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

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REVIEW ARTICLES

EDITORIAL NOTE

Scholia features articles on a wide diversity of topics and from a variety of theoretical, interdisciplinary and philological perspectives. This diversity of topics and perspectives is reflected in this volume, which contains articles on the classical tradition (the modern refashioning of *The Odyssey* by a Caribbean playwright),[1] sculpture (how art historians can gain a deeper understanding of ancient Greek sculpture by looking to African parallels),[2] rhetoric and philosophy (Isocrates' use of Greek poetry and allusion to fragments of Heraclitus in the texts of two Greek historians),[3] tragedy (Euripides' method of the damp squib),[4] satire (Stoicism in Horace, *Satires* 2.3),[5] history (the political implications of military defeat during the principate),[6] epic (the relationship between an aphorism of Caesar and Lucan's text)[7] and textual criticism (conjectures on a late Greek medico-magical treatise).[8]

Scholia is the only journal in Africa that regularly features book reviews on a range of topics dealing with classical antiquity in the manner of established classics journals overseas. Under the reviews editorship of John Hilton, *Scholia* features in its Review Articles and Reviews sections an edited selection of reviews from *Scholia Reviews*. The reviews editor disseminates the pre-publication versions electronically via the internet; these electronic reviews can be accessed at *Scholia*'s world wide web site at http://www.und.ac.za/und/classics/schrev/welcomsr.html. This web site, which is currently managed by Adrian Ryan, now features all sections of the journal. Although only the abstracts of the articles are currently available, there are plans to make available the text of all articles in volumes 1-7 (1992-1998) within the next year.

In addition to the usual features, this volume contains a list of the articles that have appeared in *Scholia* 1-7 (1992-1998). These articles and those forthcoming in *Scholia* 8 (1999) have been authored by scholars and academics at universities and other institutions from eighteen countries in Africa, Europe, North America, South America, Australasia and Asia. Although there are no geographical restrictions upon

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[1] B. van Zyl Smit, 'Derek Walcott's *The Odyssey*: The Gates of Imagination Never Close' (pp. 3-16).

[2] P. A. Hannah, 'The Reality of Greek Male Nudity: Looking to African Parallels' (pp. 17-40).

[3] T. L. Papillon, 'Isocrates and the Greek Poetic Tradition' (pp. 41-61); A. V. Zadorojnyi, 'Two Reflections on Heraclitus' (pp. 62-71).

[4] W. Hift, 'Euripides and the Damp Squib' (pp. 72-81).

[5] R. P. Bond, 'Horace on Damasippus on Stertinius on . . .' (pp. 82-108).

[6] A. Cheung, 'The Political Implications of Imperial Military Defeat' (pp. 109-17).

[7] A. Erskine, 'Cato, Caesar and the Name of the Republic in Lucan, *Pharsalia* 2.297-303' (pp. 118-20).

[8] D. Bain, 'Eight Further Conjectures on the *Cyranides*' (pp. 121-25).

contributors, the editors are disposed to give preference to African contributions of a suitable standard. *Scholia* particularly welcomes submissions on classical antiquity and the classical tradition in Africa.

The B. X. de Wet Essay Editor, Aileen Bevis (University of Natal, Durban), wishes to bring to the attention of Heads of Departments, lecturers and students in Africa information about the essay competition. In 1999 the essays will be judged by a panel consisting of Richard Evans (University of South Africa), André Basson (Rand Afrikaans University) and Betine van Zyl Smit (University of Western Cape). The competition is open to undergraduate students every year and to Honours students in even-numbered years; in 1999 the competition therefore will be open to undergraduates only, although students currently in their Honours year may submit essays written during their undergraduate careers. The idea is that students should submit work done as part of their courses, but they may of course write specifically for the competition if they choose. The candidate whose paper is judged to be the best essay submitted to *Scholia* is awarded a prize of R250. Submissions should be sent by 30 June to Richard Evans, Department of Classics, University of South Africa, P. O. Box 392, Pretoria 0003, Republic of South Africa. Students from any university in Africa may submit entries. Essays may be in English or in another language such as Afrikaans, French or German and may deal with any area of classical studies. Papers should not ordinarily exceed 3 000 words in length. The author of the essay chosen for publication should be prepared to submit a computer-readable text and to edit it if so requested by the B. X. de Wet Essay Editor.

As for past volumes, the Editorial Committee wishes to express its gratitude to the Centre for Science Development and the Classical Association of South Africa for sponsoring *Scholia* and the B. X. de Wet Essay respectively. Naturally we encourage our readers to subscribe to *Scholia*; a subscription form is included at the back of this volume for this purpose.

William J. Dominik
Editor, *Scholia*

DEREK WALCOTT'S *THE ODYSSEY*: THE GATES OF IMAGINATION NEVER CLOSE[1]

Betine van Zyl Smit
Department of Latin, University of the Western Cape
Bellville 7535

Abstract. Derek Walcott's *The Odyssey* is discussed as an example of the refashioning of Homeric epic into a play that combines the old with the new. By incorporating elements from other works influenced by Homer and elements from the modern world, including his own Caribbean background, Walcott has created a drama that reflects the multiculturalism of the global world and testifies to the vibrancy of the classical tradition.

Homer's *Odyssey* is one of the best known and most influential works of literature in the world. It was composed in what we would regard as a small community.[2] Yet through nearly three thousand years its story of the heroic traveller Odysseus finding his way home in spite of many perils and obstacles has been translated and retold countless times and is familiar to many millions of people. In 1992 Odysseus was reincarnated once again, this time on stage in *The Odyssey* by Derek Walcott.[3] This version has subsequently been published. In this article I shall examine the way in which Walcott uses Homer's epic as a framework to create a new work which, because of its incorporation of elements from various cultures, reflects facets of the modern world with its global culture.

Modern dramatists who use ancient literary works as a basis for their plays usually have a particular theme in mind. A certain aspect of the model may thus come to dominate the new play.[4] In his dramatization of Homer's *Odyssey* Derek

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[1] Menelaus says these words in Derek Walcott's *The Odyssey: A Stage Version* (London 1993) 35. All references in this article are to this edition.

[2] This article does not deal with the perennial question of the identity of Homer and the method of composition of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. For a good indication of the controversy see the review article by H. Pelliccia, 'As Many Homers As You Please', *New York Review of Books* 64 (20 November 1997) 44-48.

[3] Walcott had previously drawn from Homeric epic in many of his poems and especially in his great 'epic' poem *Omeros* (London 1990). For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between *Omeros* and Homeric epic, see R. Whitaker, 'Derek Walcott's *Omeros* and the Classics', *Akroterion* 41 (1996) 93-102.

[4] A good example of this tendency is offered by the afterlife of Euripides' *Medea*. The Greek tragedy is so rich in nuance and subtle in characterization that it has been interpreted in countless diverse ways by scholars through the centuries and also has served as inspiration to numerous dramatists from Seneca to our own time. It is noteworthy, however, that the most

Walcott has avoided this pitfall of oversimplification and has given the adventures of his Odysseus a splendid resonance. The many facets of the ancient hero are apparent, while aspects and themes from many later cultures have been incorporated to create a play that mirrors 'many cultures co-existing in dialogue'.[5]

Walcott's background has given him roots in many languages and cultures. Born and brought up in Castries on the island of St. Lucia in what was then the British West Indies, he spoke English at home but was also fluent in the French *patois*, which was the lingua franca of the streets and the countryside.[6] Although his family was Methodist, he was educated by Roman Catholic laymen and Irish brothers at St Mary's College. His honours degree studies in English, French and Latin developed his enthusiasm for and knowledge of the western tradition in literature. He began to publish poetry from an unusually early age. Inevitably the young Walcott was torn between the two worlds of his experience. On the one side was his environment, on the other his schooling. The natural beauty of the islands, their colonial heritage including that of the native Caribbean, African and Indian inhabitants, was exciting, but against the intellectually intoxicating European literary tradition there was a risk that this patrimony might seem inferior. Indeed, as John Figueroa has remarked, 'There is little doubt that in his early days Walcott was much concerned in his poetry with themes of colour, discrimination and rejection, of being on the periphery'.[7] However, as he matured as an artist, Walcott seemed to resolve this conflict and succeeded in synthesizing these two worlds. It is this creative amalgamation of different cultures which finds expression in his stage version of the adventures of Odysseus.

Derek Walcott has written many plays and most of them were first staged in Port of Spain at the Trinidad Theatre Workshop, which he founded in 1959

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recent versions of this drama often present a one-sided view of the protagonist and thus flatten the many dimensions of the original. Thus, to cite a striking example, Jackie Crossland's *Collateral Damage: The Tragedy of Medea* (Vancouver 1992) is a feminist interpretation of the action that strives to exonerate Medea from the responsibility for the murder of her children. In the process, it seems to me, the characters are simplified to such an extent that the play does not have much impact.

[5] See S. Breslow, 'Derek Walcott: 1992 Nobel Laureate in Literature', *World Literature Today* 67 (1993) 271.

[6] Biographical information about Walcott was gathered from: S. P. Breslow [5]; S. Brown (ed.), *The Art of Derek Walcott* (Chester Springs 1991); R. D. Hamner *Derek Walcott* (New York 1993) and J. Figueroa, 'Derek Walcott—A Personal Memoir', *Kunapipi* 14 (1993) 82-89.

[7] Figueroa [6] 83.

and directed until 1977.[8] However, *The Odyssey: A Stage Version* was written for and first produced by the Royal Shakespeare Company in Stratford-upon-Avon in 1992. Like the Nobel Prize for Literature, which he received in the same year, this is proof that Walcott had long left the edge and moved right to the centre. As Stephen Breslow has remarked, 'If we are entering an era in which multiculturalism is our central ideology, Derek Walcott must be acclaimed as one of our greatest cultural leaders'.[9] Walcott transforms the Homeric epic into a play which not only echoes the classical past, but also deals with many aspects of the present and quotes some of the many intermediate variations of the story of Odysseus, so that the end-product is a rich palimpsest where past and present, old and modern, colonial and post-colonial, pagan and Christian, are layered.[10]

Homer's *Odyssey* has had a most active afterlife.[11] In addition to inspiring a multitude of poems and novels through the ages, it has formed the basis for a large number of stage versions among which are comedies, tragi-comedies, parodies, musicals, satirical dramas and tragedies.[12] Walcott has preferred the neutral term 'a stage version', which encompasses his two-act play, where elements of high drama, tragedy, comedy and musical drama combine. Modern playwrights who base their work on a classical myth that is treated in an extant ancient drama have a ready-made framework in which to adapt the classical myth. Walcott has, however, chosen as his raw material a lengthy Homeric epic. Stage production entails a limited time span and could not accommodate the full epic narrative. Some of the stories from Homer's *Odyssey* have been selected by Walcott and recast as dramatic episodes that are linked to provide a coherent whole.[13] As in Homer's epic the action does not proceed chronologically, but some scenes are flashbacks. The period covered is the same ten years from the capture of Troy to Odysseus' home-coming to Ithaca and his wife and son.

The bare outline of the play is pretty much pure Homer. A prologue introduces the theme. The first scene is at Troy where the victorious Greek leaders are preparing to depart. The next transfers to Ithaca ten years later.

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[8] See B. King, *Derek Walcott and West Indian Drama* (Oxford 1995).

[9] Breslow [5] 271.

[10] As is apparent, I am dealing with the text of Walcott's play, as I have not been able to see it in performance.

[11] For discussion of this phenomenon see W. B. Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme: A Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero*[2] (Oxford 1963); H. Bloom (ed.), *Odysseus/Ulysses* (New York 1991) and the introduction in G. Steiner (ed.), *Homer in English* (London 1996).

[12] For more detail see J. D. Reid, *The Oxford Guide to Classical Mythology in the Arts: 1330-1990's* (New York 1993) 726f.

[13] The first act has fourteen scenes while the second has six.

Telemachus is inspired by Athena as Mentes to depart on the voyage to consult Nestor and Menelaus. These visits occupy the next two scenes. Then there is a transition to the beach at Scheria where the shipwrecked Odysseus is met by Nausicaa. The remaining scenes of the first act proceed from Alcinous' palace to Odysseus' adventures with the Cyclops, Circe and his visit to the Underworld. Act two opens with Odysseus delirious on a raft. Ghosts of his drowned sailors steer him past the Sirens and Scylla and Charybdis until he is carried ashore on Ithaca. Here he makes his way, disguised as a beggar, from Eumaeus' house to the palace, where he defeats the suitors and is at last reunited with Penelope. The Homeric outline is clear, but it is in the fleshing out of the scenes and in the links between them that Walcott develops his own interpretation and also incorporates references to others who have made Odysseus their subject.

Walcott's main device to link the flashbacks into the unfolding action is his introduction of blind Billy Blue, who sings the prologue and assumes the Homeric bardic roles of Phemius among the Scherians and Demodocus in Ithaca.[14] Like the chorus of ancient tragedy, Billy Blue sometimes comments upon the dramatic action or prepares the audience for the following scene. Just as Billy Blue opens the play with his sung prologue, 'Gone sing 'bout that man because his stories please us . . .', he is there at the end to conclude the play, 'I sang of that man against whom the sea still rages . . .'. Another unifying thread throughout the play is the swallow. The bird, as in Homer, is associated with Athena, goddess of wisdom, who acts as protectress of the ingenious hero. The swallow thus represents Athena's watchful presence that guards and guides Odysseus home.[15] A third integrating factor is the sea—the sound of the sea and references to the sea. The sea is also a link between the Mediterranean islands and the West Indian islands. Billy Blue/Demodocus points out, 'The sea speaks the same language around the world's shores' (122). In the same scene Odysseus' name is also associated with the sea: 'His name sounded like hissing surf. Odysseus'. According to the stage directions, the sound of the surf should be heard at the beginning and at the end of the play .

Walcott has taken all the major characters from the Homeric *Odyssey*: Odysseus, Penelope, Telemachus, Eurycleia, Antinous, Eumaeus, Nestor,

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[14] Walcott uses a similar device in *Omeros*, where Homer is reincarnated in the blind singer 'Seven Seas', in a river griot and in a Sioux shaman (318f.); in this regard see Whitaker [3] 96.

[15] References to the swallow are found in the prologue. There the audience/reader is alerted to its importance. Its link with Odysseus is established in scene 1, while in scene 2 Telemachus takes the appearance and behaviour of a swallow as a sign that his father will return. There are numerous further such associations throughout the play with the swallow as indicating the return of the hero from Troy to Ithaca. They culminate in Billy Blue's final song 'And a house, happy for good, from a swallow's omen' (160).

Menelaus, Helen, Nausicaa, Alcinous, Eurylochus, Elpenor (whose *persona* here is derived from Vergil's Palinurus in book 5 of the *Aeneid* rather than from Homer), Circe and the Cyclops. Some of these characters have been modified considerably. Minor characters have been introduced, such as Thersites, who seems to be the loudmouth from book 2 of the *Iliad*. He represents the mercenary soldier who has no scruples about war and bloodshed and, in fact, cannot live without the prospect of battle. Odysseus' crew are given the modern Greek names of Stratis, Costa, Stavros and Tasso, thus turning them into Greek sailors who would not be unfamiliar in the modern world. The role of the gods has been significantly reduced. Athena is the only Olympian who takes part in the action. For instance, she takes over Hermes' part (*Odyssey* 10) in the episode with Circe.

While the overarching themes of Walcott's version are similar to those in Homer, the home-coming to the loyal wife, the coming of age of Telemachus, the survival of the patient and resourceful hero against all odds, there are additional themes which, through transformation of the ancient epic, cast new light on past and present and throw into relief affinities between them. These themes are political, religious and cultural, and will be discussed in that order. In the conclusion the theme of home-coming will be considered.

The political theme is most conspicuously generated by Odysseus' visit to the Cyclops. The Homeric Polyphemus is unquestionably a savagely cruel monster who has no scruple in satisfying his own appetite. Yet his life reveals planning and organization in the way he keeps his sheep and goats (*Od.* 9.216-49). Polyphemus' absolute control over his domain is guaranteed by his ability to seal the entrance to his cave with a huge rock, which no mortal can move. These different factors, savagery, organization and absolute control, are transferred to a different environment by Walcott. As in Homer, Odysseus' tale of the encounter with the Cyclops is told to the Scherians, but the introduction already signals a change. Odysseus announces, 'The future is where we begin' (59). Stories related in the epic normally refer to the past. Thus the reference to the future prompts Nausicaa to ask, 'Is this just a dream?' Odysseus responds ominously, 'No. A place where dreams are killed'.

The technical change from Alcinous' palace, where Odysseus is relating his adventure, to the Cyclops' territory is deftly managed while a martial chorus starts singing off-stage (60):

> To die for the eye is best, it's the greatest glory:
> Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.
> There is no I after the eye, no more history . . .

This is an appropriately military and at the same time sinister prelude to the presentation of a totalitarian regime which follows. The eye refers to the one-eyed Cyclops who is a tyrannical despot—hence 'to die for the eye is best'. The Cyclops represents the State. His ruthless suppression of individual dissent is suggested by the pun, 'There is no I after the eye'. An example of the fate of anyone who defies the authority of the state is provided by a character introduced by Walcott, a philosopher. He characterizes Greece in the paradoxical phrase, 'Philosophy's cradle, where thought is forbidden' (61). The specific reference to Greece and to 'the era of the grey colonels' (62) immediately evokes the military dictatorship in Greece from 1964 to 1974. However the total surveillance and control carry literary echoes from novels such as George Orwell's *1984* and those of authors such as Milan Kundera depicting life behind the Iron Curtain. Further elements of the Cyclops' state widen the application to other totalitarian states. Mention of 'the wall' (61) suggests East Berlin and the German Democratic Republic, while describing 'crowds of many thousands in the square' applauding 'tiny faces on the balcony. Those in front with the caps, braids and medals' as victims 'in what felt like a mass grave' (63) conjures up associations with the Nazi regime in Germany and with the states in the Soviet bloc—to name but a couple of examples.

Odysseus witnesses the rough arrest and removal of the philosopher whose name, Socrates Aristotle Lucretius, represents the accumulated philosophical legacy of ancient Greece and Rome under threat from the totalitarian state. Walcott's Cyclops disposes of patrolmen in sheepskin coats. He is known as 'The Great Shepherd'. This title inevitably carries connotations of a perverted Christ figure. Thus Walcott effectively turns Homeric elements into tools of state. Ordinary citizens are prepared to acquiesce in carrying out unjust and inhumane instructions. Parallels in the modern world are not far to seek. In the play examples of the reign of terror are the arrest and butchery of the philosopher and of Odysseus' men. They are served up for dinner in a gruesome scene. However, Odysseus manages to outwit and blind the Cyclops and to escape by means of the Homeric ruse of the false name 'Nobody'. As sirens moan and loudspeakers blare, 'NOBODY'S ESCAPED, NOBODY'S BLINDED THE EYE', Odysseus, symbol of resistance to oppression and injustice, shouts, 'Learn you bloody tyrants that men can still think!' (72)

The scenes with the Cyclops are not the only projection of Odyssean adventure into anachronism, although no other carries such a strong, overtly political message. The visit to Hades, which is conceived of as similar to Aeneas' visit to the underworld in book 6 of Vergil's *Aeneid*, is facilitated by Shango dancers and priests. As Odysseus descends to 'hell', as Circe roundly calls it (85), he encounters a turnstile. Walcott's underworld is called 'The

Underground'. It has all the appurtenances of modern underground railway systems: platforms, trains flashing by and even a blind, guitar-playing vagrant petitioning for alms, who turns out to be Billy Blue. This scene offers a wry satire upon the modern urban life to which millions are condemned every day.

These anachronistic motifs are part of the multicultural nature of Walcott's *Odyssey*. Other similarly anachronistic aspects contribute to the religious theme of the play. The Shango dancers and priests who lead Odysseus in the ritual that provides access to The Underground are unknown to classical mythology. Shango is a god of thunder originally worshipped among the Yoruba in Nigeria. Ogun is the Yoruba god of iron and war.[16] This cult is also practised in parts of the Caribbean. To the gods of Yoruba origin are added Erzulie, a god from Benin who is associated with love. Maman d'l'Eau is especially worshipped by fishermen. As her name indicates she is an aquatic deity.[17] The ritual and cult as it is to be performed in the play is practised in parts of the Caribbean. Significantly, however, in their chant they invoke their own as well as Greek deities (87f.):

> Shango
> Zeus
> Who see us
> Man go
> Name Odysseus
> Go down
> Go down
> Ogun
> Erzulie
> Go down to hell
> Sprinkle water
> Erzulie
> Athena
> Maman d'l'Eau
> River Daughter
> Shango
> Zeus
> All who see us.

Thus Walcott seems to suggest that different rituals and different gods are all in equivalent relationships to their human worshippers. Odysseus' adventures are not restricted to the Mediterranean, but the Caribbean islands accommodate them

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[16] See M. T. Drewal, *Yoruba Ritual, Performers, Play, Agency* (Bloomington 1992).

[17] See A. Pollak-Eltz, *Religiones Afroamericanas Hoy* (Caracas 1994).

too. This aspect of Walcott's *Odyssey* is a faint echo of the transformation of the Homeric epics against a Caribbean backdrop in Walcott's *Omeros* and calls to mind his description of Homer as 'a great Caribbean artist'.[18]

Another facet of the play which underlines the theme that all religions have equal validity is the moment at the beginning of act 2, scene 6 where Odysseus, patiently bearing his humiliation by the suitors, is described in terms associated with Christ (141):

> EURYMACHUS: Let's see if he's a god. Slip a spear in his side!
> CTESIPPUS: Spike his brow with pine needles. Make thorns his crown!
> POLYBUS: Just nail KING O' BEGGARS over his bleeding head!

This scene precedes Odysseus' revelation of his true nature through the test of the bow. The association of Odysseus with Christ goes back to early Christian literature.[19] There is no total identification of Odysseus with Christ suggested by this scene, but it serves to stress his willingness to undergo suffering in order to attain his goal. At the same time it is rich in association for those familiar with the Christian tradition in literature and art.

The third theme that runs through Walcott's play is that of the cultural role of poets and poetry. This theme is dominated by the importance attached to the function of the poet in society, whether modern society or Homeric society where the bard is the medium through whom the epic narrative is transmitted to the audience. In the Homeric context, Walcott has taken over Phemius and Demodocus from Homer's *Odyssey*. It is perhaps surprising that Walcott has exchanged their places. Billy Blue, as Phemius, opens act 1, scene 7, Alcinous' banquet, while Demodocus is the court poet at Ithaca. Billy Blue plays both these roles as well as his own analogous one as narrator. Robert Hamner's conclusion, that Walcott probably intends to suggest 'a commonality of poetic function, regardless of place and time',[20] seems correct. This centrality and the importance of poetry are also highlighted by Alcinous' courtiers telling Phemius that he could 'build a heavy-beamed poem' out of his tales which 'will ride time to unknown archipelagoes' (59). An association with Walcott himself and the archipelago where he was born and grew up seems to be suggested.

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[18] Quoted by J. A. Minkler, 'Helen's Calibans: A Study of Gender Hierarchy in Derek Walcott's *Omeros*', *World Literature Today* 67 (1993) 276 n. 13.

[19] See J. Pépin, 'The Platonic and Christian Ulysses', in Bloom [11] 228-48; Stanford [11] 281f.

[20] R. Hamner, '*The Odyssey*: Derek Walcott's Dramatization of Homer's *Odyssey*', *Ariel* 24 (1993) 103.

Further evidence of the centrality of the theme of the importance of poetry is found in the final scene of the play when Odysseus threatens to kill Demodocus/Billy Blue for presenting a false picture of the siege of Troy as glorious and heroic adventure instead of (151):

> Troy's mulch! Troy's rain! Wounds. Festering diseases!

Eumaeus intervenes with the words (151f.):

> He's a homeless wandering voice, Odysseus.
> Kill him and you stain the fountain of poetry.

Walcott is well known as a strong advocate of the use of verse in the modern theatre. He has chosen to write his version of *The Odyssey* in loosely structured dactylic verse. This underscores the idea of the power of poetry as medium. In a lecture to the Poetry Book Society in London in 1990 Walcott forcefully expressed these preferences, '[T]he diction in modern poetry in English, that is the private voice, the lyric or narrative poem in England or America, has created a power peculiar to our epoch: a massive advance in verse, equal in tone if not in vocabulary to the Elizabethans—and perhaps going beyond them even in metre, in verse, to a splendid colloquiality'. He concluded that much of modern poetry in English is 'dramatic' and 'totally speakable'.[21]

This conviction of Walcott's is borne out by his own plays that are mostly in verse. In his *Odyssey* he has a version of epic dactyls for the most part, but has not hesitated to break his lines into stichomythia to express rapid exchanges between characters. This is a technique established in drama since classical times and represents the colloquiality important to Walcott. A good example is provided by the conjugal bickering of Menelaus and Helen during Telemachus' visit to them in act 1, scene 4 (31):

> MENELAUS: Odysseus has spent ten years without coming home.
> HELEN: Well, at least he's travelling.
> MENELAUS: She's bored. She misses Troy.
> HELEN: I do *not* miss Troy.
> MENELAUS: Miss being its centre. Its cause.

Departures from the dactylic rhythm of epic occur also in the prose dialogue of act 2, scene 8, which effectively portrays the Cyclops' interrogation of Odysseus (64):

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[21] D. Walcott, 'The Poet in the Theatre', *Poetry Review* 80 (1990-91) 4-8.

CYCLOPS: Don't stare.
ODYSSEUS: Sorry.
CYCLOPS: What is your name?
ODYSSEUS: Nobody.
CYCLOPS: Where're you from?
ODYSSEUS: Nowhere.
CYCLOPS (*Nodding*): Where're you going?
ODYSSEUS: I don't know.
CYCLOPS: Nobody.
From nowhere.
Going where he doesn't know.
Normal.
No?

Further departures from epic metre occur in the calypso songs in Circe's brothel and in the songs of Billy Blue. Their metre may be compared to the lyric metres of the chorus in ancient drama.

Another aspect of Walcott's *Odyssey* that contributes to its multicultural nature is his use of language.[22] Breslow rightly spoke of 'heteroglottic multitexts' in his discussion of the award of the Nobel Prize to Walcott. As in his previous works, dramatic and poetic, *The Odyssey's* English comes from a range of countries and social environments. It is interspersed with words, phrases and expressions from various other languages. An analysis of some examples will show that this heteroglottic or multilingual aspect of the play is an important part of its many cultural dimensions. This aspect would be even more noticeable in a production, where different accents and pronunciation would highlight different kinds of English, for instance American or Caribbean.

As I have mentioned above, Walcott has a strong preference for colloquial English and that is the predominant dialect of *The Odyssey*. Yet against this there are passages where he seems to 'Homerize' English.[23] This is especially evident in his creation of composite epithets that evoke those found in the Homeric epics, for instance 'sea-smart' Odysseus in the prologue (1). The neologism 'sea-smart' functions on two levels. On the first level it designates Walcott's hero and his knowledge and experience of the sea, and on the second it evokes the Homeric epic and thus links this Odysseus to his famous predecessor. Some of these epithets are descriptive, for example 'smoke-blue' (1) islands, while others

[22] For succinct and illuminating comment on Walcott's use of English in *Omeros*, see Whitaker [3] 101 with n. 16.

[23] I have adopted this term from Richard Ellmann, who uses it in 'Joyce and Homer', in Bloom [11] 214-27, where he discusses the same technique employed by James Joyce in his novel *Ulysses*.

introduce a playful tension with well established Homeric epithets, for example, the renowned 'fleet-footed' Achilles becomes 'slow-striding'(1). Walcott does not resist giving an airing to one of the most famous of these formulaic phrases, 'the wine-dark sea', but adds his own precision, 'veined aquamarine' (34). These composite adjectives form part of the epic backbone of the play. Indeed Walcott stresses his hero's links with his predecessor by quoting three of the original Greek composite epithets. When Odysseus has reached Ithaca and is coming to realize that his travails are nearly over, he hears the surf sighing, 'Polumechanos, polutlas, polumetis, Odysseus' (110). These are three of the epithets most commonly applied to him by Homer, 'Odysseus full of resources, much-enduring, of many counsels'. This reminder of his heroic reputation spurs him on to carry through to the end.

Walcott makes further use of transliterated Greek in order to establish himself as a direct heir to Homer.[24] The fifth line of the prologue (*Andra moi ennepe mousa polutropon hos mala polla*, 'Tell me, o muse, of the man of many devices, who many evils . . .') is the opening line of Homer's epic and needs the second line of the Greek to complete it syntactically. By leaving it incomplete and adding his own lines Walcott thus signals that he is the poet of this *Odyssey*. A whimsical snatch of Greek is heard when a chorus of oarsmen chanting off-stage counts, 'Ayis! Do-o! Trayis! Tetra! Pente! Ex!' (22). This suggests Telemachus being rowed off on his visit to Nestor.

Although not in Greek, there are further echoes of Homeric language in the play. Walcott adopts many words and phrases as they are usually rendered in English translations of the Greek epic, for instance 'black ship' (29), 'Troy's black plain' (29), 'and the ways darkened' (28). These expressions offer another link with the epic and serve to elevate the tone of the passages in which they occur.

By means of apt quotation from Latin and Russian, Walcott implicates the regime of the Cyclops in imperialistic designs. The troops of the Cyclops sing (60):

> 'To die for the eye is best, it's the greatest glory:
> Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.'

This unthinking obedience to orders is the antithesis of the free spirit that Odysseus embodies and the quotation of the Latin tag, which has so often been misused by authoritarian governments, evokes the Roman empire with its military

[24] Compare Joyce's use of the similar technique 'epi oinopa ponton' ('on the wine-dark sea'), quoted in *Ulysses* as one of the many borrowings from other writers and languages.

discipline. In the same scene the Soviet empire is briefly brought to mind when the Cyclops in his interrogation of Odysseus makes use of the Russian negative 'Nyet'. (64)

The standard of the English in which most of the play is written ranges from an elevated poetic register through coarse colloquialisms, Americanisms, Caribbean English to the *patois* used by the uneducated in the West Indies. The elevated language is suited to epic moments such as the opening scene, where the Greek leaders are preparing to sail from the Trojan shore (2):

> AGAMEMNON: Pile our worn weapons on this remembering cairn.
> NESTOR: Till salt air rusts them, till they're wrapped in veils of sand.
> MENELAUS: Turn the gaping beaks of our fleet homeward again.

In the same scene, however, the coarse nature of Thersites is indicated by his crude language: 'I'd piss on the populace' (6) is his reaction to Odysseus' invitation to him to join him in a life of peace on Ithaca.

Americanisms are occasionally employed to happy effect. For instance Alcinous remarks of Nausicaa, who is portrayed as rather precocious: 'She's a smart girl but a bit too fresh for her age' (59). When Odysseus boasts to Demodocus that he has put out a giant's eye, the bard ripostes with, 'Man, you must be one mean mother' (122). The loutish Arnaeus, who is the reincarnation of the Cyclops at the palace on Ithaca, reacts to Odysseus' enquiries about his past with 'None of your goddamned business' (127). He empties slop over Odysseus with the remark 'Enjoy!' (128). This seems like sly satire of American commercial imperialism.

Caribbean English occurs frequently in the songs of Billy Blue and also in the calypsos sung in Circe's domain, for instance (80):

> No, no, doux-doux
> I have a message for you
> As sweet as you are
> And you sweeter than guava jam
> I have a wife at home
> And she begging me come
> And I saving it all for she.

Eurycleia, the old nurse of Odysseus and also of Telemachus, speaks the *patois* of the ordinary people in the Caribbean: 'Lord, bird t'ief this boy's wits' (7) and 'Nancy stories me tell you and Hodysseus'(8). This is in keeping with her station in life, but also reflects her association with the intimate sphere of home. Walcott may be a citizen of the world and master of many varieties of English, but he

reserves these humble colloquial tones from his own home country for the intimate circle of his hero's home.

The theme of home-coming is handled by Walcott in an innovative way. Menelaus tells Telemachus, 'We earn home, like everything else' (29). This provides a leitmotif and rationale for Odysseus' struggles. A similar realism comes to the fore when Odysseus (still anonymous) tells the Scherians about the adventures and longings of Odysseus. His home is 'his own rock, too stony for horses' (57) and yet he prefers it to an immortal life with Calypso or all the wealth and luxury that life with Nausicaa would offer. When he is on the raft singing deliriously, he has only one clear idea, that he is far away from home. After he has reached Ithaca, the full complexity of being home is revealed. It entails being recognized by members of his family and at last being free to relax his guard and assume his proper name and place. This is not a simple process. A different set of obstacles has to be surmounted. Walcott broaches this idea through the technique of dramatic irony. When Telemachus first meets his father and does not recognize him, they have the following exchange (129f.):

> ODYSSEUS: And where're you from, young man?
> TELEMACHUS: I'm from where everybody comes from. From my home.
> ODYSSEUS: And where's that?' I said, 'Where is that?'
> TELEMACHUS: Look, man, it's late.
> ODYSSEUS: It's never too late, youngster.
> *(Silence)*
> TELEMACHUS: So, where are you from?
> ODYSSEUS: From home as well.
> TELEMACHUS: Then we're both from the same place. Great.

However, finally, after the suitors have been defeated and he has been recognized by his faithful wife, Penelope, Athena tells Odysseus, 'The harbour of home is what your wanderings mean' (159). Odysseus had to undergo all the hardships and undertake almost superhuman tasks in order to come to a proper understanding of what it means to be home. Home means shelter, safety and serenity. This is well established in the ancient epic too, but at the same time, the epic celebrates warfare. In contrast, war, and the glory of war are sharply demystified in the play. The futility of war is suggested from the first scene where the Greek leaders are preparing to depart from the Trojan shore. There is no atmosphere of triumph, but a bleak desolation, captured in lines like this one: 'The bones of our comrades rattle like dice on this shore' (7). The devastation caused by ruthless militarism is stressed in the episode with the Cyclops, but the strongest condemnation of war and violence is reserved for the final scene. Odysseus loses his mind for a time after killing the suitors and thinks he is back

at Troy again. This time he refuses to fight. In this way the hollowness and insanity of war are underlined. Walcott's Penelope prevents further bloodshed when she refuses to let the disloyal female servants be hanged. By this departure from Homeric precedent Walcott indicates that such punishment is no longer acceptable in the modern world. Odysseus' home has also come to stand for civilization as it is understood in the twentieth-century western world.

Walcott thus makes use of the mythic material from the ancient epic poem not to idealize, but to depict a human reality which includes violence and bloodthirsty vengefulness, even in the hero known for his patience, prudence and restraint. In the end it is clear that a life of order is to be preferred. The last line of the play expresses gratitude for peace. Walcott's *Odyssey* successfully combines ingredients from the ancient world and the late twentieth century, elements from the cultures of the colonizers and the colonized, in a multicultural masterpiece.

THE REALITY OF GREEK MALE NUDITY: LOOKING TO AFRICAN PARALLELS[1]

Patricia A. Hannah
Department of Classics, University of Otago
Dunedin 9015, New Zealand

Abstract. The male nude, especially in classical sculpture, has often been studied in terms of 'ideal beauty' and 'heroic nudity'. By re-examining mundane artistic representations and looking to African parallels, one can gain a less Victorian and deeper understanding of ancient Greek society in the Archaic and Classical periods. Men were portrayed in art not artificially undressed, but realistically in a (semi-) naked, or rather oiled, state.

Christoph Clairmont recently set out a very persuasive case for seeing the nakedness and semi-nakedness of Greek males represented on Classical Attic tombstones as an accurate representation of their real-life appearance.[2] By concentrating on this particular body of evidence, he was able to argue convincingly against the concepts of 'ideal' and 'heroic' nudity which have been promoted by both classical scholars and art historians.[3] This article offers further support to Clairmont's interpretation of the artistic representations.

In the first part, the focus is primarily on vase-painting instead of sculpture. It can be argued that Attic vases, especially those in red-figure, and especially when they represent daily-life scenes, constitute a down-to-earth medium on which the craftspeople regularly present a fair reflection of their world and clothing.[4] In the second, attention will turn to a far-removed culture and time, namely that of East Africa in the recent past and present. The point

[1] An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 'Bodies in Question' symposium at Auckland University. I am grateful for the advice and comments offered by colleagues and especially by Emerita Prof. A. Thornton. Special thanks go to Robert Hannah for his continuing support and encouragement.

[2] C. W. Clairmont, *Classical Attic Tombstones: Introduction* (Kilchberg 1993) 30f., 137-59.

[3] See, e.g., K. Herzog, *Die Gestalt des Menschen in der Kunst und im Spiegel der Wissenschaft* (Darmstadt 1990); N. Himmelmann, *Ideale Nacktheit in der Griechischen Kunst* (Berlin/New York 1990).

[4] For the opposite view, that it would be absurd to interpret the workers' nakedness as real and that it is an artistic convention, see N. Himmelmann, *Realistische Themen in der Griechischen Kunst der Archaischen und Klassischen Zeit* (Berlin/New York 1994) *passim*, esp. 37-39.

here is not that the apparent similarities in male dress between the ancient Athenians and modern Africans suggest identical attitudes to nakedness, though in fact they may be quite close. Rather it is hoped that, by observing living people in a contemporary culture wearing loosely draped clothes, more classical scholars may come to view figures in white marble and on black- and red-figure vases differently. By exploring and accepting the possibility that such figured scenes are images honestly drawn from a real world, they may come to visualise a different physical reality for ancient Athens. In short, they may become more open to the idea that Greek men, who are still widely considered to be the founders of the European tradition of civilisation, were nevertheless content to go about in their ordinary lives wearing a minimum of clothing and a coating of perfumed oil.

1. The Evidence of the Vase-paintings

If one accepts that vase-paintings reproduce not only the desired artistic image but also the real cultural environment of Athens in a consistent way, then a few representative examples, chosen for their clear and accessible illustrations, may be taken to demonstrate how the Athenians normally dressed.[5] The actual arrangement of the folds on real bodies may well have lacked the full aesthetic impact achieved by some artists, but the picture presented is generally reliable and explicable.

On a Late Archaic belly amphora[6] the Kleophrades Painter depicted two naked boxers with their trainer who is identified by his cleft stick. This older, bearded man wears a long cloak, the *himation*, which is simply a rectangular length of material draped around his body. One end hangs down his left side at

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[5] The terminology here has been limited to the basic words for a long and short cloak and two types of tunic as they are currently recognised in standard commentaries on Greek art. The ancient literary and epigraphic evidence betrays the existence of a wider Greek terminology which has not yet been definitively identified in the artistic evidence. Cf. J. Kirchner (ed.), *Inscriptiones Graecae* editio minor 2-3 part 2.1 (Berlin 1927) 1514, 1524 for textile dedications to Artemis, and L. M. Stone, *Costume in Aristophanic Poetry* (New York 1981) 155-81 for Aristophanes' use of many terms for male items, for example, *himation* (ἱμάτιον), *chlaina* (χλαῖνα), *tribon* (τρίβων), *chlanis* (χλανίς), *sisura* (σισύρα), *diphthera* (διφθέρα), *katonake* (κατωνάκη), *ledarion* (ληδάριον), *kaunakes* (καυνάκης), *spolas* (σπολάς), *chlamys* (χλαμύς), *chiton* (χιτών), *exomis* (ἐξωμίς), *batrachis* (βατραχίς), *halourgis* (ἁλουργίς) and *phoinikis* (φοινικίς).

[6] Munich, Staatliche Antikensammlungen 2305: J. D. Beazley, *Attic Red-figure Vase-painters*^{2} (Oxford 1963) 182.4, 1631 (hereafter *ARV*^{2}); J. D. Beazley, *Paralipomena* (Oxford 1971) 340 (hereafter *Para.*); T. H. Carpenter, *Beazley Addenda*^{2} (Oxford 1989) 186 (hereafter *Addenda*^{2}); R. Lullies, *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum* 4 (Munich 1956) pls. 173.2, 174.2.

the front. The material is then taken over his left shoulder, crosses his back, is passed under his right arm and finally draped over his left forearm. This is the sole garment for men of all ages, draped in the commonest of a variety of ways.

On a slightly earlier *hydria*[7] attributed to Phintias a music lesson is depicted. The bearded man standing at the left wears his *himation* slightly differently, for he has thrown one end over each shoulder, and one realises that the centre front of his body is not really covered by it at all.

In fact, even on important public occasions this cloak on its own represents perfectly respectable dress for young and old men, and the evidence from relief sculpture bears this out. There is no suggestion of a tunic always being worn underneath, and one becomes accustomed to seeing a large part of the naked male torso. The material was kept in place without the aid of pins or a belt, and practical experience with reproductions indicates that it must have required frequent adjustment in the course of a day. There is no doubt that sudden, involuntary movement would have caused the *himation* to slip and expose more of the body. On one well-known and striking slab of the Parthenon Frieze,[8] for example, the position of the cloak helps us to realise that one of the marshalls has been surprised by the chariot-horses coming up quickly behind him. Drunkenness also leads to less care being taken in the wearing of the *himation*, as in a Late Archaic scene of revellers on the outside of a cup by the Brygos Painter.[9]

A shorter cloak, a *chlamys*, was worn usually by active young men when travelling, hunting or riding. It was pinned by a brooch at the neck or more usually on the right shoulder and looks rather like a poncho, but it left the right side (or more) of the torso free, as can be seen, for example, on an *oinochoe* by the Shuvalov Painter.[10] It is not clear whether this scene is one of departure or home-coming, but in either case there is no suggestion of the man's being partially or improperly dressed in the presence of the woman.

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[7] Munich, Staatliche Antikensammlungen 2421, late sixth century: *ARV*^{2} 23.7, 1620; *Para.* 323; *Addenda*^{2} 155; J. Boardman, *Athenian Red Figure Vases: The Archaic Period* (London 1975) fig. 38.2.

[8] Athens, Akropolis Museum, Parthenon Frieze North XXIII 65 (formerly XVII 58), *ca.* 438 BC: J. Boardman, *The Parthenon and Its Sculptures* (London 1985) pl. 71 (cf. North XI 44).

[9] Würzburg, Martin-von-Wagner Museum 479: *ARV*^{2} 372.32, 1649; *Para.* 366f.; *Addenda*^{2} 225; P. E. Arias, M. Hirmer, B. B. Shefton, *A History of Greek Vase Painting* (London 1962) pl. 138.

[10] Dunedin, Otago Museum E 54.80, *ca.* 440-435 BC: *ARV*^{2} 1206.6; *Addenda*^{2} 344; A. Lezzi-Hafter, *Der Schuwalow Maler* 2 (Mainz 1976) pls. 81c-d.

Sometimes a short tunic, a *chiton* or *chitoniskos*, was worn underneath the *chlamys* as by a hunter on a *lekythos* by the Pan Painter,[11] but it clearly did not have to be. In fact, this tunic only rarely appears as the sole garment for mortal men and is most commonly seen underneath body-armour, when it was worn presumably for extra comfort, as on a departing hoplite on a *stamnos* by the Achilles Painter.[12]

In its longer, ankle- or floor-length version the *chiton* is a very special garment for men (while normal for women). If it is worn on its own and/or highly patterned, it may serve to characterise men who are fulfilling special roles like musicians, charioteers and priests: such as a *kitharode* on a *pelike* attributed to the Leagros Group;[13] a charioteer on a Panathenaic amphora of the late fifth century;[14] and a priest at an altar in the tondo of a fragmentary *kylix* by Makron.[15] Occasionally it is worn by apparently ordinary men, in which case, when combined with the long cloak, it seems to signify a man of greater age, one who requires to be more covered up, whether against the cold or because of a flabbier, less attractive body. At the departure of the hoplite on the *stamnos* by the Achilles Painter mentioned above,[16] the bearded man at the left (presumably the father) is dressed in both the long tunic and cloak.[17]

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[11] Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 13.198, *ca.* 470 BC: *ARV*^{2} 557.113, 1659; *Para.* 387; *Addenda*^{2} 259; Arias, Hirmer, Shefton [9] pl. 164. Even if this hunter may be interpreted as Kephalos or another figure from mythology, his dress and equipment are the same as those of ordinary men.

[12] London, British Museum E 448, *ca.* 450 BC: *ARV*^{2} 992.65, 1661, 1677; *Para.* 437; *Addenda*^{2} 311f.; J. Boardman, 'Greek Art and Architecture', in J. Boardman, J. Griffin and O. Murray (edd.), *The Oxford History of the Classical World: Greece and the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 1988) 137.

[13] Kassel, Staatliche Kunstsammlungen T 675, *ca.* 500 BC: J. D. Beazley, *Attic Black-figure Vase-painters* (Oxford 1956) 376.223 *bis* (hereafter *ABV*); *Para.* 167; *Addenda*^{2} 100; J. Neils *et al.*, *Goddess and Polis: The Panathenaic Festival in Ancient Athens* (Princeton 1992) 69 fig. 47.

[14] London, British Museum 1866.4-15.249 (B 606): *ABV* 411.3; *Para.* 177; *Addenda*^{2} 107; Arias, Hirmer, Shefton [9] pl. 81.

[15] Palermo, Museo Nazionale V 661 a, *ca.* 500-480 BC: *ARV*^{2} 472.210, 1654; *Addenda*^{2} 246; J. Marconi Bovio, *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum* 1 (Rome 1938) pl. 14.1.

[16] See above, n. 12.

[17] The clothing worn by Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae* is probably not this *chiton*. At 821-59 Dionysos plans to disguise Pentheus as a woman by dressing him in a floor-length, fine linen garment (πέπλοι) with a wig and headdress (μίτρα). Pentheus' reaction is very hesitant. To wear such an item ἀμφὶ χρωτί/χρῶτ' ('close to the skin' or 'around the body', 821, 830) amounts to more than cross-dressing and equates with a sex-change (822f., 855), causing him to feel αἰδώς ('shame', 828) and to be unable to comply: οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην θῆλυν ἐνδῦναι

Sometimes a narrow strap is found over the shoulder on this tunic, but it is commoner on a version of the shorter tunic which is called an *exomis* because it leaves one shoulder free. Whenever a man needed to have plenty of freedom of movement and not to be hampered by his clothes, the choice of *exomis* was appropriate, and it came to be associated with workers like the potters and vase-painters themselves. On a bell-crater attributed to the Komaris Painter[18] the seated worker at the left wears an *exomis*.

Indeed, totally naked workers are extremely common on the Athenian vases. One finds, for example, ploughmen,[19] olive harvesters,[20] black-

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στολήν ('I couldn't put on a woman's dress', 836). When he reappears on stage dressed as a maenad, his lack of familiarity with his long tunic and the requisite feminine gestures is emphasised (925-44). The plural forms of πέπλος occur three times (821, 833, 935) with only the final reference spoken by Pentheus in the singular (938). The tragedians seem to use this word generically as 'garment(s)' or 'robe(s)' and this may be its meaning here, but the equally vague alternative for a 'dress' or 'robe', στολήν, appears in 828, 830, 836, 852, with θῆλυν ('female') each time except in 830. In modern archaeological terms the *peplos* (often called 'the Doric *peplos*') is a particular type of female garment: a very large rectangle of woollen material, folded over along one long side to create a double layer of variable depth (an overfold), wrapped around the body, pinned on the shoulders and belted at the waist above or below the overfold. For contemporary (late fifth century) examples, see the *peploi* worn by Peitho (Persuasion) and Helene on an *oinochoe* attributed to an artist connected with the Heimarmene Painter: Vatican City, Museo Gregoriano Etrusco Vaticano inv. 16535: *ARV*^{2} 1173; *Para.* 460; *Addenda*^{2} 339; J. Boardman, *Athenian Red Figure Vases: The Classical Period* (London 1989) fig. 309. It seems very likely that for maximum dramatic effect Euripides is referring specifically to this form of woman's tunic, rather than the unisex *chiton*. With the exception of some fourth-century *kitharodes* and especially the Apollo Patroos (*ca.* 340-330 BC), male figures are not depicted wearing the *peplos* in the Classical period: cf. O. Palagia, *Euphranor* (Leiden 1980) 18.

[18] Oxford, Ashmolean Museum G 287 (V 526), *ca.* 430 BC: *ARV*^{2} 1064.3; *Para.* 446; *Addenda*^{2} 324; B. A. Sparkes, *The Red and the Black* (London 1996) fig. III: 1. See A. Seeberg, '*Epoiesen, Egrapsen*, and the Organization of the Vase Trade', *JHS* 114 (1994) 162-64, for the suggestion that the two figures at the right wearing the *chlamys* over their shoulders and down their backs may not actually be workers, but their garment is all the same pushed out of the way to facilitate movement.

[19] E.g., on a band cup, Paris, Louvre Museum, *ca.* 530 BC: G. A. Christopoulos (ed.), *The Archaic Period* (Athens 1975) 47.

[20] E.g., on neck-amphoras by the Antimenes Painter, *ca.* 520-510 BC, London, British Museum 1837.6-9.42 (B 226): *ABV* 273.116; *Para.* 119; *Addenda*^{2} 71; J. Boardman, *Athenian Black Figure Vases* (London 1974) fig. 186 and Berlin, Staatliche Museen 1855: *ABV* 270.50; *Addenda*^{2} 70; M. H. Jameson, C. N. Runnels and T. H. van Andel, *A Greek Countryside: The Southern Argolid from Prehistory to the Present Day* (Stanford 1994) 269 fig. 5.3 (here two bearded men wear simple goatskins on their backs, knotted by the legs at their shoulders and hips).

smiths,[21] potters,[22] a sculptor[23] and a helmet-maker.[24] In a foundry scene on the outside of the Late Archaic name-vase of the Foundry Painter,[25] those workers closest to the heat of the furnace are naked, while the man who is working on a statue at the right wears a short piece of material, probably his *chlamys*, tucked around his hips. Another worker, usually identified as a carpenter, is similarly dressed in the tondo of a late sixth-century *kylix* attributed to the Carpenter Painter,[26] and here it is clear that the material wrapped loosely around his lower abdomen cannot be worn for the sake of modesty for it leaves the genitals exposed. The workers, in fact, exhibit the same range of clothing as other men, and when a job was dirty and sweaty enough, they did not hesitate to strip off completely.[27] After all, there was no modern soap or detergent available for easy washing of these valuable, home-made items.[28]

Athletic exercise was not, therefore, the only pursuit for which nakedness was acceptable, and the choice of dress depended, not surprisingly, upon the social context, the age, occupation and status of the wearer. Certainly some of the naked workers will have been slaves and not citizens, but their identification cannot automatically be assumed from their appearance.[29] For even the citizen-

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[21] E.g., on an unattributed neck-amphora, Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 01.8035, *ca.* 520-510 BC: H. Hoffmann, *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum* 1 (Boston 1973) pl. 37.2.

[22] E.g., on an unattributed calyx-crater, Caltagirone, Museo della Ceramica 961, *ca.* 460 BC: Neils [13] 21 fig. 7.

[23] E.g., in the tondo of a *kylix* by Epiktetos, Copenhagen, National Museum 119, late sixth century BC: *ARV*^{2} 75.59, 1623; *Para.* 328; *Addenda*^{2} 168; Boardman [7] fig. 74.

[24] E.g., on a *pyxis* lid by the Thaliarchos Painter, Paris, Petit Palais 382, late sixth century BC: *ARV*^{2} 81.1; *Addenda*^{2} 169; Boardman [7] fig. 81.

[25] Berlin, Antikenmuseum 2294: *ARV*^{2} 400.1, 1651, 1706; *Para.* 370; *Addenda*^{2} 230; Boardman [7] fig. 262.2f.

[26] London, British Museum 1836.1-24.231 (E 23): *ARV*^{2} 179.1; *Para.* 339; *Addenda*^{2} 185; Boardman [7] fig. 124.

[27] Cf. Hes. *Op.* 391f. and Ar. *Lys.* 1173 for farming naked (the latter with sexual connotations).

[28] True soap was invented later by the Arabs: E. T. Morris, *Fragrance: The Story of Perfume from Cleopatra to Chanel* (New York 1984) 6.

[29] Cf. Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.10-12 for the difficulty in distinguishing slaves, metics and citizens by their dress and appearance at Athens. The philosopher Aristotle (*Pol.* 1254b 27-34) could propose that Nature intended the bodies of free men and slaves to be distinguishable, but he was aware that it did not always turn out that way: slaves should be strong for forced employment, free citizens upright and unfit for such work. Stone [5] 282-85 discusses the possibilities for identifying slave characters on stage. Clairmont [2] 143 and 147 respectively views the presence of one or other cloak as an identifier of civic status: 'Lyseas, the priest, in civic garb, a large *himation* which fully envelops his body' and 'I conceive of these garments

soldiers follow this custom,[30] so much so that many modern commentators have felt it necessary to explain their nakedness as 'artistic', 'ideal' or 'heroic nudity'.[31] But in a single fight, whether mythological or not, one soldier may be naked, another fully armed and others wrapped in the various cloaks or tunics which we have seen to be ordinary, contemporary clothes, for these artists had no

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as civic dress eventually worn in public surroundings where females were also likely to be present'. Contrast A. G. Geddes, 'Rags and Riches: The Costume of Athenian Men in the Fifth Century', *CQ* 37 (1987) 307-31, esp. 326f.: 'The arrangement of the *himation* indicated good breeding, but the garment itself revealed nothing. So far from suggesting rank or prestige, the everyday clothes of poor Athenians were the same sort of clothes that slaves wore. . . . Sometimes a slave occupation can be detected in vase painting, like a *paidagogos* carrying a boy's lyre. But he is always wearing a *himation* like everyone else'. Geddes explains the simplicity of Athenian clothing in the fifth century as a symbol sending social, political and economic messages of leisure, fitness, equality and like-mindedness (*homonoia*).

[30] Plato states in the *Republic* (5.452d) that it was found to be practically and rationally better to do physical exercises without the encumbrance of any clothing at all. It may have seemed an easy and logical step to extend this attitude to other areas, where similar vigorous activity was required, for example in the workshop and on the battlefield. One notes the association made by Xenophon's Sokrates between physical fitness and personal survival/national success in war (Xen. *Mem.* 3.12, 3.5.15). Plato's Nikias too points out how gymnastic exercises and the more exhausting military training develop the body (Pl. *La.* 181e). If the men who kept fit and active in civilian life were considered to have a better chance of winning on the battlefield, the equation of the two activities (sport and war) in the ancient mind is not far-fetched.

[31] E.g., R. M. Cook, *Greek Art* (London 1972) 21: 'male soldiers are often represented naked except for helmet and shield—a practical absurdity but a useful convention for the ideal artist'. L. P. Wilkinson, *Classical Attitudes to Modern Issues* (London 1979) 89: 'Warriors are sometimes represented as exposed in the parts below their cuirass. Exposure for either magic, i.e. apotropaic, purposes or alternatively for psychological shock effect, is not unknown among primitive warriors. It is conceivable that even in seventh- and sixth-century Greece some men fought in this guise, without the undertunic worn in Homeric times, though it seems unlikely. But when it comes to warriors depicted as fighting in only a helmet and shield, or to legendary heroes grappling naked with enemies, it is clear that artistic idealisation has taken over'. B. S. Ridgway, *Fifth Century Styles in Greek Sculpture* (Princeton 1981) 13: 'Heroic quality is suggested by nakedness, especially in battle contexts where armor is unrealistically limited to token elements'. Geddes [29] 308: 'There are some difficulties in using drawing and sculpture as evidence for clothes, for example the conventional preference for nudity. I assume that Greek warriors never went into battle, as they are sometimes portrayed in art, wearing only their helmets and shields. But in spite of these conventions Athenian art is a precise and detailed record of clothes'. Contrast L. Bonfante, 'Nudity as a Costume in Classical Art', *AJA* 93 (1989) 543-70, esp. 556: 'No longer does it [nudity] mean vulnerability; it means, on the contrary, the readiness to stand up and fight even though one knew one was vulnerable. It has to do with military valor which requires risking one's life, being fully exposed'.

sense of 'period dress'. For example, in several Early Classical red-figure Amazonomachies, like the one by an artist near the Penthesilea Painter on a calyx-crater in Bologna,[32] the dress and equipment of both the male and the female combatants is drawn from the everyday stock. Two Greeks are depicted here as 'ideal nudes', another in a muscle-corselet and *chiton*, a fourth in a short, patterned skirt with his *chlamys* in a roll around his chest, and two others in a linen-corselet and *chiton*, one with a rolled *chlamys*. Why should the painter offer us so much variety in the clothing of figures who are all heroes? It cannot be to heroise or idealise only the two of them who are 'nude'.

Two unexceptional *oinochoai* by the Shuvalov Painter can help to confirm this point about the reliable portrayal of contemporary soldiers. On one a fight between two Greeks and a 'Persian' is depicted.[33] The 'Persian' is easily recognisable as an Eastern opponent from his lavishly detailed, all-enveloping costume, while his beard removes any doubt about his possibly being an Amazon. The Greeks are equally carefully characterised as Greeks and as two different types of soldiers: the one on the right is a light-armed fighter (*psilos*) who resorts to stone-throwing and wears only the typical traveller's kit of *petasos*, *chlamys* and boots; the one on the left is a 'heavily-armed' hoplite who in the manner of the time, *ca.* 435 BC, carries a spear and hoplite shield and wears a conical *pilos* on his head and a sword in the scabbard at his left side—and nothing more. On the second *oinochoe* the Shuvalov Painter varies the personnel and the composition.[34] He replaces the foreign opponent with another Greek and largely reverses our view of the group, so that the hoplite is on the right and seen in back view, and the companion is on the left and seen from the front. The latter has gained a spear (apparently not a javelin, as might have been expected of a light-armed soldier), while his *petasos* has slipped off his head; the outer hoplite now wears a Corinthian helmet, and the *pilos* has been transferred to the central figure who (spearless) draws his sword from within the cover of his shield. But essentially the Greeks on both vases are the same: all the hoplites are naked of clothing though armed, while the supporting figures are only partially dressed in a hat and cloak. It is difficult to see why one should interpret the second painting as a mythological combat between Greeks in the heroic past and

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[32] Bologna, Museo Civico Archeologico 289: *ARV*^{2} 891, 1674; *Addenda*^{2} 302; *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* 1.2 (Zurich/Munich 1981) pl. 479 Amazones 299.

[33] Ferrara, Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Spina 2495 (T 915): *ARV*^{2} 1207.18; *Para.* 463; *Addenda*^{2} 345; Lezzi-Hafter [10] 2 pl. 84: Figure 1.

[34] Ferrara, Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Spina 8293 (T 364A): Lezzi-Hafter [10] 2 pl. 179a-b: Figures 2a and 2b.

the first as realistic and contemporary, but heroised,[35] solely on the grounds of the presence of the bare bodies in both.

To put the issue another way, on commemorative reliefs,[36] on which the victorious men are clothed in a variety of normal ways, are the defeated hoplites who are naked or partially so really the ones to be viewed as heroised? It seems more reasonable to regard this as a close reflection of the real-life situation at the time. It is not the clothing or the absence of it which inspires us to treat some of the figures on the reliefs as special and worthy of remembrance, but their 'heroic' actions and poses. Their state of dress or undress is irrelevant here, except for any aesthetic pleasure it may offer the individual spectator.

Of course, the concept of 'artistic' or 'ideal' nudity carries with it the implication of a distortion or falsification of reality. One is asked to believe that, while, as far as one can tell, in all other aspects the artists portray their subjects faithfully, in the sphere of human dress, and male only at that, they perversely choose to create a false picture in which the so-called under-garment is stripped off the male participants to leave them naked or in a cloak only. Certainly the artists are interested in the human body and in making their representations of it as varied and interesting as possible, but have they invented a fantasy world or have we?

It has long been time for us to get rid of a surprisingly persistent misapprehension built up on 'that fear of the body which is usually called Victorian.'[37] A century ago in 1893, Lady Evans in her *Chapters on Greek Dress* could write:

> It was not correct for a dignified citizen to go beyond his own door in the chiton only without an upper garment. It was also considered improper to wear chlamys or himation without the chiton. Yet instances of such wearing of one garment only are undoubtedly found in art. . . . These may only be instances of artistic latitude and of the desire, at the fine period in Greek art, to show as much as possible of the human form, for in real life in Athens only poor people and philosophers wore the upper without the under garment in public or *vice versa*.[38]

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[35] Cf. Lezzi-Hafter [10] 1 80: the hoplite at the left on the first vase 'kämpft in heroischer Nacktheit'.

[36] E.g., the gravestone of the cavalryman Dexileos, Athens, Kerameikos Museum and the stele for the state grave, Athens, National Museum 2744, dated by their inscriptions to 394/3 BC: J. Boardman, *Greek Sculpture: The Late Classical Period* (London 1995) figs. 120, 122.

[37] K. Clark, *The Nude: A Study in Ideal Form* (Princeton 1956) 161. Cf. H. H. Johnston, *The Kilima-njaro Expedition* (London 1886) 27f. concerning the shock to the 'sensibilities of those of our weaker sex' at the sight of the 'natives' bathing naked at Zanzibar.

[38] M. M. L. Evans, *Chapters on Greek Dress* (London 1893) 55.

One might have expected that this view of what was socially acceptable in ancient Greece would have changed since then, but it was certainly current until the 1980s and has not yet entirely disappeared.[39] Martin Robertson expressed it clearly in his monumental work on Greek art, when describing an Archaic statue of a man carrying a calf over his shoulders (the Moschophoros):[40]

> The cloak covers the shoulders and upper arms, and the back and sides of the body down to the middle thighs, but exposes it in front. . . . A Greek of this time would not have gone about in a single little garment exposing the whole front of his body. It is an indication that the artist, though adhering in spirit to the sculptural convention of male nudity, is here representing an Athenian citizen who would naturally be clad.[41]

N. Spivey's justification of why 'we must hold on to the concept of "heroic nudity"',[42] in his recently published book on Greek sculpture, serves as a salutary indicator of the tenacity of this outlook:

> Greek men did not normally walk around with no clothes on, so if figures are glimpsed [?] naked (or nude) in the context of what appears to be a 'realistic' scene, then the chances are that the scene has been elevated from the realistic to the supernatural. . . . Simply by a process of association, we shall find that most men considered as heroes are shown naked: nudity, therefore becomes a costume that may be donned by anyone who thinks he should be counted among their number.[43]

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[39] E.g., Cook [31] 21: 'in domestic scenes men are again often naked, though when respectable women were present this would have been most improper'. Stone [5] 172, 192 n.57: 'Other kinds of monuments may show the *himation* alone, but this is because of artistic effect, and does not necessarily reflect either daily usage or comic costume'. Geddes [29] 312: 'In every period a short chiton was worn as an undergarment'. But contrast E. Keuls, *The Reign of the Phallus* (Berkeley 1985) 67: display of the genitals 'was not confined to the gymnasia and the wrestling arenas but was a feature of daily life'.

[40] Athens, Akropolis Museum 624, *ca.* 560 BC: M. Robertson, *A History of Greek Art* 2 (Oxford 1975) pl. 25b.

[41] Robertson [40] 1 94f. In his later book, *A Shorter History of Greek Art* (Cambridge 1981), Robertson revised his description of this piece (28), but still maintained (12) the standard opinion that, 'whatever its origin . . . it is a basic convention of art in Greece that males (not females) may be shown naked in any context'. Cf. R. M. Cook, *Greek Painted Pottery*^{2} (London 1972) 277.

[42] N. Spivey, *Understanding Greek Sculpture: Ancient Meanings, Modern Readings* (London 1996) 113.

[43] Spivey [42] 112f.

2. *The Cross-cultural Parallel*[44]

If one is prepared to look without prejudice and to avoid preconceptions about so-called 'primitive' and 'civilised' peoples,[45] profitable comparison may be made with the Nilotic tribes of East Africa like the Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania.[46] Their dress may consist of simple lengths of material[47] which they drape around the body and knot on one shoulder, tie (or now safety-pin) around the hips or wear loosely as cloaks. The resemblance to the *exomis*,[48] *chlamys*[49] and *himation*[50] is striking.

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[44] The comparative method briefly employed here is, of course, a standard anthropological one already familiar in several areas of classical study: e.g., D. Cohen, *Law, Sexuality and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens* (Cambridge 1991). For a warning about the problems involved in cross-cultural comparison as a method for illuminating ancient Greece, see M. Golden, 'The Uses of Cross-Cultural Comparison in Ancient Social History', *EMC* 36 (1992) 309-31. For the need for a methodology that will avoid 'subjectivity and above all cultural determination', see C. Sourvinou-Inwood, *'Reading' Greek Death: To the End of the Classical Period* (Oxford 1995); the quotation is from p. 300.

[45] Cf. Clark [37] 24 for the view that easy acceptance of a lack of clothing equates with the 'conquest of an inhibition that oppresses all but the most backward people' and J. A. Arieti, 'Nudity in Greek Athletics', *CW* 68 (1975) 431-36, esp. 436: 'The public nakedness, which does not, in the 1970's, shock us as it shocked the Romans—though it does, perhaps, seem somewhat uncivilized for the Greeks'.

[46] Some European explorers with a classical education recognised the similarity between the build and appearance of the Maasai men and the 'classical ideal' of Greek sculpture: e.g., H. H. Johnston, *The Nile Quest* (London 1903) 297: 'Masai like Greek athletes'.

[47] A photograph of a warrior from 1910 demonstrates how these garments had originally been created from skins: G. Turle, *The Art of the Maasai* (New York 1992) 90. Cf. the descriptions from 1888 supplied by the explorers, Teleki and von Höhnel, in N. Pavitt, *Kenya: The First Explorers* (London 1989) 149, 155, 185.

[48] For the *exomis*, compare (a) the *apobates*, Athens, Akropolis Museum, Parthenon North Frieze XXIII 64 (formerly XVII 57), *ca.* 438 BC: Boardman [8] pl. 71, with (b) a warrior (*moran*) with his mother: M. Ahim, D. Willetts and J. Eames, *The Last of the Maasai* (London 1987) 174: Figure 3 and Figure 4.

[49] For the *chlamys*, compare (a) the groom, Athens, Akropolis Museum, Parthenon North Frieze XXVII 72 (formerly XXII 66), *ca.* 438 BC: Boardman [8] pl. 70, with (b) warriors coming to an *eunoto* ceremony: Ahim, Willetts and Eames [48] 118f.: Figure 5 and Figure 6.

[50] For the *himation*, compare (a) the youths leading bulls to sacrifice on the front of a volute-crater by the Kleophon Painter: Ferrara, Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Spina 44894 (T 57C), *ca.* 440-430 BC: *ARV*^{2} 1143.1, 1684; *Para.* 455; *Addenda*^{2} 334; Boardman [17] fig. 171, with (b) a Maasai herdsman: C. Salvadori and A. Fedders, *Maasai* (London 1973) 26: Figure 7 and Figure 8.

For further comparison one may look at the closely-related Samburu of Northern Kenya, whose warriors (*lmurran*) 'wear two red or red-and-white pieces of cloth wrapped around their waists; in the chill of early morning they wrap one around their shoulders.'[51] Since a sword is carried at the right side, the right hip and thigh may at times be exposed.[52] Like the Greeks, the Samburu have no hesitation in stripping off completely when strenuous activity is required.[53]

Elders, also like the old men of classical Greece, wrap up more in longer, *himation*-like garments and modern woollen blankets instead of their traditional skin cloaks.[54] Children and babies of both sexes remain naked, until they adopt a *chlamys*-like wrap usually of old, worn material,[55] while during their initiation into warrior status adolescent boys wear a distinctive, blackened skin cloak knotted at the shoulder and again comparable to the Greek *chlamys* in that it may leave half of the body bare.[56] For these nomadic pastoralists this ceremonial garment is more traditional than the imported lengths of brightly coloured woven material, which have to be bought at the Westernised settlements, inconveniently washed in rivers and replaced more frequently.[57]

In fact, there are peoples in this area who until recently used to think that even this simple clothing was unnecessary, for the uncircumcised Turkana and the Luo, who include the Nuer, considered that only circumcised males were truly naked.[58] As the Scottish explorer, Joseph Thomson, commented after

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[51] T. Magor, *African Warriors: The Samburu* (London 1994) 20 and for photographs, 33 (Figure 9), 46. Cf. the short 'skirt' worn by the youth with the sacrificial ram on a bell-crater near the Chrysis Painter, Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 95.24, *ca.* 430 BC: *ARV*^{2} 1159; *Para.* 458; *Addenda*^{2} 337; Boardman [17] fig. 183: Figure 10.

[52] Magor [51] 54.

[53] See N. Pavitt, *Samburu* (London 1991) 158f. for naked men bringing up water from a deep well.

[54] Magor [51] 108. Cf. the bearded man on the left of the gravestone from Rhamnous, Athens, National Museum 833, *ca.* 330-320 BC: Boardman [36] fig. 128.

[55] Magor [51] 51, 84-91.

[56] Magor [51] 164: Figure 11. Cf. the light-armed warrior on the *oinochoe* by the Shuvalov Painter, Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum 898, *ca.* 440-435 BC: *ARV*^{2} 1206.7; *Addenda*^{2} 344; Lezzi-Hafter [10] 2 pl. 80c: Figure 12. Black was also the colour adopted by the Athenian *ephebes* for their distinctive cloaks: P. Vidal-Naquet, *The Black Hunter* (Baltimore/London 1986) 112.

[57] Cf. D. R. Klumpp, 'An Historical Overview of Maasai Dress', *Dress* 7 (1981) 95-102, esp. 96f.

[58] Cf. A. Graham, *Eyelids of Morning* (Greenwich, Conn. 1973) 80. Significantly W. E. Sweet, *Sport and Recreation in Ancient Greece* (Oxford 1987) 132f. suggests that repeated

encountering them in 1883, 'they eloquently illustrate the fact, which some people cannot understand, that morality has nothing to do with clothes.'[59] In a similar (somewhat bemused) vein are the comments of another Victorian explorer and later colonial administrator, H. H. Johnston, about the peoples who inhabited the area of Mount Kilimanjaro in 1884:

> Both sexes [of the Wa-taveita] have little notion or conception of decency, the men especially seeming to be unconscious of any impropriety in nakedness. What clothing they have is worn as an adornment or for warmth at night and early morning.[60]
>
> We should be apt to call, from our point of view, their nakedness and almost animal unconsciousness of shame indelicate, but it is rather, when one gets used to it, a pleasing survival of the old innocent days when prurient thoughts were absent from the mind of man. The Wa-caga [the Chagga] cannot be accused of indecency, for they make no effort to be decent, but walk about as Nature made them, except when it is chilly, or if they wish to look unusually smart, in which cases they throw cloth or skins around their shoulders.[61]

So, as far as these societies were concerned, at least prior to interference by missionaries[62] and directives from government officials[63] that they adopt Western-style dress, clothing satisfied the needs of protection, when required, distinction and ornament, but not modesty, that is, only three of the generally

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infibulation of the penis would result in the permanent elongation of the foreskin and that by the first century AD, 'inadequate covering of the glans [consequent upon circumcision as practised by the Jews] was unacceptable' to the Greeks.

[59] Quoted by Pavitt [47] 127.

[60] Johnston [37] 433, similarly 76, 90, 413.

[61] Johnston [37] 437.

[62] Cf. J. Adamson, *The Peoples of Kenya* (London 1967) 167f.

[63] Cf. S. O. Saibull and R. Carr, *Herd and Spear: The Maasai of East Africa* (London 1981) 44: 'He was aware of the incongruity of his spare cotton toga, his spear, and his educated foreign tongue. Under his left arm he carried a folded pair of green shorts in defiance of a local order that the Maasai must wear pants under their sparse clothing to avoid unseemly exposure.' The term *'toga'* is frequently employed in relation to the Maasai garment (*en aiperra* in Maa, *lubega* in Kiswahili) (138 and pl. 1): cf. Klumpp [57] 100 figs. 6f.; L. and S-O. Lindblad, *The Serengeti: Land of Endless Space* (London 1990) 150; T. O. Saitoti, *Masai* (New York 1980) 18-21. Any similarity to the semi-circular, Roman *toga* seems to me quite mistaken. I prefer to liken it to a Greek *chlamys,* although it is regularly worn under the left armpit, not over the left shoulder.

recognised functions of dress. The ancient Athenians probably would have sympathised with this point of view.

Indeed, for the Maasai and Samburu much time and care is focussed on the arrangement and decoration of the hair, ears and the upper body, including the careful painting of the face and torso with a mixture of red ochre and animal fat.[64] These features serve to distinguish the warrior age-set at once. Among the Greeks the fact that similar attention was paid to personal appearance is suggested by their appreciation of their young men's physical beauty.[65] Indeed, one might question whether the body-painting too had any parallel. I believe in a way it did.[66]

It is generally acknowledged that the Greeks were in the habit of anointing themselves, skin and hair, with perfumed oils during athletic exercise and before symposia[67]—and of course, corpses were anointed too. Many thousands of

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[64] Cf. Adamson [62] 345-47 for her detailed drawings of some of the different hairstyles of young warriors; Saibull and Carr [63] pls. 3, 8b and c, 10; and from last century Johnston [37] 429 *re* the skin of the Wa-taita 'disguised by the coating of soot or red earth and fat or castor-oil, which is rubbed over the skin'. Among the Greeks the Lakedaimonians, of course, were noted for their long hair and the care they took of it: Hdt. 1.82, 7.208f. before Thermopylai; Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 11.3; Arist. *Rh.* 1367a 28-32.

[65] E.g., Xen. *Symp.* 1.8f. (Autolykos, whose beauty is said to be riveting, had just won the *pankration* in the Panathenaic Games, so that one wonders what his real physical state would have been at the time!) and 4.10-28, in which Kritoboulos justifies his pride in his beauty and claims that beauty can be found in males of all ages. Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1361b 7-14.

[66] What is perhaps surprising if the Greeks were using the exposure of their bodies as a signal of their Hellenic ethnicity when surrounded by clothed neighbours, is that they chose not to 'customise' their bodies by scarification and the like (as is practised by modern ethnic groups in Africa and elsewhere). It seems possible that their individual efforts to develop an athletic physique may have satisfied this common human urge for a recognisable uniform without the need for other deformation of the natural properties of their bodies. Herodotus twice notes the distinctive Egyptian practice of circumcision (2.36.3, 37.2). At the latter point, while he acknowledges the claimed hygienic reason (καθαρειότητος εἵνεκεν), he goes on to express the opinion that they circumcise themselves προτιμῶντες καθαροὶ εἶναι ἢ εὐπρεπέστεροι ('because they prefer to be clean rather than better-looking'). The word, εὐπρεπής, means 'decent/seemly' as well as 'good-looking/handsome'. The ambiguity is probably deliberate here. I am grateful to the anonymous *Scholia* referee who directed me to this reference. For the Greeks the punitive mutilation, especially castration, of free men represented a horrifying proof of the otherness of the non-Greek, Eastern world: cf. E. Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-definition through Tragedy* (Oxford 1989) 157-59. Hall [above, this note] 44, 131 also points out that scratching the skin as an expression of mourning was a female practice frowned upon by the male members of the society as excessive and barbaric.

[67] Evidence can be found in artistic and literary sources: for example, an *aryballos*, sponge and *strigil* hang behind the mature *hoplitodromos* runner in the tondo of a cup attributed to

aryballoi, *alabastra* and *lekythoi* have survived from ancient sites and cemeteries.[68] We may not know what form these perfumes took precisely,[69] but with their usual base of 'olive oil, almond oil, castor oil, sesame oil and linseed oil' scented with 'lilies, marjoram, thyme, sage, roses, anise, and iris root,'[70] they did amount to a coating or 'dressing' of the body and are comparable to the base of animal fat used in Africa.[71]

Onesimos, Basel, Antikenmuseum BS 439, *ca.* 500-480 BC: *ARV*^{2} 323.56; *Para.* 359; *Addenda*^{2} 215; Boardman [7] fig. 230. A young man pours perfumed oil into his left hand on the late sixth-century calyx-crater by Euphronios, Berlin, Staatliche Museen 2180: *ARV*^{2} 13.1, 1584, 1596, 1619; *Para.* 321; *Addenda*^{2} 152; Boardman [7] fig. 24.3. Xenophon refers to guests arriving for a dinner-party, οἱ μὲν γυμνασάμενοι καὶ χρισάμενοι, οἱ δὲ καὶ λουσάμενοι ('some having exercised and anointed themselves, others having bathed as well', *Symp.* 1.7). Cf. Thuc. 1.6.5: ἐγυμνώθησάν τε πρῶτοι καὶ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν ἀποδύντες λίπα μετὰ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι ἠλείψαντο. ('[The Lakedaimonians] were the first to strip naked and, in the open undressed, they anointed themselves richly during exercise'). Note μετά taking the genitive, not the accusative for 'after', as translated by R. Warner in Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*^{2} (Harmondsworth 1972) 38; Sweet [58] 126; and M. McDonnell, 'The Introduction of Athletic Nudity: Thucydides, Plato, and the Vases', *JHS* 111 (1991) 182-93, at 183. λίπα here clearly refers to the use of scented creams probably based on animal fat (τὸ λίπος, -εος), though olive oil is elsewhere specified by the addition of ἐλαίῳ.

[68] The filling (re-filling?) of the small perfume vases from larger *pelikai*, while the customer waits, is represented, for example, on a black-figure *pelike* from the late sixth century, Vatican City, Museo Gregoriano Etrusco Vaticano 413: Boardman [20] fig. 212. Cf. a similar scene of women on a *pelike* in the manner of the Altamura Painter, Bern, Historisches Museum 12227, *ca.* 470-460 BC: *ARV*^{2} 596.1; *Para.* 394; *Addenda*^{2} 265; Sparkes [18] fig. III: 5; see Sparkes [18] 141-43 for the purchase of a small bottle of (presumably scented) oil for an *obol* in Aristophanes' *Frogs* (1236). Boardman [17] 239 suggests that additional 'portable oil-dispensers' of skin may have been used by athletes, but these have not survived.

[69] In Xen. *Symp.* 2.3f. Sokrates emphasises the difference between the smell of perfume (τὸ μύρον), which he associates with women, and the athlete's olive oil (τὸ ἔλαιον), which identifies free men. Cf. W. R. Biers, K. O. Gerhardt and R. A. Braniff, *Lost Scents: Investigations of Corinthian "Plastic" Vases by Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry* (Philadelphia 1994), esp. 23-32. They established the presence of oil (possibly olive) and animal fat scented with a pungent, probably coniferous, resin and non-specific plant material, with insect-repelling and embalming properties.

[70] Morris [28] 75. Because the Greeks were not aware of the process of distilling alcohol for making perfume, but followed the Egyptians in employing fatty oils from plant or animal sources, like pig lard or beef fat (suet), in the processes known as enfleurage and maceration (27-31), it is perhaps more correct to speak in terms of unguents or creams instead of perfume. These incidentally acted as emollients to keep the skin soft (5).

[71] Cf. Saibull and Carr [63] 44: 'The Maasai in the Highlands have no use for soap, with water being scarce. They remove body dirt with red ocher and a little water. The ocher and

It seems possible that the oil base helped to tan the skin in the way that, until the latest range of anti-cancer sun blocks took over the market in the West, the sun-tan oils of the past helped to cook white skin a dark brown. But the question remains as to whether the Greek unguents also contained ingredients whose aim was to colour the skin. Plato refers to the adornment of the pleasure-loving man with ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι καὶ κόσμοις χήτει οἰκείων ('alien skin colours and ornaments from a lack of his own', *Phdr.* 239d 1).[72] One would not be justified in concluding that it is only the face and not more of the body which is being decorated here.

Indeed, a passage in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (10.5-8) seems to confirm the use of red ochre (*miltos*) as a body colouring by some Athenian men. Iskhomakhos, who wishes to stop his wife trying to deceive him by using the female cosmetics of white lead (τὸ ψιμύθιον) and rouge (ἡ ἔγχουσα), asks her whether she would prefer him to make love to her in his naturally strong and healthy state with his own skin colour, or anointed with red ochre and wearing a pigment which imitates male colouring as eye make-up. Despite the more familiar uses of *miltos* in the manufacture of ceramics and waterproofing of ships at Athens,[73] there is no suggestion in this passage that the proposal to put it on the male body is unprecedented.

Grease and oil have actually been acknowledged as constituting a form of 'clothing' for a wide range of peoples throughout the world. The addition of a coloured pigment, usually red but sometimes blue or green, to the final product is the norm rather than the exception.[74] Apart from colour, the oils applied by the Greeks may have offered them extra (unrecognised) protection as a barrier against germs, moisture and cold air, an aspect which has not been emphasised before for the classical world.[75]

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animal fat they smear over their bodies acts as insulation against heat and cold and gives their skin a silken texture.'

[72] Noticeably here the list of alleged vices includes being soft not hard, bred in dappled shade not full sun, unfamiliar with manly toil and strong sweat, but familiar instead with a soft and unmanly lifestyle.

[73] Cf. R. J. Hopper, *Trade and Industry in Classical Greece* (London 1979) 60, 164.

[74] For the ability of mankind to survive in apparently hostile climatic conditions by resorting not to cloth or skins, but to fat and oil, for protection, see P. A. Storm, 'A Thought on the Origin and Function of Dress Since They Weren't Naked After All', *Dress* 7 (1981) 90-94. One calls to mind the brilliantly coloured zinc-based creams applied nowadays even in 'civilised' societies to cheeks, noses and lips by children and players of outdoor sports and the unnatural orange-brown colour applied to all their visible skin by body-builders as an essential part of their 'costume' in competitions.

[75] For the medicinal, especially germicidal, properties of essential oils, see Morris [28] 14f.

If some Greek men, then, chose not to wear all the time their loose-fitting clothes made of animal or vegetable fibres, but applied to themselves a decorative and protective layer of perfumed fat or oil, they will not have been truly 'naked'. And their artistic, male 'nudes' will have simply constituted a realistic portrayal by the artists of the normally 'dressed' men, youths and boys of the Archaic and Classical periods.



Figure 1: Ferrara, Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Spina 2495 (T 915).
(Courtesy, Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Ferrara)

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Figure 2a: Ferrara, Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Spina 8293 (T 364A).
(Courtesy, Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Ferrara)

Figure 2b: Ferrara, Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Spina 8293 (T 364A).
(Courtesy, Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Ferrara)

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Figure 3: Athens, Akropolis Museum, Parthenon North Frieze XXIII 64 (formerly XVII 57).
(Courtesy, Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Athens, neg. no.76/447)

Figure 4: Maasai warrior.
(after M. Ahim, D. Willetts and J. Eames, *The Last of the Maasai* [London 1987] 174)

Figure 5: Athens, Akropolis Museum, Parthenon North Frieze XXVII 72 (formerly XXII 66).
(Courtesy, Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Athens, neg. no.76/448)

Figure 6: Maasai warriors.
(after M. Ahim, D. Willetts and J. Eames, *The Last of the Maasai* [London 1987] 118f.)

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

Figure 7: Ferrara, Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Spina 44894 (T 57C).
(Courtesy, Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Ferrara)



Figure 8: Maasai herdsman.
(after C. Salvadori and A. Fedders, *Maasai* [London 1973] 26)

Figure 9: Samburu warriors.
(after T. Magor, *African Warriors: The Samburu* [London 1994] 33.
Courtesy, HarperCollins Publishers Ltd.)

Figure 10: Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 95.24.
(Catharine Page Perkins Fund. Courtesy, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)

Figure 11: Samburu initiates.
(after T. Magor, *African Warriors: The Samburu* [London 1994] 164.
Courtesy, HarperCollins Publishers Ltd.)

Figure 12: Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum 898.
(Courtesy, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna)

ISOCRATES AND THE GREEK POETIC TRADITION

Terry Papillon
Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Virginia Tech University
Blacksburg, Virginia 24061-0225, USA

Abstract. This paper discusses Isocrates' use of the Greek poetic tradition in his own prose. It presents what Isocrates says about poetry and poets, what he does that recalls the poets, and why he connects himself with the poetic tradition. Such a study will contribute to an understanding of Isocrates' sense of prose and will show how Isocrates created a different kind of discourse by adapting the moral and political seriousness of the poetry to the educational ideas of the sophists.

Isocrates' literary and rhetorical stance grows from two major roots, roots which nourish its political and ethical interests.[1] The first is his connection with the philosophical and rhetorical world of the older sophists. Following in the tradition of Gorgias and Protagoras, Isocrates represents a philosophical view different from that of Plato or Aristotle.[2] The second seed from which Isocrates' ideas grow is his awareness of the Greek poetic tradition as an educative and therefore ethicizing force for Greece. Indeed, Isocrates' interest in poetry is something of an offshoot from his sophistic roots. The sophists saw themselves as the new educators of society, as replacing in some sense the didactic and entertaining function of poetry. The poets had been a source of wisdom, the *sophoi*, but now the sophists sought to take that title on themselves.[3] But the

[1] Thanks are due to I. Worthington, B. Kytzler and A. S. Becker for useful comments. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the biennial meeting of the Southern Section of the Classical Association of the Middle West and South in Chapel Hill (1994) and at the biennial meeting of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric in Edinburgh (1995).

[2] Scholars who have contributed recently to the re-evaluation of the sophists include G. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge 1981); J. Poulakos, 'Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric,' *Ph&Rh* 16 (1983) 35-48 and *Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece* (Columbia 1995); T. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore 1991); S. Jarratt, *Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured* (Carbondale 1991); E. Schiappa, 'An Examination and Exculpation of the Compositional Style of Gorgias of Leontini,' *Pre/Text* 12 (1991) 237-57 and 'Gorgias' *Helen* Revisited,' *QJS* 81 (1995) 310-25; S. Consigney, 'The Styles of Gorgias,' *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 22 (1992) 43-53. E. Schiappa, 'Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage?,' *Rhetoric Review* 10 (1991) 5-18 wisely cautions us about grouping the sophists too closely together, but their contrast to Plato (and later Aristotle) allows for some corporate description.

[3] See W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Sophists* (Cambridge 1971) 35; Kerferd [2] 24-41; W. Jaeger (tr. G. Highet), *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*[4] 3 (London 1954) 85 *et passim*; H.

sophists came under attack for a lack of moral seriousness in their teaching.

Isocrates recognized the power of the poetic tradition and adapted it for his own kind of prose. In response to the criticism of the sophists and the strength of the poetic tradition, Isocrates' goal was to produce men of affairs, talented and politically astute, through a new sort of *politicos logos*.[4] This type of *logos*, broader and more inclusive, has a strong ethical content, which speeches like the *Panegyricus* and the *Panathenaicus* demonstrate.[5] To accomplish his goal, Isocrates had to subsume the poetic tradition into his own new work. For the purposes of this study, I shall look at how Isocrates would take up the educational ideas of the earlier sophists and re-inject the moral and political seriousness of the old poetic education into his system.

My goal, then, is to discuss how Isocrates, working in prose, used the poetic tradition. The topic has significance because it addresses Isocrates' role in the development of Greek thought and Greek prose. It also addresses how Isocrates viewed a rhetorical education in the fourth century and how this might relate to the thinking of others about rhetoric at this time. While what I have to say may sound somewhat commonplace—sophists looking to poetry is not a new idea, after all[6]—I would point out that this is for a reason. That is, Isocrates seeks to present a method of discourse which had been common for generations in Greece, and yet was beginning to decline in influence. Isocrates' goal was to maintain a very popular and, he believed, very effective way of communication in spite of the changes in the attitudes toward poetry and prose. I will approach this topic in three ways. First I shall discuss what Isocrates says about poetry and poets. Then I shall discuss how Isocrates makes the connection with the Greek

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North, 'The Use of Poetry in the Training of the Ancient Orator,' *Traditio* 8 (1952) 1-33. See also Isocrates' comments at *To Demonicus* 51 and *To Nicocles* 13.

[4] See T. Poulakos, 'Isocrates' Use of Narrative in the *Evagoras*: Epideictic, Rhetoric and Moral Action,' *QJS* 73 (1987) 317-28. More recently Y. L. Too, *The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates: Text, Power, Pedagogy* (Cambridge 1995) 10-35 discusses this concept at length, apparently without an awareness of Poulakos' contribution.

[5] See D. Gillis, 'The Ethical Basis of Isocratean Rhetoric,' *PP* 24 (1969) 321-48, esp. 334. See also Dion. Hal. *Isoc.* 2: '[Isocrates' oratory] is also moral and convincing in tone and appropriate to its subject.' The translation is that of S. Usher (ed.), *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: The Critical Essays* 1 (Cambridge 1974).

[6] See N. J. Richardson, 'Homeric Professors in the Age of the Sophists,' *PCPhS* 21 (1975) 65-81. Particular note has been made of Isocrates' *Evagoras* and its dependence on poetic conventions by E. Conrotte, 'Pindare et Isocrate: Le Lyrisme et l'éloge funèbre,' *MB* 2 (1898) 168-87; W. Race, 'Pindaric Encomium and Isokrates' *Evagoras*,' *TAPhA* 117 (1987) 131-55; M. Valozza, 'Alcuni motivi del discorso di lode tra Pindaro e Isocrate,' *QUCC* 35 (1990) 43-58.

poetic tradition by looking at what Isocrates does that is akin to the poets before him. Finally, I shall close with some suggestions on why Isocrates might be interested in bringing the poetic tradition into the prose of the fourth century.

1. What Isocrates Says About Poetry and the Poets

Isocrates in fact says very little about the poets in his works; what he says, however, is significant. The observations that Isocrates makes about poetry's nature and advantages include its usefulness, its focus on praise, its ability to create a new history, its ability to immortalize, and its employment of ornament. Isocrates' ideas, while not particularly novel, represent what Isocrates thinks is a long-standing strength of discourse in general, even in the face of the changes of the fourth century.

Isocrates asserts on a number of occasions that poetry is useful to the hearer. In the speech *To Nicocles*, for example, Isocrates describes the things which contribute to the training of a person, things such as frugality, laws, freedom of speech, and poets. He says 'some of the poets of bygone times have left precepts on how one should live' (3).[7] The poets are a topic of study for those desiring education and wishing to become better. Later in that same speech Isocrates says: 'don't think that you can be ignorant of the respected poets or the wise men (σοφισταί), but rather you must listen to the poets and study the wise men . . .' (13). He says later that Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides are the best counselors for life (43). He comments specifically about the wisdom of Homer in *Against the Sophists* (2) and says in the *Panegyricus* that Homer correctly set before the Greeks a glorious picture of enmity between Greece and the East (159). That is, Homer picked a morally edifying topic. For Isocrates, the poets are good repositories of knowledge useful for the noble life.

In a significant passage in *To Demonicus*, Isocrates links himself with this useful poetic tradition. He has been arguing that base behaviour is more shocking from the noble than from the ordinary person, citing a mythic contrast between Tantalos and Herakles. He then continues: 'employing such [mythic stories of Zeus] as examples, you must strive for nobility of life and not only abide by what I have said but also learn the best of the poets and read whatever other wise men have said that is useful' (51). Isocrates thus includes the σοφισταί ('wise men') and himself in his discussion of morally useful sources.

The second observation Isocrates makes about poetry is that its topic is praise. For Isocrates, praise means to make someone more impressive to an

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[7] All translations of Isocrates are my own and are based on the Budé editions of G. Mathieu and E. Brémond (Paris 1929-62).

audience. Isocrates specifically says in *Busiris* 4 that those wishing 'to praise' (εὐλογεῖν) should expand the truth, making characteristics larger than they really are. At *Evagoras* 72 Isocrates includes ὑπερβολή ('extravagant claim') as a characteristic of poetic technique. The tragedians and lyric poets make some characters more noble and worthy than those who have greater character but are unsung. At *Antidosis* 136f. Isocrates says: 'how many of the prior generation have been unrecognized although they have become much more noble and worthy than those sung of in lyric or tragic poetry? These latter ones happened upon poets and prose-writers (λογοποιοί), while the former have no one to sing their praises.' At *Evagoras* 6 he points out that no one can hope for the fame of the Trojan heroes of poetic legend, even if he were to surpass them in ἀρετή ('excellence'). The poets have made the past so big that it cannot be matched. This recalls Pindar's words at *Nemean Ode* 7.20-30. Thus Isocrates can lament the influence of earlier poets, but his censure follows criticism as it is found in the poets too. Like Xenophanes, Pindar, and Plato, Isocrates also criticizes the immorality of the gods as presented in the poets (*Busiris* 38). Isocrates recognizes the potential dangers when he occasionally complains about unfair treatment, but he perceives that the technique of the poets also created a clearer picture. He is very concerned, when he looks at earlier poetry or the prose of his own day, that topics be well chosen and well treated.[8] If these choices are made carefully, praise can be more like a magnifying glass than the curved mirror of a side-show.[9] Isocrates sees this ability to praise, the ability to make larger, as a distinct advantage for poetry, even if dangerous.[10]

Isocrates claims, in the third place, that poetry can create a new history:

> Καὶ μὴν τῶν γε παλαιῶν καθόδων αὗται μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμοῦσιν, ἃς παρὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκούομεν· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐ μόνον τῶν γεγενημένων τὰς καλλίστας ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν καινὰς συντιθέασιν. (*Evagoras* 36)

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[8] On Isocrates, the choice of topics, and their treatment, see T. L. Papillon, 'Isocrates on Gorgias and Helen: The Unity of the *Helen*,' *CJ* 91 (1996) 377-91.

[9] On the positive idea of illusion, even deceit (ἀπατή), see N. O'Sullivan, *Alkidamas, Aristophanes and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory* (Stuttgart 1992) 20 and the bibliography there.

[10] Isocrates avoids any picture of the divine world (or the world of myth or history) that is not positive. See T. L. Papillon, 'Isocrates and the Use of Myth,' *Hermathena* 161 (1996) 9-21. Keeping with a positive approach can have its difficulties, however; much of the history Isocrates narrates is open to question for its veracity. See N. H. Baynes, 'Isocrates', *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (London 1960) 144-67 and C. D. Hamilton, 'Greek Rhetoric and History: The Case of Isocrates,' in G. Bowersock, W. Burkert, and M. Putnam (edd.), *Arktouros: Studies Presented to B. M. W. Knox* (Berlin 1979) 290-98.

> Indeed the ancient stories of the returns which are most highly esteemed are those which we hear from the poets. For the poets not only relate the best of the stories to us, but even create new ones of their own devising.

The ability to create something new and have it accepted and passed down is part of the nature of poetry. This would seem to be a rather powerful, and dangerous, ability, given Isocrates' awareness that poetry can make things larger than they are.

A fourth characteristic and advantage of poetry is its ability to immortalize its subject. The permanent status of the Trojan heroes is due to the songs of the poets (*Evagoras* 65; *Antidosis* 137). It is true, as Norlin points out in his Loeb edition of the *Antidosis*, that this idea 'recalls the poetic commonplace on the immortality lent by literature' such as is found in Horace.[11] It is found in Homer, too, as Helen talks of their lives as being a 'source of songs for men to come' (*Il.* 6.358). And that it is a *poetic* commonplace is to the point, for Isocrates takes over this idea that was so prevalent from a poetic tradition to introduce it into his prose.

A fifth and final advantage for poetry is increased allowance for ornament:

> Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ δέδονται κόσμοι· καὶ γὰρ πλησιάζοντας τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οἷόν τ' αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι καὶ διαλεγομένους καὶ συναγωνιζομένους οἷς ἂν βουληθῶσιν, καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις, τὰ δὲ καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν τοῖς εἴδεσιν διαποικῖλαι τὴν ποίησιν· . . . πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ μὲν μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν, οἱ δ' οὐδενὸς τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν·
>
> (*Evagoras* 9f.)
>
> To the poets is granted the use of many ornaments, for they are able to make gods draw close to humans and speak and fight with whomever they wish. They are able to show such things not only with accepted vocabulary[12] but even with unusual and new words and with figures, and leaving off nothing they are able to ornament their poem with all kinds (τοῖς εἴδεσιν). . . . In addition to these things poets do everything through meter and rhythm, while prose writers share none of these things.

The contrast here is between the power of poetry and the power of prose as the latter existed in the fourth century. The passage denies that prose in the fourth century shares in any of these things.

But we can see in the *Antidosis* that Isocrates brings the poets and some prose-writers close together:

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[11] See G. Norlin (ed.), *Isocrates* 1 (London 1928) 262.

[12] Brémond [7] translates τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν as *des expressions usuelles*.

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> Εἰσὶν γάρ τινες . . . γράφειν δὲ προῄρηνται λόγους, οὐ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων[13] συμβολαίων, ἀλλ' Ἑλληνικοὺς καὶ πολιτικοὺς καὶ πανηγυρικούς, οὓς ἅπαντες ἂν φήσειαν ὁμοιοτέρους εἶναι τοῖς μετὰ μουσικῆς καὶ ῥυθμῶν πεποιημένοις ἢ τοῖς ἐν δικαστηρίῳ λεγομένοις. Καὶ γὰρ τῇ λέξει ποιητικωτέρᾳ καὶ ποικιλωτέρᾳ τὰς πράξεις δηλοῦσιν, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ὀγκωδεστέροις καὶ καινοτέροις χρῆσθαι ζητοῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἰδέαις ἐπιφανεστέραις καὶ πλείοσιν ὅλον τὸν λόγον διοικοῦσιν. ὧν ἅπαντες μὲν ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τῶν ἐν τοῖς μέτροις πεποιημένων, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ μαθηταὶ γίγνεσθαι βούλονται, νομίζοντες τοὺς ἐν τούτοις πρωτεύοντας πολὺ σοφωτέρους καὶ βελτίους καὶ μᾶλλον ὠφελεῖν δυναμένους εἶναι τῶν τὰς δίκας εὖ λεγόντων.
>
> (46f.)
>
> For there are some [who] . . . have chosen to write discourses not about private matters, but discourses about Greek matters, about matters relating to the *polis* and related to festival gatherings, topics which all would say are more similar to works made with *mousikê* and rhythm than those spoken in the law court. For they display things with more poetic and ornate style and seek to employ more weighty and novel *enthymêmata* and organize their whole discourse with other *ideai* more notable and more numerous. All enjoy listening to such discourses no less than to poetry. Many desire to study this, thinking that those who are best at it are much wiser and better and more able to be useful than the experts at courtroom oratory.

He contrasts this type of prose with the prose of the courtroom, the prose he said shared nothing with poetry. The loftier type of prose includes things that are part of the nature and advantage of poetry (*Evagoras* 8-10). Isocrates makes the connection with poetry explicit with the comment that this prose is in 'a more poetic style' (τῇ λέξει ποιητικωτέρᾳ) and more akin to poetry than to law court prose (ὁμοιοτέρους εἶναι τοῖς μετὰ μουσικῆς καὶ ῥυθμῶν πεποιημένοις ἢ τοῖς ἐν δικαστηρίῳ λεγομένοις). There are striking similarities in thought and diction between the passages on the virtues of elegant prose and on the advantages of poetry. Both passages treat the content and style of the genre, mentioning their use of novelty (καινοτέροις; καινοῖς), the ornate nature of their treatment (ποικιλωτέρᾳ; διαποικῖλαι), the thoroughness of the treatment (διοικοῦσιν; διαποικῖλαι), the abundance of treatment (πλειόσιν; μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν, πᾶσι), and the use of notable ideas (ἐνθυμήμασιν ὀγκωδεστέροις . . . ἄλλαις ἰδέαις; μεταφοραῖς . . . πᾶσι τοῖς εἴδεσι).

Isocrates is presenting an argument for a kind of prose more useful to the Greeks than the prose seen in the law courts or seen in extemporaneous debate.[14]

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[13] I prefer the reading of τῶν ἰδίων ('private') to that of τῶν ὑμετέρων ('your'), since the contrast is thus more pointed.

[14] See pp. 23f. in the introduction of Norlin [11]. This prose continues the characteristics of the poetic tradition without the meter. Meter is an attribute of poetry not given to his prose

At a number of places where Isocrates discusses the contributions of poetry, he includes as well the wise men (σοφισταί) and prose-writers (λογοποιοί).[15] The word λογοποιοί is used by Isocrates and others like Alkidamas in discussions of Isocrates' prose at this time. Isocrates and Alkidamas agree on the careful, poetic nature of Isocrates' prose. In his recent book on early stylistic theory, O'Sullivan says: 'Alkidamas views the written style as more akin to poetry than prose. . . Composers of written speeches should more properly be called ποιηταί ['poets'] than σοφισταί ['sophists'] . . . anyone pursuing their goals will end up as a ποιητὴς λόγων ['poet of speeches'] . . . rather than a ῥήτωρ δεινός ['clever rhetorician'].'[16] O'Sullivan is here contrasting the written style (of Isocrates) with the improvisational and agonistic style (of Alkidamas).[17]

Isocrates connects poetry with his own type of prose because he sees something inherently beneficial in the poetic tradition; Alkidamas connects the two because this was an insult at the time. O'Sullivan has pointed out that calling prose 'poetic' in the early fourth century was 'a term of abuse at the time when *Kunstprosa* was being born.'[18] Isocrates' elaborate, poetic prose is a problem for Alkidamas because the prose of the fourth century is rejecting its earlier poetic influences. If Isocrates is to practice a prose which is akin to poetry, he will have to overcome a prejudice that is forming in the fourth century about poetic prose.

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by Isocrates in the passage under discussion, although he will make claims about it elsewhere (*To Philip* 27; *Against the Sophists* 16). This is one of the reasons that the prose encomium is such a difficult thing, as he claims at *Evagoras* 8. The issue of meter recalls Gorgias' comment (*Helen* 9) τὴν ποίησιν ἅπασαν καὶ νομίζω καὶ ὀνομάζω λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον ('I consider and call all poetry to be discourse having meter'). O'Sullivan [9] 50 and n. 153 rightly points out that Alkidamas seems to attribute a sense of ῥυθμός to Isocrates' written prose.

[15] Verse and prose: *To Nicocles* 7, 42. Poets and prose-writers: *Antidosis* 137; *Philip* 109. Poets and Sophists: *To Demonicus* 51; *To Nicocles* 13; *Panegyricus* 82.

[16] O'Sullivan [9] 49.

[17] Much of what I say here is indebted to O'Sullivan's useful study [9]. O'Sullivan [9] 22 has shown the beginnings of a distinction between poetry and prose in the late fifth century BC. It will be clear from my remarks, however, that I disagree with him on the extent to which Isocrates gladly took on the nature of the poetic tradition. For his view see pp. 50-52: 'Conscious of his role as a pioneer, Isocrates would never see himself as producing merely a pale imitation of the oldest intellectual tradition in Greek culture, the composition of poetry.' On the contrary, I would see part of his pioneering role to be that of setting out a new vision for fourth-century prose which contrasts with its current dicanic nature and connects it with the useful tradition of poetry.

[18] O'Sullivan [9] 49f. and n. 152. O'Sullivan [9] 53 says of the *Phaedrus*: 'Thus it seems that here [in the *Phaedrus*] Plato intends to equate the writing of speeches with poetry, using the latter term in a derogatory sense. . . .'

MacDowell says that there was not much separation of poetic and prose vocabulary in the fifth century and that such a distinction was not made until the fourth century.[19] Gorgias, in his own poetic prose, has the advantage of no such distinctions being made in vocabulary, and no hostility toward a poetic prose. Indeed, the Athenians, we are told, were captivated by his stunning prose style. Isocrates, in contrast, worked in a time not so conducive to following in the footsteps of Gorgias, Thucydides, or Pindar. Here is a way in which Isocrates fought against contemporary ideas, since he was trying to maintain the validity of a poetic prose.[20] Isocrates' complaint about the advantages accorded to the poet are indicative then not of a *lack* of poetic prose, but of the *difficulty* of bringing such a style into prose. 'I intend to do a difficult thing, to eulogize a man's excellence in prose (ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ λόγων ἐγκωμιάζειν),' something not yet attempted by the philosophers (*Evagoras* 8). This movement away from sophistry and toward poetics is interesting, given the recognized purity of Isocrates' prose. There is no poetic vocabulary in Isocrates; no quotations from poetry; not even a reference to famous poems, save one to Pindar's praise of Athens (*Antidosis* 166). Since this is so, we must turn to the question of how Isocrates employs the poetic tradition.

2. What Isocrates Does that Recalls the Poets

Isocrates uses the poetic tradition in a number of ways to develop his own prose. He takes from it ideas on how to organize the discourse, topics appropriate for treatment, and styles which appropriately present the topics. I shall present here a number of examples of these uses, drawing on a variety of sources, though with a marked emphasis on Pindar.

In a first organizational technique, Isocrates uses myth to elevate and argue. In verse, this can be seen most vividly in the genre of epinikian poetry, and in the work of Pindar especially. Indeed, the hallmark of Pindaric epinikian poetry is its use of myth to elevate, to amplify, and to praise. Myth, for Pindar, is a digression whose goal is praise by association. So in *Olympian Ode* 1 for Hieron, tyrant of Syracuse, Pindar uses the story of Pelops defeating Oinomaos in the chariot race in order to elevate Hieron for his own victory in a chariot race.

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[19] D. M. MacDowell, *Gorgias: Encomium of Helen* (Bristol 1982) 17. See too O'Sullivan [9] 16.

[20] For other ways in which Isocrates fights the trends of the fourth century, see T. L. Papillon, 'Isocrates' *Techne* and Rhetorical Pedagogy,' *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 25 (1995) 149-63. On the awareness of stylistic facets of this separation of poetry and prose, see V. Bers, *Greek Poetic Syntax in the Classical Age* (New Haven 1984).

By equating the charioteer Hieron with the charioteer Pelops, Pindar raises Hieron to mythic status. Isocrates too will digress on mythic topics in order to strengthen and elevate his topic. His treatment of Agamemnon (*Panathenaicus* 74-90), Theseus (*Helen* 29-37) and Herakles (*Philip* 109-12) demonstrates how he uses mythic figures to argue and amplify by association.[21]

A second organizational principle common from lyric poetry is the use of the priamel to open a work. Here one lists a number of possibilities, leading with a crescendo to their rejection as inferior to the actual topic of discussion. It again highlights and elevates the topic of praise. Sappho provides a famous example:

> o]ἰ μὲν ἰππήων στρότον οἰ δὲ πέσδων
> οἰ δὲ νάων φαῖσ' ἐπ[ὶ] γᾶν μέλαι[ν]αν
> ἔ]μμεναι κάλλιστον, ἔγω δὲ κῆν' ὅτ-
> τω τις ἔραται·
>
> (fr. 16)
>
> Some say that an array of horsemen is
> the fairest thing seen on the black earth;
> some say men marching, some say ships,
> but I say it is whomever one loves. . . .

Pindar opens *Olympian Ode* 1 with another well-known example:

> Ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς αἰθόμενον πῦρ
> ἅτε διαπρέπει νυκτὶ μεγάνορος ἔξοχα πλούτου·
> εἰ δ' ἄεθλα γαρύεν
> ἔλδεαι, φίλον ἦτορ,
> μηκέτ' ἀελίου σκόπει
> ἄλλο θαλπνότερον ἐν ἁμέρᾳ φαεννὸν ἄστρον ἐρήμας δι' αἰθέρος,
> μηδ' Ὀλυμπίας ἀγῶνα φέρτερον αὐδάσομεν·
>
> (1-7)
>
> Water is preeminent and gold, like a fire
> burning in the night, outshines
> all possessions that magnify men's pride.
> But if, my soul, you yearn
> to celebrate great games,
> look no further

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[21] On Agamemnon specifically see W. Race, '*Panathenaicus* 74-90: The Rhetoric of Isocrates' Digression on Agamemnon,' *TAPhA* 108 (1978) 175-85. We could add here Isocrates' digression on Timotheus in *Antidosis* 107-39, which works in a very similar way but with a historical hero. This demonstrates how Isocrates expands the use of the poetic tradition, by mixing what we would distinguish as myth and history. See G. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer* (Baltimore 1990) and Poulakos [4]. That this is not without precedent in the poetic tradition can be seen in Xenophanes' reference to the coming of the Mede Harpagos in 545 BC (H. Diels and W. Kranz (edd.), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[7] 1 [Berlin 1954] 21 B 22).

> for another star
> shining through the deserted ether
> brighter than the sun, or for a contest
> mightier than Olympia.[22]

Both poets begin with a priamel, but the tone is different. For Sappho, the priamel is used to present a personal statement about personal interests, as the poem talks of what is valuable—an individual's lover. Pindar's goal is to present the great Panhellenic games, especially those at Olympia, that celebrate the glory of the *polis* in the public realm. Isocrates' priamels have the public, Pindaric tone, as the opening of the *Evagoras* shows:

> Ὁρῶν, ὦ Νικόκλεις, τιμῶντά σε τὸν τάφον τοῦ πατρὸς οὐ μόνον τῷ πλήθει καὶ τῷ κάλλει τῶν ἐπιφερομένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ χοροῖς καὶ μουσικῇ καὶ γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ἵππων τε καὶ τριήρων ἁμίλλαις, καὶ λείποντ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων ὑπερβολὴν, ἡγησάμην Εὐαγόραν . . . εὐμενῶς μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ταῦτα, καὶ χαίρειν ὁρῶντα τήν τε περὶ αὐτὸν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τὴν σὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν, πολὺ δ' ἂν ἔτι πλείω χάριν ἔχειν ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν εἴ τις δυνηθείη περὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν κινδύνων ἀξίως διελθεῖν τῶν ἐκείνῳ πεπραγμένων·
>
> (1f.)
>
> When I saw you, Nikokles, honoring the tomb of your father, not only with numerous and beautiful offerings, but also with dances, music, and athletic contests, and, furthermore, with races of horses and triremes, and leaving no possibility of surpassing you in such celebrations, I judged that Evagoras . . . while gladly accepting these offerings and rejoicing when he saw your devotion and princely magnificence in honoring him, would feel far greater gratitude than he felt to all the others, if someone should worthily recount his principles in life and his perilous deeds.

Isocrates surveys many wonderful things, only to sweep them aside with the numinous opinion of the dead father Evagoras, namely that epideictic speech is what really matters. William Race has shown the ubiquitous presence of the priamel in early Greek poetry and beyond, with Pindar and Sappho as prominent exponents.[23] He shows the priamel's prominence in poetry and also shows its rarity in prose. Eighty pages are devoted to Greek poetry; three are devoted to Greek prose: an example from Herodotus, four from Isocrates, and six from

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[22] The Greek text of Pindar comes from the Teubner edition of B. Snell and H. Maehler, *Pindarus* 1*: Epinicia* (Leipzig 1980). Translations are from F. Nisetich, *Pindar's Victory Songs* (Baltimore 1980).

[23] W. Race, *The Classical Priamel from Homer to Boethius* (Leiden 1982).

Plato. It is uncomfortable in prose in anything other than summary fashion, yet Isocrates will include it.[24]

A third organizational technique is self-correction. In the *Helen* Isocrates is at a loss:

> Ἀπορῶ δ' ὅ τι χρήσωμαι τοῖς ἐπιλοίποις· ἐπιστὰς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ Θησέως ἔργα καὶ λέγειν ἀρξάμενος περὶ αὐτῶν ὀκνῶ μὲν μεταξὺ παύσασθαι . . . (29)
>
> Yet I am at a loss about how I should treat the rest of the story. Since I have entered upon the deeds of Theseus and begun to speak about them, I hesitate to stop in the middle. . . .

We see here that Isocrates is not sure where to turn, but certain that he is getting too far into his digression for his own good. This is a tool that Pindar uses to make his transition out of the mythic digression back into the praise portion of his poem. When Pindar moves from a retelling of the Orestes revenge story, he says

> . . . κατ' ἀμευσίπορον τρίοδον ἐδινάθην,
> ὀρθὰν κέλευθον ἰὼν
> τὸ πρίν· ἤ μέ τις ἄνεμος ἔξω πλόου
> ἔβαλεν, ὡς ὅτ' ἄκατον ἐνναλίαν; (*Pythian* 11.38-40)
>
> I have been whirled along
> ever since
> the road divided—
> all was well till then;
> or was it a sudden gust
> blew me off course
> like a boat at sea?

and from here he returns to the victor and his family. In both instances, feigned hesitancy simulates spontaneity and concern for propriety; it also returns us to the point at hand. Isocrates uses the Pindaric idea of self-conscious correction, though Isocrates here adds his disclaimer of *aporia* as part of his own persona.

And so we have brief evidence of the organizational tools of myth, priamel, and self-correction. Isocrates also treats several topics that are familiar from the poetic tradition. Since he draws from Pindar and the gnomic tradition,

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[24] Race [23] 112 and n. 194 points out that 'summary priamels' can be seen in another group of examples, but this type is weak enough to make one pause. Race's examples come from Demosthenes (6 examples), Isocrates (3), Plato (4), Thucydides (1), Sophocles (2), Aristophanes (2), Lysias (1), Menander (1), Aeschylus (1), and Homer (2). Are summary priamels more 'prosaic' than full priamels and therefore more characteristic of prose?

they will be patterns that emphasize morality and the need to see the great persons of the past as moral exemplars for the contemporary listeners.

We can see a focus on the city, specifically Athens, in the public works of Isocrates such as the *Panegyricus*, the *Panathenaicus* and the *Antidosis*. The city supports the political life of the Greeks against the potential despotism from the East; as a result, the city is the central locus of praise and benefit to which devotion is due, for in it are the clans and the households which make it work. Pindar too gives central place to the city since it produced the victor. The victor is an inseparable product of his city. *Pythian Ode* 2 opens a praise of Hieron with praise of the greatness of Syracuse. *Olympian Ode* 2 (90-95) emphasizes the city's creation of the victor's excellence and *Olympian Ode* 7 (92-94) emphasizes the unity of city and citizen. In addition, Pindar attaches the victor to his family, where he sees a close connection and a hereditary bond. *Pythian Ode* 11.43-48 shows the connection Pindar draws between a victor (Thrasydaios) and other family members (his father Pythonikos) and the emphasis on the importance of the family tree.

Another topic shared by Isocrates and Pindar is their role as advisors to princes. Isocrates offers essays to various princes about how they should live: Nikokles, Demonikos, even Philip of Macedon. A similar approach can be seen in the epinikian poems of Pindar to various tyrants. Race points this out when he says that Isocrates' speeches 'show a similar blend of praise and counsel [as the odes of Pindar], while promoting heroic virtues and Panhellenic ideas.'[25] Pindar mixes together praise and advice, what rhetoricians call epideictic and deliberative motives, in a way similar to Isocrates. *Olympian Ode* 1.106-16 shows both Pindar's advising and a self-consciousness that is also present in Isocrates. One can see such a self-conscious advisory motif in other early poetry as well, such as Theognis or Solon. Isocrates' advice to young princes in *To Demonicus*, *Nicocles*, and *To Nicocles* is quite similar to the advisory ideas in Theognis, Hesiod, and Pindar, especially when one considers that these were used as teaching texts for his own pupils.

A final and very prominent topic shared by Pindar and Isocrates is their concept of poetry as compared to the plastic arts. In the *Evagoras* Isocrates commends his speeches as superior to statues for praising and immortalizing the *laudandus*:[26]

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[25] W. Race, *Pindar* (Boston 1986) 121. See also Poulakos [4] and R. Martin, 'Hesiod, Odysseus, and the Instruction of Princes,' *TAPhA* 114 (1984) 29-48.

[26] The thought appears also in *To Nicocles* 36. On the concept of a *laudandus* in praise poetry, see E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* (Berkeley 1962).

> Ἐγὼ δ', ὦ Νικόκλεις, ἡγοῦμαι μὲν εἶναι καλὰ μνημεῖα καὶ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων εἰκόνας, πολὺ μέντοι πλείονος ἀξίας τὰς τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, ἃς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄν τις μόνον τοῖς τεχνικῶς ἔχουσιν θεωρήσειεν. Προκρίνω δὲ ταύτας . . .
>
> (73f.)
>
> For my part, Nikokles, I think that while images of the body are fine memorials, yet images of deeds and of the character are of far greater value, which one might observe only in discourses composed according to the rules of art. These I prefer [to statues] . . .

In the following sections (74f.), he cites three reasons for not preferring statues: (1) deeds are more important than physical appearance; (2) speeches can move throughout Greece, while statues are geographically fixed; (3) admirers cannot make themselves look physically like the hero, but they can pattern their life and actions after him. The second motif recalls the opening of Pindar's *Nemean Ode* 5:

> Οὐκ ἀνδριαντοποιός εἰμ', ὥστ' ἐλινύσοντα ἐργάζεσθαι ἀγάλματ' ἐπ' αὐτᾶς βαθμίδος
> ἑσταότ'·
>
> (1f.)
>
> I am no sculptor, fashioning statues to stand motionless,
> fixed to the same base.

Pindar too thinks that statues stand pat, while his words go forth.[27] It is a remarkably similar idea. The two share a sense of the importance of public proclamation.

All of these topics focus on the ethical encouragement of the audience: a victor and his city, a tyrant, a young prince, the city of Athens, or Isocrates' pupils. Isocrates shares with these poets a sense of urgency about moral conduct. For Isocrates and Pindar, this moral conduct is obtained by looking to the past, especially the past of myth, and heeding its message. Both therefore present a traditional idea of what the culture is because they are both interested in maintaining the pattern of life that they know: of the Greek life of the city, its stability, and all it has to offer.

The third area of interrelation between Isocrates and the poets comes in the realm of style, for the stylistic variety in Isocratean discourse comes from his looking to various poetic models. Pindaric poetry is famous for its impressive

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[27] See also *Isthmian Ode* 2.44-46. This comparison has been developed at greater length by Andrew Ford, 'The Price of Art in Isocrates: Formalism and the Escape from Politics,' in T. Poulakos (ed.), *Rethinking the History of Rhetoric: Multidisciplinary Essays on the Rhetorical Tradition* (Boulder 1993) 31-52.

style, influenced by the conventions of epinikian poetry certainly, but brought to a pinnacle through the elevation of style and thought characteristic of Pindar. Usher points out Isocrates' connection to the style of poetry when he says '[prose] rhythm could provide a basis for balance between the units of the period, the cola, which . . . may be compared with the measured verses of poetry.'[28] Dobson and Blass have pointed out that the Isocratean period is parallel to the Pindaric triadic stanza structure.[29] Though these observations are made with reference to Pindar, the items mentioned apply equally to the epinikian genre generally. The smoothness of Isocrates might be better equated with the smooth narrative techniques of Bacchylides than with the striking torrent of Pindaric poetry. One thinks of Pseudo-Longinus, *De Sublimitate* 33 and his comparison of Bacchylides to Pindar:

> Or take lyric poetry: would you choose to be Bacchylides rather than Pindar? Or in tragedy Ion of Chios rather than Sophocles? Certainly Bacchylides and Ion never put a foot wrong and in all their works show themselves masters of beautiful writing in the smooth style, whereas the other two sometimes set the world ablaze in their violent onrush, but often have their flame quenched for no reason and collapse miserably. Surely no one in his right mind would rate all the works of Ion put together as highly as one single play, the *Oedipus*.[30]

A similar comparison could be made of Isocrates and Demosthenes, where Isocrates serves the function of the smooth Bacchylides and Demosthenes serves the function of the raging Pindar.

It is common to equate Isocrates with the grand periodic style of the *Panegyricus* or *Panathenaicus*, perhaps most famously at *Panegyricus* 47-50.[31] This style is certainly characteristic of him, and might be seen as epinikian in the complexity and grandeur which Usher discusses. But we can see other sides as well. The speech *Against the Sophists* displays a style much more vigorous and hostile than in his grand political speeches. Indeed, there is a defensiveness running throughout Isocrates' discourses; it is particularly strong here and in the *Antidosis*, as he presents a defense of his contributions to the city. In this respect he is akin to Solon, who composed poems to show how and why he was able to

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[28] S. Usher, 'The Style of Isocrates,' *BICS* 20 (1973) 41.

[29] J. F. Dobson, *The Greek Orators* (New York 1919) 133; F. Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit* 2 (Hildesheim 1892) 586.

[30] In D. A. Campbell (ed.), *Greek Lyric* 4 (London 1992) 111.

[31] On this passage, see G. A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric in its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill 1980) 35f.; and S. Usher (ed.), *Greek Orators* 3: *Isocrates* (Warminster 1990) 11.

help the city.[32]

Isocrates' hortatory speeches show the variety possible when matching style to substance. In these speeches, Isocrates connects himself with another poetic school, that of gnomic or didactic poetry. He makes this connection explicit when he refers to Theognis and Phocylides in *To Nicocles* 42f. These are poets in the gnomic tradition, known especially for short pithy statements of common moral ideas. Isocrates' hortatory speeches have a style that is not periodic, but abounding in asyndeton, quick imperative phrases, assonance and word play, Gorgianic figures, short clauses, high use of antithesis, as we might expect from Isocrates, but a very low incidence of the amplification so often attributed to him.[33] In the *Antidosis* Isocrates borrows the style of gnomic poetry and explicitly points out the difference of this style:

> οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ γέγραπται τοῖς ἀνεγνωσμένοις. Οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον ὁμολογούμενον ἀεὶ τῷ προειρημένῳ καὶ συγκεκλειμένον ἔχουσιν, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τοὐναντίον· ἀπολύσας γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ χωρὶς ὥσπερ τὰ καλούμενα κεφάλαια ποιήσας πειρῶμαι διὰ βραχέων ἕκαστον ὧν συμβουλεύω φράζειν.
>
> (67f.)
>
> But [the extract from *To Nicocles*] was not written like the others. For these [earlier quotations from *Panegyricus* and *On the Peace*] possess phrases always said in a similar way and linked to what was said before. But in this [discourse] it is different. For breaking from the preceding and putting things separately as in so-called headings I try to say what I wish briefly.

Isocrates is capable of using a lofty panegyric style, a style of pedagogical correction, a style more defensive, or an advisory style, as the need arises. For this variety in his approach, his immersion in different poetic styles serves as a source.

3. Why Isocrates Connects Himself with the Poetic Tradition

In making the claim that Isocrates borrows and reforms the poetic tradition, I am not claiming that Isocrates had specific passages of the poets in mind. While section 2 provided a number of parallels to earlier poetry, the parallels do not include verbal allusions. I am claiming that Isocrates emulated the different ways in which poetry could speak with authority in the Greek *polis* and thus kept the

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[32] See Solon 5f., 32-33a, 36f.; J. M. Edmonds (ed.), *Elegy and Iambus* 1 (Cambridge 1931). We might note too Solon's corrections of Mimnermus (20f.) as a parallel to Isocrates' correction of Polykrates at the opening of the *Busiris*.

[33] See Usher [28] 39-67.

poetic mode of discourse in his work when others were rejecting such a component.[34] Nagy has argued for the presence of an *ainos* tradition in which different kinds of poetry share a language of authority, advice, and praise and blame.[35] This is most manifest in gnomic advice poetry or public celebrational epinikian poetry, though it can be seen elsewhere too. Nagy sees a shared 'mode of discourse,' which connects different traditions. Thus the poets may share ideas because of the prominence of the tradition, even if they do not explicitly borrow from one another. Isocrates shares in the ideas of the poets in this sense, and this approach to the question explains why there is so little quotation or verbal allusion to earlier poetry in Isocrates.[36] Other orators and philosophers explicitly quote the poets because bringing in a poetic thought is to bring in something external. It is something foreign and so they mark such intrusions as quotations. Isocrates, on the other hand, sees no distinction in types of thought, and sees this all as part of the common voice of the Greek world he wishes to present. Where others 'borrowed phrases from Homer,' Isocrates recast the ideas.[37] He does not quote, but uses the patterns, topics, and styles of the poets. He therefore speaks in his own words, not those of earlier poets, but they are his words as informed by that poetic tradition.[38] He may use a pure, prose vocabulary, but his method is poetic.

Nagy and Edmunds have argued persuasively for the importance of utility,

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[34] It may be possible to find ideas similar to Isocrates' in other authors before Isocrates' time; this merely points out that the poetic style and topics were recognized and used in the fifth century. In spite of a movement away from them in the fourth century, Isocrates sought to carry on the tradition that could be seen in other, earlier work. See on this Schiappa [2 (1991)] 5-18 and G. A. Kennedy (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism* 1 (Cambridge 1989) 184f.

[35] Nagy [21].

[36] On quotations from poetry by the orators, see S. Perlman, 'Quotations from Poetry in Attic Orators of the Fourth Century B.C.,' *AJPh* 85 (1964) 155-72.

[37] O'Sullivan [9] 50 n. 156. R. Mondi, 'Greek Mythic Thought in the Light of the Near East,' in L. Edmunds (ed.), *Approaches to Greek Myth* (Baltimore 1990) 142-98, has argued for a similar kind of adaptation in the development of what he called 'mythic ideas' in the realm of comparative mythology. He does not see comparative mythology as a search in Greek myth for specific texts borrowed from the Near East, for example, as much as a more general adaptation of ideas that are shared.

[38] The closest Isocrates comes to a quotation is his mention (*Antidosis* 166) of Pindar's description of Athens as the ἔρεισμα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ('foundation of Greece'). Isocrates' method of incorporating poetry may be why some thought that Isocrates neglected poetry (*Panathenaicus* 18). In this we can see a contrast with what Herodotus did in the fifth century. Nagy [21] 333 has pointed out that Herodotus frames poetry with prose. Isocrates does not frame it; he absorbs it.

praise and blame, the *polis*, and Panhellenism as organizing principles of early Greek poetry and song.[39] Edmunds quotes Xenophanes (fr. 1.19-23) on this issue:

> Praise the man who, when he drinks, brings genuine things [*esthla*] to light,
> in order that there may be *mnêmosunê* and exertion over *aretê* [achievement]—
> do not treat the battles of Titans and of Giants
> nor of Centaurs, fictions of earlier men,
> or violent seditions. In these there is nothing useful.

Edmunds points out that usefulness is important in elegy: 'For Xenophanes (B1.23 DK) as for Theognis (772), poetry must be useful, and epic seems to contain "nothing useful."'[40] The Xenophanes fragment shows elegy's desire to move beyond the notions of epic and create its own space, and this space is created within the context of the *polis*. 'The *polis* itself, then, that arena of praise and blame, can preserve memory.'[41] Nagy talks of the importance of Panhellenism for all early Greek poetry and song. According to Nagy, this theme of Panhellenism is one that contributes to the endurance of much of early poetry, for it gives a wider sense of relevance to a work which may focus originally on the *polis* or the individual. These central issues of the poetic tradition—usefulness, praise and blame, the *polis* and Panhellenism—bring to mind Isocrates' attempts to create a new kind of discourse. The idea of usefulness recalls the ideas of poetry as Isocrates described them and connected them with his own prose. His discourse has consistently been referred to, often disparagingly, as epideictic where the focus is praise and blame.[42] Recent scholars have focused on the importance of the *polis* in early poetry and the centering of discourse on the status of the *polis*.[43] But this can be problematic:

> But where is the true city? Where can Theognis' verses be put into effect? Those who are in power are not the true citizenry, and the *polis* that Theognis would reclaim is only the remembered *polis* of his own poetry. This poetry is the charter for a once and future city. Furthermore, this city is not Megara, or not only Megara but a generalized Greek *polis*. . . .[44]

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[39] Nagy [21]; L. Edmunds, 'The Genre of Theognidean Poetry,' in T. Figueira and G. Nagy (edd.), *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis* (Baltimore 1985) 96-111.

[40] Edmunds [39] 97.

[41] Edmunds [39] 99.

[42] G. Nagy, *The Best of The Achaians* (Baltimore 1979) 222-42. Quintilian 3.4.11 says: *Isocrates in omni genere inesse laudem ac vituperationem existimavit* ('Isocrates judged that there is praise and blame in every type [of discourse].').

[43] Edmunds [39]; A. Ford, 'The Seal of Theognis: The Politics of Authorship in Archaic Greece,' in Figueira and Nagy [39] 82-95; Martin [25]; Nagy [21].

[44] Edmunds [39] 110.

The creation and praise of a 'once and future city' recalls the role of epideictic oratory as seen in funeral orations or Panathenaic discourses. One thinks of the idealization of Athens by Pericles in Thucydides or of Athens by Isocrates in the *Panegyricus*. Finally, Panhellenism is recognized as a main component of the political and educational agenda of Isocrates in, for example, his call to Greek unity against Persia in the *Panathenaicus* or *To Philip*.

It is, in fact, the extension of the idea of the *polis* to an idealized place, the 'once and future city' of Edmunds, that joins the idea of *polis* to Panhellenism. Isocrates talks of Athenian prominence, but in a cultural shift he equates the culture of Athens with the culture of Greece:

> It is significant that the last discourse as well as the first great effort of his career, the *Panegyricus*, extols the noble history of the city of his fathers. Love of Athens is the one passion of his dispassionate nature; and second only to this is his love of Hellas. Or rather, both of these feelings are blended into a single passion—a worship of Hellenism as a way of life, a saving religion of which he conceives Athens to be the central shrine and himself a prophet commissioned by the gods to reconcile the quarrels of the Greeks and unite them in a crusade against the barbarian world.[45]

Isocrates raises up the primacy of Greek culture as demonstrated at Athens.

When Isocrates takes on the characteristics of poetry, he is not necessarily interested in novelty. He follows the poets also in his emphasis on the tradition of speaking with authority to the *polis*. As Andrew Ford has said: 'Theognis is not claiming that [his utterances] are original with him. This is the [*sophie*] 'skill' of the archaic poet; he does not seek novel or idiosyncratic self-expression but desires to speak intelligibly and with authority.'[46] Martin has argued that parallel phrasing in poets is not a result of one borrowing from another, nor even of both borrowing from a common prior poem. Rather, he sees the common theme and common phrasing of the advice passages as the result of sharing a common generic heritage: 'I would claim that similar themes produce the resemblances. The themes are generated by a common source, an ancient genre of discourse, which has a basis in social fact of considerable antiquity, the discourse between a king (or advisor) and a prince.'[47] Isocrates employs this genre of discourse privately in such speeches as *To Nicocles* or *To Demonicus*. Isocrates' speech *To Philip* is the political public manifestation of such a tradition. The influence of his speeches as educational texts for his school—and indeed for European education in general, especially with *To Demonicus*—also shows the public, Panhellenic

[45] Norlin [11] ix-x.

[46] Ford [43] 83. Isocrates comments on this explicitly in *To Nicocles* 40f.

[47] Martin [25] 32.

focus of the discourse which has the dramatic setting of advice. The 'publication' of a 'private' communication is one of the main characteristics of such discourse.[48]

Thus the areas of focus seen in the social world of early poetry parallel those of Isocrates. I have argued above for similarities in organization, thought, and style between poetry and Isocrates' prose. We can see Isocrates borrowing the concept of encomiastic treatment, the Panhellenic concept of the city,[49] and the use of amplification as a form of epideictic argumentation. Isocrates saw that epideictic and deliberative rhetoric are very close in spirit;[50] to advocate a plan, one must persuade the audience, and praise is a way to do so. Part of what Isocrates sought for himself, his students, and perhaps even the culture, was a concept of deliberative oratory written in the style of epideictic. He will strive for the concept of the great city, the unity of Greece against Persia under Athens' leadership (or *anyone's* leadership later on), and a sense of 'the glory that was Greece' that is worth preserving. And so Isocrates reveals, to quote Gillis, the 'two central ideas of [his] life, eloquence and Panhellenism, one serving the other.'[51] And the latter, the idea of Panhellenism, is not only a political idea, but an educational and ethical ideal:

> Τοσοῦτον δ' ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ὥσθ' οἱ ταύτης μαθηταὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασιν, καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκεν μηκέτι τοῦ γένους, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας.
> (*Panegyricus* 50)
> And to such an extent has our city out-distanced other people in thinking and speaking that her pupils have become the teachers of all others; and she has made the name 'Greek' belong no longer to a race but to a manner of thought, and she has brought it about that those are called Greeks who share our world-view more than those who share a common ancestry.

This is his deliberative proposal, as one can see in the *Panegyricus* or the *Panathenaicus*, a proposal that will be argued in the epideictic mode, and the epideictic mood he gets from the poets.[52] The similarities pointed out above focus

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[48] See M. L. West (ed.), *Hesiod: Works and Days* (Oxford 1978) 22-25; Martin [25]; Nagy [21].

[49] See Nagy [42] 222-42; Nagy [21] 146-98.

[50] See Poulakos [4] 324-26; Papillon [20] 149-63.

[51] Gillis [5] 338.

[52] The similarities to Thucydides' version of Pericles' funeral oration (2.40-42) recall the role of public oratory in the life of the *polis* and the formulaic nature of funeral oratory. The

on the ethical encouragement of the audience, be it a victor and his city, a tyrant, a young prince, the city of Athens, or Isocrates' pupils. Isocrates shares with the poets a sense of urgency about moral conduct as exemplified by the greatness of the past and in service to the *polis*. This moral attention is acquired by looking to the past and heeding its message. Isocrates' education is based on what Anne Carson has called 'paradigm acquisition.' One hears the stories of great persons of old, and strives to live in accordance with the ἀρετή they exhibit.[53]

In this, we can see the contrast between Isocrates and the 'new thinking,' characteristic of Plato and (later) Aristotle. Plato describes traditional education in the *Protagoras* when he says that the students 'meet with many admonitions, and many descriptions and encomia of the great men of times long ago, so that the boy, desiring to imitate, seeks to become like them' (326A).[54] Plato, however, argues for a different kind of education resulting from the new literate world view of the late fifth and the fourth centuries. If his approach is as radical as Kevin Robb has presented it, then dialectic replaces memorization of the poets as the mode of coming to understand ἀρετή. Robb even goes so far as to say: 'If the society becomes fully literate, then great poetry at last has no important social or paideutic roles to play,' where 'literate' for Robb means 'dependent on dialectic.'[55] But Robb may have gone too far in his description of Plato's new approach. Plato used myth and recognized its force; he also advocated the use of (appropriate) poetry in education. If Isocrates perceives Plato's approach in the way Robb perceives it, then the preservation of the poetic is more understandable. In response to a threat to the poetic tradition as an influential force in Greece in the fourth century, Isocrates sought to maintain a system that had worked for the Greeks, but which was now being threatened in a battle concerning the education of Greece.[56]

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conventions of the *epitaphios* or the Panathenaic discourse are familiar, and perhaps it is the formulaic nature of these discourses that makes us think of them as most poetic. For the antecedents of epideictic in the poetic world, see V. Buchheit, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles* (Munich 1960) and T. Burgess, *Epideictic Literature* (Chicago 1902). On the importance of epideictic in the early history of Greece, see J. Walker, 'Before the Beginnings of "Poetry" and "Rhetoric": Hesiod on Eloquence,' *Rhetorica* 14 (1996) 243-64.

[53] A. Carson, 'How Not to Read a Poem: Unmixing Simonides from Protagoras,' *CPh* 87 (1992) 110-30. On the use of Homer for this, see *Panegyricus* 159.

[54] The translation is that of K. Robb, *Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece* (Oxford 1994) 184.

[55] Robb [54] 176.

[56] Educators know how easily young people learn from models; learning from discussion and contemplation of right behavior is an acquired skill which is only developed with time, and

4. Conclusions

There are, then, similarities between Isocrates and the poets. They both are willing to remold the tradition into something new. Xenophanes saw a need to bring usefulness into its message, something he saw to be lacking in epic. Isocrates agreed with this emphasis on utility, but followed Pindar in seeing the stories of the past, in epic as well as elsewhere, as useful patterns for the present and future. Isocrates struggled to present a cultural morality which unites the past with the present, which unites the universal with the particular, which creates mythic and epideictic situations out of historical and deliberative ones.[57] The Greeks had for many years looked to the poets as the source of wisdom: If a youth seeks ἀρετή, let him hear again and again the poetry of Homer and other poets, for ἀρετή is to be found there. The philosophers of the late fifth and the fourth centuries sought to modify that role of the poets and add themselves to the reading list, so to speak. Plato said that much of the old reading list was useless if not dangerous. But Isocrates' view was recognized and affirmed in the first century. How pleased Isocrates might have been to read what Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote of him three centuries later (*Isocrates* 4):

> The influence of [the themes of Isocratean discourses] would make anyone who applied himself to his works not only good orators, but men of sterling character, of positive service to their families, to their state and to Greece at large. The best possible lessons in virtue are to be found in the discourses of Isocrates: I therefore affirm that the man who intends to acquire ability in the whole field of politics, not merely a part of that science, should make Isocrates his constant companion. And anyone who is interested in true philosophy, and enjoys studying its practical as well as its speculative branches, and is seeking a career by which he will benefit many people, not one which will give him a carefree life, would be well advised to follow the principles which [Isocrates] adopts.

Dionysius sees Isocrates as the place to learn civic excellence; Isocrates saw the poetic tradition as the place to learn civic excellence. If Isocrates sought to put that tradition into his own prose, Dionysius asserts that he succeeded.

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with varying degrees of success. Most of us know from experience that young children's behavior comes from observation of role models and unconscious cultural formation, from acquiring the paradigms of the culture, as Carson [53] calls it. We know from advertising that adults follow this pattern as well. Clearly reasoned choices will become part of the developmental process for adults, but the use of observation and habit are powerful forces that cannot be ignored.

[57] This is what I have called hypodeictic discourse [20]. See also Poulakos [4].

TWO REFLECTIONS ON HERACLITUS[1]

Alexei V. Zadorojnyi
Department of Classical Philology, Moscow State Lomonosov University
Moscow 119899, Russia

Abstract. This article aims at detecting allusions to fragments of Heraclitus in Thucydides' *History* and Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. The first part treats the personification of war in Thucydides 3.82.2 as an inexact and somewhat polemical reminiscence of Heraclitus, fragment 53. The second part views the words of Socrates in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.4 not as a precept on athletics but as an echo of Heraclitus fragment 29.

1

> ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν. ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ.
>
> (Thuc. 3.82.2)
>
> For in peace and under favourable circumstances both the states and the individuals are rather well disposed, because they do not fall prey to constrained necessities; but the war, taking away the everyday well-being, is a violent teacher, and adapts the tempers of the many to the present situation.

This passage in Thucydides' analysis of *stasis* ('revolution', 'discord', 3.82f.) has often attracted scholars' attention.[2] It has been authoritatively argued that 'if Thucydides wanted his readers to draw any one moral from his work it was βίαιος διδάσκαλος ὁ πόλεμος' ('war is a violent teacher').[3] The remark is

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[1] In this paper I am especially grateful to D. A. Russell, C. B. R. Pelling and J. B. Hainsworth in Oxford, as well as to *Scholia*'s anonymous referees, both for their valuable criticism and for emending my English. All remaining errors are my own.

[2] Ch. 84 is condemned as spurious; see A. Fuks, 'Thucydides and the Stasis in Corcyra: Thuc., III, 82-3 Versus [Thuc.] III, 84', *AJPh* 92 (1971) 48-55, but see the objections of S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides* 1 (Oxford 1991), 488f.

[3] A. W. Gomme (ed.), *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 1 (Oxford 1945) 90; cf. Gomme (ed.), *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 2 (Oxford 1956) 385f., esp. 373: 'I have always regarded this as one of the strongest and deepest of Thucydides' personal convictions, and clearly expressed. . . . He appears here to be expressly dissociating himself from the cynical doctrine of force which he puts so often in the mouths of others. . . '. See also O. Luschnat, 'Thukydides', in A. Pauly, G. Wissowa and W. Kroll (edd.), *Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* Suppl. 12 (Stuttgart 1970) 1251; Hornblower [2] 482; Hornblower, *Thucydides* (London 1987) 69, 156f. For *stasis* see the article by C. Macleod,

indeed 'so famous that it is easy to forget that it is an audacious and arresting personification'.[4] Personification, or near personification of war, among other phenomena and abstracts, appears to be rather popular with Thucydides (cf. 1.121.1; 1.122.1; 2.18.2; 6.41.3; 5.5.3; 6.34.2; 6.70.1; 2.59.1).[5] Other authors too furnish many examples of war and related personified notions, for example, strife, fear and calamity.[6] Most interesting are contexts where war is given the role of inventor and instructor, as in Herodotus 7.144.2, Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* 391 (συμφορά, 'calamity'), Plato's *Laws* 709a3-4, Isocrates 8.19, Demosthenes 18.89, Hyperides *ap.* Longin. 15.10 (μάχη, 'battle'), and especially Aeschines 3.148 (πόλεμος . . . ἀείμνηστον παιδείαν αὐτοὺς ἐπαίδευσε, 'the war . . . has taught them a lesson not to be forgotten').[7]

One of the earliest and most fascinating personifications of war is found in Heraclitus, fragment 53 (cf. Hippol. *Ref.* 9.9.4):[8]

'Thucydides on Faction', *PCPhS* 25 (1979) 52-68, esp. 53f.; L. Edmunds, 'Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82-83)', *HSCPh* 79 (1975) 73-92; W. R. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton 1984) 95-105; Hornblower [2] 477-88; C. Orwin, *The Humanity of Thucydides* (Princeton 1994) 175-82.

[4] Hornblower [2] 156.

[5] See R. S. Radford, *Personification and Use of Abstract Subjects in the Attic Orators and Thucydides* (diss. Johns Hopkins 1901) 31: 'Especially noticeable in Thucydides is the frequent personification of πόλεμος, which is treated almost invariably as a personal notion—an unaccountable Power, full of violence and capture'; C. F. Smith, 'Personification in Thucydides', *CPh* 13 (1918) 241-50, esp. 241-43. Both scholars seem a little over-enthusiastic in labelling Thucydides' words as 'personification', e.g., τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον κινεῖν ('to move the war there', 6.34.3).

[6] Hom. *Il.* 13.299f. (Flight); 11.37, 15.119 (Flight, Fear); 4.440-43 (Flight, Fear, and Strife); 19.91-94 (Woe); 4.15, 4.82, 4.84, *et al.* (War); Hes. *Theog.* 225-32 (Strife, etc.); 756, 759 (Death); Hes. *Op.*11-20, 804 (Strife); Aesch. *Eum.* 864; Aristoph. *Ach.* 979, *Pax* 205, *Nub.* 6; Pericles *ap.* Plut. *Per.* 8.7; Theopomp. 115 fr. 127 ([F. Jacoby (ed.), *Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker* (1923-)] War); etc.

[7] It is, of course, possible that Aeschines and other orators were influenced by Thucydides. J. Classen and J. Steup (edd.), *Thucydides* 3 (Berlin 1892) 165 quote the Byzantine historian Theophylactus: ζωγράφος γὰρ τοῦ θανάτου ὁ πόλεμος . . . τῶν ἀνθρωπίων κακῶν ἀρχηγέτης καὶ διδάσκαλος αὐτοδίδακτος ('for war is the painter of death . . . the leader and self-teaching teacher of human distress', Theoph. Sim. *Hist.*1.15).

[8] The principal texts used in this work are H. Diels and W. Kranz (edd.), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 1 (Berlin 1951) for Heraclitus, E. C. Marchant (ed.), *Opera Omnia Xenophontis* (Oxford 1900-1910) for Xenophon, and H. S. Jones and J. E. Powell (edd.), *Thucydidis Historiae* (Oxford 1898-1901) for Thucydides.

> πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.
>
> War is father of all, king of all; and some He has rendered gods, and some men, some slaves, and some free.[9]

Now, in fact, the philosophical and literary background of Thucydides is as elusive as his ethics.[10] One cannot rule out the possibility that he was acquainted with Heraclitus' ideas.[11] Consequently, a pithy saying might become imprinted on his mind, so that he would recall it in an important section of his own work.

The *stasis* episode stands out as a reflection of Thucydides' personal attitude towards morality and history through the 'scientific' account of the 'greatest convulsion befallen the Hellenes' (1.1.2). The tone is that of grim

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[9] Cf. Plut. *De Iside et Osiride* 370d; Procl. *In Tim.* 1 p. 170, 22-24 (E. Diehl [ed.], *Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum Commentaria* [Leipzig 1965]); see comments by W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* 1 (Cambridge 1962) 446-49; M. Marcovich, *Heraclitus* (Venezuela 1967) 145-49; C. H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge 1979) 205-09, who connects it with fr. 80. For Hippolytus' attitude see C. Osborne, *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics* (London 1987) 132, 145, 158f.

[10] See, generally, Luschnat [3] 1230, 1260-64 and the brief but comprehensive analysis by Hornblower [2] 110-35, esp. 120-31, for philosophical affinities. Among other relevant studies are P. Moraux, 'Thucydide et la rhétorique', *LEC* 22 (1954) 3-23; J. Finley, 'Euripides and Thucydides' in *Three Essays on Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 1-54, esp. 33, on *stasis*; Finley, 'The Origins of Thucydides' Style', in Finley [above, this note] 55-112 (for Gorgias, Protagoras, Sophocles and Antiphon); L. Pearson, 'Thucydides and the Geographical Tradition', *CQ* 32 (1939) 37-60; K. Weidauer, *Thukydides und die hippokratischen Schriften* (Heidelberg 1953); G. Rechenauer, *Thukydides und die hippokratische Medizin: Naturwissenschaftliche Methodik als Model für Geschichtschreibung* 47 (Hildesheim 1991); C. Macleod, 'Thucydides and Tragedy', in *Collected Essays* (Oxford 1983) 140-58; E. Hussey, 'Thucydidean History and Democritean Theory' in P. A. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (edd.), *Crux: Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste Croix on his 75th Birthday* (London 1985) 118-38.

[11] Heraclitus' teaching was certainly known at Athens at that time. Diogenes Laertius 2.22 (cf. 9.12) reports an anecdote (=Arist. fr. 30 [F. R. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentar* 6 (Basel 1952)]) that after reading Heraclitus' book given to him by Euripides, Socrates said that its depth could be measured only by a 'Delian diver'; and there is also the obscure figure of a professed Heraclitean Cratylus, on whom see J. Stenzel, 'Kratylos', in *RE* 22 (Stuttgart 1922) 1660-62. Marcellinus, *Vita* 22 makes Thucydides a pupil of Anaxagoras.

irony,[12] as if by concentrating on the literal meaning of πόλεμος ('war')[13] Thucydides the 'reporter' objects to the contents of Heraclitus' thought.[14] War begets and invents, but it is βίαιος, ('violent') sire and 'teacher'.[15] Note that in the beginning of the *stasis* both Corcyrean parties promise freedom to the slaves who will join their side (3.73), while the citizen members of each party clearly run the risk of losing their status in case of defeat, if they are spared at all (cf. 3.81.4f.). Civil war creates a socially inverted world where fundamental identities of individuals are subject to change (cf. Heraclitus fr. 53: τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους, 'has rendered some slaves, others free'). It may be true that war rules the world, but it is a dismal truth about a terrible world. Things *are* like that, yet they ought not to be. . . .[16]

One should not be discouraged by the fact that Thucydides calls war 'teacher'[17] instead of 'father and king'. Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 370d also offers a slightly different version of fragment 53:

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[12] Thucydides 3.82.2 expresses a fairly pessimistic view of human nature (πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ ἀεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, 'many grievous calamaties, such as occur and will always occur while human nature is the same'), which has a 'Heraclitean' ring; cf., e.g., frr.1, 20. See also P. R. Pouncey, *The Necessities of War: A Study in Thucydides' Pessimism* (New York 1980) 20-22.

[13] Cf. Pouncey [12] 184: 'We should emphasize that with the philosophers these principles are *cosmic* forces; Thucydides as a historian reduces them in scope to principles governing *human action*'.

[14] Heraclitus' text is, as always, enigmatic. It can mean either the philosophical principle of opposition or the literal (heroic?) war; cf. Kahn [9] 205f., 208, who argues that Heraclitus substitutes War for Zeus as the traditional Father of the universe, comparing ἔδειξε ('he has rendered') to *Il.* 13.244; cf. also Pind. fr. 152 (C. M. Bowra, *Carmina Pindari cum Fragmentis*^{2} (Oxford 1947) on 'Law the King'. Note that Aeschylus in a celebrated passage refers to Zeus as ὁ τῶν θεῶν τύραννος . . . βίαιος ('the oppressive tyrant of the gods', Aesch. *Prom.* 736f.).

[15] 'Violent teacher' is usually translated as 'teacher *of* violence', yet R. Weil and J. de Romilly (edd.), *Thucydide: La guerre du Peloponnese* 3 (Paris 1967) 91, modify the meaning to 'un maître . . . dans la violence'.

[16] A momentous statement against civil discord is *Il.* 9.63f., quoted by Aristoph. *Pax* 1096-98; Arist. *Polit.* 1253a5-7 (cf. 33-35); see J. B. Hainsworth (ed.), *The Iliad: A Commentary* 3 (Cambridge 1993) 67; cf. Hdt. 8.3.2; Cic. *Phil.* 13.1. The thought of Eur. *Ion* 1045-47 is remarkably close to Thucydides. Edmunds [3] 82-88 compares Thuc. 3.82f. to Hesiod's description of the Iron Age (*Op.* 174-201).

[17] Macleod [3] 53 (=124) emphasises the 'oxymoron' hidden in juxtaposing the ideas of teaching as persuasion (cf. Thuc. 4.126.1, 5.86; Pl. *Gorg.* 453d9-11; Pl. *Ep.* 7.332a3-5) and of violence, referring to Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.12 and perhaps thinking also of *plagosus Orbilius* ('Orbilius the Chastiser', Hor. *Ep.* 2.1.70f.). Cf. also Arist. *Met.* 1009a17-18: 'Some need persuasion and some force'.

> Ἡράκλειτος . . . ἄντικρυς πόλεμον ὀνομάζει πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα καὶ κύριον πάντων.
>
> Heraclitus . . . calls war outright father and king and master of all.

Plutarch is obviously quoting from memory, as Thucydides is likely to have done. Conflation may well have occurred, as seems to be the case in Thucydides 1.11.1.[18] I would certainly not go as far as to suggest that there was an alternative 'reading' of Heraclitus known to Thucydides. Still I think that βίαιος διδάσκαλος ('a violent teacher'), a strikingly powerful personification, may be echoing the famous dictum or is at least comparable with it.

2

> ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ σώματος αὐτός τε οὐκ ἠμέλει τούς τ' ἀμελοῦντας οὐκ ἐπῄνει. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑπερεσθίοντα ὑπερπονεῖν ἀπεδοκίμαζε, τὸ δὲ ὅσα ἡδέως ἡ ψυχὴ δέχεται, ταῦτα ἱκανῶς ἐκπονεῖν ἐδοκίμαζε. ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἕξιν ὑγιεινήν τε ἱκανῶς εἶναι καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν ἔφη.
>
> (Xenoph. *Mem* 1.2.4; my emphasis)
>
> But he [Socrates] himself by no means neglected to care about his body and did not commend those who neglected their own; *accordingly, he disapproved of eating immoderately and labouring beyond measure, but approved of sufficient digestion of as much food as the soul took with pleasure.* He said that such condition was healthy enough and did not hinder the management of the soul.

The philosophical achievement of Xenophon's Socratic writings traditionally has not been valued highly by scholars.[19] The image of Socrates emerging from his works seems particularly humdrum, especially when set against the brilliant, paradoxical figure of Plato's dialogues. Therefore, it is often argued that, being himself a faultless, but very much a practically minded, 'country gentleman' and

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[18] Scholars made heavy weather about the Achaean wall in Thuc. 1.11.1, which is hard to identify with the wall erected in *Il.* 7.436-41: see E. Dolin, 'Thucydides on the Trojan Wall: A Critique of the Text of 1.11.1', *HSCPh* 87 (1983) 119-49; for the Homeric wall see Hainsworth [16] 145f. Thucydides apparently remembered that a wall is mentioned in Homer, but he also took it for granted that a siege must *start* with construction of one.

[19] Cf. E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* 2.1 (repr. Hildesheim 1963) 235f., 240; T. Gomperz (tr. G. G. Berry), *Greek Thinkers* 2 (London 1905) 136-38; W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* 3 (Cambridge 1969) 335, 339. Exhaustive bibliography has been compiled recently by D. R. Morrison (ed.), *Bibliography of Editions, Translations, and Commentaries on Xenophon's Socratic Writings: 1600-Present* (Pittsburgh 1988).

soldier, Xenophon either failed to understand the profundity and subtlety of Socratic discourse, or even distorted it deliberately by ascribing to Socrates pragmatic ideas so dear to his own heart.[20]

Chapters 1 and 2 of book 1 of the *Memorabilia* can be regarded as a second apology of Socrates.[21] In 1.1.1 Xenophon states the three points of accusation: Socrates was convicted of neglecting city gods, introducing new deities instead, and corrupting youths.[22] Xenophon refutes the first imputation (1.1.2-20), virtually skips the second (but see 1.11.1), and in 1.2.1-8 approaches the third, most complex, charge. He bases his argument on rather presumptuous premises. Socrates in no way corrupted young men, since he taught them endurance and moderation as far as heat and cold, exercise, sleep, sex, food and drink were concerned. Ψυχή ('soul'), etymologically linked with ψύχω ('to cool') and ψῦχος, 'cold',[23] seems to have a somewhat specific connotation here and in other similar passages (*Cyr.* 6.2.28; 8.7.4; cf. [Hipp.] *Hum.* 9),[24] since cooling was considered a necessary phase of digestion (cf. [Hipp.] *Int.* 1.170; *Morb.* 4.47; *Morb. Sacr.* 10).[25] This practical side of Socrates' philosophy is likely to have made a deep impression on Xenophon.[26] The theme of moderation in meals is recurrent (cf. *Mem.* 1.3.5-15; 4.7.9; *Oec.* 11.12; esp. *Cyr.* 1.6.17.).

Scholars discern a contemporary dietetic treatise behind Xenophon's text.[27] Greek medicine of the time, indeed, associates moderate nutrition with a healthy regimen, while surfeit is unwelcome as being followed by diseases

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[20] A. H. Chroust, *Socrates, Man and Myth: The Two Socratic Apologies of Xenophon* (London 1957) 3f., 11f.; J. K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (London 1974) 20, 27. See also the recent survey by S. B. Pomeroy (ed.), *Xenophon, Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary* (Oxford 1994) 21-31.

[21] Chroust [20] 44-68.

[22] Cf. *Apol.* 10; Pl. *Apol.* 24b8-c1; see O. Gigon (ed.), *Kommentar zum ersten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien* (Basel 1953) 3. The actual wording in Xenophon may reflect the literary post-mortem accusation of Socrates by the sophist Polycrates.

[23] H. Frisk (ed.), *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* 2 (Heidelberg 1970) 1141f.

[24] *Pace* Gigon [22] 32.

[25] P. Potter, *Hippocrates: Works* (Cambridge, Mass./London 1988) 77.

[26] Chroust [20] 56; Anderson [20] 29-32, esp.31f. Socrates preaches not so much relentless asceticism as prudent avoidance of excesses of both abstinence and indulgence, e.g., *Mem.* 1.3.5-15; 3.12.1-8.

[27] Gigon [22] 30-32, esp. 31: 'Kein Zweifel, dass Xenophon . . . den Sokrates sozusagen Teile eines diätetischen Traktats vortragen lässt, worin die richtige Mesotes im Masse der Nahrung und des physischen Trainings empfohlen war . . .'. H. R. Breitenbach, 'Xenophon von Athen', *RE* 2.18 (Stuttgart 1967) 1822 claims to identify Xenophon's 'source' as Herodicus of Selymbria.

([Hipp.] *Flat.* 7; *Aff.* 50).[28] Comedy too agrees that the belly is a great evil for men (cf. Alex. fr. 215; Diph. fr. 60[29]);[30] the idea occurs already in the *Odyssey* (7.215-21; 15.344f.; 17.473f., 228, 286; 18.53f., 364) Finally, Socrates' real, or literary, adversary could have made use of the poor physical condition of his students, as can be gleaned from Aristophanes' *Clouds*: they are pale (103, 119f., 1112, 1171),[31] untidy (836f.), and hungry (175, 186, 416); gymnastics (417) and outdoor activities (198f.) are forbidden to them.[32] So Xenophon might consider the charge of ascetic exhaustion worth rebutting.

What does ὑπερεσθίοντα ('eating immoderately') exactly refer to? Commentators saw in 1.2.4 a precept directed against traditional athletics with its heavy diet.[33] Πόνος ('work') is a common word for physical training and competition (cf., e.g., *Mem.* 4.7.9; Pind. *Ol.* 5.16; *I.* 5.25); ὑπερπονοῦντας ('getting tired') occurs in Xenophon, *De Equitum Magistro* 4.1 in a drill-context. Yet, ἐκπονεῖν in two already mentioned passages of Xenophon (*Cyr.* 1.6.17; *Oec.* 11.12) undoubtedly means 'to digest'.

The notion of athletic gluttony was proverbial (e.g., Theocr. 4.10; Cic. *Tusc.* 2.40). Athenaeus 10.412d-14d tells not a few stories about voracious sportsmen, with Heracles as the archetypal athlete (10.411a-12b). However, occasionally the situation is reversed; therefore, at the Olympic games the athletes had to fast for thirty days on a vegetarian diet.[34] Hippocrates advises how to reduce nutrition while training, if necessary (*De Salubr.* 7).

Although the reasons for such excessive eating were understood,[35] it often played a part in condemnation of (professional) sports as a waste of time and

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[28] Cf., e.g., [Hipp.] *Aff.* 1.47; *Alim.* 1; *Vict.* 1.35, 2.60; Pl. *Tim.* 87b5-8. [Hipp.] *Vict.* 3.71-75 is a discussion of types of surfeit and the ways of dealing with it.

[29] R. Kassel and C. Austin (edd.), *Poetae Comici Graeci* (Berlin 1983-).

[30] Alhough the comic reasoning may be different from the medical: a full belly is soon empty again and that means more trouble and expense.

[31] A 'normal' man should be suntanned from work and exercise: cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 457-59; Pl. *Rep.* 556d3-4.

[32] See K. J. Dover (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds* (Oxford 1968) 108; Guthrie [19] 364f. and n. 1; A. M. Bowie, *Aristophanes: Myth, Ritual and Comedy* (Cambridge 1993) 117f.

[33] L. Dindorf, *Xenophontis Memorabilia Socratis* (Oxford 1862) 11f.; R. Kühner, *Xenophon's Memorabilia*[6] (Leipzig 1902) 17.

[34] See W. Burkert (tr. J. Raffan), *Greek Religion* (Cambridge, Mass. 1985) 106.

[35] Compare the explanations of Athenaeus (καὶ οὐδὲν παράδοξον τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀδηφάγους γενέσθαι· πάντες γὰρ οἱ ἀθλοῦντες μετὰ τῶν γυμνασμάτων καὶ ἐσθίειν πολλὰ διδάσκονται, 'and it is not at all suprising that these men are voracious: for all athletes along with their exercise get used to eating a lot', Athen. 10.413c) and Galen (οἵ τε ἀθληταὶ διότι τοῖς γυμνασίοις αὐξάνουσι τὴν ἔμφυτον θερμασίαν, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ

effort, admired by the mob but below the dignity of the wise man. Philosophical indignation at athletics is as old as Xenophanes, fragment 2 (cf., e.g., Eur. fr. 282; both fragments are cited, again, by Ath. 10.413c-14c; [Pl.] *Amat.* 132c8-9). Galen's *Thrasybulus*[36] must have had a long and solid tradition behind it.

The significance of sport and physical culture was, certainly, much greater for the Greeks than for us today. Still, the position of this athletics passage is odd, since the section on Socrates' self-control (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.1-8) is sandwiched between the treatment of such serious accusations as atheism (1.1.2-20), contempt for the city laws (1.2.9-11), and perhaps the gravest charge: association with the newly hated Alcibiades and Critias (1.2.12-39). To exaggerate the situation a bit, imagine someone constructing a defence of Nietzsche like this: (1) he was not really so anti-Christian; (2) he did not ban marriage and never promoted nudism; (3) and he must not be blamed for the Nazi crimes.

Gluttony was used as a stock topic of reproof and negative portrayal in a broader sense. The focus of attention is by no means limited to athletes alone, but shifts freely. The good philosopher can be contrasted with the depraved tyrant and his court (Pl. *Ep.* 7.326b6-9 with 326c-d) and the good simple folks are set against the wicked rich (Eur. *El.* 424-31; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 7.92).[37] Timaeus' abuse of Aristotle included the charge of being a gourmand (fr. 156f.)[38]. Gluttony regularly appears in comic gibes (e.g., Aristoph. *Eq.* 956-58, 1290-99; *Nub.* 335-39; *Pax* 809-12; *Av.* 289). 'Inferior' human species such as women (Aristoph. *Lys.* 36, 537; Semonid. fr. 7.24, 46f.) and slaves (Alex. fr. 25; Men. *Pk.* 289f.) are insatiable eaters and drinkers. One thinks too, of course, of the monstrous Polyphemus (cf. *Od.* 9.292f., 296f., 373f.).

We may say that gluttony operates within the non-specialized opposition between the good/wise/right and the bad/ignorant/wrong.[39] The 'other' side might

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τροφῶν ἀπολαύειν δύνανται πλειόνων, 'and the athletes, as they increase the inborn heat with exercise, can therefore consume much more food', Gal. *Hipp. Aph.* 17 [K. G. Kühn (ed.), *Galen: Opera Omnia* 2 (Hildesheim 1964-65) 417]).

[36] Compare especially ch. 37: ὅλον γὰρ ἑορῶμεν αὐτῶν τὸν βίον . . . ἢ ἐσθιόντων ἢ πινόντων ἢ κοιμωμένων ἢ ἀποπατούντων ἢ κυλινδουμένων ἐν κόνει τε καὶ πηλῷ, 'for we were seeing them spend their whole life . . . either eating, or drinking, or sleeping, or easing themselves, or rolling about in dust and mud', Gal. *Thras.* 37 (Kühn [35] 5.879).

[37] See D. A. Russell (ed.), *Dio Chrysostom: Orations VII, XII and XXXVI* (Cambridge 1992) 135f.

[38] *FGrH* 556.

[39] Gluttony and stupidity especially often accompany each other; cf. Shakespeare *Love's Labours Lost* 1.1.26f.: 'Fat paunches have lean pates, and dainty bits / Make rich the ribs, but bankrupt quite the wits'.

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be described as ravenous as well as, for example, slow-witted, lecherous, cruel and cowardly. Social standing of the variable opposites is secondary.

Perhaps the idea has been formulated in the wryest manner by Heraclitus, fragment 29 (cf. Clem. *Strom.* 5.9.4):

> αἱρεῦνται γὰρ ἓν ἀντὶ ἁπάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὅκωσπερ κτήνεα.
> For the best choose one thing in return for all, everlasting fame among mortals; but the many are glutted like cattle.[40]

Of course, one can never be sure about the original meaning with Heraclitus.[41] Political implications would be promptly read into the saying by the Greeks, taking it as an expression of aristocratic 'right' scorn of the rabble,[42] and I do not think such interpretation, which fits in with the traditional image of Heraclitus (cf. frr. 20, 43f., 49; Diog. Laert. 9.3, 16), is wholly unjustified. Socrates was most probably acquainted with Heraclitus' teaching[43] and therefore capable of citing and elaborating his aphorisms. It is now impossible to know in what sense he would choose to take fragment 29 or (strictly speaking) the second half of it. The probable degree of Socratic irony is likewise beyond estimation.

If my assumption is correct and Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.4 is reflecting Heraclitus' dictum, the question arises whether Xenophon failed to perceive the allusion, interpreting his teacher's words as a precept on athletics, or pretended not to notice it. To answer this question we must once again consider the apologetic task of *Memorabilia* 1.1f.

Though no aristocrat by birth, Socrates made himself politically vulnerable with his own statements.[44] Disregard for cleanliness on the part of philosophers,

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[40] In Clement's text an inexact quotation from Demosthenes (τῇ γαστρὶ μετροῦντες καὶ τοῖς αἰσχίστοις τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, 'measuring happiness by the belly and the most shameful things', Dem.18.296; cf. Plut. *De Fortuna* 97d) follows immediately afterward. Cf. also frr. 20, 89, 104.

[41] *Pace* Marcovich [9] 508: 'The meaning of the saying is clear enough'.

[42] As, for instance, was done in this century by K. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*[3] 1 (London 1957) 13, quoting fr. 29 as proof of Heraclitus' totalitarianism.

[43] See above n. 11. Certain passages in Plato's dialogues allow us to suppose that Socrates possessed an adequate knowledge of Heraclitean doctrine; cf., e.g., *Tht.* 152d2-e9; *Phaed.* 60b7, 90c5; *Gorg.* 495e2-497d8.

[44] Cf., e.g., *Mem.* 3.7.6; Pl. *Men.* 93a1-95a1; *Gorg.* 515b6-17b5. See Guthrie [19] 409-16; D. I. Rankin, 'Socrates, an Oligarch?', *AC* 56 (1987) 68-87; R. W. Sharples, 'On Socratic Reasoning and Practical Activity', in H. D. Jocelyn (ed.), *Tria Lustra: Essays and Notes Presented to J. Pinsent* 3 (1993) 35-44, esp. 36f.: 'There can be little doubt that the historical Socrates held views that were hostile to democracy at least in their implications', as there is no

too, (cf. Aristoph. *Nub.* 186; *Av.* 1281f.) was readily interpreted as a sign of pro-Spartan, therefore anti-democratic, sympathies[45] and Alcibiades' and Critias' education was never forgotten (cf. Aeschin. 1.173). In whatever, 'general' or political, sense Socrates hypothetically employed Heraclitus' saying, he could not help sounding fairly rude. In *Memorabilia* 1.3.7f. Socrates refers as if in jest (ἔπαιζε ἅμα σπουδάζων, 'he talked half joking, half in earnest', 1.3.8) to the companions of Odysseus, who were transformed into pigs through their gluttony (cf. Heraclitus' κτήνεα, 'cattle', fr. 29). Κόρος ('surfeit'), which occurs in *Memorabilia* 1.3.6 (ὑπὲρ κόρον, 'beyond satiety'; cf. Heraclitus' κεκόρηνται, 'are glutted', fr. 29) is also a word with strong ethical and therefore social implications. It can result in ἄτη, 'wickedness' (Pind. *Ol.* 1.55) or ὕβρις, 'insolence' (Sol. fr. 6.3f.; Theogn. 153f.), the latter notion being easily transferred into the political sphere.[46] Besides, it is the ordinary Athenian citizen, who loves to give himself to excessive pleasures of the belly, as can be seen, for example, from Aristophanes, *Nubes* 385-92. Heraclitus' censure of 'the many' could be interpreted as a political declaration. No doubt Socrates' accusers would gladly seize upon it as an extra proof of the man's disloyalty to the democratic regime.

I contend that Xenophon felt the danger and rather skilfully parried it by playing down and disguising the suspect allusion.[47] In shifting the weight of Socrates' words from political grounds to a safer sphere of athletics, he was probably not so simple after all as we take him to be.

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sign of his 'having seen democracy as having any positive value'. But see also remarks by K. J. Dover, 'The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society', *Talanta* 7 (1975) 24-52.

[45] See Dover [32] li-lii.

[46] See G. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past* (Baltimore/London 1990) 281. Ὕβρις in an anti-democratic context is found, for example, in Critias' epitaph (Schol. Aesch. 1.39). For κόρος in Heraclitus cf. fr. 111 and cosmological frr. 65, 67.

[47] Cf. Anderson [20] 44f. on a careful 'democratic twist' in Xen. 1.2.58f.

EURIPIDES AND THE DAMP SQUIB

Walter Hift
Department of Classics,[1] University of Natal
Durban 4041

Abstract. In a number of plays Euripides carefully builds up the audience's expectation to regard a scene as being of utmost importance and significance only to let it fizzle out badly in the end. This is not ineptitude on his part, as has sometimes been claimed, but is done very deliberately. In each case the very collapse of the expectation is the clue to what the play as a whole is about.

Euripides uses a number of different methods to achieve his effects, such as logical discussion, irony, humour and dramatic impact. There is one method, which I call the 'damp squib', which has not received widespread recognition. This is a method that is not immediately apparent; it merely leaves a feeling of dissatisfaction in the audience. Some critics consider scenes featuring this method inept, but I will attempt to show in this article that Euripides uses this method deliberately and with a clear purpose in mind.[2] In this method Euripides does his best to build up the audience's expectation to a maximum. The audience is led to believe that the coming scene will be absolutely crucial for the play and contain its vital point; the audience is urged to concentrate all its powers on it. But when it arrives the scene is sadly lacking and not worthy of such concentration (as in the first three passages discussed below). Or else the scene does reach the expected emotional climax, but thereafter it is completely ignored as if it had never happened (as in the final two passages discussed below). The whole point of the 'damp squib' method is to make the thinking man in the audience realise that the expected climax would, in fact, have been wrong or unimportant. The real purpose of the drama lies elsewhere.

For the purpose of building up audience expectation, Euripides often relies on the basic structure of Greek drama. Thus a recognition scene is generally followed by an expression of great joy, a sequence that an audience would expect.[3] In other cases the playwright may rely on memories of previous

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[1] The author is an Honorary Research Associate in the Department of Classics.

[2] For further discussion see my *Psychiatry and the Plays of Euripides* (diss. Natal 1994).

[3] Aristotle (*Poetics* 1452a, b) recommends that recognition should always entail a reversal of mood which should flow naturally from the recognition. In Aischulos' *Choephoroi* recognition (166-211) is followed by doubt (212-34) and then joy (235-63). In Euripides' *Iphigeneia among the Taurians* recognition between Iphigeneia and Orestes leads to a long

tragedies. A scene similar to the coming one would have already occurred in an Aeschylean or Sophoklean tragedy and the audience would naturally expect the same again, but the Euripidean scene seems to fall woefully short or to be utterly different in outlook.[4] These expected climactic scenes are usually carefully prepared for in the preceding parts of a tragedy where characters repeatedly seem to point out what the basic message is likely to be. When the climactic scene comes the audience is geared to expect a certain development. The greater the expectation the greater the anticlimax when nothing happens. I shall begin with a simple example of a 'damp squib' in the *Troades* and then examine some other examples in other works of Euripides.

The Joke of the Troades

Throughout the earlier parts of the *Troades* Kassandra, Hekabe, Andromache and the Chorus have all urged the same conclusions: the Trojan War is an unmitigated evil; the wicked woman Helene has caused it; therefore she ought to be made to pay the penalty. In lines 914-65 Helene conducts her defence very ably. Many commentators, influenced by what has gone before, have already prejudged her by this stage and regard her words as sophistry; indeed, many members of the original audience must have had similar opinions. But if we take an unbiased view of the matter there is much sense in what she says. Certainly the Chorus is rather shaken (966-69) and Hekabe's rebuttal is far from convincing,[5] amounting to mere vituperation towards the end. The stage is therefore set for the apparent climax of the play: Menelaos has to judge and give a verdict. He does not want to do so and attempts to avoid the issue, but Hekabe relentlessly hounds him into making a decision. When he tries to postpone the evil moment and says he will take his wife home to Sparta and decide there, she says: μή νυν νεὼς σοὶ ταὐτὸν ἐσβήτω σκάφος[6] ('At least let not the same ship carry you both!', 1049). To this Menelaos answers in line 1050: τί δ' ἔστι;

(tongue-in-cheek) passage expressing their delight in each other. Aristophanes similarly exploits this audience expectation. In *Thesmophoriazousai* recognition between the pseudo-Helene and the pseudo-Menelaos (905-10) is followed by expressions of joy (912-16).

[4] A few examples follow. Kassandra in *Agamemnon* behaves with great dignity, in the *Troades* hysterically. Ajax (in the tragedy of the same name) is inevitably driven to suicide; Herakles (*Herakles*) refuses it. Kreon in the *Antigone* gives some very pertinent reasons for his action; in the *Phoinissai* he is merely pompous.

[5] See particularly G. W. Amerasingh, 'The Helen Episode in the *Troades*', *Ramus* 2 (1973) 99-106; P. Vellacott, *The Bacchae and Other Plays* (Harmondsworth 1954) 17.

[6] The Greek text used of the *Troades* (with some orthographical changes) is that of S. A. Barlow, *Euripides: Trojan Women* (Warminster 1986).

μεῖζον βρῖθος ἢ πάροιθ' ἔχει; ('What of it? Does she carry more weight than she used to?'). From there onwards the matter is no longer in doubt: Helene has won and Hekabe has lost. But what a feeble way for such a tremendous climax to end!

Line 1050 has been called cryptic by some commentators, but I would rather call it masterly. There is no doubt about the text and the word βρῖθος (1050) can hardly be translated in any meaningful way except as 'weight'. Almost all critics agree that this is a joke. Only Buttrey maintains that it is an obscure reference to Pherekydes' account of the Argonauts.[7] Apart from being a very feeble joke, what is it doing here in this tension-laden atmosphere? And why is it spoken by Menelaos who is not noted as a humorist in any of the ancient accounts? Critics have been puzzled. The scholiast remarks on 1049f.: καὶ τοῦτο γελοῖον, γελοιότερον δὲ ὃ ἀντερεῖ ('Her remark is laughable and what he answers even more so.')[8] In addition to 'laughable', the word γελοῖον may mean 'humorous' or 'ridiculous'.

Some commentators go so far as to suggest that this whole scene should be played as a comedy with the stupid oaf Menelaos falling over his own feet.[9] Apart from this one line, there is nothing in the *Troades* that supports such an interpretation, which would completely destroy the dramatic tension. Other scholars take the remark as plain stupidity, showing Menelaos' low mentality.[10] Yet others suggest that Menelaos is trying to dismiss Hekabe's request with a laugh.[11] This makes much more sense in view of his psychological position. Menelaos is a man with deeply ambivalent feelings. He loves Helene and he hates her; he admires her and despises her. Intellectually he has made up his mind to kill her; emotionally he wants to reinstate her. In each of these contrasting pairs of attitudes one side is brought out by what he says in the text, the other in the way he acts. Torn between these extremes he appears ineffectual, fickle and easily manipulated. Helene and Hekabe are fully aware of this and try to exploit his ambivalence. Hekabe plagues him until he feels driven into a corner. He must either round on her and abuse her, which would be tantamount

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[7] T. V. Buttrey, 'Epic Illusion, Tragic Reality: Was Helen Overweight?', *LCM* 3 (1978) 285-87.

[8] For the scholia see E. Schwartz, *Scholia in Euripidem* (Berlin 1887-91).

[9] This is best brought out by G. Gellie, in J. H. Betts, J. T. Hooker and J. R. Green (edd.), *Studies in Honour of T. B. L. Webster* 1 (Bristol 1986) 114-21.

[10] Cf. B. Seidensticker, *Palintonos Harmonia: Studien zu komischen Elementen in der griechischen Tragödie* (Göttingen 1982) 89-91, 214.

[11] K. H. Lee, *Euripides: Trojan Women* (Basingstoke 1976) 297-314; G. M. A. Grube, *The Drama of Euripides* (London 1973) 294f.

to declaring Helene the winner, or give in to her and commit himself to killing his wife. He resolves the dilemma by a flippant joke. When driven into a corner, he responds with this very useful method, although the dramatic tension would be spoiled if it were followed up. But Hekabe ignores the feeble joke and proceeds with her argument. Nonetheless, in retrospect, we can see that the joke was really the turning point. From line 1050 onwards the possibility of Helene's death recedes further and further into the background.

The real reason that Euripides builds up to this climax and then 'botches' it in this way is that Helene's 'wickedness' is not the sole cause of all the ills. Many have contributed to the disaster.[12] Helene is only one link in this long chain, as she hints in her defence (919-37). She is singled out as the culprit because she is available, unable to fight back, and probably because she inspires jealousy in the other women. The real cause for all the ghastly events of the war is not to be found in any one person or even the gods or fate. Every person concerned has acted according to his or her own nature and added his quota to the final ill result. This is the overall message of the *Troades.*[13] The great climax is not really of significance at all.

The Hymn of Joy in the Elektra

The sequence of recognition followed by joy is well exemplified in Aischulos' *Choephoroi* where Orestes' revelation is followed by three lines of mild joy by the chorus and then eight lines of transcendent joy by Elektra (240-47). In Sophokles' *Elektra* this is even more pronounced. The same revelation is followed by seventy-eight lines of expressions of joy by brother and sister. In both these tragedies the playwrights reinforce this expectation by stressing Elektra's longing for her brother and her disappointment in his seeming non-arrival in many previous passages. When eventually Orestes' identity is revealed, tension is built up to an almost intolerable level by Elektra at first not being sure and asking for proof. In both tragedies this is given and quickly accepted. Thereafter joy has free rein and there is much audience satisfaction.

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[12] Thus Eris threw the apple of discord; Tyndareos made the suitors swear an oath of mutual support; Hekabe and Priam failed to kill Paris in infancy in spite of oracular commands to do so; the goddesses on Ida continued the quarrel; Aphrodite brought Paris and Helene together; Paris took her away and she offered little resistance; Menelaos first left them alone together and then felt aggrieved when the inevitable happened; Agamemnon assembled the host; various gods urged it on; all the heroes on either side fought for their own glory and status; Epeios built the horse and Odysseus manned it; and finally all the perpetrators of the recent atrocities during the sack were acting according to their own nature.

[13] As first suggested by Barlow [6] 30-35.

In Euripides' *Elektra* the same methods are employed. Elektra's longing for her brother is stressed perhaps even more than in the two aforementioned tragedies. At first recognition is delayed by scepticism. But from here onwards Euripides' play differs from the others. Scepticism is prolonged to extraordinary lengths.[14] Even after the final convincing proof (the scar, as in *Od.* 19.391ff.) the young lady still doubts: ὁρῶ μὲν πτώματος τεκμήριον[15] ('I see evidence of a fall', 575). The μέν suggests that it will be followed by a δέ, expressing further objections, though this does not actually occur. Elektra's reluctance is so marked that the old man becomes quite indignant: ἔπειτα μέλλεις προσπίτνειν τοῖς φιλτάτοις; ('Do you still hesitate to embrace your dearest one?', 576). The word μέλλειν may be translated 'hesitate', 'postpone', 'be about to', 'plan' or 'consider'. Whichever meaning we apply, her action is the very antithesis of spontaneous jubilation. Elektra responds to the implied criticism cerebrally rather than emotionally: ἀλλ' οὐκέτ', ὦ γεραιέ· συμβόλοισι γὰρ / τοῖς σοῖς πέπεισμαι θυμόν' ('Oh, no longer! Dear man, / your signs convince my heart', 577f.). Only after that do sister and brother begin to say all the expected things: ὦ χρόνῳ φανείς, / ἔχω σ' ἀέλπτως ('O, at long last you appear; / I hold you, as I never hoped', 578f. [Elektra]); κἀξ ἐμοῦ γ' ἔχῃ χρόνῳ ('And are held by me at long last too!', 579 [Orestes]); οὐδέποτε δόξασ' ('When I never expected it', 580 [Elektra]); οὐδ' ἐγὼ γὰρ ἤλπισα ('Nor did I hope for it either', 580 [Orestes]); ἐκεῖνος εἶ σύ; ('Are you really he?', 581 [Elektra]); σύμμαχός γέ σοι μόνος ('Yes he, your only ally', 581 [Orestes]). There are only four lines extant of this[16] and even these are followed by a philosophic discussion on justice (582-84). It is left to the Chorus to sing the expected hymn of joy, which they do very effectively (585-95).

As an expression of overwhelming joy and an easing of the audience's dramatic tension, this scene is clearly a 'damp squib'.[17] The reason for it is that Euripides wishes to tell us that in spite of all her protestations Elektra's real motive is not love for her brother. She has cast Orestes in the role of a glorious

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[14] Indeed, the three tokens of recognition used by Aischulos and accepted by his audience (and by Aristotle) are used again but subjected to merciless scrutiny and found wanting, so much so that many critics have taken this passage to be a direct attack on Aischulos. This would be a tasteless and pointless matter in the middle of a tragedy about Elektra. We shall see the real reason for it presently.

[15] The text of the *Elektra* is that of M. J. Cropp, *Euripides: Elektra* (Warminster 1988).

[16] There may have been one or two more lines: there appears to be a *lacuna* at this point.

[17] H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy* (London 1961) 330-40 and A. Lesky (tr. M. Dillon), *Greek Tragic Poetry* (New Haven 1972) 291-300 both comment on the ineptitude of the scene.

folktale hero delivering the damsel in distress;[18] it is this vision of him that she longs for, not the real man. In this Elektra is dreadfully disappointed. She has made her attitude perfectly clear in lines 524-26: 'You are talking rubbish if you intimate that my courageous brother would come here stealthily for fear of Aigisthos'. Elektra's disappointment shows clearly in her reluctance to accept, her prolonged scepticism, her rejection of Aeschylean proof, and the coolness of her reception. The very bathos of the scene is a powerful means of making us understand Elektra's real character and motivation, which is the crux of Euripides' play.

The Song of Triumph in the Elektra

As in his other tragedies, Euripides prepares for this scene earlier in the drama. Time and again Elektra has voiced her great hatred for Aigisthos. All she wants, according to her, is to see him punished. Now the time has come: Orestes brings his severed head to her to use as she likes. The audience may now confidently expect a passionate song of triumph. This expectation is further enhanced by a few intercalated lines (900-06). Elektra voices the fear that people may think ill of her for abusing the dead. Reassured that she may speak freely, she begins.

A great anticlimax ensues. Instead of letting her pent-up hatred gush out, Elektra projects a dry, pedantic speech (907-44, esp. 907-10, 912f.):

> εἶέν· τίν' ἀρχὴν πρῶτά σ' ἐξείπω κακῶν,
> ποίας τελευτάς; τίνα μέσον τάξω λόγον;
> καὶ μὴν δι' ὄρθρων γ' οὔποτ' ἐξελίμπανον
> θρυλοῦσ' ἃ γ' εἰπεῖν ἤθελον κατ' ὄμμα σόν . . .
> . . . . . .
> . . . νῦν οὖν ἔσμεν· ἀποδώσω δέ σοι
> ἐκεῖν' ἃ σε ζῶντ' ἤθελον λέξαι κακά.
>
> Well, then, what beginning shall I give to my cursing?
> What ending? What theme shall I place in the middle?
> To be sure, though, in the dawn hours I never tired
> Of rehearsing what I wanted to say to your face . . .
> . . . . . .
> . . . So now I am free and shall pay my debt to you,
> Cursing you as I wanted while you lived.

[18] A modern reader might think of a Percival or St George; a Greek girl presumably had someone like Perseus or Bellerophon in mind.

Much of her speech (907-44) is concerned with Aigisthos' sex life. He was a fop, a womaniser, completely under the domination of Klutaimestra. It was she who did all the evil; he was but a despicable tool. Critics almost unanimously condemn this passage. Denniston calls it a 'weak speech'; Lesky considers it to be among 'the most unpleasant passages Euripides ever wrote, like a most unsuccessful effort in rhetoric, difficult to understand'; Haigh maintains the speech has 'little real passion' and is a 'philosophical lecture'; Kitto holds there is 'no unreal pretence that Elektra's emotions relieve their charge in a torrent of abuse'; and Conacher describes the speech as 'no furious indictment . . . but a sarcastic tirade . . .'.[19]

As a song of triumph over Aigisthos Elektra's speech is indeed feeble. But as a study of Elektra's hidden motivation it is superb. Her objections to him were not so much the murder as his sex life, a stark contrast to her own blighted sex life, but her real hatred is reserved for her mother. Under the guise of triumphing over Aigisthos, she lets slip her loathing of the woman who through her domineering ways and unbridled sexuality has thwarted Elektra's desires at every turn. This is what has motivated all her actions in spite of what she might have said previously. Far from being a climax of the play, this scene serves only to prepare for the real climax to come: the confrontation between the two women. The function of the 'damp squib' is to alert the audience to where the real problem lies.

Makaria's Noble Self-sacrifice in the Herakleidai

Here too the great scene is carefully prepared for. We are shown the desperate plight of the children; their only hope is help from Demophon (31-38). The decision is carefully prolonged to generate maximum tension. At last Demophon decides virtuously (236-49). But this, in turn, turns sour when it appears that the sacrifice of a virgin is required to carry out Demophon's resolve (406-09). This he is not prepared to grant (410-14); nor are the fugitives prepared or indeed morally entitled to accept (434-37). The plight of the children is as bad as ever and there appears to be a complete impasse with no possible moral solution (471-73). Tension is at a maximum. Suddenly it is resolved by Makaria's decision to accept the role of sacrificial victim voluntarily (500-06). The audience as well as all the characters gladly accept this easy means of getting out of a difficult situation (597-600). Makaria's splendid deed is obviously the highlight of the

[19] J. D. Denniston, *Euripides: Elektra* (Oxford 1939) 159; Lesky [17] 296; A. E. Haigh, *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks* (Oxford 1896) 234; Kitto [17] 336; D. J. Conacher, *Euripidean Drama* (London 1967) 207.

play on which everything else depends. This is further emphasised by the following scenes that show that there is a moral question as well as one of personal courage. Have the Herakleidai or the Athenians the moral right to accept such a sacrifice on their behalf (602-07)? And a similar attempt at heroic self-sacrifice by Iolaos, when he tries to arm himself and enter the coming battle, only leads to ridicule (720-47). Clearly we must await the outcome of events before we can accept Makaria's splendid self-sacrifice as a moral or factual solution.

And there is the rub! The great deed is never mentioned again. True, Hyllos' relieving army arrives immediately, but they must have been on the march long before the great decision. Some critics have found this silence so abhorrent that they have postulated that a whole scene dealing with this matter must have dropped out of the play during transmission.[20] The only supporting evidence for such a view they can produce is that the play is rather short and that Iolaos is left sitting at the end of the one scene and found sprawling on the ground in the next. This is not very convincing evidence.

In lines 819-22 the army is being prepared for battle and the proper sacrifices are made: μάντεις δ' . . . / . . . οὐκ ἔμελλον, ἀλλ' ἀφίεσαν / λαιμῶν βροτείων εὐθὺς οὔριον φόνον[21] ('And the priests . . . / . . . did not delay but released / at once from the victims' throats the auspicious blood', 819, 821f.).[22] Here, if anywhere, is surely the place to have put in: 'And Makaria died, a willing sacrifice for her people' or words to that effect. But nothing is said. If this refers to Makaria it is singularly colourless. I think we must assume that Euripides quite deliberately wrote so obscurely. Granted, the Athenian army won the victory, but this appears to have been due to the heroism of the soldiers, particularly Hyllos and the rejuvenated Iolaos (851-53). Some people thought they saw Herakles and Hebe coming into the battle on the side of the Athenians, but the messenger begs leave to doubt it (847f.). Iolaos' rejuvenation itself is difficult enough to accept in view of the way his heroic stance was undercut by humour in the previous scene.

The playwright's purpose in this 'damp squib' is to convey the message: If you are very credulous you can make out a scenario where Makaria's heroic self-sacrifice caused the victory of goodness over evil. But there is no real evidence for this. The events are perfectly explicable without bringing in divine sanction for righteousness. And the final scenes of the play, otherwise almost inexplicable, will cast much doubt on whether righteousness really lay solely with the children

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[20] The matter is fully discussed by Lesky [17] 291-300.

[21] The text of the *Herakleidai* is that of A. S. Way, *Euripides* 3 (Cambridge, Mass. 1971).

[22] Different translations differ on these lines and on the possibility of this referring to human sacrifice, specifically Makaria's.

of Herakles (942-1052). Heroic self-sacrifice may be a great balm to a person's own soul, but it is arguable whether it conveys any concrete or moral advantages to society.

Menoikeus' Heroic Suicide in the Phoinissai

As Craik points out, this scene stands in the very middle of the tragedy.[23] There have been many warnings of impending disaster (the audience knew the outline of the story anyway): there will be war; many will die; and the brothers will both perish. Up to now the play has consisted of a series of attempts to avert the disaster: the Chorus has tried the invocation of the gods by dancing (239-43); Iokaste has tried the effect of love and of reason upon Eteokles (379-426); the brothers tried to solve things by parley (446-637); and Eteokles and Kreon attempted to avert disaster by strategic means (705-56). All these efforts proved utterly useless. So now there is a final desperate attempt: the prophet Teiresias is called in to explain what must be done. After much hesitation to heighten the tension, he pronounces that the fault lies in the ancient guilt of the house of Kadmos (865-90). Only the drastic means of sacrificing its last offspring, Menoikeus, will serve to avert catastrophe (896-914). Kreon refuses so dreadful a deed, but Menoikeus gloriously accepts in a speech full of youthful heroism (991-1018). The audience may confidently expect that now all will be well.

But once again nothing happens. Arming continues, armies clash, and the brothers kill each other. Menoikeus' glorious self-sacrifice is referred to only in passing on three occasions: in the third stasimon the Chorus briefly say they are happy about his action (1054-59). Although they say ἀγάμεθα ('we are happy', 1055), they sound very unsure about the value of the heroic deed. The messenger begins his account with three lines (1090-92) mentioning Menoikeus' self-sacrifice as something well known, but then ignores it. All his tale is of military events and human endeavour leading to disaster. Iokaste is the only one who seems to connect the self-sacrifice with a happy outcome (1202-07):

> καλῶς τὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ τὰ τῆς τύχης ἔχει·
> παῖδές τε γάρ μοι ζῶσι κἀκπέφευγε γῆ.
> Κρέων δ' ἔοικε τῶν ἐμῶν νυμφευμάτων
> τῶν τ' Οἰδίπου δύστηνος ἀπολαῦσαι κακῶν
> παιδὸς στερηθεὶς τῇ πόλει μὲν εὐτυχῶς
> ἰδίᾳ δὲ λυπρῶς.[24]

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[23] E. Craik, *Euripides: Phoenician Women* (Warminster 1988) 217.

[24] The text of the *Phoinissai* used is that of Craik [23].

> The arrangements of the gods and of Fate are proceeding well.
> My two children are still alive and the country has escaped.
> Only Kreon seems to have reaped the bitter fruit
> Of my disastrous marriage and that of Oidipous.
> He, poor wretch, has lost his son—good luck for the city
> But grief for him.

But no sooner has she said this than the continuation of the messenger's tale shatters this poor false hope. Complete disaster follows immediately. Once again the great deed, so carefully led up to and prepared for, is a 'damp squib'. The feeble attempts by the Chorus, Iokasta and the Messenger to read significance into it only heighten its failure. The message is that heroic self-sacrifice may do a lot of good to one's own soul but is utterly useless as a remedy for feelings of guilt.

HORACE ON DAMASIPPUS ON STERTINIUS ON . . .[1]

Robin P. Bond
Department of Classics, University of Canterbury
Christchurch, New Zealand

Abstract. This article explores the characterisation of Damasippus as enthusiastic but inexpert Stoic convert, the presentation of the Horatian voice and also the Stoic authenticity of the Stertinian portion of Horace, *Satires* 2.3. An attempt is made to analyse the Stertinian arguments and to come to some conclusions regarding the success of the poem as an entertainment and a critique of extremist Stoic values and techniques of argumentation.

Discussion of Satires *2.3.48-76*

These verses purport to give Stertinius' own introduction to his diatribe, as recalled by Damasippus for Horace's 'benefit', which expounds the Stoic paradox 'that every fool is mad'. Stertinius opens with an analogy drawn from the idea of straying from the 'strait and narrow path'. Whichever wrong directions are chosen by different people, their choices are equally wrong. The conclusion of the analogy has a proverbial vividness:

> hoc te
> crede modo insanum, nihilo ut sapientior ille,
> qui te deridet, caudam trahat.
> (*Sat.* 2.3.51-53)
> Consider only this: the man who derides you
> as insane is no wiser himself, but drags the dunce's tail.

The lively and proverbial style of expression renders the meaning memorable and the moral advice potentially less offensive. In what follows (*Sat.* 2.3.53-59) particular examples of insanity, which are implied by the analogy of 2.3.48-51, are made explicit. People who suffer from different kinds of insanity are all nevertheless equally insane.

The advice of loved ones has no effect on their lunatic behaviour (*Sat.* 2.3.57-59); the direct command of 2.3.59, voiced by the madman's dependants, adds vividness to the picture. The lack of effect of their cries is likened to that of

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[1] After my opposition as a member of the organising committee to South Africa's participation in the congress of the Australasian Universities Language and Literature Association held at Christchurch in January-February 1989, it gives me great pleasure to publish this piece in *Scholia*.

the audience attempting to rouse the drunken actor Fufius, asleep on stage and unaware of his cue (2.3.60-62). The serio-comic tone is maintained and a further smile is raised at the expense of Fufius by the technique of *onomasti komoidein*. The effect of the argument is not reduced by this 'window dressing'. On the contrary the audience/reader remembers the joke and also, by association, the serious and primary point. That point is itself underlined once more at 2.3.62f., which repeat the message of 2.3.51-53 and of 2.3.47 and 2.3.32. By the time the reader has reached 2.3.63 the message has also been strengthened by repetition.

This repetition of the moral at *Satires* 2.3.62f. acts as a bridge between the general and anonymous illustrations of the theme in 2.3.48-59 and the specific connection of the theme with Damasippus. The passage is made memorable by the allusion to Proteus and the metamorphoses which Nerius will undergo as he attempts to escape the clutches of Damasippus. Horace also allows Damasippus/Stertinius to indulge in hyperbole with more than a hint of the mock heroic, both part of the stock-in-trade of the satirist, at 2.3.69-73.

The major theme is repeated in *Satires* 2.3.74-76, rounding off the introduction and anticipating the discussion of the various types of insanity with which the remainder of the diatribe is concerned. Moreover, after line 64 the types of insanity which have been given by Stertinius are all caused by avarice. These initial examples are relevant to Damasippus' own state and the cause of his despair. They also anticipate the content of the first major section of Stertinius' diatribe after the introduction. For Stertinius concentrates there on the type of man who *argenti pallet amore* ('is pale with love of silver', 2.3.78); he has been exploiting *praemunitio*.

However, the actual attack upon the victims of avarice does not begin until the content and structure of the rest of the satire have been anticipated in *Satires* 2.3.77-81. This section is programmatic and didactic in tone and the invocation to the audience has an impressive or pompous ring to it, depending on whether we believe that the text is satirising the self-esteem of Stertinius, or merely indicating that Stertinius, by using this formula, is indicating that the audience should pay serious attention to what is to follow. The latter is likely, given Horace's own similar appeal, *propria persona*, for his reader's attention in *Satires* 1.2.37. It becomes clear from the beginning that the diatribe is carefully structured and tricked out with a variety of rhetorical techniques.

The Attack upon Avarice: Satires *2.3.82-167*

The aim here is to indicate by every means possible that extremes of behaviour in any direction must be classified as types of insanity. What becomes immediately clear is that the endemic extremism of Stoic ethical theory and its expression is

admirably suited to the satirist's purpose. Horace, however, poses as a moderate critic of human affairs. He does not vouchsafe total authority to any individual philosophical persuasion or other source of moral 'truth' (see, e.g., *Epist.* 1.1.13-19). Accordingly, his depiction of the doctrinaire Stertinius may demonstrate the moral bankruptcy of such exclusivity, while nevertheless acknowledging the value of the persuasive techniques of the Stoic school when used with discretion and common sense. However, the persuasive techniques employed by Stertinius and recalled by Damasippus do provide a lively means of presenting the case for the universal insanity of mankind.

After the invocation of *Satires* 2.3.77-81 Stertinius declares that of all fools and criminals (they are, after all, one and the same) the avaricious are in the majority by far:

> danda est ellebori multo pars maxima avaris,
> nescio an Anticyram ratio illis destinet omnem.
> (*Sat.* 2.3.82f.)
> The greatest ration of hellebore must be prescribed for the greedy: in fact, reason would dedicate all Anticyra's supply to them.

The word *ratio* ('reason') immediately reinforces Stertinius' Stoicism in the reader's mind. This is the first quasi-technical term that has appeared since the mention of Chrysippus by name at 2.3.44. Also the central position of *ratio* in 2.3.83 gives it a particular prominence, especially since it is a word with significant Stoic connections as the Latin translation of λόγος. The meaning of *ratio* in the sense of 'measure' or 'proportion' is also relevant here, given that we are talking about the putative size of a dose of medicine. This ambiguity is a measure itself of Horace's verbal dexterity and wit which ensures that Stertinius' sermon is arresting and persuasive.

The first *exemplum* of avarice is discussed in a distinctively Stoic fashion. However, the manner of this reinforcement is subtle and ironical. For, while it is true that the words *summam* ('the sum total', *Sat.* 2.3.84) and *prudentem animum* ('wise mind', 2.3.89) play a role similar to that of *ratio* in 2.3.83,[2] the most startlingly Stoic language is enunciated by Staberius himself:

[2] *Summam* ('the sum total') is reminiscent of *summum bonum* ('the greatest good'), while *prudentem animum* ('the wise mind') is reminiscent of the Stoic cardinal virtues of *prudentia* ('prudence') and *temperantia* ('temperance').

sive ego prave
seu recte hoc volui, ne sis patruus mihi.[3]
(*Sat* 2.3.87f.)
Whether I'm right or wrong, do not be an interfering uncle to me.

and more especially in lines 91-99:

quoad vixit credidit ingens
pauperiem vitium et cavit nihil acrius, ut, si
forte minus locuples uno quadrante perisset,
ipse videretur sibi nequior: omnis enim res,
virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulchris
divitiis parent; quas qui construxerit ille
clarus erit, fortis, iustus. 'sapiensne?' etiam; et rex,
et quidquid volet. hoc veluti virtute paratum
speravit magnae laudi fore.
(*Sat.* 2.3.91-99)
So long as he lived he considered poverty a great disgrace, avoiding nothing else so keenly so that had he died a cent the poorer, he would have judged himself the more depraved; everything gives way to fair riches: virtue, reputation, good behaviour, all things human and divine; who built up his wealth shall be famous, strong and just. 'And wise?' That too; king even, and whatever he wants. He expected the wealth he won to bring him praise as a prize won by virtue.

As far as *nequior* ('more depraved') in 2.3.94 the passage gives a statement of that 'philosophy' by which Staberius lived his life. *Satires* 2.3.94-99, on the other hand, explain in detail the status granted by wealth to Staberius. It is with a fine irony that Horace has Stertinius demonstrate the spiritual poverty of the man whose sole criterion of excellence is the possession of wealth. That Staberius is made to talk in a parody of the Stoic manner is finally made certain by his response to the question *sapiensne?* ('And wise?') in 2.3.97. Staberius immediately answers in the affirmative, declaring that the *dives* ('rich man') is *rex / et quidquid volet* ('king even, and whatever he wants', 2.3.97f.). The rich man is given precisely the same qualities by Staberius as the Stoic wise man; he is considered to be in possession of the four cardinal virtues of the Stoics.

As a consequence only the rich man is truly free. Staberius, or the *dives* ('rich man'), is insanely afraid of poverty and, accordingly, the ridiculousness of

[3] On the Stoic ring of these lines see, e.g., Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.100.15, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι προσαγορεύουσιν. Ἀγαθόν τε γὰρ λέγουσιν αὐτὴν, ὅτι ἄγει ἡμᾶς ἐπι τὸν ὀρθὸν βίον ('They name virtue with many names. And they say it is a good which leads us to the upright life').

his position is vividly shown, according to the likes of Stertinius and Damasippus, with their faith in the Stoic belief in the supremacy of wisdom as the sole criterion of excellence. That the majority of mankind do not accept the validity of the Stoic creed is an indication of their insanity, especially as the vast majority, according to Stertinius, are subject to that same desire for wealth which bedevilled the life of Staberius and, formerly, of Damasippus.

Staberius is insane, but so too is the kind of man whose behaviour tends to the opposite extreme, which is illustrated here (*Sat.* 2.3.99-102) by the example of Aristippus. The question *uter est insanior horum?* ('Which is the more insane of these men?', 2.3.102) is asked; in Stoic terms it is actually impossible to give a satisfactory answer to this question, since they are both equally insane, except in different ways. This point is made in 2.3.103, where a transition is effected from one set of *exempla* which may be loosely described as 'historical' to another set, the anonymous characters of which are drawn from the observation of everyday life. The *para prosdokian* of

> nimirum insanus paucis videatur, eo quod
> maxima pars hominum morbo iactatur eodem.
>
> (*Sat.* 2.3.120f.)
>
> Unsurprisingly he seems mad to only a few, since the vast majority of humankind are afflicted with the same disease.

is the more striking because of the apparent common sense of the arguments to which these lines give such an unexpected close. The reader's intellectual guard has been lowered by the obvious acceptability of what Stertinius has been saying in his description of the miser. Therefore, the paradoxical nature of this couplet drags the reader from a position of self-congratulatory smugness into one in which he finds himself subjected to the same critical fire as the miser himself. Far from promoting a feeling of self-satisfaction in the reader, the author of the diatribe has now identified his reader with the victims of avarice to such an extent that he charges them too with insanity. A similar attack on the reader is made in 2.3.122-28, where the reader is again invited to identify with the overt object of critical attention by the insistent use of the second person singular:

> quare,
> si quidvis satis est, periuras, surripis, aufers
> undique? tun sanus?
>
> (*Sat.* 2.3.126-28)
>
> Why do you lie, cheat and thieve in all directions if a little suffices? Are you sane?

The reader is charged once more with insanity. This result has not been achieved by the direct exposition of Stoic ethics. It is assumed by the speaker/author that the reader is well aware of the tenets of Stoic ethics regarding wealth and other such 'indifferents'. They are, then, introduced either from an unexpected quarter, for example, Staberius, or not introduced at all, but left to be assumed by the reader as the necessary background to the discourse. The trap that awaits the informed reader was baited by the reminder of the Stoic ambience of the poem in 2.3.120f. and then sprung by the implicit criticism of 2.3.126-28.

The direct moralising of these lines concludes with the question *tun sanus?* ('Are you sane?') which parallels the question *uter est insanior horum?* ('Which is the more insane of these men?') at *Satires* 2.3.120; both questions close clearly defined sections of the poem. After these questions the diatribe continues on each occasion on a slightly different tack. After *uter est insanior horum?* we have the illustrations of the miser which lead into the general assault on the different means by which the miser amasses money in 2.3.126-28, which in turn impinges on the reader's own feelings of guilt. After *tun sanus?* the discussion of the means by which wealth is amassed leads to the topic of murder. This allows the moralist to add a literary texture to his diatribe by exploiting of the story of Orestes.

The murder of a wife or of a mother by poison or hanging is condemned as a crime, but, if committed for financial gain, it will not be accounted an act of insanity. People assume that madness only descended on Orestes after he had committed matricide (*occisa insanisse parente*, 'he went mad after killing his parent', *Sat.* 2.3.134), although, after the matricide, his actions were those of a man who was sane. The reason why the matricide is excused is that Orestes' motive was largely financial. The prime motive, in the view of Stertinius' materialistic readership, was not revenge for the death of Agamemnon, but the recovery of Orestes' birthright. Horace exploits the myth in a characteristically oblique way to attack both the commonplace interpretation of the myth and the motives of those characters who inhabit it. This is analogous to the manner in which he attacks the notion that wealth is the criterion of excellence in 2.3.84-89; the attack there is oblique because Staberius is allowed to condemn himself out of his own mouth by praising wealth in terms more appropriate to the Stoic praise of wisdom. However, the ironical use of the myth of Orestes is not as successful as the ironical use of Stoic language put into the mouth of Staberius; the link between the motive for the murder of Clytemnestra and of the anonymous *matrem* ('mother', 2.3.131) is not made sufficiently clear, while the particular Stoic irony which colours the whole of the *exemplum* of Staberius is here missing.

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The idea of death provides the 'gliding continuity' between the *exemplum* of Orestes and the miniature comedy of Opimius in *Satires* 2.3.142-57: the contrast in tone between an archetypically tragic myth and the low comedy of the story of Opimius is remarkable and an example of the variety of tone advocated as an essential element of satire by Horace himself at *Satires* 1.10.9-15. The comedy of Opimius underlines the kinship between disease of the body and diseases of the mind and so anticipates 2.3.161-67, while the 'punch line'

> quid refert morbo an furtis pereamque rapinis?
> (*Sat.* 2.3.157)
> What matters it whether I die from disease or theft and fraud?

is so good that, by association, the moralising which follows also becomes memorable and Stertinius rises in the estimation of the readership. The defences of the audience have been demolished by the laughter with which they respond to the story of Opimius. Any hostility which may have been felt towards the Stoic moralist is temporarily removed by the universal solvent of a shared joke. Stertinius is quick to take advantage of the opening provided by his nimble technique of question and answer:

> 'quisnam igitur sanus' qui non stultus. 'quid avarus?'
> stultus et insanus. 'quid, si quis non sit avarus,
> continuo sanus?' minime. 'cur, Stoice?' dicam . . .
> (*Sat.* 2.3.158-60)
> 'Who then is sane?' The one not stupid. 'What of the greedy man?' Both stupid and mad. 'So, if he ceased to be greedy, he would immediately become sane?' Not at all! 'Why, Stoic?' I'll tell you . . .

Stertinius hastens to destroy the impression that may have been given by the length of the attack upon avarice that avarice is the only type of madness abroad. Initially he repeats in 2.3.161-67 the analogy between mental and physical ill health with great vividness. This repetition has been prepared for by the story of Opimius: however, more important than this example of prefiguring is the use to which Stertinius now puts the final line of the Opimius story. For, after the analogy of the illness and the repetition of the periphrasis for insanity involving Anticyra (2.3.165f.; cf. 2.3.83), itself reminiscent of the introduction to the diatribe at 2.3.77-81, the closing line and one half of the direct moralising, at this half-way point of the poem, echo the memorable joke of 2.3.157. Compare

> quid refert morbo an furtis pereamque rapinis?
> (*Sat.* 2.3.157)
> What matters it whether I die from disease or theft and fraud?

with

> quid enim differt, barathrone
> dones quidquid habes an numquam utare paratis?
> (*Sat.* 2.3.166f.)
> What does it matter whether you give your savings to a hole
> in the ground or never use them?

Horace makes the most expert use of repetition and anticipation; further, the repetitions and anticipations are achieved not merely with single words but with phrases, sentiments and syntactical structures. 'Stertinius' adroitly avoids the pitfall of monotony and is presented by Horace as a master of his craft.

This impression is strengthened by the skilled way in which the transition is managed from the attack on *avaritia* ('greed') to that upon *ambitio* ('ambition'). The transition is effected via the miniature drama (*Sat.* 2.3.168-86) involving Oppidius and his two sons. This story is set at a deathbed, as was the story of Opimius, and it too is concerned with the behaviour of heirs. The two heirs epitomise the extremes of vice to which wealthy men are prone. One son is by nature miserly, the other a spendthrift. The father urges moderation on his two sons and in doing so gives vent to the kind of homespun wisdom of moderation which is given prominence in *Satires* 1.1 and 1.3 in particular, and which is part of the general ethical imperative of Horatian satire, and which is itself satirised by Horace through the figure of Ofellus in *Satires* 2.2,[4] a fact which again demonstrates the ethically explorative nature of Horace's satire. In the mouth of Stertinius, the Stoic overtones of *natura coercet* ('nature sets her limits', 2.3.178) cannot be ignored, given the Stoic admonition 'to live in accord with nature' (*secundum naturam vivere*). The transition to the attack upon *ambitio* is effected by the advice which Oppidius gives to his two sons. This advice, introduced by *praeterea* ('furthermore', 2.3.179), works well within the continuity of the diatribe because it relates not only to the story of Opimius (also a deathbed scene) but also to that of Staberius. Both Staberius and Oppidius share a desire to impose their posthumous wills on their heirs. There is, however, an enlivening variety in the fact that Oppidius' motives are praiseworthy, while those of Staberius are not.

The ease of the transition from the attack upon avarice to that upon ambition indicates a philosophical connection between these two sections of the diatribe. The Stoics were prone to categorising and systematising different ethical concepts and definitions as subdivisions of either the *summum bonum* ('greatest

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[4] See R. Bond, 'The Characterisation of Ofellus in Horace *Satires* 2.2 and a Note on V. 123', *Antichthon* 14 (1980) 112-26.

good') or the *ultimum malum* ('worst evil') and to observing and commenting on the links between different but related concepts (examples abound; see, for example, Stob. *Ecl.* 2.104; Diog. Laert. 7.93). In the instances of *avaritia* and *ambitio* an important connection was observed by Cicero at *De Officiis* 1.25f., where Cicero puts a special emphasis on the abuse of wealth for political purposes, as does Oppidius here. Cicero also suggests, as does Oppidius, that a moderate expenditure on the *res familiaris* ('household') is quite justified and, in Roman terms, even necessary and honourable. Stertinius, then, makes use of the spendthrift son Aulus and the miserly Tiberius to attack not only their present vices, but also their long-term motives as imputed to them by their father. Their ultimate aim is, he fears, the acquisition of political power through the adroit dispensation of their wealth. In the Stoic context the question of motive is all important. It is vital to emphasise the question of motive regarding the acquisition of political power, because it was considered to be the duty of the right-minded Stoic to involve himself in political affairs (ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, 'unless something prevents, as Chrysippus declares', Diog. Laert. 7.121).[5]

The Attack upon Ambition: Satires *2.3.187-223*

The interpretation of the *exemplum* of Ajax and Agamemnon is clearer than that of Orestes in *Satires* 2.3.132-41, since the mythical exemplum of Ajax and Agamemnon constitutes the whole of the attack upon *ambitio* ('ambition'), if 2.3.168-86 are treated as a bridge passage, and 2.3.214-23 as the moral epilogue to the myth. The philosophical implications involved in the discussion between Agamemnon and his Stoic interrogator are evident. The reader is immediately aware of where his sympathies are supposed to lie and the reader is forced into the position of arbitrator of the debate, finding himself skilfully manipulated by the persuasive techniques and Socratic irony of the Stoic voice.

Satires *2.3.187-92*

Although the initial question of *Satires* 2.3.187 (*ne quis humasse velit Aiacem, Atrida, vetas cur?*, 'Son of Atreus, why do you command us not to think of

[5] Plutarch also records the sentiments of Chrysippus on this topic in a passage which is particularly relevant to this discussion: Χρύσιππος δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῷ περὶ Ῥητορικῆς γράφων, οὕτω ῥητορεύσειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ὡς καὶ τοῦ πλούτου ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ('Chrysippus writing in his *On Rhetoric*: the wise man will speak and take part in politics as one wealthy and sound in body and mind', Plut. *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1034b). Similar sentiments were expressed with approval by Cic. *Fin.* 3.68.

burying Ajax?') is neutral in tone,[6] it nevertheless does suggest that Agamemnon has reached the peak of temporal power. Not only has he power of life and death, but even power over the dead. The aspirations of the brothers Aulus and Tiberius are made manifest in the figure of Agamemnon. In the Roman context, however, the conscious juxtaposition of the arrogant *rex* ('king') and the subservient and skilfully delayed *plebeius* ('pleb') in line 188 immediately casts a pall of suspicion over the power of Agamemnon:

> 'rex sum.' nil ultra quaero plebeius.
> (*Sat.* 2.3.188)
> 'I am king.' I ask nothing more, mere pleb that I am.

It may also be the case that the use by Agamemnon of the word *aequam* ('fair', 2.3.188) and his claim to be *iustus* ('just') by implication from *non iustus* ('unjust', 2.3.189), coupled with the use of *rex*, suggests that the device exploited against Staberius in 2.3.97-99 is being repeated. Agamemnon is describing himself in terms appropriate to the description of the Stoic *sapiens* ('wise man').

Satires *2.3.193-207*

The attack on *ambitio* ('ambition') demonstrates the folly of considering political power a worthwhile objective, when the motivation of the aspirant is suspect. Also called into question is the value of military fame and expertise, which may be of some significance following the mention of Agrippa at *Satires* 2.3.185. This is implied by the fate of Ajax, whose success and patriotic services of time past could not outweigh the effects of one act of madness, and by the appearance at the close of the attack on *ambitio* of the goddess Bellona at *Satires* 2.3.223.

Agamemnon is the personification of both political and military power. With this power comes a concomitant responsibility. This is his excuse for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, which was as equally insane an act, claims the Stoic voice, as was Ajax's slaughter of the hapless sheep:

> tu cum pro vitula statuis dulcem Aulide natam
> ante aras spargisque mola caput, improbe, salsa,
> rectum animi servas cursum? insanus quid enim Aiax
> fecit cum stravit ferro pecus? abstinuit vim

[6] A knowledge of both Sophocles' *Ajax* and *Antigone* would, however, also suggest that in the matter of denying proper burial to anyone Agamemnon was on tricky ethical and religious ground.

> uxore et gnato; mala multa precatus Atridis,
> non ille aut Teucrum aut ipsum violavit Ulixen.
> 'verum ego ut haerentis adverso litore navis
> eriperem prudens placavi sanguine divos'
> nempe tuo, furiose. 'meo, sed non furiosus.'
>
> (*Sat.* 2.3.199-207)
>
> When at Aulis you stood your sweet daughter in the place of a cow and sprinkled her head with seasoned meal before the altars, you villain, did you steer then life's course straight? What did Ajax do that was insane when he slaughtered the flock with his sword? He did not violate his son and his wife; he may have called down many a curse on the sons of Atreus, but he laid no violence upon Teucer or Ulysses. 'But I placated the gods with blood quite consciously to free my ships as they clung to that hostile shore.' Yes, and with your family's blood, you madman. 'My family's blood, yes, but no madman!'

In this passage the philosophical and Stoic implications are kept to the fore by *rectum animi servas cursum?*[7] ('are you keeping your mind in its sound course?', *Sat.* 2.3.201) and the contrast between the *prudens* ('conscious') of 2.3.206, which is the word the 'wise' king uses to characterise his own decision-making, and the contrasting *furiose* ('you madman') and its denial *non furiosus* ('no madman') in 2.3.207. There is also another example of *praemunitio*, since this passage, with its inevitable reminiscence of Lucretius 1.80-101, most certainly prefigures the attack on superstition in 2.3.281-295.

Agamemnon defends his action in killing Iphigeneia by declaring that this 'conscious' (*prudens*) 'choice' was dictated by military and political necessity. Agamemnon's justification for his behaviour might well have found favour with a traditionally minded Roman audience for whom the sacrifice and dedication of self and family on behalf of the state was not a totally alien notion.[8] The Stoic, however, is suspicious of Agamemnon's motives. These suspicions are anticipated by *furiose* ('you madman', *Sat.* 2.3.207) and are given full expression in the couplet 2.3.212f. and in the moralising tailpiece to the *exemplum* at 2.3.208-13. As far as the Stoic is concerned a man is insane whether his criminal act was the result of anger or of an unbridled desire for *gloria* ('glory'). Ajax was insane because, in Stoic terms, he was not able to control his rage and

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[7] I prefer the reading *cursum* ('course') to the meaningless *quorum* of the mss; there is a possible parallel in *Sat.* 2.7.21; *cursum* seems to fit the Stoic context better with its relevance to the idea of the journey of the *proficiens* ('probationer') towards virtue and to the Roman concept, especially relevant in the context of this discussion, of the *cursus honorum* ('course of honours').

[8] See, e.g., Enn. *Ann.* 200-02 (E. H. Warmington [ed.], *Remains of Old Latin* 1 [Cambridge, Mass. 1935] 74f.); *Telamon* 319-22 (Warmington [above, this note] 336f.).

disappointment at the gifting of the arms of Achilles to Odysseus. The Stoics believed that it was necessary for such perturbations of the soul to be constrained by reason if disaster were to be avoided. Anger was thought of as a desire to retaliate.[9] Unless controlled it could result in miscalculation and disaster (Plut. *Virt. Mor.* 3.441c). For judgements and acts of ethical choice and also 'affections' are πάθη of the soul and, if the soul is affected disadvantageously by a burst of anger, then a choice made under such conditions, given that the intelligent mind is a part of the soul, must be irrational to the extent of indicating overt insanity. Anger must then be entirely eradicated if rational decisions are to be made.

A further proof of the insanity of Ajax was the reason for his anger; his outburst was out of all proportion to the incident which caused it. In Stoic terms Ajax was the victim of φιλοτιμία, an 'immoderate desire for glory', defined precisely by Andronicus, περὶ πάθων; φιλοτιμία δὲ ἐπιθυμία ἄμετρος τιμῆς (*'On the Affections*: Philotimia—an immoderate desire for glory')[10] This was particularly foolish since *ambitio* ('ambition'), *laus* ('praise'), *fama* ('fame') and *gloria* ('glory') are indifferents and incapable of materially affecting the soul for better or worse. At base, however, suggests the Stertinian voice, this was also the reason why Agamemnon was driven to sacrifice Iphigeneia at Aulis. The φιλοτιμία of Agamemnon weighed more than the natural ties of family affection. When the decision to kill Iphigeneia had been made by a mind unbalanced by a desire for glory, then anger at the falseness of his own position caused the king to attack the child with a savage intensity both unnatural and unnecessary. The attack upon Agamemnon is satisfying because the king is shown to suffer from precisely the same two conditions which had afflicted Ajax. Agamemnon too is insane because of both his φιλοτιμία and also his anger at what it was necessary for him to do. In support of this I would suggest that *tumidum* (*Sat.* 2.3.213) means 'swollen with anger' rather than 'puffed with pride', although both meanings are possible, and the phrase may be consciously ambiguous. Also *furiosus* suggests anger as well as insanity.[11] This is especially so in that anger is an example of irrationality or madness and the same association of stupidity and madness and criminality and madness/anger which appeared at 2.3.205-10,

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[9] E.g., Cic. *Tusc.* 4.21: *quae autem libidini subiecta sunt, ea sic definiunt, ut ira sit libido poeniendi eius, qui videatur laesisse iniuria* ('The divisions again under the head of lust are defined in such a way that anger is the lust of punishing a man who is thought to have inflicted an undeserved victory'); cf. Diog. Laert. 7.113.

[10] H. von Arnim (ed.), *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* 3 (Stuttgart 1964) 97.6.

[11] Compare the language of Verg., *Aen.* 12.666-68.

especially in 2.3.208-10, reappears at the close of the general moral drawn by Stertinius from the *exemplum* as a whole:

> ergo ubi prava
> stultitia, hic summa est insania; qui sceleratus,
> et furiosus erit . . .
> (*Sat.* 2.3.220-22)
> Therefore, where there is perverse stupidity, there you will find supreme insanity; the criminal is invariably insane . . .

while evidence that the poet is consciously prefiguring the moral of the *exemplum* may be found in the concepts of superficial misrepresentation and self-deception found in the *species alias veri* ('ideas other than the true', *Sat.* 2.3.208) and the pathetic (and amusing) lamb of 2.3.214-20). The unreal and brittle nature of ambition itself is further emphasised by the vivid metaphor with which the section closes:

> quem cepit vitrea fama,
> hunc circumtonuit gaudens Bellona cruentis.
> (*Sat.* 2.3.222f.)
> Whomsoever vitreous reputation does capture, round him thunders Bellona rejoicing in gore.

This image also calls to mind the Furies of the *Eumenides* which also have the power to drive men mad, another link with the story of Orestes.

The Attack upon Luxuria*:* Satires *2.3.224-46*

The criticism of *luxuria* ('extravagance') opens with the *exemplum* of Nomentanus. Once more the poet maintains the continuity and conversational logic of the satire. For the discussion centres again on the irresponsible abuse of inherited wealth. The Stoic views on the nature of wealth and on the uses to which such wealth should be put are again the platform from which the satirical attack is launched. The criticism now centres on unnatural and ostentatious indulgence in the 'benefits' of massive wealth. Earlier moralists such as Cato Maior and Sallust had already commented on the morally debilitating effects of wealth,[12] especially through ostentatious expenditure on foreign extravagances.

[12] See Cato the Elder's attacks on women and the allegedly morally disruptive foreign influences upon them as recorded, for example, in J. P. V. Balsdon, *Roman Women: Their History and Habits* (London 1962) 32-37; see also C. Herrmann, *Le rôle judicaire et politique des femmes sous la République romaine* (Brussels 1964) 80-85.

Stoic doctrine and Roman moralising join forces here, although it should be noted that Greek philosophy was also something treated with suspicion as being a foreign and unnecessary import.[13] The fact that foreign imports of various kinds had long been considered a contributing factor to a perceived moral breakdown by the more conservative of Roman writers may help to explain the intrusion into the attack upon *luxuria* of an assault on sexual impropriety and its attendant follies and risks in *Satires* 2.3.47-71. The fact that smutty stories are perennially amusing may also explain their intrusion into the satire at this stage, as the digression serves to divert as well as instruct.

The continuity of the satire/diatribe is, however, maintained carefully by the poet: the figure of Agamemnon has already linked the *exempla* of Orestes (*Sat.* 2.3.132-41) and of Ajax (2.3.187-223). Although no mention is made in the satire of the 'tapestry' scene of the *Agamemnon*, nevertheless in any discussion of extravagance that scene is an essential part of the aesthetic background. Accordingly, the memory of that scene, activated by the frequent references to the figure of Agamemnon, serves to prepare the reader for the attack upon *luxuria* in 2.3.224-80. Also the man who *lectica nitidam gestare amet agnam* ('loved to carry about in a litter a pretty lamb') 2.3.214) is presumably wealthy. The poor would prefer to eat the creature. However that may be, his insanity parallels that of Agamemnon in that the former treats a dumb animal as if it were his daughter, while the great king treated his daughter as if she were herself a dumb animal, namely a sacrificial lamb.

The name of Agamemnon and the idea of extravagant waste help to prepare the reader for the transition to the formal assault on *luxuria* which is made by Stertinius. The beginning of this assault is indicated by the *nunc age* ('come now') of *Satires* 2.3.224, with which one can compare *huc propius me* ('come here nearer to me', 2.3.80) and *nunc accipe* ('now learn ', 2.3.46). *Ratio* ('reason') is again pressed into service to aid the continuity of the poem and to stress its Stoic provenance as it is at 2.3.83, 2.3.225 and 2.3.250. Each of these lines comes at the beginning of a section or sub-section of the satire. In each of the lines *ratio* holds the central position, reminding the reader of the philosophical basis of Stertinius' attacks. In each line the contrast between the rationality of the Stoic and the folly or insanity of the rest of mankind is thrown into relief by the juxtaposition of *ratio* with words indicating insanity and folly, *Anticyram . . . omnem* ('all Anticyra', 2.3.83), *stultos . . . insanire* ('[being] fools, are mad', 3.225) and *puerilius* ('childish', 2.3.250). The effect is made even more obvious by the word order in 2.3.83 and 2.3.225, while the combative and adversarial tone of the diatribe is underlined in the latter two examples by the

[13] Horace reports that this is the view of his father in *Sat.* 1.4.115-29.

verbs *vincet* ('will prove', 2.3.225) and *evincet* ('proves', 2.3.250), which are themselves reminiscent of the sometimes pugnacious style of Lucretius.[14]

The start of the attack on *luxuria* ('extravagance') is well signposted. The meaning of the *exemplum* of Nomentanus is not perhaps so clear. However, if one takes this story as being part of the continuity of moralising within the poem, one can see that Nomentanus and men like him are suffering from the same diseases which were thought of as afflicting the earlier targets of the satire. The illness has taken a new and more unpleasant turn. Now the mere possession of excessive wealth and the extravagant and ostentatious squandering of that wealth is sufficient to achieve a desirable notoriety. Indeed, that kind of respect, formerly given to the properly deserving, is now bestowed upon men like Nomentanus, who have not even earned the wealth which they distribute with such a lavish hand.[15]

Horace indicates by his use of *edicit* ('decreed') in *Satires* 2.3.227 that Nomentanus, on receiving his inheritance, immediately adopts a manner of speaking that is more suited to the dignity of a Roman senator than to his own situation. *Edico* is commonly used as a word signifying the summoning of the senate (e.g., Cic. *Fam.* 11.6) and an army (Livy 22.12; 31.11) or the holding of an election (Cic. *QFr.* 2.2.2). As a technical term it signifies the public pronouncements of a praetor, especially when, on entering office, he sets out the rules by which he will be governed in the administration of justice.[16] The legal parody is maintained by the manner in which the spokesman *leno* ('pimp', 2.3.231) speaks to Nomentanus.[17] The colloquial *domi est* ('there is at home') adds an element of the humour of incongruity, while a certain amount of particularly Stoic colour and hence irony is introduced by the use of *aequus* to describe Nomentanus at 2.3.233. The evident irony of the passage (Horatian or Stertinian?) makes it difficult to assess the precise significance of *aequus* in 2.3.233. Rudd's 'decent' indicates neatly the young man's ingenuousness,[18] but

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[14] Lucr. 5.735 is a verse which almost seems an anticipation of Horace's diction here: *difficilest ratione docere et vincere verbis* ('It is difficult to teach by reasoning and to prove by words.').

[15] The portrayal of Nomentanus' court is clearly intended to contrast unfavourably with Cicero's picture of the Scipionic circle in *De Amicitia* and *De Senectute* and with Horace's own depictions of the circle of Maecenas in the *Satires* and elsewhere.

[16] At *De Finibus* 2.74 Cicero argues that no man can hold Epicurean views on the nature of the *summum bonum* ('greatest good') and honourably enter public life with any hope of success, utilising *edico*.

[17] On the legal aspects of *vel nunc pete vel cras* ('seek now or tomorrow', 231), see A. Palmer (ed.), *The Satires of Horace* (London 1891) *ad Sat.* 2.3.231.

[18] N. Rudd, *The Satires of Horace and Persius* (Harmondsworth 1973) 90.

perhaps misses some of the irony, which Muecke's 'tender-hearted' more closely approximates.[19] However, if the whole approach of Nomentanus is ironically reminiscent of the behaviour of a budding magistrate, which is in keeping with the spirit of the attack on *ambitio* ('ambition'), then *aequus* must also be understood in that context. The most common meaning of *aequus* is 'equitable' or 'impartial' in respect of an individual's behaviour towards others (e.g, *praebere se aequum alicui*, Cic. *Fam.* 2.1). This is appropriate in the present context where Nomentanus apes the behaviour of a praetor (cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.65). Therefore, when Horace has the Stoicising Stertinius describe Nomentanus as *aequus* in a context where ironical use has already been made of traditional political conventions and discourse, the reader responds both to the Roman political connotations of the word and also to the philosophical implications of the term. The realisation dawns that cloaked in the satirical garb and irony of the Horatian poem and in the overtly Stoic ambience of Stertinius' sermon are ideas relevant to issues of ethical importance to the contemporary citizen of Rome. Horace plunders the Stoic tradition for ideas, techniques and vocabulary useful to his satiric purpose, while simultaneously making his own satiric comment on the occasional excess endemic in the proselytising methods of the school itself.

That the Stoic connotations are present is made clear by the recollection that, at the beginning of the poem, Damasippus attacked Horace in Stoic terms which are echoed in the Nomentanus *exemplum*. Compare, for example,

> iratus tibi quod vini somnusque benignus
> nil *dignum* sermone canas . . .
>
> (*Sat.* 2.3.3f.; my emphasis)
>
> angry with yourself because, so generous of wine and of sleep, you compose nothing *worthy* of talk . . .

> dic aliquid *dignum* promissis . . .
>
> (*Sat.* 2.3.6; emphasis mine)
>
> recite something *worthy* of what you've promised . . .

> vitanda est improba Siren
> *desidia*, aut quidquid vita meliore parasti
> ponendum *aequo animo* . . .
>
> (*Sat.* 2.3.14-16; my emphasis)

[19] F. Muecke, *Horace, Satires II* (Warminster 1993) 51, while her notes *ad Sat.* 2.3.233 expand with humour and sensitivity on the comic overtones of the passage.

> You must avoid the wicked Siren, *Sloth*, or give up *with equanimity* whatever honour you have gained during a more noble period of life . . .

with the following:

> iuvenis responderit *aequus*
>
> (*Sat.* 2.3.233; my emphasis)
>
> the equitable youth *replied*

and

> *segnis ego, indignus* . . .
>
> (*Sat.* 2.3.236; my emphasis)
>
> *I am lazy and unworthy*

and it becomes clear whence Damasippus derived his vocabulary of criticism and the extent to which that vocabulary is useful to the satirist as he pursues his twofold agenda of attacking both the excesses of the Stoics and the folly of contemporary Rome.

There follow examples of notorious extravagance which further underline the connection which exists between extravagance and ambition. Both ambition and extravagance as well as being insane ways of squandering wealth have another aspect in common. The *exempla* in *Satires* 2.3.239-249 of the *filius Aesopi* ('son of Aesopus ', 239) and the *Quinti progenies Arri* ('progeny of Quintus Arrius', 243) demonstrate that the ambitious and the wasteful are both intent on establishing a claim to fame, or, more properly, notoriety. The continuity between the *exemplum* of Nomentanus and those illustrating this appetite for a doubtful reputation is established quite simply. The willing wife of 2.3.238-41 relates to Metella, wife of P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther and notorious for her adultery.[20] The behaviour of the anonymous wife of 2.3.238 and Metella also anticipates the causes of the lover's anxieties in 2.3.259-71 and so further aids the continuity and consistency of the sermon.

Muecke's introduction to this satire uses the term 'sermon' to describe the moralising of Stertinius and refers to Braund's comments on the similarity of this poem to Persius, *Satires* 3 and Juvenal, *Satires* 10 in terms of its structured and

[20] For the detail concerning Metella and her connections with the son of Aesopus see Palmer's [17] note *ad* 238-41.

formal approach.[21] Both of these scholars, however, assume that the sermon as presented is an accurate representation/*mimesis* of the manner of the proselytising Stoic. The important question remains as to whether the sermon's style is thought of as either persuasive or desirable by the poet himself. Although that question is ultimately impossible to answer, what does seem to be certain from the evidence so far assembled is that Horace *qua poeta*, if not *vates*, has lavished great care on the product, whether or not the product striven for is an accurate facsimile of the Stoic sermon or a parody thereof, where the idiosyncracies of that sub-genre are presented in an extreme manner, although it is clear that the Stoic style of popular harangue was extreme by nature in and by itself, in keeping with the extremism of the paradoxical doctrines that were promulgated.

It is also clear that the two examples of extravagance and frivolity in *Satires* 2.3.239-46 do effect a focus on the misguided desire for notoriety. If the date of this satire is *circa* 33 BC it would have been written in that period when Octavian was fomenting public opinion against Antony and Cleopatra in preparation for the final struggle for absolute power. In that case such stories as that concerning Cleopatra's consumption of a great pearl in 42/41 BC would have been rife (see, e.g., Plin. *HN* 9.58 for the story of Cleopatra and the great pearl). The moral of such a tale, in terms of political propaganda, would have been that this eastern woman was corrupting the honest Antony by a combination of sexual depravity and ostentation, luxury and extravagance. The story of the *filius Aesopi* ('son of Aesopus') and his pearl calls to mind the ostentation and depravity of Cleopatra, pandering both to Octavian's political agenda and to the knee-jerk xenophobia of the poet's Roman audience. The mere memory of Cleopatra also anticipates the attacks on sexual excess in 2.3.247-71, so again maintaining a kind of unity and also demonstrating a political agenda within the kaleidoscopic variety of the work. Furthermore, the very wording of 2.3.240-45

> scilicet ut decies solidum absorberet, aceto
> diluit insignem bacam . . .
>
> Obviously so that he could ingest a cool million, he dissolved a great pearl in wine . . .

suggests that the actor's son is motivated by a desire for notoriety. The speaker cannot conceive of any other motive for such an act. The speaker's incomprehension of the rationale behind the act is suggested by *scilicet*

[21] Muecke [19] 130 and S. Braund, *Beyond Anger: A Study of Juvenal's Third Book of Satires* (Cambridge 1988) 44ff., 183ff.

('obviously'), while the potential notoriety of the deed is established by the specific description of the pearl's value and the emotive *insignem* ('great').

The Attack upon the Insanity of Sexual Passion: Satires *2.3.247-280*

This subsection of the attack on *luxuria* ('extravagance') constitutes a self-contained attack on the insane behaviour of those men whose minds are deranged by the demands of their sexual appetite. The subject matter has been anticipated (*praemunitio*) by the mention of the willing wife of *Satires* 2.3.238, of Metella in 2.3.239, by the implicit references to Cleopatra in 2.3.239-42 and to Clytemnestra at 2.3.132-41. Furthermore, it was a commonplace of the comic tradition that sexual and financial extravagance went hand in hand.[22] The notion culminated in the sixth satire of Juvenal in his coordinated assault on the luxury and foreign influences which allegedly led to the total depravity of the aristocratic Roman female.[23] Such moralists had the support of the Stoics as is indicated by this attack made by Stertinius in 2.3.247-71 which is entirely compatible with the traditional Roman moral stance. For the Stoics too were inclined to correlate wealth and sexual depravity, especially when the sexual instinct was exploited for financial gain.[24] Further the emphasis on the attack upon sex here is on sex which has been procured by money. This is made clear by 2.3.252f. and by the conversation adapted from the beginning of Terence's *Eunuchus* which concerns sex for which it is necessary to pay.

So far as the Stoics were concerned sex was an instinct or impulse, essential for the preservation of both the species and the state. It was compatible with the basic ethical instinct of self-preservation. Accordingly, it was the duty of the wise man to love,[25] even as it was the duty of the wise man to take part in the

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[22] See Muecke's [19] note on *Sat.* 2.3.251-53, 'For the characterisation of the lover Horace need not have thought further than the lovers of comedy...' and on *Sat.* 2.3.258-71, 'Comedy provides an "image of everyday life" (Cic. *Rosc. Am.* 47, cf. Hor. *Epist.* 2.1.168), but, when satire draws on comedy, we should be aware of the close relationship between the two genres, see Hor. *Sat* 1.4.1.'

[23] On the relationship between these themes in Juvenal 6, see W.S Anderson, 'Juvenal 6: a Problem of Structure', *CPh* (1956) 73-94.

[24] See Alex. Aphr. *In Top.* 2.107 (M. Wallies [ed.], *In Aristotelis Topicorum Libros Octo Commentaria* 2 [Berlin 1891] 107), where the comment is made that wealth cannot be a good since it can be gained by means of πορνοβοσκία ('brothel-keeping') This commercial connection is made much of in Horace, *Sat.* 1.2 throughout, while the *uxor vocata* ('summoned wife') of line 238 in this satire is an example of πορνοβοσκία at work.

[25] E.g., Cic. *Tusc.* 4.34.72: *Stoici sapientem amaturum esse dicunt* ('The Stoics declare the wise man will be a lover').

political life of the state. This 'love' should, however, only exist in the context of marriage, within which estate the Stoics recommended that the union should be founded upon comradeship, mutual respect and equality.[26] The subordination of women in prostitution was, therefore, abhorrent to the Stoics since the institution of prostitution undermined both the need for marriage and the stability of the marriage contract. Debasement of the sexual instinct into a mere desire for the gratification of personal pleasure, for irresponsible σωματικῆς συνουσίας ('bodily congress', Andron. Περὶ Παθῶν 4), was considered both indecorous and potentially destructive, since the erotic impulse was nothing other than 'disruptive' (ταραχῶδες). It was the role of 'temperance' (σωφροσύνη) to control the erotic impulse, especially in the young, since apparently the older or more mature man was, allegedly, not prone to such temptation. Such moderation is signally lacking in the men criticised in this section of the satire at *Satires* 2.3.241-71. Accordingly, Horace is presenting orthodox Stoic views here through the medium of Stertinius. To a degree these Stoic ideas are compatible with traditional Roman views on the subject[27] and so Horace gains a persuasive advantage in the wider moral context of his satirical discourse by exploiting the Stoic method and its message.

The moral failure is once again described in terms appropriate to a description of mental illness, as is made clear by *ratio* ('reason') in *Satires* 2.3.250 and *amentia* ('madness') in 2.3.249, where we may suspect that Horace is punning, and by *insignia morbi* ('the tokens of your illness') at 2.3.254. The pangs of love reduce our behaviour to the level of children. Examples given of such childishness at 2.3.247-49 and 2.3.272-75 form a frame for the morally uplifting anecdote of the conversion of Polemon and the adaptation of Terence's *Eunuchus* 57-63. The fact that 2.3.272-75 fall outside the structural scheme previously advanced indicates that Horace is relaxing the formal structural divisions within the sermon to suggest a more relaxed and anecdotal style of persuasion suited to the nature of the matter in hand.[28] Although there is no such formal ring structure in this passage on sex as there was in 2.3.31-48, nevertheless, the repetition of the 'house of cards' concept at 2.3.275

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[26] See esp. Musonius Rufus (O. Hense [ed.], *Reliquiae* [Leipzig 1905] 66).

[27] The practical bent of Roman ethics as preached by, e.g., Cato Maior, took a different view of prostitution, however; see Acro *Ad Hor. Serm.* 1.2.32, where a moderate indulgence is sanctioned, but only for young men, before marriage.

[28] C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles* (Cambridge 1963) 6 comments on this device of the 'gliding transition' from one topic to another in the context of the *Ars Poetica*: 'The textbook is played down by this conversational and partly humorous way of constructing the link—but it is a link for all that, joining two distinct portions of the poem'.

(*aedificante casas*, 'building toy houses') from 2.3.247 (*aedificare casas*, 'to build toy houses'), where the two phrases occur at the beginning of their respective verses, coupled with illustrations concerning apples at 2.3.258 and at 2.3.272f., points up the cohesion and unity of this section, despite its perhaps lighter subject matter, and the poetic care taken in its composition. For, compared with the attacks on avarice and ambition, the attack on the dangers of giving an unbridled licence to one's sexual appetite is rather light-hearted. This comparative lightness of tone in itself facilitates the ongoing persuasive impact of the sermon. The lighter touch allows some relief from the dour and gloomy picture painted of the human condition. As the diatribe draws to a close care is taken that the audience is not alienated. The audience also should be given hope that the human condition is not totally irremediable. The story of Polemon indicates that such optimism is justified. Horace's message may also be that Damasippus' insensitive assaults on Horace at the start and finish of the satire betray a lack of sophistication compared with the style of his master Stertinius, who demonstrates a mastery of the various rhetorical techniques required for successful proselytisation. Further, the spirit of comedy invoked by the adaptation of the *Eunuchus* cannot perhaps allow of a total pessimism. The reader is, however, brought back to a harsher reality by the brutal *adde cruorem stultitiae* ('add bloodshed to folly') of 2.3.275f., and the whole of the passage which intervenes between the end of the direct assault on sexuality and the beginning of the attack on superstition.

In Horace's reworking of the Terentian model the symptoms of the lovesick youth are a lack of consistency and a lack of self-control. In his condition *temperantia*/σωφροσύνη, as is pointed out in *Satires* 2.3.265-71 by the sententious slave, is required. The slave, anticipatory of the loyal Davus of *Satires* 2.7, declares that a necessarily stormy love affair is incompatible with the reasoned moderation which should govern our 'baser' instincts. No consistency of life in accord with reason can be achieved if a man allows himself to fall prey to *amor* ('love'); the phrases *ratione modoque* ('by reason and method', 2.3.266) and *certa ratione modoque* ('by fixed reason and method', 2.3.271) are obvious periphrases of *temperantia* ('temperance') and *moderatio* ('moderation'), while the clause *quae res / nec modum habet neque consilium* ('a thing that has in it neither method nor sense', 2.3.265f.) implies also the necessity of emotional moderation. That Horace is emphasising the Stoic nature of Stertinius' advice is made clear by his clever modification of Terence, which goes beyond a simple alteration of metre. Terence's lines are as follows:

> ere, quae res in se neque consilium neque modum
> habet ullum eam consilio regere non potes . . .

> . . . incerta haec tu si postulas
> ratione certa facere nihilo plus agas
> quam si des operam ut cum ratione insanias.
> (*Eunuchus* 57-58, 61-63)
> Master, you cannot reasonably control anything which itself does not possess within itself either reason or moderation. . . . If you demand to make such imponderables act as if by set patterns of reason you achieve nothing more than if you paid attention to going mad in a rational manner.

Although the concept of strict control inherent in *regere* ('to control', 58) is softened by Horace to *tractari non vult* ('does not allow itself to be handled', 2.3.267), the Stoic nature of the adaptation is emphasised by the prominence given to the phrases *ratione modoque* and *certa ratione modoque*, especially by the repetition of *ratio* ('reason') which plays such a significant role throughout the satire in establishing its Stoic ambience.

The oscillation between states of war and peace which is the lot of the committed lover is taken directly from Terence, while the picturesque imagery of *Satires* 2.3.268-70 is Horatian. The concept of intellectual blindness implied in the image in 2.3.268-70 is anticipated by 2.3.43f. The concept of mental blindness is apposite in a treatment of the paradox that all fools are mad and continues the analogy between physical and spiritual/moral health which is a constant within the Stertinian sermon.

The Purpose of Satires *2.3.272-80*

The lines divide naturally at *sanior* ('more insane') in *Satires* 2.3.275 and the simplest explanation of their function is to take 2.3.272-75 as the structural completion of the formal attack upon sexual insanity; on the other hand, 2.3.275-80, from *adde cruorem / stultitiae* ('add bloodshed to folly'), form a bloody postscript which reminds the reader that, although the topic of sex may be treated with frivolity and in a comic vein, sexual passion is also the stuff of tragedy. The realities which may spring from unbridled passion include murder and suicide. A further and sordid connection with the earlier attack on the abuse of money lies in the fact that the name Hellas at 2.3.277 suggests a commercial connection with a professional and that Marius' destructive passion was for a courtesan.

The Attack Upon Superstition: Satires *2.3.281-95*

Were it not for the reference to Chrysippus at *Satires* 2.3.287 there would be little to suggest that this attack upon superstition was particularly Stoic in tone or origin. It is the kind of attack to be expected more naturally from an Epicurean.

Horace himself makes wry Epicureanising comments about provincial superstitions in Italy at *Satires* 1.5.97-103. Also, the example of the death of Iphigeneia, used as evidence for Agamemnon's madness in 2.3.199-220, necessarily calls to mind Lucretius' famous tirade against the fatal results of blind superstition at *De Rerum Natura* 1.80-101. Clearly the Stoic or Cynic missionary was not averse, any more than was Seneca in his consolatory works,[29] to exploiting arguments useful to their cause whatever their intellectual provenance. Neither is Horace's text averse to ethical opportunism and it may be that Horace is poking gentle fun at the Stoics, who, for all their extremism and exclusivity, were not above appropriating for themselves the ideas and techniques of others. The use of the particularly Epicurean term *casus* ('chance') in 2.3.292, for example, in the Stoic mouth of Stertinius points in this direction.[30]

The freedman of *Satires* 2.3.281-87 prays to the gods to save him from death in the mistaken belief that death is an evil, not an indifferent. His ignorance, however, extends beyond his mistaken belief regarding the nature of death and the role of the gods. The freedman is totally ignorant regarding the nature and purpose of life itself. For the freedman's motive for praying for an indefinite extension to his span of life is indefinitely to extend his enjoyment of life's so-called pleasures, the quest for which has been shown already in Stertinius' sermon to be misguided and inimical to moral health. The freedman betrays ignorance, therefore, of the workings of the cosmos for the best under the guidance of divine Providence. The freedman and other victims of like ignorance all pursue illusory goods and their folly in doing so is compounded by the abuse of these goods once gained. Accordingly, the attack on the freedman's superstitious faith and his misinterpretation of the role of the gods makes an appropriate coda to the earlier strictures of Stertinius directed against the avaricious, ambitious and sexually licentious. The superstitious mother of 2.3.289-95 is similarly misguided in believing that the gods concern themselves

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[29] That there was a tradition of exploiting alien philosophical ideas to sustain one's own distinct ideology is made clear by Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 3.76; see also C. C. Grollios, *Seneca's Ad Marciam: Tradition and Originality* (Athens 1956); R. Kassel, *Untersuchungen zur Grieschischen und Romischen Konsolations Litteratur*, (Munich 1958); C. E. Manning, 'The Consolatory Tradition and Seneca's Attitude to the Emotions', *G&R* 21 (1974) 71-81 and C. Gill, 'On Peace of Mind and Being Yourself', *ANRW* 2.36.7. (1994).

[30] The word is used of Epicurean doctrine in an ironical spirit at Cicero, *Nat. D.* 1.32.90: *sed tamen quis iste tantus casus, unde tam felix concursus atomorum, ut repente homines deorum forma nascerentur?* ('What accident was so powerful, how came such a lucky concourse of atoms, that suddenly men were born in the shape of gods'); cf. *Nat. D.* 2.2.6 and, seriously, Lucr. 6.1096.

with individual human fate and that an extension of one's earthly life is necessarily beneficial.

Horace exploits the beliefs of both Stoics and Epicureans regarding the nature of divinity and the efficacy and appropriateness of prayer. In these regards the Stoic views are necessarily more complex, since the Epicureans simply deny any divine influence on human affairs.[31] Similarly, the attitudes of the Stoics towards death and eschatological problems are more complex that those of the Epicureans. Death was defined by the Stoics in Socratic terms as the separation of the soul from the body. There was dispute among the Stoics themselves regarding the question of whose souls survived and for how long, with what degree of individuality and whether surviving souls suffered punishment or rewards for the doings of this terrestrial life. Chrysippus believed that only the souls of the wise won individual immortality.[32] Stertinius' devotion to the name of Chrysippus in this poem would suggest that he favoured the latter view and that that, accordingly, is why he advocates that individuals should train themselves through life in preparation for death and should also ensure that their children too are aware of this need. It is interesting that the two individuals whose superstitions are ridiculed by Stertinius are drawn from that more humble social grouping for the benefit of which Epicurus is said to have formulated his theories precisely in order to banish the twin besetting fears of death and the gods. Stertinius suggests by his choice of *exempla* that Epicurus had failed in this prime aim and that Stoicism actually provided a more satisfactory solution to the perennial problems of human existence. The Stoic aim was to modify rather than replace these traditional views and it is to further this developmental and educative aim that Stertinius is made to target the individually selfish requests satirised in *Satires* 2.3.281-95. For, on the one hand, an individual should not pray for things for which he cannot openly ask the gods,[33] while, on the other hand, it is far from clear that the gods concerned themselves with such individual trivia.[34] Horace shows himself once more at home with the precepts of the Stoics

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[31] See, e.g., Epicurus' views recorded by Diog. Laert. 10.123f.; Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.43; Lucr. 1.62-101; Lucr. 5.1161-1240.

[32] See Diog. Laert. 7.157; for Stoic views on metempsychosis see Stob. *Ecl.* 1.17.

[33] This precept is attributed by Sen. *Ep.* 10.5 to the Stoic Athenodorus of Tarsus (*c.* 130-160 BCE).

[34] The picture of the Stoic Jupiter at Sen. *QNat.* 2.45.1, 3 is out of sympathy with the concept of such a personal approach, although there was dispute among the Stoics on the extent to which the gods involved themselves in human affairs at the individual level. Cf., e.g., Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.65.164 with *Off.* 2.6.19; cf. also Sen. *QNat.* 7.30.3; Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.66.167. The inconsistencies and difficulties of Stoic religious beliefs in the Roman context are discussed by E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (London 1958) 216-37, esp. 217: 'All through the Roman

as voiced here by Stertinius. Damasippus, however, is depicted as the uncritical novice, who like some enthusiastic foot-in-the-door, newly-come-to-Christ charismatic, has shattered the peace and quiet of Horace's rustic retreat.

The Final Altercation: Satires *2.3.300-26*

That Damasippus has exceeded his brief is indicated by the fact that his closing comments on the purpose of the Stertinian sermon differ from those put forward at the beginning of his recital. At *Satires* 2.3. 297 the reason given for Stertinius' sermon is so that he should never be subjected to unrequited insult again, while the original aim of Stertinius was to dissuade Damasippus from suicide on the reasonable grounds, so far as a Stoic was concerned, that Damasippus was no more nor less insane than any other of his fellow mortals. That Damasippus is still aware of this original motivation is shown, however, by the vivid final couplet of his recital at 2.3.298f. which echoes in sentiment 2.3.51f.

Damasippus was not declared mad by the Horatian figure. Damasippus, rather, armed with Stoic enthusiasm, ill-digested doctrine and their techniques of persuasion, makes trial of them, unprovoked, on the hapless poet. Horace is prompted by this challenge to throw out a provocative and ironical question at *Satires* 2.3.300-02, which leads to the final violent altercation between the two and to Horace's impatient dismissal of the proselytising tiro. The irony lies in the use of the vocative *Stoice* as a virtual pejorative and in the fact that the ostensibly polite prayer of 2.3.300 is a venomous reminder of the financial crash which brought the failed dealer in antiques to philosophy. The satirist implies by this juxtaposition that on his present showing Damasippus will be no more successful as a philosopher than he was as a businessman. This is demonstrated to be true when, in keeping with his suspect efforts of the initial conversation, Damasippus' final attack on Horace proves clumsy and unconvincing. The character Horace reacts harshly because, as poet, moralist and satirist himself, he is very much aware of the need not to alienate his target audience. Horace as satirist in the *Sermones* deploys various strategies, including a kind of Socratic irony and gentle self-deprecation, to minimise the risk of such alienation. Damasippus betrays no such sensitivity. Neither does he have the wit to sense Horace's continuingly ironical tone evidenced by the use of Stoic terms such as *stultum*

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period the Stoics held in theory a definite and consistent position . . . in the application . . . to practical problems they showed that variation of standard and temperament which history has always to record even of honourable and intelligent men'. For a relatively more recent discussion see A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* (London 1974) 163-70 and 'The Stoic Concept of Evil' *PhQ* 18 (1968) 329-43.

('foolish', 2.3.305) and *insanum* ('insane', 2.3.306). When an opponent employs the jargon of the enemy the tone is inevitably sarcastic.[35] Accordingly Damasippus ploughs ahead with an attack on Horace which virtually rehearses the charges laid against humanity in general in the Stertinian sermon.[36] Damasippus' techniques, however, are a crude imitation of those of his master. Horace has granted Stertinius, in the composition of the sermon, both eloquence and a fine grasp of the ethical doctrines of the Stoic school. These, however, have not been sufficient to create a philosophical silk purse out of the failed businessman's pig's ear.

Problems Involved in the Interpretation of Satires *2.3*

The central, longest and presumably most important section of this satire is put by the poet into the mouth of a character, Damasippus, whose own authority is consistently and humorously undercut by the poet in the conversations that frame the careful articulation of the Stoic paradox that all save the *sapiens* are mad. The articulation of the paradox itself is purported to be an accurate retelling of the sermon of Stertinius which saved Damasippus from a suicidal despair. The Stoic detail of the sermon is convincing, the argumentation and exemplification vivid and a detailed study of the text suggests that there does not seem to be any problem in distinguishing between the various voices of the poem, namely those of Horace, *qua* participant and general narrator, of the incompetent but enthusiastic Damasippus and of the trained Stoic missionary Stertinius.

Given the precise characterisation of the three interlocutors at least three different but related effects are achieved by the poem. These are complementary each to the others. The follies of mankind are exposed to ridicule and a suggestion is made that the Stoic school can provide a corrective for these follies. However, as well as satirising the follies of humanity in general, through the medium of two committed, but very different Stoics, the poem has a more specific satirical target. For the poem questions the credentials and credibility of those who assume the high moral ground afforded by an adherence to such schools as the Stoa, both those, like Stertinius, who are philosophically competent and rhetorically dangerous, and others, like Damasippus, whose

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[35] Compare Cicero's use of Epicurean terms at *De Natura Deorum* 1.26.74.

[36] See Rudd [18] 181: 'Most of the forms of lunacy already mentioned are referred to again in the epilogue. Horace, says Damasippus, is ambitious in his building programme; he has a terrible temper . . . ; he lives recklessly beyond his means; and he is wildly promiscuous. One is given the impression that, if Horace had not interrupted, Damasippus would have completed the list with superstition'.

competence is questionable and whose unbounded enthusiasm makes of him a pest and a bore. There is a generally moral element in the poem in so far as comments are made about the folly and moral and spiritual bankruptcy of mankind, but also there is a more specific satirical target, the proselytising Stoics and others of their ilk.

There is a more purely literary dimension to be considered. *Satires* 2.3 represents a response to a technical literary challenge, namely that of presenting in satisfactory Latin verse that which at first sight may well have seemed rather an intractable form, despite or even on account of its evident persuasive power. Horace certainly prided himself on being an innovator in the field of Latin poetry, as is evident from *Odes* 3.30.12-14, while the *Epistles* were more than likely the first verse letters of antiquity and are the poems in which many of the techniques of persuasion developed in *Satires* 2.3 and the other dialogical satires of the second book are displayed to the best advantage. There was another advantage inherent in adapting the techniques of the Stoic sermon to Roman satire. The very extremism of doctrine, to which Horace seems to have been fundamentally opposed, and that linked extremism of expression characteristic of the Stoic paradox were ideally suited to the sometimes polemical and often extreme discourse appropriate to the satiric genre. By exploiting the techniques of Stertinius he could enjoy their vigour and success while distancing himself from too close an identification with that particular voice. The satire explores ideas and modes of persuasive discourse and the adventures of such ideas and modes of discourse when they are adopted and exploited by those not totally conversant with their nuances.

THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF IMPERIAL MILITARY DEFEAT[1]

Ada Cheung
Department of Classics and Archaeology, Monash University
Clayton, Victoria 3168, Australia

Abstract. Rosenstein has proved that a defeated Republican commander did not necessarily face political and social ruin. With the advent of the principate, an institution based fundamentally on the *princeps*' *gloria*, military defeat took on grave political implications. A solution seems to have been devised whereby the regime projected the image of the field commander being solely culpable.

Rosenstein's recent work has revealed, perhaps contrary to general expectation, that military defeat did not necessarily spell the end of a Republican general's political career since he had various options for exculpating himself in the event of failure. Blame could be attributed to a disruption of the *pax deorum* of which the commander was personally innocent,[2] or to a lack of *virtus* in the legionaries;[3] in the last resort, a general's reputation could be salvaged through courageous conduct in defeat.[4] In the imperial system, however, the *princeps* as *pontifex maximus* could not have tolerated any implied accusation of religious negligence; and not only was *gloria* ultimately ceded to him, but his position as commander-in-chief in a virtual military dictatorship ruled out any possible alienation, through imputations of cowardice, of the soldiers on whom his power fundamentally rested.

This last aspect in particular magnified the implications of defeat to an extent unknown even in the last years of the Republic, for intrinsic to the very nature of the principate was a stable military foundation. Already by 23 BCE it was demonstrated that all acclamations of *imperator* could simply be arrogated to Augustus;[5] and the settlement of 23 BCE made the *princeps* the legitimate

[1] This article owes much to Saul Bastomsky, Peter Bicknell and the Editor; all opinion and error are mine alone.

[2] N. Rosenstein, *Imperatores Victi* (Berkeley 1990) 54-91, 160-63.

[3] Rosenstein [2] 94-112.

[4] Rosenstein [2] 116-23.

[5] R. Syme, *The Augustan Aristocracy* (Oxford 1986) 274; B. Campbell, *The Emperor and the Roman Army* (Oxford 1984) 349; W. Eck, 'Senatorial Self-representation: Developments in the Augustan Period', in F. Millar (ed.), *Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects* (Oxford 1984) 138-41.

commander-in-chief by virtue of his *imperium maius* (Cass. Dio 53.32.5f.).[6] This overriding *imperium* not only conferred the legal right to deploy the provincial armies, but no less important, it raised the question of whether commanders in the field were operating under their own *auspicia* or that of the *princeps*,[7] an ambiguity which seems to have led directly to the situation in which senators came to lead armies only as *legati Augusti*.[8] The political advantage to be gained thus was that the *princeps* could then claim as his own the credit for any victories won by the Roman legions, a vital process since *Victoria* features very strongly in the fundamental ideology of the principate both as an independent quality which was the ultimate justification of autocracy (Pliny *Pan.* 12.1),[9] and also as that which underpinned *Virtus*, *Libertas*, *Pax*, *Salus*, *Securitas* and *Concordia*.[10]

A serious defeat, however, had ramifications far beyond disrupted military strategy, in that a considerable loss sustained by Roman legions was a severe blow to the image of both *princeps* and principate. The *princeps* would have been forced into a situation of having somehow to reverse the close identification with the legions which without exception had been diligently created and fostered, at least during the consolidation of accession, in order to insulate as much as possible both his person and his regime from the disastrous social and political significance of defeat. Campbell's comment that 'an emperor would also have to bear in mind that military incompetence, real or imagined, could be a useful weapon of political propaganda against him'[11] is confined to the context of hostile tradition,[12] and he neither provides evidence of negative contemporary reactions nor examines the political ramifications of defeats which did occur. An interesting pattern of behaviour becomes apparent from the study of three military disasters of the early principate: those inflicted by Arminius in 9 CE, Boudicca in 60 CE and the Dacians in 85 CE.

The defeat of Quinctilius Varus was militarily the greatest Roman loss since the disaster at Carrhae in 53 BCE (cf. Vell. Pat. 2.119.1). Moreover, the implications for the Augustan principate were even more serious than the annihilation of three out of the five German legions. It must already have been clear that the ultimate test of Augustus' plans for the hereditary succession of his

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[6] Cf. R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford 1939) 336 n. 2.

[7] The seminal investigation of this question occurred in 25 BCE when Crassus was denied the *spolia opima* by use of this same technicality (cf. Syme [6] 308; Campbell [5] 349-51).

[8] Campbell [5] 352.

[9] Cf. J. R. Fears, 'The Theology of Victory at Rome', *ANRW* 2.17.2 (1981) 752.

[10] Fears [9] 807-09, 812f.

[11] Campbell [5] 398.

[12] Campbell [5] 398 n. 71.

position was imminent,[13] and the occurrence of such a catastrophe at this point could easily have been interpreted as divine disapproval for the continuance of the principate beyond the founder's lifetime. The precautions taken to prevent unrest, both urban and provincial (Suet. *Aug.* 23.1), reflect the immediate gravity of the situation.

In demonstrating the disguising of Augustus' ultimate responsibility for the policy followed in Germany,[14] Syme has uncovered the tactic employed by the regime: the systematic deprecation of Quinctilius Varus enabled all culpability for the whole affair to be slid onto his conveniently dead shoulders. His close connection with the *domus Augusta* from as early as 25 BCE[15] would have made it very difficult for him plausibly to be depicted as a renegade commander; in addition, there may also have been the consideration that this picture might resemble too closely the method of M. Primus' destruction.

The predicament was thus one of somehow discrediting Varus as a general without thereby allowing criticism to rebound onto Augustus for having made the original appointment. The initial characterisation by Velleius is probably the closest reflection of the contemporary Augustan portrayal—Varus is depicted as torpid, mild and wholly unprepared for governing a belligerent province (Vell. Pat. 2.117.2). Rapacity is also mentioned; while Velleius did not ascribe this to Varus' behaviour in Germany, it became a central theme in later accounts (Cf. Suet. *Tib.* 18; Cass. Dio 46.18.3; Flor. *Epit.* 2.30). The combined effect is that Varus seems very much to have contributed significantly and directly to the disaster through a combination of naïveté and mild incompetence, which came to be simplified and exaggerated into stupidity and maladministration. It would, however, have been imprudent for contemporary accounts to blacken the general too much, lest this raise the difficult question of why Augustus commissioned so unsuitable a figure. Velleius' balanced summary rather contradicts his earlier assessment by rehabilitating Varus to a certain extent (Vell. Pat. 2.120.5) and fits perfectly the purpose of imperial exculpation by portraying the general as fundamentally ill-starred rather than wholly inept. Also notable is the apparent care taken by the historian to prevent any possible imputation of cowardice on the part of the soldiers.

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[13] Cf. R. Syme, *Cambridge Ancient History* 10 (1936) 376.

[14] Syme [13] 374; cf. Syme [5] 325.

[15] M. Reinhold, 'Marcus Agrippa's Son-in-law P. Quinctilius Varus', *CPh* 67 (1972) 119-21.

Although this representation has, on the whole, been accepted uncritically by modern authors,[16] it is possible to compare what may be called the Augustan creation with the picture presented by Josephus, who was writing a largely provincial history and had, moreover, no intelligible reason fraudulently to rehabilitate a general seventy years dead and wholly unconnected with the Flavian dynasty. While proconsul in Syria, Varus seems to have intervened deftly in the complexities of Idumaean palace politics (Joseph. *AJ* 18.93-133) and his successful suppression of two armed uprisings (18.250-98) belies, as noted by Syme, the charge of martial ineptitude springing from ignorance.[17] In addition, Josephus, not known for reticence with regard to proconsular maladministration, makes no mention of the financial expropriation of Roman legend; Varus' wealth may in fact be attributed to wholly honourable sources.[18]

These discrepancies support suspicion,[19] and it likewise does not seem to be mere coincidence that though contemporary, Strabo's account (Strab. 7.1.4)—which blames German treachery alone—was most probably not produced in Rome. Indeed, Woodman's comment that 'what criticism there is [of Varus] can be justified',[20] seems to be precisely the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* conclusion which was the aim of the Augustan regime. Further confirmation of an aspect of official calumny may be found in the destruction, within the next decade, of Appuleia Varilla, Claudia Pulchra and Quinctilius Varus.[21] As they were respectively the general's niece, widow and heir, it is not beyond the bounds of credibility that *pietas* shown towards his memory may have been involved in some fashion, either as motive, or additional pretext for persecution.

The sheer magnitude of the defeat seems also to have required a secondary explanation—that of fate (Vell. Pat. 2.118.4; Tac. *Ann.* 1.55). Creation of a belief that Varus was doomed to emulate his father and grandfather (Vell. Pat. 2.119.3)

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[16] E.g., R. Ridley, *History of Rome* (Rome 1987) 384; E. S. Gruen, 'The Imperial Policy of Augustus', in K. Raaflaub and M. Toher (edd.), *Between Republic and Empire* (Berkeley 1990) 407; A. J. Woodman, *Velleius Paterculus: The Tiberian Narrative (2.94-131)* (Cambridge 1977) 42f., 190.

[17] Syme [5] 323.

[18] Syme [5] 328.

[19] Syme [5] 326: 'Quinctilius Varus is impugned for a trusting nature and for culpable negligence. An aristocrat who had known Herod, the savage Idumean and the perfidious inhabitants of Syria, was easily captivated and deceived by the young prince of the Cherusci, who had seen service as an officer, who had acquired the status of a Roman knight.'

[20] Woodman [16] 190.

[21] Syme [5] 327f.

neatly removed from the *princeps* even the minor responsibility of having made the fatal appointment.

While it is absurd to conflate these suggestions into a fully fledged conspiracy theory in which Velleius was the conscious accomplice in a comprehensive plot to libel the defeated commander, it is striking that both the themes of malign fate and Varus' personal culpability are evident in Augustus' own reactions. The ancient practice of votive games to Jupiter Optimus Maximus was revived and the *princeps* denounced the legate specifically by name in the throes of somewhat pretentious displays of grief (Suet. *Aug.* 23.2). It therefore appears to be no accident that the whole disaster came uniquely to be named after the unfortunate general. Since Germanicus, guided by survivors, seems to have found the battlefield and erected a tumulus (Tac. *Ann.* 1.60-62), there is no overt reason why the defeat should not more conventionally have been termed the *clades Teutoburgiensis*. Moreover, the immediate dispatch of Tiberius, the senior general and nominated regent, to lead the series of face-saving manoeuvres was as much an attempt to salvage Roman prestige as a purely military decision.[22] The actual strategic advantages won by the evocatively named Germanicus in the last years of Augustus' principate may also be questioned.[23]

Despite the relative ease of Suetonius Paulinus' eventual victory, the political ramifications of the revolt of the Iceni under the leadership of Boudicca in 60-61 CE were perhaps even more dangerous than those occasioned by outright defeat. The destruction of three major settlements seems to have created the distinct impression that Britain, the province which more than any other symbolised Roman dominion over the very ends of the known world, could have been—or momentarily was—lost (Tac. *Agr.* 16.2; Cass. Dio 62.1.1).[24] The annihilation of the Ninth Legion and the internal military crisis which culminated in the insubordination and subsequent suicide of Poenius Postumus (Tac. *Ann.* 14.37) would only have exacerbated the situation. This, combined with the unease still felt over the Armenian conflict with Parthia, would have contributed

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[22] Cf. Syme [13] 376, 379; B. Levick, *Tiberius the Politician* (London 1976) 62; Gruen [16] 408.

[23] Cf. Gruen [16] 408.

[24] The perceived magnitude of the crisis is emphasised in the equally exaggerated record of 70 000 Romans and allies killed in the rebellion (Tac. *Ann.* 14.32f.) and the retribution of 80 000 deaths exacted in battle by Suetonius Paulinus, who lost a mere 800 casualties (*Ann.* 14.36), a ratio suspiciously similar to the legendary outcome of Agincourt. Modern commentators have noted that only the rebellion of Vercingetorix and the Mithridatic wars provide precedents for the total abandonment of a Roman settlement to the enemy (D. R. Dudley and G. Webster, *The Rebellion of Boudicca* [London 1962] 66).

to a very unsettling atmosphere; and there may also have been political consequences in the innermost circle of power since this disaster seems to have allowed criticism and subsequent modification of the policies advocated by Seneca and Burrus.[25]

Nero seems to have reacted in a fashion which may be seen as consistent with the tactics of Augustus. The replacement and recall of Suetonius Paulinus, possibly on the pretext of minor naval losses (Tac. *Agr.* 39), carries an underlying imputation of blame for the rebellion (Tac. *Agr.* 16.2f.); and it is possible that the inquiry made at Delphi (Suet. *Nero* 40.3) was at least partially motivated by the perceived disruption of the *pax deorum*.[26]

It is notable that none of the extant ancient sources blame Nero himself for the Jewish uprising which occurred four years later. The primary reason for this seems to be that Judaea, even when in the grip of insurrection, was a minor province hardly in the forefront of Roman consciousness, particularly when juxtaposed with Corbulo's Armenian campaigns. This view is reinforced *ex silentio* by the fact that Suetonius did not regard the Jewish Revolt as worthy of enumeration among the defeats suffered by Nero (Suet. *Nero* 39).[27] In additional contrast to the Boudiccan revolt, the unique ethnic character of the Jewish uprising meant that, despite spilling over into Syria and Alexandria (Joseph. *AJ* 2.457-80, 487-98), there was little danger of any nationalist spirit of rebellion spreading through other eastern provinces. Therefore, while any insurrection had to be put down as an example to others (Joseph. *AJ* 2.397), ethnic violence in a distant, insignificant province of no symbolic import, does not seem to have been considered fit political ammunition.

In 85-86 CE, when Oppius Sabinus was killed by a Dacian incursion (Suet. *Dom.* 6.1) and Cornelius Fuscus subsequently lost a considerable number of men attempting to exact vengeance in Dacia itself, Domitian seems to have faced a similar predicament to that of 9 CE (Suet. *Dom.* 6.1; Mart. 6.76; Juv. 4.111; Tac. *Agr.* 41.2).[28] The military situation was less immediately dangerous, but concurrent difficulties in several other provinces (Tac. *Agr.* 41.2) meant that this combined crisis was comparable in scale to that confronted by Augustus.

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[25] R. Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford 1958, 1967) 766.

[26] The wisdom, however, of choosing a Greek oracle rather than a Roman institution such as the Sibylline Books seems questionable.

[27] Since both Tacitus and Dio similarly make no mention of the Jewish revolt within the sequence of events in Nero's reign, it may be conjectured that had Vespasian not become *princeps*, this rebellion would only have received a very cursory notice in Roman annals.

[28] Cf. R. Syme, 'Rhine and Danube Legions Under Domitian', *JRS* 18 (1928) 46; R. Syme, *Cambridge Ancient History* 11 (1936) 170f.; B. W. Jones, *Domitian* (London 1992) 139-41.

While the ancient sources are not of similar diversity to those for the Varian disaster, the sketchy details can be pieced together to provide some indication of the military emergency and an unequivocal statement of Domitian's reaction in blaming his generals for the defeats while taking undue credit for victories is preserved by Dio (Cass. Dio 67.6.4 *ex* Xiphilinus Exc. Val. 281 [399]). The agreement reached with Decabelus two years later seems to have been portrayed as a triumph (Cass. Dio 67.72-4; Mart. 6.76; Pliny *Pan.* 11.4); the prominent diplomatic aspects did not prevent the *princeps* from assuming his sixteenth and seventeenth salutations as *imperator* and he may deliberately have heightened his personal reputation with the legionaries also at this time by conferring or confirming tax exemptions for veterans.[29] In addition, a more conservative policy—tellingly disguised with the construction of an arch at Rutupiae—was ordered for Britain,[30] clearly to lessen the risk of incurring another defeat. Jones concludes that 'military success had to be seen to be rewarded to guarantee the soldiers' continued loyalty and, as well, to enhance the image of the warrior emperor,'[31] to which may be added the equally significant aspect of obliterating the memory of failure. Moreover, the condemnation of the Chief Vestal during the period of 87-90 CE[32] may have been part of Domitian's efforts as both *pontifex maximus* and *censor perpetuus* to restore the *pax deorum*; Cornelia's citation of imperial triumphs and victories as proof of her chastity (Pliny *Ep.* 4.11.7) seems in this light decidedly self-defeating.

It is notable, however, that open deprecation of the *princeps*' political actions surfaced not in the hostile accounts of Pliny or Tacitus published soon after Domitian's death, but only much later in an epitome of the third-century historian.

It seems indicative of Augustus' success that Dio depicts the ominous portents as confirmation of the *princeps*' own suspicions of divine involvement in the disaster (Cass. Dio 56.24.2-5); such events as a lightning strike, a swarm of bees, the automotion of a statue of Victory and astrological phenomena were as easily (and perhaps more usually) seen as reflecting adversely on the regime itself. It is highly probable that the difference with the picture of Domitian is due in greater part to the interpretation of their respective reigns than to the relative quality of the contemporary propaganda; Augustus is generally given the benefit of the doubt by ancient sources in the case of the Varian disaster,[33] while the

[29] Jones [28] 142f.

[30] Jones [28] 142.

[31] Jones [28] 143.

[32] Jones [28] 102 n. 16.

[33] With the sole and striking exception within the wholly negative context of Tac. *Ann.* 1.3.

mendacity of the 'tyrant' in blaming his defeated generals is contemptuously unmasked by later tradition.[34]

To return to Rosenstein's analysis of Republican defeats, that this tactic of carefully distancing the *princeps* from responsibility for defeat succeeded at all reveals the remarkable feat of completely altering the Roman military ethos at a fundamental level. Since exoneration of the general necessarily implied inculpation of the *princeps*, all opprobrium was thrust onto the unfortunate commander, however he may have deported himself on the battlefield. Varus' refusal to outlive dishonour certainly did not save his reputation, there is no evidence that either Sabinus or Fuscus died disgracefully, and Paulinus was recalled even in victory.

The actual dissemination of the desired picture need not be as crude and unconvincing as a conscious attempt to corrupt the historical record by persuading contemporary annalists to record a distorted version which was known to be spurious. It is much more reasonable to suggest that full knowledge of the event would have been confined to those within the centre of the *princeps'* circle, men who would have had neither inclination nor reason to incriminate the *princeps* and weaken the regime of which they were an intrinsic part.[35] For others, including historians, who were not intimately connected with the *consilium principis*, it may be assumed that a mere official hint that the disaster was caused by incompetence in the field, rather than at the executive level, would have sufficed.

Once this basic premise had been accepted—and the ease with which information could be controlled removes any reason to question it—then the natural reaction would be to search for explanatory flaws in the commander. Hindsight would thus interpret characteristics such as initiative as rashness and caution as cowardice. The picture was then cemented by conventions of ancient historiography: Velleius was unable to resist the dramatic juxtaposition of the peaceable Varus with the native fire of Arminius (Vell. Pat. 2.117.2-3; 2.118.2),[36] and Tacitus similarly contrasted the disastrous inability of the preferred generals with the overlooked competence of Agricola (Tac. *Agr.*

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[34] The martial aspirations of Trajan and Hadrian may have been responsible for the unexpected reluctance on the part of Pliny, Tacitus, Suetonius and their contemporaries to draw a connection between Domitian's policies and the military defeats suffered by his generals.

[35] The decline in Seneca's and Burrus' influence as a direct result of the Boudiccan rebellion illustrates the fact that separation of the *princeps* from the executive was extremely difficult, especially in matters of inculpation.

[36] Cf. Syme [13] 374; Woodman [16] 42.

41.2).[37] Once established, these themes more often than not became an accepted part of the historical tradition.

It is notable, however, that Tacitus seems to have chosen to follow the official line in attributing the loss of so many armies and men to faults in their commanders, rather than in Domitian. There is no ostensible reason why this string of defeats should not have been ascribed to devastatingly unwarranted bellicosity on the *princeps*' part. This reticence is extremely unlikely to have been motivated by any charity felt by the historian towards Domitian. It is much more plausible that, with the form of the principate not only continuing unchanged, but being in fact reinforced by the overtly martial Trajan, Tacitus shrank—perhaps even subconsciously—from revealing a darker secret of empire.[38]

[37] Cf. Syme [28 (1936)] 23.

[38] It does not require inordinate cynicism to imagine the consequences if Tacitus had actually stripped the *princeps* of his shield against responsibility for defeat and Trajan had not returned victorious from his own campaigns.

CATO, CAESAR AND THE NAME OF THE REPUBLIC IN LUCAN, *PHARSALIA* 2.297-303[1]

Andrew Erskine
Department of Classics, University College, Dublin, National University of Ireland
Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland

Abstract. This paper draws attention to the relationship between Caesar's famous aphorism on the Republic as 'a name without body or form' and Lucan's *Pharsalia*. The focus is the funeral imagery in Cato's speech at *Pharsalia* 2.297-303, but the interplay between Caesar, Cato and Pompey is also explored.

In Lucan's *Pharsalia* 2 Cato justifies his decision to join the civil war on Pompey's side. Rather than stand back he will fall with the Republic:

> Ceu morte parentem
> natorum orbatum longum producere funus
> ad tumulos iubet ipse dolor, iuvat ignibus atris
> inseruisse manus constructoque aggere busti
> ipsum atras tenuisse faces, non ante revellar,
> exanimem quam te conplectar, Roma, tuumque
> nomen, Libertas, et inanem persequar umbram.
>
> (*Pharsalia* 2.297-303)
>
> Just as a father who is robbed by death of his sons is under orders from grief itself to lead a long funeral procession to the grave and he is pleased to grasp the smoky fires and, where the mound of the funeral pyre is heaped high, to hold the smoky torches himself, in just such way I shall not be wrenched away before I embrace you lifeless, Rome, and follow your name, Freedom, and insubstantial ghost to the grave.

Much has been said about the funeral imagery in this speech but less about the corpse itself.[2] As Fantham notes, the hendiadys of *Roma* and *Libertas* here represents the 'free republican state'. Cato anticipates its death; it will be 'lifeless' (*exanimem*), nothing more than *nomen* ('a name'), an 'insubstantial ghost' (*inanem umbram*). Nothing survives but the disembodied name and even that is questionable. Echoes of this can be found in Cato's later speech in book 9:

[1] I would like to thank Theresa Urbainczyk, Llewellyn Morgan and the anonymous readers for their helpful comments. The text followed is that of E. Fantham (ed.), *Lucan, De Bello Civili Book II* (Cambridge 1992). All translations are my own.

[2] Fantham [1] 134f.; F. Ahl, *Lucan: An Introduction* (Ithaca 1976) 243f.; W. Tasler, *Die Reden in Lucans Pharsalia* (Bonn 1972) 164-66.

'genuine belief' (*vera fides*) in *Libertas* ('Freedom') perished with the actions of Sulla and Marius, 'feigned belief' (*ficta fides*) died with Pompey (204-06). The implication here is not only that *fides* ('belief') is *ficta* ('feigned') but that *Libertas* too is now unreal. Cato may have followed the body to the grave, but the death itself had been dragged out over years. As the grieving parent Cato is closely aligned with the Republic; indeed the implication contained in *persequar*, that he is to 'follow' the corpse into its grave, makes the identification stronger still.

Cato, then, stands by *Libertas*, however shadowy it may be; if this means that he has to support Pompey as well, then so be it. On the other side is Caesar, both as a real opponent and as a literary device that can be traced back to Sallust's *Catilinae Coniuratio* (50-53.1). In Lucan's text Caesar and Cato represent opposing sides and opposing causes, against and for *Libertas*.[3] The corpse of the Republic needs to be understood within the context of this conflict.

Caesar had notoriously derided the insubstantiality of the Republic. He was reported to have dismissed it as 'nothing, a mere name without a body or form' (*nihil esse rem publicam, appellationem modo sine corpore ac specie*, Suet. *Iul.* 77). Here is Cato's shadowy corpse, *exanimis* ('lifeless'), *inanis* ('insubstantial'), *ficta* ('feigned'), a mere *nomen* ('name'), deprived by Caesar of all meaning. What Cato observes with regret, Caesar positively revels in. The allusion to Caesar's contemptuous remark within the context of a funeral serves to give further emphasis to the hubristic badness of Cato's opponent.

Whether Caesar ever uttered the outrageous words attributed to him might be doubted; the only named source for them is the Pompeian T. Ampius Balbus, who was hardly likely to have been impartial on the matter (Suet. *Iul.* 77).[4] Nevertheless, the role of Ampius in reporting them indicates that the theme was part of the political dialogue of the last years of the Republic. A similar preoccupation is visible in a letter of Cicero from April 49 BC; if Pompey does not win, he tells Atticus, 'then the *nomen populi Romani* ("name of the Roman people") must perish and even if he does win it will be a victory on the Sullan model' (Cic. *Att.* 10.7.1).[5] It is hard here to avoid the parallel with Cato's speech at Lucan, *Pharsalia* 9.204-06 where 'feigned belief in Freedom' lasts from Sulla to Pompey. It would appear, then, that Lucan was making Cato reflect the

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[3] On the opposition between Cato and Caesar in Lucan, see Ahl [2] 254-62; J. Brisset, *Les idées politiques de Lucain* (Paris 1964) 148-67; and C. Wirszubski, *Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome* (Cambridge 1960) 124.

[4] On Ampius as Pompeian, see R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford 1939) 53 n. 3; Cic. *Fam.* 6.12; *Att.* 8.11 B 2.

[5] I owe this reference to an unpublished lecture by Michael Winterbottom.

arguments and debates of the 40s BC. Given that it was the Pompeian Ampius who advertised Caesar's unrepublican sentiments, it is appropriate to find echoes of them in the mouth of Cato as he chooses to side with Pompey. Perhaps Lucan was merely making use of a well-known remark of Caesar, but his extensive knowledge of the period suggests that he cannot have been unaware of the contemporary resonances.[6]

Cato's speech in book 2 not only calls to mind Caesar's unrepublican remark, it also alludes to the previous book where Lucan in his own voice contrasts Pompey and Caesar (1.120-57). Here too Caesar's provocative aphorism resonates within the text. Lucan, while talking of Pompey, writes *stat magni nominis umbra* ('the shadow of a great name he stood', 1.135), but perhaps the reader should also think of the Republic, itself now the mere ghost of a name.[7] Pompey and the Republic may be names without substance or content, but Caesar in contrast is far more than just a name (*sed non in Caesare tantum / nomen erat nec fama ducis*, 'but Caesar had more than a mere name and military reputation', 1.143f.);[8] he is full of boundless energy, a natural force, *fulmen* ('thunderbolt') rather than *nomen* ('name'); with little thought for the superficiality of a *nomen* he dashes off in pursuit of *favor numinis* ('the favour of fortune', 1.143-57). If the Republic and Pompey are empty names that Cato will follow to the grave, it is Caesar who will fill the void, a name with substance.

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[6] For Lucan's historical knowledge, see A. W. Lintott, 'Lucan and the History of the Civil War', *CQ* 21 (1971) 488-505.

[7] On the resonance of this phrase in Lucan, see D. C. Feeney, '*Stat magni nominis umbra*: Lucan on the Greatness of Pompeius Magnus', *CQ* 36 (1986) 239-43; cf. Ahl [2] 157f.

[8] P. Wuilleumier and H. Le Bonniec, *M. Annaeus Lucanus: Bellum Civile, Liber Primus* (Paris 1962) 38 takes *tantum* as an adjective ('mere') rather than an adverb ('only'), but Feeney [7] 239 prefers the ambiguity: in one sense Caesar is more than just a name; in another he is not *magnus* ('great').

EIGHT FURTHER CONJECTURES ON THE *CYRANIDES*[1]

David M. Bain
Department of Classics and Ancient History, University of Manchester
Manchester M13 9PL, United Kingdom

Abstract. Eight textual suggestions are here offered with regard to a section of a Venetian manuscript (not noticed until 1975 and first edited in part in 1983) that contains part of books 2-4 of the late Greek medico-magical text known as the *Cyranides*.

All of these conjectures arise from textual problems which occur in the Venetian manuscript M, a manuscript not known to the editor of the first critical edition of the *Cyranides* which appeared as recently as 1976.[2] In each case I am dealing with passages uniquely preserved in M. The new material it contained was capably edited in 1983 by Anna Meschini.[3] I have already made a couple of textual suggestions in an article which, although dated 1993, appeared later than my article cited in note 3.[4] My starting point on each occasion in the present contribution is the text printed by Meschini.[5]

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[1] Compare D. Bain, 'An Emendation in the *Cyranides* (2.45.6 Kaimakis)', *Sileno* 19 (1993) 383-85; 'Περιγίνεσθαι as a Medical Term and a Conjecture in the *Cyranides*', in D. Innes, H. Hine and C. Pelling (edd.), *Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday* (Oxford 1995) 281-86; and 'Eight More Conjectures on the *Cyranides*', *ICS* 20 (1995) 169-82.

[2] D. Kaimakis, *Die Kyraniden* (Meisenheim am Glan 1976). The *editio princeps* of C.-E. Ruelle, in F. de Mély, *Les Lapidaires de l'antiquité et du moyen âge* 2.1: *Les lapidaires grecs* (Paris 1898), does not merit the epithet 'critical'.

[3] A. Meschini, 'Le Ciranidi nel Marc. Gr. 512', *Atti dell' Accademia Pontaniana* 31 (Naples 1983) 145-77. She missed three interesting passages: see D. Bain, 'Some Unpublished Cyranidean Material in Marc. Gr. 512 (678): Three Addenda to Meschini', *ZPE* 104 (1994) 36-42.

[4] D. Bain, 'Marcianus Graecus 512 (678) and the Text of the *Cyranides*: Some Preliminary Observations', *RFIC* 121 (1993) 427-49 (on 4.42.3 and 4.32d.2: see 448f.).

[5] I use at the beginning of each sub-heading Meschini's mode of reference: Roman capitals for the book number, Arabic for the section and line number, adding letters of the alphabet where there is more than one passage to be found in a given section; elsewhere I use Arabic numbers and letters of the alphabet.

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II.3a.8f. (περὶ αἰγός: 'about the goat')

> γάλα δὲ βοηθεῖ τοῖς εἰληφόσι διὰ κανθαρίδων θανάσιμον, ἀμβλῦνον αὐτῶν τὴν καυστικὴν ἐνέργειαν.
>
> Its milk helps those who have imbibed a deadly <?> through blister-beetles, dulling their caustic effect.

As can be seen from the translation, something is missing before or after θανάσιμον: the adjective requires a substantive or else an article converting it into a substantive. Read accordingly either <φάρμακον> θανάσιμον or θανάσιμον <φάρμακον> . In either case the meaning is 'a deadly poison'[6]. Alternatively, and perhaps preferably, read <τὸ> διὰ κανθαρίδων θανάσιμον ('the deadly poison which uses blister-beetles'); διὰ makes it clear that we are dealing with a *poison*[7] made from the blister-beetle and not with an attack by the creature itself.[8]

2, 3 and 4

II.9.4 (περὶ βοός: 'about the cow')

> τοῦ δὲ μόσχου ἡ χολὴ τὸ μὲν σύμπαν ἀναστοματική ἐστι καὶ σπαστικὴ καὶ διαφορετικὴ καὶ λιπαντική.
>
> The bile of the calf is in general effective for opening, absorbent, discutient and fattening.

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[6] Cf. *Cyr.* 2.35.14f. ἡ δὲ χολὴ καὶ ἡ πυτία αὐτοῦ πινομένη ποιεῖ πρὸς πάντα τὰ θανάσιμα φάρμακα ('Its bile and rennet taken in a drink deal with all deadly poisons') and *Cyr.* 3.36.50f. ἐὰν δέ τις πίηι φάρμακον θανάσιμον . . . ('if one drinks a deadly poison . . .').

[7] On the use of the blister-beetle as a poison, see I. C. Beavis, *Insects and Other Invertebrates in Classical Antiquity* (Exeter 1988) 172; M. Davies and J. Kathirithamby, *Greek Insects* (London 1986) 92. For its deadly effect compare the anecdote in Cic. *Tusc.* 5.117 (reflected in Val. Max. 6.2 *ext.* 3) and Galen, *De Simpl. Fac.* 10.8 (C. G. Kühn [ed.], *Medicorum Graecorum Opera Quae Exstant* [Leipzig 1826] 12.269.3), οὕτως γοῦν μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ διάβρωσιν ἀναιροῦντα θανάσιμα φάρμακα προτραπῆναι διδόναι τὸ γάλα, καθάπερ ὅ τε θαλάττιος λαγωὸς ἀναιρεῖ καὶ ἡ κανθαρίς ('It is for this reason, I believe, that doctors are persuaded that milk must be given to counter those poisons which kill by erosion, just as the sea-hare or the blister-beetle kills').

[8] For a similar expression cf. Galen 12.609.11 (Kühn [7])), τὸ διὰ τῆς κανθαρίδος οὐρητικόν ('the diuretic which uses blister-beetle').

First, two orthographical corrections. Read or understand ἀναστομωτική and διαφορητική. From examination of a photograph in my possession I would say that διαφορητική is in fact the manuscript reading and that Meschini has misread an eta as an epsilon, but appearances can be deceptive when dealing with photographs of this manuscript and the reading would need to be checked. Hence διαφορητική is put forward as an emendation. ἀναστομωτικός and διαφορητικός are both well attested medical terms.[9] The same cannot be said for σπαστικός and λιπαντικός, but the sense for the former given by Liddell, Scott and Jones,[10] 'absorbent', is perfectly apt in this context. Here λιπαντική, like the other adjectives, should indicate an effect. Hence, I suppose, it ought to mean 'fattening', but LSJ only gives the adjective as meaning 'for anointing'.[11] In view of what follows, however (τὰ γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ὀμμάτων λευκώματα καὶ τὰς παχείας οὐλὰς λεπτύνει: 'it thins white spots on the eyes and swollen scars'), for λιπαντική read λεπτυντική ('thinning'), a term as well attested[12] as ἀναστομωτικός and διαφορητικός.

5

II.12d (περὶ γαλῆς: 'about the weasel')

> πνιγεῖσα δὲ ἐν οἴνωι τοὺς πίνοντας πάσης εὐφροσύνης ἐκτὸς τίθησιν.
>
> Drowned in wine it puts the drinkers outside of any merriment.

This makes sense, but I doubt that it is what the author intended. In malicious magic harm should be extreme harm. A recipe for general lack of merriment is both implausible and feeble in a magical text. I therefore advance a couple of Maasian 'diagnostic' conjectures. Substitute ἐντὸς ('within') for ἐκτὸς ('outside').[13] There are several references in the *Cyranides* to recipes which induce merriment in fellow drinkers who have in fact drunk little or nothing: ταῦτα εἰπὼν εἰς ποτήριον, βάλλε

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[9] For ἀναστομωτικός, 'opening up', see the Galenic examples in R. J. Durling, *A Dictionary of Medical Terms in Galen* (Leiden 1993) 48. For διαφορητικός see the many examples in Galen collected by Durling [above, this note] 128f.

[10] H. G. Liddell, R. Scott and H. S. Jones (hereafter LSJ), *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford 1940) *s.v.* σπαστικός.

[11] LSJ [10] *s.v.* λιπαντικός.

[12] See Durling [9] 220.

[13] For this sort of polar error where 'in' and 'out' are confused, the *locus classicus* is now Theoc. *Id.* 1.32, where against ἔντοσθεν ('on the inside'), the reading of the manuscripts, *P. Berol.* 17073 correctly and uniquely has ἔκτοσθεν ('on the outside'): see G. Giangrande, 'Theocritus 1.32', *LCM* 1 (1976) 17f.

εἰς κεράμιον ὅθεν πίνουσιν ἅπαντες καὶ ἀναλύσουσιν εὐφρανθέντες μηδενὸς συζητήσαντος ('Saying this into a cup, put it [the contents of the recipe] into a bowl from which all are drinking and the guests will depart happy with no one making any dispute', 1.1.142-44; repeated more or less verbatim at 1.1.166-70); τοῦ οὖν φυτοῦ τούτου ἐάν τις λειώσηι ὅσον δραγμὴν α΄ καὶ τοῦ λίθου οὐγ. α΄ καὶ εἴπηι τὸ Διονυσιακὸν ὄνομα καὶ βάληι δὲ αὐτὸ εἰς κεράμιον οἴνου ὅθεν πάντες πίνουσιν ἕν ποτήριον μόνον, καὶ πιόντες ἀναλύσουσιν, πάντες ὡς μεθύοντες καὶ εὐχαριστοῦντες, λέγοντες ὅτι 'ηὔφρανας ἡμᾶς, δέσποτα' ('If one pounds about a drachma of this plant and one ounce of the stone and utters the Dionysiac name and puts it [the mixture] into a bowl of wine from which all are drinking, just a single cup, once they have drunk it they will depart, all of them as though tipsy and grateful, saying "You have made us happy, lord"', 1.8.13-17);[14] and ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ θύννου τὸν δεξιὸν ὀφθαλμὸν βάληις εἰς τὸν οἶνον καὶ εἴπηις τὸ τοῦ Διονύσου ὄνομα καὶ ὅτι 'ἀναλυσάτωσαν οἱ ἀνακεκλιμένοι φίλοι μὴ πιόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐχαριστοῦντες ὡς εὐφραινόμενοι . . .' ('But if you put the right eye of the tunny into the wine and say the name of Dionysus and "Let the friends who are reclining depart, without drinking, but grateful as though being made happy . . .", 1.8.18-21). Alternatively, assuming that we are dealing with benevolent magic and that a cure for madness or folly is being prescribed, keep ἐκτὸς and read ἀφροσύνης ('folly'). The recipe then 'puts them outside of folly'.

6 and 7

II.16.1 (περὶ δράκοντος: 'about the <large> snake')

> δράκοντος κεφαλὴ ὑπὸ ὁδον ἀγαθοῦ παντὸς γίνεται αἴτιος (*l.* αἰτία).
>
> The head of the snake under a road becomes responsible for every kind of good.

The parallel passage in the elder Pliny has *caput eius* limini ianuarum *subditum propitiatis adoratione diis fortunatam domum facere promittitur* ('its head, buried under *the threshold of doors* after the gods have been propitiated by worship, brings, we are assured, good luck to a home', Plin. *NH* 29.67[15]). We are dealing with thresholds, not roads or streets. Read then either ὑπ' ὀδῶι or ὑπ' οὐδῶι (or, allowing for late Greek confusion between directional and locative expressions, ὑπ' ὁδὸν or ὑπ' οὐδὸν). The word in question is not as poetic as LSJ makes out.[16]

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[14] Drawn to my attention by David Jordan.

[15] W. H. S. Jones (tr.), *Pliny: Natural History* 8 (Cambridge, Mass./London 1963).

[16] LSJ [10] *s.v.* οὐδός.

There are three examples of οὐδός and two of ὀδός in Delian inscriptions.[17] Note also Plutarch, *Moralia* 271c and Lucian, *De Domo* 18.

8

II 20a. 6f. (περὶ ἐλάφων: 'about deer')

> ἡ δὲ τῶν κεράτων τέφρα μετ' ὄξους μιγνυμένη ἐν τοῖς ὑποκυνοκαύμασι λεπτὰς χρονίους[18] θεραπεύσει.
>
> The ashes from the horns mixed with sour wine will treat chronic *leptae* during the heat of the dog-days.

What are λεπταί? There is no known medical condition so named. Read λέπρας ('leprosy'). ὑποκυνόκαυμα, incidentally, is an *addendum lexicis*. LSJ gives κυνόκαυμα from Aëtius and Alexander of Tralles.[19]

[17] See M.-C. Hellman, *Recherches sur le vocabulaire de l'architecture grecque après les inscriptions de Délos* (Athens 1992) 314f.

[18] Χρόνιος is quite commonly a two-termination adjective: for an example in the *Cyranides* note 2.5.26.

[19] LSJ [10] *s.v.* κυνόκαυμα.

REVIEW ARTICLES

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LUCAN'S *CIVIL WAR*: PROGRAMMING THE REVOLUTION

Marc Kleijwegt
Department of Classics, University of South Africa
Pretoria 0002

Shadi Bartsch, *Ideology in Cold Blood: A Reading of Lucan's Civil War*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997. Pp. x + 224. ISBN 0-674-44291-1. UK£29.95.

Shadi Bartsch's previous book offered a fascinating analysis of how the establishment of quasi-monarchical rule affected the behavioural patterns of the senatorial class and how the suppression of freedom shaped the literature of the early Principate.[1] For her latest book she has taken as her subject an author who is seen by many to have been the most vociferous critic of that particular system of government, the most open and wild advocate of the view that freedom and all that was truly Roman died at Pharsalus. *Ideology in Cold Blood* provides a strikingly dissident approach to Lucan in that it aims to weld together a text-oriented focus, a political reading of the *Civil War* and a discussion of Lucan's political activities, that is, his involvement in the Pisonian conspiracy.[2] Bartsch's decision to include a biographical approach in her analysis should not be taken for naïvety, coming at a time when influential scholars on Lucan have come to reject this approach for the blatant fallacies that it entails.[3] Bartsch offers something completely novel in this area, for it is entirely obvious that her sympathies do not lie with forms of historical reconstruction in which the biographical data are simply made to correlate with the presumed political message of the poem.

The main thrust behind our frustrations in getting things right in Lucan lies in the duality of Pompey, 'symbol par excellence of failed hopes, of chances nearly

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[1] S. Bartsch, *Actors in the Audience: Theatricality and Doublespeak from Nero to Hadrian* (Cambridge, Mass. 1994).

[2] How the text of Lucan's poem is shaped by the mental and physical catastrophes of civil war can be experienced most vividly in J. Henderson, 'Lucan: The Word at War', *Ramus* 16 (1987) 122-64, now republished in J. Henderson, *Fighting for Rome* (Cambridge 1998) 165-212; cf. J. Masters, *Poetry and Civil War in Lucan's Bellum Civile* (Cambridge 1992).

[3] Cf. Masters [2] 87f., especially n. 95, whose view is endorsed by V. Hunink in his review of Masters' book in *Mnemosyne* 46 (1993) 253.

grasped and then let slip', as Johnson has aptly characterised him.[4] Yet the narrator, that self-appointed eyewitness of the events of civil war, makes it clear that everybody's sympathies should lie with this vainglorious man. He does so emphatically in 7.207-13, most significantly just prior to the point of no return for Republican hopes, but Bartsch has discovered signs of the narrator's favouritism earlier in the poem, especially 2.519-21, 736 and 4.358f. (discussed on pp. 78f.). The latter point wreaks havoc with any attempts to pinpoint Lucan's pro-Pompeian stance to any historical event, for instance his quarrel with Nero and the subsequent ban on the publication and recital of his poetry. The change in tone from despair to hope cannot be linked to any outside changes; it comes from within the persona of the narrator without affecting the other characters' opinion of Pompey (pp. 83f.). This is the 'faultline' of Lucan's poem, 'the systematic clash in the *Civil War* between detachment and engagement as a stance toward disaster' (pp. 4f.). The explication of this change is the subject of Bartsch's book. As she makes perfectly clear (although she occasionally goes into rhetorical overdrive), the schizophrenia of the text is reflected in Lucanian scholarship. Bartsch professes to be doing what Lucan wants us to do all along, to provoke and reconcile these two possibilities for understanding, a point that students of Lucan have failed to see (p. 7).

In doing this Bartsch cleverly appropriates the structure of Lucan's poem as the framework for her own discussion. A provocative analysis of the breakdown of norms, values and rules of anatomy (pp. 10-73), her discussion can stand on its own, but it simultaneously aims to lay the foundation for the phoenix-like rise of ideology out of the ashes of nihilism. Readers familiar with the work of Johnson, Henderson and Masters will find much to their liking here. Bartsch frequently opens up new perspectives that are cogent and persuasive. Her discussion of the body, with the introduction of the term 'abject' (something that is the product of the body, but to which the mind must enact an instinctive distance) is a gem (pp. 19-22). Her analysis of the 'snakes episode' in book 9, which emphasises the ambiguity of the animals as beings that are capable of swallowing things whole and creeping into holes (the enveloper and enveloped in one species!), is the most persuasive one to date (pp. 29-35). Here Bartsch is continuing the search for the mind-warping ambivalence of civil war. Her main point is the falling away of boundaries, between friend and foe, Roman and foreigner, and within the citizen-body, between who is right and who is wrong. The argument becomes a bit repetitive here and there, but the main point is well made: 'Ideology, too, is impossible, when no clear boundary separates the two sides' (pp. 63f.). And yet Lucan's narrator makes that choice and obviously wants us to do the same.

The orthodox interpretation of this conundrum, recently restated with new vigour but hardly more convincing results by Vassily Rudich, is that the change reflects Lucan's enmity with Nero, which encourages him to take a pro-Pompeian stand. The ban on publishing and reciting, so the argument goes, drove Lucan

[4] W. R. Johnson, *Momentary Monsters: Lucan and His Heroes* (Ithaca 1987) 85.

underground and allowed him to throw off the mask of dissimulation.[5] Of course, as Jamie Masters has pointed out, this all depends on accurate chronological knowledge of Lucan's life and literary career, knowledge that we do not have.[6] In contrast, some critics have rejected the value of the biographical tradition outright and have found a possible answer within the theme of Lucan's poem. As Masters has formulated it, the narrator's abrupt and paradoxically partisan attitude is the result of the poet's fractured voice, a consequence of the doubleness and unjustifiability of the civil war that he describes.[7] Bartsch quibbles with both views and offers a surprising and at times perplexing alternative. She relies on modern and contemporary thinkers, such as Pascal, Rorty and Zizek, to explain Lucan's stand towards ideology. The latter is informed both by an awareness that belief in the Republic is dead and by a fervent desire to recreate belief nonetheless. Lucan, Bartsch argues, is a political ironist (a term borrowed and adapted from Richard Rorty's discussion of moral ironism, a contemporary phenomenon affecting the American intelligentsia) who cold-bloodedly promotes belief in a system of ideology that can no longer claim general acceptance. In her own words: 'Where Rorty suggests the coexistence of ethical commitment and ethical ironism as the unlikely bedmates of the modern intellectual, Lucan instead seems to enact the coexistence of political cynicism and despair with political commitment and fervour even in the face of the deadlock of upper-class myths of power lost' (p. 102). This argument forms part of a powerful presentation in which the paradox of contradictory views is deliberately retained in order to move toward a political explanation. For the bottom line of Bartsch's arguments is always Lucan's involvement in the Pisonian conspiracy.

One cannot but be impressed with Bartsch's ingenuity and her case is well argued. However, some doubts can and must be raised. My first line of argument focuses on the overall framework in which the discussion is embedded. Is Bartsch's approach not simply too much of a modern construct imposed on a situation for which it is distinctly inappropriate? Why does Bartsch need modern and contemporary authorities to explain Lucan's ideological conundrum? The pathological pattern behind his choice, and how this is prefigured in his poetry, becomes more understandable, but how does this fit the ancient scheme of beliefs? The crucial point here is that there are no ancient parallels for the combination of political poetry followed by political action along the lines of the ideological message of that poetry such as can be found in Lucan. There is, therefore, substantial risk involved in equating the two elements. In fact, Bartsch's explanation can only make sense as part

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[5] V. Rudich, *Dissidence and Literature Under Nero: The Price of Rhetoricization* (London 1997) 107-86, esp. 152.

[6] J. Masters, 'Deceiving the Reader: The Political Mission of Lucan *Bellum Civile* 7', in J. Elsner and J. Masters (edd.), *Reflections of Nero* (London 1994) 170. On the same page Masters makes the important point that Lucan's poem was a dangerous project from its inception, that is, from the time when relations between him and Nero were not strained.

[7] Masters [2] 87-91.

of an attempt to understand Lucan's poetry at the expense, as we shall see, of the integrity of the historical source material.

The twentieth-century experience of totalitarian regimes has undoubtedly influenced our reading of the *Civil War* and it is extremely welcome that Bartsch makes the implicit reading explicit (pp. 66f.), but does the ancient evidence allow for such bold comparisons? Surely, the scale of the destruction wrought by Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, and, more importantly, the novelty of the crimes that were committed, bears no resemblance to the pathological anxieties of the upper classes under Nero. Everything rests on the accuracy of our ancient sources and on the degree to which we are prepared to commiserate with those talented but possibly equally unlikeable members of the Roman aristocracy. On occasion the use of such an overly modernising framework results in the surreptitious elision of historical distance.[8] Lucan's poem is turned into something more than a work of creative imagination, recreating, for whatever reason, a gruesome past in which the author himself was not involved; it becomes the direct precursor of twentieth-century critics of totalitarian regimes.[9]

Secondly, how are we to treat the relationship between Lucan's poetry and his involvement in the Pisonian conspiracy? Is it necessarily true that Lucan's decision to join the conspiracy must be part of our reading of the *Civil War*? As observed above, Bartsch's view has very few similarities with previous attempts to integrate poem and biography, except for one important point. She prefers to see Lucan's pro-Pompeian stand as a deliberate move towards active involvement in the opposition against Nero. Although the rationale is entirely different, the difference between the two views is merely one of perspective, the relationship between poem and political activism remaining the same. Instead of looking for an exact moment in the poem where Lucan changed his mind about the thrust of his story, we are now in search of a reason why the poet departs on a drastically different ideological course, one in which the instability of Pompey is of minor concern. The importance of Pompey is now as a symbol, an instrument of ideology whose blemishes continue to be evoked but are transcended by the urgency of the political choice that faces Lucan the future

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[8] A good example may be found on p. 46 where Bartsch argues that Lucan's perspective on the problems of his era was not an isolated one. She immediately follows this with a reference to N. Carroll, *The Philosophy of Horror, or Paradoxes of the Heart* (New York 1990) 209-14, who suggests that a fascination with horror and the grotesque is a side effect of convulsive social changes and is most often seen in the aftermath of war, in times of cynicism about the government and fascination with countercultures.

[9] For example, on p. 40 Hannah Arendt's writings on Nazi Germany are called curiously evocative of Lucan's view of Rome under Caesar, then (p. 67) there is mention of parallel after parallel between the visions of his imagination and our own history. Yet at p. 68 (writing about parallels with the holocaust) Lucan's grim visions may become for us more than the fancy of a long-dead poet striving for the expression of evil. This is exactly what we should not allow to happen.

conspirator. But the question remains as to how far it is possible to view Lucan's poem as anything other than politically motivated, and is this necessarily true?

From the tradition on Lucan's involvement in the Pisonian conspiracy Bartsch retains first of all the unquestionable fact of his participation in the event. This makes good sense for this is the item attested to by all the historical sources as well as by the accounts of Lucan's life. However, most strikingly, she also accepts from Tacitus' account a single item that serves as the historian's cue as to how we should read the mind-set of the conspirators. M. Julius Vestinus Atticus, Tacitus tells us matter-of-factly, was excluded from their ranks because he suffered from delusions of *libertas* (*Ann.* 15.52.2). How can this bit of information help our understanding of Lucan's position? Does it not make his participation in the conspiracy even more intractable? Bartsch's reasons for endorsing this odd combination of facts are as follows: 'For here return the two most striking features of the *Bellum Civile* itself: its furious partiality in favor of the Old Republic (this is no poem in favor of *any domini*, Stoic *rex* or not) and the impossibility of justifying that very partiality' (p. 90; Bartsch's italics). This just does not make sense. By isolating Vestinus' exclusion from the rest of the evidence Bartsch wittingly imposes the framework of contradictions that she has discovered in Lucan's poem onto the conspiracy as a whole, thereby manipulating a historical source into saying what she wants it to say. Moreover, by dismissing the tradition of Lucan's literary feud with Nero (by not incorporating it in her analysis), the ban on his poetry and the termination of his senatorial career as his main reasons for joining the conspiracy, Bartsch leaves us no option but to view Lucan as a Republican activist. That the relationship between Tacitus' account and Lucan's poem is perhaps different, though equally complex, can be shown once we accept the tendentiousness of Tacitus' storytelling.[10]

Tacitus' emphasis on Lucan's personal reasons (the literary feud with Nero) for joining the conspiracy is part of a general framework of selfishness that he ascribes to the main conspirators. In fact Lucan is made to look decidedly more apolitical when we observe that his personal motivations (*propriae causae, Ann.* 15.49.3) are paired with the entirely different reasons ascribed to Plautius Lateranus, an element that is missing from Bartsch's discussion. The latter joined the conspiracy not because of any personal grievances but out of patriotism (*nulla iniuria, sed amor reipublicae sociavit*, 'He joined for no personal grievance; his motive was patriotism', 15.49.4). *Amor rei publicae* is commonly (as here) translated as 'patriotism'. Yet one could put an equally strong case in favour of 'devotion to the Republic'. This would be inaccurate, of course, for, as Tacitus makes clear elsewhere, restoring the Old Republic was definitely not the objective of the conspiracy. The phrase does, however, provide a

[10] The best approach to Tacitus' account is that of A. J. Woodman, 'Amateur Dramatics at the Court of Nero: *Annals* 15.48-74', in T. J. Luce and A. J. Woodman (edd.), *Tacitus and the Tacitean Tradition* (Princeton 1993) 104-29. The irony of Tacitus' version is that the conspirators are under the delusion of performing in a play and the play they have chosen is based on the assassination of Julius Caesar. The conspiracy fails because the individuals pay more attention to their acting than to committing the act of assassinating Nero.

neat commentary on Lucan and his poem insofar as it is a direct denial of an idea that one may reasonably derive from a political reading of the *Civil War*. By *not* ascribing these motivations to Lucan but to a fellow member of the conspiracy (who, incidentally, was thought to have played a key role in the assassination; cf. *Ann.* 15.53.2), Tacitus has deliberately widened the gap between Lucan's Republican fervour and his political actions.

The point about whether Tacitus can be trusted here or not is moot. Nobody will claim that we have to swallow everything Tacitus has to say about the conspiracy, but this much is clear: Tacitus offers very little evidence that would permit us to infer doubts about the existence of the concept of Republicanism—in Bartsch's words, 'the impossibility of justifying that very partiality' (p. 90). If Bartsch is actually arguing that Vestinus' exclusion proves how difficult it was to frame the opposition to Nero in terms of Republicanism, we end up with a different set of problems. If this were true, it carries the suggestion that Lucan was more successful than Vestinus in conveying his views to his co-conspirators and the implications of such a view automatically short-circuit our ideas about Lucan's political convictions. Lucan was *not* suffering from delusions of *libertas*, for he was accepted by the group of conspirators, and Vestinus was not. This opens up the possibility that the political content of Lucan's poem was not an issue or was not taken seriously. However we want to see Lucan's involvement in the conspiracy, the role of his poem remains elusive and it is best kept that way.

The above critique on Bartsch's analysis of the historical aspects of Lucan's life should in no way be taken as a lack of admiration for Bartsch's challenging arguments. In fact, I have done exactly what she says her book aims to provoke in a reader. It has made me think long and hard about Lucan's poetry and the place it occupies in the history of the first century AD. Her study has familiarised me with a different way of looking at this complex issue, but in the end I am left unpersuaded by the consistently modernising character of her arguments. Bartsch's approach is extremely successful when she explains matters relating to the text, especially in the matter of psychological suffering caused by civil war. I am prepared to accept, furthermore, that Lucan felt the need to replace *aporia* with fiery partisanship and that this move somehow coincided with his growing enmity toward Nero, who put an end to his hopes of a promising literary and political career. Whether his Republicanism also fired his participation in the Pisonian conspiracy is doubtful or at least not verifiable.

Bartsch's book is not for the uninitiated. As she concedes, it is not a comprehensive treatment of Lucan's poetry and life but a highly charged reading of the poem and its ideological message. It will surely be ranked among the best works on the poet and should be recommended reading for anyone interested in Lucan's poetry and the role of political epic. Its characterisation of the political climate under Nero, however, is to be accepted with caution. Bartsch accepts that the Neronian regime was somehow akin to totalitarianism and not once is the question raised whether modern readers are not too much tempted to read everything about Nero, and the Principate in general, in such anachronistic terms. For instance, Bartsch argues that

the age of Lucan was 'a time when the privacy and rights of the individual itself were under siege. The exaggerated social mobility of the era, the sense among the Roman upper classes that even the very walls were porous and their secrets unsafe, were phenomena that went hand in hand with the slow death of the subject's legal and moral identity and the attack upon the political and social efficacy of the same upper classes' (pp. 41f.). The point about the exaggerated level of social mobility is subjective and has an almost Juvenalian ring to it. In fact, a similar characterisation of Rome under Nero has been offered by Johnson.[11] It is nothing more than a paraphrase of Lucan's opinions (7.385-459), spiced up with the familiar tropes of imperial history represented in twentieth-century anti-totalitarian rhetoric. From a historian's perspective, this is perhaps the principal weakness of the book, that it allows for such psychological depth in the personality of Lucan, whereas it engages in such blatant oversimplifications of his times.

PHILODEMUS, PIETY AND PAPYROLOGY

Dirk Obbink (ed.), *Philodemus: On Piety. Part 1: Critical Text with Commentary.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. xii + 676, incl. 8 plates and 4 figures. ISBN 0-19-815008-3. UK£75.

Clive Chandler
Department of Classics, University of Cape Town
Rondebosch 7700

Obbink's edition and commentary on the first part of the work *On Piety* from the Villa dei Papiri at Herculaneum is something of a landmark in Philodemus and Epicurean studies. Obbink is to be commended not only for the sheer labour and diligence that have obviously gone into this work but also for producing a superbly accurate and accessible edition of an extremely difficult text.[1] The edition will become an essential tool for scholars of Epicureanism and Hellenistic philosophy and will undoubtedly also be of interest to students of papyrology, philology, ancient religion, Cicero and the intellectual climate of the first century BC.

The work itself (actually the first part of the treatise) was originally contained in a single papyrus roll, which was subsequently split lengthwise after excavation in the eighteenth century to facilitate access to the contents. Unfortunately after the two halves were separated, they were given different catalogue numbers and unrolled at

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[11] Cf. Johnson [4] 88: 'Rome is no longer thronged with her own citizens: she is the junkyard, the sewer, of the world, she is stuffed to bursting with the dregs of humanity'; Johnson is even more speculative at pp. 93f.

[1] Plates 1-8 at the end of the book provide a representative sample of the state of the material (apographs and papyrus) with which Obbink has had to work.

different times (*PHerc.* 1077 in 1787; *PHerc.* 1098 as late as 1825). The dislocation of the work and its attendant complications had serious consequences and have impeded all editorial endeavours until those of Obbink.[2] Although the restored title of the work is reasonably secure, the authorship is entirely conjectural. Only the letter phi has survived, which invites the supplements Ph[ilodemus] or Ph[aedrus] (pp. 88f.). Obbink does not commit himself to either conjecture, but generally uses 'Philodemus' or simply 'the author' for convenience. I shall call the author Philodemus throughout this review.

Despite the difficulties that confront an editor (or reader) of this text, the work itself is worth the effort. Like many of the works preserved in the Herculaneum papyri it is immersed in the polemics of its day. After Cicero's and Lucretius' testimony it constitutes one of the most complete records of Epicurean doctrine on the nature of the gods and human 'relations' with them from the first century BC. It contains fascinating evidence for the Epicurean conception of the gods (passages that flesh out our evidence from other sources), Epicurean participation in ritual and cult, the social and psychological effects on ordinary communities of philosophical doctrine on the gods, and an explanation of the evolution of erroneous theologies, atheism, and justice.

Obbink's book is too large to review in detail so I shall confine myself to some general comments on the major sections. The introduction (pp. 1-103) begins with a useful discussion of Epicurus and Greek religion (pp. 1-23). Obbink gives particular attention to Epicurus' (undeserved) reputation for atheism, a charge that Philodemus' work strives to disprove. But over half of the introduction (pp. 24-80) is devoted to papyrological considerations. Although it makes tough reading at times for the non-specialist, this section provides invaluable understanding of the nature of the extant text and Obbink's reconstruction of it. Obbink explains (pp. 37-53) how the original sequence of columns in the text was disrupted by the early method of unrolling and transcription; figures 1 (p. 39) and 2 (p. 43) provide welcome assistance. Obbink has managed to restore the original sequence by exploiting the discovery of a physical join between the right- and left-hand portions of column 54. This discovery, combined with the principle that the true sequence is generally the *reverse* of the copyists' sequence, constitutes a guideline for the reconstruction of the original sequence of columns.[3] To put it simply, editors of this text before Obbink have made the error of assuming that the copyists' sequence was the original one, without realising that the copyists numbered their transcriptions as they worked from the inner part of the split

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[2] *PHerc.* 1077/1098 is now lost and only one fragment of the *PHerc.* 1077 half has been discovered, which was erroneously catalogued as *PHerc.* 1093 (= col. 45 in Obbink's edition; illustrated in pl. 2). A few other fragments, which must have become detached from the inside of the roll when it was split open and were then given separate catalogue numbers, have also been identified. So the editor has had to rely mostly on the apographs.

[3] The implementation of this principle cannot be mechanical. Obbink sometimes has to manipulate the order although he always explains his reasons for so doing in terms of the methods used by the original copyists. Syntax, context and argument-flow are also marshalled in support of the reconstructed sequence.

roll outwards. Unsurprisingly, then, Obbink's edition presents a more comprehensible text than those of his predecessors. At last the *diaeresis* of the work and its parts can be followed and emerges as coherent (pp. 94f.). Obbink identifies four main sections (commentary on pp. 281-83, 389-91, 458-64, 549f.): arguments for the gods (lines 1-723); observance of cult and ritual (lines 724-1022); harms and benefits from the gods (lines 1023-1701); and origin of atheism and justice (lines 1702-2510).

In presenting the text, apparatus, and translation (pp. 105-277), Obbink combines the advantages of columnar and continuous presentation of the text by utilising facing pages. The left half of the left page contains the apparatus, the right half the text as a column; the upper part of the right page contains the same text presented in continuous lineation and the lower part an English translation of that text. The reader can therefore elect to read the text in the form in which it appeared on the papyrus or as a continuous text. While this practice expands the length of the book it is not a superfluous indulgence: many readers will simply require a convenient text without attention to papyrological considerations and the right page is designed for them. If closer scrutiny of the text is required (conjectures, deletions, available space, line numbers), the reader has the left page, which presents an accurate reconstruction of the form and stichometry of the original column.[4]

The text on both pages is easy on the eye and the left page gives the reader as clear an idea as possible of the state of the text and any alterations that have been made to it. In addition to the text-critical signs used in editions of the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Obbink has introduced an asterisk beneath letters that he has personally emended. Remarkably, there are very few inconsistencies between the texts of the left and right pages: only occasionally did I notice that a dot placed under a letter in the columnar text was omitted in the continuous text (for example, in col. 9, line 240, p. 122 a dot is printed under all three letters of τὼν [supported in the apparatus], while on p. 123 the same word lacks a dot beneath the ν). However, since the columnar text is designed to render an accurate report of the extant text while the continuous one is for swift reading, such slips are negligible. Another advantage of Obbink's edition is that the lines of the text are numbered continuously (that is, lines 1 through to 2510), a system that facilitates cross-referencing and location of passages.

The apparatus is full and its position beside the text (instead of at the bottom of the page) makes it easy to consult. It contains all relevant information for the column: apograph and (if available) papyrus reference; cross-reference for page number in editions of Gomperz, Philippson, and the *Herculanensium Voluminum* 2;[5] testimonia

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[4] Editions of the Herculaneum papyri have hitherto tended to utilise one form of presentation or the other: the 'Scuola di Epicuro' series (Bibliopolis, Naples) offers continuous text, which sometimes makes the column difficult to visualise and location of a specific line number laborious, while the earlier 'Ricerche sui Papiri Ercolanesi' series (supervised by Francesco Sbordone; published by Giannini Editore, Naples) opted for the columnar presentation, which sometimes impedes swift reading.

[5] *Herculanensium Voluminum: Collectio Altera* 2 (Naples 1863); T. Gomperz, *Philodem über Froemmigkeit: Herculanische Studien* (Leipzig 1866); R. Philippson, 'Zu Philodems

for ideas expressed in passages of the text; description of scribal signs; summary of minutiae of reading of textual sources; and a full list of conjectures and emendations from previous scholarship.[6] Where the space available in the apparatus is insufficient to render full documentation of the editorial tradition, Obbink uses the commentary for more expansive treatment (e.g., pp. 369, 401, 409f., 434). The translation is workable and literal. Unavoidably (and, no doubt, intentionally), it reflects the somewhat pedantic and unfriendly style of the original. It is also honest and Obbink makes no attempt to conceal difficulties: the translation is frequently interrupted by parenthetical descriptions of the number of words missing. There are also brief explanatory footnotes that assist a cursory reading, although the reader must refer to the commentary for more detail.

The commentary (pp. 279-614) understandably accounts for the largest portion of the book. It is not one of those commentaries that tell the reader everything she or he knows whilst remaining frustratingly silent on the most puzzling features of a text. Obbink seems to anticipate most questions and reservations (at least this reviewer's) and devotes generous space to all relevant aspects of the text: papyrological, palaeographical, philological, and exegetical. Given the nature of this text, the four aspects are largely interdependent and Obbink successfully integrates them all. Particularly useful is the section 'Order of Columns', which contains the commentary on each column. These notes provide an account of the continuity from one column to the next and enable the reader to judge how much text has been lost between the columns. Usually no more than one column of text has been lost between Obbink's columns and there are several instances where there is a secure join (e.g., columns 16-17, 25-26-27, 35-36-37); hence the reader is protected from assumptions of continuity where it does not exist. Obbink is also very good at connecting passages of Philodemus' work with more famous sections of Latin authors of the first century BC, especially Cicero and Lucretius. This is one aspect of the work that will appeal to classicists in general, since Cicero probably used this work when composing the first book of his *De Natura Deorum* (pp. 96-99).

Occasionally the reader may feel that some economies could have been effected. For example, in his note on the verb παραβαίνειν (column 26, lines 728f.) in the sense of transgressing a law, especially one of a religious nature, Obbink repeats (commentary on pp. 391f.) several parallels already listed in Liddell and Scott's

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Schrift über die Frömmigkeit', *Hermes* 55 (1920) 225-78, 364-72, *Hermes* 56 (1921) 364-410.

[6] Several of the conjectures and emendations recorded in the apparatus are unpublished and derived from Obbink's consultations with other scholars (especially Delattre, Holford-Strevens and Janko) currently working in the same field, hence *privatim*. This practice lends the work further freshness. In passing, I notice that Obbink is very scrupulous in acknowledging ideas and suggestions (both textual and exegetical) communicated to him informally by other scholars. Such generosity is most appealing.

Greek-English Lexicon.[7] Surely it would have been sufficient simply to refer the reader to the relevant entry for a sense that is well documented and hardly controversial, and to include in the commentary only parallels not to be found in the lexicon? Even if justification can be found for their inclusion on this occasion, it is hardly necessary to repeat most of them again on the second instance of this verb in column 30, line 845 (commentary on p. 434), particularly when a cross-reference is provided. There is also some repetition that might have been avoided. On page 398 of the commentary, Obbink gives a full discussion of the case for restoring the title of an Epicurean work as Ἐν τῷ περὶ [βίων] (column 26, lines 738f.). Much of this detail is repeated on p. 441 for the title κἀν [τοῖς πε]ρὶ βίων, restored in column 31, lines 896f. despite a cross-reference to the earlier passage. It is, however, possible that the repetitions are deliberate and designed to assist readers who will not be reading the work from cover to cover but may require quick reference to isolated passages.

The book also contains a full bibliography, concordances, an *index verborum*, a general index, and an *index locorum potiorum*. There are a few misprints (mainly generated by the word-processor), but in my view they do not impair the edition in any substantial way because they do not mislead or obscure the sense. Not only has Obbink produced an extremely thorough edition of an important yet intractable text, he has also achieved a high degree of 'transparency', if I might borrow a favourite term from the current discourse of the governance of institutions. By this I mean that he has ensured that the reader, even the non-specialist, is made fully aware as to why choices have been made with the text and the alternatives available. For all of this Obbink is entitled to our gratitude. I look forward to part 2.

MAGIC AND RELIGION: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN?

Fritz Graf (tr. Franklin Philip), *Magic in the Ancient World*. Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 1997. Pp. 313. ISBN 0-674-54151-0. UK£23.50.

Michael Lambert
Department of Classics, University of Natal
Pietermaritzburg 3200

Fritz Graf's imaginative contributions to the study of myth and ritual are deservedly well known; in this work, Graf brings his own scholarship, and that of participants in a series of seminars at the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris, to bear on the hitherto rather neglected field of magic in antiquity.[1] The result is an

[7] H. G. Liddell and R. Scott (rev. H. S. Jones), *A Greek-English Lexicon*[9] (repr. Oxford 1968).

[1] *Magic in the Ancient World* was originally published as *Idéologie et Pratique de la Magie dans l'Antiquité Greco-Romaine* (Paris 1994).

accessible, clear and well annotated guide to the complex world of the ancient magician, which serves both as a valuable introduction to the field and as an invaluable resource for further research and debate.

After a brief discussion in his introduction (pp. 1-19) of the sources for the study of ancient magic (for example, literature, the magical papyri and the *tabulae defixiones*) and some restrained *Quellenforschung* into scholarship on magic, Graf skilfully sketches the major contours of the magic-religion debate within classical scholarship, ethnology and anthropology, a debate heavily influenced by the Frazerian distinctions between magic, religion and science 'according to the agent's intention, rationality and autonomy' (p. 14). Frazer argued that in the spheres of science and magic the agent's autonomy characterises his/her relationship with the natural and supernatural worlds; magic and science share rational procedures and laws whereas religion is characterised by irrationality, the absence of a practical goal and by a humble submissiveness towards the supernatural, absent in the coercive attitude of the magician. Research into the religious experiences and practices of cultures outside Europe has long since demonstrated that the distinctions made by Frazer can only be made from within a specific world-view (the Judaeo-Christian one) and that many cultures simply do not distinguish between magic and religion. Some scholars have thus proposed scrapping the use of the word 'magic' altogether (for, after all, one person's magic is another person's religion), whereas others have proposed retaining the distinction only if it is clearly made by the culture under study. Graf decides to adopt the latter course and to analyse how the Greeks and Romans, who devised the words *mageia* and *magia* for the category 'magic', deployed these and related terms. This avoids the confusing (and Frazerian) use of the word 'magical' to designate the primitive stages of Greek and Roman religion (when the ancients themselves had not invented the term) and apparently lets Graf escape from a hermeneutic minefield. Of course, this option 'implies the scrupulous analysis of the ancient terminology' (p. 19), which Graf handles with elegance and precision, even at times managing a few Teutonic drolleries, which make delightful reading.[2]

In chapter 2, 'Naming the Sorcerer' (pp. 20-60), Graf traces the development of the term *magos* and considers the possibility that it had acquired negative connotations by the end of the sixth century BC, together with the words for itinerant priests and diviners (*agurtes* and *mantis*). Interesting to note is that Graf argues, convincingly, that the distinction between magic and religion had already been made in Heraclitus and Plato, a distinction made possible by the development of a philosophical theology and of science, for which the Hippocratic text *On the Sacred Disease* provides crucial evidence (pp. 30-32). Roman usages of *magus* and *magia* are also carefully explored. In contrast to the Athenians who did not legislate against black magic, the Romans used Sulla's *lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis* (81 BC) as the fundamental law for any legal action against magic. In an examination of the usages of *veneficium* and

[2] For example, the dead man in his tomb is a kind of 'infernal postman', delivering messages to the divine or demonic addressees (p. 131); on the concept of sympathetic magic, 'there are always spirits to be exorcised, notably Frazerian spirits' (p. 145).

veneficus, Graf rightly draws attention to the fact that this legislation did not condemn magic *per se*, but was aimed at crimes that caused the sudden, inexplicable deaths of citizens, in contrast to deaths caused by violence. Missing from the Roman evidence, notes Graf, is the Greek *goes-agurtes-magos*, practising a combination of divination, healing, initiation and magic. Evidence for the negative connotations attached to *magia* is found in Pliny the Elder's *Natural History* (30.1), where Pliny clearly distinguishes between *medicina* and *magia* (false medicine) and, as Graf interestingly observes, associates magic with healing and divination, rather than the black arts, that are conspicuously absent from his text.

In chapter 3, 'Portrait of the Magician, Seen from the Outside' (pp. 61-88), Graf, in an attempt to discover how the Greeks (rather loosely used here) and Romans defined the magician, and distinguished him from similar, but less hated figures, focuses on two Roman magic trials, that of the freedman C. Furius Cresimus in the first half of the second century BC, and that of Apuleius in the second century AD. Graf argues that Cresimus' trial, recorded by Pliny, demonstrates convincingly that a person accused of magic is the 'marginal' on the fringes of society threatening the society's structures. The better known trial of Apuleius (at Sabratha in Africa), whose successful *Apologia sive de magia* is the only extant evidence for the trial and thus has to be handled with caution, focuses on the erotic magic that the young philosopher was accused of using to win over the heart and the wealth of the widowed Pudentilla. Graf's analysis of the speech reveals how an unusually intense interest in religion (a silent prayer or rituals held at night or the possession of ritual objects) could be construed by the community as constituting sorcery. As was the case with Cresimus, the marginal person (the foreign, apparently itinerant philosopher with an interest in exotically named fish!) can become, in the society of Apuleius, a dangerous magician, threatening, in this case, to destabilise social institutions like marriage and inheritance.

In chapter 4, 'How to Become a Magician: The Rites of Initiation' (pp. 89-117), Graf, using as a springboard Lucian's famous tale of the sorcerer's apprentice (*The Lover of Lies* 34-36), who was taught by Isis how to become a magician after spending 23 years in secret chambers under the sands of Egypt, considers how this tale embodies fundamental aspects of the magician's initiation: secrecy, personal communion with a deity, prolonged study (for example, a knowledge of hieroglyphics being a prerequisite) and subterranean *katabasis*. All these features are present in the mystery cults as well and Graf usefully examines the similarities and differences between the magician's initiation and intiation into a mystery cult.

Graf focuses in chapter 5, 'Curse Tablets and Voodoo Dolls' (pp. 118-74), on ritual binding, using as his sources the texts of lead tablets and an array of literary references that begin with Aeschylus and Plato, who provide us with the first detailed information on binding spells. The purpose of binding was to subject another to one's will in almost every sphere of human existence in which competition was involved, as Audollent's categories reveal (judicial, erotic and agonistic spells, as well as those against slanderers, thieves and economic competitors).[3] Graf argues that ritual binding,

[3] See A. Audollent, *Defixionum Tabellae* (Paris 1904).

performed at a time of intense crisis and uncertainty, was intended not for vengeance or to injure the other party, but to influence the outcome of the competition, thus giving the community and the individual some means of emotional mastery. Pursuing his linking of the magical with the marginal and its associated reversals, Graf believes that the places where the spells were buried (cemeteries, wells, springs, sanctuaries) suggest movement towards the nether world and thus a reversal of the movement upward, which characterises the traditional religion of the *polis*; furthermore, the fact that the victim and sometimes the sorcerer are regularly defined by the name of the mother suggests reversal of the normal use of the patronymic. From the papyri, Graf reconstructs the binding ritual itself, showing how the spell was recited and written at the same moment, thus making the spoken language permanent—a message for the dead to deliver to the world below; another group of tablets consists of formulas, assimilating the victim's name to the uselessness of the cold lead tablet on which the spell is written (a *similia similibus* formula). Determined to lay the ghost of Frazerian sympathetic magic to rest, Graf argues that the magicians in this case (and in instances of reverse writing) were exploiting a traditional practice (that is, writing on lead) to forge new and unexpected meanings in the magician's marginal universe.

Detailed analyses of ritual sequences in the papyri lead Graf into a fascinating account of the *katadesmos/defixio*, the procedure of which differs from magical act to magical act: piercing tablets or a cat with iron nails, binding statuettes with bronze or iron, ensuring that some figurines are well and truly *aversi*, with their heads and/or feet turned rigidly to the back, engraving magic words on female figurines, which are then pierced, tied to a tablet (which may then be bound with a number of magical knots) and then deposited, often in graves of the untimely dead who harbour especial resentment against the living, while the magician recites a prayer, facing the setting sun (another reversal). Graf believes that in the cases of erotic magic, the performers did not intend to maim or kill the victims represented by the figurines, which may have had *ousia* (nails, hair, fabric of clothing) attached to them; the object of the spell was the total submission of the woman to the man. Drawing attention to the fact that the tablets were not necessarily found with voodoo dolls, Graf argues that their efficacy did not depend on a 'sympathetic' act performed with the help of figurines. Apart from Frazerian 'sympathetic homology', Graf attempts to exorcise the psychological interpretation of the motivation behind the spells as well, demonstrating that the rituals were clearly not spontaneous and cathartic outbursts of hatred, but time-consuming and complex rituals, performed by professionals not necessarily directly involved in the crisis situations, as caches of texts found written in the same hand suggest.

In chapter 6, 'Literary Representations of Magic' (pp. 175-204), Graf criticises those scholars who uncritically use literary texts as sources for magic rituals and practices in an effort to fill in the gaps created by the comparatively rare occurrence of curse tablets in the Hellenistic period, as compared with the classical and imperial epochs. Apart from literary questions of intertextuality, especially important in this period, Graf ably demonstrates that the binding spell, for example, in Theocritus, *Idyll* 2.1-138, does not correspond, in its ritual detail and use of magical materials, with love spells found in the papyri. Graf believes that Theocritus here constructs 'a kind of

superritual capable of activating in its readers all sorts of associations connected with magic' (p. 184), but a superritual that would not work in the world of 'real' magic. In his analysis of Lucan's Erictho and her resurrection of a cadaver for divination, Graf argues that Lucan's use of the language of religion constructs magic as an essential perversion of the civic religion, thus opposing magic and religion in a manner not found in the papyri.

Like John Winkler,[4] Graf raises the question of why women are almost exclusively the practitioners of magic in the literary texts, whereas men dominate the epigraphic texts and the papyri. Graf takes the sociological model ('for the transferring of power and fortune through women') to task on the grounds that erotic charms were not aimed at the fathers, but at their daughters, thus suggesting that erotic magic was the man's response to a painful personal crisis, in which the object of his desires seemed completely out of reach. Literary versions, which erase men's use of magic, remove erotic magic from the world of men where it should not exist. For, argues Graf, 'they [these stories] reveal the real existence of this magic; however, although practiced by men, it is in reality a concern of women. That is why a man using magic steps over the borderlines of male behaviour . . .' (p. 189). Graf is particularly unclear here; why, in reality, is magic a concern of women? Whose reality? That of male writers like Theocritus and Vergil? The 'reality' of the world of the papyri would suggest that magic is very much the concern of men. Speaking of gender reversals in the literary texts and women's 'reality' is very perverse, when the very gender categories supposedly transgressed, together with women's 'reality', are creations of the same sources (that is, male-produced texts). In this respect, Winkler's interpretation (the displacement of irrationality onto women by male writers) is more convincing.

In the final chapter, 'Words and Acts' (pp. 205-33), Graf addresses the question of the special nature of magic ritual and offers some suggestions for further debate. In an interesting analysis of the origins of Frazer's notion of 'sympathetic' magic, Graf argues that Frazer derived the essence of this idea from the *sumpatheia* of the Greek Stoics, that 'intimate orchestration that connects the whole cosmos and the planets to our everyday life' (p. 206). Convinced that the notion of 'sympathetic' magic should be relegated to the academic archives along with 'la mentalité primitive', Graf turns to Tambiah's notions of 'performativity' (the coincidence of action and linguistic utterance, as in the binding spells) and 'persuasive analogy' for hermeneutic assistance.[5] Focusing on the grammar of the ritual acts and on their semantic value in context (for example, the use of the wax voodoo doll that conveniently melts at low temperatures), Graf considers how ritual communicates and concludes that, in the case of the isolated magician, the sender and recipient of the message are the same person:

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[4] J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire: The Anthropology of Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece* (London 1990) 89f.

[5] S. Tambiah, *Culture, Thought, and Social Action: An Anthropological Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass. 1985) 123-66.

the group is missing. In contrast, literary magic, addressed to a group of listeners and readers, corresponds, structurally, to communal oath-making, rather than magic ritual. Because the magician works alone, deprived of the group's memory, he employs figurines and texts to 'freeze' the memory of the ritual act. Graf stresses that this isolation, evident in healing texts as well, constitutes the fundamental difference between magic rites and those of the civic religion; furthermore, the magician's search for close communion with the divine parallels the importance attached to the vertical dimension in group rituals.

Noting that the submissive attitude (traditionally thought to characterise religion as opposed to magic) is found in the sorcerers' hymns, Graf considers the wide range of coercion found in the magical papyri, 'from the cruellest constraint to the most obsequious submission' (p. 225). Coercion does characterise magic, but it is only employed if more benign charms fail. Criticism of coercion began with the Hippocratic text *On the Sacred Disease* and with Plato, was perpetrated by Christian polemic, and inherited by scholars like Frazer and Festugière, who thus used this feature of magic to distinguish it from religion. However, magicians use a variety of traditional religious attitudes and positions in new and interesting combinations, usually characterised by reversals—for example, animals for sacrifice are killed in different ways (strangulation is preferred so that blood is not spilt); the sacrifice of roosters and donkeys instead of pigs, sheep and cows; the sorcerer and god dine alone; the search for contact with infernal divinities and the dead. With respect to the latter, Graf comments on what he considers to be the most significant development in the history of ancient magic. Fixation on the realm below certainly characterised magic in the classical period, in which binding spells predominated, but the emergence of the realm above, in the form of the Supreme God, who can coerce demons, heroes and the dead, in the papyri of the imperial epoch, is consonant with political realities of the period, tendencies in neo-Platonic thinking and the development of the extremely hierarchical pantheon of the imperial era. Magic had changed from a technique used to outwit or injure one's adversaries in an agonistic context to a quest for knowledge and 'spiritual well-being' (p. 223), similar to that in gnosticism and neo-Platonism.

Graf's attempt in this work to demonstrate that magic, far from being opposed to religion, uses religious rituals and liturgies in unexpected ways to create new meanings, exposes problems with the hermeneutic approach he adopts: Greek and Roman authors clearly distinguished between magic and religion (as Graf makes clear in chapter 2), but distinctions are not clearly made in the papyri, which form the bulk of the evidence Graf uses. Consequently Graf oscillates between emic and etic stances; he anxiously desires to show that magic is part of religion but simply ends up finding new and significant differences between the two. Furthermore, Graf's attempt to cast out the demon of 'sympathetic' magic leads back to the definitional problems he raised in his opening chapter. If one writes about magic in, say, a study in Basle, peopled by the stern spirits of structural functionalism and the sensible wraiths of ritual theory, in a society in which not only god, but the individual subject, died some years ago, then a belief in 'sympathetic' magic must seem *absolument ridicule*; however, if one lives in an African society where old women are still being burnt as

witches, where *muti* (medicine) shops exist within a bone's throw of the university, where there is a strong belief in a universe thronged by spirits and forces and demons, a field of forces, as it were, to which the sorcerer has access, where one's students testify to the existence of voodoo dolls (most definitely *similia similibus*), smeared with *ousia*, then rejection of the concept of 'sympathetic' magic, of the belief in a law of *sumpatheia* running through the cosmos like an electric charge, becomes more difficult to reject. In an African milieu, the binding spells and the voodoo dolls of the ancient magician make more sense within a framework of 'sympathetic' magic, than they do within the doubtlessly more fashionable framework of 'performativity' and 'persuasive analogy'.

I can accept that Frazer's world-view and Father Festugière's were shaped by their Christian beliefs, that their distinctions betweeen magic and religion were based on many false dichotomies, yet in his efforts to demonstrate that magic in antiquity was a specific form of religion, which reverses many aspects of traditional civic religion, Graf perpetuates the construction of magic and the magician found in the Greek and Roman literary sources. In the process he does not exorcise Frazerian spirits, but, like a true magician, conjures them up in new and unexpected combinations, filtered through the theoretical gaze of the late twentieth century.[6]

A NOVEL COMPENDIUM 2[1]

Gareth Schmeling (ed.), *The Novel in the Ancient World.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996. Pp. x + 876, incl. 5 plates and 12 maps. ISBN 90-04-09630-2. Gld395/US$255.

Suzanne MacAlister
Department of Classics, University of Sydney
Sydney, New South Wales 2006, Australia

Schmeling's edited collection makes a fairly massive tome and covers a far broader and more varied terrain than its title suggests. In fact *The Novel in the Ancient World* moves far beyond both the ancient world and the sorts of fiction that have hitherto been included in collections on the ancient novel into discussions of the genre's heritage and reception in western Europe. It expands the range of European

[6] As the original French edition of this work was unavailable to me at the time of reviewing this book, I was unable to assess the worth of Philip's translation. However, some of the phrases in the text read like clumsy literalese: for example, 'élite milieus of the ending republic' (p. 57); 'But we also find in the papyri a whole gamut of rituals that transform the status of a person who is already a magician to promote the person to a higher level of power' (p. 105); 'That is also why the masculine sexual attractiveness, to appear beautiful in the eyes of the world, is a good that can help the ancient male to acquire some social status' (p. 187); 'But there is one crucial difference towards the Greco-Roman material' (p. 227).

[1] Cf. J. L. Hilton, 'A Novel Compendium', *Scholia* 6 (1997) 130-35.

literatures covered in Tatum's edited collection from the 1989 Dartmouth ICAN 2 conference (but published in 1994)[2] and covers later periods than Morgan and Stoneman's collection, which was published at about the same time.[3] In the first two parts of Schmeling's volume, a total of eighteen contributions range from discussions of general literary and cultural aspects of the ancient novel and its subject matter and context, to more specific discussions of the major novelists. A review of these first two sections has already appeared in *Scholia*.[4] The rest of the collection (from p. 555), which is reviewed here, falls roughly into two further sections: 'novel-like works' ('fringe elements' as they are sometimes called) and fragments of lost novels, and the *Nachleben* of the ancient novel in Byzantium and western Europe. These two sections comprise eleven contributions of which one, Niklas Holzberg's discussion on 'Novel-like Works of Extended Prose Fiction II' is actually made up of five separate discussions of different fictional genres.

Unlike the earlier parts of the collection where essays are underpinned by a more or less uniform frame for discussion (especially in the particularly good section dealing with the individual novelists),[5] for the central part of the collection (especially dealing with novel-like works) it is hard to find any coherent or identifiable issue or theme (apart from novel as subject matter) or methodology in the grouping of contributions or their parts—even in terms of the vexed question of the novel's definition (on which Selden's and Nimis's thoughtful and provocative papers should not have provided the last word).[6] At first glance, a chronological frame for the collection seems to suggest itself with what might appear to be a movement through from the ancient novel and other works of prose fiction and lost fragments, to its 'becoming' Christian, to the novel or romance of later Byzantium, to its appearance and influence in sixteenth and early seventeenth century France and Britain and to its *Nachleben* in Iberian literature in the sixteenth century.

Chapter 13, 'Novel-like Works of Extended Prose Fiction I' (pp. 555-618) follows the format of the previous chapter, where the individual ancient novelists are discussed separately by different scholars and numbered alphabetically. Chapter 13 likewise groups together separate discussions by different scholars of prose fictional works of a 'historical' kind: 'something like historical novels, fictional histories, histories as fiction' as well as 'biography (a form of history), as it develops from the subject-as-model to the subject-as-holy man' (p. 7). These are: Graham Anderson's

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[2] J. Tatum (ed.), *The Search for the Ancient Novel* (Baltimore 1994).

[3] J. R. Morgan and Richard Stoneman (edd.), *Greek Fiction: The Greek Novel in Context* (London 1994).

[4] See Hilton [1] 130-35.

[5] Questions relating to the novel's rise, origins and readership underpin most of the papers in the first section; see especially the comments of Hilton [1] 130-35 about the papers on the individual novelists (p. 5).

[6] D. L. Selden, 'Genre of Genre', in Tatum [2] 39-64; S. Nimis, 'The Prosaics of the Ancient Novels', *Arethusa* 27 (1994) 387-411.

'Lucian's *Verae Historiae*' (pp. 555-62); Stefan Merkle's 'The Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Dictys and Dares' (pp. 563-80); Bodil Due's 'Xenophon of Athens: The *Cyropaedia*' (pp. 581-600); Richard Stoneman's 'The *Metamorphoses* of the Alexander Romance' (pp. 601-12); and Graham Anderson's 'Philostratus on Apollonius of Tyana: The Unpredictable on the Unfathomable' (pp. 613-18). A similar frame is adhered to across each contribution that includes—to greater or lesser extents—points of dating, the subject matter of the work, its world and milieu, its author's aims and intentions, and questions of intertextuality. But common points of discussion across the different contributions provide only an impression of coherence. Maybe the problem of incoherence or arbitrariness in this central part of Schmeling's collection lies in its (necessary) evacuation of the attempt to establish the genre's teleology (the familiar but now discredited route more or less adhered to in the first part), but what results is nothing more than a pastiche. I must stress here that my call for coherence is not a call for another teleology; rather it is for a different sort of passage between instances. In other words, what actually links the instances selected and discussed in this second half of the volume needs to be theorised.

Contributing particularly to an impression of arbitrariness in structure for this middle part of the collection is Holzberg's discussion of what the editor explains in his preface (p. 7) 'are often referred to as fringe novels' ('Novel-like Works of Extended Prose Fiction II', pp. 619-53). Here we find grouped together 'novel-like' works of what might be called 'other' prose fiction from across a quite wide chronological space; this follows on from the chapter entitled 'Novel-like Works of Extended Prose Fiction I' but without any introductory discussion of what links or separates the two. Holzberg's essay or, rather, the grouping of separate essays (again divided into parts A, B, C, D, E) covers, in the following order, lost tales of utopias and fantastic travel, the 'historical text' of Ctesias of Cnidus of the fifth century BC, fable and the life of Aesop, the rhetoric of Dio Chrysostom, and epistolography and the letters of Chion. Unfortunately in a volume as general as this one, any coverage of such wide-ranging genres and their relation to the ancient novel, as Holzberg has attempted here, is bound to be superficial. His main linking device for discussion of these genres of fiction seems to be his (mostly unquestioning) use of the term 'novel' to describe them all, but without providing any coherent or theoretical discussion of the definition beyond identifying motifs common to the Greek idealistic novels of love and adventure. This is not so much a criticism of Holzberg's contributions as it is of the over-ambitious attempts of the editor to provide 'in a single work more information and in-depth studies than are currently available' (p. 1).

Susan Stephens' important contribution on the fragments of lost novels (pp. 655-83) forms the last of the volume's discussions of ancient fiction before the collection moves into works of the Christian era and Byzantium. Her 'Fragments of Lost Novels', which is based on her previously published analyses,[7] surveys fragments

[7] S. Stephens and J. Winkler (edd.), *Ancient Greek Novels: The Fragments, Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary* (Princeton 1995).

of texts transmitted by various modes: via papyri fragments from the sands of Egypt, via the epitomes of Photius, the ninth-century patriarch of Constantinople, via the *Souda* lexicon of the tenth century, and via quotations of varying length. Stephens isolates four fairly distinct categories of fiction type that she discusses in groups: 'Ideal-Romantic Novels', 'Nationalistic Novels', 'Criminal-Satiric Novels' and 'Antonius Diogenes'. Stephens' approach focuses on broadly interpretative issues and leads to her conclusion that the fragments present a picture of a higher degree of fictional interactivity than might be inferred from the extant complete novels.

With Pervo's contribution, 'The Ancient Novel Becomes Christian' (pp. 685-711), we move into less charted waters. Pervo faced a difficult task; not only is the definition of the Christian novel an extremely difficult one, but any worthwhile treatment of the diversity and volume of narrative fiction that can, in some way or another, be associated with Christianity could be considered far beyond the scope of one essay. In terms of the latter problem, Pervo settles for a survey that adheres to the teleological focus of many of the earlier chapters in the volume. Pervo confronts the problem of definition immediately in his introduction. First he criticises the designation 'novel' in terms of 'privilege to the "entirely fictitious"' and our inheritance of nineteenth-century romantic demands for 'unique and original creativity in literature and the arts' (p. 686). Unfortunately, possibly due to perceived restraints of the necessity for tailoring his contribution to the overall framework of the volume, Pervo adheres to a framework of comparison and difference by reference to the ideal romance as his starting point. He thereby loses the opportunity to question romantic notions of agency and our western projection of creative genius onto these cultures that he had started his chapter by confronting. Rather than taking 'The ancient novel becoming Christian' (his interesting title) to open a possible debate on cultural power, as it might operate within and across cultures and within and between levels of recording, storage and transmission, he opts for the well-trodden approach of representation. But with the prefatory adjective 'Christian' Pervo faces an even more complicated task (even if, as he says, 'less perplexing', p. 686). Several obvious questions arise. Is literature to be classified by the criterion of its religious flavour or orientation (where it might mean no more than 'Latin' or 'Greek' as used to qualify novels)? Does it designate novels written by Christians? Or ones that convey a Christian message? Or ones used to edify and/or instruct the faithful and possibly to attract adherents? Pervo chooses to employ the last of these options.

In the discussion by Pervo of the apocryphal *Acts* that flourished during the heyday of the ideal romance (for a more thorough study see his earlier work from which the present paper is largely derived),[8] he makes the important point that critics do a disservice to both texts and audience in assuming that the subject matter of the apocryphal *Acts* was to be taken concretely: a less educated audience was not bound to literal understandings of the rather fantastic subject matter of these popular texts.

[8] R. Pervo, *Profit with Delight: The Literary Genre of the Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia 1987).

Possibly relevant to this question is the later Byzantine practice of allegorisation of literary texts. Pervo's conclusion acknowledges the problems of a survey approach and emphasises the 'great deal of variation in form, style, object, and viewpoint within early Christian fiction' (p. 709).

Roderick Beaton's 'The Byzantine Revival of the Ancient Novel' (pp. 713-33) summarises two centuries of Byzantine fictional narratives, from the twelfth-century so-called learned revival of the ideal romance novel, through the Byzantine epic *Digenis Akritas* (the appearance of which might have pre-dated the learned revival of the novel), to the later vernacular verse romances of the fourteenth century. Beaton's chapter provides an abbreviated account of the medieval Greek contribution to fiction that is more fully treated in his acclaimed book.[9] Beaton starts his section on the Byzantine twelfth-century literary activity by situating it within a broader picture of what was happening in the West with the appearance of the *chanson de geste* and the earliest Arthurian romances (p. 714). At about the same time, in the capital of the Eastern Empire, Constantinople, the Hellenistic pagan novels (which, as Beaton points out in his introductory paragraphs, had continued to be read and copied throughout the years of the Byzantine empire) were being used as models for four new works of literary fiction: Eustathios Makrembolites' *Hysmine and Hysminias*, Theodore Prodromos' *Rhodanthe and Dosikles*, Niketas Eugenianos' *Drosilla and Charikles*, and the fragmentary *Aristandros and Kallithea* by Konstantinos Manasses. But Beaton stresses the importance of difference: it is precisely those features of Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus that are so striking to the modern reader—the vaudeville melodrama, the shock tactics and sadism of the former, the mysticism of the latter—that the twelfth century revivalists have stripped away (p. 716). In dismissing the damning criticism of these works by Rohde, Beaton stresses that they are not merely examples of a Byzantine exercise in imitation; rather, they are highly sophisticated and refined works of rhetoric that consciously adopt the skeletal structure of the ancient novels as a vehicle to pursue their own contemporary preoccupations, and he adds that their readers would no doubt have recognised and appreciated the detailed allusions to their models (p. 718). Although there is no evidence of the intended audience for these revival works, the suggestion has been made that they were composed for reading or performing aloud before an exclusive audience that Beaton (again making a link with activity in the West) suggests might have been a precursor of the learned academies of the Renaissance (p. 714).[10]

A brief section entitled 'Between Epic and Romance' looks at the problematic connection between the Byzantine epic, *Digenis Akritas*, and the novel. Although the epic has more in common with the contemporary western *chanson de geste* than with the novels, it nevertheless displays an obvious acquaintance with the latter. But, Beaton asserts, the importance of the epic in the overall scheme of things is that it is

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[9] R. Beaton, *The Medieval Greek Romance* (Cambridge 1989/London 1996).

[10] For a study of the literary context of twelfth-century Byzantium, see P. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos* (Cambridge 1993) 1143-88.

the first fictional narrative to circulate in written form in the vernacular and in this respect must be contrasted with the four revival works that were composed in a form of ancient Greek. Even if the first appearance of the epic did not pre-date the revival of the novel, at the very least one of the epic's elaborations can probably be dated to that very time. Beaton thus concludes that *Digenis Akritas* may have 'represented a staging-post towards the fully fledged revival of the romance' (p. 719). The final part of Beaton's contribution concentrates on the later vernacular romances in Greek that first appear (probably) in the early fourteenth century. Beaton emphasises two points: first, that these, due to the dwindling of the Empire, are to be seen as medieval Greek rather than Byzantine products, and, second, that they closely reflect what was happening with fiction in western Europe. Romances were being translated from Italian or French into Greek, but, according to Beaton, any continuation of the tradition of the ancient novel in these translated works was in terms that had already been laid down in western European vernacular literature (p. 722). But from some time in the fourteenth century, there also emerge three original vernacular romances in verse: *Kallimachos and Chrysorrhoe*, *Belthandros and Chrysantza* and *Libistros and Rhodanne*, which Beaton argues probably derived from in or near the seat of the Byzantine court at Constantinople. Beaton discusses their features, language, plot and narrative techniques in terms of representation, that is, in terms of their relation to each other and to the works of both the late Hellenistic period and the twelfth-century revival. From this framework of analysis, Beaton cautions that the only conclusion to be reached is that these three works represent 'a significant and original contribution to the romance genre at this period, drawing on the past to break new ground in language, in subject matter, in the introduction of lyrical elements, and in narrative structure' (p. 729).

The final two chapters in the collection complement each other—Gerald Sandy's 'The Heritage of the Ancient Greek Novel in France and Britain' (pp. 735-73) and M. Futre Pinheiro's 'The *Nachleben* of the Ancient Novel in Iberian Literature in the Sixteenth Century' (pp. 775-99)—and are devoted to the reception, imitation and adaptation of the ancient novel in France, England, Spain and Portugal. Pinheiro's discussion of sixteenth-century Iberian novels is divided into three sections that survey in turn the chivalric novel, the pastoral novel and the sentimental novel. It is Sandy's contribution, however, that is the more relevant to the overall collection in its interesting discussion of the modes of the ancient novel's transmission through time and place and its specific reception in western Europe. The contribution is described by Sandy as dealing with 'late sixteenth- to early seventeenth-century French and English novels modelled directly or indirectly on ancient Greek prose fiction' (p. 735). However, this chapter refreshingly is not a survey; nor does it pretend to be exhaustive. After providing a historical account of events and humanist activities surrounding the reception of the novel in early sixteenth-century France, Sandy restricts his study first to a selection of post-medieval novelists and then further by focusing principally on the ways in which the early Greek novels were used as models for the manipulation of complex narrative.

Byzantium fell in 1453 with the Turkish capture of Constantinople. Taking Greek manuscripts with them, Byzantine intellectuals had fled the Byzantine capital and had established themselves in Italy. This important event, Sandy argues, was to result in France becoming the pre-eminent centre of Hellenic studies in western Europe and, mainly through the accomplishments of Jacques Amyot (a name familiar to all Hellenists for his work on novel manuscripts and his translations of Heliodorus and Longus), was responsible for 'the impact that the ancient Greek novel had on the development of its equivalent in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Western Europe' (p. 739).[11] The following section, 'Practice of the Novel', discusses the emergence of a literary enterprise in France from its roots in French Hellenism. It is not Sandy's concern, however, simply to describe correspondences between the sixteenth-century imitator and his model. Rather, his analysis is concentrated upon Montreux's use of the *Aithiopika* in the rapid progress made through the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in the art of narrative manipulation. Sandy then turns to Great Britain where he devotes considerably less attention to the English-language adaptations of the ancient Greek novel. Two reasons are given for this abbreviation: the pattern for western Europe had already been set by the French who had initiated the enterprise, and the difficulty of distinguishing between direct influence from the ancient novel and its mediation through French adaptation—a problem that Sandy sees as an almost impossible one.

Overall Schmeling's collection provides an approach to the ancient novel that takes it out of the narrow realm of studies in antiquity and ancient literature. Despite occasional problems of cohesiveness between contributions that might be expected from such a diversity of scholars with their different approaches, the volume is to be commended for its putting the ancient Greek novel firmly on the maps of antiquity, Byzantium and western Europe. It is to be recommended for the general and detailed background it can provide for those interested in genres of ancient literature, narrative fiction and their modes of inscription, storage, transmission and reception.

LAUGHTER THROUGH THE AGES IN CLASSICAL AND EUROPEAN CULTURES

Siegfried Jäkel and Asko Timonen (edd.), *Laughter Down the Centuries* 1. Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 1994. Annales Universitatis Turkuensis. Ser. B Humaniora, Tom. 208. Pp. 223. ISBN 951-29-0335-0. No price supplied. / Siegfried Jäkel and Asko Timonen (edd.), *Laughter Down the Centuries* 2. Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 1995. Annales Universitatis Turkuensis. Ser. B Humaniora, Tom. 213. Pp. 275. ISBN 951-29-0551-5. No price supplied. / Siegfried Jäkel and Asko Timonen (edd.),

[11] Developed arguments for these claims are to be found in G. Sandy's important articles: 'Jacques Amyot and the Manuscript Tradition of Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*', *RHT* 14-15 (1984-85) 1-22; 'Italy and the Development of Hellenism in France', *SIFC* 10 (1992) 892-97.

Laughter Down the Centuries 3. Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 1997. Annales Universitatis Turkuensis. Ser. B Humaniora, Tom. 221. Pp. 299. ISBN 951-29-1006-3. No price supplied.

Bernhard Kytzler
Department of Europe Studies, University of Natal
Durban 4041

There are times when certain special topics in the humanities attract international attention. It is certainly not by chance that during the last few years the phenomenon of laughter has been discussed at a couple of conferences. The Salzburg Symposium in 1993 analysed 'Die lustige Person auf der Bühne'.[1] In the same year the splendid series of symposia on Seili Island in Suomi started, followed by the symposia on 'Laughter Down The Centuries'. It was also not by chance that the three Finnish meetings took place in Turku. Here, Siegfried Jäkel has held the chair of Classics since 1972, combined with an appointment in German Language and Literature; the comparative aspect of this arrangement is obvious. Indeed Jäkel has organised conferences under comparative aspects for many years: *Literature and Philosophy in Antiquity* (1985, 1986); *Sprachaspekte als Experiment* (1988, 1989); *History, Literature and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity and in the Modern World* (1991).[2]

The Turku symposia on laughter were held in 1993, 1994, 1996, and their papers appeared in print relatively soon afterwards. They encompass about 800 pages of text, thirty-one pictures and at the end ten columns of an *index nominum* for all three volumes. There are in total sixty-five papers written mainly in English and German (one is written in Italian) by scholars from a dozen countries. About one-half of the entire corpus deals with questions from classical antiquity; the other half of the papers discusses German (six papers), English (four) or French (three) texts; there are also studies on political jokes (two papers), on laughter in music (three papers) and in art (two), on Russian (two papers) and on Jewish (one) jokes, and on humour in proverbs (one paper). To round out the collection, there are three papers analysing generally the phenomenon of laughter and four others that investigate thermodynamics, computer science, biology and psychology with an eye on laughter.

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[1] P. Csobàdi *et al.* (edd.), *Die lustige Person auf der Bühne: Gesammelte Vorträge des Salzburger Symposions 1993* (Anif 1994) (=U. Müller, F. Hundsnurscher, O. Panagl [edd.], *Wort und Musik* [Salzburg 1994]). See also D. Arnould, *Le rire et les larmes dans la littérature grecque d'Homère à Platon* (Paris 1990); T. Vogel (ed.), *Vom Lachen. Einem Phänomen auf der Spur* (Tübingen 1992).

[2] S. Jäkel (ed.), *Power and Spirit* (Turku 1993); he also co-edited (with T. Viljamaa and K. Nyholm) *Sprachaspekte als Experiment: Beiträge zur Literaturkritik in Antike und Neuzeit* (Turku 1989) and (with H. Koskenniemi and V. Pyykö) *Literatur und Philosophy in der Antike* (Turku 1986).

Given the forum for which this review is written, the papers on classical topics will mainly be discussed here.

As an introduction, however, a few words about the opinions on the general phenomenon of laughter as they appear in this collection follow. It emerges that Henri Bergson's essay of 1899, *Le Rire*,[3] reprinted more than fifty times since then, is the basis for most of the theoretical thinking in this collection. Only Aristotle is quoted here more often; among the moderns, only Sigmund Freud matches the presence of Bergson in these volumes.[4] Hellmuth Flashar, 'Aristoteles, das Lachen und die Alte Komödie' (vol. 1, pp. 59-70) points out that Freud's many categories (jokes as 'Verkürzung, Verdichtungsvorgang, Klangwitz, Modifizierungswitz, Situationswitz, obszöner, feindseliger, zynischer oder skeptischer Witz') parallel closely Aristotle's categories in *Rhet.* 3.1 (vol. 1, p. 63 n. 2). He also underlines that three areas, 'Drastik, Phantastik, Politik', are at the core of the humour in Old Comedy, but not so much later on in plays after Aristophanes. He lists as the forms of laughing in Old Comedy 'das kathartische Lachen, das ambivalente, das triumphierende, das reflektierende, das ironische, vielleicht sogar das indignierte Lachen' (p. 69) and concludes that such a variety ('Vielschichtigkeit') of laughter is to be found only in Old Comedy, whereas it is reduced to one dimension only ('Eindimensionalität') in Middle and New Comedy.

In his opening essays of volumes 1 ('The Irony of Reality', pp. 1-14) and 2 ('Das Phänomen des Lachens als Verfremdungseffekt—oder "Lachen" als Motiv kritischen Denkens', pp. 1-16), Siegfried Jäkel puts the discussion into a wide framework, positioning it between the fundamental thoughts and artistic achievements of Homer and Brecht, of Menander and Musil, between Herman Bahr and Hermann Broch, between Soren Kierkegaard, Franz Kafka and Hugo von Hofmannsthal. He also opens the debate on Homer ('Laughter in the *Iliad*', vol. 1, pp. 23-27), which is linked to the essay of Carles Miralles ('Laughter in the *Odyssey*', vol. 1, pp. 15-22); both authors agree that laughter works 'as a possibility of communicating with each other beyond words, beyond the restrictions of language' (p. 27). There is also another set of distinctions given here: laughter as a sign of mockery and malicious joy or of friendly communication; the laughter of victory; finally ritual laughter and laughter as an expression of the universe. That Homer is discussed on many other occasions throughout all the three volumes (as the index shows) hardly needs to be mentioned; see especially Kullmann on the 'Homeric laughter' (vol. 2, pp. 79-98).

Obviously, certain genres are connected with laughter more closely than others: comedy, satire, to a certain extent fable. Our collection definitely takes care of them: Not only Flashar, as mentioned before, discusses comedy, but also Isolde Stark, 'Who laughs at whom in Greek Comedy' (vol. 2, pp. 99-116; the answer is ' . . . at slaves, cooks, *hetaerae* and pimps . . . at departures from norms'); W. Geoffrey Arnott, 'Humour in Menander' (vol. 3, pp. 65-79); and Walter Stockert, 'Der plautinische

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[3] H. Bergson, *Le Rire* (Paris 1899); English edition: H. Bergson, *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic* (London 1911).

[4] S. Freud, *Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewußten* (Vienna 1905).

Amphitruo, eine Tragikomödie' (vol. 2, pp. 117-19). Here we come across the bridge to a few other combinations of the serious and the comical, such as 'The Marriage of Tragedy and Comedy in Euripides' *Ion*' by Katarina Zacharia (vol. 2, pp. 45-63) or 'The Comic-Serious Figure in Plato's Middle Dialogues: the *Symposium* as Philosophical Art' by Kevin Corrigan (vol. 3, pp. 55-64). There is more in this vein: 'Umorismo e serio-comico nell' opera di Luciano' (vol. 1, pp. 113-20) by Paola Angeli Bernardini and Antonio Garzya's 'Die tragische Ironie im Theater des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.' (vol. 3, pp. 33-43). Satire is treated by Gregor Vogt-Spira, 'Das satirische Lachen der Römer und die Witzkultur der Oberschicht' (vol. 3, pp. 117-29); by Ernst A. Schmidt, 'Vom Lachen in der römischen Satire' (vol. 2, pp. 121-43), who at the end points to Brecht's reference to the eighth satire of Horace in 'Galileo'; and by Barbara K. Gold, 'Humor in Juvenal's Sixth Satire: Is It Funny?' (vol. 1, pp. 95-111), who finds it funny for men only.

Philosophy has a strong place in this collection, comprising no fewer than 9 papers: four treat humour and philosophy in general; two are given to Plato; one each to Democritus, Aristotle and Marcus Aurelius. History has only three contributions: one of them is on 'Jesting Emperors in Roman Biography' by Asko Timonen (vol. 1, pp. 121-31); one on Herodotus by Alan Griffith (vol. 2, pp. 45-63); and one on 'Clio's Smile: On the Styles of Laughter in European Historiography' by Gerrit Walther (vol. 2, pp. 17-29), a stimulating paper ranging from the 'Father of History' to 'The End of History', from antiquity to Voltaire and Gibbon, Ranke and Marx, Nietzsche and Baudrillard and Cioran. From the conclusion we learn of yet another category of laughter: 'laughter may be itself . . . apocalyptic . . . it is nevertheless an act of liberation from the tyranny of fashionable apocalypticism' (vol. 2, p. 28). It seems as if philosophy and laughter do not often go hand in hand. Surely philosophy is commonly seen by almost everybody as fundamentally serious business, including only now and then a bit of irony or a dash of sarcasm or a dab of satire. However, if one looks more closely at the papers presented here, especially those of Zacharia, Stockert, Corrigan, one begins to understand how correct the opinion of Socrates/Plato was to suggest that the same author should be capable of writing tragedies as well as comedies.

Among the contributions printed here, two have an almost identical title: Zeph Stewart's 'Laughter and the Greek Philosophers: A Sketch' (vol. 1, pp. 29-37) and Wolfgang Kullmann's 'Die antiken Philosophen und das Lachen' (vol. 2, pp. 79-98). While Stewart brings in 'that mysterious laughter, beautifully described by Spinoza . . . that arises when we feel that all is going well and we are happy in our world', he ends insisting on the wide variety of laughters: 'Surely no single cause can be found, no single theory can be devised, that will explain this vast phenomenon of laughter' (vol. 1, p. 37). Kullmann, on the other hand, underlines the 'shame culture' of classical antiquity and the social context of laughter.

A particularly interesting piece is Pierre de la Ruffinière du Prey's study 'Laughter at the expense of the City: From the Ancient World to A. W. N. Pugin and Léon Krier' (vol. 1, pp. 145-53, incl. 6 illustrations). Here, a line is drawn from Aristophanes, *Birds* and Varro, *Rerum Rusticarum* 3 to the British architect Augustus

Wellby Northmore Pugin (1812-52) and the Luxembourgian Léon Krier (1946-). At the end, the study sums up its results: 'The fun being poked at the city over the millennia by Aristophanes, Varro, Pugin and Krier has a lighthearted side that avoids philosophical heavy-handedness. But underneath wit and humor they disguise their earnest concern about social ills in an increasingly urbanised civilisation.' Another article deserving of special mention is Hans Schwabl's 'Von der Seltenheit des Lachens, komischen Konstellationen und Unterhaltung im Traumbuch des Artemidor' (vol. 2, pp. 171-83). Since angst is the origin of many dreams, it is not astonishing to find only a few remarks on laughter in Artemidorus' material.

Before finishing, it should be mentioned that laughter is not only discussed in its literary, musical and fine arts context, but it is also explained from the physiological point of view, including the aspect of evolution in a chapter by Gertrud Hauser *et al.*, 'The Biology of Laughter: Medical, Functional, and Anthropological—Human Ethological Aspects' (vol. 3, pp. 9-22), where the six 'buccolabial muscles involved substantially with laughter or smiling' (pp. 11-13) are painstakingly explained and where human ethological aspects come under scrupulous scrutiny. The paper's final climax: 'Modern medicine has proven what Solomon said 'A merry heart doeth good like a medicine'; as our great-grandparents, and our parents expressed it: 'Laughter is healthy' (p. 17). The very last paper by Carl A. Rubino, '"To Make Truth Laugh"—Umberto Eco and the Power of Laughter' (vol. 3, pp. 257-63) distinguishes between two kinds of laughter: one of exclusions, scorn, ridicule, victimising its objects, as Juvenal does, reaching back to Homer's 'sardonic grin (*Od.* 20.302); the other, like Horace, 'where we laugh not only at others but at ourselves as well . . . a laughter of inclusion and fellowship' (vol. 3, p. 262).

As a corollary (vol. 3, pp. 265-75), there is a very helpful and enlightening final chapter entitled '*Post Risus*', which contains notes written by some participants and by the organisers on the achievements, limitations and shortcomings of the three symposia; there are also valuable suggestions for further related research projects. The chapter rightly points out how often papers appearing later in the cycle take up ideas of earlier ones; there is also discussion of the various directions taken by the individual discussions, which constituted a very useful dialogue to which unfortunately only very few symposia aspire. At the end the editors point to the interdisciplinary character of the whole undertaking, its range from antiquity via the Middle Ages to modern times, its mix of generations (younger and older participants), of speakers from different countries, contrasting schools and various disciplines. There are indeed many reasons to thank the contributors—and, of course, especially the organiser Siegfried Jäkel—for an unusual series of stimulating conferences, well documented, rich in facts and thoughts. It is good to hear that he is preparing a new conference in 1999; this time it will be on the phenomenon of silence.

REVIEWS

Scholia publishes solicited and unsolicited short reviews. Short reviews to be considered for publication should be directed to the Reviews Editor, Scholia.

Eric W. Robinson, *The First Democracies: Early Popular Government Outside Athens. Historia* Einzelschriften 101. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997. Pp. 144. ISBN 3-515-06951-8. DM64.

Greek history in antiquity is very often perceived, and not by students alone, as the history of Athens; and the history of Athens is as often regarded as simply a history of democracy, itself an institution that passes as unique to the Athenians and their *polis* structure. It is therefore refreshing to come across a volume that appears to be devoted precisely to a study of democracy beyond the *agora* of Athens and even the frontiers of Attica, yet to a period in which Athens is held up to be the progenitor of popular participation in government as a result of Solon's reforms. It was clearly not alone in experimenting with constitutional development, even if, because 'Athens was the most famous democracy of the ancient world, it is often assumed that both the concept and the constitution itself originated there' (p. 9).

In chapter 1, 'Defining Democracy' (pp. 13-33), Robinson begins with an attempt at a definition of democracy, its characteristics, the parameters within which *poleis* that adopted this form of government operated, and the fairly self-evident differences, especially exclusive citizenship, between the various ancient and modern forms. It is quickly apparent that in an age of flux, in constitutional terms, any move towards an exact designation is going to be fraught with difficulties, but primarily by the intrusion of 'modern as opposed to ancient sensibilities' (p. 16). Similarly, the question of the formal origin and the pioneers who adopted such a constitution, whether it was the Greeks, as they themselves believed, or whether it was in an identifiable proto-democratic community in the Near East, for example, Sumer (p. 18), or in states even further east, rapidly bogs down because of the lack of reliable source material. Myths and legends may preserve an element of veracity in descriptions of the societies they serviced, but no historian worth his salt would attach overriding importance to such texts. But the diversity of the information available does give Robinson cause for the sanguine comment (p. 21), that while the 'case for actual democracy existing in any of these early cultures is extremely weak, we at least find further ground to overturn obsolete notions' of undiluted despotic monarchies, and that some popular participation in government was an early phenomenon. However, there still appears to be no good reason to doubt the provenance of Hellenic *demokratia* and there 'is no indication that there was a developmental connection between Greek democracy and a hypothetical precursor' (p. 25). The closing pages of this chapter (pp. 25-33) will be particularly well appreciated by students who are new to ancient history and Greek democracy *per se*. It is less obviously useful to fellow

specialists who ought to know and understand the often radical divergence between the mass participation in governing in antiquity, and the popular electoral systems employed in modern states.

Robinson proceeds in chapter 2, '*Demokratia*' (pp. 35-64), to an analysis of the literary sources—mostly Classical Athenian—for early Greek democracy, and what this concept actually meant to each individual writer. First off Aristotle (pp. 35-44), with his extensive discussion and multitudinous definitions of *demokratia*—or should that read 'moderate oligarchy' (p. 42)? Indeed, the *Politics* 'provides the most thorough treatment of comparative constitutional theory' (p. 35), but Aristotle himself is also a late commentator on the emergence of democratic government in the archaic period (p. 45) and, arguably, his accuracy may be suspect. On the other hand, he was fully aware that constitutional progression had not come to a halt, that maturation continued even in his own time and, therefore, his 'relative lateness means that he was in a better position to judge shifts in terminology than earlier authors were' (p. 43). The very breadth of his treatise allows recognition of the fact that democracy 'was not monolithic . . . that there were different forms . . . being practiced in many places . . . with no suggestion that they owed their appearance to the Athenian example' (p. 44). Moreover, Aristotle is virtually the sole writer, though often vague, to mention events of a constitutional nature in Greek city-states, which could conceivably have taken place before 500 BC, and the heyday of Athenian democracy.

A century and a half before Aristotle, Aeschylus (*c.* 463) hints at *demokratia* in the *Suppliants*, before the great reforms of Ephialtes, and easily pre-dates references by Euripides (pp. 52-55), Pseudo-Xenophon (pp. 50-52) and Thucydides (pp. 55-62), all of whom are heavily influenced by contemporary Athenian democratic practices. Although Robinson argues otherwise (pp. 63f.), by themselves they do not offer much tangible evidence for early democratic states in Greece. However, Herodotus, in the 430s, although hardly contemporaneous with the Cleisthenic reforms at Athens, which he describes (6.131), nor even with a supposedly Persian discussion concerning the merits of democracy, which is ostensibly but implausibly dated to 521 (3.80-83), is the prime recorder of early democracies along with Aristotle. The inherent problem with Herodotus' evidence is that he was writing a history of the Persian Wars, not intent on 'setting up a careful scheme of constitutional classification' (p. 50). While his methodology was undoubtedly influenced by 'literary and rhetorical considerations', Robinson again displays much optimism in accepting that what is recorded by Herodotus for the sixth century is really applicable to that time. Of course, Herodotus may, like the other fifth-century sources, relate governmental practices that he witnessed in his own day, and his evidence is, therefore, also open to question. But when he places a *demokratia* geographically at a distance from Athens it is likely to be believable, especially when his evidence broadly concurs with that provided by Aristotle. Thus, for example, the description of democracy found at Cyrene (pp. 105-08).

In chapter 3, 'Archaic *Demokratiai*' (pp. 65-122), Robinson finally comes to grips with the various *poleis* in which there is evidence for popular participation. The city-state was essentially a socio-political edifice ripe for such a development (p. 65),

and it is not remarkable that the emergence of the *polis* form in the eighth century should have coincided from the outset with mass participation in discussion, if not governing, as the Homeric texts well illustrate (p. 68). The Greek city-states are tackled in alphabetical order, which is slightly off-putting—Acragas is found between Achaea and Ambracia (pp. 73-82)—but this can be defended since the colonisation process, clearly closely connected with the advent of the *polis*, was an almost simultaneous phenomenon; and numerous colonies across the Mediterranean and the Black Sea reflect some form of democratisation in their initial stages. That these colonies did not acquire their participatory form of government from Athens is very clear from the evidence, which seems to point to experiments in democracy in states as diverse as Argos (pp. 82-88)—some sloppy proof-reading evident here (pp. 82f.)—and Chios (pp. 90-101), and very obviously beginning in the archaic period, but reaching a climax towards the end of the sixth century. It is also manifest that the cyclical theories of government to which historians in antiquity were so warmly attached were really inappropriate to describe the evolution of constitutions: and we see experimentation in some kind of *demokratia* occurring, recurring and being perfected in cities such as Mantinea (pp. 113f.), Naxos (pp. 117f.) and Syracuse (pp. 120-22), as forms of oligarchy or tyranny/monarchy were established and dispensed with over several generations. As Robinson says in his discussion of Samian affairs: 'we cannot pretend that the absence of further democratic accounts in our sparse sources for archaic political history means that there were none' (p. 119).

Robinson concludes in his fourth chapter (pp. 123-30), noting that 'convincing evidence exists for popular government before 480 B.C.' (p. 126), and 'that by the middle of the sixth century *demokratiai* had formed in a number of different states, and had probably appeared elsewhere even earlier. By the start of the fifth century the constitution was a well-established phenomenon' (p. 127). He states finally that an 'Athenocentric view of ancient democracy, naturally precipitated by the unusual depth of information afforded for classical Athenian history, ought not to obscure democracy's true origin elsewhere in Greece' (p. 130).

This is a very interesting and illuminating volume, with a useful and extensive bibliography (pp. 131-40): and the ideas presented here should contribute to a change in established perceptions about Greek democracy as being confined, or largely confined, to Athens. Sadly, the very proliferation, in terms of survival, of the Athenian writers and the other sources makes a complete break from Attic predominance almost impossible; the author, at times, does fall exactly into the trap that he himself seeks to avoid, namely, an overexpansive discussion of those same Athenian writers at too great a length to the detriment of the study of the individual city-states where some sort of democracy was indeed practised. Democracy was evidently almost a commonplace in the pre-classical period in Greece, Magna Graecia and beyond, and Robinson, notwithstanding some of my comments, has done much to bring this point to the forefront. This book will certainly enliven further studies in Greek democracy.

Richard J. Evans *University of South Africa*

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Michael Grant, *The Severans: The Changed Roman Empire*. London: Routledge, 1996. Pp. xvi + 117, incl. 32 black-and-white plates. ISBN 0-415-12772-6. UK£25.

Routledge has given us another book from Michael Grant Publications Ltd. The natural person who lurks under this entity in which the copyright vests might consider changing its name to Michael Grant Industries Ltd. The author's book tally is in the fifties, a remarkable figure even for a scholar regarded essentially as a populariser, 'perhaps the greatest populariser we have known in this century', as a reviewer of an earlier Grant work put it.[1] This volume is a kind of sequel to Grant's 1994 study of the Antonines.[2] A brief introduction, which begins as if the book is indeed only a section of a longer history, gives an overview of the Severan period and directs our attention to the topics on which the author is going to focus. The first four chapters are devoted to an outline of the political history and personalities of the dynasty from Septimius Severus to Severus Alexander, with the praetorian guard and prefecture highlighted in chapter 2. The remaining chapters (5-12) proceed thematically, covering provincial policy and the *Constitutio Antoniniana*, the army, finance, the influential women of the dynasty, jurists (Papinian, Paulus, Ulpian), the Greek novel (with focus on Longus), art and architecture, and paganism and Christianity. There is a short epilogue, an appendix on the literary sources, a bibliography, and a general index.

This summary might suggest that Grant has provided a comprehensive treatment of one of the less well-known periods of Roman history, a valuable introduction for the specialist in other branches of the classics, the student, and the educated general reader alike. In fact, he satisfies the needs of none of these, and the book must unhesitatingly be pronounced a failure. The fault lies above all in its scale. The main text, including the epilogue and appendix, runs to only ninety pages, to which are subjoined thirteen pages of notes. A book as brief as this, which ranges at the same time over a variety of topics, allows no scope for serious historical analysis. Some themes are properly emphasised: the importance of Septimius' army reforms, for instance, or the centrality of the fiscus in the politics of the period. But there is little argument and still less problematisation of Severan history; what we get is a sketch, attempting to present a multiplex view of a forty-year phase in the life of the Roman Empire in impossible compass.

The sense of superficiality and fragmentation that results is compounded by the slapdash manner of composition. No care or trouble has gone into this book. In parts Grant has shamelessly pillaged his earlier publications and those of others for passages of text chosen not for some especially happy formulation or striking phrase, or because they offer an effective way in to discussion of a particular issue, but because they save him time and effort. Over half of the longest chapter, on art and architecture (pp. 60-73), is made up of such quotations, two of them unencumbered by references.

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[1] Who this reviewer was I do not know; the dust jacket merely attributes the words to *Greece and Rome*, identifying the work concerned as *The Rise of the Greeks* (London 1987). But P. J. Rhodes, who reviewed this book in *G&R* 35 (1988) 217, said nothing of the kind.

[2] M. Grant, *The Antonines: The Roman Empire in Transition* (London 1994).

The following chapter, which also makes use of this technique, is even more disjointed. It is plain that the book has been dashed off with the scantest regard for style or flow; I should not be surprised to learn that it had been written by dictaphone and printed unrevised, which would explain, for example, the appearance within eleven lines of the sentences 'The new emperor was the son of Julia Soaemias, Varius Avitus Bassianus, commonly known as Elagabalus' and 'The 14-year-old son of [Julia Maesa's] daughter Julia Soaemias, whom we know as Elagabalus . . .' (p. 24), or the atrociously constructed 'The sculptors are Asian, and there is also evidence of African influence, since Lepcis Magna was in Africa and Septimius came from Africa and Lepcis, so that we see depictions of the African gods Hercules and Bacchus' (p. 69, on the Arch of Septimius at Lepcis). An enthusiastic editor with a box of blue pencils would have spared the author some blushes, and might at the same time have picked up slips of other kinds, such as the reference to the temple of Terra Mater 'taking place' (plate 9) or the glossing of a comment on the Jews under Septimius (p. 80) with the note 'Caracalla's wet-nurse was said to have been a Christian' (p. 105 n. 18; nn. 18 and 19 have presumably been transposed).

But no amount of editing of this kind could have spared this book a bad review. Even in a superficial history we should expect sufficient explanation to meet a reader's more obvious queries (what, for instance, were the 'indulgences' initiated by Caracalla [p. 49]?), and clearer thinking: the discussion of the financial implications of Septimius' Parthian campaigns (pp. 39-42) simply goes round in circles. Other passages are merely bizarre. Describing Septimius' character, Grant writes (p. 13) that he was superstitious, and was said to have regarded his rule as predestined. 'But he caught smallpox in Egypt, and for the rest of his life suffered from bad feet—though it is difficult to attribute this to smallpox—which limited his physical activity.' The text that accompanies the picture of the Baths of Caracalla (plate 31) tells us that they are still used for performances of opera, 'although audiences have found it somewhat disconcerting when huge fragments of the ancient structure fly off the main fabric and fall to the ground.' A passage on p. 4 reads as if the author is writing for ten-year-olds: 'Septimius's wife Julia Domna was clearly a remarkable person. She did not, however, rule the empire, because her very powerful husband did that.' The fact is that Grant has not confronted the questions central to any academic publication: what exactly do I want to say, to whom do I want to say it, and how can it best be said? Instead of a serious popular history, informative and focused, or an entertaining one, rich in anecdote, we get thoughts off the top of the author's head on a variety of topics, not all closely related to the period under scrutiny: Longus may not even have written under the Severans (as the author admits, p. 54), and, if it could be established that he did, *Daphnis and Chloe* would still tell us little about the Severan age specifically (this chapter [pp. 53-59] is generally one of the worst parts of the book, a third of it devoted to a synopsis of the novel riddled with confusion, error, and misrepresentation;[3] we

[3] The author states (p. 101 n. 7) that the summary is adapted from G. Anderson, *Ancient Fiction: The Novel in the Graeco-Roman World* (London 1984), but the faults are his own, and they imply a startling lack of familiarity with the text itself.

are also told [p. 84] that Longus was 'one of the most prolific writers of antiquity').

A full list of this book's shortcomings would be long, and it was for a copy-editor, not this reviewer, to provide it. We are all grateful to Routledge for its vigorous commitment to classics publishing and understand the need for commercial enterprises to make money; but serious academic publishers ought to ensure that what goes under their imprint does not fall below an appropriate standard. In this case the publisher has capitalised on a famous name to put out—at a high retail price—a book that, though attractively presented, is a shambles. It is not only our 'greatest populariser' whose reputation has been dented by *The Severans*.

J. H. D. Scourfield *National University of Ireland, Maynooth*

Clive Skidmore, *Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen: The Work of Valerius Maximus*. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1996. Pp. xvii + 142. ISBN 0-85989-477-0. UK£30.

Skidmore's book is a much revised version of his Exeter 1988 Ph.D. thesis and makes a solid contribution to the recent revival of interest in Valerius Maximus. Skidmore's aim is to rebut the frequent assumptions about Valerius' work as a mere collection of rhetorical material and to invest it with a higher purpose as 'a comprehensive source of reference for anyone faced with moral decisions' (p. xvii). Even if one rejects this thesis in the form that Skidmore presents it, there is much to be taken with profit from Skidmore's work.

Skidmore's work is organised in three parts. First (pp. 3-30) he considers the role of examples in Greek and Roman education and the views of Quintilian and Seneca the Younger: for example, 'Who will teach courage, justice, loyalty, self-control, simplicity and contempt of grief and pain better than men like Fabricius, Curius, Regulus, Decius, Mucius and countless others?' (Quint. *Inst.* 2.30). Skidmore concludes his section on Quintilian: 'Quintilian lays down guidelines for the moral education of a Roman orator or statesman and *Memorable Words and Deeds* identifies in every respect with his requirements' (pp. 24f.).

Part two (pp. 31-52) looks at the form of Valerius' work, beginning with an examination of the ideas of accessibility, convenience and brevity that Valerius enunciates in the preface. Skidmore then considers Hellenistic compilations of sayings, which were arranged by person rather than theme, philosophical collections of historical examples on specific themes (for example, Chrysippus' *On Dreams*, where the illustrative material comprised the great bulk of the work), and finally collections of paradoxographical material. Roman authors produced works of all three types, but Valerius, whose work encompasses a vast range of material, seems to have surpassed his predecessors in the complexity of arrangement and scope. In passing (pp. 47f.) Skidmore disposes of the theory of Klotz and Bosch that Valerius' work is a

mere rehash of a pre-existing Roman collection, perhaps that of C. Julius Hyginus.[1]

The third and most important part of Skidmore's work (pp. 53-118) begins with an examination of the moral purpose of Valerius' work. Skidmore gives correct emphasis to words from the preface, 'by your [Tiberius'] divine wisdom are the virtues of which I am about to speak encouraged and the vices punished with the utmost severity' (Skidmore's translation), and shows how throughout the work the themes of good and bad conduct with their respective concomitants of reward and punishment are hammered home by Valerius. Through his prefatory remarks to individual examples as well as to chapters, Valerius 'preconditions' (p. 57) the reader and guides him in the understanding of the following example(s). Valerius' antiquarianism has a moral purpose: he believes in the moral decline of Rome and points to the virtues that need to be cultivated in order to preserve the Roman empire. The Roman virtue fundamental to their acquisition of world rule was dutiful worship of the gods (see 1.1.8), which Valerius treats at length in his first book. The gods are the guarantee of the moral order Valerius supports; for him they are not literary ornaments, but forces active in human affairs.

Valerius' advice is not just moral, but Skidmore sees him as a kind of 'agony aunt' confronting the ambiguities of certain topics, such as dress sense (3.6), and instructing the reader who may be in a dilemma. Also Valerius' advice is often practical—the chapters on legal questions in book 8 'are clearly included for the instruction of the audience, and could be applied in a number of ways; they would be relevant to those adjudicating on cases as well as those engaging in litigation' (p. 73). Consolatory guidance is also presented (e.g., 7.6, 8.13), making use in particular of the concept of Fortune (e.g., 6.9, 7.1). Valerius' programmatic statement requires him to consider vices, the subject of book 9, but they occupy a small part, as they are less profitable to read (5.3, 3.5).

In chapter 8, on Valerius' choice of examples (pp. 83-92), Skidmore discusses Valerius' belief in the efficacy of examples in preference to moralising words or ethical treatises, as essentially more 'real'. His criteria for selecting his examples are their authority, plausibility and entertainment value, this last provided in particular by foreign examples (pp. 89-91) not at all at odds with the overall purpose of moral instruction. The question of plausibility is addressed in chapter 9 (pp. 93-102) where Skidmore demonstrates that Valerius can show a degree of scepticism towards examples from the mythical period and rejects fable. By contrast his religious credulity is high.

While there is much to be commended in Skidmore's presentation of a case for seeing a serious moral, educative purpose in Valerius, he perhaps goes too far. In many cases the examples are of no direct relevance to a Roman of the first century AD. We need not retreat to the old position of seeing Valerius' examples merely as a collection to be mined by those in the declamation schools, as Valerius' moulding and

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[1] C. Bosch, *Die Quellen des Valerius Maximus: Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Literatur der historischen Exempla* (Stuttgart 1929); A. Klotz, *Studien zu Valerius Maximus und den Exempla* (Munich 1942).

presentation of his material shows clearly that he wants it to be read as continuous prose. In fact, Valerius demonstrates how his examples can be used by declaimers, whose world was often safely distanced from contemporary political or social problems.

A work on virtues had a role to play in the early empire when abstract qualities were politicised as never before. The recently published *Senatus Consultum de Pisone Patre*,[2] which appeared too late for Skidmore, provides an intriguing context for Valerius' work. The decree's words, 'the Senate, mindful of its clemency and justice and generosity of spirit, virtues that it inherited from its ancestors and learned in particular from Divus Augustus and Tiberius Caesar Augustus, its *principes* . . . ', advertise to the whole empire, with indisputable official support, exactly what Valerius offers in his work—a time-honoured moral system exemplified by the greats of Roman history and latterly (and most influentially) by the lives of the emperors. In his consideration of the audience for the work (chapter 10, pp. 103-12) Skidmore rejects the recent suggestion by Martin Bloomer that Valerius was writing primarily for those outside of Rome, from the new bourgeoisie of Italy,[3] and stresses the usefulness of his material to 'an audience which was well educated and of high social status' (p. 107). I am not convinced that Valerius' examples made an ideal accompaniment to upper-class dinner-parties; in particular Skidmore's attempt to interpret Suetonius' *aretalogoi* (*Aug.* 74) as Valeriuses is dubious. Given the importance of virtues within the ideological system of the early empire and the emperors' concern to promulgate it as widely as possible, I would not restrict Valerius' audience as Skidmore does. He had a wide 'market' for his work.

In his brief concluding discussion of Valerius' identity Skidmore may place too much weight on 5.5 praef., 'I inherited equal glory from the busts of our ancestors', as evidence that Valerius descended from a family whose ancestors had held curule magistracies. All in all Skidmore's work is to be welcomed as a contribution to Valerian studies.

D. Wardle *University of Cape Town*

Marica Frank (ed.), *Seneca's Phoenissae: Introduction and Commentary*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995. Pp xvii + 268, incl. an appendix. ISBN 9004-09776-7. Gld129/US$84.

The book opens with a useful and judicious introduction of some forty-five pages in which Frank deals with vexed issues such as the relation between the two halves of the play (pp. 3-8), arguing convincingly that such verbal echoes as, for example, the repetition of *ibo, ibo* in lines 12 and 407 point to clear links and contrasts

[2] W. Eck, A. Caballos and F. Fernandez (edd.), *Das Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre* (Munich 1996).

[3] M. Bloomer, *Valerius Maximus and the Rhetoric of the New Nobility* (Chapel Hill 1992).

between the scenes involving Oedipus and Jocasta. There is good discussion of antecedent treatments of the Theban legend (pp. 16-29), although one might have wished for the subsequent *Thebaid* of Statius to have featured a little more in both the introduction and the commentary, given the enormous resurgence of interest in Statius' epic in recent scholarship. Discussion of the manuscripts would have been welcome; though a publication such as this is no doubt aimed at professional scholars rather than students, one can reasonably expect something more than the sigla and three references given by Frank on p. 45; compare, for instance, Tarrant's concise and helpful discussion in his edition of the *Thyestes*.[1] This matter apart, the introduction is, however, an excellent guide to the play; Frank's arguments are well presented, and her careful treatment of the issue of Stoicism (pp. 29-32) is especially to be applauded.

In her preface, Frank sees her work as concentrating on 'a literary analysis' of the text, in contrast to the more philological interests of Theo Hirschberg's commentary,[2] but in fact there is much here to delight the philologist. One area given particular attention by Frank concerns Senecan linguistic usage; see for instance her notes on *Phoenissae* 411 (the respective frequencies with which Jocasta refers to herself as *mater*, 'mother', and *parens*, 'parent') and 492 (the respective frequencies of *metuo*, *timeo* and *uereor*, in not only Seneca but also Statius and Lucan as well). Parallels, especially from elsewhere in Seneca, are carefully documented, and there is even a list of Senecan passages cited in the commentary at the end of the book (though note that no reference to *Troades* 966 can be found on p. 199). There are a couple of places where useful comparisons are missed; at *Phoenissae* 411f. (*feruidos iuuenes anus / tenebo*, 'I will hold back these fiery youths even though I am an old woman'), comparison with Horace, *Carmina* 4.13.26-28 (*possent ut* iuuenes *uisere* feruidi / *multo non sine risu / dilapsam in cineres facem*, 'so that *fiery young men* with hoots of laughter might see the torch fallen to ashes') seems in order, particularly since, as Oliver Lyne has noted, in Horace's poem *feruidi* ('fiery') suggests not only the ardour of the young men but also their eventual decline as they too burn out;[3] with Seneca one can make the similar point that *feruidi*, applied to Polyneices and Eteocles, also evokes the double burning of the young men on their funeral pyre. At *Phoenissae* 354f. (*non satis est adhuc / ciuile bellum*, 'even a civil war is not enough for me now'), it is surprising that Lucan's *bella . . . plus quam ciuilia* ('wars worse than civil', 1.1) is not mentioned.

Frank's literary comment is often very subtle and illuminating. Her notes on Seneca's inversion of the trope of a blind man asking to be led about at *Phoenissae* 5f. and on the resonances of *libauit* ('sprinkled a libation') at 174f. are good examples of this, while her note on *Phoenissae* 77-79 is a careful analysis of the complex relation existing between Seneca's dramatic and philosophical treatments of suicide. The

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[1] R. J. Tarrant (ed.), *Seneca's Thyestes: Edited with Introduction and Commentary* (Atlanta 1985) 36-38.

[2] T. Hirschberg (ed.), *Senecas Phoenissen: Einleitung und Kommentar* (Berlin 1989).

[3] R. O. A. M. Lyne, *The Latin Love Poets* (Oxford 1980) 211.

commentary has its occasional disappointments: at *Phoenissae* 615 Frank remarks as follows: 'Is Seneca making Jocasta indulge in deliberate irony by calling Adrastus *fortis*, when in 510 she described him as *hostis*? Probably not; it seems likely that Seneca intends us to perceive it as a piece of unconscious irony on Jocasta's part.' Quite apart from the fact that there is no reason why a *hostis* ('enemy') should not be called *fortis* ('brave') without irony, the language of intention used in this note and others (see, e.g., 618, 623f.) is unhelpful. And, at the end of an otherwise judicious discussion of the half-line at *Phoenissae* 319 and its place in arguments concerning the unfinished status of the play, Frank concludes with unworthy (and unsub-stantiated) scorn, damning the dramas as 'having been composed with careless speed (for example, clumsy versification, excessive use of stock descriptions, unoriginal and repetitive choral lyrics)'.

Frank's handling of textual matters is generally prudent. Peiper's *uoluat* ('rolls'), which she favours over the MSS *ducat* ('leads') at *Phoenissae* 116, can be defended by comparison with other parallels where *uoluere* ('to roll') is used of rivers, such as Horace *Carmina* 3.29.38, Virgil, *Aeneid* 8.539. At *Phoenissae* 551 Frank conjectures and silently prints *uestraque* ('your'), a good suggestion that deserves to be acknowledged at least with a laconic *scripsi* in the apparatus! At *Phoenissae* 2 the lemmata in the commentary are confusing; the MSS have *patris leuamen* ('father's solace'), which appears in the text and in the lemma for lines 1f., but Gronovius' conjecture *lateris* ('side') appears in the lemma for line 2. Frank notes that Gronovius does not attempt to explain *lateris* and suggests that *lateris* is an example of synecdoche. The idiom perhaps becomes more understandable if one compares the use of *latus* ('side') in royal and imperial contexts such as Seneca, *Dialogi* 6.15.3 (*Seiano ad latus stanti*, 'Sejanus standing at his side'); Statius, *Siluae* 3.3.65, 5.1.187; Martial 6.76.1; and Lactantius on Statius, *Thebaid* 2.312.

There are only a very few misprints and slips, such as the incorrect lemma for *Phoenissae* 195, the reference in the note on 96 to Statius, *Thebaid* 614-18 (read '4.614-18'), and the claim in the note on 546f. that chariots were not used in Greek warfare after Homeric times—the scythed variety appeared in the Seleucid army as late as the battle of Magnesia in 190 BC.[4] This volume represents a valuable contribution to the scholarship of Senecan tragedy. Frank's commentary is a work of much erudition and serves usefully to illuminate a play that has received little attention.

B. J. Gibson *Corpus Christi College, Oxford*

[4] See Livy 37.41.5-7, and B. Bar-Kochva, *The Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns* (Cambridge 1976) 83f.

N. Spivey, *Understanding Greek Sculpture: Ancient Meanings, Modern Readings*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1996. Pp. 240, incl. 142 black-and-white illustrations. ISBN 0-500-23710-7. UK£28.

Nigel Spivey wants us to do something a little different while reading his book. Instead of the traditional concentration upon style and artists, which tend to be modern rather than ancient preoccupations, he wants us to think about the original contexts of Greek sculpture and the ways in which Greek sculpture was produced and developed. Generally speaking, it wasn't 'art for art's sake' (though an exception is almost made for the Parthenon, p. 140); it was art for religious, social and political purposes. Accordingly, in his search for ancient meanings, Spivey asks questions about factors like setting, function, patronage, audience, production techniques, and so on. This isn't an entirely new approach, but it is reasonably so, and the treatment is stimulating.[1]

In the first two chapters, 'Introduction' (pp. 7-15), 'The Greek Revolution' (pp. 16-53), Spivey invites the reader to ponder the shortcomings of traditional approaches to the study of Greek sculpture and suggests a variety of social and historical factors for consideration. This is the most important theoretical part of his book. In chapter 3, 'Daedalus and the Wings of *Techne*' (pp. 54-77), he focuses on the shadowy figure of Daedalus and the technical origins of sculpture in a variety of media: wood, limestone, marble, bronze, and terracotta. Chapter 4, 'Sacred Decoration' (pp. 78-104), deals with the sacred settings of Greek sculpture and the rituals it supported. Statues and reliefs commemorated numerous types of events (pp. 84-95), or served purposes of state propaganda and 'peer polity interaction' (pp. 95-103). Many different types of ceremonies were conducted around them. Chapter 5, 'Heroes Apparent' (pp. 105-22), stresses the heroisation of figures and sees Greek nudity as a costume that might be donned by anyone with heroic pretensions. The impetus given to the production of Athenian art in general, and sculpture in particular, by the victory at Marathon is dealt with in chapter 6, 'From Marathon to the Parthenon' (pp. 123-51). Chapter 7 (pp. 152-71) is entitled 'In Search of Pheidias'; in fact, Spivey embarks upon a systematic undermining of Pheidias' reputation in reaction especially to scholarship that exaggerates his role as the creative genius behind the Acropolis rebuilding programme and the artistic achievements of classical Athens in general. In chapter 8, 'Revealing Aphrodite' (pp. 172-86), Spivey deals with the genesis of the naked Aphrodite figure of the fourth century BC and its subsequent influence. The Hellenistic age is dealt with in chapter 9, 'The Patronage of Kings' (pp. 187-217), and here it is easier to write about (for example, royal) commissions of sculpture, such as the Great Altar of Pergamon. This leads on to a discussion of Roman and modern attitudes to Greek sculpture in chapter 10, '*Graecia Capta*' (pp. 218-27), with special reference to the plunder, copying and collecting of Greek works. An 'Epilogue' (pp. 228-31) follows,

[1] Proofreading is exceptional, though note 'is (= it) would be misleading' (p. 181) and 'one of (the) girls' (p. 184).

during which Spivey argues once more that it is not enough simply to trace the chronological development of style, following the broad rule that Greek art is progressively more naturalistic over a timespan of about 800 to 100 BC. He affirms the greatness of Greek art for its technical excellence and generally ennobling quality, but calls for a suppression of the biographical and philological approaches and for a new emphasis upon theory and archaeology (p. 230):

> [T]he message of this book is that a better understanding of both the themes and stylistic accomplishments of Greek sculpture can be reached if we abandon our craving for names, and transfer our attention away from those who made Greek sculpture, in the direction instead of those who asked for it and paid for it.

Certainly, the merits of Spivey's book and of its preferred approach are considerable. It is hard not to see both being influential for a long time to come. On the other hand, it is a consequence of theoretical and thoughtful work that readers are stimulated towards refinements. This occurred especially as I read the first two chapters. Spivey shows himself to be a social historian who employs archaeological material rather than an art historian who compares styles. He quotes Gombrich's view that iconology is a matter of institutions not symbols (p. 7),[2] decries the flawed and subjective technique of searching for sculptors and originals when only copies survive (p. 15), and finally justifies himself with the assertion that art belongs to a game of power (p. 15): 'And in that game, institutions and customs are more powerful than individuals.' In general terms it may be so, but this bald assertion doesn't really do justice to the mix of (often unpredictable) influences from individuals, families, communities and customs, and it also denies the strength of methodological debate on the efficacy of sociological perspectives in this and in related historical fields. The point is that Spivey's approach does not completely supersede older approaches, although it is loaded with potential for future applications.

Surely no one will henceforth be able to explain 'the Greek Revolution', characterised above all by developing naturalism, as a product of the dawn of 'civilization', a growth in personal liberty, or a predilection for narrative (pp. 17-35). Instead, scholars will contemplate factors such as 'the technical empowerment of Greek artists' (p. 26), their skill and competitiveness (a reflection of underlying competitiveness in Greek society, p. 27), and the desire to create a culturally distinctive output in comparison with art of the Near East (pp. 27-29). Three-dimensional (Greek) art was created in opposition to two-dimensional (eastern) art. The Greeks were more interested in the 'how' than the 'what', that is, 'how' elements related to one another rather than 'what' particular elements were involved (p. 29). They were also participants in a 'culture of enactment' that gave some impetus to naturalism (pp. 34f.). Drama and art both required audience participation, even suffering, which is one explanation for depictions of pain and emotion in Greek art

[2] E. H. Gombrich, *Symbolic Images* (London 1972) 21.

(factors missing from eastern art). Then there was the attitude to beauty and goodness that sanctioned male beauty contests and pederasty, and judged that 'ugly people were bad people' (p. 38). Above all, Spivey would stress that the Greeks went beyond naturalism in their depictions, producing statues that were combinations of formal measurements (pp. 38-40). His fundamental explanation is a religious one (p. 44): 'The best human bodies . . . are vehicles of the divine. Such is the basis of ancient Greek anthropomorphism.' The divine, therefore, was manifest in the best of the Greeks' physical selves. Artists, in producing lifelike or idealising statues, gave glimpses of the divine in the context of a society that did not conceive that the divine and mystical were beyond human imagination (pp. 52f.). In addition, statues were considered animated and, given the reciprocal nature of Greek religion, whereby the gods were called upon to respond in kind, the more naturalistic were statues, the more likely they were to be animated and responsive (pp. 49f.).

Naturalism was not an end in itself, an obvious artistic aim for a civilised artist. Spivey's factors definitely help in the task of recreating plausible contexts for meanings. Yet there are limits. One problem stems from the difficulties of recreating the original circumstances of commission and display. Evidence is sparse, and many important pieces have been ripped from their contexts, physically, chronologically, and in other ways. Spivey himself sees a further problem in the fact '. . . that some pieces of Greek sculpture, familiar to us for many years, continue, despite their apparent familiarity, to provoke much varied speculation as to their meaning' (p. 230). In effect, the 'problem' for Spivey resides in choosing between two or more plausible explanations. He even seems to illustrate the point by appearing in chapter 6 to support both Joan Connelly's interpretation of the Parthenon frieze (preparation for the sacrifice of a daughter of Erechtheus, pp. 146f.) and also that of John Boardman (a commemoration of the heroes who died at Marathon, pp. 147f.).[3] Yet in his 'Epilogue', he says in relation to the Parthenon frieze that: ' . . . one of several possible interpretations has been argued for, but it cannot be definitive' (p. 230). The 'problem' might actually be that we are not assessing the fundamental polysemy or polyvalency of Greek art properly, and I would have liked Spivey to discuss this point. Modern scholars conjure 'difficulty' or 'ambivalence' from a mindset that requires something definitive or exact or precise. When more than one explanation purports to be definitive, contradiction tends to be assumed, or there is 'ambivalence' if the scholar resists the temptation to rationalise or to dismiss one explanation as being 'more likely' than the other. What if the Greeks didn't think this way? What if they implicitly thought in terms of 'ambivalence', or were prepared for and appreciative of evocations, not seeing the need to rationalise or reconcile or dismiss or define to quite the degree that we do? This doesn't always fit, as for instance with some philosophical debate, but it does, in my view, help our appreciation of art and religion. It might even be expected of a contemplative people who preferred allegorical scenes to direct

[3] J. Connelly, 'Parthenon and *Parthenoi*: A Mythological Interpretation of the Parthenon Frieze', *AJA* 100 (1996) 53-80; J. Boardman, 'The Parthenon Frieze—Another View,' in U. Hockmann and A. Krug (edd.), *Festschrift für Frank Brommer* (Mainz 1977) 39-49.

depiction. They produced relatively few scenes of Greeks fighting Persians, but many evocations of the Persians in scenes of Greeks fighting Amazons, Centaurs or Trojans. Furthermore, it is human nature to contradict yourself, to be irrational at times, and so on. The point in relation to meaning is that we should contemplate more than one meaning or evocation, no 'right' one, and no necessary assumption that such a thing would be sought. If the Parthenon frieze comes from a non-definitive mindset, it could accommodate, even promote, multiple and expanding evocations of a generally positive nature. Likewise, this might permit a better appreciation of Pausanias, whom Spivey finds somewhat exasperating for a certain 'ambivalence of response . . . both attributionist . . . and functionalist' (pp. 13f.).

The discussion has greatest impact if the reader already has some familiarity with the featured pieces. It is likely that the questions that have occupied Spivey will be developed further in the future, but he is at the forefront of the field at the present moment and has produced a book that ought to benefit all students of Greek sculpture.

Tom Stevenson *University of Auckland.*

A. B. Bosworth, *Alexander and the East: The Tragedy of Triumph.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. xvi + 218, incl. 10 maps and figures. ISBN 019-814991-3. UK£32.50.

Bosworth is a towering presence in Alexander studies, with two volumes in print of his magisterial commentary on Arrian's *History of Alexander*, a major monograph on Alexander's exploits, a series of studies on Arrian and numerous other publications.[1] *Alexander and the East* offers a series of studies, with the focus on the period 329-325 BC, which includes the invasion of Bactria and Sogdiana, the war in the Punjab and Alexander's journey down the Indus, conspiracies real and alleged, and mutiny. In a field where eminent historians such as Droysen, Berve, Tarn, Schachermeyr and Badian, have both added to our understanding and multiplied uncertainties, Bosworth has advanced our knowledge and challenged innumerable orthodoxies. In *Alexander and the East* originality and brilliance abound, and Bosworth is as controversial as ever. Of course, as Bosworth says, 'even where explicit evidence exists, we may find a . . . cycle of acceptance and scepticism' (p. 186), as scholars dispute whether what appears as source testimony can be taken at face value. Thus, for example, Bosworth in a lengthy appendix (pp. 186-200) returns to the question whether Alexander had any reliable information about the Ganges and its peoples: Tarn's case that he had no such information, was refuted by Meyer, restated by Tarn, rejected by Schachermeyr, and again carefully defended by

[1] A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's 'History of Alexander': Books 1-3* (Oxford 1980); *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's 'History of Alexander': Books 4-5* (Oxford 1995); *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1988); *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford 1988).

Robinson.[2] Bosworth presents a compelling case for believing what the sources appear to attest, that Alexander received information on the Ganges. The report given to Alexander by Phegeus (Curt. 9.1.36 and Diod. Sic. 17.93.1) was in my view referred to by Cleitarchus and was in essence historical.

As ever, Bosworth is good at relating the strategic narrative to geographical realities: in this case he makes sense of the story of the journey down the lower Indus and across the Makran by relating the chronological and climatic references in the sources to what we know about the pattern of the monsoons (especially pp. 176f.), and setting out the implications. On the scale of the disaster in Gedrosia Bosworth very properly repeats his point that, while Plutarch states that barely 25 per cent of those with Alexander survived the crossing of the Makran (*Alex.* 66.4f.), the figures given for the number of Macedonians at Opis in 324 are too high for Plutarch's casualty rate to be correct for the Macedonian contingent (p. 180). This line of argument must be understood in the context of Bosworth's controversial earlier work in which he sought to demonstrate that Alexander's campaigns had a profound and lasting deleterious effect upon Macedonian manpower. After 331/330 Alexander received no reinforcements from Macedonia, and this might be attributed to a serious shortage of manpower.[3] Thus in 325 Alexander had little prospect of receiving further Macedonian reinforcements and would have had to protect the Macedonian troops he had from unnecessary wastage. Bosworth's assumptions about the pattern of reporting of the arrival of reinforcements and his relative neglect of the regeneration factor evoked criticism from Badian.[4] Bosworth has softened his position, in that in *Alexander and the East* he states that 'there had been no large-scale reinforcement since the winter of 331/0' (p. 180). But in this context Bosworth is not concerned with Macedonian demography. He argues that, while the losses among the combatants were probably far less than Plutarch's figure suggests, the casualty rate among the non-combatants and those considered dispensable probably was horrendous and the impact of this marauding army upon the native population must have been disastrous.

Bosworth's concern throughout the book to expose the horrors of Alexander's campaigns against those who offered resistance and to demonstrate that 'the history of Alexander is the history of waste' (p. 30) is a challenge to heroising accounts. Ironically, some readers may miss the challenging nature of Bosworth's approach and see it as politically correct. New combinations so often produce new insights and

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[2] W. W. Tarn, 'Alexander and the Ganges', *JHS* 43 (1923) 93-101; E. Meyer, 'Alexander und der Ganges', *Klio* 21 (1927) 183-91; W. W. Tarn, *Alexander II* (1948) 275-85; F. Schachermeyr, 'Alexander und die Ganges-Laender', *Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte* 3 (1955) 123-35; T. R. Robinson, 'Alexander and the Ganges', *AHB* 7 (1993) 84-99.

[3] A. B. Bosworth, 'Alexander the Great and the Decline of Macedon', *JHS* 106 (1986) 1-12; Bosworth [1 (Cambridge 1988)] *passim*, esp. 266f.

[4] E. Badian, 'Agis III: Revisions and Reflections', in I. Worthington (ed.), *Ventures Into Greek History: Essays in Honour of N. G. L. Hammond* (Oxford 1994) 258-92, esp. 259-68.

prompt new questions. Bosworth's originality here is in comparing surviving accounts of Alexander's campaigns with Cortés' account of the reconquest of Mexico, plus Francisco López de Gómara's edited version of Cortés' account, and the independent account by one of Cortés' junior followers, Bernal Díaz del Castillo.[5] The exercise illustrates how the perspective can alter the record, and how literary allusion can colour the narrative. Thus, for example, Cortés on his march on Tenachtitlan attacked two rock fortresses, and in Gómara's account of the second episode Cortés warned the Indians that his men 'were equipped with wings to fly': Bosworth shows that this must be a deliberate echo of the story of Alexander's assault on Ariamazes' Rock in 328 (pp. 37f.). Díaz shows that Cortés' capture of the fortress was far less heroic than Gómara affected.

Bosworth develops this parallelism in a valuable way by focusing on the role of the interpreter/mediator. For Cortés the critical link with the Indian population was the captive Doña Marina, whose very real linguistic skills were clearly, as Bosworth shows, eclipsed by her rhetorical and political skills. Reality was mediated by the interpreter (esp. pp. 124f., 161f.). Now Arrian tells us that the Oxydracae surrendered, apologised that they had been dilatory in submitting and were willing to give themselves up to one who claimed divine parentage, as they had been free ever since Dionysus penetrated into India (Arrian 6.14.2). The Mexican parallel suggests that we should suspect that the Oxydracae were briefed on the rhetoric that would find acceptance with Alexander. In this way myth grew as a factor in the rhetoric of imperialism and 'the creation of belief' (pp. 98f.) in Alexander's divine nature received further impetus.

The book is virtually free of typograpical errors. East and west appear to be confused on pp. 171 and 179. Those familiar with the problems of identifying many of the sites that feature in this chapter of Alexander's campaigns may be surprised to see Eggermont's publications missing from the bibliography,[6] although Bosworth deals with some of Eggermont's ideas in *Conquest and Empire*. In all this is a very readable and worthwhile book, a very welcome addition to scholarship on Alexander history.

John Atkinson *University of Cape Town*

[5] Editions include H. Cortés (tr. and ed. A. Pagden), *Letters from Mexico* (New Haven 1986); F. López de Gómora (tr. and ed. L. B. Simpson), *Cortés: The Life of the Conqueror by His Secretary* (Berkeley 1964); B. Diaz del Castillo (tr. A. P. Maudslay), *The True History of the Conquest of New Spain*, vols 1-5 (London 1908-16).

[6] P. H. L. Eggermont, especially *Alexander's Campaigns in Sind and Baluchistan* (Leuven 1975).

BOOKS RECEIVED

Books for review should be sent to the Reviews Editor, ***Scholia****.*

Egbert Bakker and Ahuvia Kahane, *Written Voices, Spoken Signs: Tradition, Performance and the Epic Text.* London: Harvard University Press, 1997. Pp. viii + 305. ISBN 0-674-96260-5. UK£26.50.

Shadi Bartsch, *Ideology in Cold Blood: A Reading of Lucan's Civil War.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997. Pp. x + 224. ISBN 0-674-44291-1. UK£29.95.

Robert J. Buck, *Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy: The Life of an Athenian Statesman.* Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998. *Historia* Einzelschriften Band 120. Pp. 139. ISBN 3-515-07221-7. DM56.00.

Rodney Castleden, *Atlantis Destroyed.* London: Routledge, 1988. Pp. xiv + 225. ISBN 0-415-16539-3. UK£25.00.

John R. Clarke, *Looking at Lovemaking. Constructions of Sexuality in Roman Art: 100 B.C. to A.D. 250.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Pp. xvii + 372, incl. 16 colour and 90 black-and-white plates, 19 line drawings and 1 map. ISBN 0-520-20024-1. US$39.95/UK£37.50.

Catherine Connors, *Petronius the Poet: Verse and Literary Tradition in the Satyricon.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xiii + 166. ISBN 0-521-59231-3. UK£35.00/US$54.95.

Stavros A. Frangoulidis, *Handlung und Nebenhandlung: Theater, Metatheater und Gattungsbewusstsein in der römischen Komödie.* Stuttgart: M. und P. Verlag, 1997. Drama Beiträge zum antiken Drama und seiner Rezeption Beiheft 6. Pp. x + 191. ISBN 3-476-45184-4. DM28.00.

Alex F. Garvie (ed. and tr.), *Sophocles: Ajax.* Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1998. Pp. vi + 266. ISBN 0-85668-660-3. UK£16.50.

Fritz Graf (ed.), *Einleitung in die lateinische Philologie.* Stuttgart: Teubner, 1997. Pp. ix + 725. ISBN 3-519-07434-6. DM76.00.

Fritz Graf (tr. Franklin Philip), *Magic in the Ancient World.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. Pp. 313. ISBN 0-674-54151-0. UK£23.50.

Peter Green (tr.), *Apollonios Rhodios, The Argonautika: The Story of Jason and the Quest for the Golden Fleece.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Pp. xvi + 490, incl. an introduction, commentary and glossary. ISBN 0-520-0768-9. US$60.00.

John Henderson, *Fighting for Rome: Poets and Caesars, History and Civil War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. viii + 349. ISBN 0-521-58026-9. UK£45.00/US$69.95.

John Henderson, *Juvenal's Mayor: The Professor who Lived on 2d. a Day.* Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, 1998. Proceedings of the

Cambridge Philological Society Supplementary Volume 20. Pp. 144, incl. 16 black-and-white figures. ISBN 0-906014-19-0. No price supplied.

John Henderson, *A Roman Life: Rutilius Gallicus on Paper and Stone*. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1998. Pp. xii + 155. ISBN 0-85989-565-3. UK£12.99

Stefano Jedrkiewicz, *Il convitato sullo sgabello: Plutarco, Esopo ed i Sette Savi*. Pisa: Instituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, 1997. Pp. 171. ISBN 88-8147-102-7. No price supplied.

David Kovacs (ed.), *Euripides: Suppliant Women, Electra, Heracles, Trojan Women*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. Pp. viii + 455. ISBN 0-674-99566-X. UK£11.95.

Bernhard Kytzler, *Reclams Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Autoren*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1997. Pp. 529. ISBN 3-15-029618-8. DM28.00.

Jacob Rabinowitz, *The Rotting Goddess: The Origin of the Witch in Classical Antiquity*. New York: Autonomedia, 1998. Pp. 160. ISBN 1-57027-035-X. US$12.00.

Vincent J. Rosivach, *When a Young Man Falls in Love: The Sexual Exploitation of Women in New Comedy*. London: Routledge, 1988. Pp. viii + 211. ISBN 0-415-18448-7. UK£45.00.

Nicolas Chr. Stampolidis, *Reprisals: Contribution to the Study of the Customs of the Geometric-Archaic Period*. Rethymno: University of Crete, 1996. Pp. 253, incl. 224 figures and 2 colour plates. ISBN 960-85468-4-2. No price supplied.

Gert Üding (ed.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band I: A-Bib*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyr Verlag, 1992. Pp. viii + 1592. ISBN 3-484-68101-2. DM248.00.

Gert Üding (ed.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band II: Bie-Eul*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyr Verlag, 1994. Pp. vi + 1590. ISBN 3-484-68102-0. DM248.00.

Gert Üding (ed.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Band III: Eup-Hor*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyr Verlag, 1996. Pp. v + 1610. ISBN 3-484-68103-9. DM248.00.

Vladimir Vratovic (ed.), *The Croatian Muses in Latin: A Trilingual Anthology Latin-English-Croatian*. Zagreb: Croatian Writers' Association, n.d. Pp. 313. No ISBN. No price supplied.

D. P. M. Weerakkody, *Taprobanê: Ancient Sri Lanka as Known to the Greeks and Romans*. Turnhout: Brepols, 1997. Pp. xxii + 287, incl. 3 black-and-white plates. BEF2,500.00.

T. P. Wiseman, *Roman Drama and Roman History*. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1998. Pp. xii + 228. ISBN 0-85989-560-2. UK£13.99.

Herwig Wolfram (tr. Thomas Dunlap), *The Roman Empire and Its Germanic Peoples*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Pp. xx + 367, incl. 2 half-tone maps. ISBN 0-520-08511-6. US$39.95.

Michael Wood, *In the Footsteps of Alexander the Great*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Pp. 256, incl. 66 colour, 4 black-and-white plates, and 7 maps. ISBN 0-520-21307-6. US$27.50.

IN THE MUSEUM

Scholia publishes news about the University of Natal's Museum of Classical Archaeology. Information about Classical exhibitions and artefacts in other museums in Africa is welcome and should reach the In the Museum Editor, Scholia by 30 June.

MUSEUM OF CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF NATAL

E. A. Mackay, Curator
Museum of Classical Archaeology, University of Natal, Durban
Durban 4041

For some years now it has been a policy of the Museum of Classical Archaeology, Durban, to try to build up a collection of objects that in one way or another illustrate writing in antiquity. In 1997, a donation from Joan Law made possible the purchase of an iron stylus from the Roman period, second century AD, a typical example with one end pointed for inscribing wax tablets and the other end flattened for erasing.[1] This acquisition gave the Museum its first example of an ancient writing implement and provided the stimulus for setting up a special exhibition on Greek and Roman writing from the sixth century BC on, with the intention of arousing interest not only in the techniques of writing but also in its many uses in the ancient world, some monumental, others trivial.

While much of the informative material in the exhibition is of necessity pictorial, the selection of ancient artefacts on display in addition to the stylus includes a fragment of an Athenian black-figure lip-cup[2] (wine cup) from about 540 BC, which preserves the characteristic inscription ΧΑΙΡΕ ΚΑΙ ΠΙΕΙ [ΕΥ] ('be happy and drink [well]!'), written in the Attic letter forms typical of the archaic period; a clay lamp from Roman Syria,[3] fifth or sixth century AD, with a moulded inscription in Greek on the discus indicating a Christian context: ΕΥΛΟΓΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΘΕΟΤΟΚΟΥ ΜΕΘ ΗΜΩΝ ΕΠΙΓΡΑΜ ΙΩΑΝΝΟΥ ('may the blessing of the Mother of God be with us; written by John'); a piece of papyrus from Egypt, the beginning of a legal document that can be dated to the second century BC:[4] in addition to exemplifying demotic script (the

[1] Durban 1997.43, length 108 mm; Charles Ede Ltd, *Antiquities Catalogue* 165 (1997) no. 73. The surface is slightly corroded in places.

[2] Durban 1983.9, attributed to the Centaur Painter (Haldenstein); see *Scholia* 2 (1993) 149-52.

[3] Durban 1994.38; see *Scholia* 5 (1996) 171-74.

[4] Durban 1996.42; see *Scholia* 6 (1997) 166f.

simplified form of ancient Egyptian writing used in everyday transactions), it provides an example of one of the most common writing materials in the ancient Mediterranean in historical times (this acquisition was also made possible by a donation from Miss Law in 1996). Three books dating from the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries AD exemplify the later development of writing into printing.[5]

While this direct evidence from original objects is sparse, it is supported and linked together by brief explanatory notes and by photographs of objects in other museums, such as wax tablets to illustrate the use of the Durban stylus and inkwells to relate to the papyrus.

[5] Kindly loaned by Olga Pendlebury: Cornelius Celsus (1497) and Suetonius Tranquillus (1647); from the Whiteley Collection of the University of Natal, Durban: Curtius Rufus (1644).

B. X. DE WET ESSAY

The paper judged to be the best student essay submitted to ***Scholia*** *by 30 June for the preceding year is published annually as the B. X. de Wet Essay. The competition, which is sponsored by the Classical Association of South Africa, is open to undergraduate students every year and to Honours students in even-numbered years. There is a prize of R200. This essay is named in honour of South African classicist B. X. de Wet.*

THE WOMEN OF THE IMPERIAL FAMILY AND THE IMPERIAL FREEDMEN

Bryan Esterhuizen
Ancient History Honours
University of the Witwatersrand, Wits 2050

The involvement of women in the political workings of Rome was by no means a completely new phenomenon. But, even on a superficial reading of the principal literary sources (Tacitus, Suetonius and Cassius Dio) covering the principates of Claudius and Nero, one is immediately struck by the increased power wielded by the imperial women in comparison to their Republican and early Julio-Claudian counterparts. Likewise freedman secretaries and assistants had always been part of the household of the Roman notable (witness Cicero's freedman Tiro). Yet, during the early principate, the power and influence of the imperial freedmen rose to heights undreamed of by their Republican predecessors or their more humble contemporaries. These trends, noticeable under Augustus, Tiberius[1] and Gaius, reached their zenith in the careers of the imperial women (Messalina and Agrippina in particular) and the great imperial freedmen (Narcissus and Pallas among others) of the principates of Claudius and Nero. It is a natural assumption that these two new spheres of power should have come into conflict; indeed, this seems to be borne out, to some degree, by the sources. But, on the whole, the reality of the exercise of power in the imperial household under Claudius and Nero is a great deal more complicated.

1

In order to gain an understanding of the interaction of the women and freedmen of the emperor's household, it is first necessary to examine the processes and conditions which brought about the situation as we see it under Claudius and Nero. It is possible to account for the increased eminence of imperial women and freedmen by recourse to the structural

[1] Augustus had assistants to help with his paperwork. Tiberius had a number of such servants, including an accountant (*a rationibus*). See B. Levick, *Claudius* (London 1990) 83.

nature of the principate itself. A natural result of the development of what was, in essence, a monarchy, with the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual, was a system of concentric circles of diminishing power radiating outwards from the emperor. Those members of the imperial court who had direct access to the emperor (his family and personal assistants in particular) would obviously have wielded a tremendous amount of influence.[2] This access and its practical advantages are strikingly evident in the nocturnal visit of Messalina and Narcissus to Claudius' bedchamber (Suet. *Claud.* 37; Cass. Dio 60.14.4). These individuals' powers were unofficial and dependent upon their relationship to the emperor; it was the maintenance, entrenchment and extension of this relationship which was the primary goal of the imperial courtier.[3]

The relationship of the freedman to his former owner was one of the primary reasons for the delegation of power by the emperor to his freedmen. The status of the freedman depended upon his relationship with his mater; the links binding the members of the emperor's household were thus stronger than was the case with other servants. The freedman also could have no direct designs on the imperial throne, as would obviously have been the case with the emperor's family or members of the aristocracy. He was thus the natural choice for important positions such as *a rationibus* or *ab epistulis*. The imperial freedman could, theoretically, be trusted.[4]

The chief monarchic development under the principate was the principle of dynastic succession. This introduced an element not present during the Republic and largely defined the position of imperial women. It was also one of the principal ingredients in the machinations of the members of the emperor's household in their perpetual quest to maintain or to improve their own positions. This is most especially evident in Agrippina's machinations on behalf of her son Domitius (later Nero) and his advancement over Britannicus as successor to Claudius (Tac. *Ann.* 12.25, 41).

One of the principal aspects of the political life of the imperial court was the system of patronage. Those who had the *princeps*' ear used their position and influence to secure advancement for their clients (Suet. *Claud.* 29; Cass. Dio 60.17.8), who in turn did their patron's bidding. A good example of this is the case of Sex. Afranius Burrus, who obtained his post as sole praetorian prefect through the good offices of Agrippina (Tac. *Ann.* 14.7; Cass. Dio 60.33.6a) and who was instrumental in the presentation of Nero to the praetorians following Claudius' death (Tac. *Ann.*12.66).

The wealth of the imperial freedmen, amply attested by the sources, and the independent or imperial wealth to which imperial women had access likewise allowed the building up of significant client-bases. These extended beyond the imperial court throughout Rome and Italy, all the way to the provinces, where the granting of citizenship was an important source of clients (Cass. Dio 60.17.6). The sources of power on which the women and freedmen of the emperor's household drew were largely the same (with obvious exceptions: an Agrippina or a Messalina could not hold a post like that of *a*

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[2] Levick [1] 53, 83.

[3] Levick [1] 53f.

[4] Levick [1] 83.

rationibus). In these ways the imperial women and freedmen sought to protect their own positions and power.

2

Before going on to discuss the interaction of the women and freedmen of the emperor's household, a brief discussion of the sources is necessary. Tacitus, who held various offices under a number of emperors, including the tyrannical Domitian,[5] was generally pro-senatorial in outlook, as is shown by the overall tone of his work. The senatorial tradition was, on the whole, hostile to Claudius from the start, portraying him as the foolish dupe of his wife and underlings. This hostility came about as a result of the manner of his accession: the senate was busily contemplating whether to restore the republic or put forward a candidate of their own for the principate, when Claudius was made emperor by the praetorian guard (Suet. *Claud.* 10; Cass. Dio 60.1.4). On the whole, Tacitus adheres to the senatorial tradition and, although traces of a more positive opinion can be found,[6] Tacitus' portrayal is largely negative. We should beware of overplaying the roles of the imperial freedmen in Tacitus, considering his views on them.

Suetonius, who held office under Trajan and Hadrian,[7] was, on the whole, favourably inclined towards the principate as long as the *princeps* conformed to his perception of the ideal emperor,[8] an ideal which seems to have included control over one's freedmen, hence his disapproval of Claudius. Thus, Suetonius operated within the same general framework as Tacitus, claiming that all Claudius' actions were dictated by his wives and freedmen (Suet. *Claud.* 25). Yet, rather paradoxically, Suetonius generally downplays non-traditional elements in his *Lives*.[9] This has important implications for our investigation, in that the power of the freedmen and the imperial women was anything but traditional.[10] The literary genre in which Suetonius was writing was not, in any sense, history. Rather than the more or less traditional annalistic, year-by-year account of Tacitus, Suetonius opted for an arrangement by themes such as the emperor's achievements, personal characteristics and marriages.[11] Suetonius largely rejected the traditional subject matter of history (that is, war and politics) and concentrated on the private life and characteristics of the individual *princeps*. Where politics impinged on

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[5] R. Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford 1957) 63-72.

[6] R. Martin, *Tacitus* (London 1981) 144. For example, at Tac. *Ann.* 11.6 Claudius' setting of a HS 10 000 limit on gifts to advocates is described in tones of disapproval, but this was obviously a useful measure.

[7] A. Wallace-Hadrill, *Suetonius: The Scholar and His Caesars* (London 1983) 5-8.

[8] Wallace-Hadrill [7] 139-41. Order and dignity seem to be Suetonius' two great ideals.

[9] For example, Cassius Dio claims that under Claudius, citizenship was easily obtainable and thus cheapened (60.17.6); Suetonius has Claudius executing foreigners who falsely claimed citizenship (*Claud.* 25).

[10] Wallace-Hadrill [7] 135-38.

[11] Wallace-Hadrill [7] 9, 13.

private life, such as was the case with the imperial women and freedmen, these details are omitted or played down. We thus find little of value with regard to Agrippina and Messalina and their interaction with the imperial freedmen in Suetonius' *Claudius* or *Nero*.[12]

Cassius Dio, a Greek who had a distinguished senatorial career in the late second and early third century, was largely pro-senatorial in his views and must have made extensive use of earlier annalistic sources with their biases as discussed above. Dio's history of Rome is prone to error in places and is only partially extant (Claudius' reign survives only up until AD 46; the remainder and the whole of Nero's reign survive only in epitomes).[13] Dio's opinion that Claudius was the slave of his wives and freedmen (60.28.2) is more or less representative of ancient opinion as a whole. Claudius' relationship with his freedmen is used to denigrate him. This is in keeping with general Roman upper-class ideas about the proper relationship between classes. Dio presents his account of the period of Claudius and Nero in the senatorial tradition and is largely hostile to Claudius. As in the case of Tacitus, we should be wary of his more extreme statements regarding the machinations of the imperial women and freedmen. It is apparent that the portrayal of Claudius as the dupe of his wives and freedmen is part of a hostile senatorial tradition. We should consequently be cautious about overplaying their involvement. Yet, on the other hand, for criticism to be effective there has to be truth in it. The sheer volume of material relating to the imperial women and freedmen is impressive and warrants general acceptance, although with qualifications in the light of the above.

The case of the women and freedmen in the reign of Nero is more complicated. On the whole, we have far less information on the interaction of the freedmen and the imperial women under Nero. It seems that the imperial freedmen in the service of Nero seldom crossed Agrippina's path. Their machinations, as well as those of Pallas, the Claudian freedman who remained attached to Agrippina during Nero's reign, had little of the lurid and extreme flavour of those under Claudius. This seems to be a reflection of a more positive tradition with regard to Nero and the freedmen in the light of his accession promise to keep the imperial household under control (Tac. *Ann.* 13.4). On the whole, the freedmen seem to have played less of a role under Nero than they did under Claudius.

3

Finally, it is possible to embark on an account of the actual interaction of the emperor's women and freedmen. For the sake of convenience, it is best to work chronologically, starting with the activities of Messalina early in her marriage to Claudius. The first major instance of interaction between Messalina and the imperial freedmen in our sources is in 42, in relation to the downfall of Appius Silanus. Cassius Dio tells us that Messalina was offended at Silanus' refusal to have sex with her and that this alienated Narcissus, the emperor's freedman (60.14.2-4). They then concocted a dream which terrified Claudius

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[12] Wallace-Hadrill [7] 8-22.

[13] J. Rich, *Cassius Dio: The Augustan Settlement* (Warminster 1990) 1-12.

into ordering Silanus' execution. There is a hint that the other freedmen were involved: in the immediately preceding passage Dio, in a general discussion of the murders ordered by Claudius, states that 'the imperial freedmen and Messalina were responsible' (60.14.1).[14] Suetonius' account (*Claud.* 37) agrees in all the essentials with that of Dio.

This scenario may seem rather implausible at first, but if we assume that Messalina had something to gain from a sexual relationship with Silanus and that Narcissus was her ally before this, it makes sense.[15] Messalina seems to have used adultery, from the consequences of which her status would largely have shielded her, in conjunction with the threat of prosecution (for those lower down the social scale) to bind people to her. In this context, a personal vendetta seems plausible. It has been suggested that Claudius may have orchestrated the whole charade, or at least tacitly allowed it, because he wished to remove a possible threat.[16] While this is difficult to prove, it is plausible. Whether Claudius was involved or not, both Messalina and Narcissus would have had an interest in cooperating to protect Claudius, the source of their power. This does not, of course, preclude any personal motives of the type discussed above.

Our next encounter with Messalina and the freedmen is in the chaos following the conspiracy of Scribonianus in 42 (Cass. Dio 60.15.1-16.8). Again, we see Messalina and Narcissus (and the other freedmen) working in tandem during the trials of the conspirators. Although Dio's picture seems exaggerated,[17] there is no reason not to accept the general outline. It seems plausible to assert that they were dealing with a threat to Claudius in order to maintain their own positions.

The next time we meet Messalina in connection with a freedman is in Cassius Dio 60.31.2. We are told that in 48, Polybius, one of Claudius' most powerful freedman assistants[18] (apparently he was accustomed to walk between the consuls, according to Suet. *Claud.* 28), was falsely accused by Messalina (who was allegedly conducting a liaison with him at the time), leading to his death. Perhaps he opposed her forthcoming 'marriage' to C. Silius? This seems plausible, given this passage's textual proximity and thematic link to the fall of Messalina, and it appears to be what Dio thinks. It is possible, also, that he was considering using his influence to obtain the recall of Seneca, who had been exiled as a result of Messalina's machinations.[19] After this she lost the goodwill of

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[14] This is not conclusive, since this may refer to murders instigated by Messalina and the freedmen independently of one another.

[15] Levick [1] 59.

[16] Levick [1] 58f.; see also R. A. Bauman, *Women and Politics in Ancient Rome* (London 1992) 170, who suggests that Appius was involved in the conspiracy of Scribonianus, the governor of Dalmatia (Cass. Dio 60.152-54). But, as he himself admits, this is only a guess.

[17] Bauman [16] 171. Incidentally, it was on this occasion that that paragon of wifely virtue, Arria (the wife of Caecina Paetus, one of the conspirators) stabbed herself to death (Cass. Dio 60.16.6f.).

[18] Polybius was Claudius' literary secretary and later his *a libellis.* This was a post which involved handling the emperor's petitions.

[19] Bauman [16] 175f.

the freedmen as a group (Cass. Dio 60.31.2). This gives support to the thesis, outlined above, that the primary goal of the women and freedmen of the emperor's household was the maintenance of their own personal positions. As a result of the fate of Polybius, Messalina would now have been perceived as a threat to the personal positions of the surviving freedmen. This is borne out by subsequent events.

In 47 Messalina had an affair with C. Silius, a consul-designate (Tac. *Ann.* 11.12; Cass. Dio 60.31.3). Messalina seems to have been responsible for this appointment. In 48 Messalina and Silius took part in a formal marriage (Tac. *Ann.* 11.26; Cass. Dio 60.31.3; Suet. *Claud.* 26). According to Tacitus, the imperial freedmen Narcissus, Pallas and Callistus informed Claudius, who was in Ostia at the time, of this (Tac. *Ann.* 11.28-38). Claudius, returning to Rome, was accompanied by Narcissus, who had been summoned to join him. Narcissus had also obtained temporary control over the guard. Messalina, who intercepted them en route, was deflected by Narcissus, who produced a dossier of her crimes; he likewise deflected the chief Vestal, Vibidia, who interceded on Messalina's behalf, by promising that Messalina would have a hearing with the emperor. Following the arrival of the emperor and his entourage in Rome, a round of executions (including those of a number of distinguished *equites*) was ordered. Later, when Claudius was more inclined towards forgiveness, Narcissus ordered a colonel of the guard, a military tribune accompanied by another freedman, to kill Messalina. The order was promptly carried out. Later, Narcissus was rewarded with an honorary quaestorship. The accounts of Messalina's fall, as provided by Cassius Dio (60.31.4f.) and Suetonius (*Claud.* 26), generally agree. Dio, although assigning most of the responsibility for the fall of Messalina to Narcissus and the other freedmen, gives more initiative to Claudius than is the case in Tacitus; this does not, however, detract from the importance of the freedmen in this respect. Suetonius does not mention any freedman involvement, but this does not prove their absence.

Scholars are unable to agree upon the reasons for Messalina's actions in 48. It has been suggested that Messalina and Silius had designs on the throne, or that she married Silius in response to a threat from Agrippina and her young son, Domitius. These suggestions are unlikely to be true since there is no indication that her power, or the chances of her son Britannicus' accession, would have been any greater if she were married to Silius; in any event, she may have been unenthusiastic about the idea (Tac. *Ann.* 11.26).[20] It has also been suggested that Messalina was seeking to ally herself to a faction associated with Silius aiming at relatively modest goals (replacing Claudius' current set of advisors) and that the 'marriage' was a show of support.[21] This seems extremely drastic for a mere show of support!

Tacitus' account, in many ways, is a rhetorical show-piece, complete with maenads, refuse carts, indignant priestesses and pitiful deaths.[22] We should perhaps ignore

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[20] Bauman [16] 178 points out that Messalina had averted previous threats by judicial action rather than by marrying someone.

[21] Levick [1] 66f.

[22] Martin [6] 150f.

the more fanciful aspects of his narrative, but we would do well to take into account the general impression created by the sources that Messalina was something of a reckless nymphomaniac. Allowing for possible exaggeration on the part of the sources, it seems plausible to concur with Tacitus that it was merely another, more daring, love-affair (Tac. *Ann.* 11.26).[23] Whatever Messalina's and Silius' goals, their actions would naturally have been seen by the freedmen as a threat to their own positions, closely linked as they were to Claudius.

From the above discussion of the interaction between Messalina and the imperial freedmen, it is obvious that the relationship between the women and freedmen of the emperor's household was not necessarily one of perpetual conflict. As is evident from Messalina's earlier dealings with Claudius' freedmen, Narcissus in particular, cooperation was common, as long as their interests coincided and both parties could maintain their positions. As soon as one side perceived the other as a threat, conflict occurred: thus Messalina brought about the downfall of Polybius; as a result of this and the apparent danger of Messalina's relationship with Silius, the freedmen, led by Narcissus, brought an end to her dominance (and her life).

4

Almost immediately following the death of Messalina in 49, Tacitus presents us with the picture of the imperial freedmen lobbying for their respective candidates for Claudius' new wife (Tac. *Ann.* 12.1). Narcissus supported Claudius' earlier wife Aelia Paetina; Callistus supported Lollia Paulina, the former wife of Gaius; and Pallas supported the younger Agrippina (Claudius' niece). Pallas and Agrippina prevailed and, after the technically incestuous relationship was legalised by the Senate at the instigation of L. Vitellius, the marriage took place (Tac. *Ann.* 12.5f.; Suet. *Claud.* 26).

The predominant goal of Agrippina in the early stages of her marriage was to secure the position of heir to the imperial throne for her son, Domitius, the future Nero (Tac. *Ann.* 12.4) and, following her success in this respect, to maintain her own power both before and after the death of Claudius and Nero's accession (Tac. *Ann.* 12.37, 65). The first step to securing the succession for her son was to secure his marriage to Octavia, Claudius' daughter by Messalina. Through the agency of L. Vitellius, L. Iunius Silanus, Octavia's original husband-to-be, was accused of incest and the betrothal was cancelled. In 49, at the urging of the freedmen and particularly Pallas, one would presume (Tac. *Ann.* 12.9), Claudius betrothed his daughter to Domitius (Cass. Dio 60.31.7). In 50, according to Tacitus, Pallas (who had become Agrippina's lover in the interim) persuaded Claudius to adopt Domitius, citing as examples Augustus' adoption of Gaius and Lucius and also Tiberius' adoption of Germanicus (Tac. *Ann.* 12.25). Pallas argued that the adoption would strengthen the imperial house, since its future depended upon Britannicus, who was a mere boy. The adoption, when it took place, effectively elevated Nero above Claudius'

[23] Bauman [16] 178f. agrees with the view of Tacitus; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Roman Women* (London 1962) 106f. also basically follows Tacitus, although he is rightly sceptical of the more lurid details.

own son. Nero's position was emphasized by his donning the *toga virilis* at thirteen, a year before the minimum legal age. He was declared consul designate in 51 and was granted the title *princeps iuventutis* (prince of youth) and proconsular *imperium* outside the city (Tac. *Ann.* 12.41).[24]

The discussion above (based largely on Tacitus) of the period prior to the death of Claudius shows a cooperative relationship between Pallas and Agrippina. The succession was secured for Nero, fulfilling one of Agrippina's primary goals, and the power of Pallas was maintained. Cassius Dio provides an alternative picture. With regard to the adoption of Domitius, Dio does not mention Pallas by name and ascribes the adoption to the 'freedmen' (60.32.2). Later he states (60.33.3a) that Agrippina had won over Pallas *and* Narcissus (Callistus was dead by this stage). This scenario seems extremely unlikely. When Narcissus was eventually killed following the death of Claudius, Dio refers to Agrippina's vengeance (60.34.6). This would seem to indicate disagreement at an earlier date and is supported by evidence from Tacitus: in 53 she accused Narcissus of gaining illicit profits from his supervision of the draining of the Fucine Lake (Tac. *Ann.* 12.57); in 54 Tacitus tells us that Narcissus provided a vigorous but unsuccessful defence of Domitia Lepida (Messalina's mother) against accusations levelled at her by Agrippina (Tac. *Ann.* 12.64).[25] On the whole, the evidence points to cooperation between Pallas and Agrippina prior to the death of Claudius and, parallel to this, enmity between the empress and Narcissus, who seems to have remained consistently attached to Claudius (Tac. *Ann.* 12.65).[26] Following the death of Claudius and Nero's accession, we see a continuation of the power and influence of Pallas (Tac. *Ann.* 13.2; Cass. Dio 61.3.2). During Nero's association with his freedwoman lover Acte, when he was in conflict with Agrippina (Cass. Dio 61.7.1; Tac. *Ann.* 13.10), the emperor dismissed Pallas from his position of power because of support for Agrippina (Tac. *Ann.* 13.13), which reflects their continued cooperation. This last great Claudian freedman eventually became one of Nero's victims.

Agrippina's loss of influence at court, physically manifest in the loss of her bodyguard in 55 (Cass. Dio 61.8.4; Suet. *Nero* 34), seems to have been accompanied by the rise of other imperial freedmen attached to Nero himself. Part of Nero's promise on his accession was to stamp out corruption in his household, obviously referring to the activities of imperial women and freedmen. Although freedmen did not reach the heights they had reached under Claudius, they still wielded significant influence.[27] Such men would have had no reason to cooperate with Agrippina, orbiting as they did around another locus of power. One such freedman was Doryphoros, who supervised Nero's petitions and who, to Agrippina's ire, received a gift of HS 10 000 000 in 54 (Cass. Dio

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[24] M. T. Griffin, *Nero: The End of a Dynasty* (London 1984) 29.

[25] Narcissus is also portrayed as a friend of Britannicus (Tac. *Ann.* 12.65). Martin [6] 159 points out that this is somewhat implausible: Narcissus urges Britannicus to avenge his mother whom he (Narcissus) had ordered killed. The account of Suetonius, which involves Claudius rather than Narcissus, is perhaps to be preferred (*Claud.* 43).

[26] Bauman [16] 184-87.

[27] Griffin [24] 54f.

61.5.4). Another such freedman was Anicetus, whom Nero had made the commander of the fleet at Misenum (Tac. *Ann.* 14.3). Anicetus repaid Nero by coming up with the idea of a collapsible ship and eventually killed Agrippina himself (Cass. Dio 61.13.2-5; Tac. *Ann.* 14.3, 14.7; Suet. *Nero* 34).

From the above discussion of the interaction between the imperial freedmen and Agrippina, it is possible to draw a few conclusions. From the time of her marriage to Claudius to his death, she enjoyed the support of Pallas, but was opposed by Narcissus, who was still attached to Claudius as his source of power. After the death of Claudius, followed closely by that of Narcissus, Agrippina continued to enjoy the support of Pallas. But this period saw a steady decline in the influence of Agrippina and there is evidence that new freedmen, drawing their power from their relationship to Nero, were taking the positions of influence that had hitherto been occupied by the powerful Claudian freedmen.

5

With the centralisation of power under the principate, those who had the ear of the *princeps* and controlled access to him exerted a great deal of influence. The women and freedmen of the imperial household, unable to wield official power, were dependent for their influence on their relationship to the *princeps*. The politics of the court as practised by women and freedmen were centred around maintaining this position and the power attendant upon it.

As shown by the case-studies of Messalina and Agrippina and their dealings with the imperial freedmen, their relationship was not necessarily one of continual enmity. As long as all players kept their positions and did not threaten one another, the relationship could be cooperative and mutually beneficial, as was the case not only between Messalina and the freedmen in the earlier part of her marriage to Claudius but also Agrippina's relationship with Pallas. The opposite occurred when a threat was perceived: the freedmen turned on Messalina with a vengeance following the death of Polybius and the Silius affair, and Narcissus opposed Agrippina's attempts to entrench herself and her son in the imperial power structure.

The loyalties of the imperial freedmen were, to a significant degree, dependent upon the shifting locus of power: Messalina and Claudius' freedmen drew their influence from Claudius. When she drifted from the locus of power and was seen to threaten it, the imperial freedmen turned on her. This phenomenon is best exemplified by the freedmen who orbited around Nero when Agrippina's influence was waning, leaving her with only her old accomplice, Pallas. The relationship between the imperial women and the freedmen of the emperor was thus one of complexity and flux.

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   (b) Greek names in the text should either be fully transliterated or fully Latinised (e.g., Klutaimestra or Clytemnestra) throughout.

7. (a) All Greek and Latin text should be translated, preferably by the author.
   (b) Citations of ancient works should appear in brackets (parentheses) in the body of the text wherever possible.
   (c) In the case of an indented passage, the translation should appear unbracketed (without parentheses) immediately below the quotation; the citation of the work in brackets (parentheses) should follow rather than precede the indented quotation.
   (d) In the case of a short citation in the body of the text, the following convention should be followed: *cupido dominandi cunctis affectibus flagrantior est* ('the desire for power burns more fiercely than all the passions', Tac. *Ann.* 15.53).

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   (b) Citations of modern works should be given in the notes rather than in the body of the text.
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   (d) Authors should be cited by initials and surname only.
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   (f) Titles of articles should be enclosed in single inverted commas.

(g) Volume numbers of periodicals should be given in Arabic rather than Roman numerals.

(h) Page and line references generally should be given as follows: 'f.' (e.g., '174f.') ought to be used, but 'ff.' should be avoided wherever possible (e.g., '174-76' is preferable to '174ff.').

(i) When citing a book or periodical in the notes for the first time, details should be given as follows:

H. Cancik, *Untersuchungen zur lyrischen Kunst des P. Papinius Statius* (Hildesheim 1965) 93-110.

K. H. Waters, 'The Character of Domitian', *Phoenix* 18 (1964) 49-77.

All subsequent citations should contain the author's name, footnote number of the first citation of the work in square brackets, and relevant page numbers. The following forms should be used:

Cancik [4] 38-40; Waters [17] 55f.

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(c) In citation of classical works, names of texts should be italicised and Arabic rather than Roman numerals should be used.

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