work has shown that most of the material in the lives of all poets, is basically fictional. . . . I hope to show that virtually all the material in all the lives is fiction, and that only certain factual material is likely to have survived and then usually because the poet himself provided it for a different purpose.'³² She clearly implies skepticism about such material: 'How seriously the lives were meant to be taken is another question; in the absence of statements of intent, it is usually impossible to distinguish between the results of naïveté and deceit.'³³

In the case of Claudian, there is no reliable external evidence for his origin. Although he was honored by a fourth-century inscription,³⁴ that gives no indication of origin, nor would it be expected to do so. Nor is there help from brief attacks on his religious beliefs by Augustine (*Civ.* 5.26) and Orosius (7.35.21). He is also mentioned in Latin chronicles of the fifth and sixth centuries, again without any indication of origin. Prosper Tiro says *hoc tempore Claudianus poeta insignis innotuit* ('At this time Claudian, a distinguished poet, became well known,' *Epit. Chr. a.* 395). The *Chronica Gallica anni 452* states *Claudianus poeta admiratione dignus habetur* ('Claudian is considered a poet worthy of admiration,' *a.* 395). Marcellinus refers to him as a *poeta* in quoting him on Eutropius, the Eastern consul of 399. Cassiodorus says: *hoc tempore Claudianus poeta insignis habetur* ('At this time Claudian is considered a distinguished poet,' *Chron. a.* 395). If Claudian had really been a distinguished poet from Egypt, the chroniclers could have so indicated, but it was not necessary to do so.

³¹ M. R. Lefkowitz, *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (London 1981) vii-xi.

³² Lefkowitz [31] viii.

³³ Lefkowitz [31] ix.

³⁴ E. Bormann and G. Henzen (edd.), *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* 6¹ (Berlin 1876) 373 no. 1710.

Some cite Ioannes Lydos (*Mag.* 1.43) as an indicator of Paphlagonia for Claudian's origin,³⁵ since he calls some Claudianus a Paphlagonian, in referring to a Claudian who wrote encomia of Stilicho. There are several reasons, however, for skepticism. Birt has already pointed out some problems with the text as constituted:³⁶ (1) The passage has Frontinus, who died in 104, mentioning a fourth-century emperor, Julian. (2) Claudian, who praised Stilicho in Latin, is included among the Greek authors. (3) Our Latin Claudian's panegyric of Stilicho does not discuss the subject discussed by Ioannes Lydos' Greek author. All of this is well summarized by Bandy, who also cites Birt's suggestion that 'Paphlagonian' is intended to be metaphorical rather than literal.³⁷ The point is well taken: not all persons called 'Alexandrian' were born in Alexandria. However, a careful study of the author's use of a given word would be well advised before speaking definitively. In addition, Ioannes Lydos is not that careful about biographical statements, as Stein has pointed out.³⁸ Thus the argument for Paphlagonian origin does not appear well founded. This article will go on to argue the same for any city whose natives were Greek.

While the *Suda* does refer to an Alexandrian poet, what is lacking is a clear tie to our Latin poet, such as a reference to an extant work, or a statement that he wrote Latin poetry—or even a statement that he moved to Rome; this is indicated in other cases, such as for Ailianos, Zenobios, Kekilios, Polion, Tyrannion, and Philostratos.³⁹ Neither the *Suda* nor the Latin chroniclers give any indication of an Egyptian Claudian migrating to Italy.

We are reduced to poetry taken out of context, without any consideration of the poet's purposes. Consideration, however, must be given to meter, metaphor, irony, allusion, intertextuality, and artistic unity. This is especially true for poets such as those of late antiquity who were building upon complex traditions not realized by scholars of the Renaissance; as a matter of fact, these poets are far from adequately understood today.

The reference in Sidonius occurs in a poem filled with allusions to poetic tradition and happens to immerse us in a complex mosaic. *Pelusiaco* . . .

³⁵ E.g., F. Buecheler, 'Coniectanea (VI.)', *RhM* 39 (1884) 282f.; J. Turcevic, 'Cl. Claudianus und Ioannes Lydos. Zur Frage der Herkunft Claudians', *ByzZ* 34 (1934) 1-9.

³⁶ Birt, [5] iii-v.

³⁷ A. C. Bandy (ed.), *Ioannes Lydos: On Powers* (Philadelphia 1983) 282f.

³⁸ E. Stein (tr. J. R. Palanque), *Histoire du Bas-Empire* 2 (Amsterdam 1949) 732. This is cited by Bandy [37] xxvii.

³⁹ E.g., Ailianos: καὶ ἐσοφίστευσεν Ῥώμῃ αὐτῇ (he also lectured in Rome itself); Philostratos: σοφιστεύσας ἐν Ἀθήναις, εἶτα ἐν Ῥώμῃ (lecturing in Athens, then in Rome)

Canopo (*Carm.* 9.274) is found in a passage on Death which leads us back to Statius on Lucan, *Pelusiaci scelus Canopi* ('crime of Pelusian Canopus,' *Silv.* 2.7.70), which leads back to Lucan on the murder of Pompey at Pelusium, *Pelusiaci tam mollis turba Canopi* ('Pelusian Canopus' so soft crowd,' *Luc.* 8.543). Housman's note on Lucan, *Pelusiaci, Aegyptii* ('Pelusian, Egyptian') has taken us far off the track. By 'solving' a puzzle—Pelusium and Canopus are about 150 miles apart!—he kept scholars from facing the complexities of a text. Although in many writers Canopus is merely a place in Egypt,⁴⁰ some Latin poets referred to a star and also to death—and apparently even apotheosis, for example, Catullus (66.58) and Vergil (*G.* 4.287). As a matter of fact, Eustathius (twelfth century), citing Apion (first century), in his note on Homer, *Odyssey* 4.563, says that the plain around Canopus and Zephyrium was called Elysium, reminding us of Menelaus' learning of immortality for Helen and himself.⁴¹ In this poem Sidonius speaks of Statius as his own (*Carm.* 9.226), which indicates an attachment to a literary tradition. He also shows this attachment when he honors Lucan (239-58). However, in calling Lucan the third *alumnus* of Cordoba (239), he indicates that he was not aiming at biographical accuracy, since he divides Seneca the philosopher and tragedian into two persons (230-38).⁴² Sidonius is not believed when he places Homer in Maeonia (130) or Smyrna (148). There is no reason to believe him on Claudian either.

Current literary criticism is reluctant to equate a poet's persona with the poet himself. The two poems of Claudian (*CM* 19, 22) present special difficulties, because neither's text identifies an addressee. What we actually have, in one case, is a poet refusing to write a poem while in the other a poor poet begs a godlike man for mercy. In *Carmina Minora* 19 the phrase *nostro cognite Nilo* ('known to our Nile') follows references to Italy, the Rubicon, the Roman forum, and Greece (1-4), all indicating the unknown addressee's fame, which must have been widespread. The references indicate that the addressee had been in these places, although nothing is indicated about the poetic persona. 'Our Nile' need mean nothing more than *mare nostrum* ('our sea'), since only part of the Nile was under Roman control. Claudian himself makes such a distinction when he expresses a hope that someday all the Nile will be

⁴⁰ E.g., Caes. (*Bell. Alex.* 25.2, 5); Amm. (22.16.14).

⁴¹ G. Stallbaum (ed), *Eustathii Archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis Commentarii ad Homeri Odysseam* 1 (Leipzig) 1825) 182.

⁴² A casual reading of W. B. Anderson's notes on the *Carmina* in *Sidonius* 1 (London 1936) reveals sixteen instances of doubtful accuracy, for example, the note on *Carm.* 23.161 (p. 188 n. 3): 'There is no ground for this identification of Ovid's Corinna with Julia, daughter of Augustus. . . .'

controlled by Honorius (4*H* 388f.). This poem may be a bit obscure, but it is clear that it provides no information on Claudian's origin.

Carmina Minora 22, on the other hand, is a sophisticated masterpiece. Although no addressee is named, there are numerous allusions to the powerful, on one side, and the lowly, on the other. Intertextuality, that is phrases recalling references to Stilicho in other works of Claudian, implies that Claudian's audience would have recognized the one person in contemporary Italy who fit the description of the anonymous addressee. Manuscripts so declare, as is apparent in earlier editions,⁴³ although harder to discover in more modern ones. Line 20, regarded as a key today, is not reliable. Birt's apparatus tells us that M. Bonnet considered it spurious.⁴⁴ This is easy to understand, since it reads as a marginal note rather than an integral part of the poem. In addition, it is at least peculiar that *hic* ('this man') and *ille* ('that man'), as interpreted today, would have to refer to the same person.

Pharos, personified as grieving over the narrator's unjust fate if his plea for mercy is rejected (*CM* 22.56-58), combines two motifs associated with the island elsewhere in Claudian. The first, which would indicate how notorious the injustice would be, fits Claudian's frequent use of Pharos as a land far from Rome. The only other occurrence of Pharos itself (*IE* 1.218) includes the island among distant foreign lands conquered by Rome. Moreover, the adjective *Pharius*, in three places (*BG* 57, *4H* 575, *CM* 30.60), is included among references to distant lands subject to Rome. On another occasion (*6H* 86) the emperor Honorius gladly includes the *Pharium Nilum* ('Pharian Nile') among Eastern lands happily ceded to his brother Arcadius. Clearly Pharos is peripheral rather than essential.

The second motif, in contrast to earlier references to merciful *daimones* (*CM* 22.13-22), involves the murder of Pompey. A parallel passage is well worth quoting (*IE* 1.480-84):

... heu semper Ptolemaei noxia mundo
mancipia! en alio laedor graviore Pothino
et patior maius Phario scelus. ille cruorem

⁴³ E.g., Gesner [21] 618: *Satisfactio pro se apud Stilichonem MSS* (Amends for himself to Stilicho—manuscripts); Birt [5] 298: *Excusatio pro se ad Stilichonem catal. M* (Defense of himself to Stilicho—catalogue of M).

⁴⁴ Birt [5] 298. In defense of Bonnet's opinion, these lines sound more like those of a scholiast than Claudian's. Without contributing to the flow of the poem, they tell us that Alexander is the one famous for his clemency and that Porus is the King, not the other Porus mentioned in Diodorus Siculus (17.91.1), Strabo (15.1.30), and Arrian (5.21).

consulis unius Pellaeis ensibus hausit;
inquinat hic omnes.

... Alas the servants of Ptolemy are always
harmful to the world! Oh I am damaged
by another, graver, Pothinus and I suffer a
crime greater than the Pharian one. That man
drank the blood of one consul with Pellaeian
swords, this one stains all consuls.

Thus the reference to Pharos forms a fitting conclusion to Claudian's mocking *deprecatio*.

Other references to Pharos and uses of *Pharius* fit other contexts. The playful seals of Proteus (*Ep.* 50f.) fit an upcoming marriage (as in *CM* 30.128f.). The Phoenix appropriately travels to Heliopolis (*CM* 27.72-74, as in Ovid and Tacitus). This type of *ekphrasis* forms entire poems of Claudian. *Pharias terras* ('Pharian lands,' *CM* 28.1) are found in a poem on the Nile. Claudian has written other poems on similar geographical wonders (*CM* 2 on Smyrna, *CM* 6 on a harbor, and *CM* 26 on Aponus). He has also written six minor poems on wonders of the animal world, one on the magnet, seven related poems on a crystal, and three on human works of art. The context of one poem (*CM* 21), a sleepless Pharian, despite much speculation, is unknown to all except Claudian and (presumably) its audience.

Despite the past few centuries' honoring of the tradition of an Egyptian origin for Claudian (invented in the Renaissance), continued acceptance of this tradition might be considered an act of credulous piety. Convincing evidence that Claudian was a Greek cannot be found. Moreover, there are reliable indications that he was really a Latin poet. At this time I recommend that we establish as a base for further investigation the following question: Just how Latin a poet was Claudian? That is, does he write like a neophyte in the language (to posit one extreme)? Does he write like a person thoroughly familiar with Latin (to posit another extreme)? Or is he somewhere in between? Establishing his Latinity would indicate parameters for reception of the Alexandrian arguments. If he should be a neophyte, for example, it would be much easier to accept a Greek origin. On the other hand, that would be much harder to accept for an accomplished Latin writer.

As a matter of fact, Claudian's Latin skills have been noted frequently, particularly for purity of meter and scope of allusion. Paucker has also made a study of Claudian's vocabulary, largely excluding proper names.⁴⁵ On meter

⁴⁵ C. Paucker, 'De Latinitate Claudianae Poetae Observationes,' *RhM* 35 (1880) 586-606.

Birt indicates that Claudian restricted his art to nearly Ovidian limits.⁴⁶ Cameron goes so far as to say that Claudian 'can be convicted of only one false quantity (and that venial): *feritura*.'⁴⁷ Here is a point widely recognized, although not utilized for the Alexandrian question. On allusions—these have been noted frequently. Each page of Birt's text of Claudian lists numerous allusions to earlier Latin writers. Studies of 'influences' by single authors have long been standard works, for example, those of Eaton and Bruère.⁴⁸ A later monograph by Keudel became a model for the study of allusions in a single work of Claudian.⁴⁹ Two recent works by Colton and one by Filée indicate that Claudian's allusions are becoming a field of study.⁵⁰ Colton clearly states the significance of these allusions: '. . . Claudian reveals a remarkable knowledge of the writings of the major earlier poets.'⁵¹ Such a knowledge, as well as the facility to use earlier writers smoothly, must have been based upon a familiarity going back to childhood. This has not been adequately recognized in discussions of the Alexandrian question.

One more factor may be examined with profit—the nature of Claudian's Latin vocabulary which, like the meters, can be shown to be nearly a purely classical one. The vocabulary is identified by the lemmata in my concordance to Claudian.⁵² In pursuing this study, only lemmata undeniably genuine, that is, not limited to Claudian's *Appendix*, will be considered. It is true that both Cameron and Hall have argued plausibly enough that some may be genuine.⁵³ However, the dispute over the authenticity of the poems in the *Appendix* has been such that including lemmata found only in the *Appendix* would produce more ambiguity than clarity.

In a study of the extent to which Claudian's vocabulary may be classical, a definition of 'classical' is essential. For convenience's sake, that will be based

⁴⁶ Birt [5]ccxi.

⁴⁷ Cameron [26] 287.

⁴⁸ A. E. Eaton, *The Influence of Ovid on Claudian* (Diss. Catholic University of America 1943); R. T. Bruère, 'Lucan and Claudian: the invectives', *CPh* 59 (1964) 223-56.

⁴⁹ U. Keudel, *Poetische Vorläufer und Vorbilder in Claudian's De Consulatu Stilichonis* (Göttingen 1970).

⁵⁰ R. E. Colton, 'Echoes of Propertius in Claudian's *De Raptu Proserpinae*', *RPL* 11 (1988) 97-105; 'Propertian Echoes in Claudian's *In Eutropium*', *RPL* 16 (1993) 63-67; J. Filée, 'Claudien et le "Vieillard de Vérone"', *LEC* 61 (1993) 337-43.

⁵¹ Colton [50] 'Propertian Echoes' 63.

⁵² Christiansen [1].

⁵³ Cameron [26] 203f.; J. B. Hall, *Prolegomena to Claudian* (London 1986) 144-47.

on the original goal of the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*,⁵⁴ which was intended to cover Latin to the end of the second century AD. This means that lemmata found in the *OLD* will be considered classical. However, beyond the 'classical' limits, it is also necessary to recognize that Latin was a living language which continued to evolve. Claudian uses words found in postclassical writers, words which were accepted by other speakers. As a matter of fact, outside of proper names, only seven of Claudian's lemmata are not found in other Latin writers.

Three of Claudian's adjectives are not found elsewhere. Two, *electrifer* and *multisonorus*, are alternatives of lemmata found in the *OLD* (*electrinus* and *multisonus*). A third, *irrevocandus*, is a participle related to *irrevocatus*, which is also found in the *OLD*. Four verbs are not found outside Claudian. Each is a compound of a verb covered by the *OLD* and a prefix: *obstrepitare* (*OLD* *strepitare*; also note *OLD* *obstrepere*), *perdominari* (*OLD* *dominari*; also note *OLD* *perdomare*; this occurs as *perdominetur* in *Fe* 2.45, where Gesner suggests a poetic transposition for *dominetur per annum* while Burmann's apparatus cites *dominetur* and *per annum dominetur*), *assudare* (*OLD* *sudare*; also note *OLD* *assudescere*).⁵⁵ For *St* 3.364 Hall prints *insudant*, covered by the *OLD*, for Birt's *adsudant*), and *inflorescere* (*OLD* *florescere*; also note the medieval *inflorare*⁵⁶). For *St* 3.124 Hall prints *iam floruit* for Birt's *infloruit*.

As might be expected, there is a large number of postclassical proper names, especially since Claudian wrote so many epic poems dealing with his own period. Most of these occurrences involve place names or historical persons. In addition, three coinages of Claudian indicate his closeness to the leadership of the west: *Honoriades*, *Honorias*, and *Stilichonius*, all of which represent conventional epic formulations. Far more important, as might be expected in the case of a poet who specialized in narration, are names from myth and legend.

Several original lemmata were created by some transformation of classical lemmata. *Phlegethonteus* is a variant of the *OLD*'s *Phlegethontis*. *Lemnus*, an island in the *OLD*, is used for a giant (*CM* 53.85). *Pallaneus* (Hall prints *Palleneus*) refers to a giant (*CM* 53.109), which appears to be derived from the adjective *Pallenaeus*, on the basis of passages, cited by the *OLD*, which refer to divine triumphs (*Luc.* 7.150; *Stat. Silv.* 4.2.50). The adjective *Nereus* would be an alternate for the *OLD*'s *Nereius*. Hall uses the post-

⁵⁴ A. Souter, J. M. Wyllie, P. G. W. Glare *et al.* (edd.), *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford 1968-82); hereafter *OLD*.

⁵⁵ I. M. Gesner (ed.), *Cl. Claudiani quae extant* 1 (Leipzig 1759) 161; P. Burmann (ed.), *Claudii Claudiani opera omnia* 1 (London 1821) 350.

⁵⁶ A. Blaise (ed.), *Lexicon Latinitatis Medii Aevi* (Turnholt 1975).

classical *Nerinus*, found in Nemesianus (*Ecl.* 4.52). *St* 3.250 cites two hunting companions of Diana, *Nebrophone* and *Thero*. They are both necessarily female, but they match two male hunting dogs in Ovid's story of Actaeon (*Met.* 3.211). Neither of Claudian's names is cited for any Greek writer in Pape-Benseler's *Griechische Eigennamen*,⁵⁷ but the relationship to Ovid has been noted by Keudel.⁵⁸ *De Raptu Proserpinae* 1.284 includes *Orphnaeus* among the four horses of Hades. This name also lacks a Greek citation, but it appears to be related to *Orphne*, a nymph in the lower world (*Ov. Met.* 5.539). One lemma involves a transformation of a postclassical lemma. *Leontodame* (*St* 3.249), another female hunting companion of Diana, is related to the masculine *Leontodamas*, cited by Servius as a name for Ascanius (*A.* 4.159). In noting this relationship, Keudel bases it upon lion hunting.⁵⁹ This analysis indicates that Claudian creates a few mythological names by modifying names used earlier in Latin writers. He is never driven to resort to Greek sources.

The lemmata in the *Concordantia in Claudianum* total 5664. Sixty-three of these are postclassical, of which fifty-three are proper names. All of which indicate that Claudian's Latin, like that of his contemporaries, went past the limits of the *OLD*. Twenty lemmata not found earlier than Claudian, of which nine are proper names, are found in later Latin, indicating either that they were current or that those coined by Claudian were acceptable Latin. Twenty-four lemmata, of which seventeen are proper names, are not found elsewhere. Of the seven ordinary words, four are verbs serving as alternates to standard Latin, two are adjectives serving as similar alternates, and the last is a participle related to a standard Latin participle. Of the seventeen proper names, seven are alternates for standard geographical names. Three are standard epic coinages for real people. Seven are alternates for standard mythological names.

In all of Claudian's creativity, only standard Latin was involved. Nothing requires a knowledge of even a word of Greek. This investigation of Claudian's vocabulary supplements continuing research into his allusions and the general awareness of his metrically remarkable Latinity. Paucker has already noted that Claudian appears no more inclined than anyone else to incorporate Greek things.⁶⁰ In my opinion we must conclude that Claudian was a Latin rather than a Greek poet.

Stripped of the Egyptian mask imposed during the Renaissance, Claudian's practices reveal his Italian origin. Where may we go from here?

⁵⁷ W.G. Pape-Benseler, *Wörterbuch der Griechischen Eigennamen* (Graz 1911).

⁵⁸ Keudel [49] 139.

⁵⁹ Keudel [49] 139.

⁶⁰ Paucker [45] 588 n. 2.

There is no point in reviving the Florentine tradition, whose origin Flavio Biondo could not find. Better to follow the lead of Döpp, who tries to put Claudian in his context.⁶¹ Any study of the nature of this context has to include the Roman aristocracy which welcomed Theodosius in 394. However, not much has been made of this context in recent years, since Claudian's role as Stilicho's publicist has been so heavily emphasized in modern scholarship. Yet Claudian's practice might have been quite different if the great emperor had lived. If Claudian's first political epic, honoring the consulship of Probinus and Olybrius, is any indication, Stilicho would never even have been mentioned.

⁶¹ S. Döpp, *Zeitgeschichte in Dichtungen Claudians* (Wiesbaden 1980).

SITUAZIONI CATULLIANE E LUCREZIANE NEI CARMİ DI PAOLINO DI NOLA

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Abstract. Because of the number and variety of his *Hymns* and their innovative character, Paulinus of Nola (335-431 AD) can be considered justifiably to be the 'Christian' Ausonius. Doubtless Vergil is the principal model for Paulinus, as he is for Ausonius. However, when Paulinus wishes to describe the different feelings that are aroused in him not only by the arrival and departure from Nola of one of his friends, the bishop Niceta, but also by meeting him after such a long time, he does not hesitate to reproduce in a Christian context two famous situations that are found in the poetry of Catullus and Lucretius.

Da tempo ormai gli studiosi sono d'accordo nel considerare la poesia latina cristiana del IV secolo una produzione letteraria essenzialmente riflessa che, dal punto di vista formale, si rifà spesso a modelli pagani con esiti variamente validi dal punto di vista artistico. Da qui deriva quel suo particolare tono allusivo, che non sfugge ad un lettore attento. Siffatta allusività si realizza per lo più mediante la ripresa di un termine o di una espressione avente spesso dietro di sé una lunga tradizione letteraria e poetica, ma si può cogliere ugualmente all'interno di una *callida iunctura* o in un emistichio mutuato da un altro autore e riproposto, con qualche adattamento, in un contesto per lo più diverso.¹

Accanto a questo tipo di allusività ne esiste però un'altra ancora più interessante, anche se meno frequente. Essa ha infatti una maggiore estensione dal momento che coinvolge un intero episodio o una particolare situazione, che ora si sviluppa sulla falsariga dei moduli strutturali e lessicali d'un famoso modello pagano, al quale, a giudizio di chi scrive, essi possono essere accostati. Per quanto concerne Paolino, Virgilio senza dubbio è la sua principale fonte poetica. Ciò vale ovviamente non solo dal punto di vista lessicale, ma anche per

¹ In relazione al tema dell'articolo, oltre a G. Pasquali, 'Arte allusiva', in *Stravaganze quarte e supreme* (Venezia 1951) 11-20, ristampato in *Pagine stravaganti di un filologo 2* (Firenze 1994) 275-82 a cura di Carlo Ferdinando Russo, cfr. R. Lamacchia, 'Dall'arte allusiva al centone. A proposito di scuola di poesia e poesia di scuola', *A&R* 3 (1958) 193-216 e G. B. Conte, *Memoria dei poeti e sistema letterario: Catullo Virgilio Ovidio Lucano* (Torino 1974), specialmente 5-45.

quanto riguarda la struttura stessa di alcuni episodi dei *Carmi*.²

Nello stesso tempo non si può però ignorare che in essi Paolino ha riproposto anche dei brani di natura più soggettiva che egli trovava in un autore non meno famoso, Catullo, di cui senza dubbio egli avvertiva il notevole fascino poetico. I temi e le situazioni psicologiche che Paolino mutua da Catullo per riproporli, come vedremo, in maniera abbastanza allusiva in un contesto diverso, e a volte forse in termini di *aemulatio* artistica, rientrano tra quelli che in misura maggiore caratterizzano la poesia e la fama del poeta veronese.³

Inizialmente ci occuperemo della situazione descritta da Catullo nel famoso distico in cui egli sottolinea i contrastanti sentimenti che si agitano nel suo animo nei confronti di Lesbia, la donna da lui un tempo amata:

Odi et amo. quare id faciam, fortasse requiris.

Nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior.

(*carm.* 85.1f.)

Odio ed amo. Forse mi domandi perchè io faccia ciò. Non lo so, ma sento che ciò avviene e mi tormento.

La prima volta esso è riproposto da Paolino in un *propempticon* del 400,⁴ composto in onore del vescovo Niceta:

² G. Guttilla, 'Paolino di Nola: Tre studi'. I. 'Strutture classiche nei *Carmi*', in *Polyanthema: Studi di Letteratura cristiana antica offerti a S. Costanza* 3, di imminente pubblicazione.

³ Sul debito di Paolino nei confronti di Catullo, oltre ai riscontri segnalati da G. von Hartel, *Sancti Pontii Meropii Paulini Nolani Opera, CSEL* 30, 2: *Carmina* (Vienna 1894) 379-96 nell' 'Index Reliquorum Auctorum et Imitatorum: Loci Carminum'; cfr. R. P. H. Green, *The Poetry of Paulinus of Nola: A Study of His Latinity* (Bruxelles 1971) 50f.

⁴ La datazione del carme è quella di P. Fabre, *Essai sur la chronologie de l'oeuvre de Saint Paulin de Nole* (Paris 1948) 115f., accolta anche da J. T. Lienhard, *Paulinus of Nola and Early Western Monasticism* (Köln/Bonn 1977) 190. Su Niceta cfr. A. Solignac (ed.), *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* 2 (Paris 1982) coll. 214-19 s.v. Nicetas; P. Fabre, *Saint Paulin de Nole et l'amitié chrétienne* (Paris 1949) 221-31. Sul carme, oltre a F. Jäger, *Das antike Propemptikon und das 17. Gedicht des Paulinus von Nola* (Rosenheim 1913); Fabre [sopra, questa nota (1949)] 221-26, cfr. S. Costanza, *Meropio Ponzio Paolino: Antologia di Carmi* (Messina 1971) 149-53; P. G. Walsh, *The Poems of St. Paulinus of Nola* (New York 1975) 373-75; A. Ruggiero, *Paolino di Nola: I Carmi* 1 (Napoli/Roma 1996) 287; G. Guttilla, 'Paolino di Nola poeta 'dotto': il *propempticon* a Niceta (*carm.* 17)', di imminente pubblicazione su *Orpheus*.

condizionano la sua esistenza, possano coesistere nel suo animo, e se ne cruccia dolorosamente. Paolino invece, che ha già dato una spiegazione ben precisa delle ragioni che di volta in volta determinano il suo odio o il suo amore, senza darne una giustificazione finisce col riconoscere la prevalenza dell'amore dentro il suo cuore. E così, pur sentendosi strettamente unito a Niceta dal punto di vista affettivo, dimentica quasi ciò che ha detto precedentemente e si augura che quelle strade che l'amico dovrà percorrere per raggiungere la sede del suo apostolato si stendano senza alcun pericolo davanti a lui, dal momento che per terra e per mare lo precede il nome del sommo Cristo.⁷

A distanza di due anni, nel 402, in una epistola indirizzata all'amico Sulpicio Severo,⁸ Paolino riprendeva lo stesso tema, caricandolo però di un contenuto spirituale ben più personale e sofferto:

Qualem cupis ut mittamus imaginem tibi? terreni hominis an caelestis? . . .
Sed pauper ego et dolens, quia adhuc terrenae imaginis squalore concretus sum
et plus de primo quam de secundo Adam carnis sensibus et terrenis actibus
refero, quomodo tibi audebo me pingere, cum caelestis imaginem infitari
prober corruptione terrena? Utrumque me concludit pudor: erubesco pingere
quod sum, non audeo pingere quod non sum; odi quod sum et non sum quod
amo. Sed quid mihi misero⁹ proderit odisse iniquitatem et amare virtutem,
cum id potius agam quod odi nec elaborem piger id potius agere quod amo?
(*epist.* 30.2, 3 e 8-17)

Quale ritratto desideri che noi ti mandiamo? Quello dell'uomo terreno o quello dell'uomo celeste? . . . Ma povero e infelice me, perché ancora sono avvolto nello squallore dell'immagine terrena e quanto a sentimenti carnali e ad azioni terrene somiglio più al primo che al secondo Adamo. Come oserò farmi

⁷ *Quas peradstricti superante amore / nunc tibi sterni faciles precamur / praevio terris pelagoque summi / nomine Christi* ('E tuttavia, costretti dall'amore che prevale in noi, ci auguriamo che esse ora si aprano agevoli per te, dal momento che ti precede per terra e per mare il nome del sommo Cristo', *carm.* 17.77-80). La clausola . . . *nomine Christi* ('. . . il nome di Cristo'), così frequente nei *Carmi* in esametri, acquista nel contesto una particolare efficacia in quanto coincide con l'adonio della strofa saffica.

⁸ Per la datazione della lettera cfr. Fabre [4 (1948)] 34f., 45; Lienhard [4] 189. Su Sulpicio Severo ed i suoi rapporti con Paolino e sulla vicenda che sta alla base dell'*epist.* 30, cfr. Fabre [4 (1949)] 277-337, specialmente 321-24; G. Guttilla, 'Paolino e il suo ritratto a sostegno della causa di Martino e di Severo', *Orpheus* 17 (1996) 90-107.

⁹ Anche il *quid mihi misero* ('che cosa a me misero') è una ripresa dallo stesso carme (*misero quod . . . / . . . mihi*, 'la qual cosa . . . a me misero', 51.5f.), che conferma l'ampio uso fattone da Paolino. Altre riprese catulliane di natura puramente verbale, finora sfuggite, sono *carm.* 24.27: *per trucem ponti viam* ('attraverso la tempestosa via del mare') ~ Catull. 4.9: *trucemve Ponticum sinum* ('o il tempestoso golfo Pontico'); *carm.* 24.429f.: *magis coegit . . . / desiderari litteras* ('mi costrinse a desiderare di più la (tua) lettera') ~ Catull. 72.8: *cogit amare magis* ('costringe ad amare di più').

rappresentare per te, dal momento che si sa che in me l'immagine dell'uomo celeste è sconfessata dalla mia corruzione terrena? In entrambi i casi mi opprime la vergogna: mi vergogno di fare dipingere ciò che sono, non oso fare dipingere ciò che non sono; odio ciò che sono e non sono ciò che vorrei essere. Ma cosa gioverà a me misero odiare l'iniquità e amare la virtù, dal momento che io faccio piuttosto ciò che odio e in quanto pigro non mi sforzo di fare invece ciò che amo?

A differenza di Catullo anche questa volta Paolino si affretta a dare una spiegazione al dissidio spirituale contraddizione che avverte dentro il suo animo. Mentre però nel *carm.* 17, dando quasi una risposta a ciò che a Catullo sembrava del tutto oscuro, con le due proposizioni causali egli aveva chiarito le ragioni di quel suo particolare stato d'animo così apertamente contraddittorio (*odimus quod te retrahunt, amamus / quod tuum nobis procul adtulerunt / cernere vultum*, 'le odiamo perché ti riportano indietro, le amiamo perché ci hanno portato da lontano il tuo volto perché potessimo vederlo'), nella lettera a Severo egli precisa invece l'oggetto di quei due sentimenti così inconciliabili che avverte dentro di sé: *odi quod sum et non sum quod amo* ('odio ciò che sono e non sono ciò che vorrei essere'). E questa sua affermazione si carica subito dopo di implicazioni di natura spirituale che, per il loro stesso contenuto, sembrano rifarsi da vicino ad alcuni brani delle *Confessiones* di Agostino.¹⁰

Un'ulteriore conferma del fascino che Catullo esercitava su Paolino ci è data dalle sue molteplici riprese del famoso *carm.* 51:

Ille mi par esse deo videtur,
 ille, si fas est, superare divos,
 qui sedens adversus identidem te
 spectat et audit
 dulce ridentem, misero quod omnis
 eripit sensus mihi . . .

(1-6)

Senza addentrarci nelle diverse interpretazioni che finora sono state date

¹⁰ Sarebbe stato Paolino, tramite il comune amico Alipio, ad indurre Agostino a scrivere le *Confessiones* per andare incontro al desiderio dei suoi amici, che desideravano conoscere la sua vita: cfr. P. Courcelle, *Les Confessions de saint Augustin dans la tradition littéraire* (Paris 1963) 559-607. Il libro X dell'opera, secondo lo studioso (576-82), sarebbe stato composto proprio per Paolino. Ciò può spiegare la particolare analisi spirituale che nella sua lettera del 402 egli fa della propria condizione spirituale e che trova riscontro nelle pagine dell'opera del suo illustre amico.

del carne in relazione anche al suo modello greco,¹¹ sarà per noi sufficiente sintetizzare il contenuto dei versi sopra riportati. In essi Catullo dichiara che l'uomo che, sedendo di fronte a Lesbia, ripetutamente posa i suoi occhi su di lei e l'ascolta, mentre essa ride dolcemente, gli sembra che sia simile ad un dio o che addirittura superi gli stessi dei, se ciò è possibile. Ciò, infatti, finisce con lo sconvolgere i suoi sensi. . . .

Siffatta situazione, su cui Paolino torna più volte nel *carm.* 27, inizialmente si semplifica alquanto in questi versi:

Video praesenti lumine coram
Niceten ridere mihi . . .

(179f.)

Vedo che Niceta col suo manifesto splendore sorride davanti a me.¹²

Anche in questa formulazione la scena descritta da Paolino rivela chiaramente la sua ascendenza catulliana. Sebbene il *video* ('vedo') dei versi di Paolino indica concretamente qualcosa di ben diverso dal *videtur* ('mi sembra') catulliano, tuttavia i due verbi sono pur sempre uniti dall'allitterazione in quanto derivano da una comune radice. Né meno indicative per quanto riguarda la loro allusività ci sembrano le corrispondenze concettuali presenti all'interno dei due brani: *adversus* ~ *coram*; *spectat* ~ *video*; *te, Lesbia* ~ *Niceten*; *ridentem* ~ *ridere* ('di fronte ~ davanti; posa gli occhi ~ vedo; te, o Lesbia ~ Niceta; mentre ride ~ sorride'). La stessa condizione di beatitudine che all'inizio del carne Catullo ravvisa nel personaggio che sta a guardare Lesbia (*Ille mi par esse deo videtur, / ille, si fas est, superare divos*, 'Mi sembra che quello sia simile ad un dio e che, se è possibile, superi gli dei'), trasposta nel nuovo contesto, sottolinea ora quasi per ipallage la spiritualità che Paolino ritrova nella persona di Niceta.

Anche il resto del brano:

. . . visoque parente,
cuius prae cunctis amor in me regnat, et ipse
Nicetes fio, benedicti nominis instar
mente gerens, quae nunc voto victore triumphat.

(180-83)

¹¹ S. Costanza, *Risonanze dell'ode di Saffo FAINETAI MOI KENOS da Pindaro a Catullo e Orazio* (Messina/Firenze 1950). Per quanto concerne il confronto tra Catullo 51 e il suo modello, Saffo 2 D, si veda 5-14.

¹² Per l'epifania di Niceta, che ha una sua connotazione di natura spirituale, cfr. *Aen.* 4.358 (*ipse deum manifesto in lumine vidi*, 'io stesso ho visto il dio nel suo manifesto splendore').

. . . e nel vedere il padre mio, il cui amore prevale in me su quello verso tutti gli altri, anche io divento un Niceta, portando nella mente, che ora trionfa grazie al voto esaudito, la grandezza del suo nome benedetto.

si rifà ai versi seguenti del carme catulliano:

nam simul te,
Lesbia, aspexi, nihil est super mi
.....
lingua sed torpet, tenuis sub artus
flamma demanat, sonitu suopte
tintinant aures, gemina teguntur
lumina nocte.

(51.6-12)

Infatti non appena ti guardo, o Lesbia, non resta più niente in me . . . , ma la lingua è paralizzata, sottile una fiamma scorre giù per le membra, ronzano le orecchie d'un suono interno, entrambi gli occhi si coprono di tenebre.

A livello strutturale i brani riportati evidenziano ora una maggiore corrispondenza interna. Anche la situazione descritta da Catullo a questo punto ha infatti due soli protagonisti: il poeta e Lesbia. E tuttavia nei versi di Paolino si può cogliere una certa *novitas* rispetto al modello tenuto presente. Diversa è infatti la maniera in cui nei due autori questi versi si collegano logicamente ai precedenti. In Catullo ciò avviene in termini di antitesi, pur trattandosi sempre di sensazioni prevalentemente visive: *te spectat et audit / dulce ridentem . . . nam simul te, Lesbia, aspexi* ('posa gli occhi su di te e ascolta te che ridi dolcemente . . . infatti non appena, o Lesbia, ti guardo'). In Paolino, invece, il *visoque parente* ('e nel vedere il padre mio') costituisce lo sviluppo quasi consequenziale della situazione descritta inizialmente: *Video praesenti lumine coram / Niceten ridere mihi* ('Vedo che Niceta col suo manifesto splendore sorride davanti a me').

Il diverso rapporto logico con cui i due poeti collegano questi versi al tema iniziale del personaggio che sorride finisce col condizionare e giustificare il diverso contenuto dei loro brani. La vista dell'uomo, che contempla ed ascolta Lesbia che ride, provoca infatti in Catullo, per contrasto, un offuscarsi delle sue capacità sensitive ed espressive. In Paolino invece la vista di Niceta che sorride finisce inevitabilmente quasi col soggiogarlo, facendogli avvertire nel proprio animo quella stessa gioia spirituale che egli ravvisa nel sorriso (*ridere*) del proprio ospite.

Una volta sganciatosi dal modello catulliano, il brano di Paolino si sviluppa secondo i gusti letterari del tempo, arricchendosi di un *Wortspiel* abbastanza dotto (*visoque parente, / . . . et ipse / Nicetes fio*, 'e nel vedere il

padre mio, . . . anche io divento un Niceta')¹³ ed acquisendo nello stesso tempo un contenuto apertamente encomiastico in piena sintonia col tono dell'intero carme.

Anche in seguito, sempre nello stesso carme, Paolino avrebbe ripreso alcuni dei motivi che trovava nei versi di Catullo. Dopo avere ravvisato qualcosa di miracoloso nella possibilità che gli si è offerta inaspettatamente di rivedere e di riabbracciare Niceta, egli così prosegue:

Sed quoniam lateri meus adsidet ipse magister,
comminus e regione situm venerante frequenter
lumine conspiciam. . . .

(27.243-45)

Ma poiché il mio maestro in persona sta seduto al mio fianco, con sguardo pieno di venerazione frequentemente io poserò i miei occhi su di lui che mi sta vicino. . . .

Ancora una volta in questi versi troviamo alcuni degli elementi che caratterizzano la scena descritta da Catullo: *lateri . . . adsidet . . . / comminus ~ sedens adversus* ('sta seduto al mio fianco . . . / vicino ~ sedendo di fronte'); *venerante . . . / lumine conspiciam ~ simul te . . . aspexi; frequenter ~ identidem* ('con sguardo pieno di venerazione poserò i miei occhi ~ non appena ti guardo; frequentemente ~ ripetutamente'). E tuttavia ben notevole è la differenza di fondo che esiste tra i due brani. Paolino infatti carica ora Niceta, definito suo maestro, di quella stessa sacralità che Catullo aveva creduto di ravvisare nel personaggio che vedeva seduto davanti a Lesbia: *Ille mi par esse deo videtur* ('Quello mi sembra che sia simile a un dio'). E proprio dalla sua bocca egli si augura di potere trarre fecondi insegnamenti spirituali:

forsan sapientis ab ore,
ut quondam effetae pecudes pastoris Iacob,
concipiam sterili fecundos pectore sensus.

(245-47)

Forse dalla bocca di quel sapiente, come una volta le pecore del pastore Giacobbe che avevano partorito, io concepirò nel mio arido petto sentimenti spiritualmente fecondi.

La stessa situazione ritorna nei versi seguenti:

Sic ego Niceta viso quasi fonte reperto
sicut ovis sitiens ad viva fluentia cucurri

¹³ G. Guttilla [2] II. 'Wortspiel e nomi propri nelle Epistole e nei Carmi'.

aridus et sensi mea protinus ubera tendi,
 adtentusque diu pascentis in ora magistri
 inspexi docto varias in pectore virgas
 conspectumque bibi per lumina fixa colorem,
 et me divinis sparsit mens roscida guttis.

(266-72)

Così io nel vedere Niceta, quasi avessi trovato una fonte, con la bocca asciutta sono accorso come una pecora assetata alle sue vive sorgenti e ho sentito subito dilatarsi le mie mammelle. E a lungo, attento al volto del maestro che mi nutriva, ho osservato nel suo dotto cuore le verghe di vario colore. E dopo averle contemplato ho assorbito con gli occhi fissi il loro colore, e la sua mente stillante di rugiada mi ha cosparso di gocce divine.

Se il *Niceta viso* ('nel vedere Niceta') al pari del *visoque parente* ('nel vedere il padre mio') del v. 180 si rifà, come s'è detto, al catulliano *nam simul te, / Lesbia, aspexi* ('infatti non appena, o Lesbia, ti guardo'), ben diversa si rivela la conclusione che Paolino trae ora dalla vista dell'amico. Mentre inizialmente alla sua premessa aveva fatto seguire un *Wortspiel* (*visoque parente . . . et ipse / Nicetes fio*, 'e nel vedere il padre mio . . . anche io divento un Niceta'), ora invece, restando più vicino al suo modello anche in virtù dell'omoptoto *aspexi* ('guardo') ~ *inspexi* ('ho osservato'), sulla falsariga della situazione in cui si viene a trovare Catullo, anche Paolino evidenzia le diverse reazioni di natura spirituale che la vista dell'amico suscita in lui e l'effetto rasserenante che le sue parole di vita eterna esercitano nel suo animo.¹⁴

Siffatta situazione trova in Paolino, poco dopo, un ulteriore approfondimento sempre in chiave catulliana:

Non agnosco tumens mea pectora; maior agit mens.
 Sentio Nicetam, dum proximus adsidet et me
 tangit et adiuncto lateri vicinus anhelat.

(314-16)

¹⁴ L'insegnamento che Paolino ritiene di potere trarre dalle parole di verità di Niceta è presentato in chiave simbolica. Per l'inizio del brano probabilmente egli s'è rifatto al salmo 42.1-3: *Quemadmodum desiderat cervus ad fontes aquarum, ita desiderat anima mea ad te, Deus: sitivit anima mea ad Deum fortem* ('Come il cervo ha desiderio di bere presso le sorgenti d'acqua, così lo desidera l'anima mia presso di te, o Dio: l'anima mia ha avuto sete presso il forte Dio'), sostituendo al *cervus* ('il cervo') un *ovis* ('una pecora'), un animale cioè che simbolicamente ha un significato spirituale più intenso nel *N.T.* Per il motivo *ubera tendere* ('dilatate le mammelle'), su cui Paolino ritorna anche altrove, cfr. A. Salvatore, 'Immagini bibliche e strutture discorsive. La lettera 11 di Paolino', in *Atti del Convegno XXXI Cinquantenario della morte di S. Paolino di Nola (431-1981)* (Roma 1983) 253-80, specialmente 256-59.

Non riconosco nella mia eccitazione il mio animo; un sentimento ben maggiore mi trascina. Sento Niceta, mentre mi siede accanto e mi tocca e respira vicino al mio fianco che gli si tiene stretto.

Appare evidente che il *Non agnosco tumens mea pectora* ('Non riconosco nella mia eccitazione il mio animo') altro non è che una ripresa del catulliano *nihil est super mi* ('non resta più niente in me'), così come il *Sentio Nicetam, dum proximus adsidet* ('Sento Niceta, mentre mi siede accanto') del verso seguente ripropone ancora una volta alcuni temi che rappresentano il corrispettivo spirituale di quelli che troviamo nella scena iniziale del *carm.* 51 di Catullo: *sedens adversus identidem te / spectat et audit* ('sedendo di fronte, ripetutamente posa i suoi occhi su di te e ti ascolta'). Anche in questo caso, a differenza di Catullo, Paolino descrive con ricchezza di particolari in che modo la spiritualità di Niceta, il quale gli siede accanto, finisce col coinvolgerlo, infiammando le sue membra di un ardore quasi mistico:

Acer anhelantis iuxta me spiritus intrat
insolitumque potens meditati suscitatur ignem,
frigentes animans admoto fomite fibras.

(317-19)

Il forte alito di lui, che mi respira accanto, penetra dentro di me e con la sua forza suscita un insolito fuoco in me che sto a meditare, animando le mie fredde membra con quella fiamma che mi si è accostata.

Non meno famoso del carme catulliano tenuto finora presente da Paolino è il brano che sta alla base dei versi che seguono poco dopo:

. . . tu, sancte, paterno
suscipe me, Niceta, sinu, et dum pectore docto
sustineor caput in blando mihi corde reclinans,
sal tuus insulsum me condat et sitientes
dives vena riget rivo mihi perpete sensus.

(324-28)

. . . tu, o santo Niceta, accogliami nel tuo seno paterno, e mentre io poggio il capo sul tuo dotto petto, piegandomi sul tuo cuore benevolo nei miei confronti, la tua dottrina dia sapore alla mia ignoranza e la tua ricca sorgente irriga i miei sensi assetati con le sue acque eterne.

L'esperienza che Paolino chiede ora a Niceta di potere vivere in prima persona con lui è la stessa fatta dall'apostolo Giovanni con Gesù durante l'ultima cena: *Erat ergo recumbens unus ex discipulis eius in sinu Iesu. . . Itaque cum recubisset ille supra pectus Iesu* ('Stava dunque piegato uno dei suoi discepoli sul petto di Gesù. . . E così essendosi quello piegato sul petto di Gesù', *Io.*

13.23-25).¹⁵ E tuttavia nel contesto del brano siffatto atteggiamento si arricchisce di particolari che si rifanno allusivamente alla famosa scena descritta da Lucrezio nel *de rerum natura*, che ha come protagonisti Venere e Marte:

Nam tu sola potes tranquilla pace iuvare
 mortalis, quoniam belli fera moenera Mavors
 armipotens regit, in gremium qui saepe tuum se
 reicit aeterno devictus vulnere amoris,
 atque ita suspiciens tereti cervice reposta
 pascit amore avidos inhians in te, dea, visus,
 eque tuo pendet resupini spiritus ore.
 Hunc tu, diva, tuo recubantem corpore sancto
 circumfusa super, suavis ex ore loquellas
 funde petens placidam Romanis, incluta, pacem.

(1.31-40)

Infatti tu sola puoi giovare agli uomini con la tranquilla pace, poiché le crudeli vicende della guerra le governa l'armipotente Marte, il quale spesso si abbandona sul tuo grembo vinto dall'eterna ferita dell'amore e così, guardandoti con il tornito collo reclinato, sazia di amore gli avidi sguardi, guardando estatico verso di te, e dalla tua bocca pende il respiro di lui che sta supino. E tu, o dea, abbandonandoti su di lui che sta piegato sul tuo santo corpo, effondi dalla bocca soavi parole, chiedendo per i Romani, o gloriosa, una placida pace.

Come nel modello lucreziano ad una parte descrittiva, che si conclude ai vv. 38f. con un participio (*Hunc tu . . . / circumfusa super*, 'E tu . . . abbandonandoti su di lui'), segue da parte del poeta una richiesta (*suavis ex ore loquellas / funde*, 'effondi dalla bocca soavi parole'), la quale si precisa meglio subito dopo (*petens placidam Romanis, incluta, pacem*, 'chiedendo per i Romani, o gloriosa, una placida pace'), così nella ripresa fattane da Paolino all'espressione *caput in blando mihi corde reclinans* ('piegandomi col capo sul tuo cuore benevolo nei miei confronti') segue una duplice richiesta formulata mediante due congiuntivi esortativi: *sal tuus . . . condiat et . . . / . . . dives vena riget* ('la tua dottrina dia sapore e . . . / . . . la tua ricca sorgente irrighi').¹⁶ Ma

¹⁵ Senza dubbio Paolino avvertiva la spiritualità di questo atteggiamento. Non è infatti un caso che nell'*epist.* 32.1, rivolgendosi a Severo, in un contesto chiaramente lucreziano, fa siffatta confessione all'amico: *in te reclinatio capitis nostri* ('in te è l'abbandono del nostro capo').

¹⁶ Anche nei versi finali dell'epitaffio del marito di Proba, condotti sulla falsariga dei versi lucreziani sopra riportati, troviamo dei congiuntivi esortativi: *Hunc tu, Christe, choris iungas caelestibus oro, / te canat et placidum iugiter aspiciat / eque tuo semper dilectus pendeat ore* ('Io prego che tu, o Cristo, associ questi ai celesti cori: te egli celebri cantando e

anche a livello lessicale appare evidente l'ascendenza lucreziana del brano, se si considerano i vocativi *sancte* ('o santo') ~ *incluta* ('o gloriosa'), l'allitterazione dei termini *reclinans* ~ *recubantem* e soprattutto l'isosillabismo, accentuato anche dall'omoptoto e dall'identica collocazione in clausola nel verso, dei termini *pectore docto* ('sul tuo dotto petto') ~ *corpore sancto* ('sul tuo santo corpo').

Non si può mettere in dubbio che Paolino conosceva il brano lucreziano, così come mostra di conoscere anche altre parti dell'opera, di cui certamente non gli sfuggiva la potente carica poetica.¹⁷ Bisogna infatti ricordare che questo motivo era stato già utilizzato da lui nel *carm.* 17, dove compare anche il motivo catulliano dell'*odi et amo* ('odio e amo'):

Tunc, precor, nostri nimium memento
et patris sancti gremio recumbens
roscido nobis digito furentem
discute flammam.

(313-16)

Allora, ti prego, ricordati moltissimo di noi e, stando piegato sul grembo del Padre santo, col dito stillante di rugiada allontana da noi l'ardente fiamma.

Siffatta ripresa si rivela ancora più vicina all'ipotesto lucreziano di quella già vista nel *carm.* 27.324-26, anche se in entrambi i casi il personaggio di cui si parla è Niceta. In essa infatti, oltre alla coppia di imperativi (*memento* . . . *discute*, 'ricordati . . . allontana') e al participio (*recumbens*, 'stando piegato'), troviamo infatti il termine *gremio* ('sul grembo') usato anche da Lucrezio al v. 33 (*in gremium*, 'sul tuo grembo'), per non parlare delle altre corrispondenze che non meno allusivamente, anche se a volte in termini concettualmente antitetici, legano questi versi a quelli di Lucrezio: *nobis discute* ('allontana da

senza fine ti veda benevolo, ed amato egli penda sempre dalla tua bocca', 27-29). Il brano è riportato da H. Hagendahl, *Latin Fathers and the Classics. A Study on the Apologists: Jerome and Other Christian Writers* (Göteborg 1958) 386.

¹⁷ Green [3] 51 è alquanto incline a limitare le presenze lucreziane nei *Carmi* paoliniani. Ciò ci trova dissenzienti, se si considera l'«Index Reliquorum Auctorum et Imitatorum» presente nell'edizione di von Hartel [3]. Per quanto ci riguarda, ci preme ricordare che la descrizione della malattia del piccolo Celso (*carm.* 31.35-38), a livello lessicale, è condotta sulla falsariga del brano del *de rerum natura* 6.1145-89: cfr. G. Guttilla, 'Una nuova lettura del *carne* 31 di S. Paolino di Nola', *Koinonia* 11 (1987) 69-97, specialmente 72. Una ricostruzione della vicenda culturale di Lucrezio attraverso il mondo antico fino al Medio Evo è quella di L. Alfonsi, 'L'avventura di Lucrezio nel mondo antico . . . e oltre', O. Reverdin and B. Grange (edd.), *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* 24 (Vandoeuvres/Genève 1978) 271-315, in particolare 297-304.

noi') ~ *petens* . . . *Romanis* ('chiedendo per i Romani'); *furentem* . . . *flammam* ('l'ardente fiamma') ~ *placidam* . . . *pacem* ('una placida pace') ed infine *recumbens* ('stando piegato') ~ *recubantem* ('che sta piegato').

Proseguendo il suo racconto, ancora una volta nel *carm.* 27, Paolino avrebbe riproposto qualcosa della scena descritta da Lucrezio, che fino a quel momento non aveva potuto utilizzare. Nel suggerire a Niceta la posizione che egli deve assumere col collo per potere vedere meglio le pitture che ora ornano i portici della nuova basilica, egli ripropone alcuni di quei termini con cui nel *de rerum natura* Lucrezio aveva descritto la posizione assunta da Marte nei confronti di Venere:¹⁸

Nunc volo picturas fucatis agmine longo
porticibus videas paulumque supina fatiges
colla, reclinato dum perlegis omnia vultu.
Qui videt haec vacuis agnoscens vera figuris
non vacua fidam sibi pascit imagine mentem.

(511-15)

Ora vorrei che tu guardassi le pitture rappresentate in lunga fila nei portici dipinti e che affaticassi un poco il collo sollevandolo in alto, mentre osservi ogni cosa con il volto ripiegato indietro. Chi guarda queste scene, considerandole vere, anche se sono vuote figure, nutre la sua mente devota con quelle immagini non inutili.¹⁹

Trasposti in un contesto del tutto diverso, questi dettagli desunti dalla scena lucreziana perdono molto della loro plasticità e della loro validità artistica, anche se le diverse *iuncturae* lessicali operate da Paolino mostrano abbastanza allusivamente il modello da lui tenuto presente. Infatti le espressioni *supina* . . .

¹⁸ Segno del vivo interesse di Paolino per il brano iniziale del *carm.* 51 di Catullo e per quello del *de rerum natura* ci sembra il fatto che nelle varie riprese fattene egli non tralascia di usare nessuno degli elementi che caratterizzano la situazione in essi descritta. Un identico uso sistematico di un testo, anche se ancora una volta a più riprese, riguarda l'*Oratio* di Ausonio, il terzo componimento dell'*Ephemeris*: cfr. al riguardo G. Guttilla, 'La presenza di Ausonio nella poesia dell'ultimo Paolino', *Orpheus* 14 (1993) 275-97. Per quanto riguarda l'*inhians* ('guardando estatico') del v. 36 del brano lucreziano, esso è usato più volte da Paolino: cfr. *carm.* 31.402: *inhiat* ('guarda estatico'); 22.81: *inhianti* ('a lui che guarda estatico'). Nel *carm.* 27, dove troviamo trasposti gli altri motivi, esso compare al v. 591 nella forma semplice *hianti*, con lo stesso significato della forma composta.

¹⁹ Sulla funzione didattica di natura spirituale che, a giudizio di Paolino, queste pitture avrebbero dovuto esercitare sulla folla dei fedeli, costituita per la maggioranza da persone incolte, si veda H. Junod-Ammerbauer, 'Les constructions de Nole et l'esthétique de saint Paulin', *REAug* 24 (1978) 25-57, specialmente 29f. e inoltre G. Guttilla, 'I carmi 27 e 28 di Paolino di Nola e le epistole 30 e 32 a Sulpicio Severo', *Orpheus* 16 (1995) 59-82.

l'colla, reclinato . . . vultu ('il collo sollevandolo in alto, . . . con il volto ripiegato indietro') ripropongono concettualmente ed in parte anche lessicalmente sia il lucreziano *tereti cervice reposta* ('con il tornito collo reclinato') sia il *resupini spiritus* ('il respiro di lui che sta supino'). Ma ancora più indicativo ci sembra l'*agnoscens* ('considerandole') del v. 514 del carme. Non solo, infatti, esso si rifà al lucreziano *suspiciens* ('guardandoti'), cui è legato dall'omoptoto, ma, ciò che ci sembra non meno allusivo, trova il suo completamento logico nel *pascit* ('nutre') del verso seguente, analogamente a ciò che avviene in Lucrezio: *vacuis agnoscens vera figuris / non vacua fidam sibi pascit imagine mentem ~ atque ita suspiciens . . . / pascit amore avidos . . . visus* ('considerandole vere, anche se sono vuote figure, nutre la sua mente devota con quelle immagini non inutili' ~ 'e così, guardandoti . . . , sazia di amore gli avidi . . . sguardi').

Quanto si è finora detto ci permette di affermare che le presenze catulliane e lucreziane nei *Carmi* di Paolino non si limitano alle sporadiche riprese di singoli termini o di espressioni più ampie, da tempo individuate dagli studiosi, delle quali egli non ignorava certo la valenza poetica. In una dimensione ben più ampia ed evidente siffatte presenze si possono cogliere soprattutto nella descrizione di alcuni stati d'animo di Paolino e di particolari suoi atteggiamenti mentali, che ripropongono in un contesto diverso situazioni pressoché similari ch'egli trovava nei due scrittori pagani.

Pur riproponendo in maniera abbastanza allusiva dal punto di vista lessicale e strutturale i modelli tenuti presenti, i brani paoliniani possono rivendicare nei loro confronti una certa *novitas*, che si realizza di volta in volta in termini diversi. Così, alla gelosia che sconvolge i sensi di Catullo nel vedere un uomo che, sedendo davanti a Lesbia, la guarda ripetutamente e l'ascolta, mentre essa dolcemente ride, in Paolino invece, nel vedere dopo tanto tempo l'amico Niceta in tutto il suo carisma religioso, subentra una intensa gioia spirituale. Ed essa, nei versi seguenti, si evidenzia mediante una serie di notazioni psicologiche con cui egli sottolinea le diverse sensazioni di natura spirituale che l'amico con la sua presenza a Nola e la sua prorompente religiosità suscita nel suo animo, mentre gli siede vicino.

Anche il motivo dell'*odi et amo* nella ripresa fattane da Paolino sembrerebbe un superamento in termini di 'novità' della posizione assunta da Catullo nei confronti di questi due stati d'animo così contrastanti tra loro. L'ambivalenza affettiva che il poeta veronese avvertiva dentro di sé e alla quale, con profonda conoscenza dell'animo umano, non riusciva a dare una giustificazione, nel *carm.* 17 di Paolino trova invece una spiegazione piuttosto superficiale e comunque ben diversa da quella ch'egli introduce nell'*epist.* 30 e

che, per la sua natura, ci appare così vicina alla spiritualità agostiniana. Ma, indipendentemente dal valore artistico di queste riprese, ci sembra molto importante l'aver evidenziato che, oltre a sviluppare alcuni brani dei *Carmi* sulla falsariga di episodi virgiliani e vetero o neotestamentari,²⁰ Paolino ha utilizzato in altri in maniera analitica anche due temi abbastanza famosi che trovava in Catullo, e non senza una implicita finalità emulativa.

Non meno importanti da questo punto di vista sono anche le riprese dal *de rerum natura*, che abbiamo evidenziato. Non è certo una novità l'interesse degli scrittori cristiani del IV secolo per il poema di Lucrezio. Lo aveva già utilizzato non poco Arnobio nell'*Adversus nationes* per combattere anch'egli la religione pagana, attribuendo nello stesso tempo a Cristo le parti di natura eucologica che nel poema avevano come oggetto Epicuro.²¹ Se n'era servito anche Lattanzio nelle *Institutiones divinae*,²² lo utilizza spesso anche Paolino, attingendo da lui, oltre che da Virgilio, la componente eucologica delle preghiere e delle invocazioni presenti nei *Carmi*.²³ E tuttavia nei brani di cui ci siamo occupati Paolino ricerca in Lucrezio non il filosofo divulgatore a Roma della dottrina di Epicuro, ma solo il grande poeta, i cui versi gli avrebbero permesso di conferire dignità artistica alle brevi notazioni con cui nel Vangelo si descrive la scena in cui Giovanni, il discepolo prediletto, piega il suo capo sul petto di Gesù. Nel riproporla in prima persona, attraverso la mediazione dei famosi versi del poeta pagano, anche Paolino avrebbe rappresentato una sua esperienza senza dubbio più terrena, ma non per questo per lui meno esaltante sotto il profilo umano e spirituale: la sua intensa felicità nel trovarsi dopo tanto tempo con Niceta e nell'ascoltare dalla sua bocca, sedendogli accanto, i suoi insegnamenti di verità eterna.

²⁰ A proposito dell'episodio della fuga di s. Felice dal carcere grazie all'intervento d'un angelo, che si sviluppa sulla falsariga di quella di s. Pietro (*carm.* 15.238-65 = *Act.* 12.6-10), cfr. S. Prete, *Paolino di Nola e l'umanesimo cristiano* (Bologna 1964) 136-38. Dello stesso autore cfr. 'Paolino agiografo: gli Atti di S. Felice di Nola (*carm.* 15-16)', in *Atti del Convegno* [14] 149-59 (= S. Prete, *Motivi ascetici e letterari in Paolino di Nola* (Napoli/Roma 1987) 101-16) e soprattutto G. Luongo, *Lo specchio dell'agiografo: S. Felice nei carmi XV e XVI di Paolino di Nola* (Napoli 1992).

²¹ Sull'influsso esercitato da Lucrezio sugli scrittori cristiani, oltre ad Alfonsi [17], cfr. soprattutto Hagendahl [16] 9-88 ed in particolare, per Arnobio, 12-17.

²² Hagendahl [16] 48-76. Per l'influsso esercitato da Lucrezio sugli altri apologisti cfr. Hagendahl [16] 77-88.

²³ Cfr. al riguardo Green [3] 51, il quale tuttavia osserva che, rispetto a quanto aveva fatto con Catullo, 'Paulinus' use is no greater' e soprattutto G. Guttilla, 'Preghiere e invocazioni nei *Carmi* di s. Paolino di Nola', *ALGP* 28-30 (1991-93) 93-188.

REVIEW ARTICLES

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ARTFUL MYTHOLOGY

H. A. Shapiro, *Myth into Art: Poet and Painter in Classical Greece*. London: Routledge, 1994. Pp. xxi + 196, incl. 129 figures. ISBN 0-415-06793-6. UK£12.99.

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One of the catalysts for the renaissance that Classics is currently enjoying in many parts of the English-speaking world has been the introduction on many campuses of highly popular courses in classical mythology, with a consequent need for suitable books to serve as sourcebooks and to offer appropriate patterns of analysis. Myth has for the first time become a primary academic focus rather than, as formerly, the by-product of literary analysis or the prerequisite for archaeology courses. This change of emphasis has presented problems, in that students registering for a classical mythology course are often new to the ancient world and (given that most are largely unfamiliar with the stories and find the 'difficult' names taxing) tend to expect the primary material to be the subject of study, while their teachers, on the other hand, seek swiftly to move to the meta-level of interpretative analysis and application considered appropriate to tertiary levels of education. There results a conflict between desire and demand that until recently has been exacerbated by the unavailability of textbooks suitable for prescribed or recommended reading in such courses.

Among recent publications designed to fill this need, two with opposing approaches stand out: Barry R. Powell's massively inclusive *Classical Myth*,¹ which includes in its 707 pages a vast range of stories (most of which, however, are necessarily presented in abridged form) has been reviewed recently in *Scholia Reviews*;² by contrast H. A. Shapiro in his *Myth into Art: Poet and Painter in Classical Greece* has chosen to be extremely selective, offering only thirty stories in his 196 pages. The importance of his book lies in the fact that he brings for the first time to English-speaking readers an opportunity to study Greek mythology through a close examination of the artistic evidence as well as through the usual literary sources.

¹ Barry R. Powell, *Classical Myth* (Englewood Cliffs 1995).

² *Scholia Reviews* 6 (1997) 26.

After many years of teaching courses in ancient Greek art and in Greek mythology at undergraduate level, one becomes very much aware of the importance of the visual evidence, particularly that of the vase-painting traditions, for any study of mythology. Vase-painters from the end of the seventh century BC began to represent mythological narratives on their vessels and soon established an intricate iconographical tradition for the recurrent divine and heroic personages together with a tradition of compositional patterns for the common scene-types.³ This narrative system is not always coincident with the literary mythological tradition and so can offer intriguing evidence of stories that are not otherwise known to us;⁴ furthermore, from close study of the development of the vase-painting traditions one finds that compositional arrangements of figures that have become associated with one myth are often re-used for another story, suggesting that the vase-painters at least, and presumably also those who bought their wares, saw similarities in the underlying structures of these narratives. Consideration of such evidence provides important insights into the study of myth.

In any Greek myth course, therefore, one can argue for the inclusion of three equally important categories: the standard introduction to the main theoretical approaches to myth-analysis; the customary examination of the literary source material for the stories; and analysis of the visual traditions of mythological narrative. Access to 'the stories' should thus ideally be through a combination of the second and third categories rather than through a retelling of the tales neatly arranged in systematic order, for the latter recourse can lead students to form the ineradicable impression that there is one canonical version of the stories and that they constitute logical and coherent biographies of figures such as Herakles or Theseus or family histories of Oidipous or Agamemnon. Of course, plunging straight into the ancient literary documentation carries with it the attendant need to explain the peculiarities of genre, period and literary context. Similarly, the study of the archaeological evidence as a separate tradition must have due regard for the influences and constraints of fabric, technique, stage of development, artistic preference and the impact of socio-historical circumstance.

³ This visual narrative tradition is in many ways parallel in its working to the early Greek oral tradition represented by the Homeric poems; for discussion of some of the similarities see E. A. Mackay, 'Narrative Tradition in Early Greek Oral Poetry and Vase-Painting', *Oral Tradition* 10.2 (1995), 282-303; 'Time and Timelessness in the Traditions of Early Greek Oral Poetry and Archaic Vase-Painting', in I. Worthington (ed.), *Voice Into Text* (Amsterdam 1996) 43-58.

⁴ A well-known example is the interior of a cup attributed to Douris (Vatican 16545: *Attic Red-figure Vase-painters*² [hereafter *ARV* (Oxford 1963)] 437.116), representing Jason (identified by the Golden Fleece hanging in a tree) being disgorged by a dragon while Athene watches. There is no literary source for this tale, yet there is no reason to believe that Douris invented it, since even in the late archaic period the force of tradition still virtually precludes the representation of purely invented scenes and compositions.

In his *Myth into Art*, which is specifically intended as a textbook for undergraduate study of mythology, Shapiro goes a long way towards achieving this ideal, for he places a strong emphasis on the visual tradition of mythological narrative, while also providing translations of ancient literary sources to give access to the stories. While this approach is based on that adopted by the German scholar Karl Schefold in his comprehensive, five-volume study of mythological representation in Greek art from the archaic to the Hellenistic periods,⁵ the narrower, selective scope of Shapiro's book makes it accessible in content and price for most students, who can be encouraged to consult Schefold's publications for additional detail and breadth, particularly as they are becoming available in English translation.

Shapiro's material is arranged not in the usual mythological categories but in accordance with the ancient Greek literary genres that constitute much of our textual source material: epic, lyric and fifth-century drama (in chronological order of development). Some thirty myths are selected that are proffered as "'test cases" for the comparative study of poetic and pictorial narrative' (p. xx): each story is presented initially through excerpts of ancient literary texts, which apart from the Geryoneus fragment of Stesichoros (in Shapiro's own pellucid translation) are excerpted from the widely known translations of Lattimore (Homer and Hesiod), Nisetich (Pindar) and Burnett (Bacchylides), while the tragedy excerpts are from the series edited by Grene and Lattimore. While these translations are rightly respected as appropriately rendering the form, diction and 'flavour' of the originals, they do not *always* make the ancient texts readily accessible to the average undergraduate reader: one of the consequences of mounting large and popular classics courses is that classics lecturers can no longer rely on their students' having a bookish grasp of older cultural concepts and an extended vocabulary (for instance, although Lattimore's *Iliad* remains my own text of choice for Homer in civilisation courses, I find that it is increasingly necessary to translate the translation).

Shapiro's criterion for selection of the stories was that each should be represented in the visual tradition by at least three scenes from the seventh to the fourth centuries and this has resulted in his inclusion of some less well-known myths and exclusion of many that are normally the staple of mythology courses; for instance, the story of Iphigeneia among the Taurians is included, while for Herakles only three

⁵ In turn building on the landmark study of Carl Robert, *Bild und Lied* (Berlin 1881). Karl Schefold, *Frühgriechische Sagenbilder* (Munich 1964): English translation by A. Hicks, *Myth and Legend in Early Greek Art* (London 1966); published in revised form as *Götter- und Heldensagen der Griechen in der früh- und hocharchaischen Kunst* (Munich 1993); *Götter- und Heldensagen der Griechen in der spätarchaischen Kunst* (Munich 1978) : English translation by A. Griffiths, *Gods and Heroes in Late Archaic Greek Art* (Cambridge 1992); *Die Göttersage in der klassischen und hellenistischen Kunst* (Munich, Hirmer 1981); *Die Urkönige, Perseus, Bellerophon, Herakles und Theseus in der klassischen und hellenistischen Kunst* (Munich 1988); *Die Sagen von den Argonauten, von Theben und Troia in der klassischen und hellenistischen Kunst* (Munich 1989).

stories are featured, and there are no creation myths. This prioritising of the existence of suitable visual material over selection from the wealth of literary narratives means that in discussion of the stories the emphasis lies more on the visual versions: the proportion is three pictorial representations to one literary narrative.

Considering its price, the book is well illustrated throughout: although the black-and-white photographs are admittedly greyish and never more than one-half page in size, they are nevertheless clear enough in conjunction with the detailed analytical descriptions; it is praiseworthy that Shapiro in most instances illustrates the whole vase, including all the major scenes (both sides, and for cups also the interior). In many places less-known vases are selected in preference to those more commonly illustrated in art or mythology books⁶ and there is no hesitation in using fragments where their scenes are clear and offer useful information; this performs a valuable function in encouraging students not to back off from material that is incomplete. Captions are brief, since much of the text is devoted to analysis of the scenes, but they include clear identification of the subject, vase-shape, fabric, attribution (if any), museum reference and approximate date. All that is missing is an indication of the size of the object and references to the standard bibliographical works for vase-painting;⁷ this may seem carping, but given that the size and quality of the illustrations, though adequate, are less than ideal, it would have been helpful to have had these sources of information on where better, more detailed photographs might be located.

Interpretation of ancient art, particularly of vase-paintings from the archaic and early classical periods, depends upon the close examination of iconographical details, many of which are deeply embedded in an ongoing tradition. Shapiro has long-standing expertise in the study of iconography and has won recognition as one of the leading scholars in the interpretation of ancient Greek mythological vase-painting: it is greatly to his credit that he is able to make his scholarship accessible to the non-

⁶ For instance, for Herakles' killing of Nettos, in place of the recurrent scene on the neck of the name-vase of the Nettos Painter (Athens 1002: J. D. Beazley, *Attic Black-figure Vase-painters* [(hereafter *ABV*) Oxford 1956; repr. New York 1978] 4.1), Shapiro selects the less familiar name-vase of the proto-Attic Painter of the New York Nessos Amphora (figs 110f.: New York 11.210.1) along with a Caeretan hydria in the Villa Giulia Museum in Rome (figs 112f.) and a red-figure cup interior attributed to the painter Aristophanes (fig. 114: Boston 00.345: *ARV* 1319.2).

⁷ For the Athenian vases, *ABV*; *ARV*; *Paralipomena* ([hereafter *Para.*] Oxford 1971). For the South Italian vases, A. D. Trendall, *The Red-figured Vases of Lucania, Campania and Sicily* (Oxford 1967) and three supplements (*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* Supplements 26 [London 1970], 31 [London 1974], 41 [London 1983]); A. D. Trendall and A. Cambitoglou, *The Red-figured Vases of Apulia* 1 (Oxford 1978), 2 (Oxford 1982) and two supplements (*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* Supplements 42 [London 1983] and 60 [London 1992]); and A. D. Trendall, *The Red-figured Vases of Paestum* (Rome 1987). For the Corinthian vase, D. A. Amyx, *Corinthian Vase-painting of the Archaic Period* 1-3 (Berkeley 1988). These references could usefully have been included in the 'List of Illustrations' (pp. ix-xviii) without intruding into the body of the book.

specialist. As well as identifying what is represented in each scene, Shapiro includes a wealth of additional information and insight along the way: in discussing Herakles' killing of Geryoneus, for instance, and comparing the means by which the poet Stesichoros (in his now-fragmentary *Geryoneis*) and the painter Euphronios (on a huge wine-cup, fig. 50: Munich 2620, ARV 16.17) convey pathos, he notes that on the cup 'the distraught woman running up behind Geryon, no doubt his mother Kallirhoë,' can be identified as a motif within the traditional thematic context in earlier vase-painting of having 'heroes' mothers witness their sons' deaths in combat' (p. 76). In such ways he draws together as equal interpretative partners in the study of ancient Greek mythology the parallel disciplines of philology and art history.

Perhaps because he is consciously writing for an undergraduate readership, Shapiro keeps controversy to a minimum in his discussion; in some instances, however, he does briefly raise the possibility of alternative interpretations of scenes, as, for instance, when discussing the reverse of the Theseus cup attributed to the Briseis Painter (figs 82-84: New York 53.11.4, ARV 406.7), where three possible interpretations are offered depending on different readings of the figures' gestures. It is a pity that Shapiro did not exploit the possibility for comparison of this cup with another, attributed to the same painter, that he illustrates in reference to Agamemnon's seizing of Briseis from Achilles (figs 4-6: London 1843.11-3-92, formerly E 76, ARV 406.1): on the New York cup all three scenes concern Theseus and this kind of interconnection, which is a feature that is clearly habitual in this painter since it recurs on other cups by him, provides some explanation of why Shapiro (and before him Beazley: ARV 406.7) believes that the pair of conversing figures on the London cup interior (fig. 6) is to be interpreted in the light of the two Briseis scenes on the exterior (figs 4f.).

Given that many of the readers of Shapiro's book (both students and lecturers) will not necessarily have specific training in vase-painting analysis, it could be argued that a little more space might consistently have been devoted to making more transparent the *process* of decoding vase-scenes so as to demonstrate that mythological narratives in vase-painting must be considered both as part of a traditional continuum of themes and iconography and also within the context of a given painter's *oeuvre*. Failure by non-specialists to take these considerations into account can obviously lead to serious misinterpretation of scenes and it would have been instructive had Shapiro from time to time shown more of the underpinning of expertise and insight that leads him to come up with his sensitive readings of scenes.

In bringing together in one volume the literary and vase-painting evidence for selected Greek myths, Shapiro demonstrates many times over how much the pure philologist can gain from considering the archaeological evidence. For instance, in his discussion of a calyx-krater attributed to the Dokimasia Painter that illustrates the death of Agamemnon, entangled in transparent, web-like drapery, at the hands of Aigisthos and Klytimestra (figs 89f.: Boston 63.1246: *Para.* 373.34 *quater*) he makes the point that since the vase (painted c. 470 BC) was painted before Aischylos produced his *Oresteia* (458 BC), it represents a version of the story that precedes the

playwright's handling of it; thus it becomes clear that the robe in which Agamemnon was enmeshed like netted prey was not Aischylos' invention.

Although an extensive bibliography is provided immediately preceding the index, conveniently arranged so as to follow the various sections of the book, one frustrating aspect of *Myth into Art* is Shapiro's eschewing of footnoted references, since this precludes the provision of ready access to supplementary materials; to offer a single example, he makes the perceptive observation (in respect of the cup represented in figs 4-6⁸) that in the representations of Briseis being led from Achilles' tent to Agamemnon's camp, the figures of Briseis and her warder draw upon an earlier 'iconographical schema popular in Greek art, the young man leading away his bride by the wrist' (p. 13); it would be useful to have an indication of where some examples of such a scene might be found and of their mythological contexts, particularly since within the vase-painting tradition the adaptation of a compositional motif from one context to another tends to involve a carry-over of connotation from the original or other context. In the case of Briseis above, for instance, it would be instructive for mythology students to learn that a similar schema (that is, based on the bride and groom) was used commonly in the sixth century by Athenian black-figure painters for Menelaos' recovery of Helen after the capture of Troy:⁹ recognition of the fact that vase-painters in different generations visualised the two situations according to a common pattern leads to the perception of conceptual thematic parallels between the two stories, such as their both relating to a sexual (marriage-situation) conflict between two men over a woman which had serious and far-reaching consequences; it is not coincidental that other late archaic red-figure cup-painters used the motif for Paris' original stealing of Helen.¹⁰ Such interconnections are germane to the study of myth in the ancient Greek context.

There are few slips in the book,¹¹ but one problem that cannot be ignored concerns the anomalies in the spelling of Greek names. I was unable to find any preliminary discussion of the problem or statement of the conventions to be followed

⁸ See above, p. 115.

⁹ For instance, the scene on the reverse of the name-amphora of the Painter of the Vatican Mourner (Vatican 16589, formerly 350: *ABV* 140.1).

¹⁰ For instance, a skyphos signed by Makron (Boston 13.186: *ARV* 458.1), which even pairs the Paris elopement on the obverse with Menelaos and Helen on the reverse; for the latter, however, a different scheme is adopted, one also used by earlier black-figure painters (although the companions supplied by Makron are unprecedented), whereby Menelaos makes to attack Helen with drawn sword.

¹¹ Those that I noticed include: of the two views of the lekythos represented in figures 36 and 37, one is printed from a reversed negative; in reference to Hephaistos an odd usage of 'smithy' (pp. 66, 88) where 'smith' would be indicated; and (p. 167) the old chestnut of reading as English the Latin title of Euripides' play *Iphigenia in Tauris* (in itself a translation of the Greek Ἰφιγένεια ἡ ἐν Ταύροις, so taking *Tauris* to be a place rather than the name in the ablative case of the Taurians among whom Iphigeneia served as priestess.

in the book, so the reader is immediately cast adrift into a mixture of Greek transliteration (Hektor, Menelaos, Patroklos, Klytimestra, Dionysos, Kalypso, Olympos) and Latinisation (Achilles, Aegisthus, Electra, Circe, Ajax, Aeneas, Chiron), which is all the more confusing in that the translations often follow different conventions: students are left to wonder, for instance, whether Aias is the same as Ajax, while on the same page Achilles becomes Achilleus, depending on whether he occurs in modern or ancient text.

With *Myth into Art*, Shapiro extends to students and their lecturers an extremely compelling invitation to study Greek myth as it should be studied, holistically through the visual as well as the textual documentation. However, the book is not in itself entirely adequate reading for a general course in mythology for a number of reasons: it is highly selective, necessarily so given Shapiro's selection criterion, with the result that many stories recognised as essential to the general study of myth are not represented; its needful emphasis on the visual evidence means that the literary versions are afforded less discussion; and there is no overt theoretical discussion of myth. These aspects have to be covered from other books. Here, however, the understandable but nevertheless quirky selection and arrangement of the stories makes it inconvenient to use Shapiro's book in close conjunction with other books, so that in a conventional course with conventional textbooks *Myth into Art* tends to become an adjunct, referred to when one of Shapiro's myths happens to coincide with what is being conventionally studied.

This point is easily illustrated by considering to what extent Shapiro could be used in a course in conjunction with Powell's *Classical Myth*¹² to balance the latter's dearth of archaeological material. In relation to Powell's section on Herakles, for instance, one finds that in fact only three of the stories about that hero are featured by Shapiro: Herakles and Geryoneus, Herakles strangling the snakes in his cradle, and his killing of the centaur Nettos; while the snake-strangling is one of Powell's text-based highlights, Geryoneus is mentioned only in passing, and the story of Nettos' death is only briefly summarised in relation to the story of Herakles' own end. Points of contact indeed can thus be created here between these two books, but there is no real congruence because of the authors' very different aims. Attempts to use *Myth into Art* in tandem with other books tend to result in its being used piecemeal as an additional sourcebook and this is a pity, as it needs to be read through for the author's intention to be effectively received. There is a danger, if one merely dips into his chapters, of the book's becoming relegated to the level of providing illustrations for the literary documentation handled elsewhere, and this is to miss Shapiro's point. Best use can be made of the book by constructing a syllabus around it with the express purpose of introducing students to the study of myth through the visual as well as the written ancient sources—and this is surely the purpose its author had in mind.

What emerges from lecture-room trial of recent mythology publications is the realisation that as yet no single book seems entirely to meet the definable needs of an

¹² Powell [1].

undergraduate mythology syllabus. It is to be hoped that in the near future a scholar and teacher with equal competence in philology and ancient art history and with a reasonable grounding in anthropology will produce an affordable, accessibly written, copiously illustrated volume presenting and analysing the main manifestations and functions of myths in literature and art within the context of ancient Greek society; valuable within this would be a chapter offering a series of analyses of a given myth according to the main theoretical approaches in turn. In the absence of such a pedagogical paragon, such a book might rather be produced by a team combining these categories of expertise and experience.

JEW AND GENTILE IN ANCIENT ROME

Leonard Victor Rutgers, *The Jews in Late Ancient Rome: Evidence of Cultural Interaction in the Roman Diaspora*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995. Pp. xx + 283. ISBN 90-04-10269-8. UK£43.60.

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Since its first appearance thirty-six years ago, Harry Leon's *The Jews in Ancient Rome* has been one of the standard works in its field, and to some extent remains so—at the very least with regard to the nearly six hundred inscriptions found in the city's Jewish catacombs.¹ The coincidence of its republication in the same year as the appearance of Leonard Rutgers' monograph, in part a critique of Leon, affords the opportunity to consider both books in relation to one another and to other recent scholarship in Jewish studies. As is apparent from the subtitle, the theme running through Rutgers' analysis is that of cultural exchange. Self-evidently, this is a difficult and sensitive topic to investigate at the best of times, and debate about it can easily enough become a question of whether the glass is half full or half empty. The largely negative critical reaction to meet Louis Feldman's *Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World*, another recent work that addresses the broader question, is a reminder of the methodological and indeed ideological traps awaiting anyone tackling such issues in Jewish history.² But Rutgers presses his case creatively, all the while making careful use of evidence, both material and literary. His strongest suit is his analysis of the

¹ Harry J. Leon, *The Jews of Ancient Rome* (Philadelphia 1960); an updated edition, with a new introduction by Carolyn A. Osiek, was published by Hendrickson Publishers (Peabody 1995).

² Louis H. Feldman, *Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian* (Princeton 1993). Note, for example, the reviews by Martha Himmelfarb, *Judaism* 43 (1994) 328-34 and Fergus Millar, *CR* 45 (1995) 117-19.

archaeology of catacombs, and to this he devotes the heart of the book in chapters 3-5 (pp. 100-209). Given the many problems implicit in such an enterprise, Rutgers' high degree of methodological awareness is very much in order and may be regarded as one of the strengths of his book. On the other hand, his summary dismissal of Edward Said's *Orientalism* and Martin Bernal's *Black Athena* strikes a less felicitous note, controversial as those works have been; his engagement with them is limited to asserting that their authors too have their own axes to grind (pp. xv-xvi).

A survey of the history of scholarship on the catacombs, stretching from the late antique cult of the saints and its *itineraria* right up to the present is the focus of the first chapter, 'The Study of Jewish History and Archaeology in Historical Perspective: The Example of the Jewish Catacombs of Rome' (pp. 1-49). As emerges here clearly, the history of research into the Jewish catacombs has been closely linked with that of the Christian catacombs. Antonio Bosio (1575-1629), their first great explorer, had a specifically Christian agenda within the theological politics of the Counter-reformation; he was little interested in Judaica and his discovery of the Monteverde catacombs in 1602 had little impact. The fascination with collecting antiquities in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries brought to light not only many Jewish inscriptions but also lamps, gold glasses and the like, items that often served the function of adding variety to collections of Christian antiquities.

So much for the history of scholarship on the catacombs. The broader cultural question of 'isolation' of the Jews is traced back to the origins of modern Jewish historiography: in his seminal *Die Konstruktion der jüdischen Geschichte* (1846), H. Grätz under Hegel's influence 'proposed a very rigid view of Jewish history according to which Jewish culture could relate to other cultures only by fighting and conquering them' (p. 46).³ In a sense Feldman's book is a striking recent case of the enduring influence of such views, despite that author's claimed wish to undermine 'the lachrymose theory of Jewish history' (p. 445). It is here that Rutgers validates the comparative approach that is so important for his book. 'If one studies Jewish inscriptions and Jewish catacombs without taking into account contemporary non-Jewish materials, a picture will emerge that must *by definition* be one of isolation' (p. 48). Rutgers' criticism of Leon here has a certain resonance, not made explicit in the body of the text, with Rutgers' introductory mention of Hayden White's (in)famous thesis, that 'facts' do not have an independent and objective existence but are 'shaped by the account into which they have been fitted' (p. xv).⁴ An important part of Rutgers' project is close scrutiny of the very concept of 'isolation', including such questions as volition, extent and its representation.

Chapter 2, 'The Archaeology of Jewish Rome: A Case-study in the Interaction between Jews and Non-Jews in Late Antiquity' (pp. 50-99), is mainly a formal description of the Jewish catacombs and their finds compared with non-Jewish

³ I. Schorsch (tr.), *The Structure of Jewish History and Other Essays* (New York 1975).

⁴ H. White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination of Nineteenth Century Europe* (Baltimore 1975).

funerary architecture. The thrust of this chapter is to assert the importance of a common workshop-identity (*Werkstattgleichheit*) as an explanation for the common features shared by artefacts. Yet the period beginning in the fourth century reveals preference for some distinctively Jewish iconographic motifs, none more so than the menorah. Rutgers concludes that 'In Roman Palestine, as in Rome, the material culture of the Jews thus reflects quite reliably what artefacts were available to the population of the later Roman Empire at large. It is not correct to see in this phenomenon aspects of assimilation or to view it as a manifestation of syncretism.' (p. 91) Anteriority and influence have inevitably long been at the centre of discussions comparing Christian and Jewish burial practices. But Rutgers sees the development of the catacombs as a gradual process; Jews and Christians simultaneously began to excavate underground tombs, so much so that it cannot be claimed that one group copied the practices of the other (p. 92).

Chapter 3, 'References to Age of Death in the Jewish Funerary Inscriptions from Rome: Problems and Perspectives' (pp. 100-38) confronts the question: how can the fact that only 145 out of 594 Jewish inscriptions from Rome refer to the age of the dead be explained? Given that very few (late) Jewish inscriptions from Roman Palestine show this feature, Rutgers sees this as essentially a Graeco-Roman custom, borrowed by Jews in the Near East perhaps under the influence of the Roman military (pp. 103f.). This is the most technical and statistical part of the book. Rutgers negotiates the evidentiary problem of age-rounding by having recourse to modern techniques of population research. In chapter 4, 'The Onomasticon of the Jewish Community of Rome: Jewish vis-à-vis Non-Jewish Onomastic Practices in Late Antiquity' (pp. 139-75), the fund of names arising from the inscriptions is examined. Leon saw the use by Jews of non-Jewish names as an index of Hellenisation or Romanisation; the correlation was unproblematic. Rutgers shows that the presence of Roman names reveals the influence of Roman practices, though Semitic names never disappear completely. He concludes that most of the names used were typically late antique rather than specifically Jewish.

In the fifth chapter, 'The Jewish Funerary Inscriptions from Rome: Linguistic Features and Content' (pp. 176-209), Jewish use of inscriptions emerges as being in many ways similar to non-Jewish practices. For Leon, on the other hand, those buried in the Via Appia catacombs 'represented the more Romanised and perhaps more liberalised elements of Roman Jewry' (p. 124). There is an element of appropriation in this in so far as Greek and Latin are used as a means of conveying Jewish ideas (note the proliferation of compound adjectives beginning with *philo-*). By Rutgers' reckoning, Rome of the third and fourth centuries resembles first-century Palestine in having a 'common Judaism' (a defined set of ritual practices). In chapter 6, 'The Literary Production of the Jewish Community of Rome in Late Antiquity' (pp. 210-59), Rutgers considers two very different documents, the *Collatio Legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum* (a comparison of the Pentateuch with the Twelve Tables) and the

recently discovered *Letter of Annas to Seneca*.⁵ He shows that both of these works make the most sense when considered against the background of Jewish thinking, and asserts Jewish authorship in each case. Comparison with Christian sources suggests that the Pentateuch is unlikely to have had great significance for a non-Jewish writer; he places it in the fourth-century world of Christian-Jewish polemic. If the two works are indeed by Jews, it presents a picture of Jews that is far from passive and isolated. The ideas in the mysterious letter of Annas are closely comparable with those expressed in the *Wisdom of Solomon* and the *Sibylline Oracles*.⁶ Though there are no direct quotations from biblical materials, many passages seem close to the Hebrew Bible. Rutgers views the work as being in the first instance 'a treatise designed to curry the sympathy and favour of a pagan audience' (p. 247). Bischoff's notion that the work was in fact intended to win converts should, however, not be too quickly discarded on the grounds that there is no mention of conversion: we are, after all, dealing with a text which is incomplete in its present textual state.⁷

The conclusions reached in chapter 7 (pp. 260-68) are a clear synthesis of the material discussed and arguments made in the body of the book. On the key issue of isolation Rutgers holds firm to the dynamic, nuanced view already exhibited in the individual chapters. 'Instead of living in splendid isolation or longing to assimilate, the Roman Jews . . . appear as actively and, above all, self-consciously responding to developments in contemporary non-Jewish society. Interacting with non-Jews, Roman Jews did not give up their own identity. Rather, they freely borrowed elements from Roman culture, and in doing so they adapted such elements to their own needs.' (p. 263) This type of argument is in line with the views of Bowersock, for example.⁸ There the author suggested that rather than imagining an imposed 'Hellenisation', the more dynamic concept of 'Hellenism' could be used to describe the principle whereby local cultures actually used Greek culture, notably its language, often in a superficial way, as a means of attaining self-expression. The nature of Rutgers' conclusions are very much a product of the period he has chosen to study: so many of the features described are seen as late Roman rather than specifically Jewish. By concentrating on

⁵ The *Collatio* may be consulted in the edition of T. Mommsen, *Collectio Librorum Iurisprudentiae Anteustinianae* 3 (Berlin 1890) 136-98 or B. Kübler, *Iurisprudentiae Anteustinianae Reliquiae*⁶ 2.2 (Leipzig 1927) 329-94. For a text of the letter of Anna(s) with commentary see Bernhard Bischoff, 'Der Brief des Höhenpriesters Annas an den Philosophen Seneca—eine jüdisch-apologetische Missionschrift (IV Jahrhundert?)', in *Anecdota Novissima: Texte des vierten bis sechzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart 1984) 1-9.

⁶ The best available text of the Sibylline oracles is still J. Geffcken, *Oracula Sibyllina* (Leipzig 1902), though A. Kurfess, *Sibyllinische Weissagungen* (Berlin 1951) may be more easily accessible. See Emil Schürer's contribution to G. Vermes *et al.* (edd.), *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 BC-AD 135)* 3.1 (Edinburgh 1986) 618-54 (the Sibylline Oracles), 568-79 (the Wisdom of Solomon).

⁷ Bischoff [5] 1-9.

⁸ G. Bowersock, *Hellenism in Late Antiquity* (Ann Arbor 1990).

Rome of the third and fourth centuries, he focuses on the centre of a teetering empire, on a world characterised by flux in power-relations on the broadest scale, and on a city whose population may well have dropped from 800 000 to 100 000 in the course of the fifth century (p. 1). Clearly this is a world in which we must be especially sensitised to cultural exchange. Rutgers' contribution has been to sketch one set of such interactions, those of the Jews in Rome, in dynamic terms; his comparative perspective allows for a breadth of perspective that is notably lacking in Leon's *Jews of Ancient Rome* and Feldman's *Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World*.

ENCYCLOPAEDIAS OF THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST

Eric M. Meyers (ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of Archaeology in the Near East*. 5 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xviii + 2582, incl. 644 half-tones and line illustrations, and 3 appendices. ISBN 0-19-506512. US\$595.00

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In recent years scholars working in the history and archaeology of the Ancient Near East have witnessed the appearance of a number of very high quality encyclopaedic works which have greatly benefited their research. The *New Encyclopaedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land* (hereafter *NEAEHL*),¹ presented in four volumes a detailed description of excavated sites in Israel, the West Bank and, to a lesser extent, Jordan. The *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (hereafter *ABD*),² is a massive six-volume work with entries on every conceivable person, place (and site), topic or word that could remotely be considered to have some biblical relevance. More recently, we have been treated to the four-volume set *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, edited by Jack Sasson,³ which has admirably bucked the trend by being more thematic than topic- or subject-oriented, with original essays on eleven broad-ranging themes. To this corpus is now added *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of Archaeology in the Near East* (hereafter *OEANE*). One is tempted, therefore, to state that the publication of this work is a defining moment in encyclopaedias of the Ancient Near East, being as it is the most recent, and having a close association with both Oxford University Press and the American Schools of Oriental Research (hereafter ASOR). While there are obviously areas of overlap between all four of these works, each seeks successfully

¹ E. Stern (ed.), *New Encyclopaedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land* (Jerusalem 1993).

² D.N. Freedman (ed.), *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (New York 1992).

³ J. Sasson (ed.), *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East* (New York 1995)

to fill its own niche. Consequently, although it is legitimate to make comparisons, the *OEANE* needs to be assessed on its own merits.

The encyclopaedia's editor-in-chief is Eric Meyers, Professor of Religion and Archaeology at Duke University, and immediate past President of the ASOR. The list of his associates on the editorial board is very impressive and a certain indication of the quality of the work. The project was conceived by ASOR in 1988, originally as a one-volume *Handbook of Biblical Archaeology*, but as it took shape, and the extent of the accumulated wisdom of our discipline became clear, the vision was raised and the five-volume encyclopaedia resulted. The *OEANE* is very impressive in every respect. It has 2600 pages in five volumes, containing 1125 double-column entries, listed alphabetically. The scope of the work is breathtaking. Geographically it covers not only the Near East but also includes entries on islands and countries of the Mediterranean such as Cyprus, Crete, Greece, Sardinia and Malta, North Africa from Libya to Ethiopia, Arabia, Western Asia to Iran, and Anatolia. Periods covered range from prehistory to the Crusader period. The six general categories covered in the work, each containing several sub-categories, are 'Lands and Peoples', 'Writing', 'Languages and Texts', 'Material Culture', 'Archaeological Methods' and 'The History of Archaeology'. Most entries are followed by a bibliography, many of which contain useful one- or two-line summaries of each bibliographic reference. There are three appendices in the fifth volume: a list of Egyptian Aramaic texts (pp. 393-410), regional chronologies (shown as regionally specific time lines [pp. 411-16]), and a set of excellent maps (pp. 417-30). These are followed by a directory of contributors (pp. 431-50), a synoptic outline of contents (pp. 451-59), and a comprehensive index of ninety-three three-columned pages (pp. 461-553). There are 644 black-and-white photographs and illustrations.

The presentation of the sites themselves rightly stands at the heart of the work (nearly 450 entries). However, it is the other areas, most notably the categories of 'Archaeological Methods' and 'The History of Archaeology', that set this encyclopaedia apart from its contemporaries. Archaeological research has been revolutionised in recent years by scientific advances applied both in the field and in the laboratory. Subjects covered under the general heading of 'Archaeological Methods' include 'Artifact Drafting and Drawing' (vol. 1 pp. 217f.), 'Geographic Information Systems' (curiously listed under 'Computer Mapping' [vol. 2 pp. 55-57]), 'Ethnozoology' (vol. 2 pp. 284f.), 'Resistivity' (vol. 4 pp. 423f.) and 'Underwater Archaeology' (vol. 5 pp. 283f.). Under 'History of Archaeology', Meyers and his team have done a great service to Near Eastern archaeology by being extremely inclusive, looking not only at the various national schools and institutes but also at the history of the field in ten different regions. This category also includes over one hundred biographies. Perhaps most important is the contextualisation of Near Eastern archaeology in the sub-category 'Theory and Practice', which covers such topics as 'Biblical Archaeology' (vol. 1 pp. 315-19), 'Historical Geography' (vol. 3 pp. 30-33), 'New Archaeology' (vol. 4 pp. 134-38), 'Nationalism and Archaeology' (vol. 4 pp. 103-12) and 'Tourism and Archaeology' (vol. 5 pp. 222-26), to mention but a few.

The remarkably wide breadth and scope of this encyclopaedia make it appropriate for use by virtually anyone working in any field relating to the Near East, although in terms of the site entries Palestine in the second and first millennia BC appears to be favoured. As ASOR's traditional primary area of attention, this is legitimate. In South Africa, however, there is little Syro-Palestinian or biblical archaeology taught at universities; consequently this focus in the encyclopaedia may be perceived as rendering it somewhat less useful to local scholars. Nevertheless material from the classical period and geographically from areas to the west and east of Syria-Palestine, not to mention the sections on method and the history of archaeology, all combine to make this a worthwhile, even essential, acquisition by university libraries in this country.

In seeking to provide a more specific review, I chose to examine the entry for 'Shechem' by Joe Seger (vol. 5 pp. 19-23). While there will clearly be differences in style from the various contributors, the tight editing by Meyers and his team allows for the legitimate judgement of the whole by a few of the parts. The editors have given some freedom to the contributors in their construction of each entry as well as in such matters as chronology and terminology, so there are considerable variations in style and approach. The entry on Shechem seemed appropriate for closer review as it is a prominent site geographically, historically, in terms of the history of the discipline, and it has been inadequately published. It was excavated most recently by an ASOR-sponsored expedition in the 1950s and 60s. The entry, which contains five columns of text, is divided into three sections by subheadings: following a few lines giving grid references and a short description of the location, there are sections on 'Identification' (vol. 5 p. 19) and 'Exploration' (vol. 5 pp. 19-21), and then the major portion of the entry appears under the subheading 'Settlement History' (vol. 5 pp. 21-23). This last section is a chronological overview of the results of the Drew-McCormick excavation led by G. Ernest Wright to the site from 1956 to 1968. There are no further subheadings, for example, breaking down the information into periods or fields of excavation. The entry ends with a bibliography of twenty-one titles, which is slightly fewer than the parallel entries in *ABD* and *NEAEHL*. The absence to this day of a proper final report of the Shechem excavations renders this particular entry more important than most. Strangely the absence of this report is not acknowledged. The information given in the entry is neither detailed nor technical and can best be characterised as a summary. Indeed, it is clear that the article has been subject to some very tight editing. It is accompanied by three photographs: a view of the site from Mt Ebal, a profile of Wall A (the MB IIC outer city wall), and a view of excavations in progress at the East Gate. Unfortunately there is no plan of the site, which surely would have been more useful than at least one of these photographs.

On examining the site entries of this volume, one is led to ask what may legitimately be expected in a work such as this. On the whole there is slightly less information per site entry here than in the *NEAEHL*, but it compares favourably with the *ABD*. While one cannot expect a technical report, it is legitimate to look for more than a basic description. At least the history of excavation, stratification and possible

wider significance (biblical relevance, historical significance, etc.) of the site should be included. If controversies exist over a site's interpretation, these should certainly be noted, with references. The entry for 'Samaria' by Ron Tappy (vol. 4 pp. 463-67), for example, captures all of these elements effectively, leaving the reader with a brief but solid awareness of the issues at stake, including Kenyon's methodology and stratification and the site's biblical and historical relevance. The final element that arguably should be present in each site report is a plan of the site. However, this appears to be absent more than it is present. An encyclopaedia is often the source first accessed when seeking basic information about a specific topic. In addition, its convenience and summary format make it a most useful resource for a quick review. Frequently too it is the point of departure when seeking to learn more about a subject with which one is unfamiliar. In each case a basic site plan showing the most important features and excavation areas is all but indispensable. The absence of a plan in many of the site entries is one of the few weaknesses of the *OEANE*.

The encyclopaedia's strengths, on the other hand, are manifold. Apart from the sheer breadth of the work in time and space, the inclusion of entries giving the history of the discipline as it is practised in different countries and regions and of entries discussing methodological issues is particularly praiseworthy. This is not only due to the contextualisation that such entries offer, but also because they capture many of the controversies that beset us. W. G. Dever, for example, is certainly an appropriate, if ironic, choice to write on 'Biblical Archaeology' (vol. 1 pp. 315-19) and his entry is remarkable for its fairness and even self-criticism. Yet some Israelis will again be critical of his reference to their attitude to the Bible as a 'virtual constitution of the modern state' and will hasten to point out that his view of biblical archaeology is a distinctly North American one. While the *OEANE* is more American than anything else (again, to be expected with the ASOR as the sponsoring institution) it is another of the encyclopaedia's strengths that Israelis are given the opportunity to have their say about the history of the discipline from their perspective. (There are fewer such entries from nationals of Jordan and Syria.) So from the Israelis, for example, there are entries on 'Archaeology in Israel' (a sub-entry under 'History of the Field') by Amihai Mazar (vol. 3 pp. 47-51), the 'Israel Exploration Society' by Janet Amitai (vol. 3 pp. 190-92), and the 'Israel Antiquities Authority' by Rudolf Cohen (vol. 3 pp. 189f.).

For the purposes of review, the absence of several entries should be queried. High on this list is the site of Al Mina on the Syrian coast. It was excavated by Woolley, who hoped to find a Bronze Age port there following his work further inland at Alalakh. Instead he uncovered a town founded in the ninth century that continued to be settled until the Hellenistic period. As is well known, the importance of the site lies in its role in the early contacts between the Aegean, specifically Euboea, and the Levant. It was badly excavated by modern standards and poorly published. This encyclopaedia offers a superb venue for a reasonably comprehensive overview of the history of excavation and interpretation with associated bibliography. Instead there are four passing references to the site in other entries that give little or no information at all. This is a serious omission. There are other absentees and no doubt many scholars

reading through these volumes critically will search in vain for something they feel should be there. Other significant non-appearances worth mentioning are Tel Megadim, an important Persian period site in Israel (though this is offset by several mentions in the general entry on 'Cities: Cities of the Persian Period' [vol. 2 pp. 25-29]) and some biographies. The biographies section is fascinating and remarkably inclusive; missing from it, however, are Siegfried Horn and Doug Esse.

It is easier to quibble than to praise. Yet praise is more than due and the quibbles are minor. The *Oxford Encyclopaedia of Archaeology in the Near East* is a magnificent contribution to our field that will serve for years as a standard reference work. Meyers and his team have produced a classic encyclopaedia that will take its rightful place in any library that serves scholars of ancient history, archaeology and biblical studies. The price is steep and will force some to choose between it, the *NEAEHL* and perhaps the *ABD*. The choice is not an easy one; each seeks to serve a specific need. Suffice to say that those choosing the *OEANE* will have great cause for satisfaction and none for regret.

THE NEW PAULY

Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider (edd.), *Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike in 15 Bänden und 1 Registerband. Band I: A - Ari*. Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag, 1996. Pp. 1154. ISBN 3-476-01471-1. DM268.00.

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Der Neue Pauly enjoys a noble ancestry. The first volume of the *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft* appeared in 1839, edited by August Pauly, eight years after the death of Hegel and seven after that of Goethe. When Pauly died in 1845, Christian Waltz and Wilhelm Teuffel completed the work in 1852. It then comprised six volumes; its second edition, started between 1861 and 1866, was never finished; the explosion of knowledge had set in. In 1890 Georg Wissowa started a new edition, conceived on a broader scale, which was expected to be completed in approximately ten years. Its first volume came out in 1894 but the last not until 1978, to be finally followed by an index volume in 1980. No fewer than eighty-four thick, impressive volumes span approximately three metres on the shelf and three millennia in chronology. Since the work took almost three generations to complete, the work as a whole is extremely uneven: here Apollo and Zeus do not sit in the same Olympus; hence the need for an update.

This *mega biblion* costs between one-half and one year of an academic salary. Considerably less expensive is *Der Kleine Pauly*, once again in six volumes. It partly contains no more than summaries of the mega-edition, partly valuable new

information. Produced between the years 1964 and 1975, it has been available in a pocket-book edition since 1979. In addition, a microfiche edition of the eighty-four volumes has been on the market since 1991. And now one hundred years after the beginning of the mega-encyclopaedia comes the latest offspring of this admirable family tree, *Der Neue Pauly*. What is 'new' about it? First, its size: the new edition is planned to comprise twelve volumes and to be rounded out by three more documenting the classical tradition ('Wirkungsgeschichte', 'Wissenschaftsgeschichte'). In other words, the new Pauly sits comfortably in the middle: it is about a fifth or sixth of the old big edition and two and one-half times the size of the younger, small edition. Secondly, there will be an appendix dealing on the one hand with the influence of classical phenomena on later generations and with the history of classical studies on the other. This is indeed the most important addition to the traditional encyclopaedia; a fascinating new field will open up. The first volume of this section is scheduled to appear next year. Evidently, the 'classische Altertumswissenschaft' has given way to the 'Antike' in general. Perhaps in the next generation or edition it will be defined more precisely as 'Europäische Antike', to separate it from the antiquities of, say, Latin America, China, or Africa. Thirdly, also of no small importance and no minor merit, the panorama of the twelve volumes, compared with its predecessors, will be considerably larger. The publishers list six areas of expansion: the time frame will be brought down to about AD 800; the Orient will be given more attention; Byzantine Studies will be included; verbal, visual and material sources will be equally used; philosophical definitions and concepts will be given more space; and the range of social and economic history as well as of aspects of daily life will be broadened. This is indeed a progressive programme; how it will be implemented remains to be seen.

To judge from the first volume, that is, from only one-fifteenth of the whole enterprise, most of the promises of the programme have been kept. Thus the door to biblical studies is opened: 'Adam', 'Abraham' and 'Aaron' are ushered in. Similarly names of people and places in the Orient are included and Byzantium is well represented. The same holds true for the other enlargements mentioned above. Volume I is of course quite a representative one: it brings us 'Apollon' and 'Aphrodite', 'Aischylos' and 'Alexander', 'Aristophanes' and 'Aristoteles', 'Akademeia' and 'Antisemitismus', 'Altar' and 'Ara Pacis'. As it becomes German working ethos, 'Arbeit' is here taken very seriously. There are six lemmata: 'Arbeit', 'Arbeitslieder', 'Arbeitslosigkeit', 'Arbeitsmarkt', 'Arbeitsvertrag', 'Arbeitszeit'. Similarly, we find 'Anthropogeographie', 'Anthropogonie', 'Anthropologie', 'Anthropomorphismus'. For refreshments, the table is well prepared: there is 'Aal' ('eel'), 'Apfel', 'Aprikose'. For the classroom, there is 'Ablaut' and 'Aktionsart' (vowel gradation and verbal aspect), 'Adel', 'Aderlass' and 'Almosen', also 'Abschläge', 'Abklatsch' ('squeeze'), 'Abschrift', 'Abkürzungen'; we further find 'Ästhetik' and 'Aitiologie', 'Allegorese', 'Aphorismos' and 'Anthologia' as well as 'abortio', 'abortiva' and 'Abtreibung'. It is obvious not only that ancient Latin and Greek and modern German terminology are strongly mixed but also that α is transcribed partly as ae and partly as ai. In all these lemmata, we are normally given thorough, in some cases brilliant, articles.

We are, however, inevitably confronted with some shortcomings in the practical layout and the arrangements of the lemmata and of other entries. My main concern is that the bibliographies regularly give the year but not the place of publication. The result is that a library will send back book requests because of incomplete information. Certainly there are other inadequacies: for example, for Accius there are almost three columns of text and almost a full column of bibliography: too little for the former, too much for the latter. And certainly there are deficiencies: for example, the (astonishingly long) article 'alphabet' does not mention Franz Dornseiff's work;¹ for the Teubner edition of Minucius Felix *Octavius*, the older edition of 1982 is quoted, not the revised second edition of 1992; for 'Anyte', G. Luck is not mentioned;² and the article on 'Akrostichon' does not mention that in *Or. Sib.* 8.217ff. there is a double acrostic in that Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς Θεοῦ Υἱὸς Σωτὴρ ('Jesus Christ, the son of God, [our] saviour') gives us ἰχθύς ('fish') and Ἰησοῦς ('Jesus'). A more marginal problem is that the list of the approximately 350 contributors follows the alphabet of their surnames. This order brings about some confusion: if, for example, one looks for 'S.A.', one will have to go to 'A' for 'Schafik Allam', and for 'R.Z.', to 'Z' for 'Raimondo Zucca'. Moreover, there are quite a number of explanations of these sigla missing in the index of authors; hopefully, they will be added in the following volume.

The overall plan prescribes the publication of two volumes per year, so in ten years' time the complete encyclopaedia should be available. This quick pace is an understandable and laudable reaction against the misfortune of the big *Pauly-Wissowa* with its grossly over-extended publication time and the resulting inadequacies and imbalances. However, ten years is a very short time span for an edition of this magnitude; it might force contributors and editors into some rash production exercises. Certainly it will be better to have a standard work that is expected to last for many decades, if not generations, to be completed a little later in a well-balanced way than to have it done in a hurry with some flaws here and there. Even the new edition of the (still leading) commentary on Homer's epics by Ameis-Hentze, begun in 1995, is scheduled to be ready only by the year 2010; it thus comprises fifteen years of work by a smaller team under Joachim Latacz's leadership.³ It seems that here we have a somehow healthier time plan; again it remains to be seen whether or not it will be kept to by the contributors, the editor and the publisher. At any rate, the motto to be followed in such enterprises can only be 'quality over time' and not vice versa.

Finally a word on the lemmata 'Afrika' and 'Ägypten'. No fewer than four authors contribute to each of these articles. It might seem strange that 'Ägypten' (plus 'Ägyptisch' and 'Ägyptische Recht') covers five and one-half pages, while 'Afrika' is discussed in only four pages. However, there should be no misunderstanding: 'Afrika'

¹ F. Dornseiff, *Das Alphabet in Mystik und Magie* (Leipzig 1925; repr. Leipzig 1985).

² G. Luck, 'Die Dichterinnen der griechischen Anthologie', *MH* 11 (1954) 170-87.

³ J. Latacz, 'Der neue Ameis-Hentze', *Würzburger Jahrbücher* 21 (1996-97) 1f.

here designates both the continent and the Roman province, treated in sections 1 and 3 of the article, while section 2 is on religion and 4 on 'vandalisch-byzantinisch-islamische Zeit', covering the period 429 to 734. I find especially fascinating the beginning of 'Afrika' with its 2 parts on 'Begriffsgeschichte' and 'Entdeckungsgeschichte', where the long process of developing a realistic concept of Africa and also the various expeditions of exploration to the continent are clearly outlined. Interestingly enough, the concept of the continent Africa could only be developed once it had become more or less similar to the Greek concept of 'Libya' with reference to the territory under Carthage's rule in North Africa during the second half of the third century BC at the earliest. Only via this partial designation was the full meaning for the whole continent conceived. In literature, however, it was in the time of Homer (see *Od.* 4.83-90) about a century before the Greeks colonised the Kyrenaika that rulers in Egypt used the title 'Prince of the Rbw/Lbw' and thus handed on to the Greeks the name coined by Berbers.

Both 'Afrika' and 'Ägypten' are accompanied by two maps: in the first case, both maps show no more than North Africa, one between 146 BC and AD 395, the other in the time from the fifth to the eighth century; as for Egypt, there is a very useful map on its economy from the fourth to the second century BC (not used in the text!) and another about its administration from the first century BC to the sixth century AD. The presentation on Egypt will be rounded out by later articles on 'Bewässerung', 'Koptisch' and 'Ptolemaios' for history, on 'Hieratisch' and 'Hieroglyphen' for language, and on 'Demotisches Recht' for law; for Africa the only further reference is to 'Augustinus'. Clearly this is methodologically uneven and needs more attention in the volumes to come. Furthermore, there are no pointers to entries such as 'Africitas' in Latin language and literature or to the controversial topic of the 'Black Athena' discussion. As modern as *Der Neue Pauly* may be, there are obviously still some corners that deserve more light thrown on them than they receive in volume one.

Overall Cancik and Schneider (Kassel) with their twenty-three subject editors have done a fine job. They have started to create a marvellous, distinctly modern encyclopaedia on a newly defined old field. There can be no doubt that many special and general libraries will provide a copy of it for their users; in addition, private buyers will be encouraged to acquire this helpful and useful work since it represents excellent value for money and payments can be spread out over many years as the volumes are published. As a corollary, an astonishing piece of news: do you have a lexicon that explains 'Apopudobalia'? You do not? Nor have I: in fact, no one does. However, at the top of column 895 we learn that this is an ancient sport, a forerunner of today's soccer, which miraculously survived in the British islands from where it spread anew across the world in the nineteenth century. Strange information? Why, there are even two studies on it cited in the bibliography! Who possibly wrote on a non-existent word? In antiquity, we learn, such *lumina* as Achilleus Taktikos in fragment 3 (not in Liddell-Scott-Jones' *A Greek-English Lexicon*) and Ps.-Cicero in *De Viris Illustribus* (not in *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*), and in modern times two

researchers by the not-so-well-known (but telling) names of Pila (*grundlegend*) and Pedes. Get it? I think this is wonderful. Amidst the ocean of German *Gelehrsamkeit* this enchanting island of humanistic hilarity, this gem of interdisciplinary *iocosa*: a playful fraud with enough clue to take off its disguise and an attack against the menacing modern mania of Fussball. Fantastico! Bravi, bravissimi!

A NOVEL COMPENDIUM

Gareth Schmeling (ed.), *The Novel in the Ancient World*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996. Pp. x + 876, incl. 5 plates and 12 maps. ISBN 90-04-09630-2. Gld395.00/US\$255.00.

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This ambitious collection of contributions by twenty-six scholars of many different nationalities attempts to 'take a comprehensive look at the ancient classical Greek and Roman novel' and 'to provide . . . in a single work more information and in-depth studies than are currently available' (p. 1). The question of definition immediately arises, but despite extensive discussion (e.g., Gareth Schmeling, 'Preface', pp. 1-3; Niklas Holzberg, 'The Genre: Novels Proper and the Fringe', pp. 11-28; Consuelo Ruiz-Montero, 'The Rise of the Greek Novel', pp. 29-85, esp. 29-37; Massimo Fusillo, 'Modern Critical Theories and the Ancient Novel', pp. 277-305, esp. 277-80) none of the contributors offers a positive definition and the prevailing view of the genre as 'works of extended prose narrative fiction' (p. 1) is upheld. The most important consequence of this is that a tension between the aims of providing 'in-depth' and 'comprehensive' coverage of the genre is introduced. When the scope is broadened to include 'Novel-like Works of Extended Prose Fiction' (p. viii), a category that embraces genres that may legitimately be held to be independent of the novel, such as fable and epistolography, and when the Byzantine and modern heritages of ancient fiction are added in, then the reader may rightly feel that the plan of the work is entirely misconceived. The problem does not lie so much in the bulk of the book as in the inevitable superficiality of the discussion and in the impression of incoherence; there are, in fact, a number of embryonic books within the body of this tome, such as works of literary theory; critical appreciations of the individual novels; surveys (complete with discussions of the manuscript tradition and catalogues of editions and translations going back to the Renaissance); studies of culture, gender and race in ancient fiction; and investigations of the *Nachleben* of the genre. All this when

numerous monographs and collections of articles have recently appeared that cover much the same area.¹

The collection falls into four recognisable parts: general discussions of the literary and cultural character of the genre; short studies of the 'major authors' (p. viii); discussions of fringe elements and fragments; and the tracing of the heritage of the ancient novel. To review all of these adequately is an almost impossible task for any individual and most of my comments will be focused on the first section, which is in many ways the most interesting.² Massimo Fusillo's discussion of literary theory, 'Modern Critical Theories and the Ancient Novel' (pp. 277-305), is particularly important in view of the tendency that philologists have to ignore the abstract; Fusillo gives a survey of the debate on genre (pp. 277-80), the narratology of *histoire* and *récit* (pp. 280-88), reader-response criticism (pp. 288-93), psychoanalytic interpretations (pp. 293-300) and poststructuralism (pp. 300-05) as these may be applied to the five canonical ancient novels. More could have been made of structuralist analyses of the novels, particularly the apparent thematic duplication in Heliodorus, and greater weight could have been attached to the problem posed by the composition of Xenophon's extraordinary text.³ But Fusillo's chapter is also marred by poor expression and outright mistakes, many of which can be attributed to the editorial decision to publish his contribution in English. It is true that the study of classical literature and ancient history demands much of students outside Europe in terms of being able to read the European languages,⁴ but accurate expression of the author's meaning in these languages is preferable to a poorly edited English version replete with errors such as the following selected examples: 'on the contrary' for 'on the other hand' (p. 282; cf. p. 227 n. 9); 'the discover of sexuality' for 'the discovery of sexuality' (p. 282); 'reduced exaltation' (p. 282, an oxymoron); 'if . . . then . . .' for 'although' (p. 283); 'ellypsis' for 'ellipsis' (p. 283); 'causing a very original parodic effect' for 'having a very original effect' (p. 287); 'sounds' for 'states' or 'puts it' (p. 294); and the tautologous 'omnicomprehensive' (p. 298). Some of these infelicities are such that the reader must struggle to work out the author's meaning: what, for example, is meant by 'transphrastic' (p. 280), 'lateral stories' (p. 287), 'aural fruition' (p. 289), 'ductility' (p. 292) and 'specular' (p. 295)? Others, such as 'deciphrement' for 'decipherment' (p. 285), 'cronotope' for 'chronotope' (p. 282 n. 14, making

¹ E.g., J. Tatum (ed.), *The Search for the Ancient Novel* (Baltimore 1994); N. Holzberg, *The Ancient Novel: An Introduction* (London 1995); J. R. Morgan and R. Stoneman (edd.), *Greek Fiction: The Greek Novel in Context* (London 1994).

² A review of the third and fourth parts of this book by Suzanne MacAlister is forthcoming in *Scholia Reviews*.

³ Cf. J. N. O'Sullivan, *Xenophon of Ephesus: His Compositional Technique and the Birth of the Novel* (Berlin 1985), which is not cited.

⁴ In South Africa the study of the European languages is rapidly being squeezed out of the curriculum, ostensibly in line with the promotion of the other ten indigenous languages, but in practice English is increasingly becoming the sole language of communication.

Bakhtin an unwitting supporter of the ancient view that fiction was only suited to old women), 'physionomy' for 'physiognomy' (p. 288) and 'grandguignolesque' (p. 284), merely show the influence of the author's first language and culture on his English. The problem is not limited to Fusillo's article: even Antonio Scarcella's translated contribution, 'The Social and Economic Structures of the Ancient Novels' (pp. 221-76), does not escape the charge of obscurity (my favourite solecism here is 'nosey poker' [p. 242] for 'Nosy Parker'); in addition, Scarcella does not translate the French and Italian of the quotations he cites in his footnotes. This results in one situation in which a quotation from an article written in French by C. P. Jones,⁵ who normally publishes in English, appears in a footnote to a contribution in English by an author who normally writes in French or Italian. Doubtless students outside Europe will welcome the publication of the work of European scholars in English, but this does mean that the author, editor and publisher must take additional care over the readability of such contributions.

More substantive criticisms can be made of Scarcella's discussion: the chapter is over-long (56 pages) and overburdened with a mass of unnecessary detail: the reader does not need to be told of the movements of Oroondates in the *Ethiopian Story* (p. 262: '9.19.1 the satrap flees; 9.20.5 he is captured', etc.) or that Arsake is 'a young and pretty woman' (p. 263), for example; the catalogue of references, many of which are entirely irrelevant, merely exhausts the reader's patience. Scarcella's account of Delphi in this novel is particularly weak: no mention is made of unhistorical details, such as the presence of the acolyte of Artemis at the Pythian Games (Hld. 3.5.3), and no allowance is made for literary inspiration, as in the case of the ring of Persinna (Hld. 4.8.7; cf. Philostr. VA 3.46.10-18). In addition, Scarcella does not contextualise his discussion by referring to the historical background often enough: for example, he describes Psammis' presence in Alexandria as 'unlikely' (p. 245) although there is considerable evidence for the trade in Greek girls between India and Egypt (cf. *Peripl. M. Rubr.* 49); he fails to define the notion of 'class' (according to him, sailors belong to the 'middle class', p. 248); and he does not give any general discussion of the ethics of child exposure in antiquity.⁶ Even the plain meaning of the texts themselves is not always accurately represented: Scarcella states that Psammis 'falls in love' (p. 245) with Anthia, whereas in fact he buys her from slave-traders and immediately attempts to rape her (X. Eph. 3.11). Slabs of information for each author in turn are set down in an indiscriminate jumble: for example, the private party of a group of Phoenicians (Hld. 4.17) is lumped under the rubric of the social and economic position of Delphi (pp. 261f.).

⁵ C. P. Jones, 'La Personnalité de Chariton' in M. F. Baslez, P. Hoffmann, and M. Trédé, *Le Monde du Roman Grec* (Paris 1992) 161-67.

⁶ Cf., e.g., W. V. Harris, 'The Theoretical Possibility of Extensive Infanticide in the Graeco-Roman World', *CQ* 32 (1982) 114-16; A. Cameron, 'The Exposure of Children and Greek Ethics', *CR* 46 (1932) 105-14.

Renate Johne's chapter, 'Women in the Ancient Novel' (pp. 151-207), resembles Scarcella's in being over-long and expressed in rather clumsy English, for example, 'destination' for 'destiny' (p. 195); Chloë's παίγνια ('playthings') before her marriage were 'foreplay' (p. 189); and Cnemon is Nausikleia's 'fixture husband' (p. 192). The discussion is mainly descriptive rather than analytical, there are some inexplicable misjudgements (Charikleia is said to have been motherless, p. 203) and curious omissions.⁷ Johne also appears to accept without question (pp. 189, 191) the rather implausible hypothesis of Kerényi-Merkelbach that Melite and Lykainion are mystagogues in the initiation ritual of marriage.⁸ This theory is given excellent treatment by Roger Beck, 'Mystery Religions, Aretalogy and the Ancient Novel' (pp. 131-50), who provides an insightful formulation of the problem, contextualises his discussion by comparing and contrasting ancient narrative fiction with aretalogies and biographies of holy men, and concludes that the novels cannot be described as true mystery texts since they are not properly allegorical or systematic. Nevertheless, Beck allows that the ancient narratives, especially inasmuch as they are stories of journeys, do resemble the mysteries in that they constitute the responses of 'individuals in their encounters with divine providence and human fate' (p. 149). While it would not be true to say that Beck has reopened the question of the religious character of much ancient fiction (like Merkelbach, Beck does not discuss awkward cases such as Chariton or Achilles Tatius adequately), he has provided nevertheless a much-needed counter-balance to the prevailing emphasis on the literary character of these works.

Heinrich Kuch, 'A Study on the Margin of the Ancient Novel: "Barbarians" and Others' (pp. 209-20), gives a brief account of the cultural identities of the authors of the novels and their attitudes to 'barbarians'. Kuch's discussion is careful and well considered, but, while he rates Heliodorus' innovations in the novelistic tradition highly (pp. 214f.), he does not adequately deal with the complexities of cultural identity in the *Ethiopian Story*. Some mention of race as a determinant of cultural identity in the work deserves to be made (cf., e.g., the enigmatic oracle, 2.35.5; the paradoxical birth of the heroine, 4.8; Sisimithres' condemnation of racial prejudice, 10.10.4). Some assessment of the author's critical attitude to the inhabitants of Athens and Delphi would also have been relevant.

The more literary questions are, on the whole, much better dealt with in the collection. Alain Billault, 'Characterization in the Ancient Novel' (pp. 115-29), provides a succinct and interesting analysis of new character types, the naming of

⁷ On Hypatia, M. Dzielska, *Hypatia of Alexandria* (Cambridge, Mass. 1995) is not mentioned and M. Foucault, *Le Souci de Soi: Histoire de la Sexualité* (Paris 1984) is conspicuous by its absence in the discussion of the shift in gender relations in the late Roman Empire, for which S. Goldhill, *Foucault's Virginité: Ancient Erotic Fiction and the History of Sexuality* (Cambridge 1995) is also relevant.

⁸ K. Kerényi, *Die griechisch-orientalisch Romanliteratur in religionsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung* (Tübingen 1927); R. Merkelbach, *Roman und Mysterium in der Antike* (München 1962).

characters, and the use of literary comparisons and dramatic adventures in the characterisation of the protagonists and gods in the novels. Ewen Bowie, 'The Ancient Readers of the Greek Novels' (pp. 87-106), revisits the question of readership that he has discussed before,⁹ but nonetheless manages to put the matter in sharper focus. Bowie divides the novels into 'sophistic' (Longus, Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus), 'early' (*Ninus, Parthenope and Metiochus*, Chariton, Xenophon and the Greek original of *Apollonius, King of Tyre*) and 'other' (Antonius Diogenes, Apuleius). This classification confuses the criteria of style (or content) and chronology (itself a matter that is often in dispute) and is therefore not entirely satisfactory, but Bowie's analysis of these categories in terms of their 'intended' and 'actual' readership, while fully acknowledging the looseness of the first of these terms (p. 89), is useful. Bowie appears to ignore evidence of a shift in reading habits from early to late Empire as shown by altered attitudes towards writing in the later period (cf., e.g., Apul. 11.22; Clement of Alexandria *Strom.* 1.15.69).¹⁰ However, he sensibly concludes (pp. 105f.) that there must have been a range of readers for the different kinds of novels, but a narrower range than others, such as Anderson, would allow. In contrast to Bowie, Graham Anderson's brief sally, 'Popular and Sophisticated in the Ancient Novel' (pp. 107-13), is prepared to recognise a greater overlap between 'popular' and 'sophisticated' elements in the novels and to attach greater importance to the former. The argument, though, is of limited value: it is perhaps significant that Anderson does not mention Heliodorus at all.

This collection of articles on the ancient novel contains much good, even excellent matter. Ruiz-Montero's study in particular provides a much-needed synthesis of the numerous generic sources of influence that shaped the heterogeneous corpus of ancient narrative fiction. Her careful and wide-ranging chapter avoids describing the growth of the genre in evolutionary terms but at the same time argues that the very lack of an adequate definition of the genre rules out Perry's view that it was the creative act of a single person on a specific occasion.¹¹ Utopias, history, biography, tragedy, New Comedy, epic, elegy, local legend, rhetoric, epistolography, Egyptian tales, aretalogy, the apostolic acts, and the general socio-economic conditions under the Roman empire all played their part in the development of prose fiction, but none can be considered by itself to have been the starting point. Instead the reader must consider each work on its own merits.

The second section of the book addresses this need admirably. B. P. Reardon ('Chariton', pp. 309-35), Bernhard Kytzler ('Xenophon of Ephesus', pp. 336-59), Richard Hunter ('Longus, *Daphnis and Chloë*', pp. 361-86), Karl Plepelits ('Achilles

⁹ Cf., e.g., E. L. Bowie, 'The Readership of Greek Novels in the Ancient World', in J. Tatum, *The Search for the Ancient Novel* (Baltimore 1994) 435-59.

¹⁰ Cf. F. Altheim, *Der unbesiegte Gott: Heidentum und Christentum* (Hamburg 1957) 47-66.

¹¹ B. Perry, *The Ancient Romances: A Literary-historical Account of Their Origins* (Berkeley 1967) 3-43.

Tatius', pp. 387-416), J. R. Morgan ('Heliodoros', pp. 417-56), Gareth Schmeling ('The *Satyrica* of Petronius', pp. 457-90 and '*Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri*', pp. 517-51) and S. J. Harrison ('Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*', pp. 491-516) are all scholars who have made significant contributions to the study of these authors. Each work is treated fairly uniformly: the plot is summarised, questions of authorship, dating, textual transmission, critical editions, language and style, intertextuality and *Nachleben* are discussed and brief interpretations of the novels are put forward. A generous amount of space has been allocated to each work and the contributions are without exception skilful and judicious in their assessments. This section of the book can be recommended without hesitation both to students at the beginning of their studies and to scholars seeking a fresh perspective on the major landmarks in the extensive but still (in many areas) uncharted terrain of ancient fiction. It is regrettable that the defects in the first section somewhat negate this achievement. There have been enough compendia in the field of ancient narrative fiction that have to a greater or lesser extent satisfied the short-term need for surveys and assessments. It is time to move on to more detailed investigations of the many interpretative problems associated with this youngest and dynamic field of classical scholarship.

REVIEWS

Scholia publishes solicited and unsolicited short reviews. Short reviews to be considered for publication should be directed to the Reviews Editor, *Scholia*.

Susan A. Stephens and John J. Winkler, *Ancient Greek Novels. The Fragments: Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. Pp. xvi + 541. ISBN 0-691-06941-7. US\$55.00/UK£45.00.

This is the first really comprehensive text edition with commentary of the fragments, most of them preserved on papyrus, of ancient Greek novels for nearly sixty years.¹ Since 1936, when Franz Zimmermann published his unreliable edition, a substantial number of further papyrus texts have come to light that can certainly or plausibly be attributed to this fascinating genre of Greek literature. These discoveries of 'new' texts have contributed decisively to the dramatic revival of scholarly interest in the 'ancient novel' over the last twenty years, first heralded and inspired by the conference that Brian Reardon hosted in Bangor in 1976 to commemorate the centenary of the publication of Erwin Rohde's *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer*.²

The editors have collected 'all published papyrus texts that have a good claim to be thought novels' (p. 6). These fall into two unequal groups: (1) novel fragments: *Ninos*, *Metiochos* and *Parthenope*, *The Incredible Things Beyond Thule* by Antonios Diogenes, *The Love Drug*, Iamblichos' *Babyloniaka*, *Sesonchosis*, *Kalligone*, *Antheia*, *Chione*, Lollianos' *Phoinikika*, *Iolaos*, *Daulis*; and (2) ambiguous fragments, ten shorter pieces which may or may not be parts of novels. Each text is preceded by an introductory note on the plot and a detailed description of the papyri or, in the case of Antonios Diogenes and Iamblichos, of the manuscript *testimonia*; where possible, the historical background, authorship and date of composition are also discussed. The Greek texts are presented with standardised accentuation and punctuation; gaps are indicated by square brackets, doubtfully read letters by dots. The critical apparatus underneath the text gives the punctuation and other critical signs preserved in the papyri, as well as their misspellings, corrections, et cetera.; it also gives a selection of supplements of *lacunae*, sensibly restricted to those which the editors consider

¹ R. Kussl, *Papyrusfragmente griechischer Romane* (Tübingen 1991), re-edits only *Ninos*, the so-called 'Herpyllis' fragment (P. Dublin inv. C3, which he collated with a photograph), and the Apollonios fragments; he also adds interesting remarks on five other fragments, some of which, although occasionally mentioned by the editors in footnotes or the apparatus, deserve fuller discussion.

² B. P. Reardon (ed.), *Erotica Antiqua: Acts of the International Conference on the Ancient Novel* (Bangor 1977).

feasible. Translations, facing the texts, have been added wherever possible; here, too, words supplied in gaps are enclosed in square brackets. The detailed notes that follow each text cover first the more general issues of interpretation, placement within the story, *et cetera*, then textual matters such as supplements; they amount to a running commentary which is very welcome since it gives the reader all possible help he or she may need to make sense of these broken and mostly rather fragmentary texts. Although the editors do not seem to have checked the editors' readings on the original manuscripts (they say nothing about it), they have invested much careful thought in the presentation of the Greek texts, taking into account all corrections to their first editions and all reasonable proposals made up to about 1991.³ The result has been a rich and extremely useful collection of texts, edited to a high standard of accuracy and made accessible even to those who do not know Greek through clear translations, which will remain the standard edition of these texts for a long time to come, unless, of course, a whole lot of them are discovered tomorrow that will help us combine texts and interpret them differently (too much to hope for!). Until that happens, we shall use the new edition with gratitude and admiration.

A few statements will be greeted with scepticism: for example, 'Narrators adopt not structure but storyline' (p. 116): bearing in mind how much the structure of Heliodoros' *Aithiopika* owes to that of the *Odyssey*, one might disagree. The editors are inclined to believe that the author of the *Phoinikika* may have been P. Hordeonius Lollianus, the orator and sophist (pp. 316-18), but not everyone will be convinced. There are a few mistakes, too; P. Dublin inv. C3, the so-called 'Herpyllis' fragment tentatively assigned to the novel of Antonios Diogenes, is dated to the 'mid-second century B.C.E.' (p. 161); on the next page the date is correctly given as the second century CE). On p. 319 Strabo is inexplicably 'writing in the second century C.E.' and on p. 438 the Homeric Theano is made the daughter, not the wife, of Antenor. There are a fair number of misprints, mostly of Greek accents and in German quotations and proper names, fewer in Italian and French words; in the bibliography alone (pp. 483-504) I count thirty-eight misprints.

But these are trivia compared with the wealth of information that the editors so conveniently put at our disposal. Perhaps the most important achievement of this book will be its impact on our perception of the genre called 'The Ancient Novel'. While the five novels preserved complete (those of Chariton, Xenophon of Ephesos, Longos, Achilles Tatios and Heliodoros) all share the same essential ingredients of the love-cum-adventure story, which Tomas Hägg calls 'The Ideal Greek Novel',⁴ several of the fragments evidently represent stories of a rather different nature. The novel of Antonios Diogenes, though centred, like most of the others, on a male and a female protagonist, seems to have been a tale of fantastic adventures, perhaps not unlike

³ On p. 391 the editors should have given credit to F. Conca for having linked the two papyrus fragments to the Apollonios story; see also Kussl [1] 154.

⁴ T. Hägg, *The Novel in Antiquity* (Oxford 1983) 4; cf. p. 166: 'an ideal novel of love and sentiment'.

Lucian's *True History* and Iamblichos' *Babyloniaka*; even though it included a number of erotic encounters, it seems to have had a similarly outrageous plot. The greatest surprise with regard to the nature of the Greek novel has been the discovery of the *Phoinikika*, *Iolaos*, *Daulis* and *Tinuphis* fragments.⁵ All four stories are set in a low-life milieu of crime, magic, deception, scandal, even ritual murder, in short, all the things we associate with Petronius and Apuleius. The traditional distinction between the Greek 'ideal' love novel and the Roman 'realistic' satirical novel no longer makes sense. As the editors put it: 'Fragmentary novels may well reveal . . . that the so-called ideal romantic novel is no more than a subclass of the whole, whose survival says more about the tastes of subsequent late antique and Byzantine readers than it does about the field of ancient novels itself' (pp. 4f.)

Another misconception likely to be exposed by the fragments is the idea that novels were 'popular' literature, written for entertainment and without literary pretensions. While this may be true of one or two pieces (like, for instance, the *Sesonchosis* fragment), the great majority display the whole panoply of rhetorical sophistication, so they were obviously not intended for an undiscerning public. The relatively modest number of copies suggests that demand for these texts was rather limited; they were not entertainment for the masses. One question on which the fragments do not shed any new light is that of the (possibly oriental) origins of the novel. The editors rightly point to the many non-Greek heroes and heroines (like Ninos and Semiramis) and oriental (especially Egyptian) settings. One may suspect that the reason for this may have been the excitement among educated Greek readers generated by the discovery and exploration of 'Eastern' countries and civilisations, like India, Bactria, and above all Egypt, in the wake of Alexander's campaign. This seems more plausible than the assumption of Egyptian origins of the Greek novel; the Demotic stories of the Petubastis Cycle, for instance, can hardly have played that role.

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Lawrence M. Wills, *The Jewish Novel in the Ancient World*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. 279, incl. 1 appendix. ISBN 0-8014-3075-5. US\$37.50.

What *was* the Jewish novel in the ancient world? As the vogue for studies in the ancient novel is relatively recent, both Judaic and classical scholars might be forgiven for wondering what actually constitutes the genre. The 'ancient Greek novel' is itself not a literary category taken from ancient canons but a modern construct arising from the grouping of certain ancient writings on the basis of their distinctive treatment and ethos. In this wide-ranging and lucid book, Lawrence Wills aims to show that the

⁵ In the *Tinuphis* fragment (P. Turner 8), line 13 ἦν αὐτόσοφον ὁ τέκτων can hardly make sense ('the workman was cleverness itself'; tr. Stephens and Winkler); the suggestion of Kussl [1] 171 n. 4 (<πλ>ἦν αὐτὸς ὁ φονοτέκτων) should be considered.

characteristics of what he identifies as ancient Jewish novels indicate the existence of a definite genre that justifies analysis within its literary and socio-historical context and may be fruitfully considered and investigated on its own terms. In proposing and defending the idea of the ancient Jewish novel, he offers a useful and lively survey of some ancient texts generally neglected by classical scholars and thereby provides illuminating and productive new angles for students of the novel generally and particularly of the ancient Greek novel.

The ancient Jewish novels in question essentially comprise four books of the Old Testament Apocrypha, *Esther* and *Daniel* (in their Greek rather than Hebrew versions), *Judith* and *Tobit*, together with a fifth, the pseudepigraphic story of *Joseph and Aseneth*. In addition to these more or less familiar biblical stories, to each of which Wills devotes a chapter, are what he calls 'Jewish historical novels', compositions dating from the same era that deliberately set out to render historical events in a novelistic fashion. These include a portion of *Second Maccabees*, *Third Maccabees*, and the *Tobiad Romance* and *Royal Family of Adiabene* as recorded in Josephus' *Antiquities*. The composition of all the novels in their current form dates from between 200 BC and AD 100. The distinctive characteristics that they share include a commitment to describing their characters' emotional experiences and a heightened attention to feminine roles, features that mark them out as novels and suggest interesting comparisons with other examples of the genre (for example, the depiction of heroines in 'Gothic' novels). Viewed as a group, they have hitherto escaped scholarly scrutiny and Wills' book is a worthwhile and thought-provoking attempt to address this omission.

Wills bases his identification of the genre of the 'ancient Jewish novel' partly on the premise that at least the non-historical books in question were 'before being canonized, likely perceived by their audience as fictions' (p. 2). The qualification here is important and may merit further amplification and consideration of the religious culture of Hellenistic Jews. Only the shorter Hebrew versions of *Esther* and *Daniel* became part of the Jewish canon, but the Greek versions of the novels appear to include diverse elements culled from fluid popular traditions and some imaginative additions to the biblical accounts. Wills rightly shows some unease about this element of their claim to novelistic status: for example, 'The novels were *probably* read by the audience as fictions' (p. 30); 'The book of *Esther*, *probably* also fictitious . . .' (p. 220; my italics). Indeed, one of the reasons why using the term 'novel' seems, at least initially, to jar in this context is that it urges us to look at biblical or quasi-biblical texts from a historically-minded, secular perspective. Whereas the fictional status of the texts may be necessary for Wills' definition of the genre, it is by no means clear that they were generally perceived as such at the time (notwithstanding the Greeks' own efforts, at least from the time of Herodotus and Thucydides, to distinguish *aletheia* from *mythos* on rational grounds). In most Jewish households, for instance, then as now, the stories of *Esther* and *Daniel*, whether told in Hebrew or the language current in everyday intercourse, are likely to have been thought (at best) as belonging to a twilight world between imaginative fiction, holy writ and historical truth. Conversely,

some Hellenised Jews will have approached many parts of the canonical scriptures with unconcern or scepticism regarding their historicity. As Wills is well aware, a similar kind of ambivalence may be thought to attach to the way that parts of the Christian Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles were presented:¹ despite their novelistic features and even though Gospel truth may not be the same thing as historical truth, the latter were clearly not intended to strike the reader as fictitious.

While this ambiguity regarding the historical status of the ancient Jewish novels in question may explain the traditional tendency of biblical scholarship to treat them either as scriptural commentary or as a vulgarisation of history, the bold paradigm shift demanded by Wills' identification of them as 'novels' offers a justifiable and useful new point of departure, particularly for those seeking to address them from a literary perspective. His discussions both of the socio-historical circumstances in which the Jewish novels developed and of their inherent character and 'poetics' clearly demonstrate how the stories (as transmitted in their various Greek versions) may be seen to illustrate the workings of a Jewish 'novelistic impulse'. The latter term is broadly defined in distinction to traditional oral prose story-telling as 'the tendency under certain social conditions for authors to transfer oral stories over to a written medium, to embellish and create others, using description, interior psychological exploration, dialogue and other narrative devices that can be easily manipulated in written prose but are not as often utilized in oral' (p. 5). This general tendency is plausibly related to the evolution at this period throughout the *oikoumene* of a literate, Hellenised bourgeoisie with individualistic and cosmopolitan (rather than *polis*-oriented) instincts, providing a widespread audience for written works of prose fiction expressly composed (or revised) for the purpose of popular entertainment. Thus the fragments of the earliest known Greek novel, *Ninus and Semiramis* (first century BC) reflect a readership of native Syrians and the descendants of Babylonians, while stories such as *Sesonchosis* and the *Alexander Romance* were likely to have been popular amongst native and Hellenised Egyptians.² Similarly, in the Jewish sphere, the agglutination of various non-canonical legends and episodes such as are found in the Greek version of *Daniel* demonstrates a growing impulse to recreate traditional tales in a diverting and novelistic fashion, while the existence of such novels in general reflects the changing interests and values of a literate, increasingly secularised and individualistic, Jewish middle class.

In his introductory chapter (pp. 1-39), Wills outlines the literary and historical questions associated with the genesis of the ancient Jewish novel and the intriguing question of its relationship with the Greek novel. The two genres differ in a number of significant respects. The Jewish novels are considerably shorter and generally less

¹ See, for example, R. I. Pervo's study *Profit with Delight: The Literary Genre of the Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia 1987).

² Translations in B. P. Reardon (ed.) *Collected Ancient Greek Novels* (Berkeley 1989); texts, translations and commentary in S. A. Stephens and J. J. Winkler, *Ancient Greek Novels: The Fragments* (Princeton 1995).

sophisticated in matters of style and composition than the five extant Greek novels. They exhibit characteristic Jewish motifs such as the beautiful heroine, the loyalty of the extended family, and the assertion of Jewish identity vis-à-vis non-Jews. The Greek novels tend to be formulaic love-stories in which the young couple is followed through various adventures, often taking them to exotic locations, before the invariable happy ending. Whilst such themes reflect features observable in earlier Greek literature (such as in epic, biography and New Comedy), the novels' treatment of the romance and their emotional preoccupations differentiate them as a group from their literary precursors. The Jewish novels are similarly distinguishable from earlier Jewish prose literature, while they are clearly not derived from the extant Greek novels, which they largely pre-date. They appear to have emerged out of traditional oral tales, influenced by both biblical and Persian precedents. In the period of new written literature these were extended to allow for plots and sub-plots and in particular a fuller exploration of the principal character's interior life and motivation, a technique identified by Georg Lukács as one of the hallmarks of the novel.³

The question of the relationship between the Greek and the Jewish novel thus seems to be less one of derivation or mutual influence than of parallel modes of development within a similar socio-historical context. The parallelism allows Wills to consider areas of comparison with the modern novel as well in its historical emergence, its distinguishing characteristics, and its treatment in modern literary theory from Auerbach to Bakhtin. He raises, for instance, the interesting consideration that just as the modern novel may have originated in an ambivalent relationship with the opportunities suggested by printing, in particular for the dissemination of 'facts', the ancient novel may similarly have arisen in a dialectical relationship with the demands made on author and audience by 'factual' historical writing. The creation of the ancient Jewish novel with its specific literary syntax and semantics may thus have represented the final stage of a process of reaction to the compilation of Jewish prose writings within the canon of sacred literature.

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Suzanne MacAlister, *Dreams and Suicides: The Greek Novel from Antiquity to the Byzantine Empire*. London: Routledge, 1996. Pp. ix + 235. ISBN 0-415-07005-8. UK£40.00.

The title of this book gives some indication of what makes it both a particularly interesting and a problematic contribution to criticism of the Greek and Byzantine novels. It immediately raises the question: why treat dreams and suicides together: are there specific features that they have in common? And why treat both 'early' and Byzantine novels in the same book? There is, however, a more difficult problem raised

³ See G. Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel* (Cambridge 1971).

by the way in which the work is conceived: MacAlister attempts to combine an examination of dreams and suicides in the novels in terms of the role they play in the literary structure with an examination of novelistic treatment of dreaming and suicide as evidence for sociological history, particularly in the first two chapters. The use of novels as historical documents presents many problems. *Dreams and Suicides* is part of a welcome trend to interpret ancient novels in the light of their historical context: as we will probably find with much work of this kind, if the trend continues, it is very valuable for our understanding of the novels, but unconvincing as a case for using the novels as historical evidence to advance our understanding of the history of the period in which they were produced.

Dreams and Suicides consists of an introduction, five chapters, and an appendix of plot synopses. The logic for combining dreams and suicides and 'early' (the author's term) and Byzantine novels is never really spelled out, but can be seen in the introduction. Dreams and suicides are not only common in the novels, but the author sees the interest in them displayed by the Hellenistic novelists as a reflection of a focus in contemporary culture on the concerns and problems of the individual. This does of course imply a broad-brush view, assuming considerable continuity in the sociological conditions prevailing from the time of the first novel (dating is not discussed) to the time of Heliodorus (tentatively given a fourth-century date). It is also linked with an emphasis on what the novels have in common: chapter five, 'The Revival in Context' (pp. 153-64) opens with a rejection of the idea that Byzantine novels are mere imitations, but the author treats the Hellenistic novels very much, perhaps too much, as a group. She argues that they share formal features (which is not controversial), but also that they share plots in which *tyche* plays much the same role, a view that obscures differences of theological perspective between the novels. The author is, however, admirably sensitive to the fact that there are different kinds of dreams and different kinds of suicide.

The first two chapters, 'A Response to Uncertainty' (pp. 19-52) and 'Cultural Meanings Subjected to Reflection' (pp. 53-83), deal with the Hellenistic novels and their time. The sociological analysis is quite explicitly based on two methods: an analysis of Artemidorus' *Oneirocritica* and use of Durkheim's work on suicide, together with consideration of Durkheim's critics. Both methods tend in the same direction: they produce a view of the world in which the novel flourished as a society where 'fears and desires are totally bound to a focus on "self" and private life', a self lacking 'consistent validation' (p. 13). There is no discussion of the political structures that lie behind this cultural situation: it is simply assumed that the conditions of the Empire were likely to produce it. The literary analysis of the texts makes heavy use of Bakhtin. Here the author is on safer ground. Whether or not one is convinced by MacAlister's use of the novels as evidence for the societies which produced them, her attention to the use of dreams and suicides as elements in their literary structure is compelling and interesting. Her examination of the role of dreams in the novels is to some extent foreshadowed in Morgan's unpublished Doctor of Philosophy dissertation

in an insightful note which MacAlister does not seem to have found.¹ Nevertheless, she has discussed the theme in greater detail than Morgan, while her discussion of threatened and real suicides and martyrdoms in the novels is, as far as I know, completely new. *Dreams and Suicides* can be strongly recommended for the literary insights produced by this work alone. Chapters one and two deal respectively with what the novels' authors inadvertently, and what they consciously, communicate about cultural meanings. Although the intentionalist language here will alarm some readers, the distinction is in principle legitimate and works well enough in practice: it could be described as the distinction between what we learn by examining dreams and suicides in the novels in general and what we learn by examining the particular variations introduced by different authors. The third chapter, 'The Novel, the Dream and "Suicide" in the Interim Period' (pp. 84-114), examines dreams and suicides in the apocryphal *Acts* and *Lives* of the saints, and compares them with similar motifs in the Hellenistic novels. The contrast, it is argued, is essentially between the uncertainty of personal identity experienced in the Hellenistic world, and the certainty conferred by Christianity.

The third chapter is transitional chronologically but is also transitional in that the author makes decreasing use of her sociological tools, which are based on Artemidorus, Durkheim and a background awareness of political circumstances. These perspectives are explicitly abandoned in the fourth chapter, 'The Byzantine Revival' (pp. 115-52), in favour of a study of the intertextual relationships between the Hellenistic novels and *Hysmine and Hysminias*, *Rhodanthe and Dosikles*, and *Drosilla and Charikles*. The study makes use of Bakhtin's concept of 'alien speech'. Specific dreams and suicides are examined against their models in the Hellenistic novels, showing how the Byzantine novelists challenge the reader by subverting the 'alien speech' derived from those Hellenistic models (which, it is argued, were widely read). The fifth and final chapter, 'The Revival in Context' (pp. 153-64), places this literary activity in the context of contemporary tensions between a Byzantine revival of scholarship and Christian tradition. It concludes that while themes of the Hellenistic novels were utilised and adapted by their Byzantine imitators in a way designed to stimulate intellectual enquiry in the readers, these themes were also adapted and sufficiently Christianised to provide the authors with a defence against the charge of pagan or heretical writing.

One striking feature of the book is the way MacAlister depends heavily on methods associated with a few named scholars. To some extent this approach is quite sensible. The attempt to use the novels as historical documents does require some theoretical framework to anchor it. The theoretical frameworks used to understand Byzantine culture and those used to understand Hellenistic culture are disparate; from the point of view of the reader who is interested in the novels primarily as historical documents *Dreams and Suicides* is composed of two separate essays on separate

¹ J. R. Morgan, *A Commentary on the Ninth and Tenth Books of the Aithiopika of Heliodoros* (diss. Oxford 1979) ad 9.25.1.

periods and using different methods. The approach to literary structure is much more coherent, unified as it is by a Bakhtinian perspective. The sociological analysis of dreams and suicides is interesting. I doubt whether historians will find it very instructive, but the student of the novel will welcome MacAlister's work in bringing to bear on the texts a knowledge of Artemidorus (whose techniques and beliefs seem to have been familiar, even commonplace, for the novelists) and of work on suicide in the classical world. Together with her examination of dreams and suicides as structural elements in the narratives, this throws a good deal of light on the texts.

There are a few misprints, though not too many (but several words seem to have gone missing on p. 78 line 15). There are interesting and detailed notes, a bibliography, an index of passages cited, and a general index. The index of passages confirms the impression that the treatment of Longus is very cursory, which is understandable given *Daphnis and Chloë's* very different literary structure and social preoccupations, though I think a little more could be done with dreams in Longus. It would have been nice to see some acknowledgement of the fragments of novels, although the collection by Stephens and Winkler came out too late for MacAlister to have been able to use it for her book.² Overall *Dreams and Suicides* is an interesting book in spite of its theoretical and structural untidiness. It will give specialists on the ancient novel plenty to think about and will raise awareness of and interest in the ancient Greek novel's Byzantine successors.

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Oxford English Dictionary

Ronnie Ancona, *Time and the Erotic in Horace's Odes*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994. Pp. xii + 186. ISBN 0-8223-1476-2. US\$39.95.

Time and the Erotic is a re-examination of a number of Horace's odes in the light of feminist theory. Fundamental to Ancona's approach is Judith Fetterley's idea of the 'resisting reader'; in this case the resistance needs to be shown to the essentially male perspective not only of the poet himself but also of most of the critics who have written about Horace's love poetry; that is, the reader needs to realise that the perspective of the other partner in each relationship, the female beloved,¹ is almost entirely ignored and that the view of love that emerges is therefore one-sided and incomplete. This resistant attitude is given more specific focus by two other important ideas. The first, drawn from feminist writers such as Jan Montefiore, is that 'the traditional love poet has as his central concern not the beloved herself, but rather his own identity' (p. 17); that is, the poet uses the beloved as a means of establishing his own identity. In Horace's case, says Ancona, the identity that the poet seeks to establish is that of a self removed from temporality, not subject to the passing of time;

² S. Stephens and J. Winkler, *Ancient Greek Novels: The Fragments* (Princeton 1995).

¹ Ancona treats every 'beloved' as female, whether female in fact or feminised male.

if the beloved cannot provide such an escape the poet/lover seeks to affirm himself in ways that result in a dehumanising of the beloved and that turn her into a mere object to be dominated by the lover. In the second place, Ancona draws on the object-relations theory of psychoanalysis to explain why Horace in the *Odes* fails to depict a truly mutual love relationship. This theory traces the failure to an excessive need for autonomy on the part of the male lover and a concomitant inability to recognise the self of the other (the beloved), features that are apparently essentially connected with the male gender. Ancona sees the issues of autonomy and temporality as linked in Horace, since the form that the lover's struggle for autonomy assumes in the *Odes* is the desire or attempt to control the temporality of the beloved.

It is in these terms that Ancona seeks to explain in a new way some of the well known qualities of Horace's love poetry such as his distanced, ironic stance, and to question the universality of the concept of love that emerges from the *Odes*. The theoretical basis on which she has worked is succinctly set out in chapter one (pp. 4-21), as are her reasons for finding much previous criticism of the erotic odes either mistaken or inadequate. In chapters two to five (pp. 22-139) she applies the theories to the interpretation of a selection of odes, each chapter focusing on a different aspect of her theme, and attempts to show how pervasive the issue of temporality is in the erotic odes. All the odes discussed are provided with literal translations, which are generally accurate.² It is beyond the scope of this review to comment on each of these interpretations individually; on the whole they are detailed, sensitive and stimulating, providing new insights even into poems as thoroughly analysed and criticised as the Soracte ode (1.9) and bringing out the significance of tensions between a poem's surface meaning and the effect of its imagery, word-order, vocabulary, *et cetera*. On the other hand, I found that the theoretical basis did not work equally well for all the poems chosen for analysis, and even where the material did in general seem to fit the theory I was often uncomfortable with some of the details of Ancona's interpretations.

To take one fairly straightforward example, in chapter two (pp. 22-43) Ancona has chosen *Odes* 1.25 (*Parcius iunctas quatiunt fenestras*), 2.5 (*Nondum subacta ferre iugum valet*) and 3.7 (*Quid fles, Asterie, quem tibi candidi*) to illustrate 'the dominance of the theme of temporality in the particular love situation' (p. 22). While it is undoubtedly true that temporality does constitute a major theme of 1.25 and 2.5, I did not find Ancona's arguments convincing in the case of 3.7; although *adhuc* (line 22), which she sees as being crucial to her interpretation of the ode, does imply that Gyges' *integritas* may not endure forever, that is, his *integritas*, and therefore the love affair too, are subject to temporality, the threat comes not from the passing of time itself, but from the artful Chloë. Of course these temptations and those offered to Asterie by Enipeus operate within time, but so must all human action and experience. Nor can I agree with one of Ancona's concluding points, that Asterie's fidelity is valued only in so far as it is needed to ensure the continued faithfulness of Gyges (pp. 42f.). She

² For exceptions, see, for example, 'always' for *saepe* in 3.7.31 (p. 37) and 'choruses' for *choreas* in 1.9.16 (p. 61).

argues that since the speaker cannot actually know what is happening to Gyges on Oricum, his words about Gyges' *integritas* should simply be taken as a warning to Asterie 'that somehow her fidelity is required for Gyges to remain faithful' (p. 42). Perhaps one should not apply logic too strictly to this light-hearted ode, but one might equally well ask how Gyges, cut off in Oricum, is to know whether or not Asterie is remaining faithful. And if he cannot know this, how can her fidelity be merely instrumental for ensuring his fidelity? In my opinion, the speaker in this ode assumes a bardic omniscience (a frivolous parallel to the more serious role adopted in the immediately preceding Roman odes) that allows him to know both what is happening to Gyges and what is going on in Asterie's mind,³ and so to speak with authority.

It is, however, difficult to do justice to the strengths and the weaknesses of *Time and the Erotic* without engaging in detailed discussion of every ode. Readers will judge the book both according to their own assessment of the feminist and psychoanalytical theories on which it is based and according to the degree of success with which they feel Ancona has applied these theories to Horace's poetry. I found myself quite frequently becoming a resisting reader, not because the theories seemed invalid *per se* but because some of the material chosen was inappropriate and because Ancona seemed to be forcing upon some poems or parts of poems over-ingenious interpretations that might be hard to disprove conclusively but that were, to me at any rate, ultimately unconvincing in their context. I was also troubled by the lack of reference to the added dimension created in the erotic odes by Horace's awareness of himself as love poet, not just as lover, and by an apparent insensitivity to the humour in some of the odes discussed.

Despite these criticisms, *Time and the Erotic* is a stimulating and challenging book which should provide plenty of material for debate. It would be interesting to see these same theories applied to other classical love poets, including Sappho. It would also be valuable to bring in some consideration of the social context that would have helped to shape Horace's ideas on love; it is surely relevant that almost every 'beloved' mentioned in the *Odes* was probably a member of the *demi-monde* and that the relationships depicted were therefore at least in part a matter of business. This is a book that opens up new avenues for exploration, but its theories must be used with great care and checked by constant reference to text and context.

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³ I interpret his words about Enipeus not as an attempt to plead that young man's cause but as a revelation of what Asterie herself is secretly thinking about him.

John Henderson, *Figuring Out Roman Nobility: Juvenal's Eighth Satire*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997. Pp. viii + 168, incl. appendices. ISBN 0-85989-517-3. UK£9.95.

Stemmata quid faciunt? is the famous opening of Juvenal's eighth satire. Family trees and what they are on about, what it is that they do: that is what the author announces as the theme of the text. The text starts with a question, a question that is usually read as rhetorical, as a 'leading' question, directing the reader's response in a particular direction—a *num* or *nonne* question, in terms of Latin language. Often the answer required is thought to be 'nothing' or at any rate 'not much'; that is, the satire has frequently been read straightforwardly as supportive of the message that 'moral qualities are more important than birth'. But the question can also be read as an open one. From this perspective, the text is exploring what it is that *stemmata* (family trees) do in Roman society, without too readily pushing one answer at the readership—at least overtly: there is still of course the possibility that the author is playing a more subtle game of seduction with the reader. To view the question as an open one is perhaps to face a more interesting reading of the text; it is at least a reading that keeps more interpretative possibilities open and prevents too early a foreclosure. This is the stance that Henderson adopts in this book. He refuses to attempt a definitive judgement on the question of the text's 'viewpoint', treating it, as he writes in his preface (p. vii), as a performance text, a script that can be produced in more than one way, much as the text of, let us say, *The Merchant of Venice* can be read and interpreted, and produced on stage, in several different ways. In so doing, he emphasises the amount of distancing that is possible from the overt message of the text, the extent to which the element of irony can be seen to be part of the ingredients of Juvenal's text. Distancing and irony—one might almost speak of Socratic *eironeia*—are thus integral to Henderson's reading of this satire and correspondingly to his own style in this book.

Henderson's style is unusual for academic writing, as those who have read his other works will already know. He avoids the rather bland, 'educated' style current in academic prose, choosing a range of linguistic registers with a concentration on the 'lower', more conversational end of the spectrum. There is a gadfly quality to his writing; he will make a suggestive or persuasive remark, and then, having implanted his point in the reader's mind, not settle but dart on. He uses much jokey word-play, which may disconcert those who are used to a more syllogistic mode of argumentation. Some may feel that form is privileged over substance, but this would be to misunderstand the extent to which form and substance are inseparable, in the cases both of Juvenal and of Henderson. For the latter, at any rate, style can be seen as carrying his methodology, his choice of critical approach. Avoidance of too overtly serious a tone corresponds with his preference for ironic distancing, his refusal of too close an identification with any one, hegemonic reading of the text. To some this emphasis on maintaining a certain distance from certainty may fail to satisfy, if an authoritative reading of the text is what they want. 'Ah, what a dusty answer gets the

soul / When hot for certainties . . . ' in Henderson's work! Its 'up in the air' quality may appear uncomfortably ungrounded. Henderson's mode of argument may appear (mere) word-play. This playful quality, though, is not necessarily to be looked down upon. Word-play, playing with words, is, after all, what literary criticism is, and Juvenal himself is unquestionably a master of the art of playing with words. This book is, however, despite what appears at first sight to be a stylistic light touch (which does not imply fuzziness or imprecision), well grounded in solid literary scholarship, displaying the author's indisputably wide and detailed knowledge of Latin literature. It is well buttressed by a supportive structure of appendices (36 pages) and endnotes, in which the author's erudition is apparent. It is also grounded in a detailed examination of the Roman social and cultural history of the period of which the satire is a product. The text is firmly placed in context in the world, both material and mental, from which it comes and to which it was first directed.

Henderson shows us how *Satires* 8 addresses issues that were of abiding concern to its original, elite readership: the place of 'good birth' in Roman society; the question of the transmission of elite status and its relationship with heredity; the importance of having a 'good name'—and one's name, of course, marks one's status in society. Implicitly, this satire addresses itself to the question of the place of the elite in Roman society and thus inevitably its relationship with the institution of the principate; it must be borne in mind that the principate itself had recently changed from being an office transmitted by heredity to one of adoption, where the imperial names were given to an adoptive son chosen as being 'the best man for the job'. Lineage, though, as well as being important socially and politically, is also important at the literary level. As a practitioner of the literary genre of *satura*, Juvenal himself has a lineage, both among his predecessors as satirists and more widely in the body of Latin literature as a whole, which was one of the topics to which Roman satire turned its attention, and Henderson's book draws out this element of concern too. Henderson also draws the reader's attention to the extent to which this satire is both itself a piece of rhetoric and is concerned with rhetoric. As a performance text, it has links with declamation, that rhetorical performance that was a competitive game by which men with an elite education demonstrated and reaffirmed their elite status and thus their place as good Romans. An integral element of rhetoric as taught and practised at this time was the use of *exempla*, paradigmatic stories taken from Roman history, each attached to the name of its hero or villain, which served to embody right or wrong conduct and with which this satire is crammed. The use of such *exempla* was a commonplace of speechmaking and so indeed was the hackneyed philosophical *topos* of 'birth versus virtue' that is the topic of this satire. Instead of taking the text merely as an example of such commonplace performance, Henderson in this deftly articulated book invites us to read Juvenal *Satires* 8 as a distanced comment on contemporary Roman educational practice, the place of tradition in Roman life, and on 'Romanness' itself, as created, re-created and transmitted.

Kevin Herbert, *Roman Imperial Coins. Augustus to Hadrian and Antonine Selections: 31 BC - AD 180*. Wauconda: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 1996. Pp. xxii + 92, incl. 42 plates. ISBN 0-86516-332-4. US\$50.00.

In the opening sentence (p. vii) of his introduction to this volume,¹ Herbert articulates what is clearly a guiding principle not only of the catalogue itself but of his work as a numismatist: to make the subject accessible not only to specialists but to beginners, whether undergraduate or graduate, and to contextualise the study of coinages within broader historical inquiry. This purpose underlies the introductory survey of the reigns of the Julio-Claudians, the civil wars following the death of Nero, the Flavians and the Adoptive and Antonine emperors (pp. vii-xviii). A section headed *The Iberian, Gallic and Eastern Provincial Coinage* (pp. xviii-xx), which completes the introduction, is more or less a gazetteer, and there is little actual discussion of 'provincials' in general other than a note at the beginning of the introduction justifying the inclusion of provincial coinage and some descriptions under specific emperors (pp. vii-viii).

There is a brief bibliography of standard works of reference and their abbreviations (p. xxi). On the same page are listed general abbreviations, *aurei* (thirteen are listed by emperor), Roman coins not in *Roman Imperial Coinage*² or the *British Museum Catalogue of Coins of the Roman Empire*³ (there are eighteen of these) and Greek coin-legends by emperor. The catalogue proper (pp. 1-73) is arranged chronologically by dynasty, emperor and mint. A few entries contain brief discussion of the coin type. The indexes are given separately for the Julio-Claudians and Flavians (pp. 74-85) and for the Adoptive and the Antonine emperors (pp. 86-92). Thus each of these two time-spans has indexes for emperors and their relatives, obverse legends, obverse types (where these are not named members of the imperial house) reverse legends (Latin first, followed by Greek) and reverse types. Finally there are forty-two black-and-white plates illustrating all the 1053 coins in the catalogue; the photographs, generally excellent, are by the author.

For those of us for whom Roman history ended with Trajan (or worse still, with Nero) it is helpful to have a handbook which covers the roughly two hundred years from Augustus to Marcus Aurelius in one volume. Despite its transitions and distinctions between dynasties, the period is broadly cohesive, and Herbert's introduction is informed by the perception that throughout these two centuries the principate was constructed and reconstructed in reaction to its Augustan institution; in

¹ Volumes 1 and 2 of the catalogue, both by Kevin Herbert and published by the American Numismatic Society, are respectively *The John Max Wulffing (Greek) Collection in Washington University* (New York 1979) and *The John Max Wulffing Collection in Washington University: Roman Republican Coins* (New York 1987).

² H. Mattingly *et al.*, *Roman Imperial Coinage* (London 1923-67).

³ H. Mattingly and R. A. G. Carson, *British Museum Catalogue of Coins of the Roman Empire* (London 1923-62).

a sense, Marcus Aurelius is the last of the heirs of Augustus. (Constraints of space mean that only selected coins of Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius are discussed; fuller publication is envisaged [p. xvii].)

An example of Herbert's approach in the introduction is the account of Augustus' principate (pp. vii-viii). Taking as his starting point the *princeps*' need to accommodate his own exceptional powers to Republican constitutional practice, Herbert succinctly covers the essential events and concerns in relation to the minting history of the reign, which is dealt with in periods and by types and mint centres. (Here it should be noted that while Herbert is generally faithful to his aim of providing a useful introduction for beginners, there are occasional omissions: on p. viii, for example, brief explanations are given of such types as the Julian comet [nos 13f.], the *clipeus virtutis* [nos 12 and 15], and the *toga picta* over *tunica palmata* [nos 32f.], but not of the capricorn or the altar with sculptural garlands and hinds on cistophori [nos 112f.]])

Some of Herbert's pronouncements smack more of the epigrammatic value judgments of Tacitus, Suetonius and Gibbon than of sober historical evaluation: 'The second emperor was a most able and experienced commander in the field but he proved to be diffident and resentful in his personal and public relations at Rome' (p. ix); 'Claudius, the accidental emperor . . .' (p. x); 'Nero began his reign as the dutiful ward of an informal, multi-layered regency and ended it as a bloated, jealous and murderous tyrant' (p. x). Such generalisations are not altogether a bad thing in that they engage the interest of the beginning or peripheral historian (and Herbert is not guilty of actual misrepresentation), while those who recognise them as problematic will necessarily be aware of the literature in which they are extensively debated. However, some asseverations are a little too glib, as in 'It was also Domitian's condign fate to have the great historian Tacitus expose this [the pronoun is not related to anything in the immediately foregoing text] viciousness in his masterful [masterly?] *Agricola*' (p. xiii). And if the accumulation of titles on Domitian's coinage 'offers telling evidence of the domineering political attitude as well as of the personal insecurity of Domitian' (p. xiv), are we to assume that Trajan, whose proliferation of titles came, moreover, to be expressed in the honorific dative, was similarly domineering and insecure? Herbert sums him up as possessing 'attractive personal qualities and informed restraint' (p. xv). The inconcinnity arises from a tendency (which Herbert shares with many writers on coins) to over-interpret the message of the coinage. Attractive as the study of coins as instruments of propaganda or mirrors of contemporary concerns undoubtedly is, it must be tempered with caution.

The decision to illustrate every coin is welcome and it must be said that even worn coins show up well in the photographs, which greatly increases the usefulness of the volume both to students and to numismatists who do not have ready access to the collection itself. Another particularly welcome feature is the inclusion of the provincial coins with those of the central mints; until recently provincial issues have been generally neglected and catalogued separately as Greek coins (if at all), making a

synoptic study of particular reigns difficult.⁴

A very few typographical errors must be noted: '... provincial mints in the both the West and the East' (p. viii); inconsistency between 'Tarraconensis' (p. viii) and 'Terraconensis' (p. xi); 'accomodate' (p. xv); and perhaps 'this viciousness' (p. xiii, remarked above) should be 'his viciousness'. The proportional spacing is not always reliable, and there are many instances throughout of spaces within words or between word end and punctuation mark (for example, on pp. x-xi I noted 'embodime[]nt', 'inform[]al', 'b[]roke', '*praenomen* []', 'show[]ing', 'Gaul[],'). This is a general problem of computer-generated text, which lacks the elegance of traditional typesetting, though it is a relatively small price to pay for convenience, flexibility and relative cost-effectiveness. The merits of this volume—its inclusiveness, its clarity, the range of coins catalogued and illustrated in a relatively small compass—far outweigh its few shortcomings. It will be used and enjoyed by numismatists and historians, students and all who share Herbert's evident interest and pleasure in coins.

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Maria Dzielska (tr. F. Lyra), *Hypatia of Alexandria*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. Pp. xi + 157. ISBN 0-674-43775-6. US\$35.95/UK£23.95.

This is the first monograph available in English on Hypatia of Alexandria. It is also one of only a few scholarly books on this remarkable woman.¹ Dzielska sets out to research the life of Hypatia from the available sources and to clear away the cobwebs of centuries of biased and unreliable opinions on this famous philosopher and mathematician of Alexandria who was brutally murdered by Christians in AD 415.

In the first chapter, 'The Literary Legend of Hypatia' (pp. 1-26), she deals first with the modern literature from 1720 to 1989 in which Hypatia appears as a character in essays, poems, plays and historical novels. Authors often used the story of the beautiful, innocent Hypatia to express certain philosophical ideas or biases. Most often her death at the hands of 'barbaric Christians' is used to discredit the Church as such or the clergy of Alexandria. Gibbon is among those who see her death as an example of how Christianity was the cause of the downfall of ancient civilisation.² This train of thought has persisted until the present day, for example, the plays by the Italian author

⁴ The publication in 1992 of the first volume of *Roman Provincial Coinage*, edited by A. Burnett *et al.*, marked the broadening in scope of numismatic studies, in line with more inclusive tendencies in classical historical investigation.

¹ Since W. A. Meyer, *Hypatia von Alexandrien: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Neuplatonismus* (Heidelberg 1886) no monograph has appeared except for the recent work by G. Beretta, *Ipazia d'Alessandria* (Rome 1993). Unfortunately Dzielska was unable to consult Beretta before her work was completed (p. 112).

² E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (London 1898) 109f.

Mario Luci in 1978.³ Dzielska also mentions Hypatia's appeal to feminists: two feminist journals are named after her. She concludes this section by saying that these literary sources have little to do with the historical Hypatia. In the second part of this chapter, 'The Origins of the Legend' (pp. 17-26), Dzielska extensively quotes and discusses the ancient sources on Hypatia such as Socrates Scholasticus, the *Suda*, Damascius' *Life of Isidore*, and an epigram of (perhaps) the early fourth-century poet Palladas (*Anth. Pal.* 9.400) about a Hypatia, who is often assumed to be this Hypatia (but the name was common and the dates probably wrong). Dzielska briefly discusses the use other modern scholarly works make of these sources.

In the beginning of the second chapter, 'Hypatia and Her Circle' (pp. 27-65), Dzielska states that, in view of the small amount of direct evidence about her which has survived and because we know that Hypatia had many students and followers in her mature years, 'we can approach Hypatia indirectly, through a survey of her disciples and her teachings' (p. 27). The most important source is the correspondence of one of her pupils, Synesius of Cyrene, some to Hypatia herself, and some to fellow students. Although not too much is known of all the people Synesius refers to, there were clearly people among the friends and students of Hypatia who became important in the political and clerical life in Alexandria, including Orestes and other leaders, and some of these may have been Christians. The impression is that there were almost no problems between Hypatia and the leaders of the town or church. Dzielska extracts from Synesius' letters and from Damascius' fragmentary biography of her life information on Hypatia's methods of teaching, the neo-Platonic philosophy underlying her search for 'the mystery of being' (p. 49), and her aversion to physical sensuality. Synesius also writes with great respect about Hypatia's lectures on mathematics and astronomy, which were used to achieve a higher understanding of divine knowledge. She was the daughter of Theon the philosopher from whom she learned mathematics, for which she was almost more honoured after her death than for her philosophy. Although we have no titles of her philosophical works, enough is known of her mathematics to reconstruct the topics she dealt with (p. 54). Hypatia's inner circle of disciples formed a close community held together by respect, love and the knowledge that they were privileged to be initiated into the divine intellect. From Synesius' letters Dzielska makes the assumption that there might have been even some 'ingredients of ritual' in her method of lecturing (p. 64).

The social and political world of Hypatia in Alexandria is covered in chapter 3, 'The Life and Death of Hypatia' (pp. 66-100). Her father, Theon, was not only her teacher, but she also became his closest associate. Theon's own work (including his poetry) and life are thoroughly discussed and the mathematical achievements of Hypatia herself are reconstructed as far as possible from the sources. From the discussion of her father's work it is inevitable to conclude that the atmosphere in which she grew up and worked was one of learning in the widest sense. Dzielska discusses the political and ecclesiastical events in Alexandria in Hypatia's time,

³ M. Luci, *Libro di Ipazia e Il Messaggero* (Milan 1978).

especially the activities against paganism of the patriarch Theophilus which eventually led to the destruction of the Serapeum. She sets out the possible reasons for Hypatia's low profile in this period. It seems as if she had no special feeling for any of the pagan religions and that Greek polytheism was for her 'only beautiful embellishments to the spiritual Hellenic tradition that she valued and cultivated' (p. 83). The next main part of the chapter, 'The Circumstances of Hypatia's Death' (pp. 83-100), explains the changes in Alexandria that followed the election of Cyril as Theophilus' successor. Cyril expanded his influence into civic and public affairs, strove for the purity of the faith, and turned against the Jews. The prefect Orestes was involved in this struggle and the sources suggest that Hypatia was supportive of him and of the old civil order. Hypatia's circle of influence included more than just her pupils: it also included several very wealthy and influential people, among whom was a large group of Christians, inside and outside Alexandria. A slander campaign against her, which was perhaps Cyril's only possible method of attack, implied that she was involved in sorcery and black magic. In the name of Christianity, under the leadership of a certain Peter, a mob brutally murdered her in the city. Dzielska suggests the possibility that Cyril's own guard might have been implicated in the murder. The fact that most historians of the fourth century and later were Christians is, according to Dzielska, the main reason for the scarcity of the sources on Hypatia and the reason that the truth about her death has been covered up.

The conclusion summarises all the facts about Hypatia as Dzielska has deduced them from actual historical sources rather than from biased legend. Hypatia was not killed because she opposed Christianity but because she was falsely accused of sorcery (p. 105). After the conclusion, there is a most valuable section in which Dzielska discusses and evaluates all the ancient and modern sources that she has consulted (pp. 109-17). Attached to this section in a very loose way is a discussion of 'Other Learned Women of Late Antiquity' (pp. 117-19). Here the names and a short description of female philosophers of the neo-Platonic era appear in a way that has very little to do with the book as such, except that it includes a reference to another Hypatia, who is sometimes confused with our mathematician. The notes at the end of the book show thorough scholarship and it becomes clear that all available material that was even remotely linked to Hypatia of Alexandria was consulted. The book has a brief index of mainly personal names, which unfortunately does not cover the notes.

This book is an important monograph for anyone with an interest in fourth- and fifth-century Alexandria, its social life, church history, neo-Platonism and mathematics. The book reads well and for this the translator must be congratulated. One minor irritation is having to refer to endnotes rather than footnotes. But *Hypatia of Alexandria* is a valuable addition to Bowersock's series *Revealing Antiquity*. Whether one agrees with Dzielska's conclusion that Hypatia was killed for political reasons or not, one should not ignore this book and its valuable contribution to the scholarship it has made available to the English reader.

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**PACIFIC RIM ROMAN LITERATURE
SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS**

**WRITING REVOLUTION:
ROMAN LITERARY RESPONSES TO POLITICAL CHANGE**

Durban, South Africa
Wednesday, 18th June to Sunday, 22nd June 1997

Organiser: W. J. Dominik

SESSION 1A: OVID, W. J. DOMINIK, CHAIR

POSTSCRIPTS FROM THE EDGE:
EXILIC *FASTI* AND IMPERIALIZED ROME
A. J. Boyle, University of Southern California, USA

Keynote address.

SESSION 1B: OVID, P. J. DAVIS, CHAIR

AMOR-ROMA ET AUGUSTUS: DID OVID HAVE THE LAST LAUGH?
J. M. Claassen, University of Stellenbosch

Opinions are still very much divided on the pro-/anti-/non-Augustanism of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. About the irreverence of his *Ars Amatoria* there can be no doubt. A poet who was born in the year that Augustus first came to ascendancy and reached adulthood in a smoothly working Roman state had no real call to 'write revolution'. Ovid was a rebel without a cause and he rebelled against an imposed morality; nor did he appear to heed Augustus' call for literary support. Ovid found to his cost that politics and sex make a heady mix. His poems and letters from exile are redolent with a new and unctuous subservience to Augustus; the degree to which this subservience was genuine is increasingly being questioned. Behind the abject exile an irreverent ghost of the former *lusor amorum* seems to be standing. The picture that emerges of Augustus and the imperial family made a lasting impression on posterity; this was Ovid having the last laugh.

GIVING HISTORY A HAND: *MANUS* IN OVID'S *FASTI*

M. A. Gosling, University of Natal, Durban

Although the avowed purpose of the *Fasti* as stated in 1.13f. is to commemorate in verse *Caesaris aras et . . . dies*, and Ovid explicitly asserts this kind of poetry to be a service, a kind of *militia*, there are many aspects of the poem that do not fit into the category of didactic and aetiological religious verse. Doubts as to the sincerity of Ovid's claim are compounded when parallels are drawn between the *Fasti* and his earlier or contemporary work, for example, the irreverent use of *militia amoris* in the erotic poems and the generic and thematic destabilisation of the *Metamorphoses*. A study of passages from the *Fasti* in which the word *manus* occurs in some form, particularly the narratives of Arion and Chiron (2.79-118; 5.379-414), indicates that the word has thematic significance for the work as a whole and underlines Ovid's rejection of many conventional Augustan values.

SESSION 1C: OVID, M. A. GOSLING, CHAIR

ARMA GRAVI NUMERO: A POLITICAL READING OF OVID'S AMORES

P. J. Davis, University of Tasmania, Australia

This paper examines the *Amores* not as a series of witty variations on erotic themes but as a critique of institutions central to Augustan Rome. Particular attention is paid to the issue of generic choice, especially poems justifying the choice of writing erotic elegy as opposed to more serious genres, the treatment of military themes, the mythology of the Julian family, the question of adultery and its relationship to the Julian laws on the subject, the treatment of the remote past, and the Augustan building programme.

SESSION 2A: 1ST CENTURY BCE/CE LITERATURE, B. X. DE WET, CHAIR

CATULLUS AND REVOLUTION:

A POET'S RESPONSES TO POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE

G. Tatham, University of Otago, New Zealand

The first century BCE was a time of political and social change in Rome, the period of the 'Roman revolution'. Catullus (c. 84-54 BCE) has generally been thought to have remained largely unaffected by these upheavals, since he seldom refers directly to the momentous political events that were taking place around him as he wrote. This paper suggests on the contrary that the so-called 'Catullan revolution' is aptly named, since it may be seen to constitute an aesthetic response reflecting perhaps more widespread emotional and attitudinal responses to the contemporary breakdown of traditional political and social structures in Rome.

LYRIC DOUBLE TALK IN HORACE'S ROMAN ODES

S. Thom, University of Stellenbosch

On the surface Horace's Roman Odes (3.1-6) seem to express the values shared by Augustan society in general and support for Augustan reforms in particular. Horace, however, is careful either to withhold wholesale public support for these reforms or to avoid commenting at all on the issues at stake in most of his other Odes. This paper aims to show that the poet wholeheartedly enters the debate on Augustan society. Horace is clearly aware of the constraints placed on the poet by the general requirements for political correctness, but he responds with characteristic lyric ingenuity to the extent that one could describe his response as 'lyric double talk': apparently he is speaking in a politically correct manner, but an informed audience sensitive to the lyric diction of the poet would be able to read between the lines.

SESSION 2B: 1ST CENTURY BCE/CE LITERATURE, S. THOM, CHAIR

THE FATHER ANALOGY IN AUGUSTAN LITERATURE

T. Stevenson, University of Auckland, New Zealand

The *Res Gestae* is brought to a climax with the bestowal of the title *Pater Patriae* upon Augustus (35.1). Yet the significance of this title is not easy to recover and hence is frequently overlooked or even belittled. One way to explore its meaning is to investigate the use of the father analogy by Augustan writers. This analogy turns out to have many associations that defy neat categorisation or definitive limits but seem to describe an ideal benefactor figure in contrast to a tyrannical figure. It seems in the circumstances of cultural and political change in Augustan Rome that the father analogy was uniquely powerful in expressing and supporting the ambivalent image of himself that Augustus was careful to cultivate and which was a major reason for his success as a political figure.

SESSION 3A: TACITUS, R. EVANS, CHAIR

PLASTIC SURGERY ON VATINIUS

M. Kleijwegt, University of South Africa

According to Tacitus, from AD 62 onwards Nero listened to bad advisers. One of the most unattractive villains from this darkest period of Nero's reign was a cobbler from Beneventum by the name of Vatinius. Deformed in body and mind and given to vulgar wit, his main instrument of gaining influence was spying and informing. In Vatinius' brief appearance in *Dialogus* 11.2, his influence is extended to include the field of literary studies. The image of Vatinius in Martial and Juvenal is entirely different: there

he is remembered for his long nose. Why and for what purpose? Paying close attention to the nature of arguments in the *Dialogus*, I then analyse Vatinius' possible role in Neronian censorship.

DISCOVERING TACITUS' (HIDDEN) RESPONSE TO
POLITICAL CHANGE: MODERN LITERARY THEORY AS METHOD

M. Dircksen, Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education

The history of the reception of Tacitus' works proves that the literary influences of the times have always been crucial for their reception. It is therefore not surprising that the use of modern literary concepts has found its way into Tacitean research. This paper illustrates how a theoretical framework can provide the reader with a scientific but practical reading strategy. Tacitus camouflaged his true reaction to the political changes of his times beneath oblique suggestions and veiled meanings. In order to gain insight into this 'unwritten' text, certain narrative aspects of the text are described and on the basis of the data obtained from this description the reader is led to formulate critical questions that facilitate the process of interpretation.

SESSION 3B: TACITUS, M. DAVIS, CHAIR

WHAT'S HECUBA TO HIM . . . ? REFLECTIONS ON
POETRY AND POLITICS IN TACITUS' *DIALOGUE ON ORATORS*

J. Penwill, La Trobe University, Australia

This paper investigates Maternus' role in Tacitus' *Dialogue on Orators*. On the one hand he represents his literary activity as a quasi-Epicurean withdrawal from the political world, while on the other he gives public recitations and affirms that his plays are to be read as political statements—and subversive ones at that. Yet in his later speech he appears wholeheartedly to support the principate, claiming that the oratorical excellence of the Ciceronian period was a consequence of political chaos, of *licentia, quam stulti libertatem uocabant* (40.2), and that there is no necessity for it now that the affairs of state are run by *sapientissimus et unus* (41.4). These apparent contradictions and inconsistencies are investigated and an interpretation proposed.

SESSION 4A: SATIRE AND EPIGRAM, E. A. MACKAY, CHAIR

APOLITICAL SATIRE

R. Bond, University of Christchurch, New Zealand

Scholars from W. S. Anderson onward have seriously questioned the approach of earlier scholars who were content to accept a poet's words when speaking *in propria persona*

as a genuine and valuable indication of the poet's motives *qua* poet, especially in such passages that seemed to be autobiographical or to be presenting the working manifesto of the artist. The most extreme position yet taken is that of Freudenberg, who in *The Walking Muse* (1992) claims that the satiric *persona*, the 'Horace' of the early diatribe satires of *Sermones* 1, is presented by the poet as a consciously inept and ridiculous figure of dubious philosophical expertise and out of touch with contemporary literary theory rather than as a sincere, modest, well educated, self-critical and commonsensical observer and critic of human nature and its endemic follies, implicitly and quite consciously underpinning the alleged values of the Augustan regime. My paper examines Freudenberg's stance and the ramifications of his findings for a reading of 'Horace's' relationship to Maecenas and Octavian, the ideology of the new regime, and the attitude of the *Sermones* towards the opponents of the new order.

DAVUS AND DIALOGUE: THE POLITICS OF HORACE, *SATIRES* 2.7

S. Sharland, Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education

What do Davus and Fyodor Dostoyevsky have in common? '*Iamdudum ausculto . . .*' (Davus, Hor. *Sat.* 2.7); 'You must remember that for forty years I have been listening to the kind of stuff you usually utter . . . ' (The Underground man, Dostoyevsky, *Notes from Underground*). In Horace, *Satires* 2.7 the servile Davus, a long-time listener, gives the satirist a dose of his own medicine, methodically redirecting the assertions of the first book of *Satires* against Horace, now in the role of audience and target. Despite the would-be Stoic's ineptitude, what he says curiously hits home and threatens to earn him the slings and arrows of an outraged Horace. The present paper seeks to address the 'unfinalizable' Bakhtinian dialogicality of *Satires* 2.7 in relation to the rest of the *Satires*.

SESSION 4B: SATIRE AND EPIGRAM, B. KYTZLER, CHAIR

POETS AND POVERTY: THE CASE OF MARTIAL

P. Tennant, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg

The fact that most Roman poets belonged to the equestrian or senatorial class has encouraged a sceptical attitude towards complaints of financial hardship and inadequate patronage. Such complaints tend to be viewed as a conventional 'mendicant facade'—a facet of the poet's bogus *persona*. However, the evidence provided by Martial's *Epigrams* and contemporary perceptions of what constituted wealth and poverty suggest that mere possession of equestrian status was no guarantee of affluence. It is likely that the plight of poets like Martial and Juvenal was more genuine than modern sceptics would allow and that their indictment of the state of patronage was more than a convenient literary pose.

SESSION 4C: SATIRE AND EPIGRAM, J. PENWILL, CHAIR**READING THE IMPERIAL REVOLUTION: MARTIAL, *EPIGRAMS* 10**

H. Fearnley, University of Southern California, USA

Epigrams 10, initially written in 96 CE but hastily withdrawn and rewritten in 98 after the assassination of Domitian, is an overt example of the precarious relationship between poetry and political power in the first century. This paper explores how the Martial of *Epigrams* 10 is a poet divided between home and Rome; although Martial still lives in Rome, *Epigrams* 10 closes with the book embarking on a boat for Spain. It is a book in which Martial is highly self-reflective about his poetry and personal identity, and yet a book which is rooted more firmly in the poet's homeland than in the imperial ideology and civic space of Rome itself.

DOMITIAN: SAVIOUR OF THE NATION'S MORALS?

Elizabeth Tait, University of Natal, Durban

Martial has been described as a most astute observer of the human condition. He homes in on people's foibles, ruthlessly laying bare hypocrisy and double standards and showing little mercy for anyone's feelings. The one exception appears to be Domitian, who is continually praised for his military exploits, lavish building programme and moral reforms. This adulation contrasts strongly with views expressed by contemporary historians, especially concerning the reign of terror that resulted from Domitian's paranoia about the senate. Did Martial turn a blind eye? Was he too intimidated to comment? Or did he somehow manage to pass judgement without causing offence? I investigate some aspects of Martial's epigrams to determine whether any answers can be found to these questions.

SESSION 5A: EPIC, J. M. CLAASSEN, CHAIR**VOICES FROM BEYOND THE GRAVE:
LUCAN AND THE CORPSE IN *BELLUM CIVILE* 6**

C. Tesoriero, University of Sydney, Australia

The necromancy in Lucan's sixth book of the *Bellum Civile* is traditionally seen as the greatest and the only successful prophecy, providing clear answers about the outcome of the civil war. However, as J. Masters (1992) observed, the prophecy's merits are derived simply from its length and from promises made to Sextus and the reader by Erichtho. The prophecy is in fact cryptic, vague and incomprehensible without the benefit of hindsight. Yet Lucan did devote over forty lines to this prophecy and its vague and cryptic sections would be comprehensible to his contemporary audience;

within this prophecy Lucan has written about opposition to a tyrant and the proper and improper forms of revolution in the time after Pharsalus where *res publica* and *libertas* are dead.

SESSION 5B: EPIC, A. J. BOYLE, CHAIR

VALERIUS TO VESPASIAN: *SI/SEU TU SIGNA DABIS*

M. Davis, Temple University, USA

When the *principes* appropriated Apollo's role as patron of the arts and Jupiter's role as high god on earth, poets in the *vates* tradition challenged their absurdity and blasphemy. Valerius Flaccus, using Ovid's definition of vatic responsibility, undercut praise of Vespasian by making the Jupiter of his *Argonautica* desirous of dynastic power and commercial gain. By being ambiguous about Vespasian as a literary guide, he reserved that role for Apollo. He remained true to the traditional concept of *vates* and refused the new paradigm, becoming revolutionary by being anti-revolutionary, as did the Hypsipyle of his epic.

**THE *THEBAID*'S FEMININE ENDING
AND THE RESPONSE TO FLAVIAN POWER**

J. Dietrich, Hamilton College, USA

This paper concentrates on two aspects of the final book of Statius' *Thebaid*: how the book concludes the work and the use of the female voice. Statius' handling of closure in his work is problematic, lending it a more open, therefore feminine structure. *Thebaid* 12 is also full of female voices, especially Argia, who is heroized by her attempt to bury her husband. There is a particular moment in the text when Statius brings together the female voice with the poetic voice through weaving. By associating his voice with female figures, Statius connects his own project to theirs—the need to lament. Lament, like poetry, has the power to commemorate as well as to condemn.

SESSION 6A: HISTORIOGRAPHY, D. WARDLE, CHAIR

**FORTUNE FAVOURS THE BRAVE (OR SHOULD
THAT READ 'BRAZEN'?): *COMMENTARII* AS VEHICLES
OF PROPAGANDA IN THE CAREERS OF MARIUS AND CAESAR**

R. Evans, University of South Africa

The existence of war diaries or journals kept by military commanders in campaigns during the last century of the Roman republic may be deduced from the secondary sources for the lives of Marius, Sulla, Lucullus and Pompey. Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum*

is, however, the sole surviving published account of its kind. Generals were obliged to submit annual reports to the senate about their progress and these would have been closely based on the journals they kept, which were also intended as possible source material for later compositions. These inevitably served the purpose of enhancing the *dignitas* of the subjects. Since generals were also politicians, a secondary (but not less important) intention may also be identified: furthering the careers of the writers through the use of coded messages to their audience, fellow senators and the electorate. *Commentarii* were as much responses to domestic affairs as they were records of military campaigns.

SESSION 6B: HISTORIOGRAPHY, M. KLEIJWEGT, CHAIR

CAESAR'S BULL: CICERO ON PORTENTS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE *DE DIVINATIONE*

C. Chandler, University of Cape Town

Cicero had views of his own on how history should be written. Several remarks that he makes in his letters and philosophical works contain information on this topic and the extant portions of his historical poem on his own consulship are important, if problematic, evidence of his views on the proper way to write history. Further information comes from an unexpected source—the *De Divinatione*. Many of the examples of divination that are cited by Cicero's adversary Quintus are drawn from literature and history. In evaluating these examples, Cicero sometimes comments in ways that indicate his views on the function of divinatory material within the writing of history and how such material should be evaluated by the reader.

CURTIUS RUFUS: A FIRST-CENTURY SENATORIAL DISSIDENT?

I. Hastings, University of Cape Town

This paper presents the hypothesis that Curtius Rufus used Alexander-history to explore politically sensitive topics under the first-century principate. Themes from his *Historiae Alexandri Magni* are explored for their significance as responses to the dangers of tyranny and the loss of freedom of speech experienced by senators under the early principate, for comparison with Alexander-historians prior to Curtius, and for evidence of correlation with other first-century sources on the problem of the imperial-senatorial relationship. Curtius' concerns not only point to an identification with senatorial political interests and his identity as a Roman senator but also support an interpretation of the *Historiae* as a political statement.

SESSION 6C: HISTORIOGRAPHY, J. L. HILTON, CHAIR**VALERIUS MAXIMUS AND THE NEW DISPENSATION:
IN PRAISE OF THE *DOMUS AUGUSTA*
D. Wardle, University of Cape Town**

Against a backdrop of Augustus' concealing of his autocracy there was a literary vogue to prefer the freedom of the so-called Republican past. Perhaps cowed by the fate of Cremutius Cordus, Valerius Maximus stands against denigration of the imperial house and permits us to hear the voice of the loyalist. While his praise is unstinted, Valerius is aware of the controversies that surrounded the rise of the Julio-Claudians and dogged their exercise of power. This paper analyses examples of Valerius' treatment, notably his presentation of Julius Caesar's *clementia* and role in the civil wars of 49-44 BCE. Augustus and other members of the family are also discussed. This paper highlights the problems of an author writing under an autocratic state that was concerned to influence the presentation of the past.

IN THE MUSEUM

Scholia publishes news about the University of Natal's Museum of Classical Archaeology. Information about Classical exhibitions and artefacts in other museums in Africa is welcome and should reach the *In the Museum* Editor, *Scholia* by 30 June.

MUSEUM OF CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF NATAL

E. A. Mackay, Curator
Museum of Classical Archaeology, University of Natal, Durban
Durban 4041

A generous donation to the Museum of Classical Archaeology in 1996 from Joan Law has made possible the acquisition of a fragment of papyrus from Egypt, from Memphis or the Fayum (Figure 1). It preserves the top left-hand corner of a document written in Demotic script, the popular, simplified form of ancient Egyptian writing. The text follows the normal pattern of a legal document, which would regularly begin with the date expressed in terms of the year of the current ruler's reign; in this instance, however, the specific year reference is missing. What remains of the text makes it clear that the document was recorded in the reign of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II at some time between his second marriage in 139 BC and his death in 116 BC; this can be deduced from a reference to his first and second wives, Cleopatra II and Cleopatra III.¹ The text goes on to list the eponymous priests and priestesses, who held office for a year and whose names therefore constituted a form of specific date-reference; unfortunately the actual names are missing or too badly damaged for the year of the document to be determined, but of interest are the lengthy honorifics associated with the first name, including reference to the ruler's ancestors back to Alexander the Great.²

This acquisition is important for the Museum of Classical Archaeology as a teaching collection, since papyrus was the most commonly used writing material throughout the Graeco-Roman world; it was produced in Egypt from about 3000 BC. The dry sands of Egypt have preserved large quantities of the fragile pages, which

¹ Cleopatra II was supplanted as wife of Euergetes II by her daughter Cleopatra III (the child of her first husband, Ptolemy VI Philometer). The name Cleopatra was recurrent among the Ptolemies, the Macedonian dynasty that ruled Egypt from the death of Alexander the Great in 323 until 30 BC when the last Ptolemaic ruler, Cleopatra VII, famous as the mistress first of Julius Caesar and then of Mark Antony, took her own life when Alexandria had fallen to Octavian.

² Information on the text provided by Charles Ede Ltd is gratefully acknowledged.

offer a random assortment of often very trivial documentation of the societies that produced them. The excavation of rubbish dumps (the most famous was at Oxyrhynchus) has turned up a vast variety of texts ranging in nature from the commonest scraps of legal documents to rare pieces of literature. The Durban fragment clearly shows the characteristic cross-layered arrangement of the plant fibres; examination of how the letters are inscribed on its uneven surface and observation of how the text is interrupted by holes and is broken off in mid-line leads to a better understanding of the *lacunae* so often encountered in ancient texts that derive from papyrus sources. This piece will be a key exhibit in a planned display of different forms of ancient writing.

Durban 1996.42: maximum dimensions 76 x 79 mm. Bibliography: *Ede Writing & Lettering in Antiquity* XVII (October 1996) 22.




Figure 1: Durban 1996.42. Papyrus fragment.

B. X. DE WET ESSAY

The paper judged to be the best student essay submitted to *Scholia* by 30 June for the preceding year is published annually as the B. X. de Wet Essay. The competition, which is sponsored by the Classical Association of South Africa, is open to undergraduate students every year and to Honours students in even-numbered years. There is a cash prize of R200. This essay is named in honour of South African classicist B. X. de Wet.

THE MUSES OF HOMER AND HESIOD: COMPARATIVE MUSINGS

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An analysis of the functions of the Muses in early Greek poetry cannot begin with a conventional literary textual analysis. Although both the Homeric epics and Hesiod's *Theogony* are literary works, their inspiration and composition lie in a non-literary tradition. The transformation from performance-based composition to purely textual literary composition radically affects the relationship between the reader and the composition. Therefore, to understand fully the narrative functions of the Homeric and Hesiodic invocations of the Muses, our analysis must extend back beyond the text into the realms of oral poetry.

1

The three Muses¹ as the inspiring deities of song provide the oral poet on a basic level with the eloquence and ability to sing.² An analysis of the nature and degree of this form of divine intervention will illustrate to what extent the Muses are narrative devices and to what extent they are constructed as divine characters. The references to the Muses in Homer take the form of traditional verbal formulas.³ Apart from *Iliad* 1 and 2 all the references to the Muses introduce them with the same repeated formulaic

¹ With a single exception in the *Odyssey* (24.60), it is only from Hesiod onwards that the Muses are presented as being nine in number.

² Hes. fr. 310: 'Of the Muses, who make men very eloquent, divinely articulate.' For this Greek fragment see R. Merkelbach and M. L. West (edd.), *Fragmenta Hesiodica* (Oxford 1967) 161.

³ The verbal formula in its classical form consists of a compound modifier linked to a noun, such as 'wine-dark sea' or 'swift-footed Achilles'. The reciter of an epic or saga was guided by such repeated phrases and patterns through the complex paths of a poem that he was simultaneously recalling and inventing.

pattern: 'Tell me now, you Muses who have your homes on Olympos' (*Il.* 11.218; 14.508; 16.112).⁴ These techniques of oral-formulaic composition allowed the bard time in performance to recall to mind and collate formulations for the forthcoming passages of the song. This fact becomes crucial to our understanding of the Muse reference when we observe that this formulaic invocation precedes some of the longer and more complex catalogues and listings in the *Iliad*.⁵ When the bard needed to remember these lists, he called on the Muses' assistance:

Tell me now, you Muses, who have your homes on Olympos
 For you, who are goddesses, are there, and you know all things,
 and we have heard only the rumour of it and know nothing.
 Who then of those were the chief men and the lords of the Danaans?
 I could not tell over the multitude of them or name them,
 not if I had ten tongues and ten mouths, not if I had
 a voice never to be broken and a heart of bronze within me,
 not unless the Muses of Olympia, daughters
 of Zeus of the aegis, remembered all those who came beneath Ilion.
(*Il.* 2.484-92)

The bard expresses his awareness of his own fallibility regarding the need for accurate memory. The Muse is therefore called to aid the bard with detailed and complex content. Whether or not the bard actually felt his memory to be divinely inspired, these repeated formulaic invocations to the Muses provided him with time in performance to collate and prepare himself to recall (or invent) these lists. Therefore, before a discussion on the narrative functions of the Muse, it must be observed that one *raison d'être* of the Muse formula may well be this practical aid it gave to the bard in reciting an oral-formulaic composition.

In considering to what extent the Muses function as either narrative devices or characters, an analysis must be made of how they contribute to the narrative continuity, as well as the extent of their participation and the context of their being invoked. To begin with, in his invocation Homer occasionally distinguishes between himself and the Muse. This is significant since Homer rarely identifies himself in the text in the first person singular (*Il.* 2.487-93). This unusual reference by Homer to himself is remarkable in that it is a clear intrusion of oral practice into the narrative. Homer does not allow himself to intrude into the narrative as 'I' the narrator as much as 'I' the bard. In a text based in the literary tradition as opposed to the oral tradition, references to the Muses and the references to Homer in the first person singular would not have appeared, since they impede the flow of the narrative action. So it can be concluded that Homer's introduction of himself must be seen as the bard's intrusion

⁴ All translations from the *Iliad* are by R. Lattimore, *The Iliad of Homer* (Chicago 1951).

⁵ Lists of Achaians and the Trojans they killed in a skirmish (*Il.* 14.508) and of Danaan chiefs and the catalogue of ships (*Il.* 2.484).

into the narrative and the accompanying references to the Muses must have a specific function relating to the bard's persona.

First, it may be observed that a break in the action may serve to heighten suspense. A careful analysis of the appearance of the Muses in the *Iliad* after book 2 reveals an interesting correlation between the occurrence of the Muse formula and the build-up of expectation within the surrounding narrative text. Prior to the reference to the Muses in book 11, we find Agamemnon driving the Trojans before him in a fierce battle. Suddenly Iris appears to Hector and tells him to bide his time since Agamemnon is about to be struck by a spear (11.206). This advance warning that Agamemnon is to be wounded creates for the audience one of the most suspenseful moments in the book. As the battle continues and Agamemnon ranges far ahead of the others, the Muses are consulted:

So the fighting grew close and they faced each other, and foremost
Agamemnon drove on, trying to fight far ahead of all others.
Tell me now, you Muses who have your homes on Olympos,
who was the first to come forth and stand against Agamemnon . . .
(*Il.* 11.216-19)

Homer's dilatory antics tease his audience by holding back on the promised action. At first glance it may appear that Homer invokes the Muses to aid his memory in the recitation of names or other factual details. While the invocation of the Muses before the catalogue of ships surely supports this, the above invocation makes a similar request for information, yet the information requested consists of only one name, that of Iphidamas, Antenor's son (*Il.* 11.221). While not denying the possibility that the bard may sincerely have felt unable to impart the list of ships in book 2 without calling for the Muse's help, the above passage works against the theory that the sole purpose of the invocation of the Muses is to transmit the speech of the Muses and, when necessary, for the Muses to aid the poet's memory. Homer therefore is not really invoking divine aid to recall one name, but rather is heightening tension and suspense. The same effect is created in book 14. Peneleos stabs Ilioneus, with his spear going 'clean through the eye socket and the tendon of the neck' (14.494f.). Peneleos then raises his spear with Ilioneus' eye stuck on the end and threatens the Trojans. The gruesome scene with all its tension is set and the expectation is high:

So he spoke, and the shivers came over the limbs of all of them,
and each man looked about him for a way to escape the sheer death.
Tell, me now, you Muses who have your homes on Olympos,
who was the first of the Achaians to win the bloody despoilment . . .
(*Il.* 14.506-09)

In the final invocation of the Muses in the *Iliad*, in book 16, the same effect recurs. Aias is attacked by the Trojans:

His breath came ever hard and painful, the sweat ran pouring
 down his body from every limb; he could find no means
 to catch his breath, but evil was piled on evil about him.
 Tell me now you Muses, who have your homes on Olympos
 how fire was first thrown upon the ships of the Achaians.
 (16.109-13)

Once again the tension is broken by the reference to the Muses and once again it seems almost ridiculous to think that a poet who can recreate a 15 693-line poem in performance needs to ask for help in recalling to mind a single name, as he does in book 11, or as here, a single action such as setting fire to the Achaians' ships. It can also be observed that prior to each of these invocations Homer has reached a point through the narrative action, language and imagery that is just short of the dramatic highpoint in the relevant episode. The suspense is held in the almost arbitrary invocation and then slowly built up again until a dramatic crescendo is again reached.⁶ One possible function of the invocation of the Muses by the bard is thus to create an air of suspense, which is entirely plausible if we appreciate the *Iliad* as a poem performed.

In analysing any aspect of oral poetry as a performance art, one should always keep in mind the relationship between the performer and the audience. In determining the nature of the Muse formula as divine inspiration, one must take into account the effect on both performer and audience. Dodds maintains that the gift of the Muses 'is the power of true speech'.⁷ While modern, rational scholarship may balk at the idea that divine inspiration bestows narrative reliability and validity, one should not deny the religious implications that the reference may have had for the ancient performer and audience.

The Muses can also be seen to wield a more tangible power:

[T]he Muses
 encountering Thamyris the Thracian stopped him from singing . . .
 for he boasted that he would surpass, if the very Muses
 . . . were singing against him,
 and these in their anger struck him maimed, and the voice of wonder
 they took away, and made him a singer without memory.
 (Il. 2.594f., 597-600)

According to the above passage the Muses have the power to take away (and reciprocally, it can be assumed, the power to grant) the 'voice of wonder' and the

⁶ The invocation in book 11 precedes the dramatic highpoint of the stabbing of Agamemnon (252); in book 14 the invocation precedes the description of the Trojans killed by the Achaians (510); in book 16 the invocation precedes the dramatic escape of Aias from Hektor and the firing of the Greek ships (120).

⁷ E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951) 81.

song and the actions presented within the song. Therefore, in the audience's eyes, the invocations of the Muses may validate the truthfulness of a particular list or catalogue. In the final three invocations of the *Iliad* (books 11, 14 and 16), the invocation of the Muses at critical points in the action gives the stamp of a higher, divine authority to the course of events that follow.⁹ Indeed, Homer's first words of the *Odyssey* are such an invocation, and it gives a degree of divine authenticity to the work as a whole: 'Tell me, Muse, of the man of many ways . . . ' (*Od.* 1.1).

The Muses first appear as characters within the *Iliad* in book 2, where they do not, however, contribute in any way to the narrative development of the *Iliad* at the particular point at which they appear. The context of the reference to the Muses is a list of the peoples who provided ships for the war and who were under the control of Nestor. Preceding the reference is a list of the geographical locations of the people who had provided ships. Homer makes mention of the people of Dorion, which he then uses for an excursus on the Muses, who happened to encounter the Thracian, Thamyris, in Dorion. The Muses took away Thamyris' voice and memory for daring to presume he could sing better than themselves. The fact that the action of the Muses has no bearing on the catalogue of ships in which it is found and the fact that lists of all the other places that provided ships do not have similar asides suggest a different motivation for the appearance of the Muses as characters. It is possible that Homer includes this rather out-of-place reference early in the work to establish in the minds of the audience the power of the Muses. This serves the purpose of lending a greater authenticity and validity to the lists and catalogues with which he asks the Muses to provide him and which he relates later on in the poem. This could only inspire the audience's faith in what the bard is saying, since what bard would risk the fate of Thamyris by challenging the Muses or even reciting false information in the name of the Muses?

Otherwise, the Muses very seldom appear as characters in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. In the *Odyssey*, with the possible exception of the first line, the Muses are not invoked by name and appear only as characters; they are referred to by Odysseus when he talks to the bard Demodokos in book 8 and they appear again mourning around Achilles' corpse in book 24:

And all the Nine Muses in sweet antiphonal singing
mourned you, nor would you have seen any one of the Argives not in tears,
so much did the singing Muse stir them.

(*Od.* 24.60-62)

⁹ Homer uses many epithets to describe Zeus in the *Iliad*, but it is interesting to note that when Zeus is mentioned with the Muses as being their father, he is consistently referred to as 'Zeus of the aegis' (*Il.* 2.491, 598). This reference may be seen to extend the protective connotations of the aegis to evoke the idea of the protection and guidance the Muses were supposed to extend to the bards.

This reference to the Muses, as in the above discussion of Thamyris' fate (*Il.* 2.594-99) does not serve to further the narrative action, since the Muses are not central to the action and do not further the plot. In this way it is possible to view this passage in much the same light as the earlier Muse reference in the Thamyris anecdote. If the singing of Homer has in any way stirred the audience in performance, it is perhaps being paralleled with the Muses' ability to stir their audiences to tears within the narrative. In their emotional response to the poem, the audience may be subtly led by Homer to the indirect belief that they are being moved by the power of the Muses. This suggestion of the power of the Muses emanating from the bard gives the latter a greater credibility. The bard is once again evoking the Muses in order to enhance the perceived quality of his own work.

The Muses, then, appear only to a very small extent as characters in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Their primary function in the narrative is inherent in their relationship to the bard himself. The bard may have invoked the Muses for directly performance-related reasons: the invocation may have been a narrative device that allowed him through its formulaic nature to 'gather his thoughts' in preparation for the recitation of a section of the poem that required careful thought and particular concentration. The invocation of the Muse may also have been a narrative device used to heighten suspense. The Muses may have been religiously recognised by the bard and audience as agents that ensured, not only a quality of performance, but a legitimacy of factual content. Outside of directly performance-related criteria for the invocations, certain appearances of the Muses as characters have been shown to enhance the perceived quality of the bard's work through his association with them.

2

The potential exists for an interesting comparison between the Homeric Muse and Hesiodic Muse. While modern scholarship has not been able to produce unanimity about the nature and authorship of the works of Hesiod and Homer, this essay will show that both authors were probably drawing on the same oral tradition, although Hesiod appears to have written slightly later than the composition of the Homeric poems. The first line of Hesiod's *Theogony* announces that we are dealing with an entirely different conception of the Muses: 'With the Heliconian Muses let us start our song.'¹⁰ Unlike Homer who requests, at the beginning of both his epics, the help of the Muse to tell a story, Hesiod will speak of the Muses themselves. By stating that he will sing about the Muses, Hesiod opens up within the narrative the possibility of comment and judgement on the Muses. Homer's comments on the Muses were very limited and predominantly formulaic by nature. Yet in the *Theogony*, in line 27 we meet with a particularly un-Homeric comment concerning the Muses, as the Muses tell Hesiod: 'We know enough to make up lies that are convincing.' The Muses here are probably

¹⁰ All translations of the *Theogony* are by D. Wender, *Hesiod and Theognis* (Harmondsworth 1973).

referring to the persuasive narrative ability of poets or even politicians. In lines 83f. we are told that the Muses would 'pour sweet dew upon his tongue' of any king that Zeus favoured and from his lips would 'flow honeyed words'. This reference is sufficient to illustrate the significant discrepancies between the two poets, since the Muses would only ever influence the bard in the Homeric epics.

A further problem that is presented is the differences between Hesiod's songs and the ones he ascribes to the Muses. The early differentiation in the *Theogony* between Olympian Muses (*Th.* 36f.) and Heliconian Muses (*Th.* 1) has resulted in a number of interpretations that are important to mention in passing in order to understand fully the essential differences in Hesiod's handling of the Muses as opposed to Homer's. The Heliconian/Olympian Muse differentiation may support the interpretation that the *Theogony* is not a unified composition, which consequently casts doubts on Hesiod's authorship of the proem. Another interpretation defines lines 36-115 as typical of the hymnic structure commonly directed to the Muses, while lines 1-35 display a far more individualised poetic style.¹¹ Others have suggested that Hesiod is trying to reconcile a local cult that placed the Muses on Helicon with the epic tradition that located them on Olympus.¹²

This plurality of interpretations is vital to the comparison between the Homeric and Hesiodic Muses. Hesiod shows an unresolvable complexity in his work. Homer draws consistently on the epic oral tradition (and in many ways defines it for us). Hesiod's use of the same oral tradition as Homer is blended with an unexpected individuality. The Homeric Muse has more gravity as a religious figure, while the Hesiodic Muse is slightly more sacrilegious and playfully cheeky at times:

You rustic shepherds, shame: bellies you are,
Not men! We know enough to make up lies
Which are convincing, but we also have
The skill, when we've a mind, to speak the truth.

(*Th.* 26-28)

The Muses in the *Theogony* exert an influence on the narrative from the first line of the work and they indeed are the narrative motivation for the first 115 lines. This first section is devoted to song about the Muses and it is within this section that we find the major discrepancies between the Homeric and Hesiodic Muses. For these first 115 lines the Muses are presented as characters within the narrative plot and in line 114 they are invoked in the Homeric tradition. If the *Theogony* had been written in the Homeric tradition, it would have begun with line 114:

¹¹ P. Friedländer, 'Das Proömium von Hesiods *Theogonie*', in E. Heitsch, *Hesiod* (Darmstadt 1966) 277-94, esp. 291-93.

¹² W. W. Minton, 'The Proem-Hymn of Hesiod's *Theogony*', *TAPA* 101 (1970) 368f.; A. Kambylis, *Die Dichterweihe und ihre Symbolik: Untersuchungen zu Hesiodos, Kallimachos, Propertius, und Ennius* (Heidelberg 1965) 35-38.

Tell me these things, Olympian Muses, tell
 From the beginning, which first came to be.
 Chaos was first of all . . .

(*Th.* 114-16)

If we compare this with a Homeric invocation to the Muses we can see the similarities:

Tell me now, you Muses who have your homes on Olympos,
 who was first of the Achaians to win the bloody despoilment . . .
 First Telamonian Aias . . .

(*Il.* 14.508f., 511)

In these two passages, the use of the oral formula is almost identical. It is in the existence of the *Theogony's* proem and the aforementioned complexities inherent within it that we may come to the conclusion that Hesiod's *Theogony* is a work of a later date than the Homeric epics. If an analysis can work on this premise, the comparison of the treatment of the Muses becomes far more straightforward. Hesiod drew from the same oral tradition as Homer and possibly from the works of Homer himself (cf. *Th.* 91f.; *Od.* 8.171-73). It is possible to assert that any significant deviation from that tradition is to be understood either as a manifestation of the natural development of the genre or style or as a deliberate comment on that tradition itself. Furthermore, it is possible to extract from the Muse references evidence of both a stylistic development and a comment by Hesiod on the oral tradition itself.

Hesiod appears to be making a direct comment on the tradition of the Muses and its relationship to the oral poet. Hesiod's Muses state their ability to lie if they so desire (*Th.* 26-28). To illustrate his point Hesiod gives the Muses their own song, separate from his own. There exist between the two songs some significant differences and at times Hesiod corrects statements made by the Muses.¹³ Indeed, if we were to extract the Muse reference from the *Theogony* we would have, at least in Hesiod's mind, a more precise and truthful account of the *Theogony*. The Muses in the *Theogony* are used as a narrative device that virtually rejects the sacrosanct nature of the Homeric Muse. Where Homer cultivates the image of the powerful and omniscient Muses that guide him, Hesiod very subtly destroys that image. It is even possible to find the reason why Hesiod does this.

The poet/bard is always socially placed and this influences the way he uses the Muses. On the one hand he is dependent on them; on the other he has the power of their approval to stand up and command the attention of the audience. The audience, however, must share his sense of the Muses' authority. In the *Theogony* we find refer-

¹³ For a detailed discussion on the differences, see J. S. Clay, 'What the Muses Sang: *Theogony* 1-115', *GRBS* 29 (1988) 326f. Essential differences include the fact that Hesiod lists his *Theogony* from the beginning while the Muses list theirs backwards; Aphrodite's implied genealogy, according to the Muses, contradicts Hesiod's version, and in the case of Athene, the Muses do not clarify the relations between the named divinities.

ence to kings and other people favoured by Zeus having sweet dew poured on their tongues by the Muses and speaking honeyed words (*Th.* 81-97). Unlike the Homeric Muse, the Hesiodic Muse was no longer the sole 'property' of the bards. Kings and politicians were among the increasing number of people claiming the sanction of the Muses and perhaps it was discovered that the truth was not always spoken; hence Hesiod's subtle dig at the reliability and honesty of the old Homeric Muse.

Hesiod's *Theogony* does not present itself as thoroughly settled within the oral tradition but perhaps more in a literary tradition. The strongest evidence for this would have to be the complexity and subtlety in the *Theogony* that one would not find in a work that was derived purely from oral sources. Whether or not Hesiod was the author of the proem and irrespective of what exactly he intended by his reference to Olympus and Helicon as the home of the Muses, Hesiod creates a complex series of parallels and contrasts and a thoroughness that would not be possible in a purely orally derived work. The Muses of Hesiod, like those of Pindar, are far more realised as characters and as physical forms: there is a tangibility to the goddesses that seems in form to be more internalised in Homer. Hesiod also begins his *Theogony* with a peculiar plural: 'Let us begin to sing . . .'. The ancient oral poet sang alone and this use of 'us' appears as one more un-Homeric reference. Not only did the two poets conceive the figures of the Muses differently, but they also had essentially different aims in regard to the use of the Muse reference. It has been shown how Homer made use of the Muses on a religious (or spiritual) level as well as on a more practical level. In writing about the Muses, Hesiod does not seem to have an objective reality in mind, but rather seems to be playing with an established poetic convention. Both the Hesiodic and the Homeric Muses are providers of lists, catalogues and information; in fact, the *Theogony* was taught to Hesiod by the Muses (*Th.* 22). Homer makes extensive use of the Muses to claim the truth of what he sings, even if this is done indirectly (for example, through associating the Muses with the accurate account of the Trojan War by Demodokos). Hesiod traces the reliability of his song back to the fact that the Muses taught it to him. Yet a few lines before his Muses express their ability to lie when they want. The image of the Muse as a reliable standard for truth is destroyed and perhaps even subtly mocked by Hesiod.

The Muses in the Homeric epics and in the *Theogony* are mythologically the same goddesses, yet in many ways these two perceptions of the Muses are different. The natures of both have been shown to be motivated primarily by the nature of their transmission. The expectations placed on an oral performer moulded the Homeric Muse into a rigidly formulaic reference that responded in many ways to a performance mode of transmission. The Hesiodic Muse is perhaps more settled in a literary tradition, although it is orally derived. The Hesiodic Muse essentially comments on the orally derived notion of a divine invocation as being able to assure truth. Yet perhaps Hesiod is not so much critically judging as playing with a technique that is slowly shedding the bonds of oral poetry, and experimenting with a new-found literacy.

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
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